Author: Jean Comaroff

  • Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction

    Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction

     

    Consider the following four fragments, four notes from postcolonial South Africa. Each is drawn from the archaeology of the fantastic in this new global age:

    The first. In 1996, in a far north-eastern village, a baboon, taken to be a witch in disguise, was killed by “necklacing,” the infamous way in which collaborators were dealt with during the late apartheid years. Baboons have long been thought of as potential witch familiars; indeed, a state commission recently referred to them as “professor(s) of witch-craft.” The animal in question “was huge…and was carrying a plastic [shopping] bag”–this last object suspect since it signalled an all-too-human capacity to transact and transport ill- gotten goods. Said the woman who set off the alarm, “There was definitely witchcraft here. Just look at how long [the beast] took to catch alight and at how small its body is now that we have…killed it.”

    The second. “Is it a duck? No, it’s the Howick monster,” wrote Ellis Mnyandu, also in 1996. Curious crowds are visiting the Howick Falls, in KwaZulu-Natal, to glimpse a myste- rious 25 foot creature. Says Absolom Dlamini, there is “a fearsome spirit here which makes you feel like you are being dragged [in]… [It] proves there is a monster down there.” Bob Teeney, a businessman, claims to have photographs of mom, pop, and baby monsters. But a local anthropologist, disappointingly matter-of-fact, assures us that there is nothing there at all; that the story recuperates an old Zulu myth about a water serpent. Still, people flock to the place. One sculptor, a crippled craftsman from Zaire, has become a convert. “First I believe in God and then the monsters,” he says. “I am making more money than [ever before]. I call it monster-money.”

    The third. Since 1994, notes Lumkile Mondi, there has been an explosion of pyramid schemes in the countryside. These undertake to pay three times the initial stake, de- pending for their viability on ever more people signing on. But many investors were not taking their money at maturity, waiting rather to cash in huge sums later. Mondi says that the management of one scheme found itself with R46m [$9], more than it could handle. So it asked a team of authorities–including Mondi himself–to intervene under the Bank Act. Mondi goes on to say that he had been manning a toll free line to answer investors’ questions. The callers had disconcerted him: accused of abetting government efforts to subvert local economic initiatives, he was even threatened with “necklacing.” Apartheid, they told him, had made them desperately poor. And the postcolonial state had not helped much. So “God brought the scheme and changed their lives.” Similar schemes are also rampant among whites. One, entitled “Rainbow,” demands a R10,000 stake and is run in great secrecy by an anonymous cabal with a Liverpool address. It is said to “conduct [meetings] with an almost religious fervour.”

    The fourth. Johannesburg, April 1996. A man is arrested in a shopping mall after “trying to sell a pair of blue eyes.” This incident, wrote the city’s largest newspaper, was “linked to the murder of street children for…traditional medicines.” Body parts, it added, were regularly used in potions for fertility, for success in business, and for luck in love. Those of white children fetched the best prices. The local press has been full of such cases, and courts have been kept busy trying those accused of disembowelling their victims, and either retailing organs or using them for their own magical ends. Not only body parts; who- le persons too. Witches are said to bring the dead back to life to work for them. Thus, in KwaZulu-Natal, two years ago, kin of 11 children killed in a bus crash refused to allow them to be buried because “witches [had] abducted them after bringing them back to life.” The bodies in the mortuary were no longer those of the people they knew. Soon after, an old woman, suspected of the evil, was dragged from her home and killed by schoolmates of the deceased, who, in turn, were jailed.

    These fragments may appear lurid from the cool distance of Academia Europa. In their own context they are not that at all. Each of them, moreover, has parallels elsewhere: those parts of Europe and the USA beyond the ivory tower, where ordinary people live, produce their own fair share of the fantastic. The Howick Monster recalls not only Loch Ness, which it is said to resemble. It also resonates with celluloid cosmologies of the Jurassic kind, making a mammoth montage of the Spielberg mindscape, the Scottish landscape, and Zulu mythology–all the while tapping into an increasing obsession with the return of extinct sub- yet superhuman creatures. The Leviathan of Natal belongs to a planetary species whose existence conflates the virtual with the veritable, the cinematic with the scientific, gods with godzillas, the prophetic with the profitable.

    Likewise the pyramid schemes. These recall the ten or so whose crash sparked the Alba- nian revolution in 1997. They also bring to mind other scams and stratagems, different yet similar, that flow from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation. Such schemes are springing up all over the place, especially in post-revolutionary societies. Often registered at addresses halfway across the earth from the site of their local operation, they escape control by insinuating them- selves into the slipstream of the global economy. These schemes cover a wide gamut, from chain letters, through national lotteries and offshore gambling, to aggressively speculative investment in the stock markets of the world, now heavily into global funds, which has led to an upsurge of “pump and dump” swindles. These things have a single common denominator, “the magical allure of making money from nothing.” Like efforts to weave gold from straw, an alchemy associated with an earlier transition in the economic history of Europe, they promise to deliver preternatural pro- fits, to yield wealth sans perceptible production, value sans visible effort. In its millennial moment, capitalism has an effervescent new spirit–a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist–waxing close to its core. Vide the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, an American pyramid scheme created “to change the world for the glory of God,” which persuaded 500 non-profit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million–on the promise of doubling their money in six months. So much for rational economics. And for the disenchantment of modernity.

    Neither are the narratives of witchcraft, body parts, and the brutalization of children uniquely South African. Everywhere the confident contours, and the boundaries, of the human are being called into question; hence the fascination with cyborgs, the fear of invasion by aliens cloth- ed in humdrum bodily form, the dangerous promise of cloning and genetic mutation. And from everywhere come stories of not-quite-human transactions in the corporeal. Postcolonial Africa is replete with accounts of the way in which the rich and powerful use freakish familiars and monstrous means to appropriate the life-force of their lesser compatriots in order to strengthen themselves and to satisfy consuming passions. Similarly, Latin America has, throughout the 1990s, witnessed mass panics about the theft and sale, by greedy gringos, of the organs of infants and youths. There, and in other parts of the world, this traffic–like the international commerce in adoption and mail-order matrimony–is seen as a new form of imperialism, the west siphoning off the essence, even appropriating the offspring, of impoverished “others” for ends both occult and ordinary. All of which gives ample evidence, to those at the nether end of the planetary distribution of wealth, of the workings of insidious forces, of potent magical technologies and mys- terious means of accumulation. That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itself: note the recent scares about the satanic abuse of children; also reports, some now well-documented, of a transnational trade in people, again particularly women and young people, for sexual slavery.

    Precisely because they are at once parochial and translocal, these fragments raise the same conundrums. Why now? Why now does there appear to be a dramatic intensification–none of these things is new, of course–of appeals to enchantment, to the use of the bodies of some for the empowerment of others? Why now the acute moral panics? What, if anything, has any of this to do with processes of globalization and the forms of capitalism associated with it? With postcoloniality? Or with the sociology of post-revolutionary social worlds? We pose the problem both as a general matter of anthropological concern and, more specifically, of contemporary South Africa. Is it not extraordinary, for example, that the African National Congress saw it necessary, among its first gestures in government, to appoint a commission of enquiry into witchcraft and ri- tual murder in one of the new provinces? That it found itself presiding over an epidemic of mys- tical evil? That this epidemic, far from abating with the end of apartheid, is on the increase? That, according to the head of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services– itself a curious creature–the devil actually seems to be making a “revolutionary re-appearance” here?

    Finally, what might these things have to do with the memory of Max Gluckman? Or with the present and future of anthropology, about which he had such strong ideas? As we shall see, they challenge us with the problem of doing ethnography on an awkward scale, neither unambiguously local nor, obviously, “global”–but on a plane that, somehow, captures the dialectics of their mutual determination. And their indeterminacies.

    Let us take the last question first. Our memories of Max Gluckman go back to the early 1970s, toward the start of our professional careers, toward the end of his. We came to Manchester having read and heard a great deal of debate about his work, and not a few critiques–most of them emanating from certain institutions south of the Watford Gap. None of this, however, prepared us for our encounter with charisma, Mancunian-style. Or with conflict structural-functionalism as propounded, in the flesh, by Gluckman himself, a formidable interlocutor if there ever was one. Maxism, it is true, was not quite Marxism; very much a creature of its day, many of its founding principles are now dated. But they were essayed with vigor, certitude, and a bold sense of possibility. Anthropology, for Gluckman, was both a mission and an invitation to an argument; – though, in point of fact, he was always easier to argue with when not actually present, or, more permanently, when dead. His combative, creative spirit lives on, in our consciousness, for two things above all else. It is these that provide the mandate for our lecture today.

    One was his–emphatically pre-postmodern–insistence on discerning design in, on abstracting order from, an “illogical assortment” of disparate details, minutiae, even trivia (1963:1); recall his introduction to Order and Rebellion, which notes, with approval, how a co- herent anthropology grew out of “the study of oddments by eccentrics.” Max, of course, was not lacking in oddness or eccentricity himself. And coherence is no longer valued all that much. But so be it. The serious, if simple, corollary is that our skills and sensibilities ought to be put to the effort of detecting–from diverse, discordant acts and facts–emergent social processes and patterns; that the sacred charter of the discipline is to explain the existence of such partly-obscured, barely audible, often nascent phenomena in the world. Sometimes these phenomena, like the unruly events so memorably described in his Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (1940), bring into sharp focus, and serve to bridge, cultural and material forces of dramatically different magnitude or scale; as they do, they compel us to address the evanescent, ever present connec- tions between local concerns and world-historical movements. Herein, in this challenge, lies the essential distillate of the Gluckman heritage.

    The second thing is more specific. Max Gluckman is justifiably famed for his work in legal anthropology, for his studies of political and social processes, and the like. Amidst his lesser quo- ted essays, however, is one which warrants special attention today. Entitled “The Magic of Des- pair” (see n.1), it tries to make sense of the ritual practices of Mau Mau. Not only that. Those practices are run up against Central African witchcraft movements (Richards 1935), millennial cults of the middle ages (Cohn 1957), Melanesian cargo cults (Worsley 1957), zionist prophets in South Africa (Sundkler 1948), and various forms of social banditry (Hobsbawm 1959). The point? To explain why Africans should seek recourse to the occult in situations of rapid social transformation; under historical conditions, that is, which yield an ambiguous mix of possibility and – powerlessness, of desire and despair, of mass joblessness and hunger amidst the accumulation, by some, of great amounts new wealth (1963:3f). These circumstances, added Gluckman (p.145) presciently, do not elicit a “reversion to pagan ritual.” Just the opposite. “New situations,” he wrote, citing Evans-Pritchard (1937:513), “demand new magic.”

    Put these various pieces together–Gluckman’s concern to decipher patterns-in-the-making from oddments and fragments, his insistence on seeing connections among phenomena of widely different scale, his interest in mystical responses to contradictory historical situations–and the argument of this lecture begins to take shape. So, too, do our answers to the Big Questions.

    The essence of our narrative goes like this. The Howick monster and the pyramid schemes, the epidemic of witchcraft and the killing of those suspected of magical evil, the moral panic about markets in body parts; all are, alike, symptoms of an occult economy fourishing up behind the civil surfaces of the “new” South Africa. This economy, itself an integral feature of millenial capitalism, is an odd fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of hope and hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its perversions. Its roots do not lie simply in poverty, however cruel it may be; nor are they merely a reflex of “social change.” They are to be found, rather, in a doubling, the very doubling spoken of by Gluckman in “The Magic of Despair.” On one hand is a perception, authenticated by glimpses of the vast wealth that passes through most postcolonial societies and into the hands of a few of their citizens: that the mysterious mechanisms of the market hold the key to hitherto unknown riches; to capital amassed by the ever more rapid, often immaterial flow of value across time and space. On the other hand is the dawning sense of chill desperation at- tendant on being left out of the promise of progress, of the telos of liberation. In South Africa, after all, the end of apartheid held out the prospect that everyone would be set free to speculate and accumulate, to consume and to indulge repressed desires. But, for many, the millennial moment has passed without palpable payback.

    The implication? That something has gone seriously awry; that arcane forces are intervening in the production of wealth, diverting the flow of value for evil purposes. This, in turn, underlies the essential paradox of occult economies, the fact that they operate on two inimical fronts at once. The first is the constant pursuit of new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends. The second is the effort to eradicate people held to enrich themselves by those very means; through the illegitimate appropriation, that is, not just of the bodies and things of others, but also of the forces of production and reproduction themselves.

    Partly because of the nature of the struggle to end apartheid, partly because of the legacy of apartheid itself, partly because of the dawning of a new epoch in the history of production, most of those who experience postcoloniality here as privation, and who engage the commerce in enchantment, are young. It is they–the worldly progeny of an electronic age–who held out the greatest expectations for “the revolution.” They are the repressed for whom the promise of post- colonial return is most obviously blocked by the hardening materialities of life at this coordinate on the map of global capital. As a result, rather than the more familiar axes of social division– class, race, gender, ethnicity–the dominant line of cleavage here has become generation. But entry into the occult economy, on both its fronts, is not confined to youth alone; ultimately it transects color, culture, age, and sex.

    Like Gluckman, we have argued before that the practice of mystical arts in postcolonial Af- rica does not imply an iteration of “tradition.” Per contra, it is often a mode of producing new forms of consciousness; of expressing discontent with modernity and dealing with its deformities; in short, of retooling culturally familiar technologies as new means for new ends. New magic for new situations. Nor is this true only in Africa. It is characteristic of a surging, implosive economy of means and ends popping up all over the planet nowadays, albeit in a wide variety of local guises.

    As it does, it posits fresh ways of producing immense wealth and power–against all odds, at super- natural speed, and with striking ingenuity. We have hinted that the things of which we speak have to do with global processes; or, more precisely, with specific intersections of the global and the local. And we have implied that there is a lesson in them for the practice of anthropology. Before we can give either claim any cre- dence, however, it is necessary to focus on a particular ethnographic setting, one in which realities appear more than usually fragile, fluid, and fractured. We turn to the northerly provinces of the “new” South Africa, just before and after the end of apartheid.

    III.

    The Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province was established by the new provincial government in March 1995 in response to a mounting sense of emergency in the countryside. Official commissions were the stock-in-trade of colonial rule. But these are postcolonial times, in which politics often masquerades as culture. This commission was an unprecedented hybrid of government and ethnography. Chaired by a re- tired Professor of Social Anthropology it comprised nine members, all but one black. Their Report is a rich amalgam of informant accounts, case records, first-hand observation, and recommenda- tions. These recommendations reveal a tension between (i) civic rationalism, expressed in a call for rigorous control of witch-related violence, including a possible reinstatement of the death penalty; and (ii) frank, even assertive relativism. In respect of the latter, says the Report, most Af- ricans regard magical attacks as “normal events of everyday life,” a reality incompatible with Euro- pean law, which criminalizes witchfinding. What is more, it adds, the vast majority of black police believe in witchcraft and are reluctant to intervene when suspects are attacked. The conclusion? That there is “no clear-cut” solution to the legal problem. The commissioners went on to advocate various means of stemming the brute force with which accused witches are hunted down. But they did not question the actuality of witchcraft itself.

    On the contrary. The urgent tone of the Commission is underscored by a rising demography of violence: from 1985 to 1995 300 cases of witch-related killings were recorded in the North; in the first half of 1996 there were 676. No wonder people fear that witchcraft is “runn- ing wild.” The mood of alarm is well captured in the opening remarks of the Report: “as the Pro- vince continued to burn,” as “witchcraft violence and ritual murder” was becoming endemic, “something had to be done, and very fast.”

    The countryside was burning alright. But there were lots of ironies in the fire. For one thing, this was a moment, much heralded, of exodus from colonial bondage. And yet rural populations were convinced that their neighborhoods harbored trenchant human evil; that their familiar landscapes were alive with phantasmic forces of unprecedented danger; that the state had failed to shield them from malignity, leaving them to protect themselves. For another thing, it was young men, not people in authority, who felt most moved to execute “instant justice” and to cleanse the country. They marked Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, viewed by the world as a sign that reason had prevailed at last, with a furious spate of witch burnings–often to the chanting of freedom songs. All this was accompanied by a burgeoning fear that some people, usually old people, were turning others into zombies; into a virtual army of ghost workers, whose lifeblood fuelled a vibrant, immoral economy pulsing beneath the sluggish rhythm of country life. The – margin between the human and the inhuman had become ever more permeable, transgressed by the living dead and their monstrous owners. Along with a grisly national market in human body parts, these zombies bore testimony to a mounting confusion of people with things.

    As we have said, none of this is new. It is now clear that, in much of Africa, the colonial encounter played on pre-existing enchantments. At times, it multiplied the sorts of frictions that ignite witch hunts. Witchcraft has proven to be every bit as protean as modernity itself–thriving on its contradictions and its silences, usurping its media, puncturing its pretensions. Shifts in the cultural conception of witches often register the impact of large-scale transformations on local worlds. Indeed, their very durability stems from a genius for making the language of intimate, interpersonal affect speak of more abstract forces. It is this that underlies the sudden intensification of witch-finding in postcolonial South Africa–and elsewhere. The parochialism of witches, it seems, is an increasingly global phenomenon.

    Because they distil complex material and social forces into palpable human motives, then, witches tend to figure in narratives which write translocal scenes onto local landscapes, translocal discourses into local vocabularies of cause-and-effect. In rural South Africa, the recent rise in witchfinding has coincided with an efflorescence of other magical technologies that link the occult and the ordinary by thoroughly modern, even postmodern, means; means that parody the mechanisms of the “free” market.

    Thus ritual murder is said to have become “big business” across northern South Africa. In 1995, for example, stories spread widely about the discovery of dismembered corpses in the freezer of a casino in Mmabatho, in the Northwest Province. The casino was built for tourists during the apartheid years, when betting and inter-racial sex were illegal in South Africa but not in the ethnic “homelands”; here, over the border, in the grey interstices of the transnational, white South Africans came to purchase sexual services and to gamble. In the “new” South Africa, black bodies were again for sale, but in different form; the macabre trade now nested comfortably within the orbit of everyday commerce, circulating human organs to whomever had the cash to buy them in order to abet their undertakings. Much the same thing was apparent, too, in all the talk about the “fact” that some local entrepreneurs were turning their fellows into working zombies, a practice which simulates a foundational law of capitalism; namely, that rates of profit are inversely related to labor costs. But the most fabulous narratives were about Satanism, held in the Northwest to be the most robust, most global of all occult enterprises. Less a matter of awesome ritual than of mundane greed, dabbling in the diabolical was said to be especially captivating to the young. In 1996, when Mmabatho TV broadcast two programs on the subject, the ex-Satanists featured were all juveniles. As they took calls from the public they told, in prosaic terms, of the translocal power of the black arts–among them, an ability to travel great distances at miraculous speed to garner enormous wealth at will.

    We shall return to the substance of these things–to ritual murder and zombies and satanism–in due course. Here we note merely that what is at issue is an expanded array of enchanted, often unnervingly visceral, means of producing value. Visceral, yet also strangely banal. In colonial times, divination involved a private, clandestine consultation with an expert. Now anxieties about witchcraft, money magic, and unnatural death are ventilated in churches and comic strips, on the radio, TV, and the internet; almost every day, newspapers and magazines advertise “dial-in-diviners.” The public, multi-mediated quality of this communication is reflected in innovative ritual technologies. One is divining by “mirror” or “television.” An electronic update of water bowl oracles, the procedure requires that clients imbibe a fermented drink and watch a white cloth mounted in a darkened “screenroom.” Figures of miscreants take shape on the screen; their transmission and appearance mimic the manner in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and the long-distance magic of witches condense images, objects, and sounds from afar. While an adept might help to unscramble the ethereal pictures, these are received directly by his “customers”–mark the term–who sit in the archetypal posture of family viewing-and-listening.

    Who are the protagonists in these theaters of the banal, these mundane magical dramas? Who are the witches? And who takes responsibility for killing them? According to the Witchcraft Commission,

    …the youth who are called “comrades” are in the forefront. Note: ages of the accused range between 14-38 years. Not only were young men the most identifiable perpetrators of witch-related violence, but they seem often to have forced neighbors and ritual experts to do their bidding. The purported male- volents, on the other hand, were the usual suspects of African witchcraft–men and women of conspicuous, unshared wealth–although those who were physically attacked were overwhelmingly old and, often, weak and defenseless.

    Let us take a closer look at the most extended case recorded by the Witchcraft Commission, the Ha-Madura Witch-Hunt. The defendants, who ranged from fourteen to thirty- five, were charged with having murdered an elderly woman by “necklacing.” They were also accused of attacking two others, both of advanced age. Witnesses recounted that, in the afternoon of 21 March 1990, “the youths” of Madura–most of them unemployed, most of them with little to do– gathered near the Primary School. After speakers urged them to exterminate the witches in their midst, they went off in search of suspects. Neither of their first two intended victims was home, so they torched their property and assaulted a man suspected of raising the alarm. They then moved on to the yard of the deceased, doused her with petrol, and set her alight. She fled across her maize field and crawled through a fence, where the crowd caught her. At this point she wailed: “Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?” Her assailants responded: “Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!” Garlanding her with a rubber tyre, they applied more petrol and ignited her one final time.

    There could hardly be a more bald statement of intergenerational antagonism. For these rural youth, “mass action” might have delivered the vote. But it brought them no nearer to the wealth and empowerment that the overthrow of apartheid was supposed to yield. Quite the re- verse. Trade sanctions had dramatically increased unemployment, especially in the countryside.

    The cruel irony of South Africa is that, as one of the world’s last colonies, it won its right to secular modern nationhood just as global processes were compromising the sovereignty and material in- tegrity of the nation-state, sui generis. Multinational capital is capricious: once apartheid had end- ed, it found cheaper, more tractable labor, and less violence, elsewhere. As a result, many corporations did not return and money flowed in other directions. What is more, alterations in the world economy during the 1990s–the dramatic rise of tourism and post-Fordist production, of the entertainment industry, the electronic market place, and new-age commerce–have made few inroads into the “backveld.” They engage uneasily, or not at all, with rural enterprise, and are experienced primarily as stories-from-the-city or as traces on television screens. The new era, it is true, has raised the living standards for sections of the African middle class. Very visibly. But, overall, work is harder to come by and poverty is still dire.

    It is no coincidence that the most spirited witchfinding occurs where conditions are most straitened. Also, where raw inequality has become most blatant. The north is, aggregatively, the poorest province in the country, and the remote regions of the northwest come not far behind. Agriculture, much of it on a pitiably modest scale, continues to be practiced, largely by women and, to a lesser extent, by older men. Petty business–beer-brewing, sex work, wood-cutting, thatching, carpentry, refashioning the detritus of used-up commodities for resale–supplements many household budgets. On the other hand, the migrant wages that had long subsidized faltering agrarian endeavors, and had granted young males a modicum of autonomy, are now diminishing. Concomitantly, cash resources vested in the elderly, like pensions, have risen in relative value; as disposable income, they are the object of fierce jealousy and mystical activity (cf Ritchken 1994:361). In addition, the establishment of the ethnic “homelands” under apartheid facilitated and funded the emergence of small new elites marked by their palpable prosperity and con- spicuous consumption. And so, in towns like Madura, new material distinctions, of widely variable magnitude, have become discernible among neighbors. Such differences are made incarnate, per- sonified even, in prized commodities: in houses, automobiles, televisions, cell-phones. The alleged witch of Madura was the occasional employer of several of her attackers, and sometimes let them watch her TV. The petrol that consumed her was seized from the few local men who now could afford cars.

    There is, in short, a good deal of evidence of widespread anxiety about the production and reproduction of wealth, an anxiety that translates into bitter generational opposition. Witch- hunting youth in the Northern Province acted much like an age-regiment in Sotho-Tswana society of old. Ridding the countryside of baloi, witches, was all of a piece with the other forms of “mass action” that had sought to subvert an oppressive social order; not long ago, it should be noted, urban “comrades” demonized the parental generation as passive “sellouts” to colonial oppression. Indeed, the war against mystical evil fused, in a synthetic of set of practices, political and ritual means of both recent and older vintage. In addition to singing songs of freedom as they carried out their exorcisms, “comrades” also intoned one of the best known local circumcision chants.

    Age, of course, is a relational principle. The youthful comrades forged their identity against the foil of a sinister, secretive, gendered gerontocracy; significantly, those attacked were referred to as “old ladies,” even when they were men (p.211). The antisocial greed of these predators was epitomized in the idea of unnatural production and reproduction, in images of debauched, un- generative sexuality. The Commission, for example, makes repeated reference to the inability of witches to bear children, to their red vaginas, and to their “rotten” sperm. Killing “perverts” by fire–itself a vehicle of simultaneous destruction and rebirth–bespoke the effort to engender a more propitious, constructive, mode of reproduction.

    Threats to local viability, as we said before, were also associated with the creation of the zombie workforce. Thus the following fragment from a case record:

    On a certain day, [when] the accused arrived, [people] shouted from the street that she is a witch with a shrinked [sic] vagina. They said she had killed people by lightning and has a drum full of zombies. They also said that her son “Zero” has no male seed and could not impregnate a woman.

    It is hard to imagine a more pointedly transparent portrait of perversion: of the zero-sum economy of witchcraft and its negation of life-giving material, sexual, and social exchange. In place of fertile procreation, the witch makes ghost workers out of the able-bodied, cannibalizing others, and robbing the rising generation of a legitimate livelihood and the wherewithal to marry or establish their own families; indeed, to become fully adult and to reproduce.

    Precisely this sense of illegitimate production and reproduction pervades youthful discourses of witchcraft in much of South Africa. Many young blacks blame their incapacity to ensure a future for themselves on an aged elite that controls the means of generating wealth without working. Their concern is underscored, with particular clarity, by the preoccupation with zombies, long a feature of Caribbean vodoun but new here. Testimony to a diasporic flow of electronic images–but evocative of a state of “living-death” (sefifi) described by early missionaries to the Tswana–zombies have been spliced into local mystical economies and have taken on the color of their surroundings. As one of our opening fragments suggests, they are missing persons who are thought to have been killed and revived by witchcraft. These living dead exist to toil for their creators. Bereft of tongues to give voice to their affliciton, they are believed to work after dark, mainly in agriculture, but can also be magically transported to urban centers to accrue riches for their owners. In this era of increasingly impermanent employment, there are even “part-time zombies”: people who wake up exhausted in the morning, having served unwittingly in the noc- turnal economy to feed the greed of a malign master.

    Although they have no tongues, zombies speak of a particular time and place. The end of apartheid, as we said, was in part the product of a global moment, one in which the machinations of multinational capital and the fall of the Soviet Union drastically restructured older polarities. When black South Africans at last threw off their colonial constraints, much of the rest of the con- tinent had already learned the harsh truth about the postcolonial predicament, having experienced unprecedented marginalization and economic hardship. Or, at the very least, striking new distinctions of wealth and privation. Such conditions disrupt grand narratives of progress. But they do not necessarily dispel their animating desires; to the contrary, they may feed them. Hence the situation that Roitman (n.d.), writing of the Cameroun, describes as “negotiat[ing] modernity in a time of austerity.” In these circumstances there tends to be an expansion both in techniques of producing value and in the meaning of wealth itself. It is an expansion which often breaks the bounds of legality, making crime, as well as magic, a mode of production open to those who lack other means. Which is why violence, as an instrument of income redistribution, is such a ubiquitous feature of postcolonial economies, in Africa and elsewhere.

    The zombie is the nightmare citizen of this parallel, refracted modernity. Reduced from humanity to raw labor power, he is stored up in petrol drums or sheds like tools. His absent pre- sence suggests a link to otherwise inexplicable accumulation. Being solely for the benefit of its owner, the toil of the living dead is pure surplus value: it has, as Marx (1976:325) might put have it, “all the charms of something created out of nothing.” Zombie production is thus an apt image of the inflating occult economies of postcolonial Africa. As spectral capital, it will be evident why these forms of extraction are typically associated with older people of apparent means; why they are thought to have multiplied as wage work has become scarce. Not only does the rise of a phan- tom proletariat consume the life force of others. By yielding profit without cost, it destroys the labor market, conventional patterns of reproduction, and the legitimate prospects of “the commu- nity” at large.

    But zombie production is merely one means among several. Recall that there has also been an increase in the incidence of so-called “ritual murder,” of killing for the purpose of harvesting body parts. Hence our opening fragment about eyes for sale in Johannesburg. As the Witchcraft Commission explains:

    These body parts are used…to secure certain advantages from the ancestors. A skull may be built into the foundation of a new building to ensure a good business, or a brew con- taining human parts may be buried where it will ensure a good harvest.

    These practices seem to have been relatively rare in the past. But now a great deal of evidence confirms that, in this domain too, market forces have stimulated production; indeed, newspapers publish the going rate for various parts: R5,000 for testicles, R1,000 for a kidney, R2,000 for a heart ($1=R4.85). This commerce seems to be eroding conventional social, cultural, and moral margins; in December 1994, a white policeman was charged with having removed the insides of a cadaver at a state mortuary in Johannesburg for retailing as medicine. Meanwhile, in different parts of the country, two young couples, both jobless and expecting babies, confessed in court to slaying young girls for their organs. These young people acted on the understanding that the oc- cult economy feeds the malevolent ambitions of their elders, to whom the purloined parts were to be retailed: already in 1988 it was noted that any disappearance of persons, especially children, was “immediately linked to businessmen and politicians” by young activists.

    We reiterate, yet again, that the traffic in human organs is neither new nor restricted to South Africa; that there is now a global economy in body parts, which flow from poor to rich coun- tries, from south to north, east to west, young to old; that some national governments are widely rumored to raise revenue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to East Asia, mysterious malevolents are believed to extract blood, fat, members, and living offspring from the unsuspecting. At issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise is a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself. Among Sotho and Tswana, as elsewhere, people speak, ever more apprehensively, of a relentless process that erodes the inalienable humanity of persons, rendering them susceptible as never before to the reach of the market.

    Notice the emphasis on distance. The translocal dimension of dealings in the occult economy is crucial to the way in which its workings are understood in rural South Africa. Throu- ghout the north, people ponder the interplay of mobility and compression in the production of new forms of wealth. These appear to be a consequence of the capacity to siphon goods, people, and images across space in no time at all. Movement, especially instant movement, adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? As South Africa casts off its pariah status and seeks ever greater integration with world markets, the growing velocity of long-range transaction is dis- cernible all around. In the rural Northwest, as we observed earlier, its impact is made manifest in, among other things, the rapildy growing interest in Satanism.

    Once more, however, a planetary phenomenon takes on a strikingly particular local form. Among rural Tswana, discourses of the diabolical center widely upon the most recent in a long line of missions from “overseas,” the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God of Brazil. This new Protestant denomination promises instant goods and gratification to those who embrace Christ and denounce Satan; it is also rumored to issue charmed credit cards which register no debt whatsoever. Here Pentecostalism meets neoliberal enterprise: the chapel is, literally, a store-front in a shopping precinct. It holds services during business hours, appealing frankly to mercenary motives, mostly among the young. Tabloids in its windows feature radiant witnesses speaking of the employment, health, and wealth that followed entry into the Church; eloquent testimonies, these, to rapid material returns on a limited spiritual investment. The ability to deliver in the here and now, again a potent form of space-time compression, is given as the measure of a truly global God. Bold advertisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorn the altar, under the legend: “De-light in the Lord and he will give you the desires of your heart” (Psalms 37:4). The immediacy of this, of religion at its most robustly concrete, resonates with a pragmatic strain long evident in black Christianity in South Africa.

    For those middle-class Tswana schooled in a more ascetic Protestantism, however, the hordes that pack the store front are being lured by the devil; this notwithstanding his ostentatious denunciation. With the radical reorientation of local contours of desire and despair, of wealth and inequality, the diabolical has been invested with provocative and ambiguous powers. Its interven- tion into everyday life is hotly debated. We were ourselves witness to an intriguing argument among history graduate students at the University of the Northwest: Is the Universal Church the work of the Antichrist or a vindication of Max Weber? To be sure, if Satan did not exist, crusading Christianity would have had to invent him: in order to assume its global mandate, neo-Pentecos- talism summons up a world-endangering antagonist to conquer. Like the Universal Church–with its page on the world wide web–Satanism is a globalizing discourse: “The devil and his demons,” it says on that web page, “have been deceiving people all over the world.”

    Remember, in this respect, the television programs we mentioned earlier; the ones in whi- ch “reformed” devil worshippers spoke to callers. When asked to explain the relationship of the diabolical to boloi (witchcraft), one laconic young man said, in a mix of Setswana and English: “Satanism is high-octane witchcraft. It is more international.” By such means are old ideas extended and novel tropes domesticated to meet altered conditions. These devil worshippers were rumored to travel far and wide, fuelling their accumulation of riches with human blood. The “high octane” petrochemical image suggests that the basis of their potency was a capacity, as David Har- vey (1990:31) puts it, to “ride the tiger of time-space compression”: to move instantly, that is, between the parochial and the translocal–here and there, then and now–thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of this new, postcolonial epoch.

    IV.

    Perhaps the overriding irony of the contemporary age–this Age of Futilitarianism, in which the promises of late capitalism run up against postmodern pessimism–is how unanticipated it was by modern social thought. None of the grand narratives of the orthodox social sciences came anywhere near predicting the sudden transformation of the twentieth-century international order, the fall of the Soviet Union, the crisis of the nation-state, the rapid deterritorialization of culture and society, the ascendance of an unevenly regulated global economy. The surprising recent past of South Africa is one refraction of this world-historical process. Here, too, the end came unexpectedly.

    Apartheid might not have ended in a bloodbath or a race war. But the birth of the “new” nation has nonetheless been tempestuous. Most perplexing, to many, is the apparently post- political character of the turbulence. Violence, by common agreement, is epidemic. Almost none of it, though, is clothed in an ideological agenda, a social vision, a political program. Not yet. Which is why, perhaps, it is traumatizing the populace at large. The new nightmare is of street terror run amok; of a state in retreat; of crime as routinized redistribution; of police unwilling to protect ordinary citizens, preferring to profit from the privatization of force and the sale of arms; of a new topography of public space marked by few zones of safety and many of danger; of gated communities and uncivil city scapes contested by youth gangs, Islamic vigilantes, drug dealers, car- jackers; of an economy, as much underground as above board, in which “new” black bureaucrats and businessmen, politicians, celebrities, and criminals grow rich while the rest struggle to survive.

    This, we stress, is a popular nightmare, a fast materializing mythos for the post-revolutionary moment. Sociological reality, as always, is much more complex, much less coherent. Not all is apocalypse. In the wake of apartheid, all sorts of legitimate new ventures flourish alongside older ones. From the quiet backyards of rural homesteads through the teeming taxi ranks of large “townships” to sedate urban corporations, inventive African entrepreneurs “do business.” Postcolonial commerce ruptures and dissolves long-standing racial lines in its millennial pursuit of virgin markets. A politics of optimism is actively purveyed by the ANC, not altogether in vain; refreshingly, the media envisage a future in which black is not bleak. What is more, some forms of cultural production–often exhilaratingly experimental–thrive just off the meanest of streets. Still, the fright nightmare persists. Indeed, it grows increasingly baroque, medieval almost, as it is represented with ever greater facticity.

    Reports of escalating witchcraft and ritual murder, of zombies and satanism, must be situated on this restless terrain. The specter of mystical violence run wild is a caricature of post-apartheid “liberty”: the liberty to transgress and consume in an unfettered world of desire, cut loose from former political, spatial, moral, sexual, and material constraints. Socialist imaginings, like utopian ideas of a new society, falter. In their place reigns the rhetoric of the market, of free- dom as the right to exercise choice through spending or voting or whatever, of personhood as constructed largely through consumption. Talk in the public sphere about violence gives voice to a pent up lust for all that apartheid denied, from iconic objects (notably, the BMW) and an omnivorous sexuality to extravagant self-fashionings and the flamboyant sense of independence communicated by the cell phone. But it also evokes a world in which ends far outstrip means, in which there is a high velocity of exchange and a relatively low volume of production. And yet, we repeat, it is a world in which the possibility of rapid enrichment, of amassing a fortune by largely invisible means, is always palpably present.

    The preoccupation with the occult is closely connected to all this. At one level, it is about the desire and the effort to discover the secret of those invisible means; at another, it is concerned to stem the spread of a macabre, visceral economy founded on the violence of extraction and abst- raction (i) in which the majority are kept poor by the mystical machinations of the few; (ii) in which employment has dwindled because of the creation of a virtual labor force from the living dead; (iii) in which profit depends on learning the secret of compressing space and time, on cannibalizing bodies, and on making production into the spectral province of people of the night; (iv) in which the old are accused of aborting the natural process of social reproduction–and youth, reciprocally, are demonized. The fact that none of this is truly new makes it no less sig- nificant to those for whom it has become an existential reality.

    Witch hunts are, among other things, instruments of social divination, dramatic discourses of discovery in the public sphere, whose unspoken object it is to yield explanations, to impress cla- rity on bodies and persons. That ambiguity concerns many aspects of the “new” South Africa: the rights of citizens, the role of the state, the significance of cultural identity and of social difference, the meaning and the point of post-apartheid politics, the infinitely complex articulations of race, class, and ethnicity; the legitimacy of an economic order that has sanctioned dramatic polarities of wealth and caused intense jealousy among neighbors. But, most of all, there is perplexity–in this Hobbesian universe where everything appears at once possible and impossible–about the very nature of human subjects: about their secret appetites, about dark practices of the heart that show themselves in spectacular new fortunes and orgies of consumption.

    Here, then, are the answers to our questions. It will be clear now why, in the South African postcolony, there has been such a dramatic intensification of appeals to enchantment. And why it is, in a world alleged to be filled with witches and ritual murders and zombies, that generational antagonisms loom so large. The rise of occult economies here and elsewhere in postcolonial, postrevolutionary societies seems overdetermined. For one thing, these tend to be societies in which the promise of the free market confronts the realities of neoliberal economics; of unpredictable shifts in centers of production and labor markets; of the difficulties of exercising stable control over space, time, or the flow of money; of an end to old political alignments, without any clear lines, beyond pure interest, along which new ones take shape; of uncertainty surrounding the proper nature of civil society. Such are the corollaries of the rise of millennial capitalism as they are felt in much of the contemporary world. Perhaps they will turn out to be en- tirely transitory, a mere passing moment, in the longue dureé. But this makes them no less mo- mentous now.

    Which takes us to our final question, our final point. What is the relevance of our narrative for the present and future of the discipline, for a postcolonial anthropology of the global age?

    “Globalism” and “globalization,” as everyone knows, have become tropes for our times. Like all catch-words and clichés, they are cheapened by over-use and under-specification, by confusing an expansive metaphor for an explanatory term. As a result, much of what is currently being written about them in the social sciences is Anthropology Lite, fact-free ethnography whose realities are more virtual than its virtues are real. At the same time, it is important not to overreact: not to treat anything labelled “global” either as a feckless fashion or as a threat to the existence of a discipline traditionally concerned with the parochial; this last by dissolving all things culturally contingent and close to the ground into the great Eurocentric solvent of late ca- pitalism. In point of fact, the processes involved in the rise of novel forms of planetary integration and compression–especially in the electronic economy, in mass communications, in flexitime flows of labor and capital, in the instantaneous circulation of signs and images, in the translocal commodification of culture, in the diasporic politics of identity–challenge us by re-presenting all the most fundamental question of our craft: how do human beings construct their life-worlds at the shifting intersections of here, there, elsewhere, everywhere.

    This, finally, is a problem of scale: of determining, in respect of any given ethnography– contemporary, historical, or both–the stretch of relations, concrete processes, imaginings, spatial planes commensurate to its realization. “Locality” is not everywhere, nor for every purpose, the same thing; sometimes it is a family, sometimes a town, sometimes a nation, sometimes a flow or a field, sometimes a continent or even the world; often it lies at the point of articulation among two or more of these things. Similarly, translocal, planentary connections and forces do not impinge equally or in like manner on all aspects of human thought, action and interaction. In this respect, it is important not to forget that “the local” and “the global” do not describe received empirical realities. They are analytic constructs whose heuristic utility depends entirely on the way in which they are deployed to illuminate historically specific phenomena. Which is why we have taken such pains here to trace the causal determinations of the occult economy in post-apartheid South Africa across generations and genders, villages and provinces and regions, and a nation-state intransition–not to mention along the labile vectors of a post-Fordist, millennial economy.

    As all this implies, there is little to be gained any longer from avoiding the methodological challenge posed by the global moment, a strategy effected, on the part of some anthropologists, by retreating back into the local. This move is typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neoprimitivism, the capacity of “native” cultures to remain ass- ertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this conjures up an anachronistic, ahistorical idea of culture. Of culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism. It is also to misrepresent the hybrid, dialectical, historically evanescent character of all contemporary social designs.

    Here lies one future for anthropology, at least as the discipline looks from the vantage of the South African postcolony. It is to interrogate the production, in imaginative and material prac- tice, of those compound political, economic, and cultural forms by which human beings create community and locality and identity, especially on evanescent terrains; in terms of which they fabricate social realities and power relations and impose themselves on their lived environments; through which space and time are made and remade, and the boundaries of the local and the glob- al are actualized. Observe the stress on the active voice: from this perspective, the epistemic objects of our enquiry are no longer nouns–culture, society, institutions, or whatever–but compound verbs describing the construction and deconstruction of more-or-less stable practices, conventions, forms, commodities, abstractions. As we have before (1992), even the most overdetermined, most complex, most inchoate of world-historical forces–colonialism, the global market, cyberspace, “late” capitalism–take shape in sociocultural processes that inhabit particular places during particular periods in particular persons. Without human agents, without specified locations and moments and actions, realities are not realized, objects not objectified, nothing takes place, the social is not socialized, the present has no presence.

    These locations and moments, people and practices–to return one last time to the spirit of Max Gluckman–comprise the fragments from which an anthropology of millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism is to be constructed; from which we may recuperate, by positing imaginative sociologies and legible processes, the mechanisms by which the local is globalized and the global localized. For in these processes lies an explanation for the most parochial of things, like the new occult economy in South Africa. Also for the most universal. Like the fact that enchant- ment, far from slipping away with the resolute march of modernity, seems everywhere on the rise.

  • Millennial Capitalism, Occult Economies, and the Crisis of Reproduction in South Africa

    Millennial Capitalism, Occult Economies, and the Crisis of Reproduction in South Africa

    At its broadest, this essay explores the nature of historical consciousness among a South African Tswana people. On the basis of the imagery of two Tswana men – a “madman” institutionalized by the apartheid regime and a former migrant laborer – it examines the content of Tswana historical consciousness as expressed in vernacular cultural practices, specifically in relation to productiv work and wage labor. These differ from the narrative modes of representation associated with “history” in Euromodernist contexts, and build on various poetic devices – most strikingly, on the rhetoric of contrast – to give voice to contemporary experience and its historical roots. Thus the opposed concepts of productive work and wage labor, one associated with Setswana (Tswana ways) and the other with Sekgoa (European ways), are major tropes through which Tswana construct their past and present. It is argues that this excursion into the poetics of history in South Africa illuminates very general questions concerning the connection between consciousness, culture, history, and the poetics of representation.

  • Millennial Capitalism

    Millennial Capitalism

    We live in difficult times, in times of monstrous chimeras and evil dreams and criminal follies.

    Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes

    Slouching Toward Bethlehem

    The global triumph of capitalism at the millennium, its Second Coming, raises a number of conundrums for our understanding of history at the end of the century. Some of its corollaries—“plagues of the ‘new world order,’” Jacques Derrida (1994: 91) calls them, unable to resist apocalyptic imagery—have been the subject of clamorous debate. Others receive less mention. Thus, for example, populist polemics have dwelt on the planetary conjuncture, for good or ill, of “homogenization and difference” (e.g., Barber 1992); on the simultaneous, syn- ergistic spiraling of wealth and poverty; on the rise of a “new feudalism,” a phoenix disfigured, of worldwide proportions (cf. Connelly and Kennedy 1994).1 For its part, scholarly debate has focused on the confounding effects of rampant liberalization: on whether it engenders truly global flows of capital or concen- trates circulation to a few major sites (Hirst and Thompson 1996); on whether it undermines, sustains, or reinvents the sovereignty of nation-states (Sassen 1996); on whether it frees up, curbs, or compartmentalizes the movement of labor (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, in this issue); on whether the current fixation with democracy, its resurrection in so many places, bespeaks a measure of mass empowerment or an “emptying out of [its] meaning,” its reduction “to paper” (Negri 1999: 9; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997).2 Equally in question is why the present infatuation with civil society has been accompanied by alarming increases in civic strife, by an escalation of civil war, and by reports of the dra- matic growth in many countries of domestic violence, rape, child abuse, prison populations, and most dramatically of all, criminal “phantom-states” (Derrida 1994: 83; Blaney and Pashsa 1993). And why, in a like vein, the politics of con- sumerism, human rights, and entitlement have been shown to coincide with puz- zling new patterns of exclusion, patterns that inflect older lines of gender, sexual- ity, race, and class in ways both strange and familiar (Gal 1997; Yudice 1995). Ironies, here, all the way down; ironies, with apologies to Jean-Paul Sartre, in the very soul of the Millennial Age.

    Other features of our present predicament are less remarked, debated, ques- tioned. Among them are the odd coupling, the binary complementarity, of the legalistic with the libertarian; constitutionality with deregulation; hyperrational- ization with the exuberant spread of innovative occult practices and money magic, pyramid schemes and prosperity gospels; the enchantments, that is, of a decidedly neoliberal economy whose ever more inscrutable speculations seem to call up fresh specters in their wake. Note that, unlike others who have discussed the “new spectral reality” of that economy (Negri 1999: 9; Sprinker 1999), we do not talk here in metaphorical terms. We seek, instead, to draw attention to, to interrogate, the distinctly pragmatic qualities of the messianic, millennial capitalism of the moment: a capitalism that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; a capitalism that, if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the marginalized and disempowered (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b).

    Such interrogatory observations point to another, even more fundamental question. Could it be that these characteristics of millennial capitalism—by which we mean both capitalism at the millennium and capitalism in its messianic, salvific, even magical manifestations—are connected, by cause or correlation or copresence, with other, more mundane features of the contemporary historical moment? Like the increasing relevance of consumption, alike to citizens of the world and to its scholarly cadres, in shaping selfhood, society, identity, even epi- stemic reality? Like the concomitant eclipse of such modernist categories as social class? Like the “crises,” widely observed across the globe, of reproduction and community, youth and masculinity? Like the burgeoning importance of gen- eration, race, and gender as principles of difference, identity, and mobilization? The point of this essay lies in exploring the possibility of their interconnection; even more, in laying the ground of an argument for it.

    As this suggests, our intent in this special issue of Public Culture is to animate further debate on the enigmatic nature of millennial capitalism, and also on its implications for theorizing history and society at the start of the twenty-first cen- tury. However we wish to characterize our current moment—as an age of death (of ideology, politics, the subject) or rebirth (of the spirit of Marx, Weber, and the Adams Ferguson and Smith)—ours are perplexing times: “Times of monstrous chimeras” in which the conjuncture of the strange and the familiar, of stasis and metamorphosis, plays tricks on our perceptions, our positions, our praxis. These conjunctures appear at once to endorse and to erode our understanding of the lin- eaments of modernity and its postponements. Here, plainly, we can do no more than offer preliminary observations and opening lines of argument on a topic whose full extent can only be glimpsed at present.

    Let us, then, cut to the heart of the matter: to the ontological conditions-of- being under millennial capitalism. This begins for us—as it did for the “fathers” of modernist social theory—with epochal shifts in the constitutive relationship of production to consumption, and hence of labor to capital. This requires, in turn, that we consider the meaning of social class under prevailing political and economic conditions, conditions that place growing stress on generation, gender, and race as indices of identity, affect, and political action. In light of these reflec- tions we go on to explore three corollaries, three critical faces of the millennial moment: the shifting provenance of the nation-state and its fetishes, the rise of new forms of enchantment, and the explosion of neoliberal discourses of civil society.

    First, however, back to basics.

    The political history of capital [is] a sequence of attempts by capital to withdraw from the class relationship; at a higher level we can now see it as the history of the succes- sive attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working class. Mario Tronti, “The Strategy of Refusal” (Tronti’s emphasis)

    Specters, Speculation: Of Cons and Pros Consumption, recall, was the hallmark disease of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the First Coming of Indus- trial Capitalism, of a time when the ecological conditions of production, its con- suming passions (Sontag 1978; cf. Jean Comaroff 1997a), ate up the bodies of producers.3 Now, at the end of the twentieth century, semiotically transposed, it is often said to be the “hallmark of modernity” (van Binsbergen and Geschiere n.d.: 3), the measure of its wealth, health, and vitality. An overgeneralization, maybe, yet the claim captures popular imaginings and their representation across the earth. It also resonates with the growing Eurocultural truism that the (post)mod- ern person is a subject made with objects. Nor is this surprising. Consumption, in its ideological guise—as “consumerism”—refers to a material sensibility actively cultivated, for the common good, by Western states and commercial interests, particularly since World War II. It has even been cultivated by some noncapital- ist regimes: In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping advocated “consumption as a motor force of production” (Dirlik 1996: 194).

    In social theory, as well, consumption has become a prime mover (van Bins- bergen and Geschiere n.d.: 3). Increasingly, it is the factor, the principle, held to determine definitions of value, the construction of identities, and even the shape of the global ecumene.4 As such, tellingly, it is the invisible hand, or the Gucci- gloved fist, that animates the political impulses, the material imperatives, and the social forms of the Second Coming of Capitalism—of capitalism in its neolib- eral, global manifestation. Note the image: the invisible hand. It evokes the ghost of crises past, when liberal political economy first discerned the movements of the market beneath swirling economic waters, of “free” enterprise behind the commonweal. Gone is the deus ex machina, a figure altogether too concrete, too industrial for the “virtualism” (Carrier and Miller 1998) of the post-Fordist era.

    As consumption has become the moving spirit of the late twentieth century, so there has been a concomitant eclipse of production; an eclipse, at least, of its per- ceived salience for the wealth of nations. This has heralded a shift, across the world, in ordinary understandings of the nature of capitalism. The workplace and labor, especially work-and-place securely rooted in a stable local context, are no longer prime sites for the creation of value or identity (Sennett 1998). The factory and the shop, far from secure centers of fabrication and family income, are increasingly experienced by virtue of their erasure: either by their removal to an elsewhere—where labor is cheaper, less assertive, less taxed, more feminized, less protected by states and unions—or by their replacement at the hands of nonhu- man or “nonstandard” means of manufacture. Which, in turn, has left behind, for ever more people, a legacy of irregular piecework, of menial “workfare,” of rela- tively insecure, transient, gainless occupation. Hence the paradox, in many West- ern economies, of high official employment rates amidst stark deindustrialization and joblessness.5 In the upshot, production appears to have been superseded, as the fons et origo of wealth, by less tangible ways of generating value: by control over such things as the provision of services, the means of communication, and above all, the flow of finance capital. In short, by the market and by speculation.

    Symptomatic in this respect are the changing historical fortunes of gambling. The latter, of course, makes manifest a mechanism integral to market enterprise: it puts the adventure into venture capital. Financial risk has always been crucial to the growth of capitalism; it has, from the first, been held to warrant its own due return. But, removed from the dignifying nexus of the market, it was until recently treated by Protestant ethics and populist morality alike as a “pariah” practice. Casinos were set apart from the workaday world. They were situated at resorts, on reservations and riverboats: liminal places of leisure and/or the haunts of those (aristocrats, profligates, “chancers”) above and beyond honest toil. Liv- ing off the proceeds of this form of speculation was, normatively speaking, the epitome of immoral accumulation: the wager stood to the wage, the bet to per- sonal betterment, as sin to virtue. There have, self-evidently, always been differ- ent cultures and mores of betting. However, the activity—whether it be a “flut- ter” on the horses or a domestic card game, on a sporting contest or an office pool—has generally been placed outside the domain of work and earning, at best in the ambiguous, nether space between virtue and its transgression. Over a generation, gambling, in its marked form, has changed moral valence and invaded everyday life across the world.6 It has been routinized in a widespread infatuation with, and popular participation in, high-risk dealings in stocks, bonds, and funds whose fortunes are governed largely by chance. It also expresses itself in a fascination with “futures” and their downmarket counterpart, the lottery. Here the mundane meets the millennial: “Not A LOT TO TOMAR, OW!” proclaims an ironic inner-city mural in Chicago (see Millennial Transitions, in this issue), large hands grasping a seductive pile of casino chips, beside which nestles a newborn, motherless babe.7 This at a moment when “gambling [is] the fastest growing industry in the US,” when it is “tightly woven into the national fabric,” when it is increasingly “operated and promoted” by government.8

    Life itself has become the object of bookmaking; it is no longer the sole pre- serve of the “respectable” insurance industry, of its abstract argot of longevity statistics and probability quotients. A recent article in Newsweek sports the head- line “Capital Gains: The Lottery on Lives”:

    In America’s fin de siècle casino culture, no wager seems outré. So how about betting on how long a stranger is likely to live? You can buy part or all of his or her insurance policy, becoming a beneficiary. Your gamble: that death will come soon enough to yield a high return on the money you put up. The Viatical Association of America says that $1 billion worth of coverage went into play last year.9

    A much better bet, this, than the sale of the Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Inflation notwithstanding.

    In the era of millennial capitalism, securing instant returns is often a matter of life and death. The failure to win the weekly draw was linked with more than one suicide in Britain in the wake of the introduction of national lottery in 1994; in 1999, the India Tribune reported that one of the biggest central Indian States, Madya Pradesh, was “caught in the vortex of lottery mania,” which had claimed several lives.10 Witnesses described “extreme enthusiasm among the jobless youth towards trying their luck to make a fast buck,” precisely the kind of fatal ecstasy classically associated with cargo cults and chiliastic movements (Cohn 1957). More mundanely, efforts to enlist divine help in tipping the odds, from the Taiwanese countryside to the Kalahari fringe, have become a regular feature of what Weller (in this issue) terms “fee-for-service” religions (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b). These are locally nuanced fantasies of abundance without effort, of beating capitalism at its own game by drawing a winning number at the behest of unseen forces. Once again that invisible hand.

    The change in the moral valence of gambling also has a public dimension. In a neoliberal climate where taxes are anathema to the majoritarian political cen- ter, lotteries and gaming levies have become a favored means of filling national coffers, of generating cultural and social assets, of finding soft monies in times of tough cutbacks. The defunct machinery of a growing number of welfare states, to be sure, is being turned by the wheel of fortune. With more and more governments and political parties depending on this source for quick revenue fixes, betting, says George Will, has “been transformed from a social disease”— subjected, not so long ago, to scrutiny at the hands of Harvard Medical School—“into social policy.”11 Once a dangerous sign of moral turpitude, “it is now marketed almost as a ‘patriotic duty.’ ”12

    Put these things together—the explosion of popular gambling, its legitimate incorporation to the fiscal heart of the nation-state, the global expansion of highly speculative market “investment,” and changes in the moral vectors of the wager—and what has happened? “The world,” answers a reflective Fidel Castro, has “become a huge casino.” Because the value of stock markets has lost all grounding in materiality, he says—anticipating a point to which we shall return —their workings have finally realized the dream of medieval alchemy: “Paper has been turned into gold.”13 This evokes Susan Strange (1986: 1–3; cf. Harvey 1989: 332; Tomasic and Pentony 1991), who, in likening the Western fiscal order to an immense game of luck, was among the first to speak specifically of “casino capitalism”: “Something rather radical has happened to the international finan- cial system to make it so much like a gambling hall. . . . [It] has made inveterate, and largely involuntary, gamblers of us all.” Insofar as the growth of globalized markets, electronic media, and finance capital have opened up the potential for venture enterprise, the gaming room has actually become iconic of capital: of its “natural” capacity to yield value without human input (Hardt 1995: 39), to grow and expand of its own accord, to reward speculation.

    And yet crisis after crisis in the global economy, and growing income dispari- ties on a planetary scale, makes it painfully plain that there is no such thing as capitalism sans production, that the neoliberal stress on consumption as the prime source of value is palpably problematic. If scholars have been slow to reflect on this fact, people all over the world—not least those in places where there have been sudden infusions of commodities, of new forms of wealth—have not. Many have been quick to give voice, albeit in different registers, to their per- plexity at the enigma of this wealth: of its sources and the capriciousness of its distribution, of the mysterious forms it takes, of its slipperiness, of the opaque relations between means and ends embodied in it. Our concern here grows directly out of these perplexities, these imaginings: out of worldwide speculation, in both senses of the term, provoked by the shifting conditions of material exis- tence at the end of the twentieth century.

    We seek, here, to interrogate the experiential contradictions at the core of neoliberal capitalism, of capitalism in its millennial manifestation: the fact that it appears both to include and to marginalize in unanticipated ways; to produce desire and expectation on a global scale (Trouillot 1999) yet to decrease the cer- tainty of work or the security of persons; to magnify class differences but to undercut class consciousness; above all, to offer up vast, almost instantaneous riches to those who master its spectral technologies—and, simultaneously, to threaten the very existence of those who do not. Elsewhere (1999c) we have argued that these contradictions, while worldwide in effect, are most visible in so-called postrevolutionary societies—especially those societies that, having been set free by the events of 1989 and their aftermath, entered the global arena with distinct structural disadvantages.14 A good deal is to be learned about the historical implications of the current moment by eavesdropping on the popular anxieties to be heard in such places. How do we interpret the mounting disen- chantment, in these “liberated zones,” with the effects of hard-won democracy? Why the perceptible nostalgia for the security of past regimes, some of them immeasurably repressive? Why the accompanying upsurge of assertions of iden- tity and autochthony? How might they be linked to widespread fears, in many parts of Eastern Europe and Africa alike, about the preternatural production of wealth?

    The end of the Cold War, like the death of apartheid, fired utopian imagina- tions. But liberation under neoliberal conditions has been marred by a disconcert- ing upsurge of violence, crime, and disorder. The quest for democracy, the rule of law, prosperity, and civility threatens to dissolve into strife and recrimination, even political chaos, amidst the oft-mouthed plaint that “the poor cannot eat votes or live on a good Constitution.”15 Everywhere there is evidence of an uneasy fusion of enfranchisement and exclusion; of xenophobia at the prospect of world citizenship without the old protectionisms of nationhood; of the effort to realize modern utopias by decidedly postmodern means. Gone is any official- speak of egalitarian futures, work for all, or the paternal government envisioned by the various freedom movements. These ideals have given way to a spirit of deregulation, with its taunting mix of emancipation and limitation. Individual cit- izens, a lot of them marooned by a rudderless ship of state, try to clamber aboard the good ship Enterprise. But in so doing, they find themselves battling the eccen- tric currents of the “new” world order, which short-circuit received ways and means. Caught up in these currents, many of them come face to face with the most fundamental metamorphoses wrought by the neoliberal turn: the labile role of labor in the elusive algorithm connecting production to consumption, the pro to the con of capitalism.16

    Which brings us back to the problematic status of production at the turn of the new century.

    Labor’s Pain: Producing the Class of 2000 The emergence of consumption as a privileged site for the fabrication of self and society, of culture and identity, is closely tied to the changing status of work under contemporary conditions. For some, the economic order of our times represents a completion of the intrinsic “project” of capital: namely, the evolution of a social formation that, as Mario Tronti (1980: 32) puts it, “does not look to labor as its dynamic foundation” (cf. Hardt 1995: 39). Others see the present moment in radically different terms. Scott Lash and John Urry (1987: 232–33), for instance, declare that we are seeing not the denouement but the demise of organized capitalism, of a system in which cor- porate institutions could secure compromises between management and workers by making appeal to the national interest. The internationalization of market forces, they claim, has not merely eroded the capacity of states to control national economies. It has led to a decline in the importance of domestic produc- tion in many once industrialized countries—which, along with the worldwide rise of the service sector and the feminization of the workforce, has dispersed class relations, alliances, and antinomies across the four corners of the earth. It has also put such distances between sites of production and consumption that their articulation becomes all but unfathomable, save in fantasy.

    Not that Fordist fabrication has disappeared. There is a larger absolute number of industrial workers in the world today than ever before (Kellogg 1987). Neither is the mutation of the labor market altogether unprecedented. For one thing, as Marx (1967: 635) observed, the development of capitalism has always conduced to the cumulative replacement of “skilled laborers by less skilled, mature laborers by immature, male by female”—also “living” labor by “dead.” As David Harvey (1989: 192–93) reminds us, the devaluation of labor power has been a traditional response to falling profits and periodic crises of commodity production. What is more, the growth of global markets in commodities and services has not been accompanied by a correspondingly unrestricted flow of workers; most nation- states still try to regulate their movement to a greater or lesser extent. The simul- taneous “freeing” and compartmentalizing of labor, Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh (in this issue) point out, is a tension long endemic to capitalism.

    Nonetheless, Harvey insists, if not in quite the same terms as Lash and Urry (1987), that the current moment is different: that it evinces features that set it apart, fracturing the continuing history of capital—a history, Engels once said, that “remain[s] the same and yet [is] constantly changing” (quoted by Andre Gunder Frank [1971: 36]). Above all, the explosion of new markets and mone- tary instruments, aided by sophisticated means of planetary coordination and space-time compression, have given the financial order a degree of autonomy from “real production” unmatched in the annals of political economy (cf. Turner n.d.: 18). The consequences are tangible: “Driven by the imperative to replicate money,” writes David Korten (1996: 13; cf. McMichael 1999: 98), “the [new global] system treats people as a source of inefficiency”: ever more disposable. The spiraling virtuality of fiscal circulation, of the accumulation of wealth purely through exchange, exacerbates this tendency: it enables the speculative side of capitalism to act as if it were entirely independent of human manufacture. The market and its masters, an “electronic herd” (Friedman 1999) of nomadic, deterritorialized investors, appear less and less constrained by the costs or moral economy of concrete labor.

    If capital strives to become autonomous of labor, if the spatial and temporal coordinates of modernist political economy have been sundered, if the ontological connection between production and consumption has come into question, what has happened to the linchpin of capitalism: the concept formerly known as class?

    Denunciations of the concept, Fredric Jameson (1999: 46–47) laments, have become “obligatory.” Even for Marxists. This in spite of the fact that class names an “ongoing social reality,” a persistently active dimension of “post-Cold War maps of the world system.” He is, moreover, unconvinced by claims that it no longer makes sense of the transnational division of labor; nor is he persuaded that gender, race, and ethnicity are more constitutive of concrete experience in the contemporary moment. For Jameson, gender and race are too easily reconciled with the demands of liberal ideology, with its solutions to social problems, with the sorts of politics it proffers. Class, finally, remains more intractable and more fundamental. Thus Tom Lewis (1999: 151): the failure to recognize it as “the most effective subject position” through which to organize against racism and sexism is “particularly regrettable.”

    But surely the matter runs deeper than this? Subject positions are multiply determined, shaped less by political expediency than by the compelling truths of sense and perception. As Jameson himself notes (1999: 49), “Nothing is more complexly allegorical than the play of class connotations across the . . . social field.” Our task, surely, is to examine how consciousness, sentiment, and attach- ment are constituted under prevailing conditions; why class has become a less plausible basis for self-recognition and action when growing disparities of wealth and power would point to the inverse (cf. Storper, in this issue); why gender, race, ethnicity, and generation have become such compelling idioms of identification, mobilizing people, both within and across nation-states, in ways often opposed to reigning hegemonies.

    Once again, this problem is hardly new. There has long been debate about the two big questions at the nub of the historical sociology of class: Why do social classes seem so seldom to have acted for themselves (für sich)? And why have explicit forms of class consciousness arisen relatively infrequently, even under the worst of Fordist conditions (see, e.g., Wallerstein 1972: 173; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987)? Complex, poetically rich, culturally informed imaginings have always come between structural conditions and subjective perceptions—imagin- ings that have multiplied and waxed more ethereal, more fantastic, as capitalist economies have enlarged in scale. Neither the absolute increase in industrial workers across the globe nor the fact that 70 percent of the population in advanced capitalist societies “structurally belong to the working class” (Lewis 1999: 150–51) dictates that people will experience the world, or act upon it, in classic proletarian terms.

    Quite the opposite. As we have already said, the labile relation of labor to capital may have intensified existing structures of inequality, but it is also erod- ing the conditions that give rise to class opposition as an idiom of identity and/or interest. Key here is the dramatic transnationalization of primary pro- duction (this by contrast to trade in raw materials and finished products, which has long crossed sovereign borders; see Dicken 1986: 3). A world-historical process, it is having profound effects on the configuration, and the cognition, of social relations of production everywhere: (1) By undermining the capacity of states to sustain economies in which “production, plant, firm and industry were essentially national phenomena” (Hobsbawm 1979: 313), it renders obsolete the old system of bargaining in which labor and capital could negotiate wages and conditions within an enclaved territory (Lash and Urry 1987: 232–33; see above); (2) by subverting domestic production in industrialized countries, it encourages the cutting of labor costs through casualization, outsourcing, and the hiring of discounted (female, immigrant, racinated) workers, thereby either making blue-collar employees redundant or forcing them into the menial end of the service sector; (3) by widening the gulf between rich and poor regions, it makes the latter—via the export of labor or the hosting of sweatshops and maquiladoras—into the working class of the former; and (4) by reducing pro- letarians everywhere to the lowest common denominator, it compels them to compete with little protection against the most exploitative modes of manufacture on the planet.

    To the extent, then, that the nation-state is, as Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 318) says, “the terrain on which actual class conflicts take place,” it follows that the global dispersal of manufacture is likely to fragment modernist forms of class con- sciousness, class alliance, and class antinomies at an exponential rate. It is also likely to dissolve the ground on which proletarian culture once took shape and to disrupt any sense of rootedness within organically conceived structures of production. Already, in many places, there has been a palpable erosion of the con- ventional bases of worker identity. Thus, while it is possible to argue, with Terence Turner (n.d.: 25; cf. Cox 1987: 271), that transnational flows of capital and labor have replicated “internal” class divisions on an international scale, exist- ing relations among labor, place, and social reproduction—and, with them, the terms of class conflict itself—have been thoroughly unsettled for now.

    While the contours of the global proletariat are ghostly at best—and while middle classes seem everywhere to be facing a loss of socioeconomic security, their center ground ever shakier (cf. Storper, in this issue)—a transnational capitalist class is taking more and more tangible shape. Here, again, there are questions of nuance about the old and the new: international bourgeoisies are, arguably, as old as capitalism itself. Dependency theorists have long insisted that they were a critical element in the making of modern European states and their national economies; also that their exploitation of colonial wealth was indispensable to the development of the Western metropoles. The new transna- tional capitalist elite—its frequent-flier executives, financiers, bureaucrats, professionals, and media moguls—may appear to be the planetary version of those older cosmopolitan bourgeoisies, its cadres centered in the imperial capi- tals of the world. But, as Leslie Sklair (1998: 136–37) argues, this new elite is distinctive in several ways. Above all, its interests are vested primarily in glob- alizing forms of capital: capital whose shareholder-driven imperatives are unrelated to any particular local enterprise, metropolitan or colonial. Hence, while its business ventures might loop into and out of national economies, this does not, as Saskia Sassen (n.d.) stresses, make them “national” enterprises. The entrepreneurial activities of this class are conceived in terms of markets, monetary transactions, and modes of manufacture that transcend national bor- ders. They seek to disengage from parochial loyalties and jurisdictions, thus to minimize the effects of legal regulations, environmental constraints, taxation, and labor demands.17

    Decontextualization, the distantiation from place and its sociomoral pres- sures, is an autonomic impulse of capitalism at the millennium;18 crucial, in fact, to its ways and means of discounting labor by abstracting itself from direct con- frontation or civic obligation. The poor are no longer at the gates; bosses live in enclaved communities a world away, beyond political or legal reach. Capital and its workforce become more and more remote from each other: frequent fliers and frequent friers seldom meet on the global highways they travel—in contrapuntal rhythm. Here is the harsh underside of the culture of neoliberalism. It is a culture that, to return to our opening comment, re-visions persons not as producers from a particular community, but as consumers in a planetary marketplace: persons as ensembles of identity that owe less to history or society than to organically conceived human qualities.

    This logos does not go uncontested, of course—neither by popular nationalisms nor by social movements of various stripes, left and right, North and South, especially among the marginal (Sklair 1998: 137; Turner n.d.). But the gospel of laissez-faire is a potent presence in contemporary capitalist societies, its axioms reinforced by quotidian experience and its truths instilled in its subjects by the remorseless commodification of ever more finely targeted areas of everyday life. Witness the following interpolation:

    You are at one with the world. . . . The real world where time treads with a leisure measure. You express your commitment to the new age . . . in the way you think, the way you talk, the way you dress. Leisure time dressing is YOU.”

    The off-the-peg poetics of this call to postproletarian identity comes from a label attached to a pair of women’s shorts marketed in a climate of “patriotic capital- ism” by a South African chain store.19 The thickening hegemony to which it speaks is borne also by the global communicative media, themselves seeking to construct a planetary “ecumene” (see n. 4 above), whose satellite signals and fiber-optic nerves reach the widest possible audience. Those signals are designed to evade control exercised by states over flows of images and information— flows once integral to the creation of political communities and national “publics” (cf Anderson 1983:63).

    For all their transformative power, as anthropologists have repeatedly insisted, these material and cultural forces do not have simple, homogenizing effects. They are, in some measure, refracted, redeployed, domesticated, or resisted wherever they come to rest. What we call globalism is a vast ensemble of dialectical processes (J. L. Comaroff 1996; Jean Comaroff 1997b), processes that cannot occur without the grounded, socially embedded human beings from whom they draw value. Nor can these processes occur without the concrete, cul- turally occupied locales—villages, towns, regions, countries, subcontinents—in which they come to rest, however fleetingly. Still, they are re-forming the salience of locality, place, and community in ways that often bypass the state. Hence the proliferation of attachments at once more particular and more univer- sal than citizenship (Turner n.d.: 8)—from those based on gender, sex, race, and age through those organized around issues such as environmentalism and human rights to those, like the Nation of Islam or the hip-hop nation, that mimic nation- hood itself.

    The paradox of class at the millennium, in sum, must be understood in these terms. Neoliberalism aspires, in its ideology and practice, to intensify the abstrac- tions inherent in capitalism itself: to separate labor power from its human con- text, to replace society with the market, to build a universe out of aggregated transactions. While it can never fully succeed, its advance over the “long” twen- tieth century has profoundly altered, if unevenly in space and time, the phenom- enology of being in the world. Formative experiences—like the nature of work and the reproduction of self, culture, and community—have shifted. Once-legible processes—the workings of power, the distribution of wealth, the meaning of politics and national belonging—have become opaque, even spectral. The con- tours of “society” blur, its organic solidarity disperses. Out of its shadows emerges a more radically individuated sense of personhood, of a subject built up of traits set against a universal backdrop of likeness and difference. In its place, to invert the old Durkheimean telos, arise collectivities erected on a form of mechanical solidarity in which me is generalized into we.

    In this vocabulary, it is not just that the personal is political. The personal is the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional valence. By extension, interpersonal relations—above all, sexuality, from the peccadillos of presidents to the global specter of AIDS—come to stand, metonymically, for the inchoate forces that threaten the world as we know it. It is in these privatized terms that action is organized, that the experience of inequity and antagonism takes meaningful shape. In this sense, Jameson (1999: 47) is correct. There is no autonomous discourse of class. Certainly not now, if ever. Oppositions of gender and race, even if not in themselves explicit vehicles for that discourse, are frequently “reinvested” in its practical dynamics and express its stark antagonisms. This is inevitable. Reigning hegemonies, both popular and academic, may separate the construction of identity from the antinomies of class. But the market has always made capital out of human dif- ference and difference out of capital, cultivating exploitable categories of workers and consumers, identifying pariahs, and seeking to silence enemies of established enterprise. As lived reality, then, social class is a multiply refracted gestalt. Its contrasts are mobilized in a host of displaced registers, its distinc- tions carried in a myriad of charged, locally modulated signs and objects— from the canons of taste and desire to the niceties of language use, the subtle discriminations of advertising to the carnal conflict of sport.

    In short, as neoliberal conditions render ever more obscure the rooting of inequality in structures of production, as work gives way to the mechanical soli- darities of “identity” in constructing selfhood and social being, class comes to be understood, in both popular and scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice. Which is why it, like citizenship, is measured increasingly by the capacity to transact and consume; why politics is treated as a matter of indi- vidual or group entitlement; why social wrongs are transposed into an issue of “rights”; why diffuse concerns about cultural integrity and communal survival are vested in “private” anxieties about sexuality, procreation, or family values; why the fetus, neoliberal subject par excellence, becomes the focus of a macabre nativity play, in which, “vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,” moral antago- nists lock in mortal battle over the right to life (Jean Comaroff 1997a; Berlant 1997). Analytically, of course, it is imperative for us not to take these things at face value. The problem, rather, is to explain why, in the millennial age, class has become displaced and refracted in the way that it has. Which is why, finally, its reduction, to the mere “experience of inferiority,” as Jameson (1999: 47) would have it, is insufficient. The concept of class so reduced captures neither the com- plex construction of contemporary experience nor the crises of social reproduc- tion in which much of the world appears to be caught.

    Generating Futures:Youth in the Age of Incivility That sense of physical, social, and moral crisis congeals, perhaps more than anywhere else, in the contempo- rary predicament of youth, now widely under scrutiny (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.). Generation, in fact, seems to be an especially fertile site into which class anxieties are displaced. Perhaps that much is overdetermined: it is on the backs of the pubescent that concerns about social reproduction—about the viability of the continuing present—have almost always been saddled. Nonetheless, genera- tion as a principle of distinction, consciousness, and struggle has long been neglected, or taken for granted, by theorists of political economy. This will no longer do: the growing pertinence of juveniles — or, more accurately, their impertinence—is an ineluctable feature of the present moment, from Chicago to Cape Town, Calcutta to Caracas. Preadulthood, of course, is a historically constructed category: while, in much of the late-twentieth-century English-speaking world, young white persons are teenagers, their black counterparts are youth, adolescents with attitude. And most often, if not always, male.

    There are startling similarities in the current situation of youth the world over, similarities that appear to arise out of the workings of neoliberal capitalism and the changing planetary order of which we have spoken. These similarities seem to be founded on a doubling, on simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. On one hand is their much remarked exclusion from local economies, especially from shrinking, mutating blue collar sectors. As the expansion of the free market runs up against the demise of the welfare state, the modernist ideal in which each generation does better than its predecessor is mocked by conditions that disen- franchise the unskilled young of the inner city and the countryside (cf. Abdullah 1998). Denied full, waged citizenship in the nation-state, many of them take to the streets, often the only place where, in an era of privatization, a lumpen pub- lic can be seen and heard (cf. Appadurai forthcoming). The profile of these pop- ulations reflects also the feminization of post-Fordist labor, which further disrupts gender relations and domestic reproduction among working people, creating a concomitant “crisis of masculinity”: a crisis as audible in U.S. gangsta rap as in South African gang rape, as visible in the parodic castration of “The Full Monty” as in the deadly machismo of soccer violence or the echoing corridors of Columbine High. This crisis is not confined to youth or workers, of course— world cinema has made that point cogently in recent years—but it is magnified among them.

    On the other hand is the recent rise of assertive, global youth cultures of desire, self-expression, and representation; in some places, too, of potent, if unconventional, forms of politicization. Pre-adults have long been at the frontiers of the transnational: the waxing U.S. economy in the 1950s was marked by the emergence of “teens” as a consumer category with its own distinctive, interna- tionally marketable culture. This, however, intensified immeasurably during the 1980s and 1990s. To a greater extent than ever before, generation became a con- crete principle of mobilization, inflecting other dimensions of difference, not least class, in whose displacements it is closely entailed (cf. Corrigan and Frith 1976). Youth activism, clearly, has been hugely facilitated by the flow of infor- mation, styles, and currencies across old sovereign boundaries. The signifying practices on which it is based appear to flourish, more than most things, with space-time compression.

    This is not to imply that the young form a “homogeneous, sociological cate- gory of people which thinks, organizes and acts” in coherent ways (Seekings 1993: xiv). The fact that youth culture is increasingly capacious in its reach does not mean that the situation of “kids,” or the nature of their social experience, is everywhere the same. But it is to say that, in recent times, this segment of the population has gained unprecedented autonomy as a social category an und für sich, both in and for itself; this in spite, or maybe because, of its relative margin- alization from the normative world of work and wage. In many Western contexts they, along with other disenfranchised persons (notably the homeless and the unemployed), constitute a kind of counternation: a virtual citizenry with its own twilight economies, its own spaces of production and recreation, its own modali- ties of politics with which to address the economic and political conditions that determine its plight (Venkatesh 1997).

    As a consequence, youth tend everywhere to occupy the innovative, uncharted borderlands along which the global meets the local. This is often made manifest in the elaboration of creolized argots, of streetspeak and cybertalk, that give voice to imaginative worlds very different from those of the parental gener- ation. But these borderlands are also sites of tension, particularly for disadvan- taged young people from postrevolutionary societies, from inner cities, and from other terrors incognita who seek to make good on the promises of the free mar- ket; also for anyone who jostles against the incivilities, illegalities, and importu- nities of these precocious entrepreneurs. In the late twentieth century, the image of youth-as-trouble has gained an advanced capitalist twist as impatient adoles- cents “take the waiting out of wanting” by developing remarkably diverse forms of illicit enterprise20—from drug trafficking in the urban United States, through the “bush” economies of West and Central Africa, which trade diamonds and dollars, guns and gasoline over long distances (Roitman 1999; De Boeck 1999), to the supply of services both legal and lethal. In this they try to link the poles of consumption and production and to break into the cycle of accumulation, often by flouting received rules and conventions. The young have felt their power, power born partly of the sheer weight of numbers, partly of a growing inclination and capacity to turn to the use of force, partly of a willingness to hold polite society to ransom.

    Bill Buford (1993: 264–65) has suggested that British soccer fans experience a compelling sense of community in moments of concerted violence. Others have said the same of gangland wars in North American cities, witch burning in the northerly provinces of South Africa, and cognate social practices elsewhere. Is it surprising, then, that so many juveniles see themselves as ironic, mutant citizens of a new world order? Or that the standardized nightmare of the genteel main- stream is an increasingly universal image of the adolescent, a larger-than-life fig- ure wearing absurdly expensive sports shoes, headphones blaring gangsta rap, beeper tied to a global underground economy—in short, a sinister caricature of the corporate mogul? Is this not a dramatic embodiment of the dark side of con- sumerism, of a riotous return of the repressed, of a parallel politics of class, social reproduction, and civil society?

    Precisely because of its fusion of monstrosity, energy, and creativity, this fig- ure also subsumes some of the more complex aspects of millennial capitalism, if in the manner of a grotesque: its tendency to spark the pursuit of new ways and means for the production of wealth; its ambivalent, contradictory engagement with the nation-state; its play on the presence and absence of civil society. It is to these three faces of the “rough beast, its hour come round at last,” that we now turn.

    Three Faces of Millennial Capitalism

    Liberal democracy . . . has never been . . . in such a state of dysfunction. . . . Life is not only distorted, as was always the case, by a great number of socio-eco- nomic mechanisms, but it is exercised with more and more difficulty in a public space profoundly upset by techno-tele-media apparatuses and by new rhythms of information and communication, . . . by the new modes of appropriation they put to work, by the new structure of the event and its spectrality. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx

    Occult Economies and New Religious Movements: Privatizing the Millennium A striking corollary of the dawning Age of Millennial Capitalism has been the global proliferation of “occult economies.”21 These economies have two dimen- sions: a material aspect founded on the effort to conjure wealth—or to account for its accumulation—by appeal to techniques that defy explanation in the con- ventional terms of practical reason; and an ethical aspect grounded in the moral discourses and (re)actions sparked by the (real or imagined) production of value through such “magical” means. It is difficult, of course, to quantify the presence of the occult—and, therefore, to make any claim to its increase. As we note above, finance capital has always had its spectral enchantments, its modes of speculation based on less than rational connections between means and ends. Both its underside (the pariah forms of gambling of which we spoke a moment ago) and its upper side (a fiscal industry, embracing everything from insurance to stock markets) have been rooted, from the first, in two inscrutables: a faith in probability (itself a notoriously poor way of predicting the future from the past) and a monetary system that depends for its existence on “confidence,” a chimera knowable, tautologically, only by its effects. Wherein, then, lies the claim that occult economies are presently on the rise?

    In the specific context of South Africa, we have demonstrated (1999b, 1999c) that there has been an explosion of occult-related activity—much of it violent, arising out of accusations of ritual killing, witchcraft, and zombie conjuring— since the late apartheid years. These also include fantastic Ponzi schemes, the sale of body parts for “magical” purposes, satanic practices, tourism based on the sighting of fabulous monsters, and the like. Here middle-class magazines run “dial-a-diviner” advertisements, national papers carry headline articles on medi- cine murders, prime-time television broadcasts dramas of sorcery, and more than one “witchcraft summit” has been held. Patently, even here we cannot be sure that the brute quantum of occult activity exceeds that of times past. But what is clear is that their reported incidence, written about by the mainstream press in more prosaic, less exoticizing terms than ever before (Fordred 1999), has forced itself upon the public sphere, rupturing the flow of mediated “news.” It is this rup- ture—this focus of popular attention on the place of the arcane in the everyday production of value—to which we refer when we speak of a global proliferation of occult economies.

    It is not difficult to catalogue the presence of occult economies in different parts of the world. In West Africa, for example, Peter Geschiere (1997), among others, has shown how zombie conjuring is becoming an endemic feature of everyday life, how sorcery and witchcraft have entered into the postcolonial political economy as an integral element of a thriving alternative modernity, how magic has become as much an aspect of mundane survival strategies as it is indis- pensable to the ambitions of the powerful (see also Bastian 1993). Nor is all of this based in rural situations or among poor people. In South Africa a recent case involved a well-known physician: she was “turned into a zombie” by a “Nigerian devil-worshipper,” who, having rendered her insensate, took a large sum of money from her bank account.22 By labeling the accused a Nigerian devil wor- shipper, the report ties the menace of the satanic to the flow of immigrants across national borders.

    Nor is this only an African phenomenon. In various parts of Asia occult economies thrive, often taking surprising turns (see Morris, in this issue). In Thai- land—where fortune-telling has been transformed by global technology and e- mail divination has taken off—one “traditional” seer, auspiciously named Madam Luk, reports that her clients nowadays ask three questions to the exclu- sion of all others: “‘Is my company going broke?’ ‘Am I going to lose my job?’ and ‘Will I find another job?’ ”23 In the United States, too, the fallout of neolib- eral capitalism is having its impact on magical practice. There is, for instance, a growing use (“seeping into the grassroots” of the U.S. heartland and taking its place beside other millennial pursuits) of tarot readings as a respectable form of therapy—described by the director of the Trends Research Institute as a low- cost “shrink in the box.”24 By these means are psychology, spirituality, and for- tune-telling fused.

    Sometimes dealings in the occult take on a more visceral, darker form. Throughout Latin America in the 1990s, as in Africa and Asia, there have been mass panics about the clandestine theft and sale of the organs of young people, usually by unscrupulous expatriates (Scheper-Hughes 1996). Violence against children has become metonymic of threats to social reproduction in many ethnic and national contexts, the dead (or missing) child having emerged as the stan- dardized nightmare of a world out of control (Jean Comaroff 1997a). There, and in other parts of the globe, this commerce—like international adoptions, mail- order marriage, and indentured domestic labor—is seen as a new form of impe- rialism, the affluent North siphoning off the essence of poorer “others” by mys- terious means for nefarious ends. All of which gives evidence, to those at the nether end of the global distribution of wealth, of the workings of insidious forces, of potent magical technologies and modes of accumulation.

    That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itself. Hence the recent scares, in several countries, about the sexual and satanic abuse of children (La Fontaine 1997); about the kidnapping and murder of street “urchins,” most recently in Ger- many by “Russian gangs,” for purposes of organ harvest and export; about the alleged “trafficking in women [especially] from . . . nations of the former Soviet bloc” for prostitution, labor, and other “personal services” in Western Europe, the Americas, Japan, and China.25 Again, the United States is not exempt from anxi- eties over the pilfering of human bodies and body parts for profit. Note, for just one extreme instance, the urban myth that traversed the Internet in 1997 about the secret excision of kidneys, by apparently incredible means, from business travelers.26

    In other contexts, the occult concentrates itself in purely financial dealings. Thus there seems to have been an extraordinary intensification of pyramid schemes lately, many of them tied to the electronic media. These schemes, and a host of scams allied with them—a few legal, many illegal, some alegal—are hardly new. But their recent mushrooming across the world has drawn a great deal of attention—partly because of their sheer scale and partly because, by crossing national borders and/or registering at addresses far from the site of their local operation, they insinuate themselves into the slipstream of the global econ- omy, thereby escaping control. Recall the ten or so whose crash sparked the Albanian revolution early in 1997, several of which took on almost miraculous dimensions for poor investors. One pyramid manager in Albania, according to the New York Times, was “a gypsy fortune teller, complete with crystal ball, who claimed to know the future.”27 Even in the tightly regulated stock markets of the United States there has been a rise in illegal operations that owe their logic, if not their precise operation, to pyramids: another New York Times report attributes this to the fact that investors are presently “predisposed to throw dollars at get- rich-quick schemes.” Six billion dollars were lost to scams on the New York Stock Exchange in 1996.28 These scams also bring to mind others that arise from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation, among them, the notorious Nigerian-based “419,” a truly transnational con that regularly traps foreign busi- nessmen into signing over major assets and may actually have fabricated a national election at home (Apter 1999); also the Foundation for New Era Philan- thropy, a U.S. pyramid created “to change the world for the glory of God.” On the basis of a promise to double their money in six months, its founder, John Benett, persuaded five hundred nonprofit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million.29 The line between Ponzi schemes and evangelical prosperity gospels is very thin indeed.30

    All of these things have a single common denominator: the allure of accruing wealth from nothing. In this respect, they are born of the same animating spirit as casino capitalism; indeed, perhaps they are casino capitalism for those who lack the fiscal or cultural capital—or who, for one or another reason, are reluctant— to gamble on more conventional markets. Like the cunning that made straw into gold (Schneider 1989), these alchemic techniques defy reason in promising unnaturally large profits—to yield wealth without production, value without effort. Here, again, is the specter, the distinctive spirit, of neoliberal capitalism in its triumphal hour. So much for the demise of disenchantment.

    Speaking of the neoliberal spirit, occult economies have close parallels in the spread of new religious movements across the planet. To wit, the latter may be seen as holy-owned subsidiaries of the former. These movements take on a wide variety of guises. In the case of the Vissariontsi, “disenchanted Soviet intellectu- als” who follow a traffic warden-turned-messiah, members renounce their earthly wealth for life in the City of Sun, a congregation in Siberia that recalls a commu- nist farm. The Second Coming here, led by a man with a sense of both history and irony—a City of Sun, in Siberia? A career in Russian traffic management for the Son of God?—envisages a future in the past, a hereafter (or therebefore?) that recaptures the glories of a socialist commune.31 But the renunciatory orien- tation of the Vissariontsi is not usual among new religious movements at the mil- lennium. Much closer to the global mood of the moment are fee-for-service, con- sumer-cult, prosperity-gospel denominations. These creeds are well exemplified by any number of neo-Pentecostal sects; best perhaps by the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus), a denomination of Brazilian origin which, true to its name, has opened up outposts in many parts of the world (Kramer 1999).

    The Universal Church reforms the Protestant ethic with enterprise and urban- ity, fulsomely embracing the material world. It owns a major television network in Brazil, has an elaborate web site, and, above all, promises swift payback to those who embrace Christ, denounce Satan, and “make their faith practical” by “sacrificing” all they can to the movement.32 Here Pentecostalism meets neolib- eral enterprise. In its African churches, most of them (literally) storefronts, prayer meetings respond to frankly mercenary desires, offering everything from cures for depression through financial advice to remedies for unemployment; casual passersby, clients really, select the services they require. Bold color adver- tisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorn altars; tabloids pasted to walls and windows carry testimonials by followers whose membership was rewarded by a rush of wealth and/or an astonishing recovery of health. The ability to deliver in the here and now, itself a potent form of space-time compression, is offered as the measure of a genuinely global God, just as it is taken to explain the power of satanism (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b); both have the instant efficacy of the magical and the millennial. As Kramer (1999: 35) says of Brazilian neo-Pentecostals, “Inner-worldly asceticism has been replaced with a concern for the pragmatics of material gain and the immediacy of desire. . . . The return on capital has suddenly become more spiritually compelling and imminent . . . than the return of Christ.” This shift is endemic to the new religious movements of the late twentieth century. For them, and for their many millions of members, the Second Coming evokes not a Jesus who saves, but one who pays dividends. Or, more accurately, one who promises a miraculous return on a limited spiritual investment.

    Why? How—to put the matter more generally—are we to account for the current spread of occult economies and prosperity cults?

    To the degree that millennial capitalism fuses the modern and the postmod- ern, hope and hopelessness, utility and futility, the world created in its image presents itself as a mass of contradictions: as a world, simultaneously, of possi- bility and impossibility. This is precisely the juxtaposition associated with cargo cults and chiliastic movements in other times and places (Worsley 1957; Cohn 1957). But, as the growth of prosperity gospels and fee-for-service movements illustrates, in a neoliberal age the chiliastic urge emphasizes a privatized millen- nium, a personalized rather than a communal sense of rebirth; in this, the mes- sianic meets the magical. At the end of the twentieth century, the cargo, glimpsed in large part through television, takes the form of huge concentrations of wealth that accrue, legitimately or otherwise, to the rich of the global economy—espe- cially the enigmatic new wealth derived from financial investment and manage- ment, from intellectual property and other rights, from cyberspace, from trans- port and its cognate operations, and from the supply of various post-Fordist services. All of which points to the fact that the mysterious mechanisms of a changing market, not to mention abstruse technological and informational expertise, hold the key to hitherto unimaginable fortunes amassed by the ever more rapid flow of value, across time and space, into the fluid coordinates of the local and the global; to the much mass-mediated mantra that the gap between the affluent and the indigent is growing at an exponential rate; and to the strange convolutions in the structural conditions of labor, discussed above, that seem at once to reduce and produce joblessness by altering conventional terms of employment, by feminizing the workforce, and by deterritorializing proletariats.

    This, of course, is the flip side of the coin: the sense of impossibility, even despair, that comes from being left out of the promise of prosperity, from having to look in on the global economy of desire from its immiserated exteriors. Whether it be in post-Soviet Central Europe or postcolonial Africa, in Thatcherite Britain or the neoliberal United States, in a China edging toward capitalism or neo-Pentecostal Latin America, the world-historical process that came to be symbolized by the events of 1989 held out the prospect that everyone would be set free to accumulate and speculate, to consume, and to indulge repressed crav- ings in a universe of less government, greater privatization, more opulence, infi- nite enterprise. For the vast majority, however, the millennial moment passed without visible enrichment.

    The implication? That, in these times—the late modernist age when, accord- ing to Weber and Marx, enchantment would wither away—more and more ordi- nary people see arcane forces intervening in the production of value, diverting its flow toward a new elect: those masters of the market who comprehend and control the production of wealth under contemporary conditions. They also attribute to these arcane forces their feelings of erasure and loss: an erasure in many places of community and family, exacerbated by the destabilization of labor, the translocal- ization of management, and the death of retail trade; a loss of human integrity, experienced in the spreading commodification of persons, bodies, cultures, and histories, in the substitution of quantity for quality, abstraction for substance.33 None of these perceptions is new, as we have said. Balzac (1965: 418, 117) described them for France in the 1840s, as did Conrad (1957) for prerevolutionary Russia; Gluckman (1959), moreover, spoke of the “magic of despair” that arose in similarly dislocated colonial situations in Africa. Nonetheless, to reiterate, such disruptions are widely experienced throughout the world as intensifying at a frightening rate at present. Which is why the ethical dimensions of occult economies are so prominent; why the mass panics of our times tend to be moral in tone; why these panics so often express themselves in religious movements that pursue instant material returns and yet condemn those who enrich themselves in nontraditional ways. To be sure, occult economies frequently have this bipolar character: At one level, they consist in the constant quest for new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends; at another, they vocalize a desire to sanction, even eradicate, people held to have accumulated assets by those very means.

    Occult economies, then, are a response to a world gone awry, yet again: a world in which the only way to create real wealth seems to lie in forms of power/knowledge that transgress the conventional, the rational, the moral—thus to multiply available techniques of producing value, fair or foul. In their cultural aspect, they bespeak a resolute effort to come to terms with that power/knowl- edge, to account for the inexplicable phenomena to which it gives rise, and to plumb its secrets. The unprecedented manifestation of zombies in the South African countryside, for instance, has grown in direct proportion to the shrinking labor market for young men. The former provides a partial explanation for the latter: the living dead are commonly said to be killed and raised up by older peo- ple, witches of wealth, to toil for them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b), thereby rendering rural youth jobless. There are, in this era of flexitime employment, even part-time zombies, a virtual working class—of pure, abstract labor power—that slaves away at night for its masters. In this context, furthermore, the angry dramas during which ritual murderers are identified often become sites of public divination. As they unfold, the accusers discuss, attribute cause, and give voice to their understanding of the forces that make the postcolony such an inhospitable place for them. This is an extreme situation, obviously. But in less stark circumstances, too, these economies tend to spawn simultaneous strivings to garner wealth and to put a stop to those who do so by allegedly misbegotten means.

    As all this suggests, appeals to the occult in pursuit of the secrets of capital generally rely on local cultural technologies: on vernacular modes of divination or oracular consultation, spirit possession or ancestral invocation, sorcery bust- ing or forensic legal procedures, witch beliefs or prayer. But the use of these technologies does not imply an iteration of, a retreat into, “tradition.” On the con- trary, their deployment in such circumstances is frequently a means of fashioning new techniques to preserve older values by retooling culturally familiar signs and practices. As in cargo cults of old, this typically involves the mimicking of pow- erful new means of producing wealth (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993: xv–xvi).

    In short, the rise of occult economies—amidst and alongside more conven- tional modes of economic practice that shade into the murky domains of crime and corruption—seems overdetermined. This, after all, is an age in which the extravagant promises of millennial capitalism run up against an increasingly nihilistic, thoroughly postmodern pessimism; in which the will to consume out- strips the opportunity to earn; in which, relatively speaking, there is a much higher velocity of exchange than there is of production. As the connections between means and ends become more opaque, more distended, more mysteri- ous, the occult becomes an ever more appropriate, semantically saturated metaphor for our times. Not only has it become commonplace to pepper media parlance, science-speak, psychobabble, and technologese with the language of enchantment; even the drear argot of the law is showing signs of the same thing.34 And we all remember voodoo economics, that Reagan-era insult to the rationality of Caribbean ritual practice. But, we insist, occult economies are not reducible to the symbolic, the figurative, or the allegorical. Magic is, everywhere, the science of the concrete, aimed at making sense of and acting upon the world—especially, but not only, among those who feel themselves disempow- ered, emasculated, disadvantaged. The fact that the turn to enchantment is not unprecedented, that it has precursors in earlier times, makes it no less significant to those for whom it has become an integral part of everyday reality. Maybe, too, all this describes a fleeting phase in the long, unfinished history of capitalism. But that makes it no less momentous.

    Of all the enchantments that accompanied the First Coming of Capitalism, perhaps the most perduring was nationalism. And the nation-state, a political community—conjured always out of difference, often against indifference— that gave the Durkheimean conscience collective a distinctive, effervescent twist. Recently, as everyone knows, there has been much talk of its death, especially with the end of the Age of Empire, the close of the Cold War, and the onset of the postcolonial era; it is as if the Treaty of Westphalia has finally given way to the Failure of the West. We shall consider this view, and the articulate dissent it has provoked, in a moment. What is beyond question, however, is that the Second Coming, the dawning Age of Millennial Capitalism, has had complex, controver- sial effects on the present and future of the nation-state.

    Alien-Nation, Hyphen-Nation, Desti-Nation: The Future of the Nation-State and the Fetishism of Law In its broad outlines, the scholarly debate over the current condition of the nation-state — the definite, singular article — has become something of a cliché. The thesis that the hyphenated modernist polity is being dramatically subverted, doomed even, has been rehearsed ad infinitum, with varying degrees of nuance; aspects of it have been foreshadowed in what we have already said.

    Nation-states, from this vantage, have been rendered irrelevant by world mar- ket forces (1) because capital has become uncontrollable and keeps moving, at its own velocity, to sites of optimum advantage; (2) because the global workforce has become ever more mobile as job seekers, increasingly managed by private agen- cies, migrate ever further in pursuit of even the most menial of jobs, under even the most feudal of conditions;35 and (3) because these human flows seem, in vary- ing proportions, to elude surveillance, despite the highly repressive mechanisms often put into place to monitor national frontiers. Under such conditions, it is said, state regulation of both capital and labor becomes obsolete, impossible; so, too, do fiscal designs that run counter to the mechanisms of global markets and/or the imperatives of global corporations. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996: 175–76), who argue the antithesis, put it, “[States] can no longer independently affect the levels of economic activity or employment within their territories. . . . [Their] job is to provide the infrastructure and public goods needed at the lowest possible cost.”

    In its historical framing, this thesis sees the leitmotif of the twentieth century as the “battle between government and the marketplace” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998), the latter winning out to the point that “public sectors are shrinking, deregulation is everyone’s priority, state companies are being auctioned off to private investors, and Wall Street is the most powerful influence on economies everywhere” (Garten 1998: 7). As Sassen (n.d.: 4–5) notes, this perspective casts the strength of the nation-state in a zero-sum opposition to the global economy —note, not to neoliberal capitalism, nor globalization tout court, but to the global economy. Where one gains, the other must lose. Thus, says Robert Ross (1990: 206–7, 218), until recently the regulatory role of national governments expanded progressively. Now, however, corporations are able to prevail on states “to restrain regulations, cut taxes, and allocate more public funds toward subsidizing production costs,” which puts “global capital in a position to demand changes in state policy” (211, emphasis ours). Taken together, this adds up to the prognosis that, “in the long run, the power of the state, of centralized government, will weaken everywhere, an inevitability which will change profoundly the very tex- ture of history” (Lukacs 1993: 157).

    In all this, as will be clear, it is the workings of transnational corporations, and especially the mobility of their productive operations, that are held account- able for the imminent demise of the nation-state. Others have also laid causal stress on the fiscal mechanics of the world economy, in particular on their tech- nological transformations. Joel Kurtzman (1993), for example, holds that the growth of a global electronic economy—based on an “electronic commons” in which virtual money and commodities may be exchanged instantly via an unreg- ulated world network of computers—has shattered the integrity of sovereign polities (85–86, 214–15): it has eroded their monopolistic control over the money supply, their capacity to contain wealth within borders, and even their ability to tax citizens or corporations. From this perspective, the emergence of a global economy is said to be undermining the nation-state by deconstructing currency, credit, and customs boundaries—which formerly gave governments a major means of control over the wealth of their nations—by creating mobile markets across the planet, thus dispersing the production and circulation of value. Which is why, it is so commonly said, many states are finding it impossible to meet the material demands placed upon them by their citizenry or to carry out effective economic development policies; why few can adequately house, feed, school, and ensure the health of their populations; why even fewer can see their way clear to settling their national debt or reducing their deficits; why only a handful can be confident about the replacement of infrastructure over the medium term; why almost none have the capacity to control their money supply, let alone flows of goods and people; and why a growing number have shown a startling inability to regulate violence.

    The thesis has also been argued in terms other than the simply economic, of course. The eroding boundedness of the nation-state, its loss of sovereignty as a commonwealth of signs, has been variously attributed, not least on the pages of this journal, to the impact of planetary cultural flows and electronic media (see e.g., Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1989: 69–70; Moore 1989; Foster 1991); to the assertive spread of transnational communities, social movements, and identities; to the universalization of many aspects of the law (if not of justice; Silbey 1997: 209), the expansion of tribunals that subject national jurisdictions to supranational ones (Darian-Smith 1995, 1999), and the rise of an intercontinental commercial arbitra- tion establishment (Garth and Dezalay 1996); to “worldkill,” the commodification of violence that makes it possible for corporations, political blocs, shadow states, or nations to rent soldiers on the Internet, to arrange for the application of force in breach of sovereign borders, even to buy a coup from a multinational company (John L. Comaroff 1996);36 to the shift in dominant patterns of warfare from confrontations between countries to civil conflicts that tend to trans-localize themselves, to kill higher proportions of civilians than ever before, and to feed an arms industry that has metamorphosed from a highly regulated import-export business to a global trade in illicit gun-running;37 to the assimilation of many of the traditional functions of government either into the private sector or into supranational combinations.

    As Peregrine Worsthorne recently noted, in an essay tellingly entitled “Farewell to England’s Nation State,” the “only area where [the country] remains independent and sovereign is sport.” On which Patriotic Front, he adds laconi- cally, “miserable results say all that needs to be said.” Even here, labor has become a mobile commodity as citizens of convenience take the field in acquired (“naturalized”) colors; although it is true that this is perhaps the most significant, sentiment-inspiring, trauma-inducing site of national effervescence in many parts of the world.38 In every other domain, Worsthorne continues, English institu- tions, all of them dysfunctional, have been replaced by more effective interna- tional or global ones. “But who cares?” he asks. “It is time to change our think- ing.”39 This from a notable public intellectual, in Britain’s most widely read conservative newspaper, about England, self-appointed cradle of modernity, democracy, and the state—not some struggling postcolony still trying to throw off the effects of the Age of Empire.

    Some do care—and are not prepared to give up so easily on the salience of the nation-state. It is not yet time, says Khachig Tölölyan (1991: 5), “to write [its] . . . obituary.” Turner (n.d.: 25), for one, argues that the “development of the global capitalist system” has “not led to any withering away of the state” at all. Quite the opposite, the relevance of “[nation-]state boundaries” has been height- ened; contemporary states, especially successful ones, still “attempt to regulate, encourage or obstruct flows of workers, capital and commodities across their bor- ders” (25). In stark contrast to the likes of Kurtzman, Turner also speaks of the perceived “need for national economies to remain competitive under global con- ditions” (23–24); a far cry, this, from the notion that there no longer is any such thing. Similarly Hirst and Thompson (1996: 17): “The globalization of produc- tion,” they hold, “has been exaggerated.” Companies, of which few are truly to remain so” (2). Also overstated are claims for “the dominance of world mar- kets and their ungovernability” (6); in point of fact, financial flows and trade are concentrated in the “triad” of North America, Europe, and Japan (2). Here, in a nutshell, is the countercase.

    This antithetical position has a nontrivial political dimension for its advocates, especially those on the left. To the degree that globalization dissolves the sover- eign nation-state into a sea of planetary economic forces and legal jurisdictions, it would appear to negate any real prospect of progressive or proletarian politics— be they international or intranational—as they would have no terrain on which to occur, no concrete object in terms of which to frame itself, no obvious target against which to act (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996: 1; Ahmad 1992: 317).40 We share the concern. As it is, there is a strong argument to be made that neoliberal capitalism, in its millennial moment, portends the death of politics by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, in the inexorable, expanding “needs” of business, in the imperatives of science and technology. Or, if it does not conduce to the death of politics, it tends to reduce them to the pursuit of pure interest, individual or collective—or to struggles over issues (the environment, abortion, health care, child welfare, human rights) that, important though they may be, are often, pace Jameson (1999: 47), dissociated from anything beyond themselves. It is here that the analytic case for the sustained salience of the modernist polity merges into the normative case for its desirability.

    A parenthetic comment here. There are those who would muddy the argument by pointing out that the notion of a strong nation-state has always been some- thing of a fantasy. This on three grounds: the state, the nation, and the hyphen. Recall, in respect of the first, Philip Abrams (1988: 75–77), for whom the state was always “the distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies”: an “essentially imaginative construction,” it was, at once, a “triumph of conceal- ment” and an ongoing “ideological project.” Even more extreme is Ralph Miliband’s (1969: 49) famous claim that “the ‘state’ . . . does not, as such, exist.” Shades here of things written long ago. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer (1985: 7) remind us that Marx (1967) believed the state to be “in an important sense an illusion . . . : [it] is at most a message of domination—an ideological artifact attributing unity, structure and independence to the disunited, structureless and dependent workings of the practice of government.” For Weber (1946: 78), too, it was “a claim to legitimacy, a means by which politically organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed, and it is constituted in large part by the activities of institutions of government themselves” (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985: 7). A truly curious force of history, this: at once an illusion, a potent claim to authority, a cultural artifact, a present absence and an absent presence, a prin- ciple of unity masking institutional disarticulation. But nothing like the kind of essentialized “thing” that much of the current debate treats either as alive or dead. Likewise the nation: the enormous literature on the topic—both before and after Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983)—makes it abundantly clear that neither at its dawn nor in its high modernist phase was this polity homogeneous, that even its European exemplars were as different as they were alike. What is more, their capacity to regulate boundaries and to control flows—of capital and cultural property, communications and currencies, persons and information— was invariably incomplete in the face of transnational pressures and incentives. So, too, was their hold over the loyalty of their citizens and subjects. Indeed, the nation-state has always and everywhere been a work in progress, nowhere a fully realized accomplishment. The same may be said, by extension, of its hyphen- nation: of the articulation of state to nation. Polities across the planet vary hugely in both the extent to which, and the manner in which, nation and state are con- joined in them, of which more shortly.

    In part, it is just such complexities that have led to reformulations of the argu- ment from both sides—and to the opening up of a middle ground. Even those who have made the case most forcibly for the continuing relevance of the nation- state do not deny that it is undergoing transformation or that it has been weak- ened in some respects in the face of global capitalism (see, e.g., Hirst and Thomp- son 1996: 170–71). The problem, of course, is to specify how it has changed. For some, its metamorphosis is captured in an aphoristic shift, an apt metaphor for the millennial moment: Philip McMichael (1998: 113), for one, speaks of the sub- stitution of the “citizen state” for the “consumer state.” This is a polity, adds Susan Hegeman (1991: 72–73), in which identity, at all levels, is defined not merely by the consumption of objects, but also by the consumption of the past (89–91). Echoes, here, of Jean Baudrillard (1998); also of the language of national charters, in which the protection of consumers takes precedence over the protection of workers and citizens are redefined as “stakeholders.”

    More substantively, synthetic positions typically begin by deconstructing the zero-sum opposition between globalization and the autonomous functioning of nation-states. Few would continue to deny that the sovereign independence of the latter has contracted, not least in the realms of economic management, defense, and communications; that, for all their efforts to regulate the flow of labor, their hold over the mobility of people, inward or outward, has been more or less undermined; that their parliamentary politics are devoted, in increasing proportion, to safeguarding the operations of the market, to providing stable and secure environments for transnational corporations, and to attracting overseas invest- ment. In this respect, add Hirst and Thompson (1996: 179), it is also true that, without international warfare and conventional enemies, the state does become less immediately significant to its citizens; “national efficiency” (in such things as industrial growth, education, health care, welfare, and the provision of infra- structure) does diminish; and solidarity, save for sporting allegiances, does pale. At the same time and in counterpoint, Sassen (n.d.: 6–9) observes, “most global processes materialize in national territories, [largely] through national institu- tional arrangements, from legislative acts to firms.” These may be transformed in the process, but they remain perceptibly national in their location and operation. To be sure, Sassen continues, states often participate actively in setting up those fiscal and legal frameworks through which the global economy works, and with- out whose specialized instruments it could not exist—they are not just inert objects on which that economy impacts. Nor are they inert objects in the face of the emergence of regional economic spheres that breach their frontiers— whether these be officially constituted, like the Oresund Region in Scandinavia (Peebles n.d.), or spaces of unregulated activity dominated by armed factions, like the Chad Basin in West Africa. With regard to the latter, in fact, Janet Roiman (1998) demonstrates that, far from proclaiming the demise of the nation- state, these transnational networks exist in complicated, mutually perpetuating, often complicitous relations with it; this notwithstanding the fact that those who control the networks—often very powerful armed factions—compete with gov- ernment for financial and regulatory ascendancy. In doing so, they depend on the very national frontiers they transgress and the institutions of the state in order to produce wealth; conversely, the state establishes its own legitimacy, and justifies its own existence, by doing battle with these armed factions.

    It is also the case, as we have intimated, that not all nation-states submit to the demands of the global economy without some mediation or intervention; few administrations would survive if they did. Take postcolonial South Africa again: while the African National Congress (ANC) government is unreservedly commit- ted to participating in the global capitalist economy, its new labor laws seek to protect workers in ways that do not simply serve the interests of transnational business; quite the opposite, employers have protested these laws for that very reason. Whether or not they will survive, and what their effects will be over the long run, is still very much in question. But the general point of which this is an exemplary instance—that nation-states do seek to hold a measure of control over the terms on which their citizens engage with the market—will be clear. So too will the fact that the processes by which millennial capitalism is taking shape do not reduce to a simple narrative according to which the nation-state either lives or dies, ebbs or flourishes. Its impact is much more complicated, more polyphonous and dispersed, and most immediately felt in the everyday contexts of work and labor, of domesticity and consumption, of street life and media-gazing.

    This brings us back full circle to the relationship between the nation-state and millennial capitalism—which, we reiterate, is not synonymous with globalism, although globalization is an inherent part of it. Rounding off the dialectics of the argument we have just outlined, we would like to make a few points about this relationship. All flow from things already said.

    Let us begin with the most basic. There is an antinomy at the heart of the con- temporary history of the modernist polity. On one hand, there is no such thing, save at very high levels of abstraction, as “the nation-state.” Self-evidently, the sociology of the polities that exist under its sign varies dramatically. It is difficult to establish any terms in which, say, Germany and Guinea, Bhutan and Belgium, Uganda and the United States, England and Eritrea may be held to belong to any- thing but the most polythetic of categories. Nor are the substantive differences among them—differences that are growing as a result of their engagement with global capitalism—satisfactorily captured by resort to vapid oppositions, to con- ventional contrasts like rich versus poor, North versus South, successful versus unsuccessful countries. In some places, as we all know, the state can hardly be said to perdure at all, or to perdure purely as a private resource, a family busi- ness, a convenient fiction; in others, the nation, as imagined community, is little more than a rhetorical figure of speech, the color of a soccer stripe, an airline without aircraft, a university rarely open. More complicatedly, there are many postcolonial, postrevolutionary polities, not least but not only in Africa and the former Soviet Union, in which there have developed deep fissures between state and government, this being a corollary of the transition from old to new regimes, in which, as often as not, the power brokers, bureaucrats, and administrative per- sonnel of the past are either left in situ—typically to ensure the confidence of foreign investors—or succeed in finding less visible ways to keep their hands on the levers of authority. Almost invariably, this sets in motion a struggle into which neoliberal capitalist enterprise inserts itself, often with decisive effects. On occasion, too, as in Russia (Ries 1999), organized crime seizes on that struggle to fashion itself into a spectral, underground para-state, providing civic amenities and policing on a fee-for-service basis (cf. Derrida 1994: 83). This, in turn, leads to the popular impression that government has retreated, that order has evapo- rated, that the nation-state is no longer.

    On the other hand, despite this variability in their political sociology, nation- states appear, at least in their exterior forms, to be more similar than ever before, converging on the same notions of the rule of law, enacting similar constitutions, speaking more and more English, borrowing from a single stock of signs and symbols, worshipping together at the altar of Adam Smith, and, yes, all alike dealing with the impact of the global economy—as well as the sense of crisis, real or imagined, to which its implosion has given rise. Even the strongest, for reasons we have spelled out, find themselves hard put to sustain past levels of public expenditure and/or the costs of infrastructural reproduction. Many of them, moreover, have been witness both to calls for “less government” and to a widening rupture in their hyphen-nation; in the disarticulation, that is, between nation and state. Indeed, the assertion of civil society against the state, itself a burgeoning global phenomenon, is just one symptom of that disarticulation. Of, so to speak, alien-nation. Again, none of this is unprecedented. Throughout their history, states have suffered legitimation crises, been held to account for exces- sive public spending, and had to deal with threats to the integrity of the political community. That, however, does not diminish their significance in the white heat of the millennial moment.

    The millennial moment.

    As the term suggests, it is out of the current sense of change and crisis, especially in its impact on the hyphen-nation of the modernist polity, that the millennial dimensions of millennial capitalism reenter our narrative in two ways.

    First, it is striking that almost everywhere that occult economies have arisen, the perceived need to resort to magical means of producing wealth is blamed, in one way or another, on the inability of the state to assure its national citizens a regular income: to protect them from destitution as productive employment migrates away across its borders; to stop the inflow of immigrants and others who divert the commonweal away from autochthons; to incarcerate criminals, witches, and other nefarious characters who spoil the world for upright, hard- working people. The state is also held culpable for failing to safeguard those upright people from violence. To wit, when communal action is taken—in the name of informal justice, cultural policing, or whatever—against those who ply the immoral economy, it is often in the millennial hope of restoring coherence and control in a world run amok, of filling the void left by the withdrawal of the state and making good on its sundered obligation to the nation (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999d).

    Second, in the face of the same rupture, there is a strong tendency for states to appeal to new or intensified magicalities and fetishes in order to heal fissures and breaches in the fabric of the polity. Here, again, an interpolation: recall our com- ments on the question of identity. For reasons alluded to earlier (and explored in extenso elsewhere; John L. Comaroff 1996) one of the most notable corollaries of the changing face of nationhood in the neoliberal age, and especially after 1989, has been an explosion of identity politics. Under these conditions, imagining the nation rarely presumes a “deep horizontal fraternity” any longer, not even in what once regarded themselves as the most undifferentiated of polities. While the vast major- ity continue to live as citizens in nation-states, they tend to be only conditionally, partially, and situationally citizens of nation-states. Ethnic struggles, ranging from polite altercations over resources to genocidal combat, seem immanent almost everywhere as membership is claimed on the double front of innate substance and primordial sentiment, as culture becomes intellectual property (Coombe 1998), as indigenous knowledge becomes an object of commerce, as aboriginal spirituality becomes the site of a consumerist quest (Povinelli, in this issue), as self-imagin- ings, visual representations, even genes become copyright incarnate.41 In the event, homogeneity—as “national fantasy” (Berlant 1991), national aspiration (Anderson 1983), national imperative—is giving way rapidly to a recognition of the irre- ducibility of difference. All of which puts even greater stress on hyphen-nation; all of which presses even more the necessity of finding its millennial key. The more diverse nation-states become in their political sociology, the higher the level of abstraction at which “the nation-state” exists, the greater the imperative to find that key. By their very nature, as David Harvey (1989: 108) notes, modernist states had always “to construct a . . . sense of community . . . based on [more than] money,” and, hence, to conjure up “a definition of public interests over and above the [bour- geois] class and sectarian interests” they served. They still have to fabricate that sense of community. But, with the displacement of class, the interests that they have now to encompass lie in cultural and other forms of identity.

    That states rely on magical means to succeed in the work of hyphen-nation, of articulating nationhood, is a point recently made by Michael Taussig (1997) and Fernando Coronil (1997), each in his own way. A resort to mass-mediated ritual both to produce state power and national unity and to persuade citizens of their reality is epidemic in the age of millennial capitalism—in rough proportion, per- haps, to populist perceptions of crisis, to the inability of governments to sustain their monopoly over the means of violence and the flow of wealth, and to the alien-nation of their subjects. Thus, suggests Eric Worby (1998: 560), in those parts of Africa where the hold of ruling cadres is tenuous at best, executive authority has become dependent on the performance of quotidian ceremonial, extravagant in its dramaturgy and improvisational content alike, to ensure the collusion of citizen-subjects. The latter, he goes on (562; after Mbembe 1992a: 3–4), live with the state in a promiscuous hybrid of accommodation and refusal, power and parody, embodiment and detachment. This, in turn, tends to rob “the public” of its vitality and, reciprocally, vulgarizes the political—with it, nation- hood as well—reducing it to a chimera, which creates the need for yet more magic.

    Here, it seems, lies the key to the magicality of the state in the age of millen- nial capitalism. It is not just that ruling regimes resort to theatrical display or to illusion to conjure up the present and future of the political community, its desti- nation; this has always been true, from Elizabethan royal progresses (cf. Geertz 1977) to the trumped-up rites of colonial regimes (cf. Fields 1985). It is, rather, that they become caught up in cycles of ritual excess in which ceremonial enact- ments of hyphen-nation, alike in electronic space and real time, stand as alibis for realpolitik—which recedes ever further as its surfaces are visible primarily through the glassy essence of television, the tidal swirl of radio waves, the fine print of the press. By constantly narrating hyphen-nation, moreover, these cere- monial enactments tend to draw attention to its fragility, to the ineluctable differ- ences on which the body politic is built, to the divergence of interests that it must embrace. State ritual itself, then, becomes something of a pyramid scheme: the more it is indulged, the more it is required. Hence its cyclicity, its excess, its mil- lennial qualities.

    But it is not only in the register of ritual that nation-states engage with the millennial. Another crucial dimension is the fetishism of the law, of the capacity of constitutionalism and contract, rights and legal remedies, to accomplish order, civility, justice, empowerment. Like all fetishes, the chimerical quality of this one lies in an enchanted displacement, in the notion that legal instruments have the capacity to orchestrate social harmony. This misses a point once cogently made, in prose fiction, by Carlos Fuentes (1992), namely that power produces rights, not rights power; that law in practice, by extension, is a social product, not a prime mover in constructing social worlds. Still, like many fetishes—including the “free” market itself—this one continues to survive its repeated demystification. The modernist nation-state has, from the first, been grounded in a culture of legality. Its spirit, with a nod to Montesquieu, has always been the spirit of the law. Globalization and the growth of neoliberal capitalism intensify this by an order of magnitude. The latter, because of its contractarian conception of human relations, property relations, and exchange relations, its commodification of almost everything, and its celebration of deregulated private exchange, all of which are heavily invested in a culture of legality.42 The former, because of the way in which it demands new institutional modes of regulation and arbitration to deal with new forms of property, practice, and possession—as well as with the abrogation of old jurisdictional lines and limits (cf. Jacobson 1996; Salacuse 1991; Shapiro 1993). But the fetishism of the law goes way beyond this.
    In situations of ruptured hyphen-nation, situations in which the world is con- structed out of apparently irreducible difference, the language of the law affords an ostensibly neutral medium for people of difference—different cultural worlds, different social endowments, different material circumstances, differ- ently constructed identities—to make claims on each other and the polity, to enter into contractual relations, to transact unlike values, and to deal with their conflicts. In so doing, it forges the impression of consonance amidst contrast, of the existence of universal standards that, like money, facilitate the negotiation of incommensurables across otherwise intransitive boundaries.43 Hence its capacity, especially under conditions of moral and cultural disarticulation, to make one thing out of many, illocutionary force out of illusion, concrete realities out of often fragile fictions. Hence, too, its hegemony, despite the fact that it is hardly a guarantor of equity. As an instrument of governance, it allows the state to repre- sent itself as the custodian of civility against disorder: as having a mandate to conjure moral community by exercising the monopoly of which Harvey (1989: 108) spoke—a monopoly over the construction of a commonweal out of inimi- cal, immanently fractious diversities of interest. This, in large part, is reflected in the rash of new constitutions written since the late 1980s. If law underpins the langue of neoliberalism, constitutionalism has become the parole of universal human rights, a global argot that individuates the citizen and, by making cultural identity a private asset rather than a collective claim, transmutes difference into likeness. It is an open question whether or not these constitutions yield any empowerment at all. (Interestingly, the celebrated South African one has recently been dubbed a Tower of Babel: it is utterly incomprehensible in the vernaculars of those whom it was supposed to enfranchise.44) After all, as we have said, not one of them actually speaks of an entitlement to the means of survival. They do not guarantee the right to earn or to produce, only to possess, to signify, to consume, to choose. This is consistent not only with the neoliberal mood of the millennium but also with another of its panaceas: the renaissance of procedural democracy, a “universal human right” that transposes freedom into choice by offering empowerment through the ballot—the black box that reduces politics to the rough equivalent of a quinquennial shopping spree (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997)—all in the name of the rule of law, of its magical capacity to promise new beginnings.

    But cultures of legality, constitutionality, right, and democracy speak primar- ily to the question of hyphen-nation, to moral community and citizenship, from the discursive vantage of the state and its functionaries. From the other side of the hyphen, from the side of “society against the state,” there has emerged another, complementary discourse of populist, millennial optimism: civil society.

    Postnative, Posthuman, Postscript: Civil Society in Pursuit of the Millennium

    More than any other sign, perhaps, civil society has surfaced as the Big Idea of the Millennial Moment;45 indeed, as an all-purpose panacea for the postmodern, postpolitical, postnative, even “posthuman” condition.46 Its recent genealogy, before and after 1989, is too well known to detain us here (see, e.g., Walzer 1992; Cohen and Arato 1994; Krygier 1997), save to say that the more of a global obsession it has become, the less clear it is what the term might actually mean— as a concrete object(ive), as an abstract concept, or as a political practice. Civil society, it seems, is known primarily by its absence, its elusiveness, its incom- pleteness, from the traces left by struggles conducted in its name. More aspira- tion than achievement, it retreats before the scrutinizing gaze. For all those, like Václav Havel (n.d.), who seek a way Toward a Civil Society, there are others who deny the point of so doing. Why? Some, like Michael Hardt (1995: 27), argue that we are already in the “postcivil society” era, an era incapable of producing the conditions of its possibility. Others simply dismiss it as an inherently polymor- phous, inchoate, unspecifiable signifier. Worse yet, it is said to conflate an ana- lytic construct with an ideological trope, thus rendering the former promiscuous and the latter vacuous (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a).

    In spite of this, civil society has served as a remarkably potent battle cry across the world. During inhospitable times, it reanimates the optimistic spirit of modernity, providing scholars, public figures, poets, and ordinary people alike a language with which to talk about democracy, moral community, justice, and populist politics; with which, furthermore, to breathe life back into “soci- ety,” declared dead almost twenty years ago by the powerful magi of the Sec- ond Coming, especially Maggie Thatcher. Amidst fin de siècle cynicism and retrospection, protagonists of civil society look bravely toward a new world. True, their idyll has been disparaged for its excessive Eurocentrism, for its naive liberalism, for re-presenting old-style imperialism in a seductive new garb, and for the manner of its export by such latter-day evangelists as non- governmental organizations. True, too, it has been downsized, localized, tailored to the neoliberal age; purged, in short, of global historical visions and grand emancipatory dreams (cf. Cohen and Arato 1994: xii). But, notwithstanding the skepticism, the Idea—the fetish—has worked its magic, kindling a reformist spirit all over the place as it promises rescue from the political vacuum of postmodern nihilism.

    What is it, then, about civil society that so fires the moral imagination? What makes it such a trenchant trope for these millennial times? An answer is to be found in the parallels between the history of the here and now and the history of the First Coming of the Idea in the late eighteenth century; the post-Enlightenment age in Europe, that is, that spawned the hyphenated nation-state, the concepts of political economy, culture, the civil, civility, civilization—and the distinction between “the state” and something that came to know itself as “society” (cf. Keane 1988a: 15).

    It is common cause that the world-historical conditions of the late eighteenth century embraced philosophers and everypersons alike in a phenomenology of uncertainty (Becker 1994: xii–xiv); a sense of unease occasioned by the intersec- tion of epochs, at which time the generic nature of humanity, of sociality, of self- hood and its abstraction in labor, property, and rights, of the value of things, of received means and ends was under ontological reconstruction. Though they could not have known it, they were living at the front end of an Age of Revolu- tion (Hobsbawm 1962), an age that posed profound issues of practical epistemol- ogy. Those issues were formulated, in the first instance, in political terms: they grew out of a malaise of governance, of populist opposition to absolutist rule and monarchial despotism (see, e.g., Woods 1992: 79; Keane 1988b: 65).

    But behind the surfaces of the political were working much more fundamen- tal processes of reconstruction: those attendant upon the advance of capitalism and commodity relations; upon the birth of the right-bearing citizen-subject; upon the empowerment of the bourgeoisie and the emergence of a public “with its own opinion[s]” and “interests” (Taylor 1990: 108; cf. Habermas 1989); upon the dawn of modernist nationhood; upon the rise of what Crawford Macpherson (1962) was famously to dub “possessive individualism.” In light of these processes, the problem of “the social” presented itself with particular force. How, given the erosion of old ways of being and knowing—not to mention the expand- ing scale and cumulative abstraction of human relations—was the present and future of “society” to be grasped? Wherein lay its moral, material, and regulatory moorings? It became imperative, says Tester (1992: 7), to “explain how society was [even] possible” in a world in which “time-honoured answers were collaps- ing through mixtures of political crisis, intellectual enlightenment, technological development and the . . . rapid urbanization of social life”; in which new, national divisions of labor were taking root amidst the encroachment on everything of finance; in which the sanctity of the family was seen to be at risk; in which peo- ple, things, and nature (cf. Coronil, in this issue) were being objectified in an altogether unprecedented manner. In which the prospect of Adam Smith’s face- less “society of strangers” stalked disturbingly close to hand—novel specters of a haunted gothic fiction dramatized the strangeness of what had become real (Clery 1995: 174).

    It is not hard to see why, at the time, discourses of civil society, in both their analytic and utopic registers, should have focused on the issues that they did: on the relationship between state (or, more generally, political authority) and soci- ety; on the posited existence, in the space between the citizen and the sovereign polity, of an interpolated public with its own will; on the role of voluntary asso- ciations in providing alternative loci for the achievement of the commonweal; on a democratizing image of self-generating moral community, whose elemental atom was the Christian family; on the significance of the free market in under- writing the prosperity of that community; on the capacity of commerce to inscribe civility in a new civics. Foreshadowing here of Hegel, Simmel, Durkheim and Habermas.

    The parallels with the present are more than obvious; indeed, they knit together all the various strands of our portrait of the Age of Millennial Capital- ism. Now, as then, the call for civil society typically presents itself as an emanci- patory reaction to a familiar doubling: on one hand, to the greater opacity, intrusive- ness, and monopolistic tendencies of government; on the other, to its diminishing capacity “to satisfy even minimally the political and economic aspirations” of its component publics (Haynes 1997: 16), to guarantee the commonweal, or to meet the needs of its citizenry. Thus, for example, in Central Europe the pursuit of the Idea, which took on millennial features from the first, is said to have arisen in response to increasingly repressive communist rule—and in postcolonial times, to have been sustained by the memory of Soviet excesses (see, e.g., Rupnik 1988; Krygier 1997). In the West, a cause for it has been found in burgeoning corpo- ratism of the state (Taylor 1990: 95–96) and a disenchantment with politics tout court. And in Africa it is ascribed to the rise of antistatist, promarket populism occasioned by the collapse of totalitarian regimes (Young 1994: 36), whose “pol- itics of the belly” (Bayart 1993) and vulgar spectacles of power (Mbembe 1992b) persuaded citizens that governments no longer “champion society’s collective interests” (Haynes 1997: 2).

    But this, too, speaks purely to surfaces. Now, as then, the roots of the process lie deeper: in the interiors, and the animating forces, of the Age of Millennial Capitalism—in particular, in its impulse to displace political sovereignty with the sovereignty of “the market,” as if the latter had a mind and a morality of its own; to reorder the ontology of production and consumption; to reconstruct the essence of labor, identity, and subjectivity; to disarticulate the nation from the state; to reduce difference to sameness by recourse to the language of legality; to elevate to first causes “value-free” technological necessity and the ostensibly neutral demands of economy; to treat government as immanently undesirable, except insofar as it deregulates or protects “market forces”; to fetishize “the law” as a universal standard in terms of which incommensurable sorts of value—of relationship, rights, and claims — may be mediated; to encourage the rapid move- ment of persons and goods, and sites of fabrication, thus calling into question existing forms of community; to equate freedom with choice, especially to con- sume, to fashion the self, to conjure with identities; to give free reign to the “forces” of hyperrationalization; to parse human beings into free-floating labor units, commodities, clients, stakeholders, strangers, their subjectivity distilled into ever more objectified ensembles of interests, entitlements, appetites, desires, purchasing “power.” And so to raise the most fundamental question of all: In what consists the social? Society? Moral community?

    Here, then, is our point. As in the late eighteenth century, and in strikingly similar fashion, the Idea of Civil Society makes its appearance just as the fabric of the social, the possibility of society, the ontological core of humanity, the nature of social distinction, and the essence of identity are being dramatically challenged; just as we experience an epochal metamorphosis in the organization of production, labor, and the market, in technology and its sociocultural implica- tions, in the constitutive connections between economy and polity, nation and state, culture and place, person, family, and community; just as we find it impos- sible to sustain the dominant terms of modernist sociology-as-lived, of received anthropologies of knowledge, of our geographical grasp of an increasingly four- dimensional world (Harvey, in this issue). Amidst populist moral panics, mass- mediated alienation, crises of representation, and scholarly perplexity, Civil Society, in its Second Coming, once more becomes especially “good to think,” to signify with, to act upon. The less substance it has, the emptier its referents, the more this is so; which is why its very polyvalence, its ineluctable unfixability, is intrinsic to its power as panacea. It is the ultimate magic bullet in the Age of Mil- lennial Capitalism. For it promises to conjure up the most fundamental thing of all: a meaningful social existence. And, thereby, to lay to rest—for now at least — Adam Smith’s ghostly phantasm: the Society of Strangers.

    ✦✦✦

    We have argued that many of the enigmatic features of economy and society circa 2000—be they the allegorical transfiguration of the nation-state, the assertive stridency of racinated adolescence, the crisis of masculinity, the apoth- eosis of consumption, the fetishism of civil society, the enchantments of everyday life—are concrete, historically specific outworkings of millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism. For all their apparent polysemy and disarticulation, these things are closely interrelated, all at once rooted in the past and new in the present. Together, they point to the fact that we inhabit an age that is both revo- lutionary and yet is also an ongoing chapter in the story of capital, a story that, in Theodor Adorno’s (1981: 96) phrase, “sound[s] so old, and yet [is] so new.” Despite the proclamations of neoliberal prophets, history has not come to an end. Nor will it soon. As Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (1999) puts it, “Millenarianism will survive the millennium.” Today’s apocalypse will become tomorrow’s mun- dane reality, laying down the terms of a dialectic out of which human beings will struggle to make sense of the world, to make livelihoods, politics, communities.

    Already there are signs of altered configurations, of fresh efforts to challenge the triumphal reign of the market, to turn aside the sweeping consequences of transnational economic pressures. In the wake of fragmenting national identities, Turner (n.d.) observes, newly assertive social movements have begun to pursue common cause on a world scale, forging an alternative, critical “global civil soci- ety.” It is too early, patently, to take the measure of their success. But their “pas- sionate intensity,” to invoke the spirit of Yeats one last time, might yet kindle the mature politics of a new age; “the worst” might yet become the best. There are also signs that organized labor is seeking expansive ways and means to deal with the emergent economic order. Thus a leading unionist: “The end of the century is the starting point of . . . an international labor fightback. . . . Global unionism is born.”47

    We can only hope. History, of course, will determine the substance of the poli- tics of the twenty-first century. For our part, we find it unimaginable that innovative forms of emancipatory practice will not emerge to address the excesses of neolib- eral capitalism. But that is in the future. For now, in introducing this special issue of Public Culture—a rich array of analyses of, among other things, economy and society, the production of knowledge, the fashioning of public spheres and popular discourses, the nature of nature, citizenship, subjectivity, and identity—we seek to stress the epistemic importance of critical distance. Of a refusal, that is, to be seduced into treating the ideological tropes and surface forms of the culture of neoliberalism—its self-representations and subjective practices, identities and utilities—as analytic constructs. Life, under millennial capitalism, is neither a game nor a repertoire of rational choices. It is irreducible to the utilitarian prag- matics of law and economy or to methodological individualisms of one kind or another. Indeed, these and other theoretical discourses are part of the problem. Critical disbelief, in pursuit of a reinvigorated praxis, is the beginning of a solution.

  • Reflections on Liberalism, Policulturalism, and ID-ology

    Reflections on Liberalism, Policulturalism, and ID-ology

    How do the nation-states of the twenty-first century – nation-states increasingly forced to come to terms with the ethnic heterogeneity of their citizens – deal with the problem of cultural difference? How, in particular, does the Constitution of post-apartheid South Africa – widely believed to be the most enlightened in the contemporary world, the most tolerant of diversity – strike a balance between the “One Law” of “The Nation” and the plurality of customary beliefs sustained, as a matter of right, by the various peoples who make up this postcolony? What happens when the Constitution and Custom appear to contradict one another – and raise questions of basic human rights, even of life-and- death? How are such contradictions managed, resolved, dissolved, disclaimed? Who has the authority to police the cultural lives of a citizenry when the majority recognize legal orders other than that of the nation-state itself? These questions are addressed in a critical, broadly situated analysis of the confrontation between the Constitution of South Africa and the Kingdom of Custom of one of its indigenous peoples, drawing on a complicated case, involving death rituals, argued before a high court judge in the lexicon of modern jurisprudence. It demonstrates how a “living constitution,” tolerant of everyday ambiguity and quotidian contradiction, is being forged in the space of strategic engagement opened up by the alternative languages and cultures of legality that exist in this postcolony. And in others like it.

  • Transparent Fictions, or the Conspiracies of a Liberal Imagination

    Transparent Fictions, or the Conspiracies of a Liberal Imagination

    “Only connect.”
    E.M. Forster, Howard’s End

    Ours, it appears, is an Age of Obsessions.

    It is an age in which people almost everywhere seem preoccupied, simultaneously, with transparency and conspiracy. With the lightness and darkness of being. So much is this so that, in 2001, a year that has long signified the cinematic surreal, an outbreak of livestock disease in the United Kingdom is attributed by ordinarily rational people to everything from the secret machinations of the prime minister1 to the covert operations of animal rights activists, from the illicit import of cheap meats by the Ministry of Defense to Iraqi biological warfare.2 No wonder the country is alleged to be “on the verge of a nervous breakdown…[which] has no root in real facts and figures, only in a diseased imagination.”3 At the same time, in the United States, after a presidential election that gave the nation much to be really suspicious about, the media tell their mass publics one thing above all else: “Trust no one.”4 Conspiracy, in short, has come to fill the explanatory void, the epistemic black hole, that is increasingly said to have been left be- hind by the unsettling of moral communities, by the so-called “crisis of representation,” by the erosion of received modernist connections between means and ends, subjects and objects, ways and means. All this in a global world that is at once larger and smaller, more and less knowable, more and less inscrutable than ever before.

    If conspiracy is the autonomic explanatory trope of our age, its conceptual grounding lies in its obverse, in transparency. It is, therefore, with the latter that we begin.

    The current preoccupation with transparency reveals a distinct shift in our understanding of the term. At least according to Zizek (1997:131). When used in relation to modern technolo- gy, he argues, it presumed the possibility of actually uncovering “how the machine works”; but, in its postmodern sense, the word implies the exact opposite. This, Zizek explains, is epitomiz- ed in the signifying economy of computer screens, whose cartoon icons may simulate everyday reality with beguiling concreteness; yet they conceal the real workings of the machine behind the glass facade, contriving the kind of legibility that renders the technology itself opaque. Is this so? Perhaps, perhaps not. For many of us, the dials on our dashboards and telephones be- speak a mechanical reality only slightly less impenetrable, suggesting that there has been a shift of degree, not kind. But Zizek reminds us of two things. The first is that our obsession with transparency is not unprecedented; the second, that changing patterns of illumination cast new shadows and, with them, new domains of darkness beyond their arcs of light. In fact, the more literally we believe in the axiom that to “see is to know,” the more haunted we are by what hovers beyond the edges of the visible. The sublime is obscure, according to Burke (Mitchell 1986:126), eluding ordinary sight. It is the precisely the relation between the manifest and the inscrutable – or the front and backstage, to invoke Goffman’s (1959) more mundane, dramaturgical image – that undergirds the enduring fascination evinced by human beings almost every- where with the properties of power. As David Graeber (1996:8) observes, invoking Hobbes on idolatry, the invisible is by nature unspecific and, hence, of infinite possibility. Efficacy and influence, alike in rhetoric and realpolitik, lie largely in controlling the capacity to reveal and conceal, to make “reality” appear or disappear.

    The essays in Transparency and Conspiracy provide rich, varied evidence of an impul- se, palpable across the face of the planet, to reveal the hidden workings of power. And to unco- ver its tangled complicities. This impulse is part of a more general zeitgeist; Tony Karon refers to it as “epic paranoia,”5 describing it as a readiness to connect apparently random, dispersed features of ever more impersonal worlds into tight configurations of collusion and menace, be they local sagas of harassment and corruption or worldwide, even extra-terrestrial, cabals of fanatical terror. For most Americans, the cataclysm of September 11 served to confirm – spec- tacularly, implosively – the global reach of evil empires, of secret networks of crazed killers, of suicide cells that would foment Armageddon by infiltrating the innocent forms of everyday life in the “civilized world.” But well before that day, well before that moment of revelation and radical rupture, it had already been noted how educated Europeans have come regularly to be consu- med by frightening reports of ever new hazards lurking unseen in the social fabric. Many of them, ironically, are thought to emanate from across the Atlantic;6 although Africa, of course, has long been the ur-source of epic, epidemic fears, its perennial place beyond the arc of light making it a fertile feeding ground for Eurobsessions with inscrutable dangers of one kind or an- other. Along with this, as its condition of possibility, goes a passion for “see-through visibility” that stretches from proliferating rites of national and institutional accountability to the aesthetics of public buildings and domestic design.7

    As we have already intimated, none of this is altogether new, even though the anxieties of the moment may suggest otherwise. While that does not detract from the importance of the studies collected here – quite the converse – it underlines the essential truism that change is always also, in crucial respects, continuity: that cultural creativity involves not merely incessant improvisation on existing themes, but also the re-presentation of reality in terms that are “al- most the same but not quite” (Bhabha, as cited by Humphreys). Thus it might be argued that, while moral panics about the workings of conspiracy have waxed luxuriantly after the Cold War, so did McCarthyism after World War 2. And fascism after the war before that. Each was an ur- gent hyper-rationalization of mundane modes of explanation common in the contexts from which it sprung. What is more, these outbreaks bear some resemblance, as populist theories of cause, to the millennialism and witch cleansing that occured in many non-Western societies af- ter colonial conquest. Paranoia and political theory, Hellinger notes, are often not easy to sepa- rate in practice; both exist, in large part, in the eye of the beholder. These divers manifes- tations of moral panic might be viewed, in other words, as just so many chapters in a long-runn- ing narrative, as so many variants on an old modernist theme, as a story “[which] remains the same, yet is constantly changing” (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).

    At the same time, the proportions of change to continuity, of rupture to repetition, are neither over-determined nor immutable; they are always labile, always liable to alter. There is, we believe, an immanent historical logic to the current chapter of the story, to the one writing itself just now, that does point to an epochal shift, to significant historical discontinuities amidst the continuities. We do seem to be caught up, at the turn of the millennium, in a swelling tide – an overabundance, Humphreys calls it – of claims to discern the destructive hand of evil agents, from devil-worshipers, witches, and global jihadistas, through purveyors of death in the name of spiritual truth, to pedlars of human body parts, genetically modified foods, and other nefarious commodities. Their malign machinations are envisaged as cumulatively universal in scale, even though they are made manifest in very particular sites; like the Satanists who target sleepy towns in the South African heartland, or international kidney snatchers with a penchant for New Orleans airport, or faceless felons who pollute the US postal services with biopoisons. It is true that the quests to divine their identities – with their attendant rituals of unmasking, con- fession, and apology – have precedents in earlier times; times when the pursuit of transparency likewise kindled the popular imagination, prompting a passionate pursuit of hidden truths and moral crusades; times also, as it turns out, of epochal shift. Thus, for example, the great trans- formation that ushered in the so-called “modern” world was also a period of feverish effort to find covert connections, to discern the invisible hand that gave design and purpose to a univer- se made opaque, through great economic and technical change, to contemporary theories of cause and effect; indeed, of history-in-the-making. As we have said elsewhere, we may be, at present, in the formative stages of a social revolution every bit as radical as that of 1789-1848. Several critical features of the current moment reprise, as prefixations, that earlier time; (neo)li- beralism and (neo)Protestantism, for instance. Then, as now, ontological categories and expla- nations were in flux, sparking debate about the definition of personhood and civil order, about the nature of economy and society, about the proper constitution of the state. It was a debate that struggled to frame new vocabularies and to reconcile an enhanced sense of human agency with a concomitant understanding of the “objective” forces of history.

    Optical Illusions

    It is exactly this kind of reprise — the Elightenment replayed “with a vengeance” – that Harding and Stewart see in the “paranoid” fixations of millennial America; these fixations show a “haunting trace” of sensibilities excluded by the idioms, the very obsessional explicitness, of our therapeutically-minded culture. And it is to the Enlightenment that we must look for the ori- gins of the modernist language of transparency and conspiracy; also for the signs and concepts that comprise the mis-en-scene of liberal empiricism. For it was the progressive dissolution of the Great Chain of Being, of theodicy and ecclesiastical authority, that cast humankind adrift in a material universe whose mundane truths had to be learned anew by patient, self-willed sub- jects, equipped only with sense and reason. The blind sage in Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1983) cedes his place, as the keeper of truth, to a prosaic English empiricist, who, with the aid of vision-enhancing spectacles, produces knowledge by collecting and connecting “clues” lying on the face of the world. In this universe, “seeing is believing.” Mortal beings, says Foucault (1975), increasingly made themselves both the objects and the measure of knowledge, their lives and deaths to be read less as a sign of cosmic metaphysical forces than as the sum of mundane biophysical processes, knowable primarily through the modest art of observation. Thus it is that the autopsy could become paradigmatic of the forensic gaze; thus it is that the corpse, its vitality, motion, and social connectedness all erased, could provide a “black border” within which the interior logic of life itself might be brought to light. Yet the very exclusions that permitted this illusion of transparency and order — that set the body apart from sociomoral en- tanglement to proclaim that truth inheres only in concrete evidence contained within the discre- te, anatomical individual — ensured that the definition of life captured by biomedicine was ende- mically limited, bereft of myth and mystery. Less tangible properties of being fell outside of its purview. This remains true of radical empiricism, sui generis : it continues to privilege sight over all other forms of perception, to restrict communication about the real to apparently transparent modes of representation, and to dismiss out of hand anything unsusceptible to positivist accounting, from the force of metaphor or moral values to the power of Vodoo or paranoid fantasy. Of course, the dialectical play of visibility and concealment, of darkness and truth, is not just a Dialectic of Enlightenment, so to speak. As we implied earlier, it is probably as old as poli- tics itself. The emergence of the Greek “public,” for instance, has been described as a process of “unveiling” in which powers, formerly secreted in the hands of aristocrats, were revealed for all to see (Vernant 1983, cited by Graeber 1996:11). The quest for transparency, in sum, has a long genealogy. But its techno-empiricist connotations were born of optical imagery associated with a specific period in the history of modernity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:185f), of its ma- terialities and moral discourses. The likes of Mumford (1934:124) have gone so far as to argue that the development of large-scale glass production was crucial to the evolution of a modern objectivist worldview. This claim suggests rather too stark a technological determinism for our own tastes. But it does seem clear that the phenomenological impact of glass – the everyday experience of its materiality – did much to shape the analytic sensibilities of the Age. Specta- cles, telescopes, microscopes became physical extensions of the human eye; as Mumford (1934:131) notes, they helped render the mysteries of nature “transparent.” And they fixed the idiom of all forms of knowing, not least of the workings of society. Mitchell (1986:166), for one, has remarked on the central place of optical metaphor, of images of “rational transparence,” in the writings of post-Enlightenment political theorists of all stripes, from Burke to Marx. This fo- cus on transparency also produced its own obverse: a concern with refraction, distortion, con- cealment, collusion. And a symbolic lexicon to go with it: note, in this respect, not only the ca- mera obscura – itself a famously telling icon of the dangers attendant on taking visible truths at face value – but also the hidden hand and, most of all, the fetish.

    To be sure, it is precisely its revelatory language, its argot of optics, that discloses the dark underside of Enlightenment, its traffic with discourses of unreason, race, and empire. Illumination — a condition of consciousness recognizable only to those freed from benighted savagery – was a key trope of humane imperialism, giving moral force to a host of “civilizing” crusades at once spiritual and secular. Not only did the idea authorize a blanket assault on the “primitive” lifeways of sundry others. It also shaped the everyday practices of European colonization at their most substantial. Missionaries to the heathen in southern Africa, for instance, took great pains to persuade their would-be converts to build large windows into their houses. Why? To illumine the dusky interiors of their lives and beings, leaving superstition and mystery no place to hide; to make the home a place of edification, self-construction, surveillance; to achieve a salvific lightness of being (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:278).

    The inverse of transparency in the imperial imagination, McCarthy Brown shows, was the concept of the fetish. This was the standardized nightmare of savage unreason, of depraved idolatry: fetishism evoked a childlike propensity to bestow life on “inanimate things,” insisting, with a kind of primitive paranoia, on the sort of essential, fateful connectedness between people, objects, and spiritual forces that had become anathema to a Cartesian consciousness. The primeval status of superstition and witchcraft in evolutionary histories of the modern West, like the pejorative attitude toward Voodoo and other practices likewise deemed “magical” in contemporary America, is persuasive evidence of the enduring usefulness of the fetish as a ra- cinated foil to Eurocentric images of clear-eyed reason. This lends ironic power to Marx’s refle- xive notion of commodity fetishism, that unsettling reminder of our own civilized idolatry, not to mention the alchemy that hides in the light of our own “rational” market economy.

    If the genealogy of transparency-as-trope cuts a revealing swathe across the history of the modern empirical imagination – being finely tuned, as we have seen, to the changing regis- ters of ordinary experience – its latest unfolding points squarely to the future. Thus the mechanical optics of the Industrial Age have been upgraded in, and interdigitated into, the digital era: Windows now come from Microsoft, whose corporate leaders speak as new-age missionaries for the liberating power of knowledge. The e–revolution – or, more properly, evolution – holds out the promise of a radically democratized McWorld; although some believe that promise to be pure elusion, an infantile e-scape from the more concretely pressing political realities of our times. Maybe. More salient for present purposes, the digital age brings with it the dread of ever more extensive, nefarious, tangled webs of cyber-intrigue as hackers, militias, fundamentalists, pornographers, syndicated criminals, and schemers of all stripes gain unregulated access to means of mass communication. As the division of labor everywhere becomes increasingly glo- bal, local communities across the planet are enmeshed in economies of expanding scale and abstraction, ensuring the ever more mundane experience of realities – like long-distance mig- ration, IDs and credit cards, virtual communities, digital money, electronic frontiers — that eschew any simple division between the legible and the opaque. If ever there was evidence of the dangers of too literal an application of these dichotomies, either as a mode of analysis or as a political call to arms, it is now: now, when the numbing complexity of material, social, and cultural flows across the earth presents us with a plethora of realities that are, at best, translucent. Realities, that is, that are neither transparent nor opaque, neither in plain sight nor hidden from view. We struggle, as Schrauwers says, to see “through a glass darkly,” much like social think- ers did in the ferment of the first Age of Revolution. Now as then, we must be suspicious of the imperious claims of naive empiricism, especially in the name of technical necessity – be it biological, economic, or environmental. We in the human sciences need to fight for multiplicity and polyphony in the ways in which we may come to know the world; also for a broadband sense of what might count as evidence. And we must advocate for the significance of the unseen, for regarding as critical those forces in the world that do not present themselves in technically measurable proportions, from the social effects of abstract capital to the material implications of anomie. Above all, we need to recognize that it is the very complexity of our times, the under- mining within them of the architecture of social certainties, that prompts the quest for simplifying truths, for reassuring melodramas of good and evil, for magic that would translate complicated structural influences into the language of personal desire, animosity, forgiveness. All of which is as true of new social and economic theory as it is of new social movements

    Beyond Empiricism:

    With this in mind it is instructive to reflect, as several of the contributors to Transparency and Conspiracy have done, on contexts in which liberal empiricism has come into contact with rather different local understandings of power and agency, whether among minority communities in Europe and America or in postcolonial Africa, Korea and elsewhere. Take the African case. Here, as Sanders and West both make plain, the “harbingers of a brave new transparent world” are often unaware of the intricacies of vernacular conceptions of power – and, hence, of the mystifying effects of their own languages and practice, whether they be the introduction of ID’s or democratic voting procedures. It is not that local discourses lack their own ideas of visi- bility and concealment. Much has been written about secrecy and revelation on the continent, past and present; also about ontologies of witchcraft, sorcery, exorcisms, and purges, forms of cultural practice that provide paradigmatic instances of conspiracy theories in action. Yet the ambivalent reception of ballot boxes in rural Mozambique indicates that “transparency” means different things in different places: where communities are used to a public show of hands, for example, the “privacy” of the ballot box evokes suspicions of concealment, especially in places where memories of colonial surveillance still linger. Likewise, party politics often connote a form of cabalistic collusion, a lack of the kind of accountability expected from hereditary rulers or single-party systems (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997b; Karlström 1999). But, even more than this, where understandings of the operation of power are vested in the ongoing interplay of the manifest and the invisible – of humans and spirits, words and deeds, persons and context – discourses about the capacity to act in and upon the world assume a distinctive shape.

    In fact, as West notes, in much of Africa, politics is taken to be a perpetual “game of hide and seek.” Here leaders are always sorcerers of a kind. For sorcery, whether turned to good effect or ill, requires a kind of vision more profound than that usually implied by European empiricism; insight like that of Sanders’ Ihanzu “seer,” who is attuned to the invisible “real reali- ties” thought to animate the tangible, everyday world. Like Freud’s paranoic (see Humphreys), the seer sees something that escapes normal people. Only, in his case, the knowledge is made socially salient and useful. Such visionaries – and the objects that help them bring things to light, from oracles and “traditional X-rays” to severed heads and identity tokens – are hardly the hostages of an arcane “tradition.” They conjure with a wide range of distinctly contemporary forces, forces that manifest themselves in the conflicts and triumphs of lives at once local and translocal, forces that might as well be discerned in the cannibalistic practices of new neoliberal elites as in the mysterious flow of consumer goods or in the capricious capers of the IMF (see Bastian, Kendall, and Sanders). In so doing, they articulate processes of varying scale and perceptibility, translating the reified abstractions of economy and society into a dramaturgy of such ordinary human motives as desire, ambition, anger, and jealousy. Even remorse. Unlike a Car- tesian landscape, on which human beings are set apart from matter and nature, and act os- tensibly as isolates in empty space-time, the experiential terrain of witchcraft and spirit possession is a frenzied field of intersecting influences among persons, environments, spirits, and things. Even cities, as Bastian (1993:141) has demonstrated, can assume dangerous, over-heated personalities; these being the product of intense commerce and improper accumulation. In these contexts, the modernist injunction to “only connect” is redundant; albeit by grammatical accident, the split infinitive underscores the point. Knowledge requires the constant monitoring of, and action upon, already existing connections as they pass in and out of focus and visibility.

    Virtual Paranoia: the return of the repressed?

    What, to return to our opening questions, might any of this tell us about the burgeoning twenty-first century obsession with transparency and conspiracy? Or about its expression in fantasies, common across the planet nowadays, of righteous, revelatory crusades against invisible evil-doers? The obsession itself would seem closely related to another widely noted phenomenon of our times: the rise of a host of new charismatic religious movements that are at once intensely local and yet also span vast distances through human migration, the web, and satellite dishes. These movements, Harding and Stewart point out, provide richly creative languages for rationalizing the ever more attenuated relationship between self and world. Especially in their more markedly millennial forms, they posit moral certainty and closure in an increasingly limitless, open universe, charting clear causal pathways through a jungle of information, of wildly circulating signifiers, of immaculate deceptions; all this at a moment when the authority of grand narratives of society and history are giving way to the dispassionate, dispersed reign of the market.

    In like vein, Hellinger argues, populist stories of conspiracy and revelation should be seen as serious, sometimes empowering moral allegories that seek certainty amidst indeterminacy, surety amidst insecurity. As such, they explore the links between invisible structural forces and human action, not least political action; in so doing, they often capture terrors that more cautious analysts fear to name. These moral allegories bear an uncomfortable resemblance to some species of orthodox social thought; especially social thought of a critical bent, which presumes, as a first principle, that, wherever ruling elites exist, they act in various ways to maintain their hegemony (Parenti 1994, in Hellinger). The Buryat Mongol fable that Stalin was the rein- carnation of a Blue Elephant mirrored the “paranoid” discourse generated by Stalinism, says Humphreys; though the former exceeded the latter, she notes, by insisting on the role of individual accountability in history. Humphreys uses “paranoia” less in its commonplace, pathological sense than to describe a genre of enclosed narrative that displaces attributes of the self onto others. Such narratives, she notes, permit people to voice otherwise suppressed, highly ambivalent senses of their own historical agency. This understanding of the term, we would add, contrasts with its more derisive use in the cut-and-thrust of everyday life where, like most accusations of unreason, it tends to tell us less about essential truths than about political or confessional contestations. Indeed, to label a person or persons “paranoid” is another, generic form of displacement, one that seeks to locate them beyond the limits of “normal” society; in the case of a group of believers, it is to relegate them to the marginal world of “primitive” superstition. As this suggests, allegations of pathology may, among other things, mark out fault lines of social, cultural, and ideological difference. Like the fault lines of race within many modern nation-states (“Blacks/Jews are paranoid”); or those that distinguish Western rationality from “Muslim funda- mentalism”; or those that sustained the reciprocal conspiracies that were spun, by Cubans and exiles alike, around the small body of Elián Gonzalez (cf. Ryer n.d.).

    By connecting disparate dots from across our far-flung universe into often bizarre con- stellations, however, and by discerning design in a laissez-faire universe, conspiracy theorists may capture strange, startling truths. Thus the myth of the primordial Blue Elephant, whose triumphant return to the post-Socialist scene, recall, proclaimed a crucial flaw in Soviet theories of history: the inability to link structural determinism in any meaningful way to personal agency and morality. It is this will to connect, finally, that distinguishes the various vision quests of the post-Cold War world, be they the therapeutic millennium of an America Calvary, popular Nigerian efforts to expose those who profit from the flesh of compatriots, or the nervous efforts of Ko- rean shamans who struggle in the shadow of the IMF to implicate household gods in financial success and failure. What makes them seem “paranoid,” from a liberal humanist standpoint, is not merely that they tie macrosocial processes to the acts and intentions of particular human beings, impersonal forces to intensely personal effects; nor only that, as familiar oppositions fade and old borders erode, they imagine enemies and evil-doers to be ever more pervasive, taking up residence, like X-file aliens, in otherwise ordinary citizens and neighbors. It is that these vision quests, and the narratives of conspiracy in which they are grounded, presume the eclipse of middle-order social institutions, of conventional sites of production and power, of a collective sense of morality, sociality, and history.

    As market forces take on increasing autonomy, and local productive relations become ever more subservient to the interests of global capital, the “deep horizontal fraternities” that once shaped ideals of nationhood, class, and community give way to a politics of identity, of technical necessity, and of the consumer rights of a “me generation” turned “we generation” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000:305); also, putatively, to the legal regulation of more-or-less eve- rything. History is reduced to “memory,” oppression to “victimhood”; the latter to be redressed less by empowering social reform than by the payment of financial reparations. The productive tensions, in modern life and thought, between subject and society, member and congregation, citizen and nation are reduced to a dialogue of customers and contracts, consumers and rights, clients and therapists. Stakeholders, all, in a vast impersonal order of exchange. Small wonder, then, that the millennium, in neoliberal guise, tends to be radically privatized; hence the planeta- ry popularity of prosperity gospels, national lotteries, pyramid schemes, and technicians of the arcane who “see” into the future. Small wonder, too, we should be witnessing the widespread pursuit of new forms of moral accountability and of new faiths capable, in Durkheim’s (1947:479) classic terms, of “completing” both the fragmentary knowledge of means and ends afforded by science and the growing abstraction of “man” in “society”; faiths, in other words, that offer insight into, and means of acting upon, the mysteries and malign undersides of a rapidly changing world. Neither should we be surprised that God and Satan – ultimate embodiments of invisible, infinite power and, also, of the ultimate Revelation and Conspiracy – should hold so central a sway over popular imaginations in this Age of Transparency, this age in which everyone is suspicious, and nobody really knows who the enemy is. Or what the hidden hand is actually doing, how it is doing it, and to whom.

  • After Labor

    After Labor

    Concern has been steadily mounting, across the globe, that a “world without jobs” is fast approaching. And that wage labor as we know it is disappearing. “Work,” it seems, “is not working, for ever more people, in ever more ways.”1 But there is little agreement about how, why, where, or in what measure this is actually happening. Or what might take the place of mass employment as the grounding of economy and society in the foreseeable future. Why do we – scholars, citizens, politicians, people at large – seem congenitally unable to think beyond a universe founded on wage labor, both proletarian and white collar? After all, capital has always striven to free itself of a dependency on that labor to the greatest extent possible – to the degree, as it is now becoming more commonplace to note, that wage work has been an ideal rather than an actuality for many, perhaps most, people at most times across the planet.

    The implication? That paid employment has always been more or less precarious, always a living anachronism, always threatened by the possibility of erasure. Why, then, has it remained so central both to popular and to theoretical understandings, alike left and right, of life under capitalism (Denning 2010), all the more so amidst anxieties about its immanent demise? To be sure, work has been said to “dominate and pervade everyday life – especially in Britain and the US – more completely than at any time in recent history.”2 So what exactly is unique about the contemporary moment? As we fail to conceptualize an age after labor, we seem ever more to be haunted by nightmares of our own redundancy, by surreal images of a world in which value is produced by other means – or by workers who are simultaneously living-and-dead, present-and-absent, human-and-nonhuman: zombies, robots, mutant species, and other assorted humanoids. What does this tell us about the afterlife of homo faber?

    Might we enrich our answers to these critical questions by moving beyond the Archimedean limits of Euro-America? The latter may be the source, and the ultimate horizon, of so much of our theory-work on capital and labor. But, we shall argue, a more comprehensive history of global capitalism must embrace the enduring entailment of the Euromodern world in its antipodean others – the source, after all, of much of its animating energies as well as labor power in its most precarious, most devalued, most dehumanized forms. It is a history, we shall see, whose southern past the north appears to be re-living in this, as in so many other, respects (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Beck 2000).3

    II.

    In the late 1999’s, we wrote about the sudden appearance of zombies in the South African popular imagination (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). While it was foreshadowed in local figures of predatory evil, this specter took late modern shape at a particular moment, a moment when the already fragile infrastructure of black male working life had been threatened, quite abruptly, by a radically shrinking labor market. There was a cruel irony here: wage work, or at least a large proportion of it, was made superfluous at just the time when decolonization was supposed to transform the racial capitalism of apartheid into a social order that promised fair pay and a better life for all. The “transition to democracy” coincided here with a worldwide wave of neoliberal reform: reversing the high point, in the global north, of state-centered social welfare, regulation, and redistribution after World War 2 (see below), propertied elites sought to reassert their class interests against the rising power of labor on a planetary scale by pushing to liberalize capital, to open up free trade, to give the market full reign, and to champion the private sector (Harvey 2005).

    As part of a rising hegemony, Western development agencies, under the so- called Washington Consensus, pressured governments in debt-strapped, emerging economies to outsource the functions of state, to open their borders to corporate capital, to accede to its demand for flexible, minimally protected labor, and to encourage processes of financialization – with dire consequences for most ordinary citizens (see e.g. Stiglitz 2002). In the upshot, post-authoritarian societies like South Africa experienced democratization as an ambiguous mix of enfranchisement and dispossession, simultaneous in- and exclusion; this as their new administrations sought to square liberal political freedom with the effects of mandatory laissez faire. In point of fact, global processes of deregulation had been gaining traction in such contexts since the 1970’s. But they accelerated appreciably in the 1990’s, when the dramatic decline in employment was accompanied by a surge of so-called “jobless growth.” As The Economist put it of South Africa, “the economy is doing nicely – but at least one person in three is out of work.”4

    It was then that public talk about the intervention of an army of surrogate workers became audible: talk of an “invasion” of abject migrants (makwerekwere) who would take on any degrading job, and, more tentatively and even more abjectly, of ghostly beings raised from the dead, who toiled in a nocturnal economy for their avaricious owners. Zombies (dithotsela; also diphoko), specters that lacked speech and the animating qualities of personhood, bodied forth in popular rhetoric, song, media, even magistrate’s courts and industrial conflicts (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). They bore testimony to an occult force that appeared to exist “by sucking living labor” (Marx 1976:342; see also Carver 1998:14).5

    Thus it was that wage work, at once valorized and rendered superfluous by the changing shape of the industrial economy, returned again in phantasmic guise, making inchoate threats to the established bases of human existence. Zombies, of course, have been a ghostly presence, a “profane illumination” (Benjamin 1978:179) one might say, throughout the long history capitalist modernity. Their historic associations with the predations of slavery and colonial extraction migrated into the US vernacular, probably during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1943, where they were transmogrified by the insatiable culture industry into the “scientifically-reanimated, undead”: cannibalistic consumers – rather than ravaged producers – who became versatile figurations, across the world, for various sorts of late modern monstrosity, predation, and horror.6 Not least, in this regard, were the rapacious effects of ever more arcane modes of accumulation; hence, in recent times, the circulating tropes of “voodoo economics,” “zombie banks,” and “zombie companies” (Kane 1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:40);7 South Africa’s deeply indebted electrical supplier, Eskom, said to be “the world’s largest power utlility,” has been described as a “state-owned zombie apocalypse.”8 Adds Aditya Chakrabortty from the UK, “The undead maraud around our popular culture,” but “[they are] also us. Britain in 2018 is stalked by zombie ideas, zombie politicians, zombie institutions.”9

    As the product of ghoulish greed, the zombie bears uncanny resemblance to other recent figures of proletarian undoing, like the genetically engineered “equisapiens” of Boots Riley’s luminous allegory of capitalist alchemy, Sorry to Bother You (2018). The human component of this hybrid species is not left to chance: it is black and male. In writing about racial capitalism Hylton White (n.d.), draws on Moishe Postone’s (1980) argument about anti-semitism and the figuration of the abstract power of capital: if Jews appear as the “racial body of money,” as “will without labor,” blacks are “labor without will…labour-in-itself: a brute biological force in need of mastery.” Riley’s “horse people” are the artifacts of WorryFree, a corporation that, in the words of critic Jordan Miner, is in the business of creating “creatures that are only valuable because of the extra labor” – the horse power – “they can produce.” Robots, he adds, “aren’t as efficient.”10 Shades here of the “animal spirits” that have appeared, variously, in theorizing the essence of man under capitalism, from Marx (1976:229ff), who associated them with the force that “heightens the efficiency” of the worker, to Keynes (1936:161-2), who saw them as “[the worker’s] spontaneous urge to action.”

    The robot, patently, is the other great nemesis of homo faber in these times. A recent study, tellingly titled, “‘You’re Fired,’ Says the Robot,” describes the prevalence, in the American workplace, of “technophobia,” an anxiety-related syndrome centered on new technologies, most notably robotics and artificial intelligence (McClure 2018). Similarly anguished is a 2018 op-ed essay by the Vice Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg.11 It features a prominent picture of the “first humanoid robot in South Africa” (Figure 1): the deceptively endearing “Pepper” has a map of Africa on its white metallic chest12 and the national colors around its neck. It stares intently into the eyes of its creator, a brown man, who apprehensively returns its gaze. Labor locks eyes with its mechanical replacement, whose artful, anthropomorphic form seems surplus to functional requirement. Like the zombie, the android, a robot in human form, re- presents, as a dialectical image, the figure of proletarian laborer both in the honor in the breach. Even as it is being rendered redundant, we remain entrapped in the fetishistic logic of wage work. It appears perpetually to come back, in archetypal human form, if only an agonistic measure of its effacement: an “estranged recognition” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2011:149), perhaps, of the fact that “it is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working population…” (Marx 1976:782; Denning 2010).

    III.

    In one of his last essays, “Critical Theory and the Historical Transformations of Capitalist Modernity,” Moishe Postone (2017a:148ff) reiterated his long-standing disagreement with what he termed “traditional Marxism.” It concerned the role of labor under capitalism. Rather than the means by which humans transform nature to their purposes at all times and in all places, labor, he insisted, is a “form of mediation” peculiar to capitalism (p.149). Put more plainly, capitalism is an historical formation, one “in which labor” – proletarian labor, that is – is the iconic source of surplus value, and “the primary constituter of the social world” (Jay 1993:183). Marx’s own project, added Postone, was a critique of proletarian labor aimed not at its realization in unalienated, meliorated guise, but at its total overcoming. Read from this vantage, capitalism could not be transcended by way of a more equitable distribution of the fruits of industrial manufacture or by the collective seizure, on the part of workers, of surplus value. Both would leave existing relations of production intact.13 They would leave intact, too, the so-called “treadmill” that drives forward the process of accumulation and, hence, the contradiction at the core of capitalist modernity: that, with technological and other advances, proletarian labor becomes “increasingly anachronistic” (Postone 2017b:50), increasingly irrelevant to the generation of wealth or to brute productivity – and yet it remains essential to the economic system of which it is a constitutive part. And to its endogenous sense of how value is to be created.

    Thus it is that, historically, capitalism “ceaselessly generates what is ‘new,’ while regenerating what is the ‘same’,” moving beyond the necessity of proletarian labor while continuing to assert its indispensability (2017b:48,50). While it may produce the possibility, out of its own internal workings, of giving way to other kinds of social system, to different social formations, it seems systematically to prevent their realization. Thus it is, too – and here we add our own gloss on Postone’s statement of the contradiction, and its anticipation in Marx’s concern with the deskilling, devaluation, and demise of labor14 – that, as wage work comes under threat, it typically returns in refigured, re-imagined, dehumanized forms. Among them, as we note in our opening fragments, are the specters of the zombie, the android, the mutant: the laborer who requires no pay, whose toil is pure surplus value, who has the bodily form of a human worker but none of the needs. A ghostly figure of human labor under erasure this, one that simultaneously retains its original meaning, says Derrida, yet is “rub[bed] out” (Anderson 2012:4; cf. Derrida 1976:61; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:290). But the zombie, an illumination from the suppressed underside of the long story of capitalism, also makes evident something more: the invisible story of disenfranchised, racialized labor born of historic plunder and imperial dispossession. Labor ab initio deemed deskilled, devauled, archaic. And frequently, wageless.

    IV.

    Modern conceptions of work, whatever their provenance, tend toward the metaphysical. However prosaic and utilitarian their definition of material production, they draw on the suppressed theological roots of liberal thought that takes labor to be a defining attribute of human being, the capacity that permits the species to separate itself from nature, acquire property, make history, and reach for the gods. Marx (1976:127) was not alone in seeing labor as the essence of an “exclusively human” ability, a mindful practice. But, like Postone after him (above, p.0), he also insisted that, in its prevailing proletarian form, it is the unique product of capitalism; an historical paradox this, given, as we noted earlier, that capital, under the sign of producing value, has always sought to free itself from its dependency on wage work by alienating and discounting it, by maximizing the surplus extracted from it, by quite literally dehumanizing it.

    This paradoxical proposition – that labor is essential to the ontology of human life under capitalism, and yet is undone, at the same time, by the conditions under which it has evolved – is critical to any understanding of the history of the past in the present. And to contemporary debates about the nature of work and its futures.15 Not only was wage employment, for the most part, a consequence of dispossession but, in the world at large, wagelessness has always been more common than paid labor (e.g. Denning 2010; Broad 2014:214). That said, Romantics early and late have insisted on a vision of toil that transcends instrumental function: it is artful, ethical, redemptive (Hughes 2007). Liberal and Marxist thinkers, too, have evinced a sense of its intrinsically moral aspect (Weeks 2011:12; Muehlebach 2012). But they have tended to sustain a more restricted, normative conception of work as a materially productive, remunerated activity. Feminists, by contrast, see this normative conception as irredeemably masculinist, blind to the essential productivity of unpaid domesticity and its contribution to the generation of wealth (Federici 1975; Coulson et al 1975; Beneria 1981).16 Scholars of racial capitalism (Wolpe 1972; Alexander 1979; Robinson 1983), moreover, have shown how the structural articulation of gender and race has served to devalue and debase black labor by shifting the costs of its reproduction onto women, often rural women, operating mainly outside the market economy. Not only does this suggest that waged and unwaged toil are interdependent and alike socially necessary; hence the coining of hybrids like “peasantariat” (e.g. Parson 1984) or “semi-proletariat” (e.g. Wallerstein 1976; Broad 2014:220f.) to describe colonial class formations. It also makes plain that modes of defining and classifying occupations are always ideological, mobilizing intersecting axes of difference (race, gender, age, civic status) and types of activity (skilled/unskilled, kin/market-based, affectivel/material) to prioritize, rationalize, and discriminate in the name of accumulation (cf. Bear et al 2015; Yanagisako 2012). Self-evidently, capital, colonial and metropolitan, past and present, has always been more diverse in its modes of operation than hegemonic narratives are wont to suggest. But the more general point is that the history of capitalism has reenacted, perennially if in different manifestations, the contradiction at its core, asserting the centrality of labor while discounting and disappearing much of it.

    As we shall see, the proliferation of occupations, skills, and kinds of compensation attendant on the restructuring of capitalist production from the late twentieth century onward plays out much the same contradiction, the same counterpoint, in a different key. The labile routines, flexible (even “zero hour”) contracts, and deregulated modes of accumulation that comprise lives and livelihoods in the contemporary moment (Bear et al 2015; Calvão 2016) – their uncertainties, their precarities, their ruptured temporalities – may seem unprecedented. In the age of the “gig” economy, of rampant financialization, rising self-employment, and the waning market for formal jobs, they may appear to have emancipatory possibilities. Hence their celebration by “post-workists” (Frase 2016) seeking a “[life] beyond the colonizing power” of formal employment (Frayne 2015:67) and the daily grind of “bullshit jobs” (Graeber 2013); also by those who claim that more fluid, expansive, “intelligent” forms of labor might provide the basis for a new commons (Hardt and Negri 2004:109), a new “grammar of the multitude” (Virno 2004). But much of what look to be new sorts of occupation actually go back a long way – often unmarked, unremarked, unremunerated – only to return in the here-and-now in renamed, rebranded guise. The “flexibility” and “casualization” associated with the neoliberal moment merely puts a techno-economistic gloss – in the ostensible cause of efficiency, growth, profit, even creative disruption – on forms of job insecurity, piece work, un- and underemployment, corporate-friendly contracts, and the scanting of labor protections integral to the longue duree of capitalism (cf. Broad 2000); this notwithstanding its talk of the dignity of the wage. Take, for instance, emergent categories like “affective” and “immaterial” work. They may acknowledge feminist demands for recognition of the unwaged, largely invisible labor of domesticity, nurture, and social reproduction. But they also tend to sentimentalize the very nature of that labor. Which is deeply ironic, since it is precisely their sentimentalization – their “elevation” to the decommodified domain of the “priceless” – that has been key, historically, to the feminization of womens’ activities, their literal de-valuation, and their confinement to the “sacred” space of the home (Fedirici 2008; Bear et al 2015). What remains clear, however, is that being recognized as bona fide labor has not ensured that they are remunerated at anything remotely commensurate to the value they produce or the time invested in them.

    In summary, then, what all this points to is a convergence of two processes whose entailment underlies the latest chapter in the unfolding relationship between capital and labor, its intrinsic contradiction, its working out in the “new” global economy – and our reading of this moment, both in theory and in its historical realization. One of those processes lies in the morphing planetary geography of labor. By recommissioning the structures of colonial extraction, corporate capital – facilitated by (more or less “captured”) states almost everywhere – has (re)constructed commodity chains in such a way as to decentralize, distanciate, fragment, and render mobile its sites of operation (cf. Broad 2014). [See brands and their surfeits; Nakassis] Already in the 1970’s, this was anticipated in what was called the New International Division of Labor (NIDL; Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980), a concept criticized at the time for ignoring the persistence of older metropolitan structures and their interpolation with emergent forms, but recently recuperated to take account of the intensified implications of techno-advanced, translocal manufacture on a global scale (Starosta 2016).17 As a result, what had hitherto been proletarian jobs in the nations of the north have migrated to southern reaches: postcolonial worlds erected on a mix of occasional (“flexible”?) contract work in the formal economy and various modes of value production in so-called informal economies (Hart 1973). Much of this activity, past and present, has been centered on the household and its surrounds, on extended (sometimes corporate) kin ties and feminized labor,18 on close social and religious networks, and on locality; a good deal of it involves petty commodity production, micro-marketing, “putting out” for industry elsewhere, and “penny capitalism” of one or another sort (e.g. Tax 1953), often implicating creative credit management (James 2015; see below). These are worlds in which material deficit imposes on individuals and families, especially women, an onus for multifaceted survival strategies. Such strategies, perforce, often include taking the cheapest, least protected, most insecure, most casualized employment made available by capital under conditions of maximal deregulation; this while simultaneously operating in the labile, flexi-environment of the informal sector. Here, at the frontier of “the race to the bottom,” both corporate capital and its rogue competitors – think blood diamonds, coltan, endangered species, narco-commerce – experiment most violently in their efforts to extract optimal returns. Consequently, fabrication tends to be reduced to its most elemental, to one operation in the commodity chain, paid minimally for each productive act and for nothing else. And likely to move on abruptly to another elsewhere, with little notice, if conditions favor doing so. As these sites open up for business, jobs and makeshift infrastructure migrate to them, putting northern labor in competition with, and displaced by, their more abject, more vulnerable antipodean counterparts.

    This is where the second process enters the mis-en-scene. As the attenuation of the proletarian labor market has made itself felt in the global north – with our caveat that its economies have never been anywhere near fully proletarianized, always heavily dependent on transient workers and unpaid, feminized toil – there has arisen a lively facsimile of the informal sectors of the south. This creeping informalization, as formal work gives way to diverse kinds of casualization, is partly subsumed by the growing “gig” economy, partly by other “economies” to be described in detail later: such things as the sharing economy, the caring economy, the artisanal economy, the intimate economy (below, p.000ff.). These are neither proletarian nor regularly waged. They depend on deploying the vitalism of the human body, its capacities and it properties, as micro-capital that may be put to the purposes of accumulation: activity centered on the household and, more generally, the private sphere, thus to erase, ever more, the line between sites of production and reproduction, male and female, work and home, normatively separated with the rise of industrialization. And so the infrastructure and accoutrements of the domestic domain – cars, rooms, private computers, smartphones, the kitchen table – are turned into assets that yield disposable income, as may be hospitality and intimacy itself. And so everything becomes capital, in prospect or in practice, everything the object of financialization, including, maybe most of all, the neoliberal self. Of course, many of these tendencies toward the informal, broadly conceived, have always existed, more or less overtly if unmarked, in northern contexts as well. What has changed is their proportionate relation, in labor demographics, to formal wage employment, alike proletarian and white collar, domestic and migrant; their recognition as a measurably significant part of material, social, psychic, and ethical life; and, as we shall see, their partial reappropriation, through various sorts of so-called “platform” business, back into the formal sector that spun them off. In all these respects, patently, the global north is coming more and more to resemble the global south (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012), living its history, so to speak, as Secondhand Time (Alexievich 2017). Another instance this, perhaps, of Rancière’s (1999:113) claim that, under prevailing global conditions, we live the suppressed secrets of modernity shamelessly, unhidden; in this instance, to restate it in slightly different terms, the contradiction that modern capitalism is erected on the elemental necesssity of labor which, at the same time, it seeks constantly to devalue and displace to the point of redundancy.

    This contradiction – played out recursively over the past centuries and across the entire world – is also manifesting itself, with rising intensity, in the experiential and political fabric of everyday life in the present continuous.

    Thus, on one hand, almost everywhere, public discourse continues to speak as though a waged population remains the norm. Labor as the fons et origo of economy and society – the prime basis of social value, the first and last source of human dignity, the core of material and civic existence – has lost little of its idealized purpose. “Ironically, while the ‘age of work’ seems to have come to an end,” observe Cedarström and Fleming (2012) in Dead Man Working, a darkly provocative reflection on the zeitgeist of our times, “working has assumed a total presence – a ‘worker’s society’ in the worst sense of the term – where everyone finds themselves obsessed with it.”19 If anything, growing anxieties about its precariousness have heightened its psychic centrality: a compulsive preoccupation with employment drives mainstream political manifestos, visions of education, and criteria of self-worth.20 Even the finance sector, where value is accumulated by means and instruments of ever greater abstraction – this by distancing itself as far as possible from manufacture and service, indeed from the commodity economy tout court, to which it denies any anchorage or point of reference – harks back to the language of labor: it refers to what it traffics in as “products,” as though they were commodities yielded by honest toil, to the profits it yields as “earnings,” and to itself as an “industry.”

    This is hardly surprising: “Work is the primary means by which individuals are integrated not only into the economic system, but also into the social, political, and familial modes of cooperation,” notes Kathi Weeks (2011:8). It is ”a basic obligation of citizenship.” And, ethically if not legally, also something akin to a right. Hence statesmen everywhere speak in the promissory language of “bringing back jobs” in received proletarian and white collar guise; Donald Trump’s notorious fixation, in 2016 and after, on reviving the largely defunct US coal industry is symptomatic of the nagging impasse between the idealization of blue collar production in America and its cynical decommissioning – its simultaneous presence and ever more blatant erasure under pressures of profitability.21 For their part, voting publics respond by taking promises of job creation seriously; low unemployment is regularly invoked as both an objective and an achievable measure of effective governance – even if a job does not yield an income, a matter to which we shall return.

    To be sure, whatever form it may take, however it may metamorphose, wage labor endures, with almost uncanny persistence, as the perceived basis of species-being. In the USA, notes Derek Thompson (2015), “[i]ndustriousness has served as America’s unofficial religion since its founding. The sanctity and prominence of work lie at the heart of the country’s politics, economics, and social interactions.” Similarly in Britain, argues Joanna Biggs (2015:264), where labor gives life meaning “when religion, party politics and community fall away.”22 And not only in these places. Employment, a.k.a. “decent jobs” for its citizenry, is typically portrayed as the most critical function of the nation-state everywhere; hence the millennial prominence, in government manifestos – left and right, north and south, east and west – of putting “the people” back to work, despite the repeated failure to do so.23 Cyril Ramaphosa put it front and center in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) to South Africa on 7 February 2019: “jobs” was the single most repeated word, used thirty-three times in a seventy-nine minute speech.24 Every previous president, in every SONA since 1994, has done the same thing, if not with the same stress-by-repetition.

    On the other side of the contradiction is the rising apprehension that “the end of work” is already at hand, never again to be reversed. Almost quarter of a century ago, economist Jeremy Rifkin’s The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era (1995) echoed that apprehension. It argued that “worldwide unemployment would increase as information technology eliminated tens of millions of jobs in the manufacturing, agricultural and service sectors,” with a “devastating impact…on blue-collar, retail and wholesale employees.” It also resonated with the fear that “the workplace would become ever more stressful,”25 that corporate managers and knowledge workers might benefit but that the middle class would shrink, many of its jobs, perhaps proportionally more than proletarian ones, replaced by screens and machines.26 Rifkin’s thesis was greeted with a measure of scholarly skepticism (see e.g. Caffentzis 1998 [2001]), among other things for its techno-determinism, for over-reading the effects on the job market of the factors he had identified while ignoring others, and for relying on a simplistic, normative conception of employment. But, like Richard Sennett’s (1998) account of changes in the structure of work-and-career at the hands of “corporate re- engineering”27 under the “new capitalism” – also Ulrich Beck’s bleak “destandardization of work” (1992) and the demise of “work society” (2000) – it captured a dawning American nightmare.

    That nightmare is epitomized by a spreading rustbelt, where the flight of industry, the technicization of what remains, and the concomitant eclipse of labor have become iconic of economic, social, cultural breakdown. Hence the terrifying images, conjured up by the culture industry, sociological futurism, and social media, of haunted, cityscapes bereft of the assembly line and the punch card, dotted with derelict stores, boarded up schools, delapidated homes, and abandoned churches, criss-crossed by windswept, empty streets. In sum, a cadaver left behind as industrial capital moves away and what Soules (2014) has termed “zombie urbanism” takes its place, turning decay into revenant assets through financialization and the displacement of production to yet more precarious, exploitable elsewheres across the planet.

    The anxiety that work is becoming anachronistic, that is under terminal threat, is anything but new. Like the fact of widespread wagelessness, it is as old as modernity itself. In the late sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth 1 refused to patent a knitting machine because it imperilled the jobs of “young maidens who obtain their daily bread” by handcraft;28 in the early 1800’s, English Luddites attacked the stocking frames that looked to devalue their skill and their livelihoods (Thomis 1970); and, in 1862, grain shovelers in the Port of New York demanded protection against the onslaught of elevators that rendered them redundant (Spann 2002:140). Similarly almost a century later: “Austerity policies, low wages and automation…were also of concern in the 1950s,” a Union Perspective Blog noted in 2015. But the head of the United Auto Worker’s Union, confronted by robots newly placed on the vehicle production line, had his own rather laconic response. He is said to have asked Henry Ford II, in 1952, “Henry how are you going to get [those] robots to buy your cars?”29

    Economists might speak of the “Luddite fallacy,” insisting that, rather than displacing skills or destroying occupations, new technologies merely realign existing divisions of labor, often to positive effect. But this hardly accounts for the social and existential dislocation – and the capricious trade off of lives, careers, and futures – occasioned by the radical reorganization of work. Witness, most recently, the felt effects across the world of casualization, outsourcing, and mechanization; of the polarization of employment markets within and between nations; and of the reduced quality of so many waged jobs. Hence Cedarström and Fleming’s “dead man working”; it evokes precisely the sort of fear-inducing zombification with which we began. In what Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) call the Second Machine Age, artificial intelligence and “brilliant” machines have changed the name of the game: they have colonized even some of the most creative, most intuitive professions – from medical diagnostics through criminal detection to musical composition – formerly assumed to be reserved for “humans only” (Thompson 2015). Recall here the fate of horses, once regarded as second only to homo sapiens in their indispensability to divers forms of material production.30 No species, it seems, has the cunning, capacities, or nobility to be secure from the relentless quest for better, more worry-free returns on labor time. Remember, here, those indentured equisapiens from the spooked imagination of Boots Riley (above, p.00): corporate capital might yet find the body of the post-worker, in whole or in part, more lucrative than a mechanical alternative.

    Since the 1990s, as our opening fragment suggests, angst about the impact on wage labor of the knowledge economy and of robotics – as well as other AI and techno-developments – has taken on hyperbolic proportions. A widely publicized report by McKinsey Global Institute (2017),31 for example, based on research in forty-six countries, has it that 800m jobs will be lost to robotics alone by 2030; less cited is a passage (p.3) adding that this does not necessarily mean mass unemployment, allowing for shifts in population demography – and, as Thompson (2015) notes for Youngstown, Ohio, iconic in the US for the end of work, the move of the unwaged into other forms of occupation. In equally agitated vein, an Oxford University study forecast, in 2013, that “machines might soon be able to perform half of all US jobs” (ibid.). The anxieties provoked by all this, filtered through social media, are especially acute at the already marginal edges of industrial workforces: among people of color, immigrants, those with limited knowledge capital and digital literacy. Thus a lively, all female YouTube discussion on “Black People vs. Robots,” curated in January 2019 by Data for Black Lives.32 Debate dwelled on the particular vulnerability of African American women, whose gains in personal service jobs since the 1970’s – in sales, transit, bank- telling – have proved especially vulnerable to automation. No sooner had these gains been realized, it was noted, than they were lost again; shades here of the newly enfranchised black South African laborers after apartheid, recognized and reduced to redundancy in a single stoke. The value calculations that drive investments in new technologies seldom factor in the social or material costs of human disposability, let alone their psychic effects. Typically, the loss of work – like falling wages and reduced pensions and other benefits33 – is blamed instead on the inefficiency, or the “unreasonable” wage demands, of the workers themselves.

    The precarity of workers at the margins, their structural impermanence in the formal economy, links them to other historically mobile wage laborers: migrants, currently the object of moral panic pumped, in many quarters, by neonationalist politics. Alike in Europe (see e.g. Pijpers 2006), the USA and UK,34 and the global south (e.g. Gordon 2014), these “transients” are popularly thought to seize the jobs of deserving citizens – despite the fact that they are essential to the reproduction of national economies, as Brexit Britain, circa 2019, is fast discovering.35 [Lack of labor is actuall driving emchaniszation in the US, where it is held by ovserers to be less efiicient than human labor. Primed in large part by nostalgic imaginings of homogenous, sovereign political communities, secured against the negative effects of global laissez-faire, these visions evoke a world that never really existed: societies composed of gainfully working members, each according to their abilities. But metropolitan Europe and the US – indeed, capitalist econom ies from their beginnings, as Cedric Robinson (1983) so carefully showed – have always rested on their seamy, suppressed undersides: their shadowy, unfree workers (Calvão 2016), a mass of paupers, in a technical sense, sans permanent jobs or independent means of subsistence (cf. Jones 1971).These were not enslaved and colonized populations abroad, but the semi-indentured back home, usually people from the edges of empire who have been kept well away from sites of secure, formal employment in both industrial and post-industrial times. [as one observer from agribusinee recently obsreved: farm work/food production across the world is in the hands of immigrants.] This reinfoces yet again the fact that it is leess naked economic determinism, but the complex ideological cast of modern captalism that is a key driver: capital strives to free itself from human labor by non-human productive means. The obsession with robotics…even where humans are more efficient…[NYT)

    How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers – addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?

    How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers –addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?

    How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers – addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?

    V.

    A historical parenthesis at this point, albeit a rather important one. It comes again courtesy of Moishe Postone (2017b:40-1) who, following Piketty (2014) and others, reminds us that the history of inequality, over the past century, has not been linear. To the contrary, it has fluctuated visibly, in consonance with other economic indices. After a period of deepening inequality in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there came a period, around the middle of the twentieth, during which it was sharply reduced, only to be followed by a reversal from the early 1970s: a resurgent, ever more extreme skewing of wealth and political power. This trajectory, he notes, was global, its three periods marked by a distinctive trend in average rates of economic growth: relatively low and slow in the first, more than doubled in the second, and decreasing palpably in the third. The pattern is clear: both growth and per capita GDP rose, especially in the middle phase, as wages increased and levels of inequality dropped; conversely, both have waned as wages have stagnated and levels of inequality risen. Since 1973, Postone adds, standards of living have fallen observably for the majority of Americans – and, he might have added, for many across the planet, both north and south – as income gaps have widened. That optimal second period, post-World War 2, is the one associated, in the archaeology of capital, with state- centric Fordism, underpinned by a Keynesian ideology of economic management. And by sanguine imaginings, at least partly realized, of a world of full employment, workers’ rights, and comprehensive social welfare, extending to the protection of citizens against joblessness, homelessness, ill-health, and indigence.

    A quick look at employment figures in this respect – figures that, as we shall argue, are to be read as much for what they hide as for what they reveal – is indicative. In the USA, for example, joblessness in the second half of the 1960s, when much more of the active population was counted than is the case today, never rose higher than 3.8%. In the early years of the Reagan administration, as the Fordist era gave way to the neoliberal, it rose above 8%; 10.8% in 1983.36 What is more, the African- American unemployment rate appears to have been roughly double that of whites for for those late twentieth-century decades.37 Likewise the UK, whose figures for 1945 to 1971 varied between 1.2% and 2.7%; it averaged a slightly higher 3.12% between 1952 and 1967. In 1983, under Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party, by sharp contrast, it reached a startling 12.9% (McGaughey 2018:5) – with blacks even more likely to suffer joblessness than in the US at the time.38 This is all the more striking in light of the fact that, in 1978, the Conservatives had unleashed an election slogan, designed by admen Saatchi and Saatchi, that proclaimed “Labour Isn’t Working.”39

    Tellingly, the history of trade unions in the USA and UK echo these trends, although it is as well to keep in mind that a large proportion of the population working without formal wages has never been included in them (Denning 2010). In 1954, 34.8% of all American wage and salary workers were union members, a figure that went down to 20.1% in 1983, soon after the attack on labor by the Reagan administration. It now stands at 11.3%.40 The power of the British unions, at its height in the 1960s and 1970s, was radically eroded during the 1980s at the behest of rising Thatcherism and its corporate backing. As archives released thirty years later show, it set out quite explicitly to “crush” these politically influential organizations41 – although revisionist conservative media prefer to attribute their demise to globalization,42 while another, more technical, view has it that the high inflation of the 1970s created a superfluity of labor that greatly weakened them.43 The ironies here are unmistakeable.

    If growth and GDP are taken to be significant indices of material well-being, both the US and the UK were at their healthiest during times when jobless rates were at their lowest, labor unions at their strongest, and inequality at its most attenuated; times, also, when the vision prevailed of an international order of new “developing” nations, aspiring to forge liberal modern economies and democratic societies in the aftermath of colonialism. Of course, there are any number of contingencies that affect fluctuations in employment and inequality, among them inflationary cycles, recessionary pressures, market “corrections,” and political upheavals. But our point does not lie in the specificity of these numbers. It lies in the fact that they speak, if tacitly, to a historical consciousness that recalls the post-W orld War 2 decades, in respect of national economies and societies, in a particular way.

    Those post-World War 2 decades – the coming-of-age years of the still powerful “baby boomer” generation – sustains a paradigmatic presence in the sociological imagination. This, in many ways, was the moment at which liberal democratic modernity, as retrospectively remembered, reached its zenith: at which talk of the Great Society, in its various global northern variants, appeared most persuasive; at which poverty and insecurity seemed to recede in the face of the norm of lifelong employment; at which the struggle for civil rights and the recognition of difference, most notably in respect of race and gender, looked like it had made permanent advances. But hiding in the plain sight, just off camera, there lurked persisting forms of exclusion, inequity, and injustice: in the impoverished black ghettos of US inner cities, for example, and the bleak estates of Northern Ireland; in the poorer reaches of immigrant England, the target of xenophobic outbreaks; in the violent theaters of neoimperial warfare in Southeast Asia and in innumerable other places. Recall that Martin Luther King was in Memphis, in early 1968 before his assassination, in support of a strike of African American sanitation workers, protesting their deadly dangerous, poorly paid, minimally protected jobs.

    Some saw, in these sites of immiseration, near and far, the possibility of popular struggle against the structures of capitalist power across the West; to wit, C. Wright Mills’ “Letter to the New Left” in New Left Review of September-October, 1960, and the subsequent rise of mass socialist and black power movements. But the superpowers themselves were avidly pursuing Cold War proxy battles for control over nominally independent postcolonial nations, the latter increasingly peripheralized by those setting the terms of international commerce; at the same time, those powers also took pains to crush dissent at home, ascribing it to “foreign interference” attendant on Cold War antagonisms and/or to communist provocateurs. And all the while, in tandem, there was a mounting resurgence of conservative forces that decried any kind of welfare state regime – in the US, New Deal liberalism, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, labor driven socialism – as an unfortunate and dangerous development that undermined individual freedom and pointed towards totalitarianism (Goldwater 1960). And so ended the post-war period, with its aspirations to etatist social democracy. From the 1970’s onward, as we noted earlier, those conservative forces were to capture the political center and push ideological orthodoxy in a contrary direction. Capital responded to the gains made by organized labor and civil rights activism in Euro-America in the mid-twentieth century by devising new free trade mechanisms under a “program of global restructuring…oriented toward altering labor markets and the organization of work” (Broad 2014:215). And so the long, dialectical struggle between capital and labor entered its latest chapter: wherever it could, the former, embodied in an ever more powerful corporate sector, pushed for privatization, deregulation, labor-free financialization, reduced legal liability, and policies of austerity at home – and reconfigured, flexibilized, outsourced production abroad, to places where workers were more abject and less protected.

    Still, for all the reverses that have occurred since, the postwar conjuncture continues, in critical respects, to be the normative template against which social expectations tend to be measured, even as the gap between those expectations and reality grows with every passing year. And so it remains plausible to speak, in the future perfect tense, of mass employment and the possibility of secure salaried work for all (see below, p.00) – undergirded by a modernist mythos honed in an age in which labor seemed to approach the most equitable pact possible with capital, in which, as we have said, the liberal idyll appeared within reach. It is a mythos that lingers even as, for more and more people, its promise disappears into the realm of the unreachable, the unreal. And gradually, especially for rising generations, the unthinkable.

    Which takes us back into realities present, into the present continuous now almost fifty years in the making, a neo-present without a foreseeable denouement.

    VI.

    Simply put, how, then, are we to read the planetary geography of labor, its empirical lineaments, in the here-and-now? Has work really come to the “end” of (its) history? Self-evidently, many people do still toil in the manufacturing and service sectors of both the global north and the global south. And, with ongoing shifts in the ecology of production, new jobs are created. The low official unemployment figures for most Euro-American nation-states – which we are soon to deconstruct – make that much plain, even if they do not speak to the nature of those jobs.

    [[In the global south, long home to a thoroughly racialized colonial capitalism, extractive industries, factories, and sweatshops continue to hire people who have no alternative but to be exploited, people whose labor has never been remotely “free,” whose effective indenture has displaced a rising proportion of Euro-American wage earners. As this reminds us, the imbrication of the south and the north in this respect – long written into the deep history of empire – has intensified since the 1970s with the space-time compression of the global economy (Harvey 1990); specifically, with the increasing velocity and brutality with which capital has taken to extracting labor, land, and resources (mostly) from debt-strapped postcolonies rendered accessible and vulnerable by so-called “structural adjustment.” Hence, for example, the indivisible the link, as Fedirici (2008) notes, between the post-industrial computer worker in Silicone Valley and the pauperized digger of coltan, essential to digital technology, in war-torn Eastern Congo; and, more extemely, the disemployed US garment worker and the lowly child laborer in Cambodia.44 ]]

    At the same time, as we have intimated, the mechanization, modularization, and dispersal of wage work has served its devaluation by allowing production to be parceled out, geographically: in the age of the “planetary labor market,” observes Mark Graham,45 “millions of jobs can now be done from almost anywhere on Earth,” even at the level of the micro-task. enabling firms to take advantage of what has been called “the global reserve army” on a “per-click” rather than a per-person basis. Employees in remote reaches of rural Central Africa may work in some of the twenty-first century’s most advanced tech industries, carrying out routine tasks – like basic data recognition and classification – that machines cannot yet perform. These workers are components of an overall process about which they are told practically nothing, including the fact that the very tasks they are performing are likely soon to render them and their kind redundant. And while, in theory, the flexibility of geographies of production could distribute the opportunity to work across the world, in practice, says Graham, they exert “huge downward pressure on wages and working conditions” everywhere; Kaushik Basu (2016:3) – just one voice in a fast growing literature aptly dubbed “Globalization, Labor Markets, and Inequality” (Dadush and Shaw 2012a; a) – refers to this effect of planetary articulation as “labor-linking.” It is no accident, in this light, that the make-shift, open-air factory described by Graham is located deep in the Central African countryside: long histories of violent extraction in colonial contexts, as we have already intimated, have always been the underside of the Euromodernist romance of free labor. Postcolonial work often survives, in the age when labor migrates with less friction than people,46 because African workers are often still cheaper than machines. Even quite highly skilled workers, as Nina Sylvanus (n.d.) shows, may remain less costly to capital than their robotic replacement – as they are in African ports,47 where, unlike in, say, Hamburg or Rotterdam, crane operators have not been substituted by nonhuman “solutions.” At least not for now.

    In other words, partly because of the globalization and reorganization of productive work, partly because of the way that capital has come to redefine its relationship to labor and technology, secure, emplaced employment in advanced industrial societies – the sort on which, ideologically at least, livelihoods, social benefits, long-term career trajectories, and local communities were thought to be founded until fin de siècle – has given way everywhere, north and south, to a quite different regime. Whether more or less people are actually “employed” (whatever that may mean today),48 whether there are more or less jobs (however they may be defined), the corporate capture of the state, financialization and deregulation, the rising hegemony of the market, and the re-articulation of the planetary economy have led to an ever greater proportion of received forms of work likely to migrate abruptly to more exploitable sites, to be mechanized, to be casualized, to be reduced to piecemeal (“per unit” or “per click”) operations – or, in the case of extractive industries, to be displaced when its products, like diamonds, are made by new synthetic means.49 Either way, as it has become commonplace to note, real remuneration under the new regime tends either to be largely static or liable to downward pressure,50 open to wage theft by corporations or labor brokers, and perennially uncertain.51 Which compels workers, class and race and gender and generation notwithstanding, to become entrepreneurs- or contractors-of-the-self: responsibilized, risk-bearing persons, possessed of their species being-as-capital; neoliberal subjects, that is, of the sort characterized by Foucault in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) – and as anticipated in the post-Keynesian economics epitomized early on by Gary Becker’s Human Capital (1964).

    For those who find it difficult to remain in the conventional workforce, or to find a “traditional” job – rising numbers across the world, uncounted in national statistics (see below), have stopped trying – the pursuit of alternate means of securing an income presents itself as a matter of brute survival. This may be especially so in the global south, although it is increasingly true of the north as well; after all, “of those who are employed, 60% world-wide are in temporary, part-time or short-term work with falling wages” (Fouksman 2017a:28). In South Africa, for example, according to The Economist, a startling 870,000 formal sector jobs were lost in 2009 alone despite solid economic growth;52 this in the wake of the severe attrition of the labor market over the longer run (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Yet wageless black South Africans, around 27% of whom are officially unemployed,53 have found creative ways to husband Money from Nothing (James 2015), and, even more, to make a living, albeit often a spare one, from an astonishingly wide range of activities (Steinberg 2013);54 Furthermore, as research has repeatedly shown, most of them sustain a strong desire to find employment and thereby join the salariat (e.g. Ferguson 2015:40; Fouksman 2017b:4; Dubbeld n.d.:22; cf. Barchiesi 2007); this amidst ongoing public debate, echoed in other countries too, over the politics of distribution, the social necessity of cash transfers, and the un/desirability of a basic income grant for citizens who, argues James Ferguson (2015), are owed a “rightful share” of the national wealth (see also Fouksman 2017a:30).55 To wit, many proponents of these distributional transfers – or, as they are now being called in Italy, “citizens’ income” – link them to re-entry into the job market or into petty entrepreneurialism (a.k.a. self-employment), and hence celebrate them as an answer to the “end of work;”56 although, for his own part, Ferguson (2015:20) has it that “wage work…is not going to return.” Perhaps in proportion to its eclipse, wage labor, it seems, is being morally revalued as it is materially devalued. The former, its moral value, as we have noted, has its roots in the theological inscription of labor in the very fabric of modern capitalism; it appears to sustain itself, even to wax, in the age of the Moral Neoliberal (Muehlebach 2012; see above). Contemporary personhood, as this suggests, remains deeply invested in the dignity of work and the socio-psychological significance of an earned income (see e.g. Somavia 2015; Fouksman 2017b:4), all the more so as large numbers of (especially young) people in many parts are suspended in what has come widely to be known as “waithood,”57 a concept first developed in relation to one of Europe’s southern peripheries and now commonly used across the world.

    [In the past, development economics tended to have a negative view of the informal economy, the so-called second economy, as impeding economic growth; they tried to merge the informal into the formal; in recent years the informal econ has been rebranded and revalorized as a “hidden engine…of growth” (Boyd on WIPO). Likewise, the World Bank now writes of artisanal mining, still criminalized in many parts of the world, as job creating. However, Emma Stuart et al say that “informal is the new normal”]

    And so rising numbers of people across the planet, extruded for one or another reason from formal employment, turn to an ever expanding range of practices that conjoin entrepreneurialism and the capitalization of the self to auto-employed labor in the cause of (more less hand to mouth) primitive accumulation. Thus it is that there has been an explosion of adjectives attached to the noun “economy”; to name just a select few, the artisanal economy, the sharing economy, the caring economy, the affective economy (what Arlie Hochschild [1979] called “emotion work,” aka immaterial) economy, the cultural economy, the criminal economy – some of them subumed under the collective rubric of the “gig” economy. And in each case, the term “economy” may itself be replaced by “labor,” thus to describe the species of activity now commonly associated with it. Each, moreover, has commanded a burgeoning literature of its own, both scholarly and popular. This is not the place to review them in detail. For present purposes, some synoptic sketch notes will do.

    Take the artisanal economy. “Artisans,” according to an article published in 2015 by Forbes,58 constitute “a sector now equivalent to the world’s fourth-largest economy,” with the “fourth largest workforce,” although it did not say quite how such a quantum might be calculated; it added a quote by then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to the effect that artisans are a “terrific” “place to begin” looking for “innovative way to help developing countries flourish,” as though they are a new historical phenomenon, unknown in the global south. Still, if has become a “type of entrepreneurship…widely acknowledged as an engine for poverty reduction and economic development.” And so history has been turned on its head: what modernity sought to drag domestic economies away from has become a panacea for reversing the devastation left in the wake of modernization. And, according to Derek Thompson (2015), not just for the global south: it was, he noted, one of the futures for the likes of Youngstown, and other northern cities devastated by the latest chapter in the history of capital.

    What is more, an international NGO industry – another sort of entrepreneurial “economy” in itself, one that employs an immaterial army of to manage post-work across the planet – has grown up in support of the artisanal “sector.” NGO’s like the Alliance for Artisan Enterprise (also Artisan Alliance), whose home page claims that the “artisan sector is the second-largest employer in the developing world after agriculture, worth over $32 billion every year.”59 The Artisan Alliance is “hosted” by the Aspen Institute and is sponsor of “a new #ChooseArtisan campaign to bring attention to the importance of the creative economy” (our italics) – which, adds the Forbes article, is a “pathway out of poverty for millions of households.” But it ends a little more soberly, with the “serious roadblocks” that face artisans, such things as under- capitalization, disadvantages of scale, illiquid inventories, ephemeral and unpredictable demand, inability to tap into supply chains and formal markets, and so on and on. All of which tends to ensure that the artisanal economy remains an economy of the poor, producers whose products, if they are successfully sold, continue to accrue profits to people other than themselves. Like IKEA, which “collaborates with rural artisans around the world to create limited-edition collections that are sold in its stores.” Needless to say, we do not know how its profit sharing arrangements, like so many “fair trade” retail marketing contracts, are structured.60 Nonetheless, across the world, artisanal economies are often touted as a panacea for the flight from wage labor into entrepreneurialism – and are often a resort for those who find themselves suddenly un- or under-employed, with few other choices – although, of course, what they obscure is the fact that artisanship is simply labor without a wage, labor with the risk that the commodities produced by the unwaged entrepreneur of her- or himself has also to be marketed, a process for which that producer takes all the risks, and bears allthe costs, involved.

    Or take the sharing economy, made globally visible, and typified, by the rise of such megacorporations as Uber and Airbnb. It is a largely “platform” economy in which self-employed laborers deploy their “under-utilized assets” and “flexibile schedules” – i.e. unused, unpaid, unwanted labor time – effectively to become “independent contractors” engaged in “the peer to peer based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and services, co-ordinated through community-based online services” (Hamari et al. 2015:2047). What sorts of operations (eBay? Craigslist?) actually fall within this definition, or cognate ones – and in what sense digital mega-firms are “community-based” – is a matter of some discussion (Yaraghi and Ravi 2017:4-5). Still, the explosion of this economy, whose projected revenue growth from $14bn in 2014 to $335bn by 2025 (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC] 2015:14), another occult statistic since such things are hardly knowable, appears to have reached deeply into accommodation and hospitality, transportation and delivery, consumer goods, cash lending, labor swaps; this to the extent that a report by PwC (2015), which defines the sharing economy quite capaciously (p.5) and offers a detailed analysis of who uses it and for what purposes, reports that 51% of US respondents to their survey said that they were likely to be providers and 71% consumers in this economy within two years, i.e. by 2017. For PwC, the rise of this economy is a potential threat to labor, rather than a panacea for those rendered precarious by the new capitalist economy (p.29):

    “One of the more controversial aspects of the sharing economy is the impact it has on the labor force, and the perceived shift toward contract-based employment…For some, this is regarded as a benefit, enabling workers to earn wages on their own time and their own terms. For others, it heralds an era of depressed earnings and greater reliance on welfare and other government subsidies. 78% of adults said they expected that in 30 years, working multiple jobs would be the new normal for wage earners.”

    The last sentence, however, is its own corrective: PwC’s informants appear to understand that it is their current status as employees in secure, income generating employment that is under threat, making their entry into the sharing economy, past or potential not a problem, but a solution. But one thing is clear: across the globe, the horizons of this economy, however it ought best to be named and characterized – whether it involves government supplied low cost housing in a South African black township being rented to tenants as its owners relocate to a shack in the backyard or a retired chef in a Singapore high-rise using his dining room as a chic restaurant to entertain “guests” – appear to be expanding rapidly as ordinary people across the planet find it necessary or desirable to recommission their possessions or their labor power in the cause of yielding an income.

    Thus far, the sharing economy has rested in turning into assets the means of domestic reproduction and everyday life. This, of course, is not new. It has precedents in many parts of the world, especially in the global south – among them, for example, the shebeens of black South African townships during the apartheid years, where, in the absence of private space or family around them, migrant laborers treated the homes of their owners as something akin to a shared “living room,” a place to eat, drink, and socialize around the figure of the female host. It is simply that the practice has spread, especially in the north, and become more explicitly a strategy of accumulation by turning non-commodified objects and services into commodified ones. More recently, however, the sharing economy has stretched away from the domestic into the finance sector, with a major explosion, across much of the world, of peer-to- peer [P2P] lending and debt-based crowdfunding (a.k.a. “crowdlending”), usually brokered through on-line “platform” companies, some of which – in light of the high risk/high return nature of the practice, now referred to as an “industry” – have evinced very sharp cycles of accumulation and implosion;61 sans platforming and the internet, as those familiar with the global south know very well, P2P lending has long-standing foreshadowings in rotating credit groups across colonial and postcolonial Africa (e.g. Ardener 1964; James 2015) and in Islamic finance (Sadr 2017); also Japan, where it is said to go back to the thirteenth century (Izumida 1992).

    From sharing to caring, of course, is a relatively short step. The caring, or affective economy, likewise, has become newly revalued as a domain of labor. As we have already noted, feminist critique has long pointed out that unremunerated domestic work and household production, done largely by women – but also, in “traditional” African cultures, by youths (e.g. Meillassoux 1981) – has classically gone unrecognized for what it has always been: an unrecognized, unwaged toil, rendered a free good by a patriarchal, gerontocratic ideology of kinship, family, and matrimony. In recent years, however, many of the forms of labor associated with (uncommodified) care, much of it invested in intergenerational kinship ties, have become a source of paid activity. [Filipino’s across the world; Israel only as example] Hence, for instance, the 30,000 Filipino women who look after the elderly and infirm in Israel (Liebelt 2011) – “Israel’s Invisible Filipino Work Force”62 – whose incomes support their own families back home, thus displacing the work of domestic life, and its reproduction, into the global labor market. A very global market, one that extends far beyond Israel: in Canada, to take another example, a program to import Filipinas to care for children brought almost 24,000 in 2014 alone.63 What is more, public discourse in the Philippines invests the export of its carers with cultural heft. Hence a Manila newspaper: “Being a caregiver is not only a matter of profession… [It is] about deep love, respect and care to someone of old age or anybody else who needs treatment…This is something rooted in Filipino culture and an identity as a Filipino.”64 Thus do culture and selfhood fuse into a brand that is born in the form of putatively unalienated labor that seeks, as it takes on the guise of a commodity, to become a form of monopoly capital. [LONG HISTORY; state labor export policy, with legal and diplomatic mechanisms; on 4 continents; see essay of Filipino state policy in relation to labor exports, M. Scott Solomon. ADD Cape Verde, women migrants in domestic reproduction]

    Of course, the line between care and other forms of commodified service can be rather murky; vide Luise White’s Comforts of Home (1990), a study of prostitution in colonial Kenya, which makes the point that “the work of prostitutes” which did not carry the stigma here that it did in Euroe, “was family labor” (p.2) their relationships with their male customers both “intimate and stable” (p.1). Hence the title of the volume, which describes a phenomenon common in other parts of urban Africa – especially those that were host to large populations of single proletarian migrant men; recall South African shebeens, mentioned a moment ago – and made famous in popular culture by the jazz opera, King Kong, in which Miriam Makeba played her debut role as the keeper of “Back of the Moon”65 – which were widely treated as homes away from home. Given the explosion of the caregiving market in many diverse directions across the world – not coincidentally, the anthropology of care has become its own burgeoning scholarly market of late (see e.g. Alber and Drotbohm 2015) – there are many other instances that come to mind, but perhaps none so remarkable as growing Japan’s “rent-a-family” industry (Batuman 2018),66 a commodified service in the supply of care described as “human affection through the form of the family” (pp.51, 57). Companies like Family Romance will supply substitutes for almost any conceivable role, not least to provide “the comforts of home” (p.59): doppelgangers for a divorced parent for an emotionally wrought teenager, a deceased spouse and daughter for a lonely widow, an overweight mother fearful of appearing at school events and embarrassing her child, a bridegroom for a totally staged, fake wedding to appease impatient (proto-grand)parents, a wife’s lover from whom an aggrieved cuckold demands an apology, children for neglected elders and vice versa, and so on, and on. The industry, which appears to have spawned a great deal of prose fiction, has a deep archaeology, as Batuman (ibid.:58) reminds us, and not only in Japan: “people throughout human history have been paying strangers” – typically strangers of less elevated socioeconomic status – “to fill roles that their kinsfolk performed for free.” Or were expected to and, either out of necessity or preference, did (and increasingly do) not. The vast majority of white South African families during the apartheid era devolved (as many still do) some of the intimate functions of motherhood and wifehood to lowly-paid black carers, “maids” as they were known (Cock 1980, Gaitskell et al. 1983) – and dealt awkwardly with the affective ties that grew up as a result. It was an awkwardness expressed once in the cruelly ambivalent treatment of these women less than fully human, certainly not adult, and yet as faux “members of the family,” servants who could be terminated at a whim; Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) refers to the highly exploitative relationship between “maids and madams” (Cock, ibid.) tellingly in light of our present concerns, as “mutual zombification.” [Bougeois families have long paid underclass others to raise their families in the most intimate domains of the domestic; wet nurses, nannies etc]

    The Japanese case is quite different, of course, in the nature of the contract and the conditions that have given rise to it; it attaches to the high end of the caring, affective economy, not to its indentured extremes. According, again, to Batuman (2018:57f), the rise of immaterial labor here, in this form, is owed largely to two things: changes in the post-World War 2 economic sociology of the country, which has seen the rise of single person (including older) families, a withering of the extended household, and, with “the deregulation of the Japanese labor market,…the erosion of the salaryman lifestyle”; and a spreading Foucauldian postmodernism that imagines everything to be constructed, including the affective relationships associated with intimate domesticity, thus allowing “the alchemy of the marketplace [to] transform strangers into loved ones” (p.58). And so the affective economy creates a domain of employment that returns an older form of unwaged, intimate labor as respectable, paid domestic work, less a new phenomenon than the re-cognition and re-tooling of something that has always existed as a species of devalued, proto-indentured work. [across the world there have always been paid companions; here it extends into the family and close kinship, a line typically drawn elsewhere to differentiate it from kinship; kinship highly relevant here under advanced capitalism, more so than in many places.]

    To which there is yet a further twist. Japan, it appears, lies at the frontier of the expansion of the affective economy into…robotics which, if it ever comes about, will displace the labor of humans in this sector with machines: robot lovers and wives, the largely masculinist anti- or post-human fantasy. Nor will “she” be merely a sexual service provider. She will interact with “owner, understand him, entertain him, offer him companionship, thus to encourage the relationship with her to “develop into love.”67 Unless and until switched off, thereby accruing to the “virtual love industry” the huge advantage of partners, made to desired specification, but sans the usual irritations of living with a spouse. [MARRIAGE rates everywhere dropping; its too expensive; the movie in Shoplifting] Which, some believe, would well suit the culturally inflected needs of the 45% of Japanese men who, according to a state survey in 2011, have no interest in finding a live female partner.68 All of which resonates wth David Levy’s visionary Love and Sex with Robots (2008), which predicts, well, sex and love with robots, culminating in marriage by 2050 – thus, presumably, eliminating spouses from the domain of unremunerated intimate and domestic labor, and rendering redundant their waged human replacements, only to have them return in humanoid form, once the machine age version of an African brideprice has been paid.

    The notion of a specifically Japanese proclivity for solving the problem of social isolation by recourse to commodified intimacy, like the presumptive inscription of Filipina caregiving in a primordial Fijian sensibility, opens a opens a bridge to yet another growing species of labor: that accruing to cultural economies, to what we have called, elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), Ethnicity, Inc., a phenomenon that has expanded in some contexts in direct proportion to the loss of wage work (p.11ff.). This phenomenon, too, comes in many guises. In so far as it inflects emergent forms of employment – some of it, of course, manifest in, and articulated with, the rising artisanal economy – it expresses itself in an appeal to essentialized potencies and capacities that are said to inhere in an ascriptive identity: Australian Aboriginal art work, Zulu pottery, Lanna Thai massage, Peruvian Shipibo shamanic medicine, Himalayan Sherpa mountain guidance, Roma divination and fortune telling, Nepalese Limbu weaving, Chinese Miao silver smithing. In many instances, these activities involve self-employment and entrepreneurial engagement; some ethno-providers of goods and services represent themselves as deeply “traditional – indeed, exotically “other” – albeit in strikingly digital-savvy ways as they sell their skills and wares on their own account. Others are employed in the corporate sector for a wage: San (Bushmen) game trackers in the safari industry, “nimble fingered” Bengali tea pickers, Zapotec textile producers, Maori and Samoan rugby players. [This capitalizes on the abundance of culture; money from nothing – ie cultural resources – see Eric Hirsch]

    Again, none of this is new. There has long been ethnic and national branding, simultaneously inside and outside the market, simultaneously essentialized and commodified, simultaneously alienable and inalienable. What is notable, however, appears to be the scale with which ethno-prise, amidst a rising consumer appetite for “authenticity,” is increasing the demand for ethnicized labor. On occasion, moreover, that labor has interpolated itself into inter/national imaginaries. Note the case of Fiji. Simon May (n.d.) shows how, in the context of a growing world market for private military power, indigenous Fijians assert a “form of cultural distinctiveness,” founded on their claim to be a “fighting people,” in order “to secure positions for themselves as…contractors within the supply-chain of outsourced warfare” – most notably, in the British army. The means of violence, it seems, is an integral part of the expanding cultural economy. And not only in its licit forms.

    Which brings us to another context in which entrepreneurialism of the self, primitive accumulation, and labor conjoin increasingly outside the formal sector: what is sometimes referred to, with more than a hint of racism, as the “black” economy, which stretches, with considerable plasticity, from petty hustling to violent crime. Across Africa, for example, what sometimes begin as hustles often end up as recognized, more-or-less il/licit, jobs in the so-called “informal sector.” These include everything from “car guarding” and “personal security” in South Africa (Steyn et al. 2015) through professional trickery in Nigeria (Hibou 1999 [MORE specific]), kukiya- kiya (“making do”) in Zimbabwe (Jones 2010), and débrouillage (“getting by,” “managing”) in the Francophone west,69 to coastal piracy and high-end smuggling in the Chad Basin (Roitman 2005, 2006). Despite its “informality,” this sector has a major, well-recognized impact on GDP, [NB OF ARTISANAL/SMALL MINING ON GDP/GNP] on the socio-material and moral landscapes of the continent, and on the viability of many nation-states, a good number of which seek now to levy taxation on its enterprises (Dube and Casale 2017).70 Hustling, of course, has a large presence in the global north as well, some of it close to the engines of finance capital and the state (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), but much of it minor, nestling along the fringes of the “formal” economy.

    At its “darkest,” the informal sector merges into criminal or “shadow” economies, which offer a wide, and growing, range of job opportunities across the world; the image of the “shadow,” and of “criminal specters,” having gained considerable purchase in the florescent literature on the anthropology of crime, criminal states, and the murky line between the legal and illegal in the in the contemporary age of global capitalism (see e.g. Ferguson 2006; Reno 1995, 2000; Roitman 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:16ff; cf. Derrida 1994:83). And, for a disturbingly large number of people, their sole means of survival. Thus, for example, as Levitt and Venkatesh (2000:755) note,72 recent studies of US street gangs – which remark their dramatic corporatization since the late twentieth century (e.g. Taylor 1990)73 – indicate that many of their “members pursue financial activities in response to alienation from legitimate labor markets” (our italics). Levitt and Venkathesh go on to compare average earnings in the drug trade with those in the formal sector: marginally higher, much riskier, motivated less by income in the present than by the prospect of future riches (ibid.). And, of course, the relative ease of finding work. This, we stress, is not to imply that the criminal economy is founded purely on, or shaped purely by, economic necessity or inequality, although such claims are quite often made. Unemployment, as Jonny Steinberg (2000:1f.) has pointed out, is far from the only explanation for law-breaking. People enter into this economy – or resist doing so – for a wide variety of reasons. Our point, simply, is that, along with other “post-work” spheres of human activity, it provides a site, at once material and social, into which people who would otherwise have lived their lives out in the wage labor force might interpolate themselves; or, if rational choice theorists (e.g. Becker 1968; Posner 1981) were to be believed, might choose to enter, basing their decision on a risk-return calculus like any other. [UNDERCLASSES have always lived this way – Dickensian London/ SA: people “choosing not to join the formal economy”]

    In public perception, of course, and in much normative sociology, criminal activity is taken to be the opposite of work; as if human endeavor requires a moral imprimature to be regarded as labor, sensu stricto. And yet for many of those who partake of it, crime is work. Serious, skilled work. There is an unforgettable moment in Mark Gevisser’s Lost and Found in Johannesburg (2014) when, trapped in a brutally violent house invasion, he reports, verbatim, the words of one of the armed attackers: “This is our job. This is how we do our work. You go to your work and we go to our work…You must respect us or we will kill you” (p.250). Less a case of honor among thieves than the honor of thieves. And the dignity of their labor. Also its requisite professionalism. Thus a Johannesburg detective laughs at an inept pair of carjackers, naifs who lacked the necessary proficiency for successful hit: “F—ing amateurs. They didn’t even know what they were going to say” to their intended victim (Altbeker 2000:27). Sometimes, as Paswane Mpe (2000:1) reminds us, this line of business has its own heroic celebrity, by now a Benjaminian (1978:281) cliche: the abiding, if perhaps ambivalent, admiration for the sheer artistry, the accomplished performance, evinced in the clever heist, the daring robbery, the slick take-down of a reviled personage; the assailants in the attack to which Gevisser was a participating witness referred to themselves, proudly, as “heroes [with] guns” (ibid.). In the criminal economy, as this boast implies, the revolver or the knife or the club, relatively cheap objects, are the only required means of production – or, more accurately, of redistribution. At its non-violent end, the chosen tools of trade may be a cheap laptop, a cell phone, counterfeit plastic, a stolen uniform. Criminality-as-labor, self-evidently, offers many points of access, many techniques of extraction, many sources of primitive accumulation. [Hijack Stories: “step away from my associate,” said to a cop] [Criminal behavior in colonial contexts seen as critique of racialized social exploitation, and a form of redistribution; from the much critted Primitive Rebels to Van Onnselin’s Regiment of the Hills.]

    Not everyone extruded from the formal sector is able to enter into one of these economies, be it artisanal, sharing, caring, cultural, criminal, or whatever. People who no longer sustain the prospect of earning an income may nowadays find themselves caught up with corporate capital not as labor but as more-or-less dehumanized commodities: as objects from which value is extracted under regimes of radical privatization and financialization, regimes that look, systematically, to profit from anything and everything. [Capital always finds new places to go, more assets to harvest.] Perennial as it has always been to capitalism (Luxemburg 1951:452ff.), primitive accumulation in its postmodern guise, ever more all-consuming (Harvey 2005), seems especially prone to a necropolitics; the “subjugation,” that is, “of life to the power of [social, if not physical] death” (Mbembe 2003:39). To wit, necrocapitalism, as Bannerjee (2008) and others call it,74 expropriates unto itself the very necessities of existence: water, air, food, shelter, security, land, infrastructure, culture. Indeed, the corporate capture of these things has spawned what are now referred to as “living politics” (Chance 2017), the “politics of life” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:159f.; cf. Agamben 1998:10), “vital politics” (e.g. Povinelli 2016; Muehlebach 2017)75 – all terms for collective action against the (necro?) capitalization of, and profiteering off, assets long held to inhere in citizenship and the social contract, in people’s sovereignty, civil society, and the commons. Specifically, the elemental bases of life itself (Simmons 2016).

    Perhaps the most dramatic instance of the transformation of human labor into human life as commodity is to be found in the carceral subject. There is no need here to recapitulate the literature – most developed in the US but echoed elsewhere – on the “penal state” (e.g. Simon 2007; Garland 2013) and “carceral capitalism” (e.g. Wang 2018). Suffice it to say that it ties the fluorescence of neoliberalism to the warehousing of previously working, now disposable people (especially Blacks, Hispanics, but also indigent Whites) in “correctional” facilities (Herivel and Wright 2003), leveraged largely through a “war” on the criminal economy (Wacquant 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2016); to the maintenance, in addition, of segregated urban environments, creating zones – ghettos, favelas, banlieus, projects, townships – of containment (Beckett and Herbert 2010; Smith 2013; cf. Massey and Denton 1993) and “hyperpolicing” (e.g. Tibbs 2010); to the practice of “governing through crime” populations said to be uncivil and worse (Simon 2009; cf. Foucault 1977); to the “farming” of fines from the poor, itself a source of their spiraling, unaffordable debt and high rates of imprisonment (Stillman 2014:5); to the more or less permanent elimination of convicted felons from the labor market. It is by these and other means, disenfranchisement among them, that citizenship is annulled, rights removed, humanity negated. And the formerly employed reduced to a corporeal reservoir from which surplus value may be gleaned. In times past, penality carried with it, at least ideologically, the promise of rehabilitation and a return to the workforce. Not any more. In many places, crime and punishment are about permanent exit, social death, zombification – thus to make the prisoner’s body, sans sentient civility, an instrument of accumulation.

    How? Well, for one thing, by privatizing prisons, parole, and other institutions of the criminal justice system – or, more often, outsourcing their operations – which licences carceral corporations to charge the public purse for accommodating, feeding, guarding, and providing other “facilities” to inmates; this at the same time as making the latter pay, often extortionately, for basic goods and services76 – all at minimum cost to themselves. The culture industry, epitomized in the USA by Orange is the New Black (dir., Jenji Kohan 2013-present), offers vivid ethnographic illustration of quite how comprehensive, and profit-seeking, is the business-managerial treatment of convicts and their bodies. Not surprisingly, there is plenty of evidence to the effect that firms operating in the prison-industrial complex lobby actively to keep captive populations as large as possible; the paroled population, as well, from whose supervised “freedom” hefty returns are also to be earned. At the same time, prison labor itself, often thought to be a prime site of exploitation, is a rather limited enterprise: in most correctional facilities relatively few do productive work for the private sector. Most who toil at all do so menially, usually servicing the institution itself (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2016:44).77 It from working on them, sustaining them in a condition of relatively spare life, that money is to be made.

    The point need not be labored. The carceral subject-as-object is just one instance of a growing economy in which humans, reduced to their bodies, are commodified in the cause of neo-primitive accumulation; “neo-,“ since this, too, is far from new. Per contra, it has a history as long as history itself, in which modern slavery and racial capitalism are epochal moments from whose effects a good part of the planet is still having to recover. Its twenty-first century forms, alike, do not require to be spelled out. Trafficking, in all its hydra-headed guises, is said to be a “pandemic…[from] which no country is immune”: according to UNICEF, there are 21m people being trafficked around the world, yielding annual profits of $32bn.78 Contemporary slavery, says one authoritative source, embraces some 40.3m people today;79 in 2016, estimates varied from 21m (International Labor Organization) to 46m (Global Slavery Index).80 Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers also present themselves as embodied, for-profit opportunities to those who deal, legally or otherwise, in transporting, managing, and servicing displaced persons. To be sure, the categorical distinctions separating different types of exploitable subjects are often murky, porous. But, more to the present point, in the world “after labor” it is the line between the working and the worked-on that draws our attention, a line that tends increasingly to be crossed in one direction – away from the former toward the latter. Which returns us to the paradox: if this is so, if conventional forms of wage labor are disappearing, or morphing in so many directions, how do we explain the low official unemployment rates in so many places – or, almost everywhere, the fairly common presumption, indeed blind faith, that economic and social problems may be resolved, alchemically, by “creating more jobs”?

    VII.

    Once again, let us distinguish between the empirical, the conceptual, and the phenomenological dimensions of the paradox.

    Take the first first. Empirically-speaking, as we have already said, there has never truly been a time of full employment. Or anything near it. The ideology-speak that continues to pretend to the possibility (see e.g. Stiglitz 2003:292f.; Schmid 2008:vii) – and/or claims that, under felicitous conditions, it has been “achieved”81 – wilfully ignores the fact that capital has always sustained, more or less c/overtly, a “reserve army of labor” (Marx 1976:781 et passim);82 or that, as Cedric Robinson (1983:24) insists, slavery and indenture has always been a critical element of capitalist production in and beyond Europe, and that, along with discounted, insecure immigrant labor, were a significant proportion of national proletariats. Nor is this all. As Kasmir (2018) observes, even at the height of Fordism in the US, the ur-case of this ideology- in-action, “whole segments of the population were excluded” from the workforce. As she and others have intimated, the precarity of the poor and the pigmented, the domestic and the disabled, the marginal and the migrant – those, in short, unembraced by organized labor and discounted as unemployable – may have become a scholarly preoccupation of late (after Butler 2004; cf. e.g. Standing 2011). But it has been an immanent feature of the history of capitalism all along, epitomized by racially-saturated colonial contexts like South Africa. What is more, Michael Denning (2010) recalls, Marx himself observed that the “wageless,” having been expelled en masse from work, were rendered invisible to political economy, indeed to polite society, from the first. This was especially so in the global north, we would add, during the post-World War 2 years, the heyday of Keynesian hegemony (above, p.00), when, in Denning’s words, “the wage [as] the source of capitalist ideolog[y],” of its notions of freedom and equality and the good life, were most palpably fetishized – thus to obscure the fact that wageless life is not a side effect, but “the starting point in understanding the free market,” past and present.

    Herein lies a critical element in the resolution of the paradox: its empirical erasure at the hands of the ostensibly value-free pragmatism of formal economics and modernist political discourse; specifically, of its occulting of reality by recourse to statistical reason.83 Put it this way: if, in a population, a significant percentage of those who lack employment are made to disappear from sight by literally discounting their very existence, the remaining proportion, those who do have jobs, will, statistically- speaking, appear concomitantly large. Under these conditions, there is no army of jobless people to be concerned about, nor does the “end of work” seem imminent. Per contra, full employment looks to lie well this side of the horizon of possibility and of public policy – thus to sustain the dignity of labor, and an honestly earned paycheck, as the mythic cornerstone of the good life.

    Thus in the USA, for example, the official unemployment rate hovers below 4% at present, which conjures the illusion of a largely working population. But this figure only takes into account those who are positioned to look for work and are doing so. It ignores entirely the “employment-population ratio.”84 The latter, by contrast, embraces everyone of working age, including those who are no longer in the formal job market: those who, unable to find anything else, have taken themselves out of it to enter into other – recall, artisanal, sharing, caring, affective, cultural and criminal – economies; or those who are prevented from entering employment by virtue of disability, injury, imprisonment, forced retrenchment, early retirement, custodial responsibility for others, and so on; or those who have simply become unavoidably indigent. In April 2018, this ratio was just 60.3%; in other words, almost 40% of the able bodied citizenry of America, their sociological profiles highly predictable, were not in waged jobs. These figures, trust them or not, come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.85 The discrepancy between the employment-population ratio and official jobless numbers, which are the ones most touted in the political sphere and the academy, derives, in major part, from the uncounted carceral population; the mass of primarily Black and Hispanic inner city residents to whom the formal economy is effectively closed; people, mainly women, compelled by the lack of state welfare to look after others; and laid-off laborers in places from which manufacturing and extractive industries have decamped.

    Nor is the US alone in the way it dis/counts. In the U.K, according to a study undertaken at Sheffield Hallam University, “unemployment is three times [more] than the official count,”86 notwithstanding the fact that this much-heralded count, 3.9% at the time of writing, is the lowest since the pre-Thatcherite Labour Party administration of the mid-1970s. The Hallam study echoes both public discourse – which acknowledges that “there is more hidden unemployment than suggested by the official statistics”87 – and scholarly accounts. In respect of the latter, economist David Blanchflower (2019), in his forthcoming Not Working, puts it bluntly: “don’t trust low unemployment numbers… Standard economic measures are often blind” to the very large numbers who are radically “underemployed or have simply given up trying to find a well-paying job”; extraordinarily, 55% of all jobs created since 2008 are part-time, that is, in the gig economy. He adds, also, that “wages have fallen more [in the past decade] than ever in recorded history” – and that the self-employed, who boost the myth of “rosy employment figures,” earn significantly less those in paid jobs.88 Another case, this, of hiding the radical transformation of contemporary labor, of its structural demography, in a form of occult numeration that, simultaneously, makes phenomena reappear as they disappear, rendering them at once absent-and-present in the moment of their re- presentation. Likewise Italy, often said to be a southern nation in the global north (Wagner 2017; Dainotto 2011; Cassano 2012),89 where the official unemployment rate is 10.5%, where migrants who work for “hunger wages…in conditions of slavery” are blamed for almost everything and are the object of rising racist violence,90 and where a large slice of the population is “employed in the black [economy]”: the Minister of Labor in its Five Star Movement (M5S) government has actually referred to the uncounted millions living below the poverty line and “on the margins of [the] country,” as “invisible people.”91 The nations of the global south, in general, register rather higher levels than do the USA or the UK; hence our comments earlier about those both officially recognized and publicly discussed in South Africa, whose “expanded” rate – the rough equivalent of the US employment-population ratio – was 37 percent in 2018. Either those nations are less intent to hide their historically low formal employment rates behind a statistical fig leaf, or more of their able bodied adults persist longer in looking for wage employment.

    There is another way to make the paradox disappear empirically. It is, in addition to discounting significant numbers of those excluded from work, by “add[ing] more people into the employed category without changing anyone’s actual status.”92 There are two obvious ways of doing this. The first is to count radically under- employed people as if they were properly employed, going as far as to take in those who do barely any work at all. Statistics South Africa, for instance, counts persons those who did wage work for no more than a hour in the week before its quarterly labor force surveys,93 So does the USA, which also includes those who, while formally having a job, were not necessarily doing it for one or another recognized reason.94 As this suggests, so-called “non-standard workers” – who labor on flexitime, under highly temporary and fragile arrangements, or under that oxymoronic absent-presence, the zero-hour contracts,– may inflate formal numbers by a significant margin: along with the self-employed, they made up a full 39% of the entire European Union workforce in 2016 (European Commission 2018:19). At the other extreme are those in a regular position who are paid insufficient to subsist on, and have, therefore, to hold multiple jobs; school teachers and menial service workers in the US come immediately to mind. They are counted just once, hence to enshrine the idea that it is formal employment, under whatever conditions, that is significant, rather than a livelihood – a point to which we shall return.

    The second way of making the paradox disappear by making more people appear to be employed is to redefine labor so broadly as to include basically any form of social productivity, be it mental or manual, waged or unwaged, formal or informal, even licit or illicit. This is what the European Commission on the Future of Work, Future of Society (2018:7,19) comes close to doing in the cause of recognizing unpaid exertions as a worthy basis of the dignity classically associated with wage labor: “Traditional concepts of work,” it says, “must be rethought to take in a much broader array of ‘non-standard employment,” including “a range of unpaid contributions to our societies…” Nor is the European Commission alone in this. Finding value in unpaid labor has become a common ideological theme of the twenty-first century, argued alike by feminist and critical race theorists, theologians, neoliberal ethicists, and many others besides. And so not only is the paradox made to disappear empirically by only discounting those who are recognized as officially to be counted, but also conceptually by including more or less anything in the category of value-producing enterprise – and asserting, thereby, the sustained ethico-theological centrality of work as the core of human being in the new age of capitalism. It also contributes to the erasure of “the end of work” from the phenomenology of social experience. For the unemployed, it is not a structural feature of contemporary capitalism that besets them; it is the contingent misfortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time: Youngstown or Flint or the coal towns of Kentucky or factory-shuttered towns of northern England. Or other places from which jobs have migrated. But, if we take this conception of labor, the circle is closed: all those “new” economies in the global north, those long established informal economies of the global south – all those species of activity which have flourished anew with the “end of work” – are embraced within it.

    But, while it may be disappeared empirically and conceptually by these means, phenomenologically-speaking, the paradox – the fact that wage labor remains at the elemental core of capitalism, and of species being under its political theology, yet appears as an anachronism, at its historical “end” – has not gone away. Nor have the anxieties, even the social panic, that it provokes. If anything, those anxieties keep reappearing, underscored symbolically by the figures of the zombie, the robot, and the posthuman mutant – and politically in populist promises of job creation and the like. Formal statistics may pretend to low unemployment rates – and my be claimed by politicians as proof of the positive effects of their policies – but experience tells otherwise. Not merely that work is dispersing itself into distant geographies and new temporalities, but also into the yawning disconnect between a job and an income.95

    Again, we have anticipated the point.

    – Recall David Blanchflower (2019; see above, fn.00), who says what amounts to the same thing in pointing out that the illusion of high employment rates in the UK in the past decade or so – he might have added that it applies to much of the world – has been sustained by a palpable drop in real wages and by the rise in underemployment counted as though it were employment, Put another way, if a significant proportion of people cannot subsist beyond the poverty level on their pay, there opens up a significant gap between a job and an income. This is precisely what has happened in many places: people who have jobs, either paid or self-employed, who are earning below the minimal needs for life and who, therefore, need more that one source of income to survive, are fundamentally misrepresented by official employment figures, whose very real predicament they hide. As Steven Shaviro, among very many others notes – this in a review of Lisa Adkins’s The Time of Money (2018) – “[w]ages are no longer sufficient to meet household needs, even if women as well as men enter full time into the workforce,”96 thus forcing almost everyone to accumulate debt. Given the number of people who hold jobs or work for remuneration insufficient unto their needs, national employment rates would need to be far in excess of 100% even to approach something akin to full employent; the gap between jobs and incomes hides the real state of inequality and material well-being. And disappears the contradiction between capital and labor from visibility by sustaining the illusion that most people have jobs either in the formal or in the gig economy – an illusion that is less untrue than it hides precisely what it reveals, i.e., that capital is succeeding, in significant measure, in erasing labor, replacing it by technology, outsourcing it into the gig universe, and the like, while celebrating a neoliberal economy in which everyone is at once an entrepreneur of themselves, a contractor of their own energies and capacities, and/or a commodity.

     

  • A Silent Tribute to Tata Madiba

    A Silent Tribute to Tata Madiba

    Thanks for asking us to write something on Nelson Mandela, which we appreciate. Alas, though, we both feel somewhat exhausted on the subject, having done any number of things for the media. The Harvard Gazette has already published a long interview with us, in which we try to contextualize Mandela’s legacy and move subtly away from the big-man history that underpins all the empty hagiography now so pervasive in the US and British press.1 That legacy is not the story of an individual hero, as iconic—or, rather, metonymic—as he may have become. It is the story of a sovereign struggle, one that involved the deaths of many unnamed heroes, innumerable heroic acts without signature, processes both with and without subjects. The reason that we all feel morally orphaned by the death of Madiba, of Rolihlahla (the troublesome one), of Tata, our last living grandparent, is that he was our final link to a modernist sense of political possibility, a utopianism without innocence, with critique rather than self-obsessed cynicism. But sadly, he became a living anachronism in the land of his birth, as the latter was overtaken by neoliberal adjustment, despite all that he had done and been. Somehow, while he lived, that older sense of freedom still seemed recoverable. The death of the man is also the death of an epoch, of our epoch, one in which people like you and we actually dared to put faith in the ideals of democratic equity, of justice, of a humane humanity, of the sovereignty of citizens. All that seems fanciful, indeed irrecuperable, after Mandela. In short, the reason that we feel unable to write any more about this moment is that we have said, in deliberately few words, everything we think about it. At this point, the greatest eloquence is the eloquence of a deeply reflective silence. Much of the rest is noise, ritual noise most of it, noise often being made by people who have lacked the courage to stand openly for the things to which Madiba—and the movement at large of which he was part, since he was not “apartheid’s conqueror,” in the phrase of the US media,2 just its most famous struggle hero—gave their lives, their freedom, their spirit. Perhaps the lesson of those lives for us in the US is what we, as a country, did NOT do to fight apartheid while Rolihlahla Mandela languished in prison, what we have done repeatedly to fight AGAINST democracy under the sign of security and self-interest, why we continue to condone the blatant racism and brute inequity in our desperately unequal, cruel society. Rather than mourn Mandela, which South Africans will do, have done, in their millions, perhaps Americans should mourn the death, in our own country, of the ideals and principles for which he stood.

  • A Correction Presents: Jean and John Comaroff on Theory from the South

    John Comaroff is Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology at Harvard University. Before joining the Department of African and African American Studies, John Comaroff was the Harold H. Swift Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. He is also an Honorary Professor of Anthropology at the University of Cape Town, and an Affiliated Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation. His current research in South Africa is on crime, policing, and the workings of the state, on democracy and difference, and on postcolonial politics. His authored and edited books include, with Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (2 vols), Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, Modernity and its Malcontents, Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa, Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Ethnicity, Inc., Zombies et Frontières A l’Ere Néolibérale, Theory from the South: or, how Euro-America is evolving toward Africa, and The Truth Abouth Crime: Policing and the Metaphysics of Disorder. With Jean Comaroff he is currently completing The Return of Khulekani Khumalo, Zombie Captive: Law, Imposture, and Personhood in Postcolonial South Africa, and co-editing Chiefship and the Customary in Contemporary Africa.

    Jean Comaroff is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology at Harvard University. Jean Comaroff was educated at the University of Cape Town and the London School of Economics. After a spell as research fellow in medical Anthropology at the University of Manchester, she moved to the University of Chicago, where she was remained until 2012 as the Bernard E. and Ellen C. Sunny Distinguished Service Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, and Director of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory. She is also Honorary Professor at the University of Cape Town. Her research, primarily conducted in southern Africa, has centered on processes of social and cultural transformation – the making and unmaking of colonial society, the nature of the postcolony, the late modern world viewed from the Global South. Her writing has covered a range of topics, from religion, medicine and body politics to state formation, crime, democracy and difference. Her publications include Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People (1985), “Beyond the Politics of Bare Life: AIDS and the Global Order” (2007); and, with John L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (vols. l [1991] and ll [1997]); Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (1992); Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism (2000), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (2006), Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), Theory from the South, or How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa (2011), and The Truth About Crime: Policing and the Metaphysics of Disorder in South Africa. In the pipeline is The Return of Khulekane Khumalo, Zombie Captive: Law, Imposture, and Personhood in Postcolonial South Africa. Also in process is an edited collection, Chiefship and the Customary in Contemporary Africa. A committed pedagogue, she has won awards for teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and has worked to enable college students to study abroad, especially in Africa.

    A Correction: Podcast: 10/21/2021

    https://www.acorrectionpodcast.com/phonyeconomy/r7jwsa5xhfks2b4wlre5g4645p9f7y#.

  • Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods

    Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods

    Abstract

    Among the 19th-century Tswana, we argue, cattle were like commodities; they linked processes of production and exchange, embodied an order of meanings and relations, and had the capacity to reproduce a total social world. They were, in sum, prime media for the creation and representation of value in a material economy of persons and a social economy of things. But they also had particular historical salience. As the Tswana were colonized, the encounter between periphery and center, local and global economies, was played out—materially and ideologically—in the contest between beasts and money, a contest which has given rise, also, to such token currencies as “cattle without legs.” The double character of cattle—as icons of a “traditional” order and as weapons in the struggle to assert control over modern life—has significant implications for our understanding of commodities in noncapitalist, non-European contexts, [cattle, commodities, money, colonialism, South Africa]

  • Cattle, Currencies, and the Politics of Commensuration on a Colonial Frontier

    Cattle, Currencies, and the Politics of Commensuration on a Colonial Frontier

    PREFATORY NOTE

    Encounters between different regimes of value – regimes divided by cultural space and time — presume mediation, translation, and communication. And, therefore, currencies, at once verbal and material, that objectify them. This, in turn, depends on one thing above all else: on mechanisms of commensuration, mechanisms that render negotiable otherwise inimical, apparently intransitive, orders of signs and practices. Without such mechanisms, which have often been the object of conflict and contestation, large scale projects of world-making, like colonialism, would have made no sense, neither as a world-historical undertaking on the part of colonizers nor as a lived reality to those upon whose worlds it was wrought. Jane Guyer (2004: 13), in an acute reading of the West African archive, warns against the assumption that commensuration, especially that attributed to the alchemy of money, necessarily dissolves all distinctions between disparate scales and measures of worth. In Africa, she insists, nonequivalent exchange has been pervasive. If anything, it has been facilitated by the spread of quantifiable currencies: as people became adept at deploying monetary scales, they frequently used them for negotiating intervals, “exchanging goods and services that were explicitly not the match of each other” (Guyer 2004: 47). In similar spirit, the following essay interrogates the role of the commensuration in the colonial encounter: How might the management of value conversion – efforts, that is, both to facilitate and to impede it — play into larger processes of political contestation and incorporation at the edges of empire?

    INTRODUCTION

    Money is sacred, as everyone knows… Barry Unsworth (1992: 325)

    This essay explores a very specific obsession with very general historical implications: the effort of Nonconformist evangelists to introduce coinage, to replace beads and cattle with banknotes, among Tswana peoples in South Africa. At its broadest, it posits a postmarxist argument, rooted in the concerns of both marxist and liberal theory, about the salience of commensuration in the modernist construction of society and history. And above all, in the forging of empires. For, we shall claim, at the heart of all “modern” colonialisms, a condition of their possibility perhaps, were mundane mechanisms that made ini- mical kinds of value, with different cultural roots, at once objectifiable, comparable, and negotiable–me- chanisms, that is, which permitted the up- and downloading of unlike forms of wealth, both human and inanimate. Commensuration and objectification, standardization and abstraction, equilibration and con- vertibility, of course, all feature prominently in classic theories of commodification; also in theories of the workings of money. But their significance in the construction of modernity as an ideology of global scale, and in the encounter between Europe and its others, has not been adequately plumbed. Nor, we believe, have their various media, their poetics and magicality, been adequately theorized..

    In order to make our general point, and to explore its further theoretical consequences, we interro- gate processes of commensuration in one African colonial theater, focusing on the material transactions they enabled across semantic frontiers; on their diverse, and differently endowed media, alike in- digenous and imported; on their implications of the long-run for cultural constructions of wealth; on their existential effects upon all involved. We ask why it was that the campaign to convert Tswana to Christianity, and to the ways of the West, concentrated so centrally on recasting their currencies: on tea- ching them to use cash, to make good by buying and selling goods, to commodify their labors by transfor- ming the wages of sin into virtuous incomes. We trace how these ventures were challenged by African conceptions of value; how they called into being hybrid tokens of exchange; how they set in train strug- gles to domesticate new alchemies of enrichment while striving to protect local means of storing wealth. We shall show that, for nineteenth-century colonial evangelists in South Africa, saving savages meant teaching savages to save. If Jesus was to redeem them, his sable followers had to learn to invest. Also to produce providentially, using God’s gifts to bring forth the greatest possible abundance. Or at least marketable surpluses. Only then would Africa become part of the Christian commonwealth and its sacred economy. Drawing “native” communities into that body of corporate nations meant, first and foremost, persuading them to accept money, the ultimate currency of conversion, commerce, civility, salvation. In their efforts to do this, the Protestant missions took the waxing spirits of capitalism, its specie and its signifying conventions, on a world-historical journey.

    In recuperating that journey, we seek to make visible the hidden hand, sometimes the sleight of hand, behind the political economy of nineteenth-century European colonialism. Which returns us to the broad outlines of our argument: (i) inasmuch as the building of empires depended on processes of commensuration, on rendering epistemically equivalent and transitive once incomparable objects and ideas, signs and meanings, it demanded media–beads, coin, contracts, and the like–with the capacity, simultaneously, to construct, negate, and transfigure difference; and (ii) inasmuch as those media, those currencies of conversion, opened up new lines of distinction, new languages of value, new forms of inequity, new objects of desire, new possibilities of appropriation and exploitation, they took on magical properties; this because (iii) they appeared, in and of themselves, to objectify history-in-the- making, even to make history of their own accord. Which, we shall demonstrate, is why banknotes, beads, and bovines became the objects of a protracted struggle in the South African interior; why, more generally, they became metonymic of the antinomies of value on which the colonial encounter, tout court was played out.

    As this suggests, we seek here to make two species of theoretical claim. Both are instantiated by our South African story, both extend far beyond it. One is about “modern” European colonialism, whose historical logic, we propose, is incomprehensible without an understanding the processes of commensura- tion and conversion that allowed various worlds to be brought into the same orbit of being, both imagina- tively and concretely–and made phenomenological sense of the politics, economics, semantics of the en- counters to which it gave rise. The other is about commensuration itself and about the media upon which it depends: media are fetishized not merely because they congeal labor power and/or obscure relations embodied in processes of production, nor because they displace unspeakable passions from people to obj- ects or vice versa, but because , being uniquely endowed things, they take on a social life of their own. Their genius, we shall show, does not lie in their being empty, or emptied, signifiers, just as their meaning does not derive from their relations to other, equally empty signs. It is owed in part to their intrinsic properties, in part to the moral, material, and magical work they are made to do in the exigent course of history.

    SPECIES OF VALUES, VALUE AND SPECIE

    Christian Political Economy: secular theology, sacred commerce

    If early modern European political economy was a secular theology (Hart 1986: 647), contempo- rary Nonconformist theology sanctified commerce. During the “second reformation” of the late 1700s, British Protestantism had refashioned itself with cultural fabric milled by the industrial revolution.
    Indeed, the interplay of church and business, realms never fully separate, produced a rich discourse, at once religious and temporal, about value and its production (Hempton 1984: 11; Waterman 1991: 3f). Eighteenth-century evangelicals, Rack (1989: 385f) claims, had been more influenced by the language of practical reason than their espousal of scripture and spirituality might suggest; similarly Warner (1930: 138), who long ago linked the “empirical temper” of Methodist lore to the central place it accorded econo- mics.

    But the discourse of political economy, which fused a belief in the beneficence of existing econo- mic institutions with a whiggish desire for reform, was especially audible among abolitionists and “impro- vers” in the first years of the nineteenth century (Waterman 1991: 6). As a call to practice, moreover, it was particularly congenial to the spirit of the great evangelical societies. While liberal theory per se was seldom a subject of open discussion among missionaries to South Africa, most of them were guided, more or less, by its material and moral principles. Some actually did cite it as a charter for their labors: the LMS Superintendent, John Philip (1828,1: 369), for example, quoted Adam Smith on the need to stimulate the indigent to industry; and David Livingstone (1961: 194) made mention of Malthus on the subject of re- production. As this implies, Nonconformist theologians and their followers were advocates of moral deregulation. According to the “New System” Calvinism of the Congregationalist clergy, everyone, not just the elect, were candidates for salvation. They also sought to remove the spiritual “ceiling” that the Anglican hierarchy put in the way of aspiring dissenters (Helmstadter 1992: 15,23). These men set all available means, including economic ones, to work for their cause. Likewise the Methodists; in line with early champions of free trade, Wesley saw nothing intrinsically unworthy or antisocial in riches (Semmel 1974: 71f). Quite the reverse. The “lusty zest” with which he advocated the quest for gain went further than most previous Puritans, who tended not to celebrate wealth but to condone it as a necessary compromise with evil (Warner 1930: 138f). For him, “business” did not “interrupt communion with God.” It was merely one of its channels.

    “Business,” in fact, seems to have served as a synecdoche for human action in the world,1 just as “usefulness” conveyed a sense of virtuous efficacy (Helmstadter 1992: 9). Not that commerce did not pose its own dangers. Wesley’s economic teachings were, in many ways, a lifelong effort to counter those implications of The Wealth of Nations that he saw to be corrupting (Outler 1985: 264). But therein lay the challenge: “Make yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness,” he preached (1985: 266), citing Luke’s injunction (16: 1-2) to redeem the potential of wealth. In his sermon on “The Use of Money,” he (1985: 267-8) chides fellow Christians for acquiescing in an “empty rant” against the “grand corrupter of the world.” The duty of the faithful was to deploy, to the greatest possible advantage, all that providence had provided. Money was a precious “talent”; the word evoked both biblical coinage and a sense of spe- cial, God-given capacity:

    [It] is of unspeakable service to all civilized nations in all the common affairs of life. It is a most compendious instrument of transacting all manner of business, and (if we use it according to Christian wisdom) of doing all manner of good.

    Money, he went on (p.268), was “food for the hungry” and “raiment for the naked.” Even “father to the fatherless”–surely one of the most genial images of cash in contemporary European moral discourse. As a compendious instrument, it was an ur-commodity, condensing in itself the essential quality of all good/s. Reciprocally, it could stand for all things, even the closest of human connections.

    Wesley seems to have seen coin as the servant of existing laws of value and a neutral vehicle of trade; he subscribed to the “commodity theory” of currency shared alike by classic liberal theorists and by Marx (Hart 1986: 643). Marx, of course, also stressed that money, as capital, was uniquely equipped to extract value from human producers. Wesley would himself inveigh against dishonest industry and fetter- ed exchange, but not against the powers of cash itself. In his simpler moral economy, its poison was drawn if it was used in ways pleasing to God. And it made all virtuous effort measurable and com- mensurable, permitting the conversion of worldly enterprise into spiritual credit. In this sense, the most “precious talent” of money was its capacity to enable mortals to “trade up.” Salvation itself became obtainable on free market terms. These fiscal orientations also suffused Wesleyan practice. “As a voluntary organization,” says Obelkevich (1976: 206), “Methodism…fostered in its members a new outlook, individual and collective, towards money.” Finances were a constant matter of concern and collections were taken up for many causes, not least foreign missions. In Britain, as among African converts, a ceaseless stream of demands and appeals highlighted the meliorative qualities of cash.

    The great evangelical societies, in fact, were run like businesses, with men of commerce actively investing their resources and managing their affairs (Helmstadter 1992: 10). In the field, the Nonconform- ists put their trust in the power of money to bring progress, and to place all things, even God’s grace, with- in human reach. This faith in the creative powers of cash recalls Simmel’s Philosophy of Money, perhaps the most refined statement of the nineteenth-century European belief in the transformative power of coin. For Simmel (1978: 291), man was by nature an “exchanging animal” and, by this token, an “objective animal” too: exchange, in its “wonderful simplicity,” made both the receiver and the giver, replacing selfish desire with mutual acknowledgement and objective appraisal. Transaction, he went on, begets rationaliza- tion. And the more that values are rationalized, “the more room there is in them, as in the house of God, for every soul.” Because of its unlimited convertibility (p. 292), money was uniquely capable of setting free the intrinsic worth of the world to be traded in neutral, standardized terms. And so it enabled the con- struction of an integrated society of morally dependent, but psychically self-sufficient persons (Simmel 1978: 297f).

    While they might never have put it in just these terms, the Nonconformists missionaries in South Africa devoted much of their effort to making Africans into “exchanging animals,” an enterprise in which cash played a pivotal role. They, too, nurtured the dream of an expansive civil society built not upon sav- age barter but upon transactions among self-possessed, moneyed persons. According to this dream, the liberation of “natives” from a primitive dependence on their kin and their chiefs lay in the creation of a higher order, a world of moral and material interdependence mediated by stable, impersonal media: let- ters, numbers, notes, and coin.

    There was, as everyone knows, another side to money: its long-standing Christian taint as an in- strument of corruption and betrayal. In part, this flowed from the power of cash, indeed all instruments of commensuration, to equate disparate forms of value. It could dissolve what was unique, precious, and per- sonal, reducing everything to the indiscriminate object of private avarice: the Savior, note, had been sold for thirty pieces of silver, monastic relics melted into gold. What was more, the ability of coin to trans- pose different forms of worth enabled profitable conversions to be made among them; in particular, it allowed the rich to prosper by using their assets to control the productivity of others. Parry and Bloch (1989: 2f; cf. Le Goff 1980) remind us that this sort of profit was anathema to the medieval European church, which saw productive work as the only legitimate source of wealth and condemned, as unnatural, the effortless earnings of merchants and money-lenders. Capitalism was to exploit the metabolic qualities of money in unprecedented ways, of course–especially its capacity to make things commensurable by turning distinct aspects of human existence, like land and labor, into alienable commodities. And Protestantism would endorse this process by sanctifying desire as virtuous ambition; also by treating the market as a realm of provident opportunity. Yet its medieval qualms remained. As Weber (1958: 53) stressed, those Christians who most aptly embodied the spirit of capitalism were ascetics. They took little pleasure in wealth per se. For them, making money was an end in itself, a transcendental value. It gave evidence of ceaseless “busy-ness” and divine approval.

    In so far as money remained demonically corrosive, there was only one way to avoid its corrup- ting qualities: to let it go. If it was to generate virtue, it had visibly to circulate. Hoarded wealth was “the snare of the devil” (Wesley 1986: 233). It made men forsake the inner life for superficial pride, luxury, and leisure. The Divine Proprietor required that his stewards put his talent to work either by cycling it back into honest business or by giving it away in charity; the proper movement of wealth was both creative and positive. By those lights, exchange was production (Parry and Bloch 1989: 86). Non- conformists still held to a labor theory of value, but now the notion of industry was cast in terms of manu- facture and the market, of wage labor, the circulation of wealth, and the productive character of capital.

    For Nonconformists like Wesley, in short, assiduous effort and ethical dealing–the market, lite- rally, as a “moral” economy–were enough to curb the malignancy of money. Charity, itself a high yield investment in virtue, was the main means of redistributing wealth, a way to “lay up…treasures in the bank of heaven” (Wesley 1984: 629). Humble toil also paid spiritual dividends, but at a lower rate. In the here-and-now, Methodism tended to endorse existing labor relations; during the late 1700s, even child workers were said to profit from industrious discipline (Warner 1930: 151). And the just wage was just, for exertion in one’s allotted calling was its own reward. Hence it behooved the faithful to strive cease- lessly to produce all they could, an injunction that gelled well with the expansive ethos of humane imperialism.

    Read in this light, it is clear that the economic emphasis of missionary practice in South Africa expressed more than a mere effort to survive or even to profit. It expressed the spirit of liberal modernity, being part of the attempt to foster a self-regulating commonwealth, for which the market was both the model and the means; also, to induce what Unsworth (1992) has aptly termed a “sacred hunger,” an insatiable desire for material enrichment and moral progress. As we shall see, the task proved onerous, for the “mammon of unrighteousness” was never easily befriended. By the mid 1820s, some of the more radical evangelicals in England were denouncing the reduction of human qualities to price. And, in the mission field, the Nonconformists were caught, time and again, in the double-sided implications of money. Meanwhile, the kind of value carried by coin would come face to face with African notions of worth, setting off new contrasts, contests, and combinations.

    The Southern Tswana world of the early nineteenth century bore some similarity to the one from which the missionaries set out. Stress was laid here, too, on human production as the source of value. Here, too, communities were understood as social creations, built up through the ceaseless actions and transactions of people eager to enhance their fund of worth. Here, too, exchange was facilitated by versatile media that measured and stored wealth, and permitted its negotiation from afar.

    These parallels, we have argued (1992: 127f), are sufficient to cast doubt on the exclusive asso- ciation of commodities and competitive individualism with industrial capitalism. Or modernity. But, by the same token, similar practices do not necessarily have the same genesis, constitution or meaning. Al- though Southern Tswana subscribed to a fundamentally humanist sense of the production of wealth, their understanding of value–and the way it vested in persons, relationships, and objects–was different from that of their interlocutors from abroad. Thus, while early missionaries thought they detected in the Af- ricans a stress on self-contrivance, a dark replica of Western economic man, they found, on longer acquaintance, that this person was a far cry from the discrete, enclosed subject they hoped to usher into the church. Indigenous “utilitarianism,” Tswana literati like Molema (1920: 116) insisted, was unlike European “egoism”; the evangelists referred to the “native” variant as “selfishness.” Indeed, closer en- gagement of previously distinct economies on the frontier would reveal deep distinctions behind superficial resemblances. And it would give birth to a dynamic field of hybrid subjects and signs.

    The Setswana verb go dira meant “to make,” “to work,” or “to do.” Tiro, its noun form, covered a wide range of activities–from cultivation to political negotiation, cooking to ritual performance–which yielded value in persons, relations, and things. It also produced “wealth” (khumô), an extractable surplus (of beer, artifacts, tobacco, stock, and so on) which could be further deployed to multiply worth. Sorcery (boloi) was its inverse, implying the negation of value through attempts to harm others and/or unravel their endeavors. Tiro itself could never be alienated from its human context and transacted as mere labor power; that experience still awaited most Southern Tswana. Rather, it was an intrinsic dimension of the everyday act of making selves and social ties.

    This vision of the production of value, based on close human interdependence, bore little resem-blance to that of liberal economics, which saw the commonweal as the fruit of impersonal transactions among autonomous beings. For Tswana, wealth inhered in relations. Which is why its pursuit involved (i) the construction of enduring connections among kin and affines, patrons and clients, sovereigns and sup- porters, men and their ancestors; and (ii) the extension of influence by means of exchanges, usually via the medium of cattle, which secured rights in, and claims over, others. But, while these rights and claims were constantly contested, the productive and reproductive properties of a relationship, be it wedlock or serfdom, could not be separated from the bonds that bore them (Molema 1920: 125; Schapera (1940: 77). The object of social exchange was precisely not to accumulate riches with no strings attached: the traffic in beasts served to knit human beings together in an intricate weave, in which the density of linkages and the magnitude of value were one and the same thing.

    Because they were the means, par excellence, of building social biographies and accumulating capital, cattle were the supreme form of property here; they could congeal, store, and increase value, hol- ding it stable in a world of flux (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 139). Not surprisingly, their widespread use as currency in human societies was noted by early theorists of political economy (Smith 1976: 38; Marx 1967,1: 183). While Adam Smith (1976) judged them “rude” and “inconvenient” instruments of commerce, he appreciated that they embodied many of the elementary features of coin, being useful, alienable, relatively durable objects. Although standardized as species, moreover, stock come in different sizes and colors, genders and ages, and so might be utilized as tokens of varying quality and denomination. (Many African peoples, of course, have long elaborated on the exquisite distinctions among kine). True, cattle are not as divisible as inanimate substances like metal and tend, therefore, to be more gross, slow-moving units of trade. But, as we shall see, Southern Tswana took this to be one of their advantages over cash, whose velocity they regarded as dangerous. Herds were movable, of course, es- pecially for purposes of exchange, a fact stressed by Marx (1967,1: 115); for him, the apparent self-propulsion of currency was crucial to its role in animating commodity transactions. Affluent Tswana men exploited this ambulatory quality, dispersing bridewealth to affines and loaning stock to clients as they strove to turn their resources into control over people. They also rotated animals among dependents, and between cattle-posts, both as a hedge against disaster and as a way of hiding assets from the jealous gaze of rivals (Schapera 1938: 24).

    It is as exchange value on the hoof, then, that cattle occupied a pivotal place in Southern Tswana political economy. Their capacity to objectify, transfer, and enhance wealth endowed them with almost magical talents. Much like money in the west. The beast, goes the vernacular song, is “god with a wet nose” (modimo o nkô e metsi; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 127). This is a patent instance of fetishism in bovine shape–of the attribution to objects, that is, of value produced by humans–which suggests that the commodity is not specific to capitalism. At the same time, the case of Tswana stock also shows that commodification need not be an all-or-none process; and that it is always culturally situated in a meaningful world of work and worth. Here, for example, while animals enabled rich men to lay claim to the labors of others, they did not depersonalize relations among people. Quite the contrary. They drew atten- tion to the social embeddedness of those very relations–while making them seem part of the natural order of things.

    The complex qualities of cattle currency would intervene in mission efforts to transform the Sou- thern Tswana sense of value. For beasts were enough like money to be identified with it, yet enough unlike it to make and mark salient differences. On one hand, they could abstract value. On the other, they did the opposite: they signified and enriched personal identities and social ties. The capacity of animals in Africa to serve both as instruments and as signs of human relationship has long been noted; the so-called “bovine idiom” is an instance of the more general tendency of humans to use alienable objects to extend their own existence by uniting themselves with others (Mauss 1954; Munn 1977). Both in their individual beauty and their collective association with wealth, kine were ideal–and idealized–personifications of men. A highly nuanced vocabulary existed in Setswana to describe variations in color, marking, disposition, horns, and reproductive status (Lichtenstein 1973: 81; Sandilands 1953: 342). Named and praised, they were creatures of distinction. Not only did they bear their owners’ stamp as they traversed social space (Somerville 1979: 230). They also served as living records of the passage of value along the pathways of inheritance, affinity, alliance, and authority.

    The intricate patterns of stock deployment among Tswana made it difficult for early European vi- sitors to assess their holdings. Longer-term records suggest a history of fluctuations in animal popula- tions, with cycles of depletion being followed by periods of recovery, at least until the end of the nine- teenth century (Grove 1989: 164). But there is clear evidence of the existence, at the beginning of that century, of large and unequally distributed herds. Observers were struck by blatant discrepancies in cattle ownership, and by the unambiguous association–Burchell (1824,2: 272) used the word “metonymy”–of wealth in kine with power (cf. Lichtenstein 1973: 76f; Molema 1920: 115). Thus the chief was the sup- reme herdsman (modisa) of his people, a metaphor that captured well vernacular visions of value and political economy. Situated atop the morafe (“nation”), he presided over a domain marked not by fixed boundaries, but by an outer ring of water holes and pasture–in other words, a range (Comaroff and Co- maroff 1992: 141). Royal stock also built relations beyond the polity, being used to placate and to trade with other sovereigns.

    It was not only chiefs who mobilized cattle as a currency of power: other men of position also ac- cumulated stock and set up networks of alliance and patronage. Ordinary male citizens, however, relied on inheritance, bridewealth, and natural increase to build their modest herds. Some–serfs, and others laid low–had no animals at all. They made up what Burchell (1824,2: 348) termed an “ill-fated class,” eternal- ly dependent on their betters. In the bovine economy of the Southern Tswana, in sum, an indigenous “stock exchange” underwrote inequalities of class, gender, generation, and rank. As the pliable media used to forge all productive relations, human and superhuman alike, cattle were the quintessential form of social and symbolic capital. They moved men to intrigue, sorcery, and warfare, to deep contemplation about the nature of life and worth, and, as Somerville (1979: 134) witnessed in 1801, to passionate public poetry.

    Cattle were also a prime medium in the exchanges that, by the late eighteenth century, linked Southern Tswana to other peoples on the subcontinent, yielding beads from the Kora and Griqua to the south, and iron implements, copper jewelry, and tobacco from communities to the north and northeast (Lichtenstein 1930,2: 409; Stow 1905: 449,489). Bovine capital also gave access to the ivory and pelts desired by white travelers, who arrived in growing numbers from ca.1800 (Shillington 1985: 11). And pack-oxen enabled the long-distance haulage of sebilô, a sought-after hair cosmetic, from its source in Tlhaping territory (Campbell 1813: 170). But the earliest European explorers already noted that Tswana were reluctant to trade away their beasts. Somerville’s (1979: 140) expedition to the interior failed in its mercantile objectives because of the “[natives’] unwillingness to part with their cattle.” The Englishman found this “difficult to account for, since they convert them to no useful purpose whatever.”

    Nonetheless, regional exchange networks were active enough to persuade the Europeans that they had stumbled upon the “essential principles of international traffic,” or “mercantile agency in its infancy” in the African veld (Burchell 1824,2: 555; original emphasis). Andrew Smith (1939,1: 251), in fact, ob- served that chiefs managed production explicitly to foster alliances; they tried, as well, to monopolize dealings with foreigners and to control commerce across their realms (Campbell 1822,2: 194). Indeed, whites found these men aware of discrepancies in going rates for such items as ivory, and keen to profit from them. Notwithstanding the reluctance to sell beasts, occasions to traffic with Europeans–in the early years for beads, later for guns and money–were eagerly seized. When Lichtenstein (1930,2: 388) visited the Tlhaping in 1805, before a permanent mission was established, he noted that a “general spirit of trade” was easily roused. The Africans kept up an energetic exchange until his party had naught left to sell. A few years on, Burchell (1824,2: 555) was struck by the existence of enduring trade partnerships (maats; Dutch) between individual Tlhaping and Klaarwater Khoi.

    We shall come back, shortly, to the entry of the civilizing mission into Southern Tswana commer- ce. Already, however, two things are clear. The first is that the Africans had long channelled their surpluses into trade, bringing them a range of goods from knives and tobacco to widely circulating forms of cur- rency. Of the latter, second, beads had become the most notable. By the turn of the nineteenth century,2 they were serving as media of transaction that articulated local and global economies, linking the worlds of cattle and money (cf. Graeber 1996). Along with buttons, which were put to a similar purpose, they were portable tokens that, for a time, epitomized foreign exchange value beyond the colonial frontier. Beads were “the only circulating medium or money in the interior,” Campbell noted (1822,1: 246), adding that every “nation” through which they passed made a profit on them. Different kinds composed distinct regional currencies; Philip (1828,2: 131) tells us that no importance was attached to particular examples, however beautiful, if they were “not received among the tribes around them.” At the same time, African communities showed strong preferences, in the early 1800s, for specific colors, sizes, and degrees of transparency (Beck 1989: 220f).3

    Even as they became a semi-standardized currency for purposes of external trade, beads served internally as personal adornments; in this they were like many similar sorts of wealth objects. Their at- traction seems to have stemmed from the fact that particular valuables could be withdrawn from circula- tion for display, itself a form of conspicuous consumption.4 But men of means also accumulated hidden stocks: “their chief wealth, like that of more civilized nations, [was] hoarded up in their coffers” (Camp- bell (1822,1: 246; cf. Graeber 1996). Here it stayed, in precisely the manner abhorred by the Protestants, until favorable opportunities for trade presented themselves. Market exchange was, at this point, a spora- dic activity directed at specific exotic objects. It was set apart from everyday processes of production and consumption.

    Some observers stressed the monetary properties of beads: “They answer the same purpose as cowrie shells in India and North Africa,” Campbell (1822,1: 246) wrote, “or as guineas and shillings in Britain.” But others were struck by the differences. For a start, aesthetic qualities seemed integral to their worth. “Among these people,” offered Philip (1828,2: 131), “utility is, perhaps, more connected with beauty that it is with us.” Simmel (1978: 73) would have said that the separation of the beautiful from the useful comes only with the objectification of value: the aesthetic artifact takes on a unique existence, sui generis; it cannot be replaced by another that might perform the same function. Such an artifact, therefore, is the absolute inverse of the coin, whose defining feature is its substitutability.

    Among Southern Tswana, the increasing velocity of trade did render some media of exchange–first beads, then money–ever more interchangeable. But the process was never complete. And it did not eliminate other forms of wealth in which beauty and use explicitly enhanced each other. Indeed, the longevity of cattle currencies in African societies bears testimony to the fact that processes of rationa- lization, standardization, and universalization are always refracted by social and cultural circumstance. In the cow, aesthetics and utility, uniqueness and substitutability complemented each other, coloring Tswana notions of value in general–and of money in particular. Black wage laborers in early twentieth century South Africa, Breckenridge (1995: 274) notes, set special store by the physical qualities of metallic coins; in explaining their attitude, public intellectuals John Dube and Sol Plaatje contrasted “flimsy” paper money with “the good red gold we know and love.” Comeliness and usefulness play off each other in the west as well, of course; modernists, after all, insist that form should follow function. The Tswana appreciation of prized beads and beasts, similarly, expressed a sense of “attractiveness” that fused the per- fect with the practical. Persons or objects possessed of it were thought to draw towards themselves desirable qualities dispersed in the world at large. Ornamental baubles or celebrated stock were the very epitome of attractiveness: held apart from the everyday cycle of exchange, they congealed precious po- tential.

    Objects that come to be invested with value as media of exchange vary greatly over time and space, a point well demonstrated by the emergence of new currencies as formerly distinct economic ord- ers begin to intersect. Marx (1967,1: 83) once said that, when the latter happens, the “universal equivalent form” often lodges arbitrarily and transiently in a particular commodity. So it was with beads, which had been mass-produced for different ends in the West, but turned out to serve well, for a while, as a vehicle of commerce beyond the colonial border. Marx also added that, as traffic persists, such tokens of equivalence tend to “crystallize…out into the money form.” So, once again, it was with beads. While Tswana would accept various articles as gifts, these were of little use in trade. “They want money in such a case,” Campbell (1822,1: 246) found, “that is, beads.” As transactions increased in volume, standards of value in the worlds linked by this new currency began to affect each other: merchants noted that rates charged by Africans in the interior rose and became more uniform.5 By the 1820s, the demand for beads at the Cape had driven up prices dramatically, to the extent that missionaries tried to secure supplies from England at one-third of the cost (Beck 1989: 218f).

    The bottom soon fell out of the frontier bead market, however (although not so further north; see Chapman 1971,1: 127). That market seems to have been sustained by the dearth of fractions of the rix- dollar, the currency at the Cape in the early 1800s (Arndt 1928: 44-6). After 1825, Britain introduced its own silver and copper coinage to its imperial possessions, and paper dollars were replaced by sterling. Once the new supply had stabilized, and had filtered into the interior, its effect on bead money was devas- tating. In 1835, Andrew Smith (1939,1: 250) wrote that a white merchant

    inform[ed] me that when first he began to trade in this country about 1828, nothing was desired by the natives but beads, etc., but now they are scarcely asked for; indeed nothing is to be purchased by them [beads] but milk or firewood…They understand reckoning money quite well, and if told the price of an article… they reckon out the money with the greatest precision.

    Ironically, while Tswana came to reckon in money, many traders preferred to deal in kind. But, even more important than changes in the cash supply, a shift was occurring in the structure of wants and in lo- cal notions of value. It was encouraged, above all, by the presence of the evangelists and by the entry onto the scene, at their urging, of a cadre of itinerant merchants and shopkeepers.

    Here, then, were two distinct regimes of value, one European and the other African, whose engagement would have a profound impact on the colonial encounter. To the Nonconformists, economic re- form was no mere adjunct to spirituality: virtue and salvation had to be made by man, using the scarce material resources bequeathed by providence for improving the world. Commercial enterprise allowed the  industrious to turn labor into wealth and wealth into grace. Money was the crucial medium of convertibi- lity in this. It typified the potential for good and evil given as a birth-right to every self-willed individual. Southern Tswana, upon whom the evangelists hoped to impress these divine possibilities, also inhabited a universe of active human agency, in which riches were made through worldly transactions. Exchange, in their case, was effected primarily through cattle. In contrast to cash, stock socialized assets, measuring their ultimate worth not in treasures in heaven, but in people on earth. We move, now, to examine how these regimes of value, already in contact in the early 1800s, were brought into ever closer articulation.

    EXTENDING THE INVISIBLE HAND

    Civilizing Commerce, Sanctified Shopping: The Early Years

    “You white men are a strange folk. You have the word of God…but [your traders] are giving beads to the girls [and] corrupting the women of my people. [T]hey are teaching my people abominations of which even they were once ignorant, heathen as they are. Here are traders enough.”

    Chief Sechele, 1865 6

    British observers in the early 1800s might have acknowledged that Southern Tswana showed a lively interest in exchange. But they also stressed the difference between “native commerce” and orderly European business. Thus Burchell (1824,2: 536-9) noted that “mercantile jealousy” had produced compet- ing efforts to monopolize traffic with the colony to the south. He proposed a “regulated trade for ivory… with the Bichuana nations,” to be vested in an authorized body of white merchants who would institute “fair dealing” to the advantage of all. Like liberal economies before and since, his “free” market required careful management.

    The founding evangelists shared this trust in the beneficent effect of trade. Some said that the ve- ry “sight of a shop” on mission ground roused savages to industry (Philip (1828,1: 204-5). The equation of civilization with commerce might have become one of the great clichés of the epoch. But, for the Nonconformists, it was far from a platitude. The point was not to create an exploitable dependency; al- though that did happen. Nor was it simply to play on base desire to make people give ear to the Gospel; although that happened too. It ran much deeper. Trade had a capacity to breach “the sullen isolations of heathenism,” to stay the “fountain of African misery” (Livingstone 1940: 255). All of which made materi- al reform an urgent moral duty. The optimism of the missionaries in this respect was to falter in the face of the stark realities of the colonial frontier. The Christians had eventually to rethink their dream of a commonwealth of free-trading black communities, actively enhancing their virtue and wealth. But they continued to hold that the market would rout superstition, slavery, sloth; this even when, later in the century, market forces undercut their own idyll of independent African economies, compelling “their” peoples to become wage vassals in their own land.

    There was, in other words, more to championing commerce among heathens than merely making virtue of necessity, as some have suggested; although it is true that many pioneer evangelists had to ex- change to survive (Beck 1989: 211). In fact, the most ardent advocates of free enterprise were often those most opposed to clergy themselves doing business. Livingstone (1857: 39) held that, while missionary and trader were mutually dependent, “experience shows that the two employments can not very well be combined in the same person.” Ironically, he was to be accused of gun-running by the Boers. But then, on the frontier, the lines between prestation, purchase, and profit were very fine indeed. And frequently in dispute. While traffic with peoples living beyond colonial borders was forbidden by law, missionaries were de facto exempt, except for the ban on selling liquor, weapons, and ammunition. Dealings with Afri- cans often went well beyond the procuring of necessities, involving considerable capital outlay. In the upshot, competition and accusations of dishonorable practice among the brethren soon became common (Beck 1989: 214). As early as 1817, the LMS at the Cape had had to confront the issue as a matter of poli- cy. Its members agreed that, while trade was forced on them by the inadequacy of the Society’s support, they should make their stations self-sustaining through agriculture and handicrafts. The quest for profit, however, was specifically discouraged.

    From the first, Tswana associated evangelists, like all whites, with barter. Moffat (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 18) reports that when he and the Rev. Kay of the WMMS traveled among Tlhaping in 1821, “the Bootchuanas flocked around us with articles for exchange.”7 The clergymen tended to be less than open in their formal correspondence about their dealings; this notwithstanding the fact that, in the 1820s, the mission societies considered entering the lucrative ivory business to raise funds for projects in the Co- lony (Beck 1989: 217; Moffat and Moffat 1951: 62). Cooperation between the Nonconformists and mer- chants was close: traders journeying beyond the Orange River tended to lodge at mission stations and of- ten accompanied evangelists on their travels (Livingstone 1960: 141).

    The Nonconformists also gave out goods for purposes other than trade. Early on they dispensed tobacco, beads, and buttons to encourage goodwill, only to find that prestations came to be expected in re- turn for attending church and school.8 Few Tswana seem initially to have shared the precise European dis- tinction between gifts and commodities, donations and payments. Yet one thing was widely recognized: that whites controlled desirable objects. As a result, they soon became the uncomfortable victims of deter- mined efforts to acquire those objects. Their correspondence declared that all Africans, even dignified chiefs, were inveterate “beggars”; that they persistently demanded items like snuff, which the missions were assumed to have in large supply; and that their behavior violated Protestant notions of honest gain (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 63). It took a while for the Christians to realize that “begging” was also a form of homage to the powerful (Price 1956: 166; Mackenzie 1871: 44f). Burchell (1824,2: 407), a naturalist and not a cleric, discerned that these requests were limited largely to a specific category of goods:

    ...they never asked for sikháka (beads); these being considered more especially as money, to be employed only as the medium of trade with distant tribes, and for the purchase of the more expensive articles; while muchúko and lishuéna (tobacco and snuff) being consumable merchandise, are…regarded as a less important species of property. (Original emphasis).

    A similar contrast between treasures and trifles seems to have obtained in the brazen “theft,” in the first years, of the evangelists’ belongings, especially their produce and tools (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 57). Previous visitors, interestingly, had remarked on the virtual absence of pilfering.9 Lichtenstein (1973: 75) was struck by the fact that only items not considered as property were ever taken. But Broadbent’s account of the severe response of a Rolong chief to one such incident10 makes it clear that the sudden pre- sence of quantities of desirable goods had raised unprecedented problems of defining and maintaining ownership. The missionaries tended to see this as a lack of respect for private effects: Hodgson (1977: 336) mused, in 1826, on the “precarious tenure upon which the natives [held] their possessions.” Obviously, conventions of acquisition, proprietorship, and remuneration were being tested on both sides of the encounter.

    As Beck (1989: 224) confirms, the evangelists introduced more European goods than did any other whites at the time. Their dealings eroded the local desire for beads and buttons in favor of a comp- lex array of wants, primarily for domestic commodities like clothes, blankets, and utensils. But this transformation, as we have suggested, entailed far more than the mere provision of objects. Changing patterns of consumption grew out of a shift in ideas about the nature, worth, and significance of particular things in themselves. Which, in turn, was set in play by the encounter of very different regimes of value. Thus, even where their uses seemed obvious, such goods as clothes and furniture were given meanings irreducible to utility alone, meanings which often made the Europeans uneasy (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: Chap.5).

    Yet more basic than this was the fact that, as the century wore on, it was less missionaries than the merchants they brought in their wake who were responsible for the supply of goods. Discomforted by the image of men of God haggling over the price of trinkets (Beck 1989: 213), most evangelists encouraged independent traders to settle on their stations. By 1830, John Philip (1828,1: 204f) had al- ready publicized the success of his “experiment” to have one open a store at Bethelsdorp:

    The sight of the goods in their windows…produced the effect anticipated: the desire of possessing the articles for use and comfort by which they were constantly tempted, acquired additional strength on every fresh renewal of stimulus.

    Money, he added, had gone up in the people’s estimation. They had begun, enthusiastically, to bring pro- duce to the trader to exchange for goods. Bechuanaland soon followed Bethelsdorp. The introduction of stores in this manner–all the better to instruct non-Western peoples in “the economic facts of life”–was a high priority among British Protestants in many parts of the world; Miller (1973: 101) describes similar ventures in the Argentine in the 1930s.

    Time would mute the idyll of cooperation between missions and merchants. Already in 1841, Mary Moffat (1967: 18), while reiterating the need to foster a desire for commodities, bemoaned the high prices charged by local dealers for “worthless materials.” A decade later, Livingstone (1959,2: 152) wrote in acerbic terms about traders of all stripes. While they reaped huge profits, he complained, these men re- sented the evangelists, accusing them of driving up the price of African goods. While the whites squabbled over their dealings with Africans, Tswana sovereigns–witness the words of Chief Sechele–had their own reasons for being wary of merchants. The latter paid scant respect to long-standing mores or monopolies, being ready to buy from anyone who had anything desirable to sell; the purchase of ivory and feathers from Rolong “vassals” in the Kalahari, for instance, cost the life of one businessman and his son (Mackenzie 1871: 130). Such friction was frequent beyond the mission stations (Livingstone 1959,2: 86). But even when storekeepers operated under the eyes of the evangelists, their behavior often gave offense. Brawling, theft and sexual assault were common; Sechele banished two of them for an “indecent” attack on a Kwena woman in broad daylight near Livingstone’s home (Livingstone 1974: 120). No wonder that local rulers developed a “well-known” reluctance to allow itinerant traders to traverse their territories (Mackenzie 1871: 130). Or that, later in the century, strong chiefs would try to subject European commerce to strict control (Parsons 1977: 122).

    The evangelists would have to wrestle constantly with the contradictions of commerce. In embra- cing its virtues, they had to deal with the fact that the two-faced coin threatened to profane their sacred mission. Yet the merchants were essential in the effort to reform local economies by hitching them to the colonial market–and the body of corporate nations beyond.

    Object Lessons

    And so the merchants remained on the mission stations. Where they prospered. Storekeepers stocked all the quotidian objects deemed essential to a civil “household economy” (Moffat 1842: 507, 502f): clothes, fabrics, furniture, blankets, sewing implements, soap, and candle molds; the stuff, that is, of feminized domestic life, with its scrubbed, illuminated interiors. Shops also carried the implements of intensive agriculture, and the guns and ammunition required to garner the “products of the chase,” inc- reasingly the most valuable of trade goods. Colonial whites abhorred the idea of weapons in African hands. But, by the 1830s, “old soldier’s muskets” were being sold for “6,7 and 8 oxen,” and three or four pounds of gunpowder for a single animal (Smith 1939,1: 232)11–although, after the midcentury, the expanding arms business was mostly in the hands of well-capitalized Cape entrepreneurs, a fact that would have far-reaching consequences for game stocks and for the economic independence of Southern Bechuanaland (Shillington 1985: 13f,21f).

    Mission accounts from the late 1800s show that European commodities had begun to tell their own story in the Tswana world. As Wookey (1884: 303) wrote:

    Through the settlement of missionaries, and the visits of traders and travellers, the country became known and opened up. Cattle first, and then ivory, feathers, and karosses, were the principal things brought by the natives for barter. They were exchanged for guns and ammunition, cows, wagons, horses, clothes, and…other things. To-day a trader’s stock is not complete unless he has school material, stationery, and even books…

    Ornaments, cooking utensils, and consumables were widely purchased, as were coffee, tea, and sugar. The foreign goods that seemed everywhere in use spoke of far-reaching domestic reconstruction.

    At least in some quarters: the acquisition of these commodities required surplus production and disposable income, which was restricted to the emerging upper and middle peasantry. At the same time, despite their taste for European things, many wealthy men remained reluctant, save in extremis, to sell stock (Schapera 1933: 648). On the other hand, the market was particularly attractive to those excluded from indigenous processes of accumulation. Client peoples, for example, were easily tempted to turn tribute into trade–which is why some chiefs lost their monopolies over exchange (but cf. Parsons 1977: 120). Especially along the frontier, ever more Tswana, citizens and “vassals” alike, entered into commer- cial transactions; as a result, they acquired manufactured goods well before the South African mineral re- volution of the 1870s and the onset of large-scale labor migration. Small objects may speak of big chan- ges, of course. Rising sales of coffee, tea, and sugar marked important shifts in patterns of nutrition and sociality. They also tied local populations to the production and consumption of commodities in other parts of the empire (cf. Mintz 1985). As George Orwell (1982: 82) once said, in this respect, “changes in diet are more important than changes of dynasty or even of religion.”

    But Wookey’s account also suggests that things had veered out of mission control (1884: 304): Changes, however, have taken place in the trade of the country. A few years ago many thousands of pounds’ worth of produce annually changed hands and passed through to the colony. Now ivo- ry has become scarce…[and] the [ostrich feather] trade has dwindled down…But another door was opening for the people…I mean the Diamond Fields.

    Proletarianization was an almost inevitable consequence of the economic revolution encouraged by the Nonconformist mission. Wookey (1884: 304) admitted that the material developments promoted by the evangelists had not been an “unmixed good”; in this, he anticipated the concerns of African critics, voiced later, about the impact of sugar, alcohol, and imported provisions on the health of black populations. Not only had new diseases appeared, but drink had become “one of the greatest curses of the country.” The most profitable and addictive of commodities, its effects were a sordid caricature of the desire to make “natives” dependent on the market. Despite Christian efforts to limit its distribution (Mackenzie 1871: 92), brandy was being supplied in ever growing quantities to Bechuanaland by the second half of the nineteenth century.

    The issue was not trivial. Several Tswana rulers had already tried to banish brandy from their realms, and Khama III expelled traders who failed to comply (Holub 1881,1: 278). Plaatje (1996), using the black press, was to champion the Liquor Proclamation of 1904, a law prohibiting the purchase of “white man’s fire water” by “natives” in South Africa. But the flow of alcohol had been eroding the cul- tural and physical defenses of many frontier communities for decades. Holub’s (1881,1: 236) graphic account of his tour of Tlhaping territory belies Wookey’s paean to the positive, “opening” effect of Eu- ropean commodities. It sketches a dark picture of the corrupting force of the colonial market:

    …men, in tattered European clothes, except now and then one in a mangy skin, followed by as manywomen. ..and by a swarm of childre n as naked as when they were born, came shout- ing ea- gerly towards us. They were nearly all provi- ded with bottles, or pots, or cans, and cried out for bran- dy…Th ey had brought all manner of things for barter for spirits. One man held up a jac- kal’s hide, another a goat-ski n;…It was a disgus- ting scene… One of the men made what he evi- dently imagi- ned would be an irresistible appeal, by offering me a couple of greasy shillings.

    In the nineteenth-century colonial imagination, as we have shown (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: Chap.5), “grease” evoked the clinging filth of savagery, the grime of uncontained bodies and unsavory as- sociations. Money was meant to promote the kind of industry and lifestyle that would dissolve its dirt. But in this instance it had failed, merely adding to the muck of heathenism, its own non-stick surfaces becom- ing coated with residues of depravity.

    Accounts of this sort soon became more frequent. As new industrial centers sprang to life around the diamond fields, the satanic underside of commerce came all but to the Nonconformists’ door. And, as it did, it exposed their naivety in hoping to befriend the “mammon of unrighteousness” by introducing Tswana to the market in a controlled, benevolent manner. By then, in any case, the traders they had brou- ght into their midst had already helped to set a minor revolution in motion through the “magic” of their commodities. That magic had ambiguous effects. It led, at one extreme, to the contrivance of a polite bourgeois life-world; also, among ordinary people, to forms of consumption in which objects were de- ployed in new designs for living, newly contrived identities, all of them stylistic fusions of the familiar and the fresh. At the other extreme, it conjured up the “disgusting scenes” of poverty described by Holub and others. To be sure, the merchants had also given Southern Tswana practical lessons in the exploitative side of enlightened capitalism. From the very first, these entrepreneurs engaged in the infamous practice of buying local produce for a pittance and then, when food was short, selling it back at exorbitant profit.

    The missionaries themselves had also played a crucial role in determining the ways in which wes- tern objects and market practices had entered into Tswana life, however; as we have stressed, there is more to commodification than the mere provision of goods. The Christians set out to instil a “sacred hunger,” a sense of desire that linked refined consumption to a particular mode of producing goods and selves–and that encouraged continuing investment in civilizing enterprise. Above all else, this required a respect for the many talents of money.

    THE OBJECTIFICATION OF VALUE AND THE MEANING OF MONEY

    …money’s educational. It’s far more educational than the things it buys. ([1910] 1992: 133) E.M. Forster

    In so far as colonialism entailed a confrontation of different regimes of value, the encounter bet- ween Tswana and the missionaries was most clearly played out–and experienced–through the media most crucial to the measure of wealth on either side: cattle, money, and the trade beads that, for a while, strung them together. Encounters of this sort, especially when they involved European capitalism in its expansive form, often ended in the erasure of one currency by another. But they sometimes gave rise to processes a good deal more complex than allowed by most theories of commodification. For value is born by human beings who seek actively to shape it to their own ends. Along the frontier, cash and cows became fiercely contested signs, alibis of distinct, mutually threatening modes of existence. The Noncon- formists found themselves deeply mired in this struggle, not least in the early years.

    To Tswana, it will be recalled, beasts were the prime means of storing and conveying wealth in people and things; also of embodying value in social relations. In fact, control over these relations was one of the objects of owning animals. Thus, while cattle were sometimes dealt on the foreign market, the bulk of both internal and long-distance trade seems to have been directed toward acquiring more stock.12 In ordinary circumstances, barter never drew on capital; this is why Somerville’s (1979: 140) party failed, in 1801, to persuade Tlhaping to part with bovines or to procure a single milk cow. Beads, here, stood for worth in alien and alienated form, circulating against goods on the external market, or those which had been freed from local entanglements. By being transacted with neighboring people for animals, they could also be used to convert value from more to less reified forms.

    But this currency had its own logic. With the increasing standardization of the bead market across the interior in the early nineteenth century, the value of certain resources in Tswana life was rendered measurable. And more easily negotiable. Articles formerly withheld from sale, or given only for cattle (such as karosses, made as personal property; Lichtenstein 1930,2: 389), became purchasable (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 262,267). The Nonconformists encouraged this process of commodification, although their real objective was the introduction of money. Hence they used the token currency themselves to put a price on inalienable things, such as land and labor. Not only did they pay wages in it, but, in 1823, used it to acquire (what they thought was) the freehold on which their mission station was built (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 189,113). Beads were also bartered for agricultural surpluses by both missionaries and mer- chants. There is even evidence–vide Sechele’s outrage–that some traders offered Tswana women these baubles for sexual favors.

    The effort of the missionaries to commodify African land, labor, and produce, and to foster a de- sire for domestic goods, eventually helped to reorient the bulk of trade from the hinterland toward the Cape. This had the effect of limiting the viability of bead currency itself. The latter had served well as long as token transactions remained relatively confined in space and time; as long as they involved a narrow range of luxuries from a few external sources of supply; as long as exchange was sporadic and did not extend to the procurement of ordinary utilities. But once the ways and means of everyday life began to be commodified, and increasingly to emanate from the colonial economy, a more standardized, readily available, and widely circulating currency was needed to buy and sell them. And so, as Tswana engaged with a broadening range of manufactures and middlemen in the 1830s, money quickly became the measure of worth. This, in turn, posed a threat to vernacular regimes of value, which before had been kept distinct from foreign traffic. Even where coin did not actually change hands, it came to stand for the moral economy, the material values and the modes of contractual relationship propagated by the civilizing mission–and its world.

    In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the first attempts of the missions to teach the value of cash were not a success. Tswana evinced distrust in European tender, most notably in paper money. Not only was it suspected of being an easy medium of fraud, but its lack of durability was also a worry. For good reason. Between 1806 and 1824, rixdollar notes were infamously fragile, and were thought unrelia- ble by many whites as well (Arndt 1928: 44,62). Later in the century, traders would pass illiterate Africans false bills–issued, in one case, by the “Bank of Leather,” entitling the bearer to “the best Value” in “London or Paris Boots & Shoes” in exchange for diamonds (Matthews 1887: 196).

    Given the uncertainties of colonial currency, the evangelists did not always entrust the actual in- troduction of money, or the dissemination of its qualities, to the workings of the market. Occasionally they took matters into their own hands. Thus the Rev. Campbell had, on a tour beyond the colonial frontier in 1812-3, decided that the Griqua community merited consolidation both as a “nation” and as a base for expanding LMS mission operations into the interior (Parsons 1927: 198). Crucial to the venture was a proper coinage (Campbell 1813: 256):

    It was likewise resolved, that as they had no circulating medium amongst them, by which they could purchase any small articles…supposing a shop to be established amongst them… they should apply to the Mission Society to get silver pieces of different value coined for them in England, which the missionaries would take for their allowance from the Society, having Griqua town mar- ked on them. It is probable that, if this were adopted, in a short time they would circulate among all the nations round about, and be a great convenience.

    God’s bankers indeed! This mission money would be dubbed “one of the most interesting emissions in the numismatic history of the British Empire” (Parsons 1927: 202; Arndt 1928: 128). Campbell set about or- dering supplies of special coinage from a well-known English diesinker. We have record of four denomnations, two each in silver and copper. “Griquatown” and the amount were inscribed on one face, the symbol of the LMS on the other. The latter, a dove with an olive twig in its beak, aptly embodied the ideal of pacifying diffusion. Aesthetic considerations were significant on both sides: the Griqua expressly asked Campbell to obtain only silver pieces for them. Consistent with their views of beauty, Africans at the time preferred bright, shiny currency over duller coppers, a fact that seems to have had a tangible effect on the dissemination of this money (Parsons 1927: 199). Shipped to South Africa in two con- signments in 1815 and 1816, it established itself in limited circulation (pace Arndt 1928: 127), a few examples turning up in places like Kimberley in later years.

    The evangelists also deployed other means to foster respect for money. At issue, as we have said, was a moral economy in which its talents measured enterprise and enabled the conversion of wealth into virtue. If there was no cash in the African interior it had to be invented–or its existence feigned. The evi- dence shows that, even when little coinage was in circulation, missionaries used it as an invisible standard, a virtual currency, against which to tally the worth of goods, donations, and services. In 1828, a few months after establishing an offshoot from the main Wesleyan station at Platberg, Hodgson wrote of his new school (WMMS 1829-31: 120):

    We pay for it four shillings and sixpence per month rent; which sum, however, is raised by the children themselves, most of whom subscribe one halfpenny per week each, which they obtain by bringing us milk, eggs, firewood, &c., for sale… The first week produced three shillings and nine- pence; (the children having been requested to bring one penny each;) the second, two shillings and twopence…

    Amidst a barter economy, the missions reckoned accounts with numerical exactitude. In the 1820s, the Methodists on the eastern Cape frontier encouraged offerings of beads and buttons that would be rendered in shillings and pence according to current “nominal” values (Beck 1989: 223). Also at issue in this small grinding of God’s mills was the effort to encourage calculation. Counting–adding up, that is, the margins of profit and loss–enabled accounting, the form of stock-taking that epitomized puritan endeavor. The evangelists associated numeracy with self-control, exactitude, reason; school arithmetic, for example, was taught mostly in fiscal idiom, computation being inseparable from the process of commodification itself. Numbers provided a tool with which to equate hitherto incomparable sorts of value, to price

    them, and to allow unconditional convertibility from one to another. Quantification was iconic of the pro- cesses of standardization and incorporation, the erasure of differences in kind, at the core of cultural colonization. Hence the frequent association, in “modernizing” contexts, of religious conversion with various forms of enumeration; an association well captured by Spyer’s (1996) term “conversion to se- riality.” But it was also salient to the exacting logic of evangelical Nonconformism, with its need to mea- sure conquests and count treasures. This emphasis on numbers cannot be taken to imply a trading of quality for quantity, however, as Simmel (1978: 444) might have implied in arguing that the reduction of the former to the latter was an intrinsic feature of monetization. The Protestants were also preoccupied with the morality of money, with the exchange of riches for virtue above price. They sought ceaselessly to reconcile these two dimensions of value. For, just as time always entails space, quantity always entails quality.

    Still, by promoting the commodification of the Tswana world–where, in fact, cattle had long been counted13–colonial evangelism spawned a shift from the qualitative to the quantitative as the domi- nant idiom of evaluation. This shift had important consequences for control over the flow of wealth, as men of substance were quick to grasp. In effecting it, the Nonconformists were helped, and soon outstripped, by the European traders. Ironically, while these men preferred to do business by barter (above, p.15), they used monetary values to compute all transactions (Philip 1828,1: 205f)–including the wholesale purchase of local produce, for which they gave goods set at well-hiked retail rates, and the extension of loans, from which they extracted high interest (Shillington 1985: 221; Livingstone 1940: 92). In attempts, later on, to exert influence over prices and profits, some Tlhaping farmers would persuade merchants to pay them in cash for their crops (Shillington 1985: 222). But coin remained scarce for a long time and struggles to elicit it from white entrepreneurs would go on well into this century in some rural areas (Schapera 1933: 649). Not only did storekeepers benefit from conducting business by barter, mediated through virtual money; by using goods as token pounds-and-pence, they also limited the impact of rising prices in the Colony on those they paid in the interior. This form of cash-in-kind was a species of signal currency that had its (inverted) equivalent in Tswana “cattle without legs,” or cash-as-kine. Such were the hybrid media of exchange born of the articulation of previously distinct, incommensurable regimes of value. They expressed the efforts of the different dramatis personae to regulate the conversion of wealth in both directions. We return to them below.

    While familiarity with the value of money did not always translate into the circulation of cash, it did bear testimony to the growing volume of Tswana production for the market. Most lucrative were the fruits of the hunt. As they gained access to guns, African suppliers became ever more crucial to the capital intensive colonial trade in feathers and ivory–until natural resources gave out (Shillington 1985: 24). But agriculture was also important, especially among the middle and upper peasantry. Surpluses were sold in increasing quantities, permitting the purchase of cattle, farming implements, wagons, and other commodi- ties. With the discovery of diamonds, but before the territory was annexed by Britain in 1871, Tlhaping, Kora, and Griqua took part in the new commerce, finding stones and selling them to speculators for cash, wagons, and beasts (Shillington 1985: 38; Holub 1881,1: 242). Matthews (1887: 94f) writes that, once this trade had been outlawed, traffic was conducted in an argot in which gems were referred to as “calv- es.”

    Although Southern Tswana soon lost all claim to the diamondiferous lands, many remained im- plicated in the local economy around Kimberley–wherever possible, converting their profits into live- stock. Indeed, a report in the Diamond News in 1873 voiced the worry that, by turning their cash into animals, blacks were avoiding wage work (Shillington 1985: 68). Sir Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister at the Cape, echoed this concern to white audiences on a tour of the colony in 1878. “[L]arge troops of cattle and other stock…[mean] idleness,” he declared, to cries of “Hear, Hear!”14 Such anxieties were not base- less. But they focused only on Africans of means, underestimating the growing impoverishment of the in- terior. While most resources, even water, now had a price in Southern Bechuanaland (Holub 1881,1:231,246), the majority of Tswana were in no position to benefit from new market opportunities. Those with stock and irrigated lands might have been able to provision the diamond fields; however, as John Mackenzie observed, the “poorer classes …[were] often sadly disappointed.”15 Many had already begun to sell their labor either to rural employers or in the Colony.16

    Of the ironic history of Southern Tswana proletarianization we have written elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; 1997: Chap.4). Here it will suffice to make two points. First, the workings of the co- lonial economy, of the very mechanisms supposed to “civilize” and enrich Africans, did more than just eat away at their material lives. It also perverted the effort of the Protestant mission to instill in them a com- mitment to the idea of self-possessed labor and enlightened commerce; to seed among them the persua- sive hegemony of the market as sacralized place, practice, and process; to replace their “primitive communism” with a lifestyle centered on refined domesticity, the nuclear family, and money. Second, despite their indigence, most ordinary Southern Tswana remained reluctant proletarians, with strong views about the terms on which they were willing to sell their labor. Even when hunger was rife, and jobs at the diamond fields were scarce, they were loath to toil on the Transvaal goldmines, where there was a great demand for employees, but where workers were known to be ill-treated (van Onselin 1972: 486; Cape of Good Hope 1907[G36]: 20). In fact, observers noted repeatedly that labor migration was not driven by brute necessity. Among other things, it was tied, as an Inspector of Native Locations observed in 1908 (Cape of Good Hope 1909[G19]: 32), to the state of cattle-holding; also, as we have said, to the desire of Tswana to invest, through various forms of stock exchange, in local social relations and political enterprises. It was just this, of course, that decades of colonial evangelism had been designed to trans- form.

    STOCK RESPONSES

    Cattle, Currency, and Contests of Value

    Cattle are our “Barclay’s Bank”…17 Mhengwa Lecholo, 1970

    By the close of the nineteenth century, Southern Tswana communities had become part of a hybrid world in which markets and migration were more-or-less prominent; in which money had become a ubiquitous standard of worth; in which coin undercut all other currencies, including cattle. For many, this last development was neither inevitable nor desirable. Turning cattle into cash was not a neutral act. It en- tailed the loss of a distinctive form wealth and endangered their autonomy. Especially older men, whose power and position derived from their herds, sought to reverse the melting of everything to money. Even more, as we have noted, they tried constantly to convert all gains from the sale of labor or produce into beasts. Their orientation contrasted with that of the rising Christian literati, for whom universalizing me- dia–cash, education, consumer goods–promised entry to a modernist, middle class commonwealth. Not that these families ceased to invest in beasts; correspondence among Southern Tswana elites at the time makes frequent mention of transactions in kine. But, as Chief Bathoen of the Ngwaketse wrote in 1909 to Silas Molema in Mafikeng, he would be happy to take payment for an old debt “in cattle or money.”18

    The missionaries knew that livestock enabled Southern Tswana to sustain their independent exis- tence–and to resist the invasive reach of Christian political economy. As Willoughby once put it:19

    the whole cattle-post system has been alien to our work… [T]he frequent absence of the people attheir posts has been a break in all their learning, as well as an influence of an alien order.”

    Efforts to persuade men to harness their beasts to arable production might have been reasonably success- ful. But, for the most part, the evangelists had failed to decenter the “alien order” inscribed in animals. They had not convinced Tswana to dispense with their herds or the social relations secured by them. Quite the contrary: in 1881, in Kuruman, “[t]he people [were still] almost all engaged in pastoral pur- suits–either being themselves the owners of cattle, or as servicing those who are.”20 What is more, their stock gave the Africans a potent resource–their own cultural expertise–in their dealings with whites.

    Here, to their obvious satisfaction, they were on home ground; here their own local knowledge gave them a clear edge; here, within the colonial economy, was one domain, one site of contest, from which they profited (Mackenzie 1887,1: 80). The corollary? By investing in wealth that served as a hedge against the market, they made themselves less dependent, conceptually and bodily, on the cycle of earning-and-spending on which the missions had banked to change their everyday life-ways. Through such ordinary deeds were grand colonizing designs eluded. For a time.

    Other whites, in particular those eager to employ black labor, shared the uneasiness of the missio- naries over the enduring African preoccupation with cattle. They, too, were aware that stockwealth allow- ed “natives” some control over the terms on which they entered the market economy; hence Sprigg’s fighting talk of animals, idleness, and wage work. From the very start, the colonization of Southern Tswana society involved the gradual, deliberate depletion of their herds and the dispossession of their ran- ge. It was a process that gained momentum through the century. Early on, Boer frontiersmen tried to press Rolong communities into service by plundering their beasts, seizing their fountains, and invading their pastures. Later, in the annexed territories of Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, settlers impounded “stray” African stock in such numbers that government officials were moved to express concern (Shillington 1985: 99f). Exorbitant fees were charged for retrieving these beasts, cash that had to be borrowed from traders at the cost of yet further indebtedness. The Tswana sense that “money eats cattle” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 151) owed much to such experiences.

    Apocalypse, then: Rinderpest

    Several of the evangelists working on the unsettled frontier protested the blatant expropriation of African stock.21 At the same time, they did not mask their relief when the rinderpest pandemic of 1896 seemed, along with overstocking and deteriorating pasture, to deal a fatal blow to Tswana herds. The Rev. Williams’s response was fairly typical:22

    If the loss of their stock teaches the people the value of labour it will prove a veritable blessing in disguise. The wealth of the people has always been a hindrance to progress. So long as a man had a cattle post he cared little about anything else. The cattle have gone and larger numbers of the people are away at the Diamond and Gold Fields.

    Similarly sanguine clergy elsewhere in Southern Africa reported that stricken populations were seeking refuge at missions (van Onselen 1972: 480f). Many of them cheered the apparent demise of pastoralism. A few, though, pondered its implications for the lingering ideal of viable Christian communities in the countryside. While the scourge would probably help their cause, mused Willoughby at Palapye, it had reduced “the capital of the country” by some 50% to 60%. And it had deprived Tswana of their protection from drought, their income from transport riding, and their main means of locomotion.23 From his vantage in the more heavily agricultural district around Taung, John Brown saw a revisitation of the days of Moses, when “all the cattle of Egypt died.” Wagons and ploughs lay idle, and “women and girls, and in some cases men, [were] busy picking [at the ground] in the old way.”24

    The Tswana experience of rinderpest was unquestionably apocalyptic in the short run. Stockown- ers large and small lost millions of beasts (Molema 1966: 196). The southernmost peoples, who were al- ready land-poor and widely dependent on the wage labor, never fully recovered. Some communities in semi-arid regions turned to agriculture for the first time, only to be struck by locusts and drought. “Not since the days of Moses,” repeated the Rev. Williams, had there been such a cataclysm. “Re hedile,” in- toned a chorus of local voices, “we are finished!”25 Over the longer run, in fact, herds did recover in most places. But the impact of the devastation was inseparable from that of wider political and economic processes unfolding at the time; most immediately, from the protracted, at times violent, struggle of the Africans to withstand those who would deprive them of their autonomy.26 Beasts were often implicated in acts of rebellion along the frontier; they became highly charged objects of contestation on both sides. For example, Burness, a farmer killed in an uprising in 1898 (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 290), was the keeper of an official cattle pound beside the Orange River. When government agents sought to halt the implacable advance of the pandemic by shooting entire herds of Tswana stock,27 they were met with acute disaffection. Rumors spread that the authorities had introduced the rinderpest to reduce blacks to ser- vitude (van Onselen 1972: 487). In the end, some rulers complied with the administration and received compensation. Cattle-to-cash once more.

    Africans in the Cape called the rinderpest masilangane, “let us all be equal” (van Onselen 1972: 483), a sardonic reference to its levelling effects and to the power of beasts to make or break people. While the pandemic had ruinous effects, it did not diminish the value of stock among Tswana. If anything, it enhanced the “bovine mystique” (Ferguson 1985). Exploiting the transport crisis caused by the shortage of oxen, the upper peasantry were first to rebuild their herds–and, with them, the distinctions that comprised their world. Their understanding of the economic forces at work was epitomized in the relation of cattle to coin. Not only could coin eat cattle, but the replacement of the second was made pos- sible by the first. And yet animals remained the preferred form in which to store money; a form which, barring catastrophe, allowed it to grow into, and accumulate, social worth. The association of beasts with banks became a commonplace, making livestock synonymous with wealth at its most generative (cf. Alverson 1978: 124). In the event, cash came to be seen as the most fitting recompense for kine (Schapera 1933: 649), kine the optimum medium for the storage of cash. As we said earlier, they were alike special commodities. Both had an “innate” capacity to equate and translate different sorts of value. And to pro- duce riches. It is this capacity to commensurate that give such media their magic. Because of it, they seem to bring about transformations, and so to make history, in their own right.

    But cash and cattle were also different in one respect that no European political economist could have anticipated: their distinctive colors, their racination. Money was associated with transactions controlled by whites. It was the elusive medium of the trader, the hard-won wage paid to worker, the coercive currency of taxes levied by the state. It was also a highly ambiguous instrument. On one hand, it opened a host of new possibilities, typifying the culture of the mission and its object-world; and it made thinkable new materialities, new practices, new passions, new identities. Yet, in its refusal to respect per- sonal identities, it also undermined “traditional” monopolies, eroded patriarchal powers, displaced received forms of relationship–which is why, in part, many Southern Tswana rulers found their authority weakened, the centralization of their chiefdoms giving way, the hegemony of long-standing political and economic arrangements in question. “Money,” the vernacular saying goes, “has no owner”; madi ga a na mong. In democratizing access to value, it put a great deal of the past at risk, sometimes in the cause of transitory desire. Formerly inalienable, intransitive values might now be drawn into its melting pot. And, in the name of debt, tax collectors could attach Tswana cattle and force men to sell their labor to raise cash.

    Government Stock, Live Stocks

    Meanwhile, many observers–besides the evangelists–were announcing the death of African pas- toralism. Prematurely, it turns out. The Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-4 (South Africa 1905: 54), concluded that “money [has become] the great medium of business where form- erly cattle were used.” In a post-pastoral age, it went on, Africans should be encouraged to use government savings banks. But the matter was not so straightforward. In 1909, a resigned Rev. Williams wrote to his superiors that, to Tswana, cattle were already like government bonds:28

    …the Native is very slow to part with his cattle…Too often he will see himself, wife and family growing thin, whilst his cattle are increasing and getting fat, but to buy food with any portion of them is like draining his life’s blood…His cattle are like Government Stock which no holder will sell for the purpose of living on the Capital unless forced to do so.

    The reference to “life’s blood” is telling. Williams understood that beasts, here, enabled a particular kind of existence. It was this, for Tswana, that made them capital in the first place. Indeed, any asset that did the same thing might be treated as if it were stock. Even coin. But all too often coin did the opposite, con- suming cows and threatening relations made through them. Ironically, it was referred to in Setswana as madi, an anglicism and a homonym for “blood.” But this was blood, or perhaps blood-money, in a less sanguine sense. It connoted the alienable essence of the laborer, that part of her or him from which others profited (J. Comaroff 1985: 174). As Williams implies, selling cattle under coercive conditions was tantamount to selling lifeblood.

    The Rev. Williams went on to say that Christian teaching had made inroads into the Tswana re- luctance to sell beasts, that many were now willing to part with cattle when corn was scarce. But prices had fluctuated wildly on local markets: during the rinderpest, a “salted” (disease resistant) ox had fetched £30; by 1908, the finest animal brought £6 at most. No wonder, Williams concluded, contradicting what he had just said, that Tswana were slow to retail their stock. Returns on agricultural produce were also erratic. As a result, money was often scarce. Under these conditions, the capacity of kine to serve as the “safe custody” of wealth was underlined. They were a bulwark against the ebb and flow of other, less sta- ble stores of value. Hence their enhanced mystique. Hence, too, the fact that they were exchanged only for coin or other forms of capital; in particular, wagons, ploughs, and guns, which had become the primary means of producing wealth in a receding rural economy.

    But as importantly, cattle were also shares–live stocks as it were–in a social community and a moral economy whose reproduction they enabled. While overrule further eroded courtly politics in Sou- thern Tswana chiefdoms, patronage continued to be secured through the loan of cows; young, educated royals seem, in the early 1900s, to have used their cultural capital to shore up family herds, and vice ver- sa.29 Court fines were levied in kine, and marriage involved the transfer of animals, late into the twentieth century. Significantly, where bridewealth came to be given in cash payments, the latter was often spoken of as token beasts, “cattle without legs” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 148).

    ENDINGS, CONTINUITIES

    Livestock, in sum, were still the medium for making the social connections that, by contrast to more ephemeral contracts, formed and reformed a recognizable social world. These “signal transactions” (Sansom 1976: 145)–in nominal animal currency at a rate well below prevailing prices–distinguished pri- vileged exchanges from ordinary commercial dealings. Legless cattle were a salient anachronism, an en- clave within the generalizing terms of the market. Counted in cows but paid in coin, this notional cash-in-kine was the inverse of the cash-as-kind deployed by merchants to compel Africans to barter at non-competitive rates. Both virtual currencies served as modes of surge control that tried to harness the flow of value, if in opposite directions, by putting a brake on the rapid conversion from one form to another.

    It was precisely because they experienced colonization as a loss of control over the production and flow of value that so many Tswana–-as Tshidi-Rolong elders at the court of the late Chief Setumo Montshiwa reminded us recently–pinned their hopes on cattle in the early twentieth century. In them, it seemed, lay the means for recouping a stock of wealth and, with it, a sense of self-determination. This did not imply an avoidance of money or wage work. The Africans had been made dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on the colonial marketplace; their access to beasts and other goods–not to mention cash–lay increasingly in the sale of their produce and/or their labor. Neither did it imply opposition to Christianity. By the turn of the century, as we have seen, most chiefs had joined the church, and many of their people followed suit, even if they were not, in the main, pious converts. The significant contrast in this world did not lie between Christian and non-Christian. It was between those for whom the values and relations inscribed in cattle remained paramount and those more invested, ideologically and materially, in the capitalist economy of turn-of-the-century South Africa. Cows, and the ways in which they were used, were the markers of this contrast. Rather than the bearers of a congealed, unchanging tradition, they were the links between two orders of worth. Thus, even where they served as icons of setswana, they were hybrid signs of identity in the here-and-now; identity that was itself a matter of shifting relations and distinctions.

    Remember too, in this respect, that stockwealth was not repudiated by those of more modernist bent; they tended to treat it like other forms of capital in a world of mercantilism, commerce, and commo- dities. It was they–the educated children of old elites, the upper peasantry, and the petite bourgeoisie cultivated by the mission–who were heirs to the liberal vision of the early evangelists. Others, less able to ride the contradictions of colonial political economy and Protestant modernism, remained marginal to the conventions and the cultural practices of the marketplace. They sought to garner what they could of its wealth,30 and to invest it in the social and material assets they knew and appreciated. This was to be an enduring strategy, visible even as the forces of global capital reshaped the post-apartheid Southern Afri- can periphery in the late twentieth century. In August 1995, the Gaming Gazette of the Sun International Corporation carried the story of a man, apparently of modest means, from Ramotswa in Botswana. He had hit the jackpot on a slot machine at the Gaborone Sun Hotel. Ralinki, his given name, would use his winnings to buy beasts. For Tswana, he explained, “cattle are…wealth, and it is traditional to have as many as possible to pass on to your sons.”31

    Which brings us back to the matters with which we began.

    World historical movements of social incorporation–nation-building, colonialism, globalization, and the like–are all founded on a logic of commensuration and conversion. On the demand that inimical sorts of value–in respect of language and culture, wealth, beauty, even the idea of god–are made equata- ble and translatable; that irreconcilable forms of difference among people and things are rendered reduc- ible, imaginatively and concretely, to common denominators. As our case shows, such processes of com- mensuration and conversion, and above all their enabling currencies, have often been the focus of con- cern, indeed of struggle, among people caught up on all sides of colonial encounters. These people tend to be minutely sensitive to the capacity of diverse media–money, beads, stock, or whatever–to make or to resist convertability and, therefore, the modes of exchange, abstraction, exploitation, and incorporation they allow; modes that sustain or threaten the autonomy, distinctiveness, and control we often associate with the “local.” That is why currencies of conversion often come to be fetishized; why they seem to have a power all of their own; why they loom so large at times of great historical changes of scale in economy, society and culture. Hence the obsession on the part of European missionaries with inducting Africans into the use of money–and the equally impassioned investment, among Tswana, in retaining their wealth in kine. Conversion, after all, was not merely a matter of religious reform. It was the key mechanism of imperialism at large.

  • Occult Economies, Revisited

    Occult Economies, Revisited

    In an essay written 20 years ago—of which this version is an update1—we sought to explain an unforeseen effect of the rise of neoliberalism and, with it, the spread of democracy to places it had not been before. These two processes, then widely thought to infuse each other, were attributed an almost magical potential to transform the human condition for the general good; magical in that the means-ends relations involved, and the causal circuits that linked them, were taken on faith rather than subjected to critical scrutiny. This millennial mood of expectation, of an eternal path to prosperity primed by the end of the Cold War, was driven by radical realign- ments in the received order of things—things at once political, economic, social, techno-scientific, ethical, even ontological—that shook existing inter/national institutions and eroded long-standing visions of society and world-making. New levels of global integration were experienced almost everywhere: an increasingly planetary division of labor notable for its mobility and flexibility, for instance, and an electronic commons that cir- culated capital, knowledge, images, consumer goods, and cultural practices with unprecedented speed, thus to compress space-and-time and to pro- mote “free” trade. This was felt especially in places like South Africa, Latin America, and Central Europe, so-called transitional societies, where the collapse of authoritarian regimes had been accompanied by an uneven infu- sion of liberal freedoms, freedoms long deferred.

    The sense of possibility that characterized that moment also brought with it new forms of uncertainty and precarity. In a world that saw the rapid ascendance of finance capital, a world in which unfettered market forces and entrepreneurialism were held to be the alchemic key to abun- dance, liberty, and opportunity for all, huge amounts of wealth accrued in some quarters, leaving an ever larger sediment of poverty in its wake; this as “jobless growth” became a measure of national well-being, as man- ufacture moved to ever cheaper, less regulated elsewheres, as the unbot- tled genie of “new” capitalism fed rising Gini-coefficients, separating affluent from disposable populations, the insured from uninsured, the propertied from propertyless. And leaving many caught more or less in/ securely between. It was in this context, itself heavily inflected by race, gender, and generation, we argued, that there had been a turn, in many places, toward “occult economies”: to what appear to have been arcane modes of attempting to generate value, often by experimental means, thus to access the hidden mechanisms held to operate behind conven- tional forms of accumulation. Hence the upsurge, we suggested, of “fee- for-service” theologies and prosperity gospels, “get-rich-quick” scams, and pyramid schemes of various sorts that eroded the clear line between the mundane and the miraculous (West and Sanders 2003; Wojcik 1997; Stoll 2013). Hence, too, the rise of locally inflected satanic scares and witch hunts. And a palpable preoccupation with magical practices: with mimetic performance of all kinds, from conjuring with body parts to the practices of voodoo economics—among them the turn to derivative financial instruments to charm assets from abstractions. All of which spoke, at once, to efforts to make sense of the mysterious possibilities of the “new way of the world” (Dardot and Laval 2014) and, to one degree or another, to act upon them.

    Our conceptualization of occult economies, elaborated below, has received its fair share of critical attention, although it has also been pro- ductively deployed across several disciplines. Leaving aside disagree- ments over details, a few serious objections have been raised. One is that the concept “indiscriminately aggregate[s] … disparate phenomena” (Murray and Sanders 2005: 295). As Ranger (2007: 279) notes, this critique arises from the view that the various practices that we take to be interrelated—witch killings, medicine murders, ponzi schemes, what- ever—ought each to be analyzed in its own (“local”) right; this because they have different motivations and determinations. The argument here, he adds (p. 276), is a foundational one between “splitters,” who insist on treating those practices as if each were discrete unto itself, and “lumpers,” who prefer to look for, and find explanations in, the connections among them, hypothesizing that they are cognate elements in an embrac- ing economy—itself conditioned by larger historical forces. In point of fact, in our original essay, pace those who accuse us of not taking indigenous beliefs seriously in and of themselves, we stressed that occult economies are always mediated by the substance of local signifying prac- tices. However, our intention was not to write yet another micro-anthropology of witchcraft. It was to seek out higher order articulations, pragmatic and expressive, between patently different, but interrelated efforts to engage with changing material and social conditions: condi- tions that, to many, either appeared unpropitious or seemed to hold the key to great wealth—if only one could unlock the secret of their work- ings. The object of interrogating an occult economy is precisely not to look at its component elements in isolation. It is to account for the way they are subsumed in a logic of concrete practices and rationales. Whatever the specific ends those practices seek to accomplish, whatever the specific means they use to do so.

    This is also why another critique—that our approach to the occult is functionalist, that it revives old anthropological arguments about social breakdown (Kapferer 2001, 2002; Rutherford 1999: 102)—is frankly spurious. We should, says Kapferer (2002: 18), have “rather” seen con- temporary sorcery and witchcraft as “being generated in specific kinds of structural dynamics which … generate forces that are embodied in the forms that magical beliefs and practices take.” This is exactly what we did do in showing how occult practices concretized the structural contradictions of everyday life in fin de siécle South Africa. Far from treating “sor- cery and witchcraft as pathological indicators of social breakdown,” this being the original sin of British functionalism, we showed these practices to be directed toward explaining and acting on an historically labile world, thus to produce new forms of knowledge and creative action— and pointed out the parallels to, among other things, casino capitalism in New York City. Unless all historical change is taken to be “social break- down” and hence “pathological”—which may be Kapferer’s view, but is certainly not ours—our account of occult economies has nothing to do with functionalism. Unless, of course, any explanation, any analysis of cause or determination, is dubbed “functionalist,” a common, if often meaningless, term of abuse in anthropological discourse these days. As we put it in another essay (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 169), “witches and zombies are to be read as aetiological principles that translate struc- tural contradictions, experiential anomalies, and aporias … into the argot of human agency, of kinship, of morality and passion.” Their “symbolic excess and expressive exuberance … gesture towards an imaginative play infinitely more elaborate than is allowed by purely pragmatic, functional- ist explication.” It is a play, we took care to show, that involves subtle dis/ continuities between past and present (see Moore and Sanders 2001: 14).

    A further objection to the concept of occult economy is tied to the question of rationality: Bastin (2002: 169), for example, has it that we “cast sorcery and witchcraft as … an irrational response to the world by the impotent.” Really? Even when we relate them to the workings of finance and venture capital? To be sure, we take care to extend the con- cept of occult economy to those among the wealthy and powerful everywhere who seek new, unconventional ways to become yet wealthier and more powerful. Mark also our stress on the fact that, at core, occult practices seek to produce knowledge by experimentation with means and ends. This is true of, and no more ir/rational than, most other techniques of knowledge production, which have their own enchantments—as do such “hard” scholarly disciplines as economics, itself sometimes viewed “as a religion” (Rapley 2017). This line of cri- tique appears also to project onto our account other preoccupations. One, addressed elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003), is that we have imposed a Eurocentric master-narrative of modernity on African beliefs and practices (Englund and Leach 2000)—as if Africans are not actively concerned to construct their own cutting-edge modernities, are unconscious of the colonizing effects of Euro-modernity on their life- worlds, and do not engage in critical debate about the relationship between the two.

    Which, in turn, responds to one last critical point: Ruth Marshall (2009: 25, 28) asks “[w]hat allows [us] to assume that these [occult] prac- tices are principally modes of interpretation and understanding? Why might they not be, rather, principally forms of political practice, modes of action on the world?” Again, it is hard to take this seriously. As will be plainly evident below, we emphasize how occult practices are precisely that: modes of action on the world whose culturally grounded means and material ends have both political intention and consequences—unless one intends “political” in the most narrow, formalist, and literal of senses of the term. But why, ab initio, do we say that occult practices “are … modes of interpretation and understanding”? Because, unless one refuses interpretation entirely—which Marshall (p. 29) appears to do on a priori grounds—actions on the world, not least political ones, usually have some foundation in cognition; unless, that is, one treats those engaged in them as unthinking automatons, as zombies. Which we refuse to do. Our preference, by contrast, is to listen “principally” to indigenous voices. Says one South African scholar, Sibusiso Masondo (2011: 37), who has heard the same voices, those practices are just this: “a mode of producing new forms of consciousness, of expressing discontent with modernity and dealing with its [structural] deformities.”

    But a number of more pressing matters here: Was the turn to occult economies in the late twentieth century merely a passing, ephemeral phe- nomenon? Or did it bespeak something more enduring sewn into the fabric of polity, economy, society, and personhood with the triumphal rise of neoliberalism? How transitional was the moment at which we first wrote this chapter? What has happened as the millennial mood has given way to a new normal, a time of “entrepreneurial governance” (Dardot and Laval 2014)? As global integration and deregulation have yielded yet greater accumulations of wealth in certain quarters, deepening inequality and some of the dystopic effects of contemporary capitalism in others? As nation-states, often unable or unwilling to ensure the viability of many of their subjects, condemn them either to a life of immobile disposability or to a desperate, migratory search for more secure footholds elsewhere? As means of communication, knowledge production, and conflict extend in both range and accessibility, linking local intimacies to political and economic processes of ever larger scale? As “truth” itself becomes harder and harder to plumb? How, in sum, does our argument about enchantment and the violence of abstraction hold up two decades on? With these ques- tions in mind, let us return to our reflections on millennial capitalism and occult economies in the late 1990s. We begin, as we did our earlier version, with a clutch of ethnographic fragments; different from our three original ones, they are drawn from a more recent South African archive.

    II

    The First: from a report in Times Live, South Africa, 26 February 2014 (Sapa 2014a):

    There has been an increase in occult-related crimes reported in Gauteng [South Africa], police said on Wednesday. In the last three months, 78 … were reported, Lt-Col Hendriek de Jager, head detective of harmful and religious practices in Gauteng, said in Johannesburg ….Occult-related crimes “are on the increase, especially in the black areas where young boys and girls are promised fame and riches”…

    “It’s all over Gauteng. It pops up, goes down and then appears again,” he said.

    Occult-related killings were not limited to Gauteng, but were reported across the country.

    The second: from The Daily Maverick, 13 October 2013 (Munusamy 2013):

    In the Gospel according to Jacob (Zuma, that is, not the son of Isaac and grandson of Abraham in the Old Testament) a whole lot of us are going to Hell for sins against the government … “When you are carrying an ANC membership card, you are blessed. When you get up there, there are differ- ent cards used but when you have an ANC card, you will be let through to go to Heaven …”

    In the build up to the 2014 elections, there will be lots more sermons and laying of hands, not only with Zuma as the anointed one but many other political leaders desperate for spiritual guidance, endorsement and support from the faithful. [Julius] Malema2 has already ventured beyond the borders for his spiritual enrichment when he led the EFF’s “central command team” on a visit to the Synagogue SCOAN Church of All Nation International of the great Prophet of God T B Joshua in Nigeria.

    It might be indulging in the “opiate of the masses” or “drinking from the well of living water”, but making election promises is so much easier if it comes sanctioned by God.

    Like the Lord, politicians work in mysterious ways.
    The third: from IOL News, 24 January 2009 (Kgosana 2009):

    [In January 2009, a doyen of the ruling African National Congress, indus- trial tycoon Tokyo Sexwale, accused the founders of a breakaway political party, the Congress of the People (COPE), of using witchcraft to attract support, JC/JLC]

    Businessman and ANC leader Tokyo Sexwale fiercely attacked Congress of the People for parading ‘old women’ on TV, using them as witchcraft to attract support. Sexwale was speaking at an ANC rally in Zwide township, outside Port Elizabeth, hardly 10km away from a COPE rally in the same city.

    Speaking mainly in isiXhosa, Sexwale said: “Our mothers are taken, house to house, they are also paraded on TV, these people are performing witchcraft with our mothers ….They are liars. You can’t have respect for people who use older people in that fashion,” said Sexwale … The defectors include the 92-year old mother of President Thabo Mbeki, Epainette and a veteran ANC MP Lillian Ma-Njobe.

    The fourth: from Inquisitr, 1 February 2016 (Sewell 2016):3

    Customers of a sangoma (or traditional healer) in South Africa are angry after the woman has failed to raise their loved ones from the dead as she promised. She reportedly claimed to be able to put the life back into “zom- bies” and return them to the heart of their families.

    Nolonwabo Mangele, 50, appeared in the Stellenbosch Magistrate’s Court after being arrested in the Eastern Cape of South Africa on January 18. She is now facing fraud charges for conning victims into believing she could raise the dead and bring back their loved ones.

    Victims reportedly had paid R2800 ($231) plus a consultation fee of R60 ($4.95) to Mangele after she claimed she could “heal” dead people, or “zombies” as she called them, and bring them back to life within a year …

    According to Mangele’s alleged fraud victims, she told them to buy clothing, blankets, toiletries and even airtime for cell phones and to deposit money into their dead relatives’ bank accounts. [H]er clients didn’t ques- tion why the clothing sizes kept changing as Mangele requested more to keep the “zombies” warm …

    According to a story on Eye Witness News, sangomas in South Africa … now advertise their services on Facebook.

    As these snippets suggest, forces at once spirited and ostensibly arcane remain vibrant actants in South Africa. While they may seem lurid exot- ica from the cool distance of Academia Americana,4 in their own context they seldom appear so, capturing a near-ubiquitous preoccupation—at times curious, at times playful, at times desperate, defensive, therapeu- tic—with those forces. And with the ways in which they may be wielded to gain advantage, private or collective, licit or illicit. This, moreover, has plenty of parallels elsewhere; although, to be sure, what counts as magic, and equally as rationality, varies across time, place, and cultures of knowledge production. Euro-America produces its own share of the late modern fantastic, the occult, and magical thinking (Kerr and Crow 1983; de Blécourt and Davies 2004; J. Comaroff 1994; Schwartz 1976). Commentaries on the turn to faith as “mysterious opiate” abound: vide, for instance, Jeff Sharlett’s (2016) account of Donald Trump as “American Preacher, [b]uilding a congregation for his prosperity gospel” that offers “belief in return for relief.” So does a vibrant discourse, espe- cially in the conservative Christian press, about resurgent Satanism in a USA “‘Submerged’ in the Occult”; also about witchcraft that, some claim, “is on the uprise” and has gone “mainstream” (Gryboski 2013).5 But not only in religious contexts. The turn to the paranormal, spirits, and magic, notes Annette Hill (2010: 1f.), is on the “uprise” across all contemporary Western societies. Even more, adds Eric Kurlander (2017: 299), the “renaissance in supernatural reasoning, shadowy conspiracy theories and extraterrestrial powers” has gone global in this age of uncer- tainty; significantly, Kurlander documents the centrality of the occult in other structurally similar times and places, among them Nazi Germany, where, among other things, the Schutzstaffel (SS) actually set up a “witch division.” In sum, occult economies are not new. Those of the present day have any number of precedents, each one taking on the form and substance of the social, cultural, political, and economic context in which it emerged.

    The recent explosion of electronic communications has greatly acceler- ated the dissemination of narratives of the supernatural, digging deep into the archive of gothic, transcultural, and futuristic exotica: of zom- bies, vampires, revenants, wiccans, genies, jinns, and tokoloshes, all of them pulsing with the realistic half-life of digital animation. In tune with this, the boundaries of the post-enlightenment human are increasingly being called into question. Hence the fascination with transhumanism of one or another kind: with werewolves, changelings, or invading aliens clothed in ordinary physical form. And with paranormal processes like mind-uploading and digital immortality.6 Africa has long been replete with accounts of the ways in which powerful people deploy devilish pacts and freakish familiars, the better to attract capricious wealth, political power, personal invincibility, ever more so in libertarian times (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). Where postcolonial, post-totalitarian societies have been baptized anew in the gospels of democracy and laissez faire, a yawn- ing gap has opened up between promise and possibility, means and ends. It is a gap that has been widened by the dizzying, apparently uncharted flow of goods, money, and influence across local horizons.

    These “new situations,” to evoke the ghost of Evans-Pritchard (1937: 513), have called forth “new magic.” And new organic theories to account for the hidden forces driving the moral and material economy of wealth creation, many of them decidedly unorthodox in repurposing old knowl- edge to fresh ends, thereby to divine the mysteries of the moment. In Africa, amidst the extremes of affluence and destitution that followed the impact of structural adjustment, stories abounded about visceral forms of extraction and exchange, about the sacrificial logic—the violence, fast and slow—said to underwrite unnatural accumulation: stories of traffic in organs (Scheper-Hughes 1996; White 1997; Durham 2004); of blood drawn by “electric vampires” for illicit medical ends (Weiss 1996: 203; Bastian 1993); of trade in AIDS-impregnated clothes (Vision Reporter 2015); of commerce in indentured workers, sex slaves, brides, and the bodies of albinos, thought to hold the secret of power, prosperity, and health (Masanja 2015; Schühle 2013).

    Often referred to as rumors or panics, terms that speak to their unau- thorized, provisional, even perverse quality, these persistent suspicions tend to resonate at the interface of the corporeal and the commodity, captured by images at once apocalyptic and banal. Hence headlines like “Child Abductions at Spur Restaurants” (Sapa 2014b),7 a South African restaurant chain, which tell of new frontiers of consumerism both emi- nently benign—blacks frequenting establishments once the sole preserve of whites—and deadly. Similarly, the spreading rumors, around 2001, of organ trafficking in Chechnya: Russian forces, it was said, were murdering Chechen youths in order to sell their body parts, marking out new hor- rors of war-as-commerce (Regamey 2012). As elsewhere in the world, this traffic is suspected of charting new forms of imperialism, in which the vitality and procreative capacity of impoverished “others” is siphoned off in an increasingly corporate, transnational system of extraction for the benefit of those at the centers of power and affluence. The point is brilliantly captured in Stephen Frears’ film, Dirty Pretty Things (2002), about a London hotel staffed by over-worked immigrants, alike licit and not, that hosts a clandestine operation in which desperate illegals swop kidneys for forged passports.

    Given that many of these panics, especially nightmares of organ steal- ing, have deep histories, having long marked out the fault lines of colo- nial extraction, is there anything distinctive about the arcane, enchanted visions of economy and society characteristic of the present? Or about the occulting of the relations of means to ends that they invoke? Or about the preoccupation with the literal use of the bodies of some for the empower- ment of others (cf. Meyer and Geschiere 1999)? Why now the acute anxieties about reproduction, physical, and social? What, if anything, has any of this to do with processes of globalization and the particular forms of capitalism associated with it? With postcoloniality? Or with the sociology of post-revolutionary polities?

    We pose this problem as both a general matter of anthropological interest and, more specifically, one of concern in contemporary South Africa. Is it not surprising, for example, that the thoroughly modernist African National Congress saw it necessary, among its earliest gestures in government, to appoint a commission of enquiry into witchcraft and ritual murder in one of the new provinces (Ralushai et al. 1996)? That it found itself presiding over a so-called epidemic of mystical evil? That this “epidemic,” far from abating with the end of apartheid, increased with the democratic dispensation, despite the rationalist predictions of theorists of modernization? That, according to a former head of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services—itself a curious, oddly enchanted creature—the devil had been “[making] a revolutionary re-appearance” here (Gevisser 1995)?8 What are we to make of the strange longevity of this Unit, which survived legal challenge on the ground that its treatment of witchcraft and Satanism violated the constitutional rec- ognition of all religions and cultures? Officially disbanded in 2006, it was soon revived again, according to an internal police memo leaked in 2012. Now called the SAPS Harmful Religious Practices Unit, it strives, like its predecessor, to combat crimes driven by “belief in the supernatural, rit- ual, and spiritual coercion”—all held to be on the rise, as our opening fragment makes plain. Its 40 officers remain active across the nation (Kemp 2015).

    In short, the story we told continues to unfold. If anything, even more palpably, more urgently.

    III

    The popular preoccupations that, in late 1990s, sedimented in the spread of an occult economy—with the pursuit of prosperity by all possible means; with the rising incidence of witchcraft, real, or imagined (Ashforth 1998: 505); with killing those suspected of magical evil; with zombies, Satanism, the piracy of body parts, Faustian bargains, and much besides— waxed behind the more mundane surfaces of the “new” South Africa. This, to paraphrase Julian Barnes (2016: 125, 91), was the “whisper of history” beneath the more audible, more strident “noise of time.” Primed by the expanding horizons of the post-Cold War world (cf. Piot 2010), with a sudden awareness of new geographies, new media, new means of mobility and accumulation, these preoccupations, as we have repeatedly said, drew on cultural elements with deep local pasts. But, in probing circumstances at once familiar and uncanny, they also invoked the narra- tive of liberal transition that beckoned them into the “brave neo world”: the narrative of democratization and development, of rights, resources, redress. And, above all, of the free market, the salvific spirit of millennial capitalism—which, in the global south, was experienced, ambiguously and ambivalently, as an uneasy fusion of the modern and the postmodern, utility and futility, promise and its perversion (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001).

    As this suggests, the roots of the rising occult economy are not to be found simply in poverty or deprivation; local populations had suffered these things, and worse, for a very long time. They were grounded, rather, in a doubling. On one hand was the perception that, behind the ordinary, visible workings of the market lie mysterious mechanisms that hold the real key to its bounty: to the rapid, often immaterial, invisible flow of value across time and space, converging in the gray spaces where the local meets the transnational. This perception was authenticated by glimpses of vast wealth passing through many postcolonies into the hands of a few of their citizens. On the other hand was a dawning sense—not only among the poor, also among those caught in the mid- dle—of having been left out of the full promise of prosperity. In South Africa, after all, the end of apartheid held out the prospect that everyone would be free to speculate, accumulate, and indulge repressed desires. But, for many, the millennial moment went by without payback, either economic or political. While those who enriched themselves openly— political “big men,” cultural producers, property tycoons, prosperity preachers, sports stars, even “great” criminals—became objects of fame and admiration, others whose sudden affluence had no discernible source were subject to suspicion and scandal. And were thought, by vir- tue of their presumed control of the dark arts, to be potentially danger- ous to those around them. This, in turn, underlies an essential tension at the core of many occult economies; or, more precisely, the fact that they tend to manifest themselves on two inimical fronts at once. The first is the search for the key, the hidden means—often taken to lie in the power of profanation and the flouting of moral conventions—to tap into the arcane knowledge that yields this new kind of wealth-without-work. The second is the effort to identify and eradicate those held to have enriched themselves by those very means.

    Partly because of the nature of the struggle to end apartheid, partly because of the legacy of racial capitalism here, partly because of the eco- nomic and political history of South Africa since 1994, most of those who experience the present as privation and thwarted aspiration, and who engage most visibly in enchanted commerce, are young. It is they, progeny of the digital age, who held out the greatest expectations for “the revolution.” They see themselves, with good reason, as the repressed for whom the promise of postcolonial return has been most obviously blocked by the hardening materialities of life. As a result, the dominant line of cleavage across the land has become generation. Post-1994 South Africa, to put it bluntly, has been attempting to construct a modernist nation-state under postmodern conditions, a historical endeavor fraught with contradictions and impossibilities. Black underclass youths embody those contradictions and impossibilities most tangibly. And volubly. It is the males among them, more than anyone else, who have to face up to the contemporary situation: to the difficulties of social reproduction in an age that once held out fervent hopes of rebirth. But, as we have already intimated, it is not only them. Entry into the occult economy transects color, culture, age, and sex.

    In order to illuminate this, and to explore how locally grounded occult practices retool culturally familiar technologies for new ends, how they give voice to discontent with prevailing the social, economic, and politi- cal order, how they produce new forms of consciousness, and how they express themselves as one variant of a global phenomenon rising in response to similar structural conditions, we focus on a particular ethno- graphic setting: the northerly provinces of South Africa, just before the end of apartheid. And after, into the continuing present.

    IV

    In March 1995, in response to a mounting sense of emergency in the countryside (above, p. 00), a Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province9 was established by the new provincial administration. Not unlike official commissions in colonial times (Ashforth 1990), this one was an uneasy hybrid of gover- nance and ethnography: an effort at once to regain control over a runaway world and to grasp persistent lived realities, its terms of reference drew both from the tropes of scientific universalism and from the language of cultural difference. Chaired by Professor N.V. Ralushai, it comprised nine members, eight of them Africans. Their report is a rich, barely analyzed, amalgam of informant accounts, case records, first-hand observa- tion, and recommendations. These recommendations voice two impulses: (1) civic rationalism, expressed in a call for liberation through education and for a rigorous response to witch-related violence, including possible reinstatement of the death penalty and (2) frank, even assertive cultural relativism. Consistent with the latter, the report declares that most Africans regard magical attacks as “normal events of everyday life,” a real- ity incompatible with the legacy of European law, which criminalizes witch-finding (p. 61). The report also notes (p. 63) that most black police believe in witchcraft, making them reluctant to intervene when suspects are attacked. The conclusion? That there is “no clear-cut” solution to the legal problem—other than to advocate various strategies to stem the brutality with which accused witches are hunted down. The actuality of witchcraft itself, however, was never called into doubt.

    On the contrary. The urgent tone of the commission, the sense of crisis to which it spoke, was underscored by a rising demography of violence: between 1985 and 1995 there occurred over 300 cases of witch-related killings in the Northern Province (p. 31); in the first half of 1996 there were 676, a 45-fold increase. Similarly in the Northwest Province where, although the overall incidence was lower, it also increased over the decade. Two decades later, in 2014, as we saw in our first fragment above, it was also said to be rising in Gauteng Province. Little wonder that many peo- ple, here as elsewhere in Africa, feared that witchcraft was “running wild.” Many still do. The mood of alarm was well captured in the opening remarks of the report (p. i): “[A]s the Province continued to burn,” as “witchcraft violence and ritual murder” were becoming endemic, “some- thing had to be done, and very fast.”

    The countryside was burning alright. But there were lots of ironies in the fire. For one thing, this was a much heralded moment of exodus from colonial bondage. And yet rural populations were convinced that their communities harbored trenchant human evil; that familiar landscapes were alive with phantasmic forces of unprecedented power and peril; that the state, past and present, had failed to shield them from malignity, leav- ing them to protect themselves. For another thing, it was youths, not persons in authority, who felt most moved to cleanse their towns and villages by executing “instant justice.” They had greeted Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, viewed by the world as a sign that reason had pre- vailed at last, with a furious spate of witch burnings—often to the august chanting of freedom songs (pp. 62, 244). All this was accompanied by a growing fear, in the northerly provinces, that some people, mainly old people, were turning others into zombies: into an army of ghost workers whose lifeblood fueled a vibrant, immoral economy pulsing beneath the sluggish rhythms of rural life. The margin between the human and the inhuman had become permeable, ruptured by the living dead and their depraved owners. Along with a grisly national market in human body parts, these zombies bore testimony to a mounting confusion of people with things.

    None of this, we repeat, is entirely new. In much of Africa, the colonial encounter gave rise to the sorts of frictions that ignite witch hunts (e.g. Richards 1935; Auslander 1993). To be sure, witchcraft has proven to be every bit as protean as modernity itself, thriving on its contradictions and its silences, usurping its media, puncturing its pretensions. Yet longevity does not imply continuity. Whatever their putative powers, witches can- not escape history. Neither is their flexibility infinite or random. Shifts in their cultural conception often speak, if often indirectly, to the impact of large-scale structural transformations on local worlds. Indeed, their very durability stems from a genius for making the parochial language of inti- mate, interpersonal affect register the impress of abstract social forces. It is this articulation, in both senses of the term, that has underlain the intensification of witch-finding in South Africa, and throughout the con- tinent, since the late twentieth century (Geschiere 1997; Meyer and Geschiere 1999). The parochialism of witches, it seems, is an increasingly global phenomenon.

    Because witches distill complex, diffuse material and social processes into comprehensible human intentions and actions, they tend to figure in narratives that tie translocal forces to local events, map them onto proxi- mate landscapes, and translate them into vernacular vocabularies of cause-and-effect. In rural South Africa, the 1990s rise in witch-finding coincided with an efflorescence of other occult technologies that linked the arcane and the ordinary by thoroughly modern, even postmodern, means; means that evoked, parodied, and contorted the mechanisms of the market. Thus ritual murder was widely reported in the media to have become “big business” in northerly South Africa. In 1995, for example, stories spread about dismembered corpses found in the freezer of a casino in Mmabatho, capital of the Northwest Province, formerly the “independent” Tswana “homeland” of Bophuthatswana. The casino had been built for tourists during the apartheid years, when betting and interracial sex were illegal in South Africa—but not in the ethnic “homelands.” There, over the border, in the gray interstices of the transnational, white South Africans came to gamble and purchase sexual services. After 1994, as we have noted, black bodies were still for sale, but in different form; the gruesome trade now nested within the orbit of everyday commerce, circulating human organs to whomever could invest in them, thus to abet their undertakings by occult means.

    Much the same thing was apparent, too, in all the talk about the “fact” that some local entrepreneurs were turning their fellows into working zombies, a practice that conjures with a foundational law of the market, namely, that rates of profit are inversely related to labor costs; as our fourth fragment makes plain, zombie-conjuring remains part of the social and media landscape in South Africa. But the most fabulous narratives, especially in the Northwest Province, concerned Satanism, held to be the most robust, most global of all occult enterprises. Less a matter of awe- some ritual than mundane human greed, dabbling in the diabolical was said to be particularly captivating to the young. In 1996, when the Setswana TV network broadcast two programs on the subject, the “reformed” ex-Satanists featured were juveniles. Taking calls from the public they told, in prosaic terms, of the translocal power of the black arts, among them an ability to travel great distances at miraculous speed to garner fabulous riches at will.

    We shall return to ritual murder, zombies, and Satanism in due course. Here we note merely what our local interlocutors insisted on telling us: that the available array of enchanted, often visceral, modes of produc- ing value was expanding rapidly. Visceral, yet also oddly banal. In the past, divination and resort to occult means involved a clandestine encounter with a human expert. Now anxieties about witchcraft, money magic, ritual murder, and unnatural death are ventilated in a public sphere comprising “electronic” churches, radio, TV, and social media; newspapers, magazines, and online websites regularly advertise “dial-in- diviners” and “short time call” consultations with traditional healers on WhatsApp (see e.g. Gumtree n.d.). The multimediated quality of this communication is neatly captured in innovative ritual technologies. One is divining by “mirror” or “television” (Ralushai et al. 1996: 6, 148, 177): it requires clients to visit a “screen-room,” where they imbibe a fermented drink and watch a white, wall-mounted cloth, on which appear figures of miscreants, both human and animal. Their transmis- sion mimics the way in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and long-distance magic condense images, objects, and sounds from afar. Such technologies, moreover, keep evolving, like those facilitated by texting, whose enchanted potential has not been limited to Africa, as the haunting movie, Personal Shopper (2016, dir. Olivier Assayas), makes plain.

    Once these theaters of mundane magicality render their verdicts, who are revealed as the witches? And who take responsibility for acting against them? According to Ralushai et al. (1996), the purported malevolents were, as they continue to be, the usual suspects of African witchcraft— men and women of unshared, conspicuous wealth (pp. 219, 253)— although those physically attacked were typically old, often socially isolated, and defenseless. As to taking action against them, “[i]n general the community is responsible … but the youth who are called ‘comrades’ are in the forefront” (p. 15). Not only were these young men the primary perpetrators of witch-related violence but they seem often to have forced neighbors and ritual experts to do their bidding.

    Let us take a closer look at the most extended case recorded by the Witchcraft Commission, the Ha-Madura witch hunt (pp. 193f).10 The defendants, who ranged from 14 to 35, were charged with having mur- dered an elderly woman by “necklacing” and attacking two other elderly persons. Witnesses recounted that, on the afternoon of 21 March 1990, “the majority of the youths” of Madura, most of them male and unemployed, gathered under a tree near the primary school. Speakers urged them to exterminate the witches in their midst (p. 202), and they set off in search of suspects. The vacant homes of a couple of suspected miscreants were torched before the youths moved on to the yard of the deceased. When they found her, they doused her with petrol and set her alight. She tried to flee across a nearby field but the crowd caught up with her. “Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?” she wailed. Her assail- ants responded: “Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!” (pp. 206, 212).

    There could scarcely be a more bald statement of deadly antagonism between generations. Or the reasons for it. Or its political consequences. For these youth, mass action might have vanquished the ancien regime. But it did not bring them the wealth or empowerment that was sup- posed to follow. South Africa threw off the shackles of apartheid just as global processes were compromising the sovereignty of liberal nation- states and their control over economic growth, as the manufacturing sector was shrinking, as multinational capital found more exploitable sites of production, as the service sector and the immaterial economy grew, and as other features of the neoliberal turn took root—all of which made un- and under-employment increasingly chronic, dispro- portionately so in the countryside. The fact that the living standards of a growing urban African middle class were rising at the same time (Mabandla 2013) only underscored the predicament of those rendered disposable in the post-apartheid moment. Complex historical forces, these: forces that brought deep structural change in their wake—but, to underscore our point, distilled into the vernacular idiom of occult evil. And into a proximate, human cause, one that was actionable. Thus the cry from the youths as they killed the alleged witch: “We can’t get work because of you!”

    It is no wonder, then, that the most spirited witch-finding tends to occur where conditions are especially straitened, where raw inequality is especially blatant, and where contradictions inherent in the new order of things are most acutely felt.11 Limpopo, the former Northern Province (see note 9), is the second poorest in the country;12 the remote reaches of the Northwest come close behind. The failure of plans for reconstruction, development, redistribution, and accelerated growth has been most evi- dent in these regions. Agriculture is still practiced, largely by women, but much of it is pitiably limited. Along with social grants, petty business— beer-brewing, food vending, construction, service- and piece-work— supplements household budgets. At the same time, the migrant wages that had long subsidized faltering agrarian endeavors, and had granted young men a modicum of autonomy, have diminished markedly. Concomitantly, cash assets vested in the elderly, like pensions and grants, have risen in relative value; as disposable income, they are the object of fierce jealousy and mystical activity (e.g. Ritchken 1994: 361, 357). Also, conditions in the countryside have facilitated the emergence of modest new elites there too, if on nothing like the scale of the rising urban mid- dle class. And so, in places like Madura, material distinctions, albeit of widely variable magnitude, have become apparent among neighbors. Such differences are embodied in the kinds of commodities that index prosperity: houses, cars, televisions, even cell phones. The alleged witch of Madura owned some of these luxuries. She was, in fact, the occasional employer of several of her attackers and sometimes let them watch her TV (p. 212). The petrol that consumed her was seized from local men who now could afford cars by young men who saw little chance that they would ever do so.

    Witch-hunting youth in the Northern Province acted as a cohort, much like an age-regiment (mophato) in Sotho-Tswana society of old. Ridding the countryside of baloi, witches, was all of a piece with the other forms of mass action that had fought a repressive social order; dur- ing the struggle, it should be noted, urban “comrades” denounced their parental generation as passive sellouts to colonial oppression. Indeed, the war against mystical evil fused political and ritual means of both recent and older vintage. In addition to singing songs of freedom as they carried out their exorcisms, “comrades” in Venda and Giyani also intoned a well- known circumcision chant (pp. 50, 179, 244).

    Age, of course, is a relational principle. The young comrades forged their assertive identity against the foil of a gendered gerontocracy; signifi- cantly, those attacked were referred to as “old ladies,” even when they were men (p. 211). The antisocial greed of these predators was epitomized in the idea of unnatural production and reproduction, in images of toxic, ungenerative sexuality, of adultery, rape, and abortion (Ritchken 1994: 325, 363). The Commission, for example, made repeated reference to the inability of witches to bear children, to their “red” vaginas, and to their lethal, “rotten” sperm (pp. 141, 150, 158, 168). Killing these “per- verts” by fire, a vehicle of simultaneous destruction and rebirth, bespoke an effort to engender, literally, a more propitious, socially constructive mode of reproduction.

    Threats to local viability, as we have noted, were also ascribed to the creation of a zombie work force. Thus, the following fragment from a case record (pp. 50, 158):

    On a certain day … [when] the accused arrived … [people] shouted from the street that she is a witch with a shrinked [sic] vagina. They further said that she had killed people by means of lightning and that she has a drum full of zombies. They also said that her son “Zero” has no male seed and that he could not impregnate a woman.

    It is hard to imagine a more pointed portrait of perversion: of witchcraft as a negation of life-giving, social exchange. In place of fertile procre- ation, and the forms of wealth that nurture community and enrich oth- ers, the witch makes ghost workers out of the able-bodied. She thrives by cannibalizing people, especially robbing the rising generation of a legiti- mate income and the wherewithal to marry and establish their own fami- lies, indeed, of becoming fully adult.

    This sense of illegitimate production and reproduction pervades youth- ful discourses of witchcraft in much of South Africa. Many young black men, their adult masculinity ever more at risk, blame their incapacity to ensure a future for themselves on an all-consuming, aged elite. Their concern is underscored by the preoccupation with zombies (sing., setlotl- wane, Northern Sotho; sethotsela, Tswana). Long a feature of Caribbean vodoun, their appearance here owes much to a diasporic flow of occult images (Appadurai 1990), although they resonate with an indigenous affliction known as sefifi, a state of “living death” first described by nineteenth-century missionaries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 143). Spliced into local mystical economies, these shadowy figures take on the color of their surroundings. As one of our opening fragments suggests, they are persons who are thought to have been killed and revived by witchcraft. The living dead exist only to serve their creators—generally, in the South African context, unrelated neighbors. Bereft of tongues to give voice to their alienation, they are believed to work after dark, mainly in agriculture (Ralushai et al. 1996: 5; Ritchken 1994: 329). Ghost workers can also be magically transported to urban centers, in fact, to any place where they might toil for their owners. In this era of casualization, there are even “part-time zombies” (pp. 224–225): people who awake exhausted in the morning, having toiled unwittingly at night to feed the greed of their masters

    Reduced from humanity to raw labor power, the zombie, like the murderous criminal, is a nightmare citizen of contemporary South Africa. His absent presence makes tangible the sort of violent abstrac- tion that fuels otherwise inexplicable accumulation; to be sure, he dis/ embodies that mode of abstraction. Existing solely for the benefit of its owner, the toil of the living dead is pure surplus value (Marx 1976: 325): it has “all the charms of something created out of nothing.” Zombie production is thus an apt image of the inflating occult econo- mies of postcolonial Africa, of their ever more brutal forms of extrac- tion. As spectral capital, it will be evident why these forms of extraction are typically associated, as is witchcraft in general, with older people of apparent affluence: why they are thought to have multiplied as wage work has become scarce among the young and unskilled. Not only does the rise of a phantom proletariat consume the life force of others. By yielding profit without cost, it destroys the labor market, conven- tional patterns of social reproduction, and the legitimate prospects of “the community” at large. This, in essence, was the point made by striking workers on an Eastern Transvaal coffee plantation in 1995: they demanded the dismissal of three supervisors accused of killing employees to gain control of their jobs and keeping zombies for their own enrichment (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1995: 8). Spectral times also yield spectral crimes: the power of zombies to materialize wealth in the guise of ordinary things that mark the good life—clothes, toiletries, cell phone airtime—also shapes the fraudulent imagination; vide the case of the fake sangoma we encountered above in our final fragment.

    But zombie production is merely one means among several. Recall that there has also been an increase in recent years of the incidence of ritual murder, of killing for the purpose of harvesting body parts. As Ralushai et al. (1996: 255) explained:

    [B]ody parts are used … to secure certain advantages from the ancestors. A skull may … be built into the foundation of a new building to ensure a good business, or a brew containing human parts … buried where it will ensure a good harvest.

    While they have long been part of the ritual repertoire of southern African societies, these practices appear to have been rare in the past. But a great deal of evidence confirms that, in this domain too, market forces have spurred production. In addition to stories of mutilated remains, the press purveys matter-of-fact details of such things as going rates for various body parts (Khoza and Mapoma 1994). Evidence from court cases in dif- ferent regions of the country confirms that would-be entrepreneurs, most of them young, engage in the sale of organs.13 These youths appear to act on the assumption that the occult economy feeds the malevolent ambi- tions of their elders, said to be the most ready consumers of the purloined parts. Already in 1988 it was noted that, in the (future) Northern Province, any disappearance of persons, especially children, was “imme- diately linked to businessmen and politicians” by young activists (p. 271). Across the border at Mochudi, Botswana, public discontent over the han- dling of a girl’s ritual murder in 1994—allegedly by local entrepreneurs, abetted by her father—brought youth onto the streets of the capital, prompting the Office of the President to call in Scotland Yard to help solve the crime (Durham 2004).

    We reiterate that, just as the traffic in human organs is not new, neither is it restricted to South Africa: that there is a well-established, global economy in body parts (e.g. Frow 1997; White 1997: 334; Scheper- Hughes 1996), which flow from poor to rich countries, south to north, east to west, young to old; that some governments are said to raise reve- nue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to East Asia, mysterious malevolents are believed to extract blood, fat, members, and living offspring from the unsuspecting (Scutti 2014). At issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise is a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself. Among Sotho and Tswana, people speak apprehensively of a relentless process that erodes the humanity (botho) of persons and renders them susceptible as never before to the long reach of the market.

    Notice the emphasis on distance. The translocal dimension of the occult economy is crucial to the way in which its workings are understood in rural South Africa. Throughout the northerly provinces, people ponder the role of mobility and the means of abstraction—specifically, the capacity to siphon goods and people across space in no time at all—in producing new forms of wealth. Preternatual movement adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? As South Africa has cast off its pariah status and has sought ever greater integration with transnational markets, the grow- ing velocity of long-range transaction, of the almost instantaneous flow of signs and styles and commodities across the earth, is discernible all around. This, to wit, underlay the fascination in the Northwest with Satanism (see above), itself a feature of the millennial moment in many parts of the world (e.g. Wright 1995; La Fontaine 1998; Meyer 1999).

    Remember, in this respect, the television programs mentioned earlier, the ones in which “reformed” devil worshippers spoke to callers. When asked to explain the relationship of the diabolical to boloi (witchcraft), one laconic youth said, in a fluent mix of Setswana and English: “Satanism is high-octane witchcraft. It is more international.”14 So it is that old ideas are extended and new tropes domesticated to meet altered conditions. The devil’s disciples were rumored to travel far and wide, fuelling their accumulation of riches with human blood. As the petrochemical image suggests, the basis of their potency was, again, the capacity to “ride the tiger of time-space compression” (Harvey 1990: 351): to move seamlessly between the parochial and the translocal—here and there, then and now—thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of the history of the present.

    V

    It will be clear now why, in post-1994 South Africa—and elsewhere in a world of whose epochal shifts South Africa is symptomatic—there has been a palpable intensification of appeals to enchantment. The rise of occult economies has tended to occur, at the turn of the twenty-first cen- tury at least, in contexts in which an optimistic faith in the free market has encountered the realities, indeed the “crises,” of neoliberal times: unpredictable shifts in sites of production and increasingly casualized, increasingly scarce, increasingly insecure labor, exacerbated, for many, by the contraction of real wages; the rising power of corporations and, with it, explosive levels of inequality; the dis/ordering of space, time, and the flow of value that has accompanied tightening global integration and the spread of a digital commons; the devolution of many of the func- tions of state to the private sector, rising authoritarian populism, de- democratization, and the dissolution of received political alignments— without any obvious coordinates, beyond identity and interest, along which new ones are taking shape. In South Africa, still struggling to cast off the legacies of apartheid, these things have been felt especially acutely, along with the dawning realization that the dream of liberation, its prom- ise of new freedom, prosperity, plenitude, has given way to a new normal. It is a “normal” characterized by state capture and epidemic corruption, by mass concern with violent crime against persons and property, and by the highest levels of debt in the world. Almost daily protests—for the delivery of basic services among the poor, for free and decolonized education among students, for safety, protection, and ethical government among the public at large—express spreading political disaffection. And urban environments continue to juxtapose the comfortable neighborhoods of the propertied against the violent, insecure streets of their less privileged, racially marked compatriots.

    Such are some of the corollaries of the new age of capital. At the same time, of course, all sorts of legitimate ventures, some of them strik- ingly inventive, prosper and propagate themselves. From the quiet back- yards of rural homesteads through the teeming taxi ranks of large townships to sedate urban corporate quarters, African entrepreneurs “do business,” dissolving many, if not all, older cleavages of color. And a goodly number of whites continue to live in paradisiacal comfort. A poli- tics of optimism is actively purveyed by the ANC, not altogether in vain; the broadcast media envisage an Afropolitan future in which black is not bleak. Cultural production, often exhilaratingly experimental, spirited, intense, thrives across the country. Still, the dystopic undersides of the moment persist, although they evince ups and downs. At times they recede in the popular imagination, at other times—in the wake of the 2008 economic recession, for example, or with spikes in official crime rates and fresh revelations of corruption in the upper reaches of government— they grow increasingly baroque, medieval almost.

    Perhaps all this will turn out to be transitory, a mere passing moment in the longue dureé. For now, however, enchantment in its diverse mani- festations, far from slipping away with the resolute march of modernity, seems virtually everywhere on the ascent, from back country Limpopo to an American presidency deeply mired in millennial thinking. In South Africa, as we saw in our opening fragments, it is palpable in police reports of spiraling occult crimes, especially killings, across the country; in “the Gospel according to (ex-)President Jacob Zuma,” according to which an ANC membership card is not merely a guarantee of direct access to heaven, but a ticket to electoral success and the privilege it conveys; in the claim by leading public figures that witchcraft has the magical capacity to attract electoral support; and in the fact that zombie conjurers advertise their services in the national media, even, allegedly, on Facebook. No wonder, then, that, in July 2017—amidst a rush of bewilderingly com- plex scandals surrounding state capture and political corruption—a pub- lic intellectual wrote, in the largest national newspaper, that, “against a backdrop of precipitous economic decline and a total collapse of governance,” the country at large has become “[an environment] fertile for purveyors of miracles” (Zibi 2017). The conditions that gave rise to the occult economy with which we were concerned almost 20 years ago, it seems, have not disappeared. If anything, that economy has become endemic, constantly reinventing itself in step with the contingencies of the historical present.

  • On Personhood

    On Personhood

    PROLEGOMENON

    The Autonomous Person: A European Invention.

    Is the idea of “the autonomous person” a European invention? The interrogative seems straightforward enough. Even ingenuous. But, hiding in the hypertext beneath its surface, is an- other, altogether less innocent question, one which carries within it a silent claim: To the ex- tent that “the autonomous person,” is a European invention, does its absence elsewhere im- ply a deficit, a failure, a measure of incivility on the part of non-Europeans? And what of the corollary: Is this figure, this “person,” the end point in a world-historical telos, something to which non-occidentals are inexorably drawn as they cast off their primordial differences? Is it, in other words, a universal feature of modernity-in-the-making, a Construct in the Upper Case? Or is it merely a lower case, local euroconstruct?i

    1

    We begin our excursion into African conceptions of personhood in a decentering, rela- tivizing voice: the voice often assumed by anthropologists to discomfort cross-disciplinary, transcultural, suprahistorical discourses about Western categories, their provenance and puta- tive universality. From our disciplinary perspective, “the autonomous person,” that familiar trope of European bourgeois modernity (Taylor 1989), is a Eurocentric idea. And a profoundly pa- rochial, particularistic one at that.ii To be sure, the very notion that this generic person might constitute a universal is itself integral to its Eurocultural construction, a part of its ideological apparatus. What is more, “the autonomous person”–the definite, singular article–describes an imaginaire, an ensemble of signs and values, a hegemonic formation: neither in Europe, nor any place else to which it has been exported, does it exist as an unmediated sociological reality (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:60f). Neither, of course, does the classical contrast be- tween (i) the self-made, self-conscious, right-bearing individual of “modern Western society,” that hyphenated Cartesian figure epitomized in the Promethean hero of Universal History (Car- lyle 1842:1), and (ii) the relational, ascriptive, communalistic, inert self attributed to premodern others. As we shall see, African notions of personhood are infinitely more complicated than this tired theoretical antinomy allows (Fortes 1973; La Fontaine 1985; Lienhardt 1985).iii So, too, is the telos of Afromodernity, which is not moving, in a fixed evolutionary orbit, toward Euro- modernity. For one thing, the continent, as diverse as it is large, has spawned alternative mo- dernities in which very different notions of selfhood, civility, and publicity have taken root (Co- maroff and Comaroff 1999a). For another, there is a strong counter-teleological case to be made: a case for the radically revisionist thesis that, in sociolegal terms at least, Europe is ev- olving toward Africa, not the other way around. But that is a story for another time.iv

    As this suggests, we shall call into doubt the universality of “the autonomous person” by recourse to an anthropological insistence on cultural and historical specificity (cf. La Fon- taine 1985). But this does not exhaust either our objectives here or the interrogative that fra- mes them: …A European Invention? Phrased thus, the question mark points toward two further problems: Is the idea of “the autonomous person” properly regarded as an invention at all? If so, is it to be attributed to Europe? The first, patently, depends on the manner in which we understand processes of cultural production; the second, on the extent to which we allow that anything in European modernity was ever fabricated endogenously–rather than in hybridizing encounters with significant, usually colonized, others. We shall return, in due course, to the historical dialectics underlying the rise of post-enlightenment Western constructions of selfhood and, with them, to the answers to these questions.

    First, however, let us turn to Africa. Note that we do not seek to arrive at a generic ac- count of “the African conception of personhood.” There is no such thing. Our purpose is to take one good, historically-situated case: that of the Southern Tswana peoples of South Africa during the late colonial period. As it happens, much of what we shall have to say about Tswa- na imaginings of being-in-the-world, and about their historical anthropology, has broad reso- nances elsewhere across the continent. But, more to the present point, by illuminating the con- trasts and consonances between African and European discourses of personhood, this case casts a sharp, prismatic light on received Western notions of the modernist self and its antino- mies.

    PERSONHOOD AND SOCIETY IN THE INTERIORS OF SOUTH AFRICA

    Among those peoples who, during the colonial encounter came to be known as “the Tswana,”v personhood was everywhere seen to be an intrinsically social construction. This in two senses: first, nobody existed or could be known except in relation and with reference to, even as part of, a wide array of significant others;vi and, second, the identity of each and every one was forged, cumulatively, by an infinite, ongoing series of practical activities. Pace Tonnies, selfhood was not ascribed: status and role were determined by factors other than birth or ge- nealogy, although social standing was typically represented in genealogical terms (Comaroff and Roberts 1981:37-46).vii For reasons having to do with its internal workings–anthropolog- ists have long noted that the coexistence of an ideology of patrilineal descent with endogamous marriage yields social orders of this sortviii–the Tswana world of the time was at once highly communal and highly individuated. From within, it was perceived as a rule-governed, hier- archical, and ordered universe, and yet as an enigmatical, shifting, contentious one: a universe in which people, especially men, had to “build themselves up”–to constitute their person, po- sition, and rank–by acquiring “wealth in people,” orchestrating ties of alliance and opposition, and “eating” their rivals. Potentially at least, selfhood and social status, which was reckoned in terms of agnatic seniority, was always negotiable, an observation which Gluckman (1963) once claimed to be true of all African “tribal” societies. For Tswana of the colonial era, in sum, “the person” was a constant work-in-progress; indeed, a highly complex fabrication, whose complexity was further shaded by gender, generation, class, race, ethnicity, and religious ideo- logy. Among other things.

    But we are running ahead of ourselves. A bit more background first.

    The Tswana peoples today compose one of the largest ethnic groupings in South Af- rica.ix At least from the late eighteenth century onward, and probably for a good time before (Legassick 1969:98), the majority of them lived in expansive chiefdoms in the central, semi-arid interior of the country; although, for more than a hundred and thirty years, many have either migrated to cities and towns across the subcontinent or have lived in small decentralized rural communities (Schapera 1953; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:127). Until the colonial state went about subverting their autonomy, the chiefdoms were a substantial political presence on the landscape, their economies founded on cultivation, cattle, hunting, and trade (Shillington 1985). Each was centered on a densely-populated capital, with thousands of residents ordered into family groups and wards, surrounded by fields and cattle-posts; polities (merafe) stretched as far as chiefs and their subjects could pasture and protect their animals (Comaroff and Comaroff 1990). In the spaces between were tracts of “bush,” cross-cut by pathways that linked the capitals. These trails served as vectors of trade and alliance, of warfare and raiding, and of the exchange of cultural knowledge over long-distances (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997:54).

    With the arrival of Protestant evangelists and European settlers from the 1820s onwards, the region became increasingly populated. And contested. White farms, trading posts, and villages began to dot the countryside. Along with the missions–themselves augmented by schools, shops, and other structures–they soon asserted a visible presence on the “bushveld.” Inexorably, roads and transport routes followed; inexorably, autochthonous populations found more and more of their land expropriated. With the mineral revolution, Southern Tswana, alrea- dy schooled by the civilizing mission in bourgeois ideas of property and progress, would learn the lessons of colonial capitalism at first hand. Many migrated as neophyte proletarians to the burgeoning mining settlements just beyond the edges of their territory; some benefitted great- ly from the opening up of markets for their produce and their services; all became embroiled in a rapid process of class formation, in which new patterns of social distinction and ideological difference, partly phrased in the polite language of the Protestant ethic, came to divide old communities. Finally, in the 1880s, overrule inserted the British state onto this terrain. Its structures and personnel located themselves either in the white towns at the hub of farming districts or in newly erected administrative centers, from which nearby “natives” could be go- verned. Often these centers were sited close to Tswana capitals and brought in yet more Europeans, generally in pursuit of trade and business; the building of a railway line across the territory in the 1890s made it accessible to people and goods otherwise unlikely ever to have entered it. Which, in turn, exacerbated the ingress of Southern Tswana into the racialized, class-fragmented world of colonial economy and society–with all that it entailed see e.g. Shillington 1985; Molema 1966).

    The most obvious thing it entailed was a complicated, contradictory sociology. On one 6 hand, colonialism spawned relations that transsected the lines of race, class, and culture, crea- ting hybrid identities and unexpected patterns of consociation (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997:24-5).x On the other, it came to be represented as a sharply sundered, Manichean world, in which the cleavage between black and white, ruler and ruled, African and European was caste in stone; the pun, of course, is intended. Elsewhere (1997:24-9), we have argued that this schismatic reality was endemic to the construction of colonial societies. We have also shown that, in its representation here–wrought largely as a result of the encounter between Southern Tswana and colonial evangelists–this irredeemable opposition came to be phrased as a con- trast between sekgoa, European ways and means, and setswana, their Tswana counterpart; each being reduced from a dynamic, evanescent, open-ended, historically expansive order of signs and practices to an ahistorical essence, a fetishized object, a tradition. A culture.

    In point of historical fact, the content subsumed by these two constructs, by setswana and sekgoa, changed a great deal over time; that much is clear from the documentary record. However, they continued to stand in stark epistemic antinomy throughout the colonial epoch. To be sure, their residues persist today–even as they are encompassed within an increasingly heterotopic postcolonial cultural politics. It is out of this contrast that we may begin to draw our description of what personhood, as framed in setswana, may be taken to have meant during the late colonial period; to have meant, that is, both as a stereotypic representation and as a set of intersubjective practices.

    Of Being and Becoming

    As we said a moment ago, the Southern Tswana world was a socially fluid, evanescent field of social relations: one in which, despite the stress on genealogical placement, the onus was on citizens, especially adult males, to “build themselves up,” to protect themselves from their enemies and rivals, to negotiate their rank and status,xi and to extend themselves across social space by accumulating wealth in people. Of course, not everybody was equal in this res- pect. For one thing, there were, until well into the colonial period, various forms of servitude to be found in most chiefdoms (Schapera 1938; cf. Tagart 1933). Slaves and servants, who were regarded as semi-social beings (Moffat 1842:383; Mackenzie 1883:57), lacked the right to own property or possessions–indeed, to be self-possessed. For another thing, women were jural minors, subject to the representation of their senior male kin. In the context of everyday social life, as well as in political process that played themselves out away from the public eye, females were anything but inert or impotent; quite the opposite (J.L.Comaroff 1987b). But, le- gally speaking, they lived in the passive voice: for example, where a man might marry (go nya- la), a woman was married (go nyalwa). For a third thing, status made a difference. Kings and commoners, the rich and the poor, ritual experts and supplicants enjoyed varying capacities to act upon the world; not least, as we shall see, because the empowering activities of some people had the effect of reducing the potency and potentiality of others.

    This qualification aside, however, most Southern Tswana adults found themselves en- gaged constantly in a praxis of self-construction. Given the scaffolding of their universe, it could not be otherwise. Either people acted upon the world or the world acted upon them. Or both, in some proportion. Every now and again this involved dramatic confrontations over property, possessions, or position. For the most part, however, it entailed the unceasing, quotidian bu- siness of cultivating relations and fields, of husbanding animals and allies, of raising offspring and avoiding the malign intentions of others, of gradually accumulating cultural capital and cash to invest in the future. Here, then, is the first principle of contemporary Tswana personhood: it referred not to a state of being but to a state of becoming. No living self could be static. Sta- sis meant social death.

    The principle of personhood as a mode of becoming expressed itself in every aspect of social existence. Take, for instance, marriage, an ensemble of practices often treated as the site, par excellence, of social formation and reproduction.xii Earlier generations of anthropolo- gists were wont to say that, in Africa, wedlock was a process rather than “an event or condi- tion” (Radcliffe-Brown 1951:49); that, as Murray (1976; 1981) has observed of Lesotho, the salient question was not whether or not two people were married, but how much. Among Sou- thern Tswana, the creation of a conjugal bond, and of the parties to it as fully social adults, took the form of a protracted, cumulative succession of exchanges, sometimes ending only af- ter the death of the spouses. What is more, the status of that bond was always open to (re)in- terpretation–as casual sex, concubinage (bonyatsi), living together (ba dula mmogo), marriage (nyalo)–this being facilitated by the fact that the terms used between partners (monna [m], mosadi [f]) were unmarked; they might as well have referred to someone with whom an individual cohabited the night before as to a mate of long-standing. Nor, in the flow of every- day life, was any effort made to clarify such things: relations might go undefined because, in the normal course of events, they were growing, developing, becoming. As were the human beings involved in them. It was only at moments of rupture, when the continuing present came to an abrupt end, that there was any necessity to decide what they had been. Or, rather, had become. And this only because different kinds of partnership involved a different disposition of assets on dissolution (Comaroff and Roberts 1981:151-3).

    Much the same stress on becoming rather than being, on persons and relations as the unfolding product of quotidian social construction, was evident in patterns of inheritance as well. By contrast to European convention, the devolution of estates across the generations was not tied to death. It began, rather, as soon as an individual reached adulthood, set about estab- lishing a conjugal union, and had children. And it continued, as an ongoing process, through- out the life cycle. Indeed, its success was measured not by how much of a residue of property one had at death, but by how much had been distributed before–and how little had been kept back to become the object of argument among heirs (Comaroff and Roberts 1981:175-215). Through the cumulative, gradual disposal of property, men and (to a lesser extent) women rea- lized themselves as parents, spouses, citizens of substance, ancestors-in-the-making; by these means they insinuated, objectified, and embodied themselves in their offspring. And ensured their perpetuity as persons.

    As this suggests, the foundational notion of being-as-becoming, of the sentient self as active agent in the world, was so taken-for-granted that it went largely unsaid. Throughout life (in embodied form) and even after death (as a narrated presence), the person was a subject with the potential to engage in the act of completing and augmenting him- or herself. Take just one, very mundane demonstration of the point:

    In 1970, in the course of doing ethnographic fieldwork in Mafikeng, we were sitting in a domestic courtyard with the family of a ward headman, Mhengwa Letsholo. An elder- ly female neighbor, obviously well past childbearing age, walked across the public mee- ting space just beyond the homestead wall. “There goes Mme-Seleka,” said the head- man’s wife, gesturing her way. “Mme-” denotes “mother of,” although its connotative fan is rather broad. Trying to place her in social space, one of us asked whether she had sons or daughters. “Not yet,” said the headman, “No, not yet.” At face value, this seemed a refractory answer: there was no doubt that, given her age, Mme-Seleka was not about to fall pregnant. But it made perfect sense. For one thing, there were conven- tional means–such as the levirate and sororate–by which offspring might be “born” to a person who could not physically produce them. But there was another, less prag- matic dimension to Mhengwa’s response: to answer in the absolute negative would have been to consign the woman’s active life to the past tense, to pronounce her socially dead. As long as she was a sentient being, as long as she was still in the process of becoming, some form of maternity was always possible. “Not yet” implies the continuous present, just as “no” puts closure to something that once may have been but now but no longer is.

    The only time that people stopped “becoming” was when they fell victim to witchcraft or were “eaten” by someone more powerful. In the former case, they were either immobilized by illness or mysteriously rendered inert, their capacity for productive activity negated (cf. Munn 1986). In the latter, which implied feminization, they were reduced to dependency and eventually lost all self-determination; typically, they ceased to toil on their own account, working instead at the behest of their masters and patrons. “Absorbed by another personality,” was the way in which one early nineteenth-century missionary-ethnographer described this state of arrested becoming (Willoughby 1932:227). A second observer, J. Tom Brown (1926:137-8), wrote an unusually vivid description of men who, having been thus consumed, suffered an eclipse of their personhood (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:143):

    When a man’s relatives notice that his whole nature is changed, that the light of the mind is darkened and character has deteriorated so that it may be said that the real manhood is dead, though the body still lives; when they realize that…the human is alie- nated from…his kith and kin, they apply to him a name (sebibi or sehihi), which sig- nifies that though the body lives and moves it is only a grave, a place where some- thing has died or been killed. The essential manhood is dead. It is no uncommon thing to hear a person spoken of as being dead when he stands before you visibly alive. When this takes place it always means that there has been an overshadowing of the true relationships of life…

    Sefifi [sehihi], the term for this state of non-being, is the same as that for “death pollution.” Interestingly, it describes a condition strikingly similar to the figure of the zombie, which has recently appeared in the South African countryside as part of a moral panic about joblessness in the postcolony (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b). It speaks of an erasure of self-determina- tion; of empty shells of humanity who toil mindlessly for others; of a slippage into the passive, past tense. But how, by contrast, do sentient social actors construct themselves? Wherein lies their mode of producing personhood?

    On Producing Personhood
    The production of personhood here, we reiterate, was an irreducibly social process; this despite–or, perhaps, because of–the fact that, given the workings of the Southern Tswana social universe, initiative lay with individuals for “building themselves up.” The epistemic em- phasis on self-construction was embodied, metonymically and metapragmatically, in the idea of tiro, labor.xiii Go dira, in the vernacular, meant “to make,” “to do,” or “to cause to happen.” It covered a wide spectrum of activities, from cultivation, cooking, and creating a family to pas- toralism, politics, and the performance of ritual (J. Comaroff 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:140ff). Tiro was, still is, generally translated as “[a] work” (Brown 1931:308), and accented the act of fabrication. It yielded value in the form of persons, things, and relations, although it might be undone by sorcery and other malign forces (see below). But tiro was not an abstract quality, a commodity to be bought or sold. It could not exist as alienable labor power. Southern Tswana often said that, in the past, even the energies of a serf were not to be exchanged, let alone purchased. They were only available to his or her master by virtue of a relationship of interdependence; hints, here, of Hegel. Work, in short, was the positive, relational aspect of human social activity; of the making of self and others in the course of everyday life.

    Not only were social beings made and remade by tiro, but the product–namely, person- hood–was inseparable from the process of production itself. As Alverson (1978:132) has not- ed, “an individual not only produce[d] for himself, but actually produce[d] his entitlement to be a social person.” This was captured in the various inflections of go dira. Its simple reflexive form, go itira, “to contrive oneself” or “to pose as,” carried ambiguous moral implications. It spoke of antisocial, egocentric self-enhancement; hence the common usage go itira motho (lit. “to make oneself a distinct person”) connoted “to be proud” or “haughty.” Go itira contrasted with go itirela–the reflexive extension of direla (“work for”)–which translated as “to make (work, do) for oneself” in an affirmative sense. For Tswana in Botswana during the 1970s, according to Alverson (1978:134), itirela still referred to the accretion of riches in family and social relations, in cattle and clients, in position and possessions; all of which was also held, hegemonically, to contribute to the common good. The creation of these forms of value was dubbed “great work”–the effect of which was to extend the self through ties of interdependen- ce, often by means of objects. Thus the significance of property, most notably beasts, was that it both indexed and capitalized leverage over people. By extension, power was taken here to be a measure of command within a complex, labile field of material and signal exchanges. Far from being understood in terms of individual autonomy or self-sufficiency, its signature was con- trol over the social production of reality itself.

    The concept of self-construction–of tiro, “work” and itirela, “to make [for] oneself”–then, projected a world in which the “building up” of persons in relation to each other, the accumulation of wealth and rank, and the sustenance of a strong, centralized polity (morafe) were indivisible aspects of everyday practice. The object of that practice, minimally, was to avoid social death, to continue producing oneself by producing people and things; maximally, it was to do “great works.” But just as individuals were presumed to be unequal in their capacity to construct themselves (above, p.00), so not everyone was able to toil in the same kinds of way. Above all, male labor differed from female labor. Before the introduction of the plough–and af- ter it, save for wealthy cultivators–women were associated primarily with agriculture, domesticity, and reproduction. The racial capitalism of the colonial state, and especially of the apartheid regime, played into this by coercing men into migrant wage employment away from home; concomitantly, their wives and daughters remained in the countryside. In addition to subsistence farming, these women were the source of the most basic value of all, human life. But their fertility also yielded polluting heat (bothitho) that could spoil the activities of their husbands, fathers, and brothers; even Christian converts evinced concern at this danger. Thus they were said to need physical confinement, denied an active role in the public sphere, and kept away from cattle, the most prized form of capital. Men, by contrast, were cool (tshididi): they had the qualities necessary for raising stock, for effective social production, and for the management of the commonweal. While wives did hold fields on their own account, had their own granaries, and exercised some control over the disposal of their harvest, their “works”–the fruits of their labor pains and labor power (cf. Jeffery et al)–provided the material base, the mundane commodities, on which male politics, law, and ritual depended. The point was made repeatedly in Tswana poetics: for example, the origin myth of the male initiation, the most com- prehensive of their rites de passage, told how society was born when the raw fertility of females was domesticated by men and put to collective ends.

    Personhood, Negation, and Self-Defense

    The ongoing process of self-construction was, as we said above, under constant threat of countervailing forces; forces inherent in the social world itself. Because men, especially ag- natic rivals, sought to “eat” one another, and because sorcery was an ever-present danger, work also involved protecting one’s self and one’s dependents from “being undone.” Dirologa, the reversive extension of dira, described this mode of destruction. People took great pains to fortify their homesteads and fields against attack–and sometimes to attack their adversaries, real or imagined, before being hit themselves. Nor was this true only of “traditionalists.” In the 1930s, Christian elites, deeply committed to “private interest and competition,” were ob- served–by a Tswana anthropologist–to deploy magical means to doctor their crops and cattle in order to safeguard them;xiv also, to “get ahead.” We observed the same thing, sometimes fused with Christian ritual, in the 1970s.

    Of all the available preventive measures against “being undone,” however, the most fundamental, and the most effective, lay in the fabrication of personhood itself. In anticipation of the postmodern stress on multiple subjectivity, and in a manner evocative of the partible per- sona described for Melanesia (see n.3), Southern Tswana were careful to fragment and ref- ract the self in presenting its exteriors to the world. This derived from an ethnotheory of pow- er/knowledge based on two foundational, if unspoken, axioms. First, because that self was not confined to the corporeal body–it ranged over the sociophysical space-time occupied by the sum total of its relations, presences, enterprises–anything that acted on its traces might affect it for good or ill; which is why human beings could be attacked through their footprints, immo- bilized by curses, enabled by ancestral invocation, undermined or strengthened by magical ope- rations on their houses, their clothes, or their animals. Second, to the degree that anyone was “known” to others, she or he became vulnerable to their machinations, to being consumed by them. Conversely, empowerment, protective or predatory, lay in the capacity to conceal: to con- ceal purposes, possessions, propensities, practices–and, even more subtly, to conceal concealment, to hide the fact that anything at all was being hidden.

    Put the two axioms together and the corollary is obvious: it made sense only to present partial, refractory aspects of one’s person–of one’s property, projects, interests–to the various others who shared the same coordinates of the life-world. Hence the people with whom an indi- vidual worked, or engaged in economic enterprises, were shown a single facet; political allies saw another; those with whom s/he prayed or played, yet another; and so on. Clearly, given the nature of everyday existence here, and the local predilection for gossip and scandal, there were inevitable overlaps; boundaries were breached, what was masked occasionally became transparent. Still, the effort to sustain the partibility of personhood, thus to empower the self and its undertakings, was a fundamental premise of being-through-becoming. So much so that it went utterly unremarked. But it was revealed, metapragmatically, at the one moment in the life-cycle at which the coherence of biography was enacted: death. Echoes, here, of Sartrean existentialism.

    The integration of the fractal human subject occurred toward the end of his or her fu- neral. In a public ceremony known as tatolo, people arose to narrate that part of the career of the deceased of which they, in particular, knew; and so, piece by piece, a composite portrait emerged, a life took shape from its shards. In the 1970s, we were told more than once that tatolo was the most engaging part of a burial–not least to mourning relatives, for whom the synoptic accounting was sometimes as much as a surprise as it was to relative strangers. In a universe in which social knowledge was a matter of insatiable interest and informational va- lue, it is no wonder that tatolo held such fascination: it represented an existential denouement, the summation of a biography that had, until now, been an inscrutable work-in-progress. And was about to move onto an altogether different, even less scrutable plane. In the case of per- sons of power, the fascination grew exponentially: tatolo stood to reveal their ways and means, their secrets of being-and-becoming, in this complex, labyrinthine social world.

    CONCLUSION: THE DIALECTICS OF ENCOUNTER

    The Southern Tswana conception of personhood, in sum, was part and parcel of a dis- tinct, historically-wrought universe of meaning and action; a Afromodernist universe in which labor, the self, and the social were mutually constituting. Shades, here, of Marx. This concep- tion was at once different and yet similar to its European counterpart. The latter had come to be represented, ideologically, in the liberal language of possessive individualism (Macpherson 1962), a language alien to vernacular African experience–especially because it appeared to background the social, to relegate it to mere “context.” But, pace the conventions of Western knowledge, the antinomy between Euro-individualism and African communitarianism, past and present, is profoundly misleading. For one thing, as anthropologists never tire of pointing out, personhood, however it may be culturally formulated, is always a social creation–just as it is always fashioned by the exigencies of history. This is as true in Europe and the USA as it is in Africa or Asia; as true of the eighteenth as it is of the twenty-first century. And it remains true under epochal conditions in which the very existence of Society is called into question. Or even, as in Britain of the Thatcher years (Tester 1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999), flatly denied.

    Similarly the stress on the social and communitarian foundations of African personhood. Nowhere in Africa were ideas of individuality ever absent (Lienhardt 1985). Individualism, another creature entirely, might not have been at home here before the postcolonial age; not, at least, outside of Protestant elites. But, each in its own way, African societies did, in times past, have a place for dividuality, personal agency, property, privacy, biography, signature, and authored action upon the world. What differed was their particular substance, the manner of their ontological embeddedness in the social, their ideological formulation. All of which ought to underscore, yet again, why crude contrasts between European and African selfhood–or the reduction of either to essentializing, stereotypic adjectives of difference–make little sense; why sociological and semantic similarities may be obscured by dissimilarities in languages of representation.

    In this respect, Michael Welker has offered the term “autoplexy” to signify the mode of personhood we describe for the late colonial Tswana world:xv a mode of personhood, as he glosses it, which involved “playing with” a multiplicity of shifting roles and identities to secure freedom of action and social position. This form of play in a fluid, intricate field of relations, Wel- ker concludes, produced something analogous in Africa to the autonomous individual of the post-Enlightenment Western imagination. Perhaps. The more fundamental point, however, is that the idea of “autoplexy,” and the analysis to which it applies, seeks to pay due regard to the sheer complexity of African ideas of personhood. Also to treat them as parallel to, and commensurate with, their European counterpart; as their coeval rather than their benighted precursor.

    We have situated this account in the late colonial period, not in “traditional” Africa. As we intimated at the outset, no such thing exists, least of all in respect of the signs and practices of personhood. Among Southern Tswana, those signs and practices altered a great deal over the long-run. In part, this was due to the encounter with Protestant missionaries, who evangelized the South African interior from the 1820s onwards, and who bore with them a strong commitment to liberal individualism and rights-bearing selfhood. The Protestants essayed contradictory perceptions of Tswana subjectivity. On one hand, “the natives” were described as “primitive communists,” savages with no individuality or sense of self; yet they were con- stantly accused of brute “selfishness” and “greed,” even of a lack of “natural affection” for others.xvi All of which made it necessary to instill in them a capacity for self-possession and an appreciation of refined individualism. For their part, Southern Tswana found the Euro- peans–whose idea of labor lacked the grammatical range and subtle semantic inflections of tiro–to be perverse in their insistence on private property and individual rights. To translate the discourse of toil into the vernacular, the Christians put itira, “to contrive oneself” (in the mo- rally ambiguous, self-seeking sense of the term) over itirela, “to make oneself” in a positive, socially accountable manner. What is more, they stressed the value of contracts, titles, and deeds, a mode of textualizing relations that, to the Africans, appeared to make humans into “paper persons”; it also disembedded exchange from its social referents and rendered visible what ought to be concealed, thus opening people up to being “eaten” more easily than before. To wit, the reduction of material transactions to these instruments of legality was referred to, by Tswana in the 1880s, as “the English mode of warfare” (Mackenzie 1887,1:80).

    As this suggests, the dialectics of encounter were far from straightforward. For all the differences between European and Tswana sensibilities, Euro-Christian concepts of self and virtuous labor had strong resonances with indigenous notions of “great work” and being-as-be- coming. As a consequence, the transcultural discourse of personhood here bore within it a num- ber of legible, transitive signs; signs that pointed toward an ideological conjuncture for those who drew near to the church, adopted the practices of bourgeois civility, and entered the black elites spawned by colonial political economy. It also set in train a long conversation among Southern Tswana themselves about selfhood and civilization (see e.g. Molema 1920; Plaatje 1996)–a conversation modulated by processes of class formation and social distinction. While some found the liberal individualism of sekgoa (“European ways”) highly appealing and took on its terms, others repudiated it entirely, even while being affected by it. Yet others forged hybridity out of the antinomy.

    They still do.

    The conversation continues today across the northern reaches of the South African countryside, albeit in altered circumstances. Indeed, it is has become more fervent as anxieties over the future of “community” and “culture,” now named as such, grow into a populist post- colonial obsession. Amidst gathering talk of human rights and civil society, of the celebration of autochthony and authenticity, the vision of an African Renaissance arises to counter the ram- pant excesses of European modes of being-in-the world.

  • Ethnography on an Awkward Scale

    Ethnography on an Awkward Scale

    …talking to the natives is evidently a dangerous experiment. Violetta Lee [1890] 1998:407

    More than thirty years ago we met a madman in Mafeking, now the hyphenated capital of the North West Province in the “new” South Africa.1 Or, to be more precise, we met a prophet in polythene robes who had been incarcerated in a mental asylum by the apartheid state. We spoke of him in a scholarly essay (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987): outside of his extravagantly colored costume, what had marked his presence on the local scene before his “admission” to hospital was a fondness for standing, hour af- ter hour, as a silent witness near the local railway depot. It was from here that genera- tions of black men were transported nightly to the cities of Makgoweng, the Place of Whites, to toil in its mines and factories. It was from here, too, that the capillaries of ra- cial capitalism, South Africa-style, became visible to anybody who cared to gaze upon the twilight movement of migrating males across a cloven landscape. Anybody troubled enough. Or mad enough.

    Three decades on, after the demise of the ancien régime, we passed the very spot, in Station Road, where the mute madman used to linger. He had died, anonymou- sly, some years before. It was early afternoon on a Saturday, a sparkling winter day in July. As we crossed the street on our way to the local police station we noticed a small knot of men-in-blue nearby. They had surrounded a decidedly strange figure: an adult male, nude except for a pair of threadbare boxers, covered in white paste. Emaciated, his eyes showed no animation whatsoever. With a measure of gentleness not usually associated with the law here, he was taken to the Mafikeng Community Service Center – police stations are now “community service centers,” just as the old South African Po- lice Force has become the South African Police Services – where he was fed and al- lowed to wander around unhindered. Which he did, every now and again climbing on a chair or a desk, every now and again curling up in fetal repose. All the while, like the madman of earlier vintage, he uttered not a word. We asked the officers on desk duty who, or what, the figure was.
    “A zombie,” we were told.
    “What is to become of him,” we asked.
    “We hope that his people, maybe a maternal uncle (malome), will come for him,” said one officer.
    “How did he come to be wandering in Station Road?”
    “Who knows? Perhaps his owner lost him or let him go by mistake.”

    As we have noted (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999c; cf. Ralushai et al 1996:5), there are a fair number of living-dead about these days. Termed dithotsela or dipoko (sing. sepo- ko; from the Afrikaans spook, “ghost”), they are thought to be the creatures of witches who by nefarious means, have sucked away their human essence and turned them in- to brute labor power; this to make them toil away at night in the fields. Indeed, the (then) acting Vice Chancellor of the local University of the North West, himself a scholarof the white Afrikaans occult, casually promised to introduce us to one about whom he had long known.

    He did not have to. We encountered many more in the course of our own resear- ch.2 Some of them appeared in circumstances much less benign, much more violent and troubled, than those that brought the frail phantom to the attention of the Mafikeng police. One such circumstance ended in the murder of a well-known personage in the province, “Ten-Ten” Motlhabane Makolomakwa. Sometime middle-level state emplo- yee, owner of a local football team, successful farmer, and the chairman of the tribal council of Matlonyane village, he was set alight by five youths who insisted that he had killed their fathers and turned them into spectral field hands.3 Another, in 1995, involved striking workers at a coffee plantation in nearby Mpumalanga Province: they refused to work for three supervisors whom they accused of killing employees and turning them into zombies for their private enrichment.4 A third case – immortalized in a play, Ipizom- bi, well-known in local cultural circles and beyond – was sparked by a taxi accident in Kokstad in which twelve schoolboys were killed. Much discussed all over South Africa at the time, it involved the murder of two elderly “witches” who were said to have stolen the corpses and conjured them into living-dead.5

    Cases like this are often reported in matter-of-fact terms by the national media (cf. Fordred 1998) and – along with Hollywood horror movies, local telenovelas of witch killings, and other iterations of spectral death-and-dread – are widely consumed. Signifi- cantly, they are sometimes invoked, either before the fact or in the act, by those who perpetrate occult-related violence in the South African countryside. On occasion they have also become the stuff of cybertalk, not least among southern Africans abroad, whose anxious internet exchanges, intermittently filtered through EuroAmerican urban legends, have flowed back onto local soil, there to be fabricated into new kinds of fact. Thus it is that reality and its representations become confounded in one another, at once both cause and effect, each inseparably a part of the phenomenology of everyday life in the postcolony. Thus do imported and domestic spirits infuse each other; all being signs of both the local and the translocal, here and elsewhere, now and then, the con- crete and the virtual. Thus it is that the national population of living-dead is thought, in some parts of South Africa, to have been joined by transnational zombies, entering the country from Mozambique and other places (see n.2), just as they did in earlier times (Harries 1994). Thus it is, too, that home-grown phantoms bear more than passing, if culturally inflected, resemblance to images originating in Haitian Voodoo, to the celluloid freaks that haunt such films as Night of the Living Dead (George Romero 1968) or The Serpent and the Rainbow (Wes Craven 1988), and to ghouls that rise to the rhythms of various popular musics.

    These specters, in turn, evoke others: most obviously, a trade in human beings and body parts at once local and transnational, real and imagined, legitimate and illicit, more or less coerced. It is a trade, as we all now know, that stretches from the import and export of sex-workers, domestic workers, and mail order brides (these often being hard to tell apart); through the sale and adoption of babies (also difficult to distinguish, the latter often being an ethicized, affectively-acceptable euphemism for the former); to transactions in blood, genes, eyes, hearts, kidneys, and the like, transactions in which the medical may run into the magical (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Scheper- Hughes and Wacquant 2002). Some of this trade, when it entails fully sentient persons, evokes the horrors of slavery; where less than whole persons are involved, it extends the logic of commodity exchange to ever more divisible components of homo sapiens. Almost everywhere it is regarded, by those whose populations are being harvested, as a new form of Empire erected under the increasingly contested sign of global free trade and its highly inequitable flows of wealth; a curious footnote, this, to Hardt and Negri (2000).6 Elsewhere, we argue that these phenomena are all interrelated features of an “occult economy,” itself spawned by a brand of neoliberal capitalism that attributes to the free market an ineluctably salvific, redemptive, even messianic quality. By “occult economy” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a) we intend a set of practices involving the (again, real or imagined) resort to magical means for material ends; or, more expansi- vely, the conjuring of wealth by inherently mysterious techniques. Of course, what counts as “magic” varies, although it is always set apart from habitual, more transparent forms of production. This arcane economy has other, well-known manifestations: among them, an alleged rise in many parts of the world of witchcraft and satanism (J. Comaroff 1997; Geschiere 1977; La Fontaine 1997), of “fee for service” faiths (Weller 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 2002; cf Kramer 1999), of enchanted financial practices that, like pyramid schemes and lotteries, promise fabulous wealth without work.

    All this enchantment, tellingly, is making itself felt at just the moment when the global triumph of modernity was supposed to put an end, once and for all, to such puta- tively premodern things. The iron cage, so feared by Max Weber, turns out to have been a cage of ironies. To be sure, if ever there was a figure that typified the magical production of wealth without work, of the occult grounding of neoliberal capitalism tout court, it is the zombie: all surplus value, no costly, irrational, troublesome human needs. This kaleidoscopic figure, the ultimate embodiment of flexible, “non-standard,” asocial labor, comes to us in a range of ethnographic, historical, and literary accounts that point both to subtle differences and to noncoincidental similarities. Zombies appear, simultaneously, as antemodern and postmodern, simultaneously supralocal, translocal, and lo- cal, simultaneously planetary and, refracted through the shards of vernacular cultural practices, profoundly parochial. Which is why the living-dead now regularly cross inter- national borders; why, say, a South African doctor of Indian origins could claim to have been turned into a ghostly automaton by a Nigerian satanist.7 And why zombification, the stuff of much urban legend across the world right now, has become an allegorical touchstone for describing the ostensible alienation, loss of individuality, and corporate mastery of an epoch, as yet in its infancy, already being described as Post-Human (Halberstam1995; Fukuyama 2002) As it did, albeit in somewhat different guise, with the rise of Fordism and the mode of human abstraction (dis)embodied in its production lines8 – and, before that, on the plantations and in the mines of far-flung colonies.

    Our concerns here, we stress, are not theoretical or conceptual.9 We came ac- ross zombies, recall, through an empirical conjuncture: it was by force of historical fact, rather than by way of abstract analytical interest, that we found ourselves compelled to make sense of them in situ. Consequently, what detains us here is much more immediate, much more modest, much more, well, methodological. By what ethnographic means does one capture the commodification of human beings in part or in whole, the occult economy of which it is part, the material and moral conditions that animate such an economy, the new religious and social movements it spawns, the modes of produc- ing wealth which it privileges, and so on? Inherently awkward of scale, none of these phenomena are easily captured by the ethnographer’s lens. Should each of them none- the less be interrogated purely in their own particularity, their own locality? Or should we try to recognize where, in the particularity of the local, lurk social forces of larger scale, forces whose sociology demands attention if we are to make sense of the worlds we study without parochializing and, worse yet, exoticizing them. Geertz (1973), for whom ethnography defined the generic practice of anthropology, once remarked famously that we do not study villages, that we study in villages. The point was well-taken. But how – given that the objects of our gaze commonly elude, embrace, attenuate, transcend, transform, consume, and construct the local – do we arrive at a praxis for an age that seems post-anthropological? Of an age in which we are called upon not to study inplaces at all, indeed not to trust “anthropological locations” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), but rather to study the production of place (Appadurai 1996)? If we are not sure where or what “the field” is, or how to circumscribe the things in which we interest ourselves, wherein lie the ways and means by which we are to make the knowledges with which we vex ourselves?

    Of course, the question of Method, in the upper case, is not new. It has been with us throughout the life of the discipline, if in different forms and formulations. Nor, right now, are we alone in this. Postcolonial historians, for example, seem to be angui- shing a lot these days about the death of history. Not The End of History as proclaimed a decade ago, somewhat infamously, by Francis Fukuyama (1992), but an altogether new kind of death: death by diffusion into memory, biography, testimony, heritage tour- ism, and other expressions of history-as-lived rather than history-as-learned (Minkley, Rassool and Witz n.d.; cf. J. Comaroff n.d.). In times past we anthropologists plagued ourselves over the epistemic, ethical, and political dimensions of what we do: over whe- ther ours was not an endemically colonizing enterprise – a preemptive seizure of autho- rity, of voice, of the right to represent and, incidentally, to profit – or, worse yet, an acti- vity founded, voyeuristically, on the violation of “the” other. Now, like those postcolonial historians, we worry whether our subject matter is ours at all or whether it has forever dispersed itself beyond our privileged dominion. Once we were told that we would be out of business just as soon as our natives were no longer authentically native (a.k.a. primitive, colonized). Today we are undermined by the fact that those very “natives” have seized the terms of our trade, terms in which we once described them, terms that seem not to work very well any more as analytic constructs, terms that, now essentiali- zed and commodified by “others” one and all, return to haunt us. Add to this two other considerations, themselves intimately connected: first, the aforementioned fact that al- most everything which falls within the discursive purview of contemporary anthropology exists, in the phenomenal world, on a scale that does not yield easily to received anth- ropological theories or methods; and second, that our “subjects” no longer inhabit social contexts for which we have a persuasive lexicon, not least because abstract nouns like society, community, culture, and class have all been called into question in this ever more neoliberal age (cf. Stoller 1997:82), this age of the scare quote-around-everything, this age of ironic, iconic detachment. What, in the upshot, are we left with? A very stark question: Has ethnography become an impossibility? Have we finally reached its end?

    ETHNOGRAPHY AND ITS GLOBAL DESTRACTIONS

    …what actually happened, the facts of the case, who said what,..all that is incidental. The real truth is behind all that. The real truth may be swimming in a completely different direction…And that’s what you have to get to…Forget the appearances.

    Neil McCarthy, The Great Ourdoors10

    Not surprisingly, in light of this Big Question, there has been a fair bit of debate, over the past few years, about the fate of ethnography in the age of globalization. We have addressed the matter ourselves, most pointedly in our Max Gluckman Memorial Lecture of 1998 (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). Its title, “Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction,” sought to invoke the stark dislocations wrought on the every- day lives of ordinary citizens in the northerly provinces of South Africa by material for- ces of ever more planetary scale, dislocations about which many of them spoke with both anxiety and passion. We also meant to underscore the challenge involved in gras- ping, ethnographically, the processes by which those world-historical forces were being made meaningful and tractable by the human beings in question: how they labored to condense and personalize values and relations in conditions which they presumed to be labile, difficult to understand, inherently mysterious in their effects. Among our objec- tives, in sum, was an effort to reflect on the interplay of theory and method in the treat- ment of an anthropological location of changing proportions. Although of pressing con- cern at the moment, this is a problem as old as the discipline itself. Our essay, after all, was written to commemorate a scholar who tried long ago to subject the broad sweep of the colonial encounter to the ethnographic gaze.

    In the post-Maxist age, the strongest suit of anthropology, in the eyes of most of its practitioners, remains its “ability to get inside and understand small-scale communi- ties, to comprehend local loyalties and systems of knowledge” (Graeber 2002:1222). Our disciplinary concerns may alter, our genres may blur, our theories may come and go, but ethnography remains “the anthropologist’s muse” (Lewis 1973), the source of solace to which we turn in the face of epistemic or political doubt. An extended spell of “participant-observation” is still the irreducible minimum of professional credentials re- quired in the discipline, Sherry Ortner (1997:61) notes. This in spite of the ambiguity that attaches to each of the two terms, not to mention the oxymoron built into their hy- phenation. This in spite, also, of the fact – illustrated by Ortner’s own account of study- ing the “postcommunity” – that contemporary anthropological practice deviates, as it probably always has done, from the foundational fiction of fieldwork: the conceit, now long criticized (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997), that it is possible to access “the totality of relations” of a “society,” or the essential workings of “a culture,” in any one place.11

    And yet the axiom that lies behind this fiction, that any knowledge derived at first- hand by proximity to natives has an a priori privilege, continues to shape the analytical vision of the discipline. “Ethnography,” says George Marcus (1994:44), “functions well and creatively without a sense that it needs a positive theoretical paradigm – that is, conventional social theory – to guide it. Instead, it breeds off the critique of its own rhe- toric.” As a result, anthropology has, for the most part, remained unrelentingly positivist in spirit. Much of its shared wisdom consists in generalizations about the particular that are also particularizations of the general; empirical aggregates, in short, not abstract propositions or explanatory schemata. The role of this species of knowledge, like its po- litics (Graeber 2002), has been to show that, even in the act of accommodating to ine- luctable macrocosmic forces, different peoples do things differently, be it because of their distinctive cultures, their social situations, or their will to resist (cf. Marcus 1994). The epistemic consequences that follow are plain enough: a committed realism, and a form of relativism that sits uneasily with “general” theory grounded in history, philoso- phy, political economy, or whatever. True, there have always been counter tendencies: those who have espoused evolutionary, Marxist, sociobiological, or psychoanalytic ap- proaches, for instance, have been more partial to higher-order abstraction, generaliza- tion, explanation. But this minority has tended to be the exception that proves the rule.

    The epistemic foundations of anthropology’s empiricism received somewhat less scrutiny than they might have done during the “reflexive moment” of the 1980’s. But in practice, ethnography was already undergoing a metamorphosis. The discipline was co- ming face to face with the consequences of what had begun to make itself felt in the 1960s: that “local” systems – or, to be more precise, the signs and practices observable within any given social world, however it was constituted – could no longer be studied, or accounted for, with reference to conventional geographies; that the fiction of sover- eign cultures, however deftly described or ethnographically authenticated, could no lon- ger be sustained; that established modes of representation were no longer sufficient unto the political and ethical demands of “writing culture” (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Yet, in the absence of “an explicit paradigm for experimentation” (Marcus 1994:46), the methodological revolution one might have expected to flow from these shifts of pers- pective – themselves sharpened with every passing year by the complex, uneven eff- ects of processes of planetary integration – has not been forthcoming. Per contra, not- withstanding some creative efforts to author new kinds of anthropology, the reaction in many quarters, in Europe as well as in North America, has been conservative. There has been a tendency to batten down the hatches in fervid defense of the particular, the local, and the parochial against the onslaught of “the global” (e.g. Sahlins 1999; Kapfer- er 2000, 2001; Englund 1996; Rutherford 1999), the latter, in anthropology-talk, having become a generalized, under-motivated sign of the changing universe in which we live and work.

    Why? One consequence of globalization for the human sciences, argues Appa- durai (1997:115), has been to instill an anxiety that the “space of intimacy in social life” will be lost; the very space of intimacy that has always been the ethnographer’s stock- in-trade. Whether or not this is a sufficient explanation for the anthropological angst of the present moment, it certainly is the case that our latest “crisis of representation” has been transposed into a methodological key – as if the survival of the discipline depended entirely on preserving its established modes of producing knowledge. Note how, in some quarters, ethnography is being depicted as an endangered species. Englund and Leach (2000:238), for instance, appear to believe that “it” is engaged in a mortal struggle with “generalizing perspectives” whose powerful, if unnamed, proponents have allegedly decreed that “localized fieldwork has had its day.” For Englund and Leach, the enemy is the “meta-narrative of modernity,” a somewhat ill-defined construct which, de- spite their protestations to the contrary, seems suspiciously like a synonym for “Theory” in the upper case.12 And for an ensemble of “familiar sociological abstractions,” among them commodification, space-time compression, individualization, disenchantment. This “metropolitan” meta-narrative, they argue, “undermine(s)…what is unique in the ethnographic method – its reflexivity, which gives subjects authority in determining the context of their beliefs and practices” (Englund and Leach 2000:225). The apprehensiveness about the future of fieldwork palpable here seems to stem, above all, from a crisis of identity, from sacred boundaries breached, and, concomitantly, from the desire to pre- serve a unique scholarly patrimony from the encroachment of an ever more generic so- cial science. It cannot have gone unnoticed, in this regard, that other disciplines have lately laid claim to ethnographic methods. Thus Englund and Leach (2000:238) insist that “[t]he uniqueness of the ethnographic method is at stake in the current fascination with multiple modernities…Sociocultural anthropology merges into cultural studies and cultural sociology, and ethnographic analyses become illustrations consumed by metropolitan theorists.” How unlike an earlier, brilliantly iconoclastic Leach (1961), who encouraged anthropologists to move, by “inspired guesswork,” beyond hide-bound empiri-

    cism. Thereareseriouspoliticalissuesatstakeinargumentslikethis.Intheeffortto privilege “the local,” however worthy it may be, we risk slighting or misrecognizing the global forces that – increasingly, if with varying degrees of visibility – are besetting “little guys” (Graeber 2002:1223) all over map. Many of those among whom we work, appa- rently unlike Englund and Leach’s “natives,”13 are very anxious about the effect of those forces, which, they tell us, are putting their social and material survival at risk. In the faux egalitarianism of these neoliberal times, it is easy to become mired in trivial argu- ments over whether “meta-narratives of modernity,” or “Theory,” removes from “others” the capacity to represent themselves or to determine their own futures. All this while the masters of the market, and powerful political pragmatists, fashion new modes of extrac- tion, abstraction, and explanation. We would do well to ponder, in this respect, why it is that so many “native” intellectuals have been distrustful of even the most sensitive, os- tensibly other-centered knowledge produced by our discipline, why they believe that this knowledge is intrinsically inimical to their own authority and interests (cf. Banaji 1970; Magubane 1971, Asad 1973). Mafeje (1998:67; cf. Sharp 1998), for one, holds that eth- nography, to be true to itself, needs to be liberated entirely from anthropology, thus to become – without even the most reflexive of ethnographers – a source “of social texts authored [solely] by the people themselves.” The logical end point of reducing our prac- tice to the elicitation of narratives of local experience is not a unique anthropology at all. Nor is it a politics of positive engagement. Quite the opposite. In a postcolonial age in which “natives” everywhere speak for themselves, it is, simply, redundancy. The alter- native, patently, is to argue for a theoretically and politically principled social science.

    For our own part, we continue to have confidence in ethnography and the forms of insight – both reflective and reflexive, both imaginative and empirical – to which it gives access. There is a proviso, however: that, instead of fetishizing method, instead of romancing the idea that it might itself yield up naked truths, we face up to the episte- mic challenge of what it takes to “commit social science” in the postcolonial world: in a world in which “globalization” is an increasingly contested, troubling reality, in which “modernity” is an increasingly contested, troubling ideological formation (Knauft 1997). Those anthropologists who have chosen to take on this challenge have tended not to decry “localized” ethnography, but to insist on its unique value in plumbing the nature and effects of large-scale social, economic, and political processes (e.g., Appadurai 1997, 1996; Geschiere 1997; Meyer 1999; Weiss 1996). Their work points to the fact that our modes of producing knowledge demand critical review – even “redesign” (Marcus 1994:46) – in the face of history; especially the history of a time such as this, when popular discourses across the planet posit that the world is undergoing changes of ma- jor proportions. This perception, after all, does not exist only in the imagination of anth- ropologists afflicted with “the meta-narrative of modernity.” What is more, we need to concede that our craft is not, and never has been, analytically self-sufficient. Part of a shifting division of labor within the human sciences, it is engaged in dialogue with other ways of making sense of the present in both its macro- and microcosmic dimensions (Stoller 1997; Sharp 1998). This is all to the good, since it is only by broadening our frames of reference that we may address some of the awkward questions that have come to confront us about our methodology: can we be sure, for example, that “the par- ticular” we seek to study, or the cultural worlds we presume to exist, may actually be empirically bounded? Is “the local” not the constantly refashioned product of forces well beyond itself (Appadurai 1996; also 1997)? Does it not exist only as part of a sociopoli- tical geography of multiple scales and coordinates (Ortner 1997)? Is it not true that the singularity of places, just like the singularity of “traditions,” “customs,” and “cultures,” is being fashioned ever more in response to the market? Surely, neat antinomies between the local and the global, between field and context, between ethnography and metanar- rative, beg the very questions that we should be asking.

    These questions have also been at the core of a friendly exchange we have had with Sally Falk Moore (1999) over the susceptibility of large-scale analytic claims to eth- nographic proof. Her critique of our Gluckman Lecture hinges on a methodological poi- nt: the unverifiability of its central thesis, namely, that the rapid expansion of an occult economy in postcolonial South Africa has been a by-product of the material and experiential impact on rural populations of the cumulative effects of a globalizing capitalism – specifically, of the processes of abstraction and alienation built into it. The “imaginative sociology” by means of which we arrive at this thesis may be illuminating, concedes Moore. But it does not offer sufficient evidence either to substantiate or to falsify a claim of cause-and-effect. Moreover, by ascribing the growth of a local occult economy to world-historical forces, we “turn general context into particular explanation” (l999:306). We also confuse the general and the particular. How so? At times, she suggests, we deny that resort to the magical, and to its associated forms of violence, is unique to South Africa; at other times we imply that there is something special about its deployment here.

    Allow us to recall what the disagreement is about. Our objectives in the Gluck- man lecture were twofold. One was to make sense of some highly visible, much discus- sed, old-yet-new practices in postcolonial South Africa. Taken together, these practices, themselves rooted in variously defined “localities,” appeared to constitute a discernible phenomenon: an occult economy. As we have implied, this term describes an empirical- ly-grounded abstraction, an abstraction derived from, but not reducible to, the narrated experience and social activities of a large number of diversely positioned human be- ings. In short, it is an analytic concept based in the concrete. Located between the glo- bal and the local, subsuming them in a four-dimensional geography,14 that concept is mobilized to arrive at “thick,” moving portraits of peoples’ lives and labors; also to eluci- date the motivation, the meaning, and the consequences of their actions. It is a tool that enables the dialectic of deduction and induction on which, in our view, all principled social science ought to be founded.

    The other objective of our analysis of “occult economies” was to explain why that enchanted economy should manifest itself so palpably now, when conventional wisdom would have us expect otherwise; why it calls forth received cultural practices, yet trans- mutes them into virulently altered forms; why, while clearly a domestic product, it bears close resemblance to similar economies in other places, most of all in post-totalitarian contexts, where neoliberal reform has suddenly and simultaneously liberated and dis- empowered, enriched and impoverished. These parallels are striking and yet hard to pin down. They bear witness to the play of large forces (i) that, although volatile and only partly visible, are not random; (ii) whose existence may be inferred only through their ef- fects; (iii) whose workings vary across the axes of the planetary map, making them im- possible to grasp at only one site; (iv) which, because they have not yet fully run their course, elude proof by ordinary means. The problem that we set ourselves, then, was to account for the workings of a metamorphosing capitalism that is both global in its reach and localized in its protean manifestations. Built into that problem is an effort to engage at once with the general and the particular, with variance and similarity, with continuity and rupture. Far from being a confusion yielded by our method, it is a necessary re- quirement thereof. Respectful of the empirical without being empiricist, we seek to open up new angles on a world-historical process of awkward, shifting scale.

    At issue here, then, are alternative ideologies-of-method, alternative epistemes. The differences that flow from them, not least over what it takes to prove an argument or to verify a theory, are substantial. Which is why we stand accused, in this exchange, of not having provided enough evidentiary support for claims about some very general transformations in South African economy and society; even more, about their location in the broad sweep of the history of capital. Even if we agreed that we ought to render as “provable propositions” our analysis of these transformations – or of the ways in which they are locally inhabited, experienced, narrated, acted upon – we find it hard to see how to do so without resorting to reduction ad absurdum. But we do not believe that this is what we should be doing; indeed, we resist the positivist reflex that would encour- age us to do so. After all, if they were held to the demands of empiricist validation, or subjected to the blinding lights of Western science, some of the most enduring insights of modernist social thought would not pass muster. We have in mind, inter alia, Marx’s analysis of the commodity, Weber’s elective affinity between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism, and Durkheim’s theory of the elementary forms of religious life.

    Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, of course, all argued against both ungrounded historical conjecture and theory deduced purely from philosophical first principles; although each of them indulged in these things on occasion. More to the point here, each sought to take the measure of the difficult relation between the experience of social phenome- na and the forces and facts, the rhymes and reasons, that lay behind it. Each exercised a fertile sociological imagination, seeking, in the Great Outdoors of their changing wor- lds, to “forget the appearances,” the better to discern the “real truths” swimming behind them (McCarthy, cited above). Each knew that social action, like the fabrication of social meaning, is not pursued by human beings just as they please; that its determinations have to be explained; that the job of the social scientist is to construe the processes by which realities are realized, objects objectified, classes of persons and things classified, and so forth. All of which returns us to the dialectics of deduction and induction – to the co-production of fact and sociological imagining – implicated in “doing ethnography.”

    It also returns us to a very basic question: Precisely what kinds of methodological operations are entailed in “doing ethnography” as we envision it? That question is not, we suggest, best answered in the abstract. Just as method is always profoundly theore- tical in its provenance, so its substance ought always to be practice-based and context- sensitive.

    CONFRONTING THE GREAT OUTDOORS

    Our time: 1989, near the end of apartheid.

    Our place: the North West Province of South Africa where, long ago, we did doctoral research.

    We returned to the Mafikeng District after an enforced absence of some twenty years; our research, in the interim, had crossed over into Botswana and into the colonial past. Driving in from across the veld, we crested the foothill to the south of the Tshidi- Rolong capital to behold a strikingly discordant landscape. The contours of the old Tswana town – weathered red-clay walls, desiccated thatch roofs, giant boulders, cattle-trodden trails, spry camelthorns – had been dwarfed by a skyline of altogether different scale. The precocious, postmodern outlines of a new city, its architecture a bold pastiche of various international styles of the 1970’s and 1980’s, proclaimed an as- sertive, upstart governmentality. History and Hubris, both capitalized, had consummat- ed a brazen, quick and dirty affaire on this arid terrain: on it, one of apartheid’s most elaborate ethnic “homelands,” had been put in place. The illegitimate insta-polity of Bophutatswana, and the simulacra of its bastard sovereignty, had been erected on land long owned and inhabited by the Tshidi, subjecting them and scores of other Tswana chiefdoms across the northwest to the violent authority of a puppet-state empowered by the material, military, and ideological might of the apartheid regime.

    What met our astonished gaze, in sum, was the enactment, in concrete, of that regime’s version of indirect rule: the tight, closely-policed integration of local polities, un- der their “traditional” rulers, into an ostensibly independent ethno-nation. Herein lay the completion of the process, endemic to colonialism, by which those polities – now designated “tribal authorities” – were relegated to the peripheries of a nation-state predicated on difference. The running together of humble adobe and soaring plate glass made visible another juxtaposition: the affirmation, on one hand, of a sense of Tshidi cultural particularity, and, on the other, its encompassment within a wider, multi-ethnic state that was itself a maelstrom of powerful economic, social, and moral currents. It hardly seem- ed accidental that the independent-minded Tshidi chief, Kebalepile, had died in Mafikeng in the early 1970’s, allegedly as a result of witchcraft at the hands of the recently- installed president of Bophuthatswana, Lucas Mangope.15 Mangope, a subaltern sovereign if there ever was one, was seen by the citizenry of Mafikeng as the new colonizing cuckoo in their nest. By blaming him for the occult killing of their traditional leader, Tshidi sought to name the spirit of a spiritless age, the Zeitgeist of late-colonial history.

    This magical murder, refracted through the local moral imaginary, might have opened a new chapter in the unfolding confrontation between the late Tshidi world and the wider universe that embraced it. But the history of which it was part went back a long way. As we have noted before (e.g., Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1997), setswa- na, the more-or-less open, more-or-less labile ensemble of signs and practices taken locally to constitute vernacular “culture” – the term is used as freely by black South Afri- cans these days as it is by others – was itself the offspring of a protracted colonial en- counter. Mafikeng bore all the scars of that encounter, of earlier struggles, of earlier conjunctures. In the mid-1800’s, for example, it was at the nub of a frontier along which white settlers and African chiefdoms fought over land, labor, and sovereignty; along which, too, evangelists fought for souls and civilization, Later, at the turn of the twentie- th century, during the South African War, it became an imperial battleground on which heroes and villains of all races vied for national gains and personal glory. More recently, it has been branded as a commodity, a heritage site on the newly-wrought tourist map of the postcolony. And for all this time it has lain at the crossroads of an intricate web of exchange relations: relations among the various Tswana polities of the region, relations between them and diverse “strangers,” relations that fan out, today, across the globe. The embarrassment of historical traces we found here stubbornly resist the foreshorten- ed lens of the ethnographic here-and-now.

    Consequently, in order to account for the social archaeology of the place, and for the ebullient memories of its people, we were forced from the first to historicize our me- thods; this, in the early 1970’s, at a time when there was a great deal of antipathy within anthropology toward history. We had no alternative but to develop an ethnography of the archives to discern the processes by which the past and the present had construct- ed each other; an ethnography that, among other things, entailed scouring the records – images, inventories, accounts, material shards, documents, linguistic residues, even silences and absences – for the constellation of ordinary practices, the passions and interests, that produced and reproduced this site as an empirical fact, a named-and- known locale (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Often this meant trawling texts for what they were not, putting into conversation pieces of paper that, in the cold storage of the archives, languish as solitary objects. It also necessitated our transposing inert verbs and nouns into depictions of living things, of vibrant ritual activities, of expressions of collective affect, effort, effect.

    If the ethnography of the archives proved anything, it was that Mafikeng, “Place of Stones,” had, from the start, been situated between a rock and a hard place. The town was established by the ruling Tshidi chief, in the 1850’s, with two ends in mind: to ward off the seizure of his land by white settlers and to quarantine the rise of Christianity, along with its Eurocentric forms of civility. In time, and for complicated historical reasons, Mafikeng would become the capital of the chiefdom. It was here that Tshidi asserted their autonomy as fully as they could from the colonial state, the settler economy, and the British missions; here that they fashioned an ethnically-marked localism – refer- red to, explicitly, as setswana, “Tswana ways and means” – that quietly fused into itself the cultural practices of various others. For their part, the Protestant converts, original residents of the place, were also to make common cause with a national black petite bourgeoisie anxious to proclaim its modernity.

    We hardly need insist here that, to be read ethnographically, these economies of signs and practices have to be situated in the intimacy of the local contexts that gave them life. At the same time, they require to be inserted into the translocal processes of which they were part ab initio: processes – commodification, colonization, proletarianization, and the like – composed of a plethora of acts, facts, and utterances whose very description demands that we frame them in the terms of one or other Theory of History. The emerging substance of Tshidi religious, legal, literary culture, their styles of costu- me and senses of self, all deployed images and materials at once fresh and familiar, autochthonous and imported. Each, in its own idiom, replayed, and sought to redress, the mutually-constitutive antimonies of the colonial world: in marking the contrast bet- ween magic and faith, custom and reason, folk dress and fashion, the living forms of setswana recycled and remade the contrast between the culturally particular and the universal, between ethnic subjects and modern persons. Between Africa and Europe.16

    For much of its modern existence, anthropology has been trapped inside this set of antinomies. Its ethnographic habitat has, conventionally if not always, been the first term of each: the particular, ethnic subjects, Africa. Conventionally, too, these terms have been taken to signify analytic domains that may be treated as self-sufficient unto themselves. And, for heuristic purposes at least, as hermetically, hermeneutically clos- ed. This was certainly the orientation that framed our first fieldwork among “the Tshidi- Rolong” of Mafikeng in the late 1960’s, when the proclivities of a British structural-func- tionalist training seemed perfectly reflected in the ethnology of African tribes invoked by high apartheid. Yet our field-site – chosen because it gave us an alternative vantage across the Bostwana border if we were expelled by a regime hostile to research on the “wrong” side of the color bar – proved stubbornly intractable to this perspective. Wheth- er in respect of political or religious life, of kinship relations or healing rites, there simply were no “customary” practices that did not bear the imprint of long-standing engage- ment with various elsewheres, with (often coercive) embodied social and material forc- es beyond themselves. The production of the local here was always also entailed in the effort to fabricate some measure of existential coherence and closure against the cross- currents of history, a history of overrule and economic expropriation, of colonial evange- lism, of apartheid, of the ravages of deliberately exploitative labor markets. Of prophets and profiteers, madmen and migrants.

    For all their discordant hyper-modernity, then, the built-forms of the bantustan were but an increment in a drawn-out dialogue between the local and the translocal, here and elsewhere – these tropes being understood not as antonyms but as imaginative axes on maps of shifting scale. As it turned out, for all its concrete confidence, this edifice of apartheid was in its death-throes. The long colonial history that had spawned it was coming to an abrupt end, swept away by the changes that marked the close of the Cold War and the realignment of the old international order. So, too, was the nation- al economy that underpinned the ancien régime, its industrial infrastructure and its sovereign autonomy recalibrated by the cumulative effects of neoliberal capitalism. By the time we next visited Mafikeng, two years after South Africa’s first free democratic elections, its civic structures had been inhabited by functionaries of a new provincial government. The old white town, once set off from its black counterpart by the railway-line, and by equally caste-iron cultural and legal barriers, had been significantly integrated.

    Other auguries also suggested that Mafikeng had entered a new era – or, rather, that the proportionate relationship between rupture and continuity had, for the moment, tilted somewhat toward the former; history, in our view is never all one or the other, al- ways a complex analytic equation-to-be-resolved. Unfamiliar forces, emanating less from the old international order than from the global economy, were making themselves felt as never before. Some of them promised the infusion of cargo that black South Afri- cans had expected with their liberation: an army of NGOs, of “universal” Neoprotestant churches, of distance-learning corporations, of internet services had opened up around town. Almost immediately, locals tried to capture the bounty promised by these techni- cians of twenty-first century “development.” Not only did satellite dishes mushroom ac- ross the veld. One mud-brick building, nestling beneath a thorn tree on an otherwise barren stretch of land, sported a rough, hand-painted sign: “We teach in English, in step with the global age.”

    At the same time, less sanguine signs gave Tswana cause for anxiety. Many pointed out – to us, in letters to newspapers, on local TV – that the old migrant labor system had collapsed and that this collapse, along with a severe recession, had made jobs extremely scarce, especially for young black males. An unusual number of people appeared to be dying in accidents, to be committing suicide, to be victimized by brutal crime, to be ill, to be depressed. Public facilities and welfare services were receding by the month. There was a growing population of “black people” on the streets, immigrants from elsewhere in Africa who were drawing much suspicious and scandalized talk: hav- ing eluded state regulation, it was said, they were plying their wares noisily on once pristine sidewalks, thus usurping the trade of South African merchants. Not only that: they had brought drugs and AIDS with them, and had taken the few available jobs on the surrounding farms. And yet, despite all this pessimism, notwithstanding all this apo- calyptic talk, in the midst of this economy of genuine hardship, some locals seemed, mysteriously, to be prospering. As we note elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a), it is this that has fed the raw underside of the occult economy: the killing of alleged wit- ches and zombie conjurers.

    Zombie-conjurers. This brings us back full circle to where we began. To the strangely dissociated man in the police station, to the youths who killed because they believed their fathers to have been turned into phantom laborers, to popular representa- tions of the violent abstraction entailed in witchcraft. Recall what we said at the outset: that the zombie is a figure metonymic of the playing out of world-historical forces in the northerly reaches of South Africa right now; also of the domestication of a form of neoliberal capitalism thought to enable the production of wealth without work. Recall, too, the question that followed: how are we to make sense methodologically of this figure, of those forces, of their determinations, of the unfolding connections between them? That the question demands a sociological imagination at once local and translocal, empirical and analytic, was brought into sharp relief for us in a context part pedagogic, part ethnographic. During a history class at the University of the North West, a graduate student broke suddenly across the discussion: “Do Americans believe in diphoko, in magical medicines? ” he asked. “Is it like here? Is there also trouble with zombies in America?”

    By what methodological means, then, did we actually address the question of the living-dead in the late Tswana world?

    DISCURSIVE FLOWS AND THE DIALECTICS OF DISCOVERY

    [Writing a novel is] like playing chess in three dimensions.

    David Lodge 1999:52

    So, too, is doing ethnography. Four dimensions, actually, if one includes the ter- rain of the virtual: the electronic commons that has interpellated itself – as a medium of translocal communication, as a vehicle for the flow of money and other kinds of capital, as a mechanism of the market, as an instrument for the establishment of public spheres of different scales – into even quite remote social worlds.

    Unlike chess, however, ethnography-as-practice has, in the first instance, to con- struct its own field of play, its heuristic landscape. Strategically, it has always seemed logical to us to locate the center of that field around one or more focal points to which the anthropological senses are drawn because they are the crucibles in which contem- porary vernacular concerns – whatever they may be, whatever their phenomenal scale – are construed, enacted, played out, socially contextualized. Given that our anthropo- logy seeks to be empirically-grounded without being empiricist, our objects of research have invariably been defined with reference to the prevailing preoccupations of the times and places in which we have worked, whether they be the politics of chiefship or ecstatic religious movements, agrarian development and its undersides, the colonial en- counter, occult economies, or, most recently, crime, policing, and the metaphysics of disorder. In the dialectic of the concept and the concrete, it is the latter that sets metho- dology in motion, serving as the fons et origo of the operations by which we set out to apprehend the existential processes of everyday life. Our ethnography, in other words, takes off not from theory or from a meta-narrative, but from the situated effects of see- ing and listening. Of course, the way in which we see, what we pay attention to, and how, is not empirically ordained; that, ineluctably, depends on a prior conceptual scaf- folding, which, once the dialectic of discovery is set in motion, is open to reconstruction.

    In the late 1990’s, the zombie, and the enchanted economy of which it was part, provided just such a focal point at which the preoccupations of the period had taken tangible shape. How did we know this? It came at us, insistently, from a number of diverse sources, some of them already alluded to: in such episodes as the encounter with the almost-naked man on Station Road, in what followed at the police station, and in the sheer ordinariness of the whole thing to the men in blue; in the murder of alleged corpse-conjurer, Motlhabane Makolomakwa, in its avidly-consumed press coverage (see Figure 1), in its courtroom arguments, and in the conversations to which it gave rise, many of them about the “epidemic” of occult violence afflicting the northerly provinces; in “mob” attacks, committed by local youths in the name of their communities, against those suspected of practicing the arcane arts; in personal stories of the sort told to us by the scion of a ruling dynasty – a man with a first-class graduate degree in development studies, an excellent job in government, and a large following as a DJ in a large city nearby – who had lost a beloved sibling, snatched away secretly by a witch for whom he worked until rescued many months later; in a remarkable incident in which po- lice tried to save a young boy from the persistent attacks of a vicious tikoloshe, a trans- local witch familiar,17 first by calling in the local television channel in the hope that its cameras might immobilize the creature and then by eliciting the help of several technicians of the sacred (see Figure 2); in the reactions of the state to outbreaks of witch- craft killings, which included tough law enforcement, high level conferences on the top- ic, and the appointment of a commission of enquiry; in discussions on the internet, in national and regional TV dramas, documentaries, news broadcasts, and talk shows, in local genres of cultural production (see Figure 3); and, most of all, in our everyday ex- changes in homes and schools, stores and shebeens, taxi ranks and churches across the length and breadth of the Mafikeng district.

    This was not all, not by any means. But it gives a sense of the way in which a flow of narratives, incidents, activities, dramas, material exchanges, conversations, and representations embedded in the “natural” discourse of different and complementary public spheres may come to organize the ethnographic gaze – and, thereby, to set me- thod in motion. Discursive flows, although having focal centers, are inherently open, fle- xible in scope, and shifting in both their content and their constituents. Determining what, exactly, falls within the purview of any such flow is itself a product in part of pay- ing careful attention, in part of inspired guesswork, in part of theoretical and philosophi- cal predilection; making sense of its substance depends on what, previously, we have spoken of as an “imaginative sociology.” We use “imaginative” here in two senses. It re- fers to (i) doing ethnography by plumbing – through whatever resources of the analytic imagination are available to us within the political and ethical imperatives of our practice – the phenomenal worlds in which we situate ourselves; this by (ii) seeking to grasp the manner in which those worlds are indigenously imagined and inhabited by people vari- ously positioned within them. Note all the plurals. They point to an anthropological cli- ché, albeit an important one: that most of the signs and practices with which we con- cern ourselves are either contested or, if not, are the object of a polyphony of percep- tions, valuations, means and ends.

    To the extent that doing ethnography necessitates, in the first instance, tapping into focal discursive flows – and, lest we be misunderstood, we reiterate that this inclu- des not “just” talk or texts but practices as well, not “just” the meaningful but also the material – it demands three critical methodological operations. Each is a condition of the others’ productivity.

    The first is the pursuit, in respect of any given discursive flow, of points of articu- lation among the various spheres in which it manifests itself; this by tracing the co-pre- sence of persons, texts, images, or arguments (and especially arguments of images) across them. Thus, for example, the imaginative sociology we were able to construct surrounding the figure of the zombie – and that was to sediment into our ethnographi- cally-rooted abstraction, the “occult economy” – took shape when we began to hear si- milar words and see similar pictures over and over: when, among many other things, the accused youths in the Makolomakwa murder trial claimed that the deceased had “killed their fathers and put them to work”; when stories about zombification kept return- ing to the “fact” that the witches in question, invariably sexual “perverts,” had “turned people into tools,” thereby preventing ordinary citizens from earning a living or starting a family; when an old woman, said to have amassed “mysterious” wealth, was told, as she was set on fire by the “boys” of her village, that they had no income because of her; when so much local opinion, from the most intellectual to the most humble, blamed the living-dead for the absence of employment, for denying young black males the opportu- nity to graduate to adulthood, for the despoliation of community. This is not to say that all representations of, or explanations for, the postcolonial (re-)appearance of zombies are the same. Nor that they are ascribed the same social salience by everyone. However, where there is argument about the matter – be it in courts of law or over quarts of beer, on soccer fields or in the maize fields, around backyard fires or among fired work- ers, in university classrooms, church meetings, or the electronic media – it usually turns back to the connection of witchcraft to the dearth of work and the impossibility of securing the future; the last being what we, in theory-speak, might refer to as a crisis of social reproduction. This, in short, is the animating vernacular around which the discursive flow is organized. It turns out to be crucial in the dialectic of the concept and the conc- rete, of theory and ethnography.

    The first methodological operation, then, is to map the substance of the pheno- menal landscape on which any discursive flow is grounded, thus to identify its animating vernaculars and to chart the object world in which it interpolates itself. The second is to follow the traces of that discursive flow, of its various signs and images, tracking the mi- gration of the latter from their densest intersections to wherever else they may lead.

    Let us give a couple of instances from the situation with which we were concern- ed here. One is the allusion to the sexual perversion of witches, a submerged theme in many zombie narratives. At face value, this allusion seems, in itself, to have little to do with the workings of the occult economy or the figure of the zombie, more with the figuration of the witch as “standardized nightmare” (Wilson 1951), the epitome of anti-sociality and immorality. But in pursuing the allusion, in posing questions about it, in seeing where else it turned up, we found ourselves drawn into a meaning-maze that took in AIDS, the sexualization of death, bad blood, compromised masculinity, and drought – and culminated, by fusing all of these things, in the clear and present threat to the fu- ture of communities everywhere attendant on the fact that young men cannot find work or make families. As sexual pervert, the witch, in short, embodies social destruction, fertility abused, social reproduction violated.

    The other instance also arose out of a recurrent theme in zombie narratives: What precisely is the reach of the occult economy? What is the reach of the modern witch? Is corpse-conjuring, or the arcane fabrication of wealth without work, purely a parochial matter? Or does it somehow extend beyond? One night, the local TV channel held a phone-in talk show in which the special guests were a pair of young “reformed” satanists, each with his spiritual advisor. Asked about the difference between witchcraft and satanism, one answered, in a fluent mix of Setswana and English: “Satanism is high-octane witchcraft. It is more international” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). This comment called forth a flood of responses from the virtual community constructed by the program. Tse station switchboard was overrun. Audiences across the province were fascinated. Satanists were said, by and large, to be youthful, male, and black, just the social category most under threat of joblessness, most likely to dabble in nefarious new technologies. Witches, by contrast, were held to be motivated, more often, by local con- flicts, framed in long-standing idioms of kinship and community; although they, too, app- ear to be widening their horizons and their range of techniques. As the “high octane” petrochemical image suggests, what “satanic” youth bring to the occult economy is a capacity to “ride the tiger” – actually, in these parts, a leopard – “of time-space comp- ression” (Harvey 1990:351): to move across vast distances instantly, thus to accumu- late riches, without visible effort, by means unknowable to ordinary persons. The sym- bolic references in this are too dense to unravel here: they extend from the “fast” wealth being produced in the postcolony by control over the transportation of people, signs, and things to the changing salience of borders and transnational elsewheres in neolibe- ral South Africa. Above all, however, what became plain, listening both to the partici- pants in the show and to those with whom we watched it, was the fact that the occult economy is understood to link the most local of concerns, activities, and relations – un- derstood in the most local of terms – to inscrutable forces arising out of an equally in- scrutable world beyond, a world ever more “global.” This last, we stress again, is not our gloss. Recall that sign on the mud-brick school, the one that promised an education “in step with the global age” (above, p.00).

    In short, the second methodological operation involves mapping the extensions of the phenomenal landscape, the four-dimensional geography (see n.14) with referen- ce to which any discursive flow constitutes itself. Self-evidently, this, like mapping its substance, demands more than “multi-sited” ethnography. It demands an ethnography that, once orientated to particular sites and grounded issues, is pursued on multiple di- mensions and scales: an ethnography as attentive, say, to processes occurring in virtu- al space as to those visible in “real” places-under-production; to the transnational mass- mediation of images as to ritual mediations between human beings and their ancestors; to the workings of state bureaucracies or international courts as to the politics of “tradi- tional” chiefship and customary moots; to the flow of commodities across the planet as to marriage payments between lineages; and so on and on. Often it turns out that there are intimate, if invisible, connections across dimensions and scales: just as planetary commodity flows may, these days, determine bridewealth in an African village, so bride- wealth in an African village may have an impact on the planetary flow of labor, cash, and goods; similarly, just as the purview of local chiefs and their “traditional” courts may be decided by global human rights jurisprudence, global human rights jurisprudence is being challenged by demands for the recognition of “traditional” cultural imperatives.

    The third methodological operation is to trace the passage of a discursive flow over time; this to establish what, precisely, is new about it and what is not, what are the relative proportions of rupture and continuity to which it speaks, what is unique and what is merely a local instance of a wider phenomenon. How? By means of a counter- point: by (i) eliciting a local genealogy of cultural precursors and (ii) running it up against a comparative archaeology of similar signs and practices to ascertain where else, and in what circumstances, parallel discourses might be found. In respect of the zombies of the North West Province, and the occult economy of which they are part, local genealo- gies make it clear that they have not been around for much more than a decade; regar- ded thus, they signal a rupture. But there did exist a foreshadowing: sefifi, observed by missionaries in the nineteenth century (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:143), a condition – in which “manhood is dead, though the body still lives” (Brown 1926:137) – brought about by the eclipse of a person by another, more powerful than s/he. This condition, it seems, provided a semantic frame within which the zombie has been accommodated. As to a comparative archaeology, there is evidence of at least two broadly parallel his- torical situations in Africa – in Mozambique and Cameroon earlier this century – in which living-dead have appeared (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999c). In both instances, their presence was intimately tied to radical changes in colonial labor conditions, to the disruption of received connections between persons, production, and place, to the pre- cariousness of wage employment, and to the alienation attendant on new forms of work. Put all this together and the point becomes clear: once historicized and interpella- ted into its local cultural context, the discursive flow surrounding the figure of the zom- bie has most immediately to do with labor history, with a burgeoning fear of the eclipse and commodification of people and social relations, with a sense of lost control over the means of producing value, with threats to the survival of local worlds under the impact of enigmatic forces from outside, with the unmooring of horizons and expectations oc- casioned by shifts in the workings of capital.

    CONCLUSION

    This brings us back, one last time, to the dialectic of induction and deduction, of theory and ethnography, of the concept and the concrete.

    When we resumed our work in post-apartheid South Africa in the 1990’s, as we have said, we had no idea that we would run into a fully fledged occult economy; or, to be more precise, into the phenomena captured in this ethnographically-grounded abs- traction. Nor could we have known how that economy had become a public preoccupa- tion. The appearance of a new breed of witches and zombies, and the anxieties they heralded, might have been interpreted purely as an expression of parochial conflicts and relations gone bad. What is more, in the hands of a cultural anthropologist with only the pristine horizons of the particular in view, a case could no doubt have been made for the idea that the living-dead of the present are a transformation of the sefifi of old; that the mystical evil of the here-and-now is an extension of “traditional” notions of witchcraft and sorcery. However, once we had traced out the discursive flow in which zombification is caught up – made manifest, methodologically, by charting the land- scape on which it had taken shape, rendered decipherable by recourse to local genealogies and comparative archaeologies, mediated by our own conceptual categories and commitments – it became obvious that this kind of explanation would have been woe- fully incomplete. For one thing, it would have left unaccountable the fact that similar phenomena have appeared in very different cultural contexts at roughly the same time and in response to the same broader historical conditions. For another, it would also have paid scant respect to the real-world concerns of Tswana living in the North West: to their arguments about the impossibility of social reproduction, about arcane means of producing wealth, about new forms of labor, commodification, and alienation, about witchcraft, satanism and globalization.

    In seeking to take account of those arguments and their social motivation, and to grasp the phenomenology of the lived, material world out of which they arose, we brought to bear an explicit theoretical orientation; it is one about which we had written a fair amount over the previous decade, one which contained within it a particular under- standing of the contemporary history of capital. That orientation primed our early read- ings – and misreadings – of the “new” South Africa. But it did not take long for its insuf- ficiencies to make themselves plain. Apart from all else, our take on the workings of modern industrial capitalism and its colonial extensions did not prepare us for the post- colony, for its postmodern zombies and unemployment-related witch killings, for its “cri- sis” of masculinity and generation, for the complex absent-presence of the state. It was, in other words, the incompleteness of our theoretical scaffolding – incomplete, that is, in the face of the concrete world which we were encountering – that set the dialectic in motion anew, altering our conceptual repertoire just as that repertoire was being mobili- zed to make sense of the unexpected landscape on which we found ourselves.

    Ethnography is like much else in the social sciences; indeed, more so than anthropologists often acknowledge. It is a multi-dimensional exercise, a co-production of social fact and sociological imagining, a delicate engagement of the inductive with the deductive, of the real with the virtual, of the already-known with the surprising, of verbs with nouns, processes with products, of the phenomenological with the political. Robert Foster (2002:247) has recently remarked, as we have ourselves (Comaroff and Coma- roff 1999a), that the key problem of doing ethnography “is ultimately a question of scale.” For him, that question boils down to the avoidance of “dissolving local particularities in the uniform sameness of global conditions without treating the radical distinctiveness of the local as if it stood against or apart from the global.” For us, the challenge goes yet further. It is to establish an anthropology-for-the-present on an ethnographic base that dissolves the a priori breach between theory and method: an anthropology, of multiple dimensions, that seeks to explain the manner in which the local and the trans- local construct each other, producing at once difference and sameness, conjuncture and disjuncture. An anthropology that takes, as its mandate, the need to make sense of the intersecting destinies of human lives, wherever they may happen to be lived out.

  • Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa

    Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa

    This essay explores the diverse, unexpected, and controversial ways in which the idea of civil society has recently entered into populist politics and public debate throughout Africa. It offers a critical theoretical analysis of the nature and deployment of the concept—and the current debates surrounding it across the continent. Drawing on the comparative literature in the subject, John and Jean Comaroff examine the impact of colonial ideology, postcoloniality, and development practice on discourses of civility, the workings of everyday politics, the construction of new modes of selfhood, and the pursuit of moral community. They argue that struggles over civil society in Africa reveal much about larger historical forces in the post-Cold War era, making a strong case for the contribution of historical anthropology to contemporary discourses on the rise of a “new world order.”

  • Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and Sovereignty

    Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and Sovereignty

    I. PROLEGOMENON

    Just over a quarter century ago, Simon Roberts and John Comaroff opened Rules and Processes, their study of African jurisprudence, with a statement that did not win them many friends among their colleagues at the time. “It is doubtful,” they wrote (1981:3), “whether [legal anthropology] should exist at all.” Their point was not that the comparative study of law was too insignificant or too marginal to claim a discursive do- main of its own. Quite the contrary. It was because its subject matter – and especially its theory-work – was too important to be confined to a island unto itself. Nor were they alone in thinking this. Max Gluckman was wont to assert that legal anthropology was the root of all anthropology: not only did much of modernist Western thought owe its un- derstanding of the social to one or another version of contract theory, but it rested on the implicit truth that homo sapiens was, everywhere, homo juralis. Gluckman also liked to say that, were apprentice anthropologists to read just one text, there was no question what it should be: Henry Maine’s Ancient Law (1919). Anthropology in the Maine- stream, some of his younger Manchester colleagues used to joke (Comaroff 2002).

    Now, an epoch later, this seems more than a little overdrawn. Comparative law is not everything. Nor, patently, ought it to be the primary source of social theory. But there is reason to believe that legal anthropology warrants a more prominent place at the core of the social sciences than ever before: that it is fundamental to making sense of our Brave Neo World, a world whose lineaments are only beginning to make them- selves visible, a world for which we do not yet have adequate analytic equipment. If the idea of anthropology in the Maine-stream appeared first as farce, it returns to history a second time in deadly earnest. So much so that, in thinking out loud here about the pre- sent and future, we shall concern ourselves with two things, in counterpoint: One is to consider why it is impossible to approach the contemporary global order without close attention to law; to law especially in its polyvalent relation to governance. We shall ar- gue, in this regard, that the latest chapter in the longue duree of capital, the chapter often titled “neoliberalism,” has led to a hyper-extended, often counter-intuitive deploy- ment of legalities in the social, geographical, political, moral, and material reconstruc- tion of the universe, a process most usefully estranged, and grasped, by a critical legal anthropology. Our second objective is part programmatic, part problematic: it is to sket- ch three potential directions for that anthropology, three directions – among many, we stress – in which it may do both forensic and theory-work at the vanguard of the social sciences.

    Before we begin, let us digress for just a moment. Much of what we shall say would have been impossible without the development of a discursive field now known as “legal pluralism,” a field productively cultivated at the Max Planck Institute in Halle, under whose aegis this essay began its life.1 Notwithstanding the critiques it has attracted (e.g. Roberts 1998, Merry 1988, Moore 1978), legal pluralism – as an orienting sensibility, as a call to reconceptualize the scope of the law, as provocation (von Benda-Beckman 2002:37) – sent a wave of creative energy through our discipline. Intersecting with other scholarly initiatives, it has compelled us all to look anew both at the colonial past and at the neomodern present; in particular, at the legal institutions, practices, and processes to which they have given rise. The question for us now, though, is not what has been ac- complished. That has been answered cogently by the von Benda-Beckmans (2006) and others. For us, the question is the future. Where do we go from here? As we shall see, the move from legal pluralism, as orienting gaze, to law and governance, as problemati- que, turns out to be a highly productive one.

    CARDINAL POINTERS: MAPPING THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

    We begin with the most general of our three cardinal directions. For want of a better signpost, since it will take us down several intertwined pathways, let us refer to it as…

    1. THE FETISHISM OF THE LAW

    The modernist nation-state, we hardly need say here, has always been erected on a foundation of legalities.2 Nor only the modernist nation-state. Among the premodern Nuer of the Sudan, who had no government sensu stricto, the line between a tribe and its exteriors, that Schmittian frontier between friend and enemy, was, according to Evans-Pritchard (1940:278-9), precisely the point at which the law gave way to war, the legal to the lethal. Similarly in classical Greece, where, Hanna Arendt (1998:194-5) observes, “the laws [were] like the wall around the city.” Since the destruction of The Wall that marked the end of the Cold War, law – specifically, that species of law held to un- derpin public order – has been yet further fetishized; even as, across the world, ever more forbidding walls are put up to protect the propertied from the unruly. Note that, in speaking of fetishism, we refer to the process of displacement whereby an abstraction – in this case, “the law” – is objectified, ascribed a life-force of its own, and attributed the mythic capacity to configure a world of relations in its own image.

    Striking, in this regard, is the number of new national constitutions written since 1989: a hundred and five, and rising.3 Even more striking is the millennial faith in their capacity to conjure up equitable, ethically-founded polities (cf. Ackerman 1997:2,5) – and social order. It is a faith owed largely to the fact that the promulgation of a new Le- gal Order, in the upper case, signals a break with the past, with its embarrassments, its nightmares, its torments, its traumas. Throughout the global south, moreover, these na- tional constitutions have become the paradigm for a wide range of lower order analo- gues. In South Africa, everyone is acquiring them: chiefdoms, churches, NGO’s, taxi dri- vers, even street gangs. As salient as the sheer quantum of new national constitutions, though, is a change in their content. This, David Schneiderman (2000) argues, is owed to a global shift in “constitutional design” from a state capitalist to a neoliberal model – it- self the product of an epochal transformation in the relationship between the economics and politics of capitalism; also of a re-visioning of the relationship between law and governance. Thus, whereas post-World War II constitutions stressed parliamentary sove- reignty, executive discretion, bureaucratic authority, and cultural homogeneity, recent ones focus, if unevenly, on the primacy of civil and political rights, the freedoms of the citizen, the limitations of state power, the tolerance of difference, and the rule of law.

    This is the case even when both the spirit and the letter of that law are despoiled, distended, desecrated. Even as more regimes suspend it in the name of emergency, ex- pediency, exception. Even as they expropriate its sovereignty unto themselves. Even as they franchise it out.

    The enchanted faith in constitutionalism speaks to something yet deeper: a “cul- ture of legality” seems to be infusing everyday life almost everywhere, becoming part and parcel of the obsession with order that haunts many nation-states nowadays. The term itself – “culture of legality” – underwrites a new citizenship education program in Mexico, for example.4 It also describes the object of a game invented in Sicily, mythic home of northern banditry; the game is called Legalopoli.5 Even the Vatican is using it. In 1998, Jubilaeum carried an essay entitled “A Strong Moral Conscience for a Culture of Legality” (Torre1998). It said, among other things, that we have entered an age in which humanity knows itself by virtue of its rights. Spelled r-i-g-h-t-s. A new chapter in the “judicial experience has been opened,” the essay added, a chapter we might “call the `rights of [individual] desires’…” In fact, this age appears to be one in which rites and rights conjoin in parallel significance as rarely before: faith and the law, arguably, are the twin fixations of this-worldly being at the new millennium. Ours is the epoch not of theodicy or theocracy, but of theo-legality. Pace Karl Schmitt, it is not just about political theology that we ought to be vexing ourselves. It is also legal theology. Nor is this true only of the Judaeo-Christian world. As we shall see, it applies as much to Islam.

    That humanity knows itself more than ever before by virtue of its rights – or, at least, that more of humanity knows itself in these terms – seems evident from the plane- tary explosion of human rights advocacy; also from the spread of law-oriented NGOs, especially in the global south. The civilizing missions of the new century, these NGOs, which ply the intersection between the public and the private, encourage citizens to deal with their problems by legal means. In the upshot, even those who break the law appear ever more litigious. In South Africa – which introduced a “law train” in 1998 to traverse the country giving free counsel6 – a plumber recently convicted of drunk driving sued the state for imprisoning him when, by rights, it should have had him in rehabilitation.7 And alumni of the liberation struggle, members of the Umkhonto weSizwe Veterans Association, squared up for a struggle in the courts in 2005 over the assets of the organization.8 In times past, this intra-ANC conflict would have been fought by political means. But then, in times past, Umkhonto would not have been an investment company as a com- mons for ex-guerillas.

    The global effect of all this is such that it is not unusual any more to hear the Euro-language of jurisprudence in the Amazon or Aboriginal Australia. Or among the poor of Mumbai, Madagascar, Cape Town, and Trench Town. Even in places where traf- ficking outside the law is as common as trafficking within it – Nigeria, Russia, Zimbabwe – the self-imaginings of citizenship, and actions taken in its name, tend to be infused with that language. Nor is it just rights, interests, identities, and injuries that have beco- me saturated with legality. Politics itself is migrating to the courts. Conflicts once joined in parliaments, by means of street protests, media campaigns, strikes, boycotts, blockades tend more and more to find their way to the judiciary; note Julia Eckert’s (2006:46 et passim), observation that, in India, the “use of the law” now “complements or repla- ces” other species of counter-politics. As we have noted before (2006:27), class strug- gles are giving way to class actions in which people drawn together by material predica- ment, culture, race, sexual preference, residence, faith, and habits of consumption beco- me legal persons as their common plaints turn them into plaintiffs with common identi- ties. Citizens, subjects, governments, congregations, chiefdoms, communities, and cor- porations litigate against one another in an ever mutating kaleidoscope – changing “con- stellations,” legal pluralism might call it – often at the intersections of tort law, human rights law, constitutional law, and the criminal law. Even democracy has been judicializ- ed: few national elections these days go by without some resort to the courts. No need to mention the American presidential election of 2002, which was decided by an ideologically-stacked judiciary, thereby aborting the democratic process; this in the imperium that imposes its political theology of “freedom” upon much of the rest of the planet.

    For their part, states are having to defend themselves in courts against unprece- dented sorts of things in unprecedented ways. And against unprecedented sorts of plain- tiff. The legal struggle between the ANC and AIDS sufferers in South Africa is legend. But there are many others. Like that of the Brazilian government which, in 2000, was ordered to pay damages, by its own high court, for the death and suffering of Panará Indians. Or Nicaragua, held to account a year earlier by the Inter-American Court for violating the ter- ritory of Tingni Indians by granting a timber concession to a Korean company.9 Suits of this species – which exemplify Eckert’s (2006:50-4) “legalism from below” – are often ab- etted by advocacy groups. In them, the law connects political means to political ends. At times, too, legalities are directed against unexpected sites of authority – in a manner that reverses the Foucaultian notion of capillary biopower. Thus 16,000 graduates of Indian schools recently filed suits in Canada against the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic Churches, alleging physical, sexual, and cultural abuse.10 They won. But many such ini- tiatives fail. Thus the Ogoni lost a claim against Shell for its complicity in killing those op- posed to its presence in Nigeria. Patently, the law often comes down on the side of the powerful. And of big business, which also flexes its legal muscles as far as possible to create deregulated environments conducive to its workings.

    In sum, while the law has always been a battle-ground, it appears ever more so; ever more, people seek, and find, legal justifications and jurisdictions on the basis of which to attack rogue capital, the state, and their enemies, real or imagined – extending, in the process, what has long been known as “forum shopping.” Note, here, the increas- ing appeal to the Alien Torts Act in the USA, which allows those who have suffered wrongs at the hands of American parties abroad to take their suits to federal courts. Their efforts have enjoyed some success. Unsurprisingly, mega-corporations have responded by trying to have the Act repealed, and by offering as an alternative “corporate social res- ponsibility,” and “soft law”; that is, self-regulation and mediation. A luta continua. But what this means is that the political geography of the planet is no longer sufficed by the kind of thing taught in school, the kind of geography that began with Kant and von Humboldt. The cartography of our times transects the order of nation-states with another, equally significant set of coordinates: the jurisdictional axes of effective collective action. Indeed, an urgent task of legal anthropology, which will have to await another occasion, is to esta- blish the epistemic basis for this new geography.

    Let us return, though, to the judicialization of politics.

    It is not only the politics of the present that are being judicialized. The past, too, is being fought out in court. As Anja Peleikis (2006) and Judith Beyer (2006) have shown for Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan, history enters the law in diverse ways, often insinuating it- self into the cultural underpinnings of everyday jurisprudence, into its ways and means, its materialities and motivations. But we mean here something yet more specific: the struggle actually to repossess and reposition the past. Just as Brazil has had to recognize its part in the ethnocide of the Panará Indians, and to make material amends for it, so Britain is having to answer for atrocities in East Africa (cf. Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders at whim, for having alienated land from one people to ano- ther, and for other such illegalities. By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to break its silences, to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is lawfare: the use of penal powers, administrative procedures, states of emergency, mandates and warrants to discipline its subjects by means of violence made actual by its own sovereign word.

    As a species of displacement, lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the viol- ence inherent in the law, for political ends – becomes most visible when those who “serve” the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Outside the USA, the most infamous instance right now, perhaps, is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime con- sistently passes statutes to justify the silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, which forced dissidents out of urban areas under the banner of “slum clearance,” took this to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, said the authorities, was merely an appli- cation of existing statutes to raze dangerous “illegal structures.”11 Lawfare may be limited or it may reduce people to “bare life.” And it may mutate into necropolitics. Typically, it seeks to launder power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital, all under the sign of governance. Hence Benjamin’s (1978[1921]) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal animate one another. Of course, in 1921, when he wrote his critique, Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also become a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty.

    But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its wider implications?

    Modernist nationhood seems to be undergoing a tectonic shift: the ideal of cultural homogeneity on which it was founded, always more aspiration than achievement, is giv- ing way to a recognition of greater heterogeneity. It is a move marked almost everywhere by nervous xenophobia, a move closely linked to the rise of neoliberalism, to its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of images, objects, desires, identities, on new geo- graphies of production and accumulation. And heterogeneity begets more law. Why? For one thing, because legal instruments appear – we stress, appear – to offer a means of commensuration: a repertoire of standardized signs and practices that, like money in the realm of economics, permit the negotiation of values and interests across otherwise in- transitive lines of difference. Hence the planetary flight into a constitutionalism that expli- citly embraces heterodoxy in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less of those bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. Hence the extension of the model of the market to ever more domains of everyday existence – and, to close an epistemic circle, to legal theory itself. Hence the displacement of so much politics into jurisprudence.

    But there is something else at work too. Another well-recognized feature of the neoliberal turn has been the outsourcing by government of many of its conventional ope- rations, including those integral to the management of “bare life.” The Weberian bureauc- ratic state has mutated into a rather different beast: a state that is not just a corporate management enterprise – although, as Rancière (1999:113) says, it is ever more overtly just that – but one whose principal regulatory work lies in franchising and licencing, not least in the realm of policing and warfare. Where the modernist state undertook the redis- tribution of private wealth for public ends, the neoliberal state redistributes public wealth into private hands. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course. But most regimes have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the mark- et. And devolving ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, communities, or clas- ses of consumer. This has a number of corollaries, variably felt across the world. One is that, with states no longer the sole guarantor of the security of citizens – with many shrin- king their policing operations and relinquishing their monopoly over the means of violence to the private sector – populations tend to become more fearful about the prospect of dis- order, more anxious about criminal violence, real or imagined. Of which more later. A se- cond corollary is that, with the outsourcing of government, counter-politics tends to be cri- minalized; this because it is treated not as the expression of democratic dissent, but as il- licit action against the property, persons, and prerogatives of those who act, contractually, in the name of authority. Which, in turn, quickens the resort to lawfare on all sides. A third corollary is that, with the sacrifice of the originary ideal of leviathan to the deities of self- regulation, self-protection, and self-interest, the court – one institution still securely under the purview of the state, the one ostensibly capable of commensuration – becomes a utopic site to which human agency believes it may turn in order to pursue a widening horizon of ends.

    Put all this together and the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are sub- and transnational “communities”: cultural communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of faith or interest. Sometimes, as in India, these communities appropriate the law of the state unto themselves, which, Eckert (2006:47-8) notes, dissolves legal pluralism into judicial pluralism; sometimes they assert autonomy in specific domains, but leave others to government. And sometimes, as we shall see, they seek juridical independence. Nor is it only the communities of civil society that are saturated with legality. So are its criminal undersides. In the US, South Africa, Brazil, Russia, and elsewhere, “gangs” of various scale, i.e. organized crime, mimic both the state and the market. Many provide their “tax-paying” clients with the policing and protection that government has stopped supplying; some have shadow judiciaries to try offenders against the persons, property, and social orders over which they exert sover- eignty. In South Africa, recall, a number have constitutions. Several are structured as franchises. A few even offer “alternative citizenship” to their members. Charles Tilly (1985:170-1) once noted that the modern state operates much like organized crime. These days, organized crime is operating ever more like the modernist state. Concretely, we mean. Not just, as Derrida (1994) once suggested, in the manner of a specter.

    In the process of becoming ever more legalistic, communities of all kinds, including outlaw communities, appear increasingly to evince a will to sovereignty; by sovereignty we mean the exercise of control over the lives, deaths, and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law (cf. Hansen and Stepputat 2005). “Lawmaking,” said Walter Benjamin (1978:295), “is power making.” But “power [is] the principal of all…lawmaking.” In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra. Perhaps because of changes in the relationship between law and gover- nance in the age of neoliberalism, perhaps because so many of the operations of the bu- reaucratic state now live within the realm of the market, perhaps because the outsourcing of its authority has stretched so deep into the management of “bare life” – in short, be- cause we live in a world at once post-Weberian – more and more non-state institutions, from corporations through cultural communities and churches to criminal organizations, are asserting sovereignty of greater or lesser scale. Modernist political theory, of course, allows only one sovereignty to any nation, a vertically integrated one invested in the state. Increasingly, however, polities consist in a horizontal tapestry of partial sovereignties: so- vereignties over terrains and their inhabitants, over people conjoined in faith or culture, over transactional spheres, networks of relations, regimes of property; sovereignties at war or peace with each other; sovereignties longer or shorter lived, protected by more or less violence. Under such conditions, the social world tends to be imagined as an archipelago of zones of civility, of Arendt’s “walled” spaces of legality, under one or another sovereign jurisdiction; civil zones joined by corridors of tenuous safety in environments otherwise presumed to be, literally, out of control – inhabited by criminals, warlords, druglords, immigrants, and other alien non-persons – with the mediating reach of government over the whole being distinctly uneven.

    If vertical and horizontal sovereignties are archetypical ends of an imaginary continuum, the states of the global north tend to be associated more with the former, those of the south, with the latter. But the global north seems to be edging southward. Russia has found as much with Chechnya and Tatarstan, two notable, if very different, instances of centrifugal sovereignty; so has Great Britain with the devolution of its Celtic fringe; also the US, where Native Americans are claiming ever more autonomy under the sign of ex- ception, where mega-churches are asserting ever more regulatory control over the lives of their congregants, and where inner cities, increasingly seen as a problem of human waste-management by the state, are the exclusionary domain of underworld syndicates. And these are only the most dramatic instances of a thoroughgoing, often dispersed pro- cess. The more general point? That sovereignty – as Agamben, Arendt, Bataille, and Benjamin understood – is the root construct, the encompassing algorithm, on which the unfolding, labile relationship between law and governance is wrought. How it is exercised, by whom, in what name, and with what effect; how it interpellates itself in the state, the market, civil society, faith, identity, even criminality; how it constructs a geography of jurisdictions and a cartography of violence; in these things lie the present and future of the Brave Neo World, of its social character, of its political life, of its architecture, of its ethics, even of its aesthetics. It is toward a confrontation with this clutch of problems, towards interrogating the nature of sovereignty, we believe, that legal anthropology is being inexorably drawn. A great deal hangs on it.

    This first cardinal direction leads directly to our other two. But, before we move on, we should like to stress that several things rather quickly passed by demand more atten- tion from legal anthropology. We have only scratched the surface of the problems of so- vereignty, of constitutionalism, and of the fetishism of law. The triangulation of these three axes mundi – and, concomitantly, the move from a world in which politics reigned over law and economy to one in which law seems to reign supreme – may turn out to be as consequential to our understanding of the neoliberal age as, say, the process of ratio- nalization was to Weber’s analysis of modernity, or the commodity to Marx’s reading of capitalism; both, interestingly, were also concerned with enchantment and commensura- tion. Indeed, what we have called legal theology – or theo-legality, the twenty-first century mutation of Carl Schmitt’s political theology – is, we would suggest, a critical grail to be followed, to whatever theoretical end-point it leads. So, we believe, is the mapping of a new jurisdictional geography through which to make sense of the unfolding logic of collec- tive action in the world. All of these questions are profoundly the subject of a legal anthro- pology that, as we said at the outset, ought to play a key part in theorizing the twenty-first century.

    But let us move off in our second direction. We signpost it as…

    2. DIFFERENCE, ID-OLOGY, AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM

    The turn toward legal self-imaginings on the part of communities of diverse kinds, like the changing cartography of sovereignty, is, we reiterate, not just uneven. It is visibly polymorphous. So, too, is the relationship between sovereignties and the sorts of legality on which they base themselves. Some operate with shadow juridical orders that replicate or replace those of the state, some stress their alterity, some resort to modes of regula- tion that are only tenuously law-like, some strive for very limited autonomy. For their part, states tend to regard such sovereignties with deep ambivalence: those that contend in the economy of violence, or spill over into polite, propertied society, are likely to be criminalized – or recommissioned – by government, if it has the capacity to do so. Others may be tolerated, particularly if they limit themselves to the “private” sphere, which, according to the liberal theory at the core of modernist governance, is the domain in which difference ought to express itself.

    One species of sovereignty poses particular problems for states on this front: so- vereignty based on cultural or religious difference of the kind that refuses altogether the antinomy between the private and the public; the kind that invokes intransitive, and often intransigent, ontologies of being-in-the-world; the kind whose alterity extends, as well, to governance. These sovereignties may be willfully self-limiting. Amanda Pirie’s (2006:78- 9, 93) Tibetan pastoralists, for example, are fiercely protective of the autonomy of their cultural patch when it comes to managing internal affairs and conflicts – and defer volun- tarily to the Chinese authorities in matters of criminal violence. But the appeal to the so- vereignty of culture or faith against government seldom stops at this felicitous border, the border of disorder. With neoliberal nationhood having to admit ever increasing heterodo- xy, with its explicit recognition in post-1989 constitutional design, ontological otherness is widely invoked these days to make substantial claims to autarkic self-regulation; claims that exceed the polite politics of recognition proffered by liberal philosophers as a pana- cea for the demands of difference in multicultural times. We have written of this in respect of South Africa (2003), which may exemplify a phenomenon spreading with exponential gravity.

    South Africa, being a postcolony, was erected from the first on difference. Like most other places, it has seen a significant shift in the dialectic of law and governance. Here as elsewhere, neoliberalism has emerged triumphant, its language spoken as a national vernacular, albeit not without challenge. Here too, it has hidden its ideological scaf- folding, reducing government to, and representing it as, technical management. Here too, partisan politics has become a tournament in the promise of competing profitabilities and efficiencies. Here too, there has been a displacement from the struggle between political visions to struggles in the name of interest and affect. And interest and affect, in their col- lective voice, congeal in identity – itself naturalized, as though it were a generic and ge- netic condition of human being. For more and more people, the site of politics has shifted from ideology, the -ology of the idea, to ID-ology, the -ology of identity.12 Notwithstanding all the noisy debate about the future of the country that swirls around the African National Congress, its leadership and its policies, the “vast majority” of South Africans think of themselves first and foremost as members of “an ethnic, cultural, language, religious or some other group” to which they “attach their personal fate” (Gibson 2004:2).

    The most comprehensive assertions of ID-ology, as we have already implied, are those made in the name of culture and faith; most comprehensive because they are exis- tential in their foundations – based, in the instance of faith, on transcendent truths and sacrally sanctioned ways and means, and, in the instance of culture, on shared essence and bio-genealogical alterity. Let us take each in turn.

    ID-ology under the sign of culture and shared essence, when it is translated into a will to sovereignty, yields poli-culturalism. The prefix, poli-, denotes both plurality and a political claim to the exercise of governance over, well, everything; this through the instru- mentation of a law accountable to no temporal authority. In South Africa, it asserts itself most articulately, perhaps, in the argot of cultural jurisprudence, of the right of Zulu, Xho- sa, Tswana, and others to rule and be ruled according to their own customary ways. Note that this is taken to be quite different from the custom of colonialism, although it may un- wittingly reproduce some of its effects. It is, quite expressly, a living, Afro-modern law (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004b), one that – now unencumbered by the ancien regime – is said, from within, to be vital and growing, but in vernacular ways that apply long-standing principles of Africanity to the life and times of the postcolony.

    The cause of policulturalism here has been most fervently fought – no surprise, gi- ven what we have said about the fetishism of law – on the terrain of the South African constitution. Its primary protagonist is the Congress of Traditional Leaders (Contralesa). For the past decade, Contralesa has put pressure on government to change the Bill of Rights, which subjects all forms of difference to the universal rights of citizens;13 it argues that “chiefs and kings” ought to enjoy sovereign authority over their realms. By statute, their formal powers, although amended several times, are confined to the administration of “customary law,” the coordination of cultural activities, any “function…delegated by a competent authority,” and such odds-and-ends as “the gathering of firewood.”14 Matters came to a head at a national conference held in August 200015 to discuss “[indigenous] leadership and institutions” with a view to producing a parliamentary White Paper.16 Contralesa refused to take part, although many of its members were physically present. Even more, it declined to talk to anyone other than the president – and only about constitution- al change. There have been times when the organization was sure that the state had been persuaded to do its bidding. And times when it has declared that the ANC, acting in bad faith, has never intended “to accommodate [chiefly authority in] the making of the new South Africa.”17 Such assertions have typically drawn denials from government, leav- ing behind them a trail of ambiguity, to the extent that there remains “considerable con- fusion as to what exactly the constitutional recognition [of chiefs] implies.”18 All the more so since the state has enacted laws, like the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (No.120 of 1998), that authorize some vernacular practices – including ones once deem- ed “repugnant”19 – and, by implication, delegate to indigenous rulers the sovereign authority to administer them.

    The upper echelons of the judiciary, which occasionally embrace Africanity in their jurisprudence,20 have added to the confusion by acting incoherently on the sovereignty of culture and, by extension, of those institutions in which it is vested. On one hand, for ex- ample, in May 2000, in Mthembu v. Letsela, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that women married under African customary law were subject to the rule of male primogeni- ture – and, thereby, excluded from inheriting conjugal property. The “interests of the com- munity” as expressed in its “mores and fundamental assumptions,” said the bench, were of paramount importance in cases of this sort.21 In short, it declared that there are situa- tions in which culture ought to take precedence over the Bill of Rights; in this instance, over its gender equality clause. The decision drew criticism from some quarters, notably feminist, but that is another story. On the other hand, in a vividly contrasting, controversial judgment four years later, Bhe and Others v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, the Constitutional Court concluded that “the rule of male primogeniture…is…inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid…”22 This outcome, too, evoked outrage, now from those who rule over the polities of indigenous South Africa, many of whom retain a high level of legitimacy among their subjects (see e.g. Oomen 2005); they complained that the Court had violated the constitution by criminalizing their culture.

    Nor did Bhe bring an end to the confusion. Or to the struggle over policulturalism. As we write, a female ANC member of parliament, Tinyiko Nwamitwa-Shilubana, is emb- roiled in a dispute that replays, in a new key, the uneasy dialectic of sovereignty against the state. Ms. Shilubana claims that the chiefship she inherited from her father, Fofoza – who ruled the Valoyi, of Limpopo Province, until his death in 1962 – has been “stolen” by her cousin, Sidwell Nwamitwa. The intricacies of the conflict need not detain us, save to say that Fofoza died without male heirs at a time when daughters could not succeed to office and was, therefore, followed by his brother, Richard, also now deceased, and then by Sidwell, Richard’s son. Most significant about the story is the fact that, in 1996, when Ms. Shilubana approached the Valoyi people with her desire to become their ruler, they agreed, citing the gender equality clause of the Constitution and recognizing her genealo- gical status. But Sidwell went to law, asserting the principle of patriliny, and won a deci- sion from the Pretoria High Court and then from the Supreme Court of Appeal; why either entertained a quarrel that, by “tradition,” fell within the purview of the sovereign politics of an African chiefdom, was never broached (cf. Tebbe 2008). Both benches ignored the publically-sanctioned change in Valoyi succession rules; they paid no heed when Ms. Shilubana insisted, correctly, that “customary law” is constantly evolving. And both, acting like colonial tribunals, held that male primogeniture ought to prevail since, “pursuant to tri- bal custom and tradition, a Hosi [chief] is born not elected.”23 Which simply ignored Bhe. The case, not surprisingly, has been taken on by the Constitutional Court. What is surpri- sing, however, is that Ms. Shilubana is opposed by many of her ANC parliamentary com- rades, who think that a victory for her would lead to “`instability’ throughout Southern Africa’s traditional communities.”24 To tamper with vernacular sovereignty, they believe, is to enter a policultural minefield, with explosive consequences. Not to do so, of course, is to affirm that sovereignty, at least by omission. And to limit the jurisdictional reach of the Constitution.

    The struggle for sovereign indigeneity – and against Euromodern liberal democra- cy, conventionally conceived – seems to be spreading across the legal terrain of the country. A few instances, true social dramas in the old anthropological sense of the term, have come to stand as paradigmatic of this struggle. While often arising out of conflicts of value within African polities, their intended audience, and ultimate respondent, is the state itself. And, not infrequently, they play on the incoherence of the judiciary in dealing with Afromodern “custom.” One, a cause celebre in the late 1990’s,25 pitted a staunch Je- hovah’s Witness, Mrs. Kedibone Tumane, against Chief Nyalala Pilane of the Bakgatla, under whose jurisdiction in the North West Province she was then resident. For reasons of faith, Mrs. Tumane had violated a burial taboo which enjoins bereaved women to re- main confined for a specified period and, when going abroad, to sprinkle a herb (mogaga) on their paths; not to do so is to risk spreading death pollution (sefifi), with potentially leth- al consequences for the “nation” (morafe). When Mrs. Tumane tried to leave her home and refused to broadcast mogaga, she was stopped from doing so by the Tribal Authori- ty. Some of her neighbors, reacting with a mixture of fear and fury, called for her banishment. In contemporary South Africa, riddled with AIDS and other perennial threats to life, dicing with death evokes deep existential anxieties. And mass anger.

    To cut a tortuous story short, Mrs. Tumane, abetted by the Human Rights Com- mission (SAHRC) took Chief Pilane to court late in 1998.26 Her constitutionally-protected rights had been deliberately traduced, she said. Having been put under “house arrest” – note her use here of an apartheid-saturated term – she had been forced to “live…[as] an outcast.”27 In an affidavit sworn prior to the case, Mrs. Tumane claimed that, in June 1998, the ruler had agreed to call a mass gathering and had promised to announce the end of her confinement, but had failed to do so. Pilane replied that he could not “release” her at the meeting in question, since “the tribe” had taken a “democratic” decision there to the contrary. He added that Mrs. Tumane was “confined” not by the tribal authority, but “by her own custom,” which could not be changed save by the “consent of the Kgatla na- tion,” of which she herself was a member. Her rights had been respected, he said, except where they were in tension with the Section 36 of the Constitution, which acknowledges that some limitations on individual freedoms are “reasonable and justifiable in an open… society” (see above, n.13). For Kgatla, a received practice whose transgression present- ed a clear and present danger to their community, and was recognized as such in a de- mocratically-constituted public forum, was just such a justification.28 To this, the complain- ant answered that, while an indigenous people is entitled to promote its culture and religion, it had to do so within the compass of the Bill of Rights, which placed individual free- doms above all things. This argument won, at least in the short run: in July 1998, the cou- rt agreed that the compulsory performance of mogaga violated the Constitution. An inter- im order instructed the chief to lift Mrs. Tumane’s confinement immediately.

    Nothing happened. Political pressure from the state mounted. Counter-pressure came from the House of Traditional Leaders, which put three questions to the state. In paraphrase: Why did the constitution place the individual rights above those of “tribes”? Why were cultural practices not similarly protected? And why was the Tumane case be- ing handled by the high court and not by their own house, where it belonged? For its own part, Pilane’s defense fused British functionalist anthropology with Agamben on sovereig- nty: “Tradition is the glue that holds the tribe together, gives it purpose, sustains its identi- ty…” Virtually all Kgatla, irrespective of religion or education, observe mogaga, it went on. The transgression of death rituals endanger social life. Only Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to comply. This explained why his people, following due democratic procedures, had de- cided to sacrifice Mrs. Tumane’s “rights” and – deploying the exception authorized by Section 36 of the Constitution – to condemn her to social death. This was their right as a sovereign nation; his sovereign obligation was to do their will. What is more, the SAHRC, clearly seen here as a cipher of government, had exploited the circumstances to crimina- lize an unobjectionable rite in the hope of bringing a cultural practice under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Pilane added, in a subtle legal stratagem that seemed to reverse his earlier statement, that mogaga was a ritual voluntarily followed by Kgatla and that, there- fore, Mrs. Tumane had not suffered compulsion. Per contra, being “eccentric,” she had shown contempt for a constitutionally-protected practice.29 Stressing that mogaga had been “declared voluntary” – that it belonged to the “private” domain of individual choice and did not compel anyone to violate their religious beliefs – the court dismissed the case. It clearly did not want to enter deep constitutional waters by being seen to outlaw an indigenous rite. As it happened, Mrs. Tumane’s period of mourning was by then long over.30

    Here, then, is a paradigmatic instance in which policulturalism expresses itself. Here the sovereignty of a vernacular jurisprudence, and the political order in which it is embedded, is asserted against the state.31 Here the fundamental lines drawn by the Con- stitution – between the private and the public, the religious and the secular, the prerogati- ves of the individual and the imperatives of the communal – are directly challenged. Here an existential struggle over sovereignty itself is conducted by means of lawfare, displac- ing the political into the legal. Note that this is also a confrontation between Euromod- ernity and Afromodernity: Pilane did not simply invoke “custom.” He sought to re-write it into the thoroughly contemporary language of democratic decision-making, jural excep- tion, freedom of choice, rights-talk. Thus do constitutional jurisprudence and culture re- cast each other – and the political geography of a nation-state now built on the irreducibility of difference. Thus does policulturalism, its imbrications and its effects, become the urgent object of legal anthropology.

    But it is not merely on the rarified scape of constitutionality that policulturalism is making itself felt. The confrontation between the Euromodern and the Afromodern, the displacement of the politics of sovereignty into the juridical, and the reworking of legal subjectivities are occurring in more mundane contexts as well. For example, so-called customary courts across the country are constantly having to deal with practices that are outlawed or unrecognized, yet are part of everyday life for much of the population. Most notable in this respect are conflicts arising out of the African occult – whose practice, real or alleged, remains illicit – which call into doubt the capacity of the state to impose both its rule of law and its monopoly over the means of violence (cf. Geschiere 2006). Precise- ly because they do, they provide a theologico-legal space for indigenous rulers to assert sovereign control over their realms. On occasion, these kinds of conflicts also filter into the lower reaches of the judiciary, where they compel the authorities to deal with the ine- luctable pragmatics of difference. Which, at times, has called forth a strikingly novel, and an analytically unexpected, species of jurisprudence (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004b).

    Because we know it best, we have taken South Africa as the ground on which to open up the matter of policulturalism, of the processes it sets in motion, of its capacity to transform the interiors of both the national and the native, of its challenge to liberal no- tions of legality, of the analytic and theoretical issues that it raises. We could equally have looked elsewhere; for example, to France and its treatment of Muslim head scarves or to the banning of female circumcision most lately in Eritrea or to the outlawing of sati in In- dia. Also, as in our discussion of the fetishism of the law, we have barely scratched at its surfaces. For now, though, let us turn to the other domain of ID-ology that poses import- ant questions of sovereign difference, and its implications, for legal anthropology: faith. We said earlier that faith and the law are the twin obsessions of the 21st century,

    that we are living in an age of legal theology, of theo-legality: faith, it seems, is taking more and more to the law to re-make the world in its own image, to extend is sovereignty, to police populations. Not everywhere, patently, nor always in the same way. But palpab- ly. Many religions, of course – not least those that bear the capitalized adjectives “Great” or “World” – have long had a juridical scaffolding. What appears different nowadays is the degree to which they are resorting to lawfare to extend their imperium. And to displa- ce liberal reason, albeit often by liberal means.

    Take orthodox Islam. Where there have been efforts to recast the foundations of nation-states in its name, they have been deeply invested in the rule of Sharia law. The same applies to regions within states, as in Northern Nigeria, and Aceh, Indonesia; also to Muslim initiatives that would extend the dominion of both the faith and the faithful, like the Salafiyya movement in Morocco, which propagates a “return” to legal Islam (Turner 2006:101). Indeed, the force of Sharia law in the lives of Muslim populations was dramati- cally affirmed in early 2008 when, of all people, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, suggested that some measure of official recognition be given to it by the British state for purposes of everyday governance in predominantly Islamic communities; per- haps the first time, this, that a religious leader of his stature has called for the policultural acceptance of (even partial) sovereignty for another faith. “As a matter of fact,” he noted, “certain provisions of Sharia are already recognised in our society and under our law” – as they are in India and Egypt – to the extent that their adoption was “unavoidable.”32 Predictably, his statement sparked a bitter controversy. Said his predecessor, Lord Ca- rey, “there can be no exceptions to the laws of our land.”33 What is significant, however, is that the argument has been joined at all. Clearly, we have reached an historical juncture in the convergence of faith and the law at which it has become thinkable.

    But it is not only for the governance of everyday life that Muslim theo-legality has been evoked in policultural assertions of sovereignty. The religion itself is being reframed in these terms. A dramatic instance is to be found in Pakistan. It began in the 1970s, when the ulema, orthodox religious authorities, sought and won an injunction against the Ahmadis, a movement they declared heretical, to prevent them from using any of theSha’ir (“signs”) of Islam; these, said they said, belonged solely to “proper” Muslims (Ah- med 2006:19-24, 40-45). When, in 1978, the Ahmadis appealed to the Lahore High Court,34 counsel for the ulema again argued “that Muslim-ness [is] the exclusive property of Muslims alone, that certain Muslim terminology [is] analogous to copyright and trade- marks,” and that their improper is, therefore, “an infringement of the rights” of the faithful (p.21). On this occasion, the judge found against the religious authorities on the technical ground that they could not show that a material loss had been incurred (p.41). But fifteen years later, in 1993, in a Pakistan Supreme Court case35 that addressed the constitutional bases of Muslim identity, the same argument was accepted by a majority of the justices: they argued that certain signs were not just distinctive characteristics and practices but the exclusive property of Islam” (loc. cit., pp.41-2). Thus was Islam transformed “into property, something that could be owned, possessed and bounded off from others” (Ibid.), something whose true nature vested in the law. In some religions, as we have ob- served elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.), divinities may themselves have a jural identity. In 1986, when the Indian government sued for the return of a 12th-century bron- ze Shiva that had been looted from a village in Pathur, “it did so on behalf of the offended god himself,” who was the “named…plaintiff in the case” (Keefe 2007:60-1; emphasis ad- ded). Thus does a Deity, and the faith for which it stands, become a legal person.

    Contemporary Christianity is also interpellating itself into the law – and, through it, into governance – in the effort to extend the reach of faith-based sovereignty. This, too, has precedents: Protestant and Catholic missions have, throughout their history, sought to create more-or-less closed, sovereign communities, thereby to exercise an authority over their citizens at once institutional and capillary. And the church, in its various deno- minational guises, has always taken pains to exert influence on political society and the state. But we appear to be seeing an acceleration, and an accretion, of this tendency, evident both in small Christian movements and in large evangelical awakenings across the world. Henning Mankell, the noted crime novelist and organic anthropologist of Swe- den, writes of these movements in One Step Behind (2003). “No longer [are they] simply charismatic,” he observes, “They are corporate franchises run by lawyers and account- ants” (p.351), legal persons that strive to change the world by means of legal ploys. The extent to which this is true has been brought to light in the US, on unprecedented scale, since the turn of the new century: reminiscent of the rise of Christian Political Economy (CPE) at the dawn of the modern Age of Capital (Waterman 1991), conservative Protes- tantism would render social, moral, and material life according to the dictates of faith – al- though, in its second coming, CPE seems much more anxious to insinuate itself directly into the workings of state.

    Witness, in this respect, the spread of so-called dominionism, whose “global `king- dom’ agenda” is founded on the belief that Jesus will not return “until the Church has tak- en…control of the earth’s governmental and social institutions” (Leslie 2008:2, 3), includ- ing the market and the courts; its “3-legged stool” subsumes the state, business, and civil society (ibid.:6). Even among Christians who do not explicitly see themselves as part of this movement, many support the effort to entrench “godly dominion over our neighbor- hoods, our schools, our government, our literature and arts, our sports arenas, our…me- dia, our scientific endeavors – in short, over every aspect and institution of human socie- ty.”36 For some, the longer term objective is to make the country over into a theocracy, thereby to reverse the course of history. And to put an end to the hegemony of secular reason. The ideology of the religious right is too familiar to bear repeating: its assaying of “family values” and laissez faire, its antipathy to abortion, homosexuality, welfare, and stem cell research, its hard-nosed positions on poverty, the environment, theological and cultural relativism, immigration, “just” wars, and the like. In pursuing its imperial ends, conservative Christianity has been quick to resort to the means of lawfare.37 Recall the disturbing Jesus Camp (2006, dir. Rachel Grady and Heidi Ewing), a documentary about the indoctrination of very young people, who spend their summers learning to “seize back” the USA for Christ. The film may seem extreme in its choice of subject matter and in the matter of its subjects’ choices. But it captures a rising tide in modern America. Oth- er than footage of a Christian leader claiming to have open access to the White House and its decision-making processes, its most potent motif is a life-size cardboard effigy of George W. Bush, the ultimate American Idol: prayers are said for (to?) him, urging that he install “righteous judges” – the youths chant the mantra “righteous judges,” over and over – who would conjure into being a truly Christian commonwealth. The fight for domi- nion, in short, gives yet further impetus to the fetishism of the law and, and, with it, the ju- dicialization of politics. Legality is the secular instrument by which civil society is to be re- made in the image of the sacred.

    Also uncivil society. Over the past decade or so, penitentiaries have become a ma- jor target of Christian movements in many countries (Burnside 2005); in the US, this initi- ative is associated primarily with PFM, the conservative Prison Fellowship Ministries foun- ded in 1976 by Charles W. Colson, ex-Watergate conspirator and alumnus of an Alaba- ma correctional facility. Neither Durkheim nor Foucault would have been surprised, of course, given their grasp of the constitutive relationship between the prison and the world, the disgraced and the disciplined. PFM’s “cultural commission” is to assist the church in evangelizing inmates, to promote “biblical standards of justice in the criminal justice system,” and, more broadly, “to cultivate righteousness in society, strengthening the work of God’s kingdom.”38 In its Utopia, the Lord’s Leviathan – about which Hobbes (1986:Pt III) himself would have felt distinctly queasy, given his belief that religious power ought al- ways to be subordinate to civil authority – would be ruled by a seamless fusion of the Laws of Leviticus and the Laws of the Land. Again, the Protestant presence in prisons has a deep history: the Bishop of Norwich, Barry Unsworth (1992:158) reminds us in Sac- red Hunger, owned one of England’s more notorious houses of detention in the late eigh- teenth century. But there was less concern then for the promiscuous interpellation of church into state. Ironically, as Governor of Texas, George W. Bush was sued by a con- vict for violating the constitution by turning the pastoral care of the penitentiary over to PFM, hence to advantage evangelical Christianity over other faiths or no faith at all.39 PFM has had to answer to the law on its own account as well: its InnerChange Freedom Initiative (IFI), partly funded by the state under President Bush’s Faith Based Community Initiatives Program, was the object of a suit filed in Iowa in 2003 by Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. It “is unconscionable” said the plaintiffs, for “govern- ment to give preferential treatment to prisoners based solely on their willingness to under- go religious conversion and indoctrination.” The real controversy here, argued Ministry-Watch, a Christian Organization sympathetic to PFM and IFI, is about whether “our na- tion’s basic approach to solving social problems [is] secular humanism powered by big government and void of transcendent values [or] real and lasting social change…effected by `armies of compassion’… working for true justice based upon unchanging principles.”40

    Critics of PFM accuse it of religious coercion, indeed, of theologico-lawfare. They point out that the evangelical Christian Ministry, committed to dominionism, has persuad- ed several states to make its programs, paid for by tax dollars, a requirement of parole – and to give better carceral treatment to those who sign on.41 As it turned out, the Iowa
    suit was successful. Both the lower courts and a federal appeals court, the second in late 2007, found that IFI does violate the constitutional separation of church and state. Althou- gh the plaintiffs took the ruling to be “a major setback for the White House’s `faith-based initiative’,” the IFI was banned only if it continued to operate with government funds.42 In other words, as long as it is privately financed, it will continue to have access to prisons, and be free to press its convictions on convicts. At the time of writing, PFM was consider- ing an approach to the ideologically-stacked Supreme Court – in respect of whose com- position Mr. Bush has answered the prayers of the Jesus Campers – there to persuade the highest levels of the judiciary that government should pay for its work. And that the constitutional wall between church and state, the sacred and the secular, ought to be re- aligned. A luta continua. Nor only in the USA. In South Africa, where the constitutional protection for religious expression is much greater than it is in the USA, there is ongoing debate about the place of faith in civil society and its governance, not to mention ongoing efforts on the part of religious parties to deploy the judiciary to extend their sovereignty.43

    Similar things might be written about other faiths, other places. For example, the popularity of fundamentalist Judaism has grown strikingly over the past decades. In Is- rael, the role in government of the religious parties – in particular, their control over family law – has long posed a problem for the full accomplishment of a secular liberal democra- cy. With the occupation of Palestine and the expansion of settlements dominated by or- thodox Jews, the West Bank has become an archipelago of faith-based sovereign com- munities notorious for their aggressive self-assertion. Outside Israel, throughout the Jew- ish diaspora, ultra-conservative congregations have tended to be highly protective of their integrity, closing themselves off to the world and its interventions, settling disputes, enact- ing sociality, managing their public finances, and negotiating their own moral economies – with rabbinical courts as the arbiters of order and propriety. Some time back, Channel 4 in the UK presented a television program entitled Jewish Law in its series, Faith and Be- lief.44 Focusing on just such a “self-contained” community in Manchester, it showed scenes of religious authorities “enforcing an array of intricate regulations ‘governed by biblical texts’,” rules that cover “every element” of people’s lives. And deaths.

    The degree to which ultra-conservatice Jews seek sovereign autonomy, and suc- ceed in attaining it, is highly variable, of course – as it is among other communities of conviction, be they evangelical Christians or orthodox Muslims, Mansions of Rastafari or ancestor-worshiping Africans. But the overall trend seems clear. The sovereignty of diffe- rence, of ID-ology under the sign of culture or faith or the fusion of the two, is decreasingly a matter of indifference, increasingly the stuff of lawfare, ever more world-altering in its will to self-expression.

    Note: world-altering.

    It is not simply that faith or culture are becoming more significant. In claiming sov- ereignty for culture and/or faith, the turn to ID-ology is having a fundamental impact on the very nature of political society. Nation-states may seek to subordinate these sover- eignties to them; although, in the USA, it often seems the other way around. But, inevita- bly, they find themselves locked in a dialectic of mutual transformation, albeit an under- determined, as yet far-from-decided one. How so? Because assertions of sovereign diffe- rence, of policulturalism, seek to reconstitute the lineaments of the universe. Not only do they insist on a realignment of the relationship between the public and the private, the sa- cred and the secular, the empirical and the ineffable, and other founding oppositions at the core of liberal modern society. They also demand that the authority of the state – in respect of governance, legality, the means of violence, the fiscus, and many things besi- des – no longer be cast as universal, that it be parsed rather along lines of difference; of different universalities, that is, those of god rather than government. Similarly citizenship, whose rights and responsibilities are no longer to be defined purely in relation to the body politic, but to identities than nestle within it, transcend it, or transect its boundaries. Which returns us, full circle, to the historical shift of which we spoke earlier, the shift from a wor- ld built on vertical sovereignties to one erected on horizontal, partial ones.

    Once again, the theory-work in all this for legal anthropology is to plumb the dialec- tic. It is a complex one, we reiterate, not one of winners or losers, domination and subor- dination, or even simple syntheses. It is one of translucent subtleties of substance, alter- ing, as we have said, the political ontology of the lived world in such a way as to reground the future-history of democracy, of law and governance, of our ways of being-and-knowing. Of the Order of Things, tout court.

    Could this be why so many people in so many parts of the world are concerned right now with order – and, conversely, with disorder? That is the question that points us finally, and very briefly, toward our third cardinal direction…

    3. ON THE METAPHYSICS OF DISORDER, OR TOWARD A CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY

    We live, it seems, in an age of anxiety, an age of fear, an age of ambivalence. It is not the first, nor will it be the last. To the contrary, apprehension and uncertainty – at times acute, often just naggingly there – are the perennial undersides of social existence.

    But what is notable about this age, if we tap into populist discourses across much of the globe, is the extent to which social angst manifests itself in the gathering idea that criminality is almost everywhere out of control, everywhere excessive, everywhere a dan- ger to life, limb, liberty, property (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004a). Even to society itself.

    Moreover, it is common cause, among many national publics, that the fight against law- lessness and disorder can no longer be won. Except maybe in fiction, film, melodrama. Bertrand Russell’s (1950:143) “arduous journey,” that great modernist march toward “a social organization which curb(s) private violence and gives a measure of security to daily life,” appears to have ground to a halt. Moral panics have surfaced in many places: the Netherlands, Guatemala, Argentina, El Salvador, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Japan, Aust- ralia. Brazil, we are told, lives with a “culture of fear” (e.g. Caldeira 1996:303f, 2000). In sedate Sweden, citizens have come to see their country as “a place of dark crimes and vicious psychopaths, of fractured families and a fraying society.”45 In Britain, the “rule of lawlessness” was a major issue in the 2001 national elections. At the time, England, which today has more students of criminology than students of sociology, was so vexed by the problem of social disorder that Polly Toynbee spoke of it as being on the verge of a “nervous breakdown”;46 things have not improved appreciably since. In North America, where panics over crime peaked a little earlier, they have given way to a terror of terror- ism, of warfare made criminal.

    In sum, criminality has become a more-or-less global trope of undoing, of the im- minent demise of civility, democracy, social order; just as economic meltdown, contagion, nuclear holocaust, moral decay, ecological catastrophe, and other things have been in previous historical epochs. Seldom seen as political in its causes or effects – or, for that matter, as having anything at all to do with political economy – lawlessness is now, in vernacular imaginations, exactly what Durkheim’s normative sociology long ago made it out to be: a human pathology that, unchecked, threatens the viability of modernist polities. Concomitantly, policing has come to “stand for…order” in twenty-first century notions of governance (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:4). It – or, more generally, security – is now the state function par excellence. It is also a major criterion by which the strength of regimes is measured; hence its rhetorical significance when those regimes perform themselves for their citizens (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004a). This is in spite of the fact that, all over the world, the work of enforcement and incarceration is being ever more displaced into the private sector. Or, more likely, because of it: there is good reason to believe that contemporary obsessions with disorder, themselves fed by a mass-mediation, are a corollary of the outsourcing of many of the operations of government, leaving the national citizen unsure of who or what might be the guarantor of life-and-death, of private property and public space. As Kevin Haggerty (2001:197) puts it, mass anxieties with lawlessness and punishment have more to do with “the late-modern breakdown of a host of… social secu- rity systems” than with the brute fact of “criminal victimization.”

    This, in turn, raises a number of questions, among them, whether felony rates are not in fact rising precipitously, fed by the massive economic impact of upward flows of wealth and rising Gini coefficients, by the retreat of the welfare state and morphing labor markets. Some criminologists of both the left and the right have argued that they are. And crime statistics seem to bear them out; although the crime statistic is itself an inherently unstable knowledge-object (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006b). Whatever the “truth” in this respect, there is a well-established disproportion in many places – including the USA (see.e.g. Garland 2001:10f) and UK47 – between fear and risk: those who fear lawlessness most do not typically suffer it worst, those who suffer it worst do not tend to fear it most. In Cape Town, South Africa, for instance, where 350 murders occur in the poor black township of Khayelitsha for every one in wealthy, white Camps Bay, residents of the latter evince far greater concern with criminal violence. This disproportionality is why police departments often spend more these days on fighting the fear of crime than on fighting crime itself (cf. Haggerty 2001). It also points to something more general: that criminality is an ethical vernacular, a reflexive language in terms of which populations frame their discourses of deficit, arguing among themselves about what it is that stands between them and the good life. Which is why it always takes on a profoundly contingent, local content: such things as the alleged incapacity of the government of the day to deliver on its responsibility to it citizens, or, worse yet, the corruption of its personnel; the inherent unruliness, incivility, violence of racialized others (a.k.a young black men); the insidious presence of immigrants (a.k.a. “Illegal aliens”); the evil of those whose jealous terror wou- ld wilfully destroy our civilization (a.k.a. Muslim fundamentalists). It is, conversely, by vir- tue of their translation into the argot of criminality that racism, xenophobia, and their ilk may be spoken, and enacted, without being named.

    Crime, to invoke Foucault, is productive: it is productive of emergent discourses of politics and law, of economics and ethics, of liberty, civility, sociality, and religiosity – all of which it defines by its transgressions. As Durkheim (1938:xxviii) noted, Carol Greenhouse (2003:276) reminds us, “a society…free of crime would fall into chaos, since it would be bereft of the signs of its own existence as an authoritative order.” Like the African witch, in other words, the felon is a “standardized nightmare” (Wilson 1951): an embodied figure by means of whom, as camera obscura, a civil order may conceive of itself – and, to the degree that nightmares are historical in their content, locate itself in its own contempora- neity. If, therefore, we are to interrogate law and governance at the dawn of the new cen- tury, if we are to understand the nature of its socialities and sovereignties, one way of do- ing so is to develop, within legal anthropology, an anthropological criminology that takes as its problem (i) what criminality and policing mean, what they convey and communicate in the here-and-now, (ii) how we read crime “facts and figures,” even fictions, as a spe- cies of political and social knowledge, (iii) what kinds of governmentality they bespeak, (iv) what sorts of world they conjure up. We already have some extraordinary examples, of course: James Siegel’s New Criminal Type in Jakarta is one. So, too, is Malcolm Young’s An Inside Job. Each, in its own way, shows how it is that uncertainty and ambi- valence, congealed in the specter of lawlessness – in a metaphysic of disorder, so to speak – have come to haunt the present. Both underscore the contention with which we began: that a critical legal anthropology is foundational to the theory-work required to make sense of the twenty-first century.

    Which brings us to one or two words by way of conclusion.

    ENDS, ENDINGS

    Our three cardinal topoi – the fetishism of the law, ID-ology, and anthropological criminology – converge. They are triangulated dimensions of the same thing: of the grow- ing centrality of a culture of legality, broadly defined, in the post-Cold War (neoliberal?) Era, in its politics and sociality, in its economics both moral and material, in its emergent forms of sociality, religiosity, and citizenship, collective consciousness and subjectivity. In short, in world-making in the wake of the millennium. We have tried to take the measure of this “legal turn,” of its expression in such diverse things as the judicialization of political life, changing patterns of sovereignty, the rise of policulturalism and new faith-based movements, and spreading obsessions with lawlessness and disorder. But our primary objective has been more general, more programmatic. It has been to show why it is that a critical legal anthropology – one unafraid to take on Big Issues, even as it continues to interrogate small things – is so crucial to contemporary social theory at large, especially to theorizing the 21st century. In sketching one possible set of horizons for that anthropology, we seek to claim for it its proper place in the mainstream.

  • Policing Culture, Cultural Policing

    Policing Culture, Cultural Policing

    PROLEGOMENON

    Our objective here is somewhat unusual. Rather than an ethnographic analysis or a theoretical discussion, what follows is an extended reflection on a research endeavor still in its early stages. We are concerned to share the methodological and conceptual questions raised, ab initio, by the effort to interrogate an unusually perplexing phenomenon. In so doing, we transgress the received distinction between two genres: the grant proposal and the scholarly essay. By means of this hybrid, however, we seek to open a new aperture onto a global issue at once consequential and difficult to pin down: the contradictions that manifest themselves in postcolonies when, under the impact of neoliberal capitalism, constitutionalism, recourse to law and popular justice are fetishized – and when the future of the nation-state comes to depend on struggles over inimical species of rights and entitlements.

    The study of which we speak grows out of a spectacular rise, during the 1990s, of witch burnings in the northern provinces of South Africa. Several aspects of the phenomenon are stri- king: the fact that, while they began in the last years of apartheid, these killings have intensified dramatically in the postcolonial period; that they are a response to populist fears of an alarming increase in witchcraft practices, zombie-conjuring, and the traffic in body parts; that they are perpetrated largely by youth in the cause both of the common good and of individual aspiration; and, most of all for present purposes, that the punishment of alleged evil-doers has involved distinctly hybrid cultural styles of informal justice.

    We have sought elsewhere (1999) to explain the unusual escalation in occult-related violence here. Note, in this respect, that we do not ourselves pass judgment as to whether there has actually been an “epidemic” of witchcraft and other forms of magical practice in the nor- thern provinces. Locally, however, people are wont to say that more cases of ritual murder have come to courts in recent years than ever before. They also point to more confessions of Sa- tanism, some of them in dramatic media revelations; more press reports of zombies, some of them replete with photographs and “eye witness” accounts; more confirmatory testimony given by ritual experts about the nefarious behavior of prominent people. All of which has led to a widespread sense of crisis in the countryside.

    While the state has been forced to react to this “crisis” – both to the belief that there is an epidemic of evil about and to the “vigilante” violence it has sparked – it has found it hard to do so by legal means. Indeed, so agitated has been the moral panic in the Northern Province that one of the first things done by the African National Congress (ANC), after it came to power in 1994, was to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murder. Its report (see below) posed a stark paradox by presenting its findings in two inimical voices. One evoked the spirit of legal universalism: it called for rigorous prosecution of those who “took the law into their own hands” by attacking suspected witches. The other spoke the language of cul- tural relativism: the criminalization of witchfinding, it said, was incompatible with the pervasive African belief – shared by many state functionaries – in the actuality of witchcraft itself. By mid- 1998, the recently established Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services had set up a national workshop on the forensics of occult-related crime scenes. But questions were raised about the constitutional status of the Unit: did not its very existence presuppose the illegality of the cultural convictions of many citizens?1 Later that year, a Witchcraft Summit was convened to discuss the problem tout court. It was attended by prominent politicians and public intellectuals – and (then) Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. Soon thereafter, in August 1999, the media took to the air on the issue: SABC began a 13-part TV series, Ke Bona Boloi? (“Is This Witchcraft?”) which addressed the threat of occult activities to civic order.

    A CONUNDRUM, FOUR QUESTIONS, AND A THESIS

    The particular form taken by this confrontation between legal universalism and cultural relativism lies at the core of our concerns here. It is made even more explosive by another, his- torically specific tension. On one hand, the “new” South Africa is founded on a distinctly moder- nist idea of the nation-state: of a polity with a strong sense of unity and collective interest, with a deep investment in democracy and human rights, with a government which sustains a monopoly over the legitimate means of force. It is an ideal underpinned by an almost fetishized faith in constitutionality and the rule of law. On the other hand, despite the popularity of the ANC, many South Africans believe that the post-apartheid state is failing to ensure the moral and material prosperity of its citizenry, failing to protect it from illegitimate violence, failing to deliver on the promise of rights, failing to unite the postcolony in the face of countervailing cul- tural and ethnic impulses. In the northerly provinces, these sentiments are given expression in community efforts to redefine moral order and to police, by local cultural means, those infrac- tions of the commonweal that escape the oversight of the authorities; most notably those involv- ing the occult. Our objective in this study, then, is to address four sets of related questions.

    First, how exactly are we to understand occult-related violence – violence, that is, again- st alleged perpetrators of magical evil – in this context? As a kind of vigilantism, in which communities “take the law into their own hands” in dealing with people who contravene their norms? As the revenge of the poor against the rich, young against old, male again- st female? Or as a mode of “cultural policing” directed at those held to threaten the well- being of the community itself?

    This form of action, whether it be regarded as illegal vigilantism or cultural policing, violates the exclusive control by the state of the legitimate means of force. And so:

    Second, how does the state react to community policing of the occult? How do we exp- lain the fact that, despite efforts to criminalize them, such “dangerous” cultural practices are proving decidedly recalcitrant to regulation, posing a stark challenge to the idea of a nation unified under the law?

    Occult-related violence may be seen to shade into other local institutions of informal justice – among them, makgotla, urban courts modelled on Sotho-Tswana tribunals; the “trial and pu- nishment” executed in Cape Town “by taxi-drivers with strong community support”;2 the contro- versial activities of Mapogo a Mathamaga, a notorious “vigilante” organization in the north; and, in times past, the “necklacing” of apartheid collaborators by township youth. Is the policing of the occult different because it seems so manifestly “irrational,” because it is clothed-in-culture, because it is sanctioned by appeal to customary moral and legal conventions?

    Third, to the extent that occult-related violence contests the state’s monopoly over the means of coercion, what are its implications for the governance of the “new” South Africa? Does its appeal to cultural relativism call into question the Eurocentric ideal of the nation-state? Can cultural relativism and legal universalism coexist? How might postcolonial states adjudicate among the individual rights of citizens, the cultural rights of ethnic groups, and the collective rights of other kinds of community?

    The new South African constitution puts individual rights above all else; to wit, it is censured, in some quarters, for its relative disregard of community or cultural rights. But here lies the classic conundrum of the modernist nation-state: if it presumes a unity born of a commitment to univer- sal truths and to One Law, how much cultural relativism can it tolerate? To what extent can it concede legal authority, or the means of violence, to ethnic or religious groups and still retain its sovereignty?

    Fourth, to what extent is this a peculiarly South African problem?
    Are we merely observing a parochial phenomenon? Or are similar problems manifesting them- selves elsewhere in this ever more global age?

    It is our thesis that the “epidemic” of occult-related violence, and the kinds of cultural policing that accompany it, are the product of a structural contradiction at the heart of post- apartheid South Africa, a contradiction also evinced in other postcolonies – especially since 1989, when new liberal democratic constitutions began to give primacy to legal universalism while seeking, simultaneously, to protect cultural heterodoxy.3 These postcolonial polities are all rooted in the modernist ideal of nationhood, an ideal embodied in bills of rights that subordinate difference to a transcendent moral and legal unity. Yet all of them are, in prospect or in fact, challenged by the very pluralism that they embrace: by the entitlement of their subjects to their own vernacular ways and means. When those ways and means transgress the bounds of the commonweal, when they defy the rationalist assumptions on which governance is founded, when they violate the authority of the state, government cannot but intervene. But local “tradi- tions,” especially those involving the occult, are notoriously resistant to regulation; if anything, efforts to police them intensify the assertions of difference out of which they arise in the first place. While the antinomy between universalism and relativism has always been inherent in the nation-state, it has been sharpened of late, on one hand, by an erosion of modernist state power and, on the other, by the rising stakes invested in the cultural politics of identity. This, in part, is why ruling regimes across the world perceive their moral and executive legitimacy to be under increasing threat from “dangerous” customary practices. And from relativist assertions of truth and right. But we are running ahead of ourselves. What we seek to do here is to proceed, dialectically, from the empirical phenomenon with which we are concerned – and the problem of cause-and-effect posed by it – toward the theoretical terms by means of which we may give explanatory account of it.

    FRAMING THE PROBLEM: (i) background

    On the Archaeology of the African Occult: the crime of witchcraft

    Historians and anthropologists have documented the existence of a highly elaborate ar- ray of ideas about witchcraft, sorcery, ritual murder, and divination in southern Africa. These vary across the region. And they have changed markedly over time (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). Their common features, however, are well-known: most notably, that the African occult is not a form of primitive magicality or “animism”; that, everywhere, it embodies a set of normative convictions about moral order, social value, and material equity; that it provides a matter-of-fact repertoire of “first cause” explanations in the face of human misfortune or natural catastrophe; that, in respect of the latter, its bears epistemic analogy to Western notions of ill-fortune, divine intervention, or even statistical probability; that, as a set of techniques, it tends to be regarded, indigenously, as a species of practical activity whose principles of operation, while not transpa- rent to all, are regularly deployed by those with the necessary power/knowledge.

    Occult means have been used, since time immemorial, for socially accepted ends – as when a family employs “medicines” to prosper in its enterprises, to protect its property, or to enhance its fertility. They still are relied upon by many people. Similar means might also be de- ployed by political communities for the collective good. Among Tswana, for example, rain rites were performed periodically during colonial times (Schapera 1971); such rites persist in some places, often in conjunction with Christian prayer (J. Comaroff 1985). These exercises in the oc- cult were conducted under the direction of experts, some of whom acquired great fame. In fact, during the late colonial epoch “traditional healers” were formed into a national association re- cognized by the state; in the “new” South Africa, they are accorded respect by government – to the extent that their ministrations are, under some conditions, covered by medical aid.

    Conversely, for as long as there is a documentary record, magical means have been said to be used for antisocial, selfish ends, typically to appropriate the life-force, social wealth, and effects of others. Witches epitomize this mode of destruction. Their activities were widely treated as crimes (Schapera 1970) and were severely punished. On the other hand, the intrinsi- cally ambiguous character of the occult – as a force for either good or ill – is symbolized by ri- tual specialists, who have always been ambivalent figures. While they were usually employed to counter the activities of malevolents, their expertise in the arcane opened them to suspicion: it was widely believed that, at a price, they might be induced to abet evil schemes.

    Much has been made of the figure of the witch in Africanist anthropology. The “standar- dized nightmare of the group,” Monica Wilson’s (1951) celebrated aphorism, suggests that the symbolic substance of this figure is determined by a cultural process of inversion: by turning the ethics of communal life on their head. Wilson went on to claim that moral orders are themselves a function of social structure – and that, by extension, so too are patterns of witchcraft accusa- tion. Different social structures yield different modes of transgression, and hence different expectations about the means and ends of magical evil. All of which is to say, after Munn (1986), that witches produce “negative value”: they unravel human relations and moral commu- nities. It was this that persuaded Marwick (1965) to describe allegations of malevolence as a “strain gauge”; to argue, that is, that such allegations occur at critical points of stress in any so- ciety. From this perspective, in sum, witchcraft has both an ethical and a social rationality.

    These anthropologies of the African occult, all of them dating back to the colonial era, were written with a specific set of interlocutors in mind: state functionaries, missionaries, set- tlers, and other agents of empire who regarded “native” ideas of witchcraft as primitive, often dangerous, superstitions.4 For its part, the colonial state outlawed accusations of mystical evil (Schapera 1938), treated ritual murder as a common crime (Jones 1951), and liked to think that, under its civilizing influence, vernacular ideas of the occult were disappearing. Beyond the purview of colonizers, however, witchcraft retained a lively salience for most Africans; for many, it still does. Only members of the Christian elite spawned by the mission churches eschewed their existence – at least in public, and even then not all of them. As we noted a moment ago, – the substance of these beliefs varied across space and time. For now, following what we have already said, a few summary points, focused on South Africa, will suffice:

    (i) Witch beliefs and practices saturated everyday life. The presence of mystical evil, and the need to protect against it, was taken for granted; most rural people, and many in town, consulted doctors regularly to divine the cause of affliction, to guard against at- tack, to give a competitive edge over rivals, and to ensure their well-being. The scope of activities subject to magical attention has increased over the generations: it now covers such things as passing school and university examinations, success in job applications, and the effort to win elections.

    (ii) For those who believe in it, witchcraft is the presumed first cause of misfortune. Un- less another explanation is found for an affliction, the activities of a witch are blamed.

    (iii) Symptoms of witchcraft have always been said to be fairly nonspecific; they include physical illness, delusion, the death of a child or livestock, loss of work, the disappea- rance of possessions, crop failure, and sudden, inexplicable misfortune. However, its prime effects are often those associated with aborted reproduction and production.

    (iv) Human organs – especially of children, cut out while the victim is alive, or those ta- ken from fresh corpses – were, and still are, held to make potent medicines. At the same time, ritual murder was rare in the colonial period (see e.g. Jones 1951).

    (v) According to local oral history, occult techniques have always been both desired and dreaded: people want access to them – and yet fear anyone who has it. Tautologically, a person of great wealth, especially wealth gained by invisible means, is liable to be sus- pected of having dabbled in the arcane; s/he will almost certainly inspire moral opprobrium and, simultaneously, the uneasy respect accorded to the powerful.

    (vi) Indigenous ideas of witchcraft and healing have come to live easily with Christianity, even though they were demonized by colonial missions. This is owed, in part, to the relativizing tendencies of the vernacular cultures of South Africa; unlike post-enlighten- ment European epistemology, they posited no contradiction in the coexistence of more than one order of knowledge in the world. As a result, the African occult is an evanes- cent hybrid of iconography and ideology, of signs and practices.

    (vii) Occult movements, particularly outbreaks of witch-finding, occurred intermittently in Africa during the colonial period, perhaps the best known being that described by Ri- chards (1935) in Northern Rhodesia. But such outbreaks were rare in South Africa.

    It is against this cultural archaeology that the recent rise of occult-related violence, and the moral panic to which it is a response, must be read. Before addressing the contemporary mo- ment, however, let us turn briefly to the emergence of the “new” South Africa.

    The Making of the New South Africa: legality, identity politics, and the question of youth

    The fall of apartheid, and the rise of the new South Africa, is one of the great liberation narratives of the 20th century. The official story – often told in black and white, washed clean of its complexities – speaks of an unremitting struggle, of untainted heroes and unvarnished hopes, of the turning back of history on itself, of a post-racist future of infinite possibility. As Ro- bins (1998, 9) notes, this “heroic nationalist narrative” was sundered by often angry, often poig- nant, occasionally revisionist evidence given to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose task it was to lay some very restless ghosts; also by such things as the controversial film Apartheid did not Die, made by John Pilger in 1998, and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull (1998), an agonistic reflection on the past and the difficulties of recuperating its “truths.”

    If the past is proving more elusive than it first seemed, so is the present: the political, economic, and cultural sociology of the postcolony, still in its infancy, is also a matter of ani- mated public debate. A few features of that contested sociology are especially relevant here.

    Perhaps the most notable feature of the emergence of the “new” South Africa is the way in which it reversed the teleology of the anti-apartheid struggle. That struggle was grounded in a vision of African socialism; or, rather, visions of anti-capitalism, since the spectrum of ideologies that congealed in the liberation movements was strikingly broad. Indeed, the founding document in the fight against white domination, the Freedom Charter of 1956, undertook to nationalize major industries and to mandate a state-directed, welfare-freighted economy (see e.g. Walshe 1971; Lodge 1983). And yet, from the moment it took office, the ANC, constrained by its perception of global economic realities, has committed itself unequivocally to neoliberal capitalism (Sharp 1998, 245). It has courted global corporations, sought foreign investment, en- forced wage restraint, and reigned in the labor unions. Many blacks who believed that the new regime would deliver jobs, housing, wealth, and well-being, now accuse it of not meeting its promises, of favoring the powerful over the poor, of being rife with corruption, of allowing crime to run rampant, of failing to ensure a future for its youth. Middle class whites and the national media make similar complaints: that the wealth gap is widening dangerously, that unem- ployment is even higher than the unofficial 38% to which the state admitted in the late 1990s, that unstable labor conditions are discouraging investment, that urban violence is scaring off tourists, and so on. So much so that, in 1998, the press spoke of imminent economic “melt- down” – although, since then, public opinion on the matter has become more nuanced.

    Whether or not this alarmist scenario turns out to be justified, the anxieties are real en- ough. What is more, they are deeply implicated in the occult-related violence across the north- erly provinces. At the same time, there is more to the sociology of the “new” South Africa than a precarious economy. Three features of that sociology are noteworthy for present purposes.

    (i) the culture of constitutionalism, legality, and rights:

    Among the most protracted, contentious processes in the construction of the postcolony was the writing of its constitution. The document itself is remarkable for its sheer scope. Emphatically modernist, Eurocentric, and liberal – individual rights take precedence over all other claims – it does nonetheless protect “traditional beliefs.” The faith in the capacity of this constitution to resolve social problems by appeal to legalities verges on fetishism: the Constitutional Court is presented with an extraordinarily broad range of issues on which to adjudicate. Likewise, other courts have to deal almost daily with unprecedented forms of conflict arising out of cultural difference.

    The tolerance of the new constitution for “traditional beliefs” – which, after all, are held by the majority of South Africans – raises several pressing issues. The most ob- vious is whether, and in what form, indigenous ideas of the occult are to be recognized by the state and with what implications (i) for the treatment of accused witches and (ii) for those who take action against them. Recall that witchcraft allegations were outlawed by colonial governments. The prospect of admitting them into law – efforts are currently being made to draft a new Witchcraft Act – has consequences that are only beginning to be understood; apart from all else, those who presume the reality of the African occult, and who see witches as anti-constitutional, antisocial figures par excellence, are skeptical that any law might keep them in check. More immediately, however, the consti- tutional protection of custom raises a number of general problems. Are cultural rights held by persons or ethnic groups? And what happens when such rights violate those of individuals? Add into the mix a great deal of popular criticism against the constitution for not protecting communities – note, not necessarily cultural communities – against crime, corruption, and avarice, and it is clear that there is room for serious conflict over the proportional significance and articulation of different kinds of rights. This conflict has profound material and ideological implications for the future of South Africa.

    (ii) the rainbow nation and the rise of identity politics:
    The dominant ideological trope in the fight against the old regime – indeed, its final objective for many – was “nonracialism.” Intellectuals have long argued about the meaning of the concept; nor was it accepted by all anti-apartheid organizations (see Gerhard 1978). Still, it featured prominently in the Eurocentric ideal of the nation-state to which the ANC aspired: South Africa was to be a “rainbow” nation, one that made no distinctions of color or creed as it fashioned a strong sense of unity to embrace the cul- tural traditions of its polyethnic population.

    Notwithstanding the official narrative of nation-building, postcoloniality, as we have already intimated, has been accompanied by a vigorous politics of difference, of identities seeking to assert collective interests, even to reinvent themselves. Often moreover, such claims are made by appeal to primordial affiliations, not least by “peop- les” whose ethnogenesis dates to the colonial epoch. In the upshot, the accommodation of their life-ways within the post-apartheid polity has become controversial; to wit, it is just this that frames the debate now joined over “traditional” practices deemed danger- ous by the state and by others who do not share in them.

    The waxing politics of identity in South Africa may be read as an effect of local processes: either as a legacy of the colonial past or as a reaction to postcolonial circum- stances, in which the mobilization of collective interest, mandated in the name of culture, seems the only available protection against the overwhelming force of the market and a new ruling class. On the other hand, it may be interpreted as an outworking of the rise of a neoliberal capitalist order which appears everywhere to have intensified identity poli- tics. These, as it turns out, these are not alternatives. They are conditions of each other’s possibility. We shall return to them.

    (iii) the youth question:
    Public discourse in contemporary South Africa, as in many other places, is deeply concerned with the “problem” of youth” (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[a]). This “prob- lem,” fundamentally, boils down to the “challenge” of making young blacks – many of whom were brutalized by the old regime, more of whom have been left un(der)employed by the new one – into “responsible” citizens. The nightmare citizens of the postcolony are liberation fighters who have turned their skills to illicit ends; without the prospect of a secure livelihood, or the means of becoming fully adult, they are commonly assumed to be the material from which violent, vengeful outlaws are made.

    NGOs, churches, and overseas donors have introduced innumerable small self- help projects, built community centers and sports clubs, and established training prog- rams in order to address the problem. The youths we interviewed saw little value in such projects. For them, there is only one solution: regular jobs and incomes. Even in the remote countryside, they were quick to point out that the “new” South Africa has made some people very rich. In a rapaciously consumerist culture, where the politics of desire is measured in the possession of commodities, those without are constantly confronted with their privation. As we shall see, this sense of privation manifests itself explicitly in occult-related violence.

    Clearly, these aspects of the “new” South Africa constitute only a small part of its postcolonial sociology. As we have said, however, they chart the context in which an occult economy, driven largely by youth, has arisen. We now move from background to foreground.

    FRAMING THE PROBLEM: (ii) foreground

    The Rise of the Postcolonial Occult Economy: from global capitalism to local illegality5
    The Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province was set up in 1995 to deal with a growing sense of crisis in the countryside. A melan- ge of eyewitness evidence, case records, observations, and recommendations, its Report6 calls for tight control of occult-related violence, including a possible return of the death penalty. But, it notes, most Africans regard magical attacks as normal, everyday events – a reality incompati- ble with European law, which criminalizes witchfinding. It adds also that the majority of black po- lice believe in witchcraft and are reluctant to intervene when suspects are attacked (see below). The Report concludes that there is no clear answer to the legal problem; nor does it dispute the facticity of witchcraft itself. It does, though, advocate means of stemming the brutality with which accused malevolents are hunted down. The urgent tone of the Commission is underscor- ed by a rising demography of violence: from 1985 to 1995, 300 witch-related killings were recor- ded in the North (p.31); in the first half of 1996 there were 676. “[A]s the Province… burn[ed],” as “witchcraft violence and ritual murder” were becoming endemic, “something had to be done, and very fast” (p.i)

    There are several ironies here. For one thing, this was a triumphal moment of exodus from colonial bondage. And yet many were convinced that their communities harbored trench- ant human evil, that familiar landscapes were alive with phantasmic forces, that the state had failed to shield them from those forces. For another thing, it was youth, not men in authority, who felt most moved to execute “instant justice” and to cleanse the countryside of malevolence. Singing freedom songs (p.62), they marked Nelson Mandela’s release from prison with a fu- rious spate of witch burnings. All this was fed by a growing fear that some, usually old, people were turning others into zombies: into a virtual army of ghost workers, whose lifeblood fueled an energetic immoral economy beneath the slow rhythms of rural life.

    We have already said that none of this is entirely new. In Africa, the colonial encounter gave plenty room for the play of the occult. As this suggests, and it is a point on which we shall expand, witchcraft is a profoundly historical phenomenon. Shifts in the cultural conception of the witch often register the impact of large-scale transformations on local worlds (see e.g. Aus- lander 1993), writing global processes into vernacular vocabularies of cause-and-effect; s/he has a genius for distilling complex social forces into the language of intimate, interpersonal rela- tions. It is this that underlies the intensification of witchfinding in postcolonial South Africa, where it has coincided with a fluorescence of other magical technologies that link the occult, by thoroughly modern means, to the workings of the free market.

    Thus ritual murder is said to have become “big business” in the northern provinces. In 1995, for example, rumors spread widely that dismembered corpses had been found in a casi- no freezer in Mmabatho, capital of the Northwest. The casino was built in the apartheid years, when betting and interracial sex, banned in South Africa, were allowed in the ethnic “home- lands.” Here, in the grey interstices of the transnational, whites came to purchase carnal servi- ces and to gamble. In the postcolony, black bodies were again for sale, but in different form; the macabre trade now nested within the orbit of everyday commerce, circulating organs to whom- ever could buy them for dipheko (medicine). Much the same thing was apparent, too, in the allegations that some local entrepreneurs were turning people into working zombies in order to profit from their labor. But more fabulous still were stories about Satanism, held in the North-west to be the most global of occult enterprises. Dabbling in the diabolical was especially attractive to the young. In 1996, when Mmabatho TV broadcast two programs on the subject, the ex-Satanists featured were all juveniles. As they took calls from the public they told of the translocal power of the black arts – among them, an ability to travel great distances at miracu- lous speed to garner wealth at will.

    What we have here, then, is an expanded array of enchanted means of producing value. Enchanted yet also ordinary. Witchcraft, money magic, and unnatural death are discussed, al- most every day, in churches and comic strips, on radio and television; newspapers and magazi- nes regularly advertise “dial-in-diviners.” This turn to the mass-media has also spawned innovative ritual technologies. One, an update of water bowl oracles, requires clients to drink an alcoholic potion and watch a white “screen” on which the figures of miscreants take shape; their transmission mimics the manner in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and the long-dis- tance magic of witches condense images and sounds from afar. While an adept might help to unscramble the ethereal pictures, these are received directly by his “customers,” who sit in the archetypal posture of family viewing-and-listening.

    Who are the actors in these theaters of the banal? Who are the witches? And who kills them? Our evidence shows that young men are the most identifiable perpetrators of occult-rela- ted violence. The purported malevolents, on the other hand, are the usual suspects of African witchcraft – people of conspicuous, unshared wealth and undue influence – although it is old, defenseless females who tend to be attacked; however much they may be rumored to engage in the arcane arts, the rich and powerful are more difficult, more dangerous, to accuse or to assail. In a notorious case recorded by the Witchcraft Commission, “youths” of Madura village, most of them unemployed, killed an elderly woman in the early 1990’s (p.193f). Witnesses recall that, after gathering at the local school – where a noisy agreement was made to extermi- nate all witches in their midst – they went off in search of suspects; echoes, here, of Ashforth’s (2000) thesis that, without apartheid to blame for their misfortunes, South Africans are turning inward to find scapegoats. When they reached the yard of their victim, they doused her with petrol and set her alight. Dying, she cried: “Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?” Her as- sailants responded: “Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!” (p.206, 212).

    There could hardly be a balder statement of antipathy between young and old. Given that, for most rural youth, the end of apartheid has brought none of the employment or empow- erment that it had promised, given also that the global economy of desire is experienced in the backveld largely as traces on television screens, it seems non-coincidental that the most spirit- ed witchfinding should occur where conditions are most straitened. And where inequality has become most blatant. The North is the poorest province in the country, with the remote regions of the Northwest not far behind;7 Reconstruction and development has had little impact here. Furthermore, the migrant wages that had once subsidized faltering agrarian endeavors, and had granted young men some autonomy, are now diminishing. Agriculture is still practiced, but most of it by older women on a pitiable scale. Household budgets have often to be buttressed by petty business – brewing, sex work, carpentry, leather craft – much of it erratic. As a result, cash resources vested in the elderly, notably pensions, have risen in value; they are the object of fierce jealousy, criminal assault, and mystical activity. At the same time, the creation of the ethnic homelands under apartheid funded the emergence of small elites, elites marked by ass- ertive patterns of consumption, elites that have been able to take advantage of the few oppor- tunities for enrichment that have lately presented themselves. And so, in places like Madura, new material distinctions have become discernible among neighbors. Such differences are made incarnate in prized commodities: in houses, cars, televisions, cell-phones.

    In sum, concerns about wealth in the countryside – about its production, distribution, and scarcity – have been translated into bitter generational, gendered opposition. Young com- rades, their manhood compromised, forge identities against the foil of an emasculating geronto- cracy; significantly, those attacked are called “old ladies,” even when they are men (cf. Ritchken 1995, 344). Their antisocial greed, real or imagined, is epitomized in the idea of unnatural pro- duction and reproduction; also in images of debauched, ungenerative sexuality. The Commis- sion speaks repeatedly of the inability of witches to bear children, of their red vaginas and their “rotten” sperm (cf., again, Ritchken 1995, 325; also 363). Killing such “perverts” by fire evinces the desire, literally, to engender a more propitious, “natural” mode of reproduction.

    Threats to local well being, as we said before, were also associated with the creation of a zombie workforce. Zombies, long a feature of Caribbean vodoun, are often said to be new in Africa (Geschiere 1997), although they have local precursors (Junod 1927, 299, 488f; Harries 1994, 221; cf., on Tswana, Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 143). Whatever their source, these nightmare figures have been spliced into vernacular mystical and moral economies. Allegedly killed and revived by witchcraft, they are believed to toil for their creators, usually unrelated neighbors. Bereft of tongues to give voice to their affliction, these living dead are believed to work after dark, mainly in agriculture, but can also be magically transported to urban centers to accrue riches for their owners. In this era of increasingly impermanent jobs, there are even “part-time zombies”: people who are made to serve unwittingly in the deep of the night to feed the greed of a malign master.

    Although they have no tongues, zombies speak of a specific time and place. By 1994, when South Africa finally threw off its colonial shackles, much of the continent had learned the harsh truth about the postcolonial predicament, having experienced unprecedented economic hardship. Such conditions disrupt narratives of progress. But they do not necessarily dispel their animating desires. In these circumstances, there tends to be an expansion in modes of producing and redistributing value – modes, like crime and magic, that often break the bounds of legality. Which is why violence, both ordinary and occult, is such a common feature of post- colonies. The living dead are the monstrous citizens of this parallel world. Reduced to raw labor power, their toil is pure surplus value: it has, in Marx’s (1976, 325) phrase, “all the charms of something created out of nothing.” As spectral capital, the zombie is an apt icon of the occult economies of contemporary Africa. The rise of a phantom proletariat, after all, offers a ready explanation for the scarcity of work,for the impotence of youth and the relative wealth of their elders, for the destruction of the labor market, conventional patterns of reproduction, and “the community.” It is also a potent metaphor for the emptiness of democracy sans a substantive right to material well-being.

    But zombies are not the only object of moral panic. So-called “muti (medicine) killings” have also been the subject of graphic media accounts; since the early 1990’s, moreover, the press has reported intermittently on the going rate for various organs, making it clear that ritual murder has become highly responsive to market forces.8 We reiterate, again, that this traffic is neither new nor confined to South Africa; that there is a global economy in body parts, which flow from poor to rich countries, from south to north, young to old; that some governments are said to raise revenue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to Asia, mysterious malevolents are alleged to extract blood, fat, members, and living off- spring from the unsuspecting (Frow 1997, White 1997, Scheper-Hughes 1996). Often at issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise is a fear of the commodification of life itself: of a relentless process that renders human being(s) susceptible as never before to the reach of the market.

    Note the stress in all this on movement. Throughout the north, people ponder its signifi- cance in the production of new wealth, which appears hinge on the capacity to siphon goods, persons, and images across space. Mobility adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? Among Tswana, it is this question, as much as anything else, that has given rise to – a growing fascination with Satanism, which seems to be enjoying renewed interest in many other places of late, from the east coast of Africa through Britain to the west coast of America (Wright 1994, LaFontaine 1997, Meyer 1999). Discourses of the diabolical center in this part of southern Africa center upon the most recent in a long line of overseas missions, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus) of Brazil, a denomination that promises instant goods and gratification to its members; it is also rumored to issue charm- ed credit cards which register no debt. Here Neo-Pentecostalism meets neoliberalism: one of the early chapels of the Universal Church at the capital of the North West Province was a store- front in a shopping precinct. It held services during business hours, appealing frankly to merce- nary motives, mostly among the young. The ability to deliver fast returns on spiritual in- vestments, itself a potent form of space-time compression (cf. Harvey 1990), is given as the measure of a truly global God. Pictures of BMWs and lottery winners adorn the altar under the legend: “Delight in the Lord and he will give you the desires of your heart” (Psalms 37:4).

    For middle-class Tswana schooled in a more ascetic Protestantism, the crowds that packed the storefront were lured there by the devil – notwithstanding his denunciation by the Church. Nor is this hard to understand. With the radical reorientation of local contours of wealth, desire, and despair, and with the failure of democracy to deliver material returns, the diabolical has taken on provocative, inscrutable powers. Like the mission of the Universal Church, Satan- ism is a globalizing discourse: “The devil,” says the Church website, has “been deceiving peo- ple all over the world.” Recall, in this regard, the TV programs in which “reformed” devil wor- shipers spoke to callers. Asked to compare the diabolical with witchcraft, one youth said,

    “Satanism is high octane witchcraft. It is more international.”9 By such means are old ideas ex- tended to meet altered conditions.10 These devil worshipers claimed to have traveled far and wide, fueling the accumulation of riches with human blood. The petrochemical image suggests that the basis of their potency was an ability to move instantly between the parochial and the translocal – here and there, then and now – thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of this new, postcolonial epoch.

    This returns us to our opening conundrum, albeit now in a slightly different key. Insofar as occult activity is on the rise, at least in the popular imagination, it has evoked a populist im- pulse to punish mystical evildoers; to police them, that is, by available cultural means. Those means, from a modernist legal perspective, are less judicial or just than they are criminal: they involve “informal” modes of divination, “kangaroo” courts, and unregulated, retributive violence. But they are rooted in “traditional” beliefs protected by the constitution, a fact of which the new regime is acutely aware; hence the Witchcraft Summit. How, then, might we expect the state to police the occult? How does it deal with the kinds of cultural policing to which the allege epide- mic of magical evil has given rise?

    Policing the occult

    The law is no good. The courts don’t believe in witchcraft…They should bring a proven witch into the court room. That would convince them. – Inspector Jackson Gopane
    South African Police Service, 1997 11

    We have noted that the African occult has long presented a challenge to the modernist rule of law. Colonial administrators, as Fields (1985) shows for Central Africa, were caught in a quandary over the policing of witchcraft. To ignore it was to leave its (often violent) prosecution in the hands of local authorities, a situation incompatible with “civilized” governance. But to out- law magical practices and the means of disciplining them seemed to recognize their reality – and to acknowledge their significance. It also risked introducing legislation that European admi- nistrators could not enforce. What is more, from the “native” viewpoint, curbs on the power of indigenous rulers to bring witches to book rendered their subjects defenseless against mystical attack, a perception that, in times of crisis, contributed to mass witchfinding movements. Not surprisingly then, colonial regimes were inconsistent in dealing with the matter, which sometimes gave impression that they were themselves in thrall to the occult.

    In apartheid South Africa, the Witchcraft Suppression Act (1957), an extension of coloni- al law, made it illegal to practice witchcraft, to accuse anyone of doing so, or to use “occult sci- ence” in its detection. While diviners were prosecuted for “sniffing out” suspects, the authorities were more concerned to ensure that offenses under the Act were not tried in customary courts. For many blacks, this limitation of chiefly jurisdiction was a prime instance of the European suppression of African culture; it is often said, in retrospect, to have been responsible for driving magical evil underground. In fact, the reality was more complex: “ritual” offenses were brought to local rulers, albeit in other guises.12 But one thing is clear. The end of apartheid permitted a more overt acknowledgment of witchcraft by ordinary people – and, with it, both an alarming spate of witch burnings and an anguished public debate. Hence the question put by social com- mentator John Matshikiza during a nationally-aired debate on the topic: “How can the nilling be stopped? Must we deny our traditional beliefs, or is there another way?”13 In reducing the conundrum to its bare bones, Matshikiza transposed it into a practical key.

    The postcolonial state is seeking “another way.” But, like colonial authorities of old, the ANC has had difficulty in dealing with the challenge posed by communal witch burning to the rule of law. It is hard for any liberal democratic government to put a stop to retributive violence perpetrated under the sign of “traditional” precepts of truth and justice, especially when those precepts enjoy mass support. In South Africa, the matter is made all the more delicate, and the problems of principle, policing, and prosecution all the more acute, by the fact that the consti- tution explicitly embraces cultural relativism and moral pluralism. Under pressure to address the “crisis,” the Minister of Safety and Security pledged, at the Witchcraft Summit of 1998, to discuss it with the cabinet – and to consider making witch killing a “priority crime.”14

    This undertaking did little to assuage the moral panic in the countryside. For one thing, it was taken as an admission by the ANC that the state had failed to protect its citizenry from a clear and present danger. For another, it promised to act against the victims of magical evil, not against its perpetrators, criminalizing those who would defend themselves by recourse to traditional ways and means. Even more fundamentally, it ignored the paradox at the core of theCommission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders, namely, the incommen- surability between a Eurocentric national law founded on liberal principles and vernacular Afri- can beliefs in the occult; beliefs that defy investigation or interrogation under the usual terms of Western legal reason. State functionaries who speak to the issue generally try to resolve this in- commensurability by drawing a clear distinction between culture and violence. Said Seth Nthai, a former Minister of Police, Northern Province, “The people have a right to believe in witchcraft. It does not make them part of `African Darkness’. But [that] cannot be allowed to lead to the killing of others and the destruction of their property.”15 On the face of it, this seems perfectly rea- sonable. To be sure, it is the assumption on which is based the existence, and everyday operations, of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services (SAPS). In offering their workshops on the forensics of witchcraft, ritual killings, Satanism, and other “dan- gerous” practices – and in going about their routine work – its personnel insist that their busi- ness is not culture but the conviction of common murderers.

    In point of fact, the separation of culture from crime is not quite so straightforward; recall the question raised in this regard about the constitutionality of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit (above, p.2). It is more openly raised by a small vanguard of diviner-detectives in the SAPS, and those of their colleagues – we came across a substantial number – who see in their work an alternative policing capable of dealing with magical evil; also an alternative to “mob” witch burnings. Among them are Sergeant S. P. Moshupa and the celebrated Inspector Jackson Gopane, who seek to address “both sides” of the paradox of culture-as-crime by “crossing into the spiritual world.”16 Described in the national media as “one of the few success stories in a po- lice force that has almost collapsed under the strain of democracy,” Gopane uses methods that require a high level of local knowledge. At relevant moments, he exchanges his police uniform for the paraphernalia of a traditional healer: in him, the forensic and the oracular, scientific in- vestigation and social diagnostics, become one. Photographed beneath a smiling portrait of Nelson Mandela, he makes a strong case for the efficacy of combating occult killings by occult means. In the same vein, the chair of the national Traditional Healers’ Association, Dr. Hitler Letsoalo, has pledged the services of his members to help the state “put out the fires”17; this offer being consistent with the objectives of the Indigenous Knowledge Systems Program, a par- liamentary initiative to “protect and promote indigenous knowledge within a legal framework, and harness indigenous technology in rural development and international trade.”18 While such efforts remain unorthodox and limited, they do seem to be spreading; the SAPS Liaison Officer in the Northwest Province, Patrick Asaneng told us that dealing with the occult has become part of the mundane work of policing in the countryside.

    It is yet to be seen if and how further bridges will be built between conventional law en- forcement and vernacular forensics. In the meantime, the state and its criminal justice system insist on sustaining the distinction between witch beliefs (a constitutionally-protected right to cul- ture) and retributive violence against witches (a common felony). This is in spite of the fact that, both for those who perpetrate it and for those in whose name it is perpetrated, the latter is an enactment of the former: witch killing is the practical expression of a customary belief recogniz- ed under the Bill of Rights. Hence our term “cultural policing” to describe it. With most SAPS cadres unwilling or unable to intervene effectively in cases of the occult, or to provide a convincing alternative for this kind of cultural policing, it is no wonder that “mass action” against alleged malevolents continues to enjoy a large measure of populist legitimacy.

    Neither is it any wonder that the judiciary has also found it hard to hold the line between culture and crime (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004). Perhaps the difficulty is best illustrated by an ideal-typical case, versions of which have come before the courts in the northerly provinces with gathering frequency in recent years. Reduced to its bare bones, with names of people and places appropriately altered, the story goes as follows:

    A late middle-aged woman, Temane Makgetla, widowed and living alone, is alleged to have put several children to death in order to harvest their body parts; these, according to local rumor, have been used to make magical potions for sale to rich clients. Convinced by the “evidence” against her – evidence at once forensic (dipeko, medicines, seen in her home), social (unusual appetites, selfish behavior), and material (assets not easily accounted for) – her neighbors decide that she must be killed in order to prevent further predations on “the community,” the sprawling village of Metsing, 50k from the capital of one of the northerly provinces; this after informal public discussion has congealed diffuse gossip into a specific accusation. Approached by the local chief, Kgosi Monei, to arrest the suspect, the nearest SAPS station commander, Captain Segogelo, responds that he cannot do so without physical proof of wrongdoing; efforts to find witnesses or missing children yield nothing. Initiative to act is taken by a large, but indeterminate, number of young men, most of them aged between 16 and 25, most of whom live in Me- tsing or a nearby village. It is unclear whether they have been encouraged by the older generation. Led by one Moeketsi Monareng, some of their names come to the attention of the police after they tell kin and friends about the circumstances of Temane’s demise. Seven are arrested by Captain Segogelo. Arraigned before the court, they plead self- defense: their act of cultural policing – “protecting our village as our forefathers did,” was the phrase used by one of them – had been made unavoidable by the inaction of “government.” In doing what they did, they had not shed blood for its own sake, nor to enrich themselves. Their sole motive was to prevent more deaths, thereby to “save” their community from a active serial killer. Many of the members of that community, Kgosi Monei quietly among them, fete Moeketsi and his peers for having served the public interest. Some say quite openly that the “boys” should be forgiven and allowed to go home. They are not, however. Sentenced to 25 years each, they plan to appeal, confident that a higher court – one that “understands the Constitution,” said Moeketsi to us – would concur in their plea. “This is the way our people do these things.”

    Pleas of self-defense in cases of this kind – in which the “punishment” meted out to an alleged witch is invariably said to have met culturally accepted canons of proof and due process – are not unlike pleas of self-defense in US murder trials: they justify the use of lethal force by invok- ing the right of persons to protect themselves against a clear and present danger to their lives. Indeed, we have heard the comparison explicitly drawn.

    South African courts are faced with more and more legal arguments made in the name of African “tradition”; hardly surprising, this, in an African postcolony. In the upshot, some judg- es, black and white alike, have come to recognize vernacular conceptions of evil as a sufficient basis for mitigation. Oddly, this often is clothed in the language of diminished responsibility. For example, in sentencing five Tswana youths for burning to death a 52-year-old man – they said that he had slain their fathers and made them into zombie workers – the High Court of the Northwest treated “a belief in witchcraft” and “excessive drinking” as extenuating factors,19 thus equating an indigenous culture with a state of inebriation. Pejorative? Certainly. Ironic? Not in- tentionally. But it does resonate with an old belief, as jailed witch-killer Anderson Tshibalo once explained to a national tv audience, that those overcome by witches lose consciousness of their deeds – and, with it, responsibility for them.20 It also has led to a situation in which, increasingly, courts convict those found guilty of occult-related violence and then, tacitly acknowledging the force of culture, hand down very light or suspended sentences. All of which drives a wedge bet- ween judgment and justice.

    For all such strategic resolutions to the problem, these cases evoke large questions in South Africa, questions that have become the stuff of argument in public spheres across the postcolony. Can there ever be a clear-cut formula for balancing legal rationalities against moral relativities, the universal rights of citizens against the demands of culture? Can they ever be brought into the same orbit, synthesized, mediated, proportioned? Or is the contradiction bet- ween them irreducible, an inevitable corollary of postcolonial constitutions that embrace, simul- taneously, cultural difference and the legal indivisibility of the nation-state?

    THEORETICAL MEANS, ANALYTICAL ENDS

    Our concern here is not to answer these Big Questions. It is to understand why they pose themselves so persistently, so publicly, in the “new” South Africa. Only then does it be- come possible to make sense of the ways in which occult violence – and “dangerous” cultural practices tout court – are regarded in the postcolony; only then might we grasp fully the contra- dictions at the core of its legal culture. Our quest leads us toward the intersection of three ana- lytic frames.

    Modernity and its enchantments

    The first concerns the relationship of enchantment to modernity. Most efforts to make sense of the recent “epidemic” of witchcraft accusations seek an explanation in the continuing hold of “tradition”: the effort to police magical evil by cultural means is seen as a call to return to the values, and to the ways and means, of the African past. Perhaps the aphorism that best captures conventional wisdom is Gluckman’s (1959) famous “magic of despair.” It suggests that indigenous peoples tend to look to their customary ritual practices in the face of the anguish wrought upon them by historical forces beyond their control. Extending the same point to ecs- tatic religious movements, Lewis (1971) argues that they may be understood as vernacular res- ponses to a growing sense of “deprivation.” These functionalist explanations resonate with the view, still held by many anthropologists, that ritual is a conservative species of communal action, one which reinforces prevailing modes of authority and order (e.g. Bloch 1989). They are also a corollary of the classical theories of witchcraft, discussed earlier, that take the African occult to be a timeless mechanism for sustaining the moral and material status quo.

    In our view, the recent spate of witch killings in South Africa has to be approached quite differently. In Modernity and its Malcontents (1993) we showed that ritual is not an endemically ahistorical or conservative species of action, let alone an autonomic mechanism of social, cul- tural, or moral reproduction (cf. Tambiah 1985, 123f); that it is often a site of experiment and social invention, a site for the production of new understandings of the world, indeed for making history ane; that technicians of the sacred – diviners, prophets, witch finders – regularly deploy the heightened sensitivities of ceremonial occasions to distill order out of the ambiguous, incho- ate forces that configure any social environment. Especially a troubled, changing one.

    Seen from this vantage, incidents of cultural policing and occult-related violence – like the Madura witch hunt – are moments of social divination: ritualized moments, that is, in which participants seek, as they assign blame and punish moral infraction, to account for the transfor- mation of their world. And to test out ways of redirecting it. Recall here how divination itself has undergone a semiotic revolution, carving out new techniques for the electronic age. In short, these forms of ritual practice are an altogether contemporary phenomenon, part of an effort (i) to render explicable the bewildering realities of the “new” South Africa; (ii) to fashion a universe in which both the demands of moral community and the ambitions of individuals may be satis- fied, in which young people may find work and the wherewithal to marry and reproduce, in which those who endanger the commonweal are banished; (iii) to resolve the ultimate paradox of the postcolony, the fact that is a place of both infinite possibility and utter impossibility, one wherein fabulous wealth seems to be produced without visible effort by some people and yet eludes everyone else; in other words, (iv) to alter the very trajectory of the present – thereby to realize the promises of democracy.

    It is precisely because the African occult is finely tuned to the contradictions, mysteries, and irrationalities of the here-and-now that it holds such sway for so many South Africans. And it is precisely because it holds such sway that it poses so stark a challenge to the liberal moder- nist state, especially to its legal foundations. Which, in turn, is why there is so much vexed argument about the proper place of culture in the postcolony. But this anticipates a topic to which we shall return.

    The nation-state in an age of revolution

    The second frame concerns twenty-first century nation-states. And citizenship within them.21

    The European nation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Benedict Anderson (1983) famously noted, imagined itself as a culturally homogeneous community, a community- of-the-whole with a deep sense of “horizontal fraternity.” This imagining was always more aspi- ration than achievement: throughout its history, the modernist polity has been a work-in-prog- ress, one that has evinced great variation over time and space. Further, for all the idea that it was made up of right-bearing persons equal before the law, it was inhospitable to difference; to be sure, many were excluded from its commonweal. Still, the fiction of a unity of essence, aff- ect, and interest mandated the legitimacy of the state: government was the ultimate guarantor of the well-being of all citizens. Hence the hyphenated indivisibility of nation and state.

    Much has been said lately of the “crisis” of the modernist polity under the impact of global capitalism: of its shrinking sovereignty; of its loss of control over economic policy, cultural production, and the flow of people, currencies, and commodities; of a widening disjunction between nation and state (cf. Appadurai 1990). Whether or not “the” nation-state is flourishing, ail- ing, or metamorphosing – we prefer the third alternative – one thing is clear. The received notion of polities based on fraternal homogeneity, real or fictive, is rapidly giving way to imagined communities of difference, of multiculturalism, of ID-ology; the pursuit, that is, of interest in the name of shared identities. This is true even in places as long antagonistic to otherness as England, which, despite recent race wars on the streets of its northern towns, now projects itself, with apologies to Benetton, as United in its tolerance of Color and Culture. There has, of course, been considerable scholarly debate over the causes-and-effects of the heterogenization of so many nation-states; also of the rising incidence, since 1989, of cultural struggles and ethnopolitics (J.L. Comaroff 1996). We do not need to retrace that debate here. It is enough merely to take note of the phenomenon itself.

    For most postcolonies, the politics of identity are not new. Heterodoxy has been there from the first. Born of long histories of colonization, these polities typically entered the Neo World Order with legacies of ethnic diversity invented or exacerbated in the cause of imperial governance. Colonial regimes, intent on the management of racial capitalism, never built na- tions in the Euromodernist sense of the term, even where they introduced the ceremonial trapp- ings of nationhood. In their wake, they left behind them not just an absence of infrastructure, but a heritage of fractious difference. This has been heightened, since fin de siecle, by some of the cultural and material corollaries of neoliberalism: the movement across the planet of ever more people in search of work and opportunities to trade; the transnational mass-mediation of signs, styles, and information; the rise of an electronic commons; the growing hegemony of the market and, with it, the distillation of culture into intellectual property, a commodity to be – possessed, patented, exchanged-for-profit. In this world, freedom is reduced to choice: choice of commodities, of life-ways, and, most of all, of identities. In the upshot, the great irony of our times is that identity has become, simultaneously, a matter of voluntary self-production and a matter of ineluctable essence, of genetics and biology.

    In short, notwithstanding their different histories, and their histories of difference, both European and postcolonial nation-states are having to come to terms with heterogeneity as never before. And, with it, fundamental changes in the nature of citizenship.

    The explosion of identity politics after 1989 has not manifested itself in ethnic assertion alone. Difference is also vested, increasingly, in gender, sexuality, generation, race, religion, life-style, and social class. And in constellations of these things, sometimes deployed in highly contingent, strategic ways. While most human beings continue to live as citizens in nation-states, more and more are only conditionally citizens of nation-states: their composite personae may include elements that transgress political borders or mandate claims against the common- weal within them. In consequence, identity struggles of one kind or another appear immanent almost everywhere as selfhood is immersed into collective essence, innate substance, and primordial destiny. What is more, the assertion of autochthony – which elevates to a first principle the interests, “natural” rights, and moral connectedness that arise from a shared place of birth – has become an ever more significant mode of exclusion within polities; this in propor- tion to the extent to which “aliens” are held to erode the Wealth or Security of the Nation. It is, putatively, in the name of the latter that the state is becoming a metamanagement enterprise in the neoliberal world:22 in the name of subjects who, even as they seek to be global citizens in a planetary economy, demand also to be shareholders in the polity-as-corporation. Herein lies the complexity: the fractal nature of contemporary political personhood, the fact that it is overlaid and undercut by a politics of difference and identity, does not necessarily involve the negation of national belonging. Merely its uneasy, unresolved, ambiguous co-existence with other modes of being-in-the-world.

    Of the modes of being that constitute the twenty-first century political subject, cultural at- tachment is often taken, popularly, to run deepest. As we have said, ethnic consciousness, like all ascribed identities, represents itself as grounded ineluctably in blood, essence, emotion, and common purpose. Add to the equation the fact that culture is increasingly regarded as a “na- turally” copyrighted, legally-protected species of intellectual property and it will be clear that we are witness to the dawn of the Age of Ethnicity, Inc. (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[b]). Observe, in this respect, that more and more ethnic groups around the world are incorporating themselves; that many have opened businesses to market their heritage, their landscape, their knowledge, their religious rites, their artefacts; that some have sued for the unremunerated reproduction of their symbols, sacred and secular. Thus it is that identity, in the age of partible, conditional citizenship, is defined, ever more, by the capacity to possess, privatize, profit, and consume; that politics is reduced to the pursuit of individual or collective entitlement; that social being in general, and social wrongs in particular, are translated into the language of “rights.”

    Self-evidently, under these conditions, the term “multicultural(ism)” is insufficient to des- cribe the fractious heterogeneity of many contemporary nation-states – and, most of all, postco- lonies. Demeaned in popular usage, that term evokes images of Disney’s “Small World,” of world music, fusion food, and ritual calendars respectful of human diversity; in short, of benign indifference to difference. Neither as noun nor as adjective does it disclose the critical limits of liberal pluralism: the fact that, notwithstanding the utopian visions of progressive philosophers, the recognition afforded to culture even in highly permissive democracries falls far short of allo- wing claims to political or legal sovereignty. In those postcolonies in which ethnic assertion plays on the simultaneity of primordial connectedness, natural right, and corporate interest – and in which the majority of citizens evince strong ethnic affiliations – the nation-state is likely to be less multicultural than policultural. The prefix, “poli-,“ marks two things at once: plurality and its politicization. Far from denoting merely an appreciation on the part of the national majority for the customs, costumes, and cuisine of minorities, it bespeaks an argument, grounded in cul- tural ontology, about the very nature of the pluri-nation, about its constitution and citizenship within it; about the spirit of its laws and its hyphe-nation. In South Africa this takes the form of an ongoing confrontation between Euromodern ways and means and variously expressed, va- riously formulated notions of “traditional” governance, the latter represented by a vocal lobby under the organizational umbrella of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa. Because its members have the capacity to affect national elections, Contralesa has been fairly successful in husbanding the interests of African “custom” and in enclaving those domains of life in the countryside in which vernacular law still obtains. It has also fought a long fight to change the constitution in such a way as to allow even more to Africanity.

    It is the grafting of policulturalism onto the ontological core of the Euromodernist nation- state that gives cultural policing its shadowy claims to legitimacy – and that, by asserting the so- vereignty of difference, renders murky the distinction between culture and crime. Which brings us to our third analytic frame.

    The postcolonial state and the language of legality

    Postcolonial states vary widely in the extent to which they condense legitimate power in themselves, suppress the politics of difference, contrive popular consent, and ritualize the sub- jection of citizens to their authority. Some seem to be irrecoverably weak, others much strong- er; some highly intrusive, others scarcely visible; some energetically protective of corporate en- terprise, others less so; some brutally violent, others hardly in control of the means of coercion; some prone to ostentatious ceremony, others matter-of-fact in their regulatory routines; some institutionally integrated and fairly efficient in their technologies of rule, others in perpetual dis- array (cf. Cooper and Stoler 1997). These variations are owed to a range of historical factors too broad to list here. So, too, is the degree to which partisan blocs – business interests, ethnic groups, and the like – have insinuated themselves into, and appropriated, the mechanisms of government, including the use of force.

    But, whether weak or strong, these states share one thing. They speak of and for them- selves. Incessantly. Like its Euromodern precursor, “the” postcolonial African state is a state- ment, an ongoing claim: it gives voice to an authoritative world view, sometimes backed by dis- plays of might, sometimes by carnivalesque ritual (Mbembe 1992). Its language, however, is not arbitrary. It is the language of legality. Modern state-formation, note Corrigan and Sayer (1985, 1f), was a “cultural revolution.” At its heart lay the Spirit of the Law. Many scholars have tied industrial capitalism, modernity, the nation-state, governmentality, the right-bearing citizen, and the rise of lex naturae into a single historical knot. We seek to add a modest addendum: that it is this Spirit, this language, hegemonically re-tooled for the neoliberal epoch, that gives postcolonial nation-states their delicate sense of unity and coherence. We would go yet further. The more disarticulated and/or impotent any given postcolonial state, the more the language of law – especially the appeal to a common culture of democratic constitutionalism – affords them a means to make political facts appear out of fantasies, concrete realities out of fragile fictions; to represent themselves as guarantors of the commonweal; to legitimize their power, both coer- cive and capillary, and their right to mediate diverse identities and interests.

    This language also constitutes the currency of the public sphere. Not only does it lay down the terms of cooperation, commerce, competition, and contention among people of differ- ent cultural worlds, social endowments, and material circumstances. It also provides an osten- sibly neutral medium for them to enter into contractual relations, to transact commodities, and to deal with conflicts. In so doing, it creates an impression of consonance amidst contrast, of the negotiability of incommensurables, of the existence of universal standards which, like mo- ney in the domain of the market, facilitate exchanges across otherwise intransitive boundaries. And it establishes the state as the axis mundi of order within diversity. Indeed, by deploying the language of legality, postcolonial regimes, bereft of many of the political and economic resour- ces of modern governance, regularly try to delineate the moral frontiers of civil society; also to criminalize vernacular cultural practices deemed uncivilized, politics deemed primitive. Law, in short, is the hydra-headed instrument by which postcolonial states seek nowadays to extend control over the space and time, the cultures and identities, of their subjects.23

    The enormous significance of the language of law in postcolonies arises in part from the past. In ruling their “native” subjects, colonial states tended to rely heavily on legal instruments – proclamations, decrees, orders-in-council, statutory acts, commissions of enquiry – to impose their will (cf. Ashforth 1990; Mamdani 1996). Tswana-speaking South Africans referred to this, in the 19th century, as “warfare [with] papers” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, 378); elsewhere we have called it “lawfare,” the deployment of legalities to do violence to people and their property by indirect means (J.L. Comaroff 2001). In so doing, and in narrating nations that did not exist, imperial regimes tended to draw the attention of emerging indigenous elites to their legal disabilities and social exclusion. As Davidson (1992) argues, it seems overdetermined that early demands for independence made by African nationalist movements should have appro- priated the terms of European politics, with its deep roots in the culture of constitutionalism and the language of the law. It seems overdetermined, too, that, with the passage into postcolonia- lity, this same culture, this language, should come of age as the argot of authority, the source of civility, the guarantor of unity amidst difference – and should also be invoked by those who would perpetrate their own kind of cultural justice.

    CODA

    Draw these three strands together – the increasing appeal to enchantment in dealing with the mysteries of Brave Neo World; the changing nature of the nation-state, its new forms of citizenship and its gathering policulturalism; and the role of law in the postcolony – and it will be clear why the Big Questions of moral relativism and liberal universalism, of cultural difference and legal rationality, are so pressing here. And why they are the object of so much public de- bate. To put the matter in a nutshell, postcolonial nation-states cannot but live with both sides of an unresolvable equation. They have no option: this contradiction is their historical legacy. The best they can do in addressing the pragmatic problems that arise when the demands of culture run up against liberal universalism is to arrive at contingent solutions, strategic compromises; hence, for example, the accommodation forged between judgment and justice in handling ca- ses of witch burning (above, p.000). Occult-related violence rings such alarm bells – and calls forth the urgent attention of the state – precisely because it brings into life-and-death focus the contradiction at the core of the “new” South Africa and other postcolonial polities. These poli- ties, as we said at the outset, are cut from the modernist mould of nationhood: they are founded on constitutions that speak of One Law for One Nation, constitutions with Bills of Rights that set specific limits to heterodoxy, subjecting it to a transcendent legal and moral unity – and to the universal rights of citizens. Yet they are all confronted by the very differences that, simultane- ously, they recognize and embrace: by the entitlement of their subjects to their own cultural practices. That entitlement, we stress again, does not grow out of a politics of recognition for minorities; the kind of thing on which philosophical debates over multicultural citizenship tend to fixate. In places like South Africa, in which the democratic will of the majority is taken very seriously, most people “have” culture; most subscribe to ways and means that, in at least some respects, depart from Euromodern liberal orthodoxy. Those ways and means often include practices that, to others, appear dangerous; indeed, that cross the line between culture and crime. What makes the problem so acute is that such practices are not trivial “customs.” They may be existentially critical: occult-related violence in the northerly provinces of South Africa, as we have seen, is perpetrated in reaction to a perceived threat to life, livelihood, community, and commonweal. It is also an instrument of discovery and divination by which local populations seek to grasp the secrets of a world in flux. And act upon them.

    There is another facet to all this, another piece to bring to conclusion: cultural policing of the kind entailed in burning evil-doers is, itself, a more-or-less explicit indictment of the state. To the extent that the arrival of democracy was taken by black South Africans to promise material melioration and a new measure of personal security – a promise reiterated repeatedly by the ANC – the witchcraft “epidemic” bespoke its dramatic failure. Witches, after all, destroy material wealth and pose a mortal threat to personal security. As this suggests, the moral panic to which the “epidemic” gave rise was, among other things, a statement about the inability of govern- ment to make good on its mandate to safeguard its citizens. Occult-related violence, not sur- prisingly, is almost invariably accompanied by complaints against the inaction of the South African Police, inaction predicated, in part, on the sheer difficulty of intervening in accusations of magical malevolence; vide the role of Captain Segogelo in the death of Temane Makgetla. The “informal” justice dealt in such cases is warranted by appeal to another democracy: the populism of tradition. Ironically, it is also rationalized by recourse to the fetish on which the liberal democracy of the postcolony is founded: the rule of law. Only it turns the Law of the Nation upside down, calling for a mode of policing, rooted in the vernacular, that meets the occult on its own cultural ground; much as do Inspector Gopane and Sergeant Moshupa, who seek – in a manner still exceptional among police cadres – to cross the planes of the bureaucratic and the spiritual. And, as it does so, as it invokes the sanctity of traditional knowledge, this mode of policing confronts the state where it is most ideologically vulnerable: in its assertion of a univer- sal law against the claims of difference enshrined in its own founding constitution. Hence, we repeat, the seriousness with which the problem of occult violence is being regarded. And all the controversies which it has fueled.

    The phenomena of which we write here, phenomena that have their most vivid expres- sion in postcolonies like South Africa, may seem far removed from other parts of the world. And yet the antinomy between universalism and difference, inherent in the nation-state since its in- ception, has been sharpened by the emergence of neoliberal capitalism across the globe. This epochal process has had a mixed bag of consequences. Among them has been the growth of occult economies all over the planet, especially as those left out of the millennial promise of new wealth try to divine its arcane sources; the erosion of modernist state power, producing, in many places, the privatization of policing and the means of violence, the assertion of sub- and transnational identities, and early manifestations of Ethnicity, Inc.; the rise both of populist de- mands for cultural rights and of religious movements, sometimes framed in open opposition to the state; and a growth, almost everywhere, of a new faith in legality and constitutionalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). All of these are ingredients for the emergence of policulturalism and ID-ology of the kinds on which cultural policing in South Africa are founded. Perhaps we have here, in embryonic form, harbingers of things to come elsewhere. Perhaps a new struggle between the imperatives of culture and the hegemony of liberal universalism is just dawning.

  • Criminal Obsessions, After Foucault:

    Criminal Obsessions, After Foucault:

    “Perhaps it is because our lives are so chaotic, so filled with unsol- ved mysteries, incomplete stories, uncaught murderers that crime fiction is so popular. I believe that is why South Africans are so hooked on American TV crime series…because somewhere, some- how, someone is solving crimes. At least in fiction justice is served”….Michael Williams, The Eighth Man, a novel1

    People across the planet have, in recent years, been uncommonly preoccupied with public order, crime, and policing. From Britain to Brazil, Nigeria to the Netherlands, Slovakia to South Africa,2 the specter of illegality appears to be captivating popular ima- ginations. In much of the world, to be sure, this preoccupation is far from groundless. True, “accurate” crime statistics may be impossibly difficult to arrive at3; such actuarial artefacts depend, after all, on what is seen to constitute a felony in the first place, on what counts as evidence, on how much is conceded to the truth-claims of aggregate numbers. True, too, the perceived threat of criminal assault is often incommensurate with the “real” risk to persons and property; as it happens, that risk remains more un- evenly distributed in South Africa than it is in most places.4 All this notwithstanding, the incidence of violent crime here, and its effects on the lives of ordinary citizens, are not to be trivialized. They are perfectly real. As criminologists have come to recognize, the burgeoning violence endured by segregated black communities under apartheid has, especially since the late 1980s, spilled over into once tranquil, tightly-policed “white” cities and suburbs.5 This is an integral part of our story.

    And yet, at the same time, there seems to be more to the public obsession with criminality and disorder than the mere fact of its reality. South Africans of all stripes are also captivated by images of crime and policing, whether it be in the form of avid rumor or home-grown telenovelas, Hollywood horror or high theater, earnest documentaries or trashy melodramas. Whatever dangers they may dodge on the streets by day, at night, behind carefully secured doors, a high proportion of them indulge in vicarious experi- ences of extravagant lawlessness by way of the media, both imported and local. Why should this be so?

    The South African preoccupation with law and order – or, rather, with its mediat- ed representation – is neither new nor unique. “Even though crime exists…in what the public chooses to think of as epidemic proportions,” wrote Stuart Scheingold of the US two decades ago, “we still feel compelled to invent it.”6 For over a century, in fact, fictio- nal “cops and robbers” have provided a compelling topos for popular myth-making all over the world; clearly, they offer pliant allegorical terms for exploring the nature and li- mits of social being almost everywhere. This taste for crime fiction is not restricted to those who consume it as mass entertainment. Nor is it of interest only to those who contemplate order in the abstract. To the contrary, theater and fantasy appear integral to the workaday routines of policing itself. As if to make the point, Scotland Yard recen- tly hired a professional magician, using “illusions as a metaphor for real life situations” to “boost [the] confidence and…leadership skills” of its superintendents.7 In like vein, as we shall see, the strained South African Police Services, whose cadres include a some successful diviner-detectives,8 devote considerable effort to staging illusory victories over the dark forces of violence and disorder. But why all the drama? Why would aug- ust officers of the law – the very embodiment of the state at its most rational, legitimate, and forceful – feel a need to play around, to act out, in this manner? Has Foucault not convinced us that it is the panopticon, rather than the theater, that holds the key to pow- er in its modernist form?

    THE USES OF HORROR

    Crime looms large in the post-cold war age. Increasingly flexible in its modes of operation, it often mimics corporate business,9 constituting an “uncivil society” that flou- rishes most energetically where the state withdraws. Hence the implosion of ever more virtual, more vertiginous forms of fiscal fraud, ever more supple, border-busting markets in illegal substances, armaments, and mercenary violence – all facilitated by the liberali- zation of trade, by new kinds of financial instruments, and by cutting-edge communica- tions media. Hence, also, the role of organized crime: of the mafia and of business-ori- ented “gangs” in post-totalitarian polities which, for a fee, perform services that govern- ments no longer provide.10 Such criminal “phantom-states,” notes Derrida,11 are a fact of our times. Often embedded in complex transnational relations, often relying on highly sophisticated technologies, they shade into the networks of terror that are rapidly repla- cing conventional threats to “national” security.12 Indeed, received distinctions between crime and terror, always inchoate, are being revised as we speak, each term being de-ployed, ideologically, to make sense of, and to “fight,” the other. Thus it is that we have “the war” on terror, on drugs, on gangs, on illegal aliens, on corporate corruption, and so on. Note, in this respect, that Egged, the Israeli bus company, is reported to be suing Yasser Arafat for damages incurred in suicide bombings, and that Americans bereaved on 9/11 have filed a $100 trillion claim against Islamic charities, the Sudanese state, Saudi Arabian banks, and others for their support of Osama bin Laden – actions that would reduce the intifada and World Trade Center attacks to common illegalities ac- tionable by recourse to tort law.13 Under these conditions, crime and terror merge in the epistemic murk of a “new” global system that both reproduces and eclipses its old inter- national predecessor. In the upshot, social order appears ever more impossible to ap- prehend, violence appears ever more endemic, excessive, and transgressive, and poli- ce come, in the public imagination, to embody a nervous state under pressure. Officers of the Los Angeles Police Department, hardly known for their civility, recently described themselves as “the outer membrane of civilization” in a disorderly world.14 Similarly, the policeman protagonist in a stunning piece of postcolonial South African theater, Neil McCarthy’s The Great Outdoors, observes that the “line between order and chaos” is like “one strand of a spider’s web.”15

    The obsession with crime and lawlessness is not merely a commentary – at least, in South Africa – on social order, sui generis. It is also a reflection on the state of the nation. Take mass advertising, a genre that seeks to transform nightmare into de- sire. In April 2001, the Mail & Guardian, perhaps the most seriously critical newspaper in the country, observed that “bolted doors, patrolling dogs defending gated communi- ties and dark figures cocking guns in the shadows appear even in ads for toilet paper and popcorn.”16 At the time, a music radio station in Johannesburg was promoting itself, on huge billboards, by means of just two words: MORE POLICE. And, even more wryly: “YOU CAN TAKE THE CAR. JUST LEAVE THE RADIO. 98.7FM” Hardly subtle, this counterpoint between panacea and panic, pop and the politics of enforcement, ardent consumerism and Hobbesian anarchy. Texts like these are haunted by the specter of immanent attack, above all, attack on the part of unruly black youths. Violent crime, here as in the USA, has become the lightning rod for an escalating range of everyday anxieties; anxieties fed by the insecurity of the privileged as they witness the anger and impatience of those excluded from the Promised Land. In the banal theatrics of the mass media, crime becomes racialized and race criminalized. And both, if we may be forgiven the term, are youthenized.

    Regarded in this light, South Africa appears to evince what Mark Seltzer has ter- med a “pathological public sphere;17 it is increasingly at the “scene-of-the-crime,” he ar- gues, that contemporary publics are constituted. But there is more at stake in the popu- lar obsession with scenes of violent disorder in this particular postcolony. This, after all, was, until not long ago, a racist police state; its transition from the ancien regime, more- over, was husbanded by a celebrated Truth and Reconciliation Commission whose deli- berations were based on a model of justice that sought to address atrocities past with- out resort to punishment. Consequently, beyond constituting a public, the “scene-of-the- crime” in South Africa, broadly conceived, is also the source of a passionate politics on the part of government, a politics aimed at making manifest both the shape of the na- tion and a form of institutional power capable of underwriting its ordered existence. What we have here, in other words, is an inversion of the history laid out by Foucault in Discipline and Punish,18 according to which, famously, the theatricality of premodern power gives way to ever more implicit, internalized, capillary kinds of discipline. Indeed, it is precisely this telos – which presumes the expanding capacity of the state to regu- late everyday existence and routinely to enforce punishment – that is in question in South Africa. To wit, the drama that is so integral to policing the postcolony is evidence of a desire to condense dispersed power in order to make it visible, tangible, accountable, effective.19

    These theatrics, we shall see, are anything but hidden or half-hearted. More of- ten than not they assume the overdrawn shape of melodrama, a genre, according to Peter Brookes,20 that polarizes conflicting forces in such a way as to “make evident, le- gible, and operative” values which lack the transcendent authority of a religion, a domi- nant ideology, or whatever. So it is with the spectacle of policing, the staging of which strives to make actual, both to its subjects and to itself, the authorized face, and force, of the state; of a state, that is, whose legitimacy is far from unequivocal. Nor is this true only in postcolonies. Wrote Malcolm Young, an ethnographer of British law enforce- ment: “police culture possesses a dramaturgical or melodramatic inflection.” It mobilizes “illusion, praxis, and imagery” in “well-directed” social productions, deploying “mythical archetypes…in exaggerated games of ‘cops’ and ‘robbers’.”21 Melodrama in blue, so to speak. Young should know. He was himself a career police officer. His testimony returns us to one of our opening questions, now phrased more specifically: In what ways have illusion and fantasy been implicated in the work of law enforcement in recent South African history? And what might changes in the nature of police performance, in all senses of that term, tell us about the postcolonial – post-Foucauldian? – state, about its powers and its differences from its precursor?

    A great deal, in answering these questions, hangs on the way in which we grasp the connection between modernist state power and popular fantasies of law and order. Gramsci, for instance,22 observed that judicial apparatuses are “always in discredit” with the public, a corollary of which is the enduring appeal of private and amateur sleuths. Especially pertinent to our story, in this respect, is the reflection of CLR James’ on de- tective fiction in America after the Great Depression.23 There has, of course, been a long-standing infatuation with extralegal enforcement in US history; it has expressed it- self not just in the popularity of such things as the dime western, but also in the horror of public lynchings. James’s exploration of the salience of the genre in the 1930’s is to be read against this backdrop. Popular film, comics, and radio at the time, he recalls, were finely tuned to mass desire and frustration, giving allegorical shape to apprehen- sions about the meaning of freedom, prosperity, and nationhood in the midst of epic cri- sis. It was a moment of reckoning, too, for the liberal state and its moral economy; its failure to nurture a capitalist commonwealth had driven many ordinary people to despe- ration. Yet the avidly consumed crime drama of the period seldom spoke of economic collapse, labor struggles, or fear of war. This, James insists, was less a matter of deli- berate sabotage than of a silent, “armed neutrality” among the classes.”24 In the space vacated by politics, dyspeptic private eyes sallied forth in the name of the law, sharing some of the hoodlum chic of gangsters themselves: above all, a “scorn for the police as the representatives of official society.” 25 As ruling institutions lost legitimacy, gumshoes – men of iron, men of irony – became purveyors of a cynical justice that acknowledged anger, appetite, fallibility, power. In so doing, they made it possible to imagine a social order wrought by heroic action in the cause of a greater moral good.

    The detective fiction of post-depression America bears some kinship with popular imaginings of law and order in South Africa after apartheid: its reference to rapidly changing social and economic conditions; to the shock effect of mass joblessness and the unfulfilled promise of a new age of prosperity; to a perceived failure of the regulato- ry state; to a view of the police as inefficient and easily corruptible; to the bipolarization of crime into, on one hand, petty felonies committed by drab miserables driven by ne- cessity and, on the other, the flamboyant larceny of defiant antiheroes. If the US crisis yielded the New Deal, it remains to be seen what kind of deal the “new” South Africa fa- shions for itself. In the meantime, criminality has come to be represented, as it was in America during the 1920s and ‘30s, and would be again in the late twentieth-century in- ner city, as a means of production – or, rather, of productive redistribution – for those alienated by new forms of exclusion. At the same time, there is more at work in contem- porary South Africa than simple deprivation. As Jonny Steinberg points out, and mass- mediated drama affirms, the local underworld is not the sole preserve of the poor; it is peopled, as well, by the “well-healed and well-educated.” This suggests that, for an ever more visible sector of the population, most of all young black men, gangster “lifestyles” have a seductive appeal.26 It also suggests, after CLR James and many popular movies and musics since his day, that the outlaw embodies, often in deeply racialized guise, a displaced discourse about desire and impossibility, one as characteristic of the neoliberal moment in South Africa as it was of the depression-era US. Here too, the state is regarded with ambivalence, roughly in proportion to its alleged failure to secure the well-being of its citizens. Here, too, violence speaks elegaically of a very general angst about the anomic implosion of the established order of things.

    The sheer fecundity of crime-as-imaginaire is no mystery. Thoroughly grounded in the experience of the real, it gives voice to a fundamental conundrum of social being in the secular liberal state, a conundrum of unsettling relevance in the US since 9/11: How much freedom ought to be alienated, in the cause of security, to any regulatory re- gime, especially one whose legitimacy is open to question. This is a tension that dra- mas of law and order tend everywhere to resolve, in Durkheimian fashion, by making the obligatory appear desirable.27 But fantasy is never reducible to pure functionality. Crime fiction also provides readily available tropes for addressing ironies, for ventilating desires, and, above all, for conjuring a moral commonweal, especially when radical transformation unseats existing norms and robs political language of its meaning. In these circumstances, the felon personifies an existence beyond the law, an existence at once awesome, awful, and sublime. Mogamat Benjamin, high ranking member of a deadly gang in Cape Town’s notorious Pollsmoor Maximum Security Prison recently told a TV team: “I am powerful; I am partly God.”28 He was referring to his capacity to determine the lives and deaths of other inmates, even warders. Brusque iconoclasm of this kind opens a space of possibility, a space in which order is up for grabs, a space in which new modes of being are forged in the heat of unspeakably transgressive violence as the state withdraws or is rendered irrelevant. Benjamin and his brethren run a comp- lex organization in the dark interstices of the jail by means that elude its administration; means that spill back into the tough terrain on which their gang does its usual busi- ness.29 Shades here of another revered Benjamin, Walter Benjamin, for whom violence in its archetypal, mythic form was a “manifestation of the Gods.”30 It is awesome, he argued, because it threatens state monopoly over the law; note how “‘great’ criminal[s],” even when their ends are repellant, arouse the “secret admiration of the public.”31 But why do these figures, large and small, take on such intense salience in the here-and- now? Is this a result of the unique predicament of the postcolony? Or did it exist be- fore?

    Some clues from elsewhere may be helpful. James Siegel, for example, shows how, in an Indonesia facing political and economic dissolution, “the body of the criminal” has become the alibi against which the integrity of the nation and the law is asserted.32 The “dangerous classes” serve a similar symbolic end in an ever more polarized, post- industrial Britain, says Malcolm Young: police invoke them to authorize “wars” – again, that term – on behalf of “the social order” against whatever is seen to imperil it.33 Like- wise banditry in parts of the Mediterranean and Latin America, where outlaws are cast as a fearsome anachronism over which modernist states must exercise authority in order to sustain the viability of the polity and its sovereign space.34 In sum, the figure of arch-felon, albeit culturally transposed, seems to be doing similar work in many places, serving as the ground on which a metaphysics of order, of the nation as a moral com- munity guaranteed by the state, may be entertained, argued for, even demanded.

    The question, then, is plainly this: To the extent that discourses of crime and en- forcement, as popular national fantasy, are endemic to the imaginary of modern state power, how might current changes in the nature and sovereignty of states – especially postcolonial states – be tied to the criminal obsessions sweeping so many parts of the world? Why do outlaws, as mythic figures, evoke fascination in proportion to their pen- chant for ever more graphic, excessive, unpredictable violence? In South Africa today,

    Rob Marsh points out, it is white-collar crime that is most likely to “bring the country to its knees.”35 But it is red blooded assault on persons and property that is of most public concern. Violence, in short, is immensely productive, sometimes horrifyingly so: quite apart from its capacity to redirect the flow of wealth, it usurps representation, reveals the limits of order, and justifies state monopolies over the means of coercion.

    Self-evidently, violence is never just a matter of the circulation of images. Its ex- ercise, legitimate or otherwise, tends to have decidedly tangible objectives. And effects. Indeed, it was the raw clarity of physical force that persuaded Fanon of its potential for liberating colonized bodies and minds.36 This notwithstanding, its means and meanings always exceed its immediate ends, precisely because they rely on poetic techniques to inflate their impact. Could this be why brute coercion everywhere is inherently theatrical, its perpetrators upping the emotional ante via a host of self-dramatizing techniques – before, during, and after the fact? Begonia Aretxaga, following Zulaika and Douglass, notes that brutality sets those who wield it in a “play-like” frame, one in which extraordi- nary feats seem achievable, in which all pretense of distinguishing fact from fabrication disappears.37 Those who wish to command must constantly invoke violence, if not di- rectly, then in displaced or mimetic form. It is this invocation – above all, by those en- trusted with the impossibility of enforcing the law – with which we are concerned here: its rough play, its predilection for criminal fantasy, its response to the vicissitudes of state power. The police become visible, argues Agamben, citing Benjamin, where the legal dominion of the state runs out; their “embarrassing” proximity to authority is mani- fested in perpetual displays of force, even in peaceful public places.38 As we shall see, where governance is seriously compromised, law enforcement may provide a privileged site for staging efforts – the double entendre is crucial here – to summon the active pre- sence of the state into being, to render it perceptible to the public eye, to produce both rulers and subjects who recognize its legitimacy. Herein, we shall argue, lies the affinity between policing, drama, and illusion. Herein, too, lies the source of popular preoccu- pations with the representation of law and order. Those, recall, were the two issues with which we began.

    Let us move, then, onto the shifting planes of recent South African history. Scene 1 opens in the late 1980s, in what was the last act of the dying apartheid regime.

    CAPERS WTH COPPERS: The Closed Museum and the Spectral State

    We begin with an anomaly: a public museum closed to the public, perhaps inde- finitely. If this is an oxymoron, it is one that indexes the contradictory implications of ra- dical democratization for the construction of a nation of free citizens on the vestigial ruins of a police state, the ruins of a polity founded on racial exclusion.

    In 1999, when first we visited the South African Police Museum, housed in a shabby, elegant Victorian building in Pretoria, the executive capital of the country, it was shut for “renovation.” The edifice, which had been the national Police Headquarters in the 1930s was, we were told, in dangerous disrepair. This was visibly so, although it soon became clear that the wear and tear was not merely architectural. For the public exhibition space had coexisted, in the apartheid era, with something else, something clandestine, something now abhorrent: the epicenter, and an interrogation facility, of the infamous national security service. The bizarre coexistence of the two within the same walls – the museum below, the secret police above – appeared to be beyond coincidence. But more of that in a moment. It was not only the lurking traces of state terror that compromised the building. The content of the exhibits, once very popular with patrons, had themselves become inappropriate. State museums, of course, are more or less blatant statements, conjuring up the national populations, subjects, and interests for which, and to which, they speak. In times of historical change, they offer glaring indictments of denatured ideologies, of a slippage between state and nation, signifiers and signifieds. Not surprisingly, they have become prime objects of argument about the politics of representation in the “new” South Africa. Behind closed doors, in the late 1990s, the staff of the Police Museum pondered how to make their displays relevant to the post-apartheid era.

    We had been drawn to the place by an interest in the changing public sense of police work brought by the advent of majority rule.39 The indefinitely closed museum called forth an historical speculation, a hypothesis if you will: that reforming the image of the old South African Police Force, jackboot of the state, into that of the South Afri- can Police Services, a gentler, human-rights orientated, community-friendly agency, could well turn out to be an exercise in impossibility. By the late apartheid years, when it became increasingly difficult to contain the contradictions of the racial state, the SAP operated, for the most part, as a paramilitary force. Its security branch existed above the law, torture and deadly force were routine in the treatment of political dissidents, and a dense network of informers extended its capillaries into every sphere of existen- ce. Against this background, the state portrayed the police as heroic defenders of order against terror, treason, and savage insurrection.

    The Police Museum spoke unchallenged from the heart of that state. It began life in 1968 as a haphazard collection of relics – murder weapons, graphic photographs of “ritual” mutilations, the personal effects of a famous female poisoner – all from land- mark cases of the more or less distant past; these being used, early on, in the training of cadets. With the recruitment in 1982 of a museologist, Tilda Smal, herself a police of- ficer, the collection was developed in an altogether more ambitious direction, combining edification with entertainment, high melodrama with low-tech installations. Central to its design was a series of tableaux that, together, composed a specifically South African history of crime and punishment. They also served as the setting for what would beco- me the best known feature of the institution, its Night Tours, during which staff of the museum and the Police Education Unit brought epic felonies to life by impersonating famous “criminals.”

    There could hardly be more literal or vivid evidence of the dramaturgy, the melo- drama, of police work. But what did it all mean? What prompted otherwise austere offi- cers of a police state to inhabit the personae of their arch-enemies; indeed, to make public exhibitions of themselves in order to delight and terrify rather ordinary patrons and their children? What might their play have had to do with the more sinister rituals that took place backstage in this extraordinary venue?

    We take up the story with the help of the curator.40 The Museum, said Sgt. Smal, was only allowed to display artifacts from cases that had ended in convictions. It catalo- gued the triumph of law and order over enemies of the state. In the 1980s, the range of exhibits – a mixture of dioramas, documents, and objects – covered two key domains of police work. One was the apprehension of spectacular criminals, the other, the protec- tion of “national security” against the threat of “terrorism” and, later in the decade, “dangers on the borders.” Installations of the first kind featured the likes of Daisy de Melker, perhaps South Africa’s most notorious serial killer: indicted for poisoning two husbands and one of her children, de Melker was an horrific inversion of the national stereotype of the genteel white female, entrusted with reproducing the moral essence of her race.41 Such emblems of aberration within the nation were set off from the peril to its existence posed by those alienated from it: by Poqo, the armed wing of the radical Pan-African Congress, for instance, which, in the early 1960’s had made a particular target of the police,42 and by the “Rivonia conspiracy,” uncovered with the arrest, in 1962, of several top ANC leaders, most notably Nelson Mandela, who were alleged to be plotting treas- on. Dioramas dealing with defensive action on the borders depicted a hostile alliance of others bent on bringing down the ruling regime: exiled “terrorists,” sympathetic frontline African states, and international communism. As this installation underlined, the dividing line between the military and the police was conspicuously fuzzy in the late years of minority rule.

    Night Tours, in which the tableaux were animated, were started in 1990 as a “once-off” experiment to entertain a group of “VIP’s” from the International Police Asso- ciation. Word spread. Besieged by inquiries from an interested public, the staff decided to offer the tours on request. Soon the demand became overwhelming: at one stage, there were three a week, all year, each for 40 visitors. Performances continued until the building closed in April 1999. Initially, most visitors, both night and day, were white Afri- kaans-speaking South Africans. Later, Africans, especially school groups, began to pat- ronize the place. By that time, efforts had been made to revise the exhibits (see below). The Police Museum, in which everything was free of charge, seems to have been popular above all with the super-patriotic and the very poor. Toward the end, the Night Tours attracted some cultured critics of the regime, for whom this dark, if not wholly in- tended, parody – its freak-chic – became an excursion into the comic underside of the police state.

    The staff look back on the Tours with great fondness. These were occasions of carnivalesque camaraderie, occasions that gave license for various sorts of play, some of it decidedly ambiguous. As visitors entered the building, they came upon cops in ana- chronistic uniforms on antique bicycles; a somewhat heavy-handed signal, this, that they had departed real-time for the domain of history-as-theater, of docu-dramaturgy. As we intimated earlier, the vaudeville itself turned on the willingness of the officer-play- ers to inhabit the identities of public enemies. This willingness, almost a caricature of the mix of outrage and enjoyment that Lacan calls jouissance, may be read, following Aretxaga,43 as an appropriation by state functionaries of the “seductive and fearful pow- er” of their adversaries. But there is more at work here. The performance also recalls the repetitive enactment of paradox characteristic of African rituals under colonial condi- tions.44 The Night Tours replayed the Hegelian enslavement of white rulers to the terror of the swart gevaar, a “black danger” largely of their own making. In the play, the prag- matics of melodrama permitted the separation of the civil from the savage, enabling the law to appear to act decisively upon forces of darkness, as if to redress the contradic- tions endlessly reproduced by colonial rule. The curator acknowledged that her staff presumed that patrons would be fascinated by sensational crime. And eager for vica- rious terror. Consequently, they sought to provoke first horror and then deliverance; such “vicarious adventures in the illicit and the brutal,” Scheingold45 notes, being a “prelude” to the gratification, to the “discharges of anger,” promised by “society’s act of retribution.” In dramatizing the difficulties of defending an enlightened order against un- couth odds, the police-players elevated their audience into metonymic citizens of the nation as moral community – and, also, into a public in need of state protection from a vast mass of unruly others.

    Visitors remember the Tours vividly. One critical observer described the perfor- mance as a “home-grown chamber of horrors”: part amateur theater, part fairground haunted-house. Thus Daisy de Melker walked the halls dressed in period costume, of- fering visitors coffee from her poison flask. The real thing, that is, not a facsimile. Sett- ing the scene was a cast of characters who embodied less alarming threats to everyday order: a few police-women garbed as prostitutes, a couple who postured as addicts in front of a light show that simulated a bad trip; a group of “authentic” sangomas, traditio- nal healers, who enacted a trance to dramatize the dangers of “black magic.” Also brought to life was Panga Man, a notorious black criminal who attacked courting white couples while they were parked in a leafy spot in Pretoria, not far from the Museum. Bearing a panga, a large scythe, he would assault the men and rape the women – to whom, it was said, he then gave bus fare home. There could hardly have been a more intense figuration of the dark, insouciant menace that stalked the cities in the white ima- gination, threatening civility and its social reproduction. This nightmare gained fantastic irony when the attacker turned out to be a mild-mannered “tea boy” at police head- quarters.46 Epitomizing the standard colonial terrors of rapacious black sexuality and subaltern betrayal, Panga Man featured centrally in a regular Museum display, which depicted a car, sawn in half to reveal a couple looking up in petrified expectation of an immanent strike. During Night Tours, a door would burst open in the wall behind, and an African officer would leap out, brandishing the eponymous weapon. “We thought of having him shout something as he did so,” the curator told us. “But the first time we tried it everybody screamed so loudly, he could hardly be heard. People nearly fainted.”

    By the mid 1990’s, with the dawn of the postcolony, efforts were made to add fresh exhibits to the Museum, acknowledging the possibility of different readings of his- tory and the presence of new sorts of citizen-consumer. The aim, said Tilda Smal, was to document the role of the police in the apartheid years in such a way as to capture black viewpoints on that history. This took it on faith that it was possible, within the same signifying economy, to pluralize existing displays, their ideological scaffolding, and the kind of nation they presumed. Thus installations on terrorism were revised to explain the rationale of the liberation movements. And tableaux were included to docu- ment the insidious indignities of the Pass System and the Sharpeville Uprising of 1960, in which scores of nonviolent African protestors were shot to death by police. Popular with the public, itself now changing in social composition, was a depiction of the sabre- rattling antics of the white-right Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), whose assertive racist posturing was the very essence of neofascist melo- drama. These changes produced some paradoxical moments – like one in which Nel- son Mandela, played by a SAPS look-alike, stood inside a replica of his Robben Island cell and answered polite questions from curious visitors.

    Nor were they uncontroversial, particularly among older white police officers. The Museum, now under the jurisdiction of an ANC-administered Ministry of Safety and Se- curity, had entered an era of postcolonial contestation, becoming a space of argument as never before. So much so that, whatever the contingent causes, its closure suggests that it collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions; these wrought by thorough- going changes in the racial composition and status of the police, in the ideology of en- forcement, and, most of all, in the relation of citizenry to government. But the question of what should be exhibited, how and why, pointed to something more than a shift in the way in which the nation narrates its past and future. It signaled a transformation in the social imaginary of the state itself – and the ways in which it deploys horror to make it- self visible. About which more in a moment. In the meantime, the museum staff, un- daunted, continue to plan future displays: on, for example, the more sensational abuses revealed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,47 on the “evils” of the “witchdoctor’s art,” and on such spectacular murderers as the so-called Norwood serial killer, who, as it happens, had been a regular police sergeant. But, as these museolo- gists are coming to realize, it is difficult to capture, in tableau, the realities of policing the postcolony. Not, at least, without rethinking the regime of representation required by the present moment. To be sure, in the final years, the Night Tours themselves ran up against this difficulty, finding that the line they presumed between fact and fantasy, order and chaos, safety and violence, was dissolving. In one instance, a harbinger of things to come, the police actors staged a robbery involving hostages and a fake inter- vention on the part of the Flying Squad, firing blank bullets. By this stage, however, vio- lent crime had become a pervasive preoccupation, above all in the inner city, where the Museum was located. As the shots went off, panic ensued. Unclear, in the midst of the mayhem, was whether or not the performance had been overtaken by a real attack from the streets outside.

    It was not the first time that theater and brute reality had been confounded in this house of horrors. As we sat in the closed Museum, talking to the curator about its past and its (im)probable future, Tilda Smal gestured toward the ceiling and recalled how, in the old days, the Pretoria branch of the Security Police had been housed above. “A lot of fa- mous people were interrogated here.” she said, “Almost the whole current government.” The edifice had been home, then, to another, more sadistic form of theater: the surreal techniques of information gathering, of violence and terror, that were the stock-in-trade of “special policing” under apartheid. Since 1994, several prominent figures have revisit- ed the site of their incarceration and torture:48 the upper reaches of the building have, for former enemies of the state, become a space for re-visiting the past, a space for personal and collective re-membering.

    During the heyday of the Museum in the1980’s, its staff and visitors used an en- trance on the east side of the building. The Security Police used the west side. When political prisoners were brought in, the clanking of their handcuffs and leg irons was audible in the exhibition space below. Sgt. Smal said that she had found it hard to be- lieve what she had heard and seen at the time. But, she noted, for patrons it all seemed “part of the show.” In this way, the Museum was the facade for state terror, and state terror the mis-en-scene for the Museum.

    We are confronted here with the strangeness of the real,49 the unnerving interpe- netration of force and fantasy, of policing and performance, of the interiors and exteri- ors of the state-as-violence. There was no simple line, in this house with two entrances, between backstage and frontstage, between actors and audience, between the producers and consumers of a phantasmagoric reality. Ordinary citizens unwittingly played along in the fabrication and reproduction of precisely the sense of apocalypse – the ter- rifying threats to order – that legitimized the deadly exercise of coercion in the name of governance. For despite the distinction between public display and secret interrogation, each represented an aspect of the melodrama, of manufacturing truth by evoking terror, that appears essential to enforcement everywhere; one that takes especially cavalier and destructive forms in totalitarian states, where a continuing sense of emergency ex- onerates the most savage of disciplinary practices. In South Africa, in the present era of “human rights” policing, these practices have been radically transformed. But, as we shall see shortly, the reliance of the law on melodrama has not disappeared. In answer to one of our opening questions, there is both continuity – because it is in the nature of enforcement – and change, because of shifts in the political culture of its context.

    Old horrors leave their traces. While the future of the Janus-faced edifice hangs in the balance, its uncanny past haunts those who were part of it, those who seek now to reconfigure its purpose in the present. Toward the end of our conversation, the cura- tor remarked: “We have a few resident ghosts in the building.” One, she confided, likes to play – note that verb again – with the security system when people work after hours; a phantom, perhaps, with a particularly poignant sense of irony. What is more, Museum personnel attest to strange nocturnal experiences. South Africans of all races have al- ways been actively engaged with the supernatural, although an obsession with the oc- cult has been especially noticeable during this time of transition.50 One Sunday evening, when Sgt. Smal was alone in the building, the alarm began to sound furiously. Unable to switch it off, she sat resignedly for two hours, waiting, as she put it, “for the spirit to play herself out.” On another occasion, she reports having shouted: “Daisy,” de Melker, that is, “leave the intercom alone!” The mechanism, she said, “went wild.”

    But other, unnamed forces also spook this building, struggling to find voice in the great re-visioning of the past occasioned by the birth of the postcolony. It is as if the specters of bygone events are unable to find embodiment – or a means of representa- tion – in the present, notwithstanding laudable efforts to foster new cultures of recollec- tion; as if farce and tragedy, humor and horror, must confront each other before an aw- ful history can become a habitable present. Those who spend time on the upper floors during the small hours speak of an unquiet presence along the corridors. Some say that it is because many prisoners had “committed suicide” here; suicide being a sometime secret police euphemism for “killed in custody.” More recently, a security guard shot himself on the premises. Another person came off the street to take his own life in the courtyard. Black South Africans, in particular, disliked working in the place. Many still do. Here we get to the nub of issue. The lower floors of the building may be frequented by the ghosts of playful lady poisoners and other random spirits, but the upstairs has an altogether more sinister aura. Museum staff told us that, in the former Security Police stronghold, “there is a really strange feeling.” People hear the footsteps of those long departed. No one feels comfortable in the place. This is hardly surprising: only perpe- trators and victims know what unspeakable acts and agonies those walls have witness- ed. Thus it is that history shadows the reluctant consciousness of those – above all, those responsible for justice, law, and order – who must find ways to reconcile their activities in the past, a past that truly was another country, with the radically altered moral regime of the present.

    No wonder the Police Museum remains shut. It does so not just because its cabi- net of horrors requires drastic revision in the postcolony, but because it must find new modes of melodrama, new forms of conjuring order from terror; all the more so since, in recent times, the public preoccupation with violent crime, fed by avid electronic and print media, has made reality seem much scarier than fiction. In the event, the now mul- tiracial staff of the SAPS Education Unit has, over the past few years, begun experi- menting with other genres of self-representation – among them, video shows, popular puppetry, and street theater – to dramatize a contemporary clutch of nightmares: do- mestic assault, rape, gun-related violence, drug abuse.51 As befits the ethos of a libera- lizing state, they take their shows on the road to the various provinces of the postcolo- ny. We follow them to one such provincial outpost, there to explore the nature of police drama after apartheid.

    And so on to Scene ll.

    PLAY ACCIDENTS, CHOREOGRAPHED CRIMES, or Performing the State

    In November 1999, we read in the national press that Mafikeng-Mmabatho52 – capital of the North West Province, where we were living and working at the time – was to host an exhibit on violence against women.53 This was to be part of a countrywide campaign, Project Harmony, which sought to draw public attention to the government’s newly-minted Domestic Violence Act. Members of the North West Police Services, the papers announced, would stage educational performances at taxi ranks, those remark- able agoras of African postcolonies. Our inquiries about the event drew a blank, how- ever. Nobody, neither the local police nor anyone else, knew a thing about it.

    It was only after we traveled to the Secretariat for Public Safety and Liaison at its provincial headquarters, 10km north of town, that we learned the whereabouts of the exhibit. It was to be held in the foyer of the North West Provincial legislature. The Se- cretariat, it should be noted, is a regional division of the national Department of Safety and Security, under whose aegis falls the newly reorganized South African Police Servi- ce;54 although, at the time, relations between the two bodies were rather ill-defined. The new National Crime Prevention Strategy, adopted in 1996, promulgated a dispersed but “integrative” approach, provincial governments being charged with “co-ordinating a range of…functions…to achieve more effective crime prevention.”55 Precisely how this was to be done remained opaque, however, even to those entrusted with the urgent task of promoting “community security.” Here, patently, was local government faced with the demand to invent itself.

    Which is where Project Harmony came in. The directive from the state that pro- vincial governments should raise public awareness of the then imminent Domestic Vio- lence Bill implied a clear line of action. Hence the announcement of the exhibit which proved so strangely elusive. But why, we wondered, had it been so hard to find? And why was it being staged in the Provincial Parliament? This is hardly a public space: se- curity was so tight that only members of government, their staff, and accredited visitors were admitted. Inside, in the grand lobby, two rather flamboyant members of the Police Education Unit fussed, with professional flourish, over a single tableau. The display was small but striking. A very still life, its centerpiece was a bed with disheveled sheets. Across them lay a life-size model of a female, race indeterminate, clad in the shredded remnants of upmarket underwear. Her body was bruised and bloody, her throat cut. A knife lay close to her face. Yellow tape cordoned this off as a crime scene, which was framed by posters and works of art, all depicting violence against women, all urging the public – in English and Afrikaans, but not Setswana, the local language – to “speak out against abuse.”

    What are we to make of this grisly spectacle, whose artful detail seemed so to exceed its function? Why, again, was a diorama ostensibly intended to educate “the public” placed so securely beyond its gaze? The actions and anxieties of the police ar- tistes offered a clue. The display had to be ready for viewing by the parliamentarians, political and civic dignitaries, and press people who had been invited to attend a cere- monial session marking the passage of the Domestic Violence Act. They were the tar- get audience. It was they who were meant to witness that, notwithstanding mounting skepticism, local police and local government could cooperate effectively to fight crime. But the investment of those responsible for the exhibit, and the emotional power packed into it, implied that it was also a site of self-construction. Its authors, in the name of the SAPS, seemed intent on configuring a collective sense of moral purpose in the face of a daunting world in which violence was thought to have become endemic, ubiquitous, even unpoliceable.

    What we were witnessing, in short, was the state performing for itself, performing itself. The state making statements. And drawing its charge from a violated female body that, in a shift from the older signifying economy, had come to stand for the moral citi- zen victimized by the new arch-enemies of the people. For the salience of the meticu- lous melodrama played out in this political setting was that it was a simulacrum of go- vernance, a rite staged to make actual and authoritative, at least in the eyes of an executive bureaucracy, the activity of those responsible for law and order. And, by exten- sion, to enact the very possibility of government. For the battle against crime, epitomiz- ed in sexualized attacks on women, has become diagnostic of the efficacy of the post- colonial regime at a time when the nation’s foes – its rapists and murderers, its gangs- ters and gunmen, its carjackers and drug dealers – are, for the most part, also its own recently-liberated subjects; this, recall, being one of the contradictions faced by the Poli- ce Museum in its efforts to revamp its signifying economy. In showing visible attentive- ness to the sanctity of the female body, to the specter of violence against it, and to poli- cing those who would desecrate it, the state objectified itself – to itself.

    But the institutional face of government also insists that it be recognized by its subject-citizens. Which takes us to the other face of police performance, its public en- actment. One such enactment came at us, literally, two months later. At 8.30 am on a Tuesday morning in downtown Mafikeng, as children rushed to school and businesses opened their doors, we heard an oncoming cacophony of horns and sirens. Obviously a motorcade. Down the street hurried a motley array of conveyances: a few lumbering Public Order Police trucks (aptly named “hippos” in the bad old days), a number of pat- rol cars, and several civilian saloons; about twenty vehicles in all. Each contained a few uniformed officers of different ranks and races, who waved energetically to those gathe- red in bewilderment on the sidewalks. On the doors and hoods of these vehicles were scrawled English signs. One condemned the abuse of women. The other proclaimed: “Give them toys, not guns,” invoking a growing concern about violent acts perpetrated by children. This, self-evidently, was yet a further nod toward crime prevention. But it was also an effort to establish a palpable police presence on the streets by playing on the nightmare of a nation consumed by brutality, a nation in which violated mothers were producing a generation of infant felons.

    People along the roadside, having discerned that the motorcade was “put on by the police,” paid it little heed. The once ubiquitous, menacing presence of the law has been drastically reduced here as elsewhere in the “new” South Africa. By contrast, poli- ce performances, especially under the sign of mass education and public relations, have become much more common. “The streets are full of tsotsis (gangsters),” one old man complained to us, “and all the police can do is play.” The choice of this last word will not go unnoticed.

    The observation itself has some ground. Local law enforcement officers, sensiti- ve to the ambivalence with which they are regarded, have devised various home-grown techniques through which to enact their visibility, efficacy, resolve, and responsibility be- fore a population fearful to inhabit public space. One of their performances – a fake traffic pile-up, staged without warning at a busy intersection in Mafikeng during the mor- ning rush-hour – was so authentic that it caused pandemonium. And one, all too real, accident. Ironically, the aim of the exercise had been to draw attention to a campaign for safe driving: carnage on the roads, much of it caused by alcohol and criminal negli- gence, is another evil besetting the province. So rapid has been the rising death toll that it seems less accidental than an index of new dangers lurking in the unrestrained pur- suit of freedom, not least the freedom to consume, that has come with the end of apart- heid. And with the expansive, and expensive, ethos of neoliberalism.

    Unlike the rape scene but like the motorcade, the accident inserted itself into the thick of street life. It deployed the full power of the law – the right to usurp public space and time, to conjure with truth, to evoke terror by mimicking death – all to impress upon “the community” the authoritative presence of the police, whose absence from crime scenes had been subject to much local criticism. But the smash was also intended, as was the Rabelaisian procession, to be a functional ritual: one that would turn popular ambivalence toward the SAPS into positive affect by dint of carefully staged emotions as transformative for the actors as for their audience. For here, again, the actors were the audience, the audience actors. Their drama was at once opaque to the public, yet made that public part of the staging. The unmarked pile-up, along with the illegible signs in the motorcade56 and the hidden-away exhibit at the parliament, implies a form of reflexivity in which the performers sought, by aping epics of disorder, to interpellate themselves as legitimate agents of caring enforcement: agents whose role in grappling with a new catalogue of national nightmares would be recognized, and respected, by the populace at large. For policing in this new era presumes a high measure of consent from citizens, a consent still very much in question.

    If, as Malcolm Young says,57 policing everywhere relies on “well-directed social productions” to maintain the mythic divide between good and evil, is it any wonder that the new SAPS, still struggling to define itself on a reconfigured moral and political land- scape, should evince a strong tendency to “act out”? Or, as in the Police Museum, that the line between staged performances and the melodrama of everyday police work should often disappear – which it does in many theatrically-staged, mass-mediated arr- ests. This was brought home to South Africans a couple of years back by a series of ostentatiously publicized raids, led with extravagant ceremony by the national chief of police, on those Johannesburg “gentleman’s clubs” alleged to be trafficking in alien sex-workers.58 While it did not lead to many arraignments, the operation dramatized a recur- rent terror of the reconstituted nation: the growing mass of illegal immigrants, archetypal others, whose very being-there is thought to endanger both the borders and the interiors of the postcolony. That such performances – many of which feature police showing off their mastery in melodramas of despoiled female bodies – may be tentative and dispersed, that they lack the compelling power often attributed by anthropologists to communal rituals, is precisely the point. It is through their uncertain playing out that the “new” South African polity is taking tangible shape.

    CONCLUSION

    We have argued that, in postcolonial South Africa, dramatic enactments of crime and punishment – alike those disseminated by the state and those consumed by vari- ous publics – are not merely fabrications after the event. Nor are they reflections, inflec- tions, or refractions of a simple sociological reality. To the contrary, they are a vital part of the effort to produce social order and to arrive at persuasive ways of representing it, thereby to construct a minimally coherent world-in-place; even more, to do so under neoliberal conditions in which technologies of governance – including technologies of detection and enforcement – are, at the very least, changing rapidly and are, in some places, under dire threat. In these times, criminal violence is taken to be diagnostic of the fragility of civil society; concomitantly, officers of the law become the prime embodi- ment of a state-under-pressure. Thus the irony of contemporary South Africans who, in the effort to build a post-totalitarian democracy, find themselves calling for “More Poli- ce.” Theirs appears to be a decidedly post-Foucauldian predicament, wherein disorder seems to exceed the capacity of the state to discipline or punish. It is a predicament in which both those who would wield power and their putative subjects find it necessary to resort to drama and fantasy to conjure up visible means of governance.

    This story could, of course, be read not as post-Foucultian, but as an historical narrative that proves the Foucaultian point; or, rather, that reinforces a Foucaultian te- los by playing it in reverse to show how, when modern power runs out, primitive spectacle returns once more. We would argue otherwise: that the distinction between politics- as-theater and biopolitics underlying this telos is too simple; that it is itself the product of a modernist ideology that would separate symbolic from instrumental coercion, melo- drama from a politics of rationalization. Melodrama may be the medium of first resort where norms are in flux and the state is incapable of ensuring order. But the history of modern policing suggests that theater has never been absent from the counterpoint of ritual and routine, visibility and invisibility, integral to the staging of power, and of law and order, in authoritative, communicable form; recall, one last time, the testimony, in this respect, of Malcolm Young, the policeman-ethnographer. That counterpoint, in short, lies at the very heart of governance, be it metropolitan or colonial, European or African, past or present.

    There is a more than arbitrary connection, then, between law enforcement, thea- ter, and dramatic fiction.59 Crime and punishment are especially salient to the reciprocal fantasy through which police and public construct each other across the thin blue line 60 that makes palpable the power of the state, the thin blue line that, imaginatively, stands between anarchy and civility, the thin blue line that underscores the fragility of order and gives focus to popular preoccupations with the threat of social meltdown. All the more so since, with the rise of global capitalism and the mutation of the old international sys- tem, new geographies of crime and terror, themselves ever more murkily interrelated, have re-articulated criminality inside nation-states with criminality across nation-states, making both harder to contain or comprehend. All the more so, too, since the world-his- torical conditions of this neoliberal age – among them, the weakening sovereignty of na- tions and their borders, the diminishing capacity of governments to control either the means of coercion or the commonweal, the challenge of cultural politics to the liberal rule of law and its grounding in universal human rights – have made policing in its mo- dernist sense difficult. Perhaps even impossible.

    This may be most readily visible in postcolonial, post-totalitarian contexts, where there is a paucity of civil institutions to counter the contraction of the welfare state. It is, however, as urgently felt in, say, the post-industrial north of England61 as in the norther- ly provinces of South Africa. And it expresses itself everywhere in the criminal obses- sions of both rulers and subjects. Thus, while much current opinion, stretching from li- bertarian to Foucaultian, might minimize the importance of “the state,” there is plentiful evidence in popular fantasy of a nostalgia for authoritative, even authoritarian govern- ment. This much is evident in the reflexive self-constructions of South African police, who dramatically inflate both the necessity to wrest community from chaos and their ca- pacity to do so. Their melodramas are founded on a dialectic of production and reduc- tion: on the productive conjuring of a world saturated with violence and moral ambiguity, the threat of which they alone are able to reduce to habitable order. Thus it is that, in their imaginaire, a metaphysics of disorder – the hyper-real conviction, rooted in every- day experience, that society hovers on the brink of dissolution – comes to legitimize a physics of social order, to be accomplished through effective law enforcement. Thus it is, reciprocally, that many ordinary South Africans are drawn to mass-mediated dramas in which men with badges confront, and typically overcome, the most heinous, most vio- lent, most antisocial of felons. Thus it is too, that, distilled in a fictional economy of representation, fantasies become facts, impossibilities become possible, and the law, as foundation of the nation-state, becomes visible once more.

  • Figuring Crime

    Figuring Crime

    Nothing rings with more authority to South African ears than a crime statistic. It is the music of our spheres: what the sound of an accordion is to a Marseilles sailor, or the jaunty plinkety-plunk of the banjo to a Louisiana woodsman, so is the rhythmic, measured refrain of a crime statistic to a South African.

    Darrel Bristow-Bovey, 20001 In an address to the national parliament in 1999, Nelson Mandela voiced an old cliche, a deep truth from both the heart of modernism and the fraught history of numbers in South Africa. “Figures,” he said, “are meaningless in the context of people’s concrete ex- periences.”2 But, in the contemporary world, the opposite may be true: that figures render large abstractions concretely meaningful to personal experience, speaking with authority about the connection of human beings to otherwise incomprehensible phenomena. Being assertions of the real, they fill the space between the unknowable and the axiomatic, imagi- nation and anxiety. Viewed thus, the statistic is a medium of communication and a species of commodified knowledge, one whose value and veracity accumulates as it circulates.

    Part fetish, it has also become a term in the ordinary language of being.
    The rise of contemporary Western perceptions of society, Ian Hacking (1990:1-5) has famously argued, was closely tied to the “avalanche of numbers” produced, publicized, and deployed for purposes of governance by nineteenth-century states (cf. Canguilhem 1989). The obsession with counting, and with calculating probability, he suggests, had pro- found epistemic effects. For one thing, “society” itself “became statistical.” For another, the appeal to law-like regularities began to replace other kinds of causal explanation, such as “human nature,” in making sense of, and acting upon, the world. Which, in turn, made rates of “deviancy” – of criminality, suicide, madness, illness – especially salient. To wit, post-en- lightenment ideas of the social, the moral, the normal, and the rational owe a lot to the crime statistic, a fact made evident in the actuarial underpinnings of much early detective fiction. Take, for example, Edgar Allen Poe, a fine organic anthropologist with an explicit interest in the “public mind.” In common with many writers of good mysteries, Mark Seltzer (2004:561) observes, Poe often invoked numbers in the interests of sociological realism; for him, “the death of God” left us with mathematics, “the death of Satan,” with forensics. The Victorian impetus to quantify deviance, in both realist fiction and social science, pre- supposed a rule-governed social order whose positive outlines were most visible in the negative: in lawlessness and vice. It was these “social pathologies” that would become the urgent object of sociology and social engineering (cf. Hacking 1990:118).

    So much for Euromodernity, in which, from the first, the very idea of governance de- pended on statistics, the “science of [a] state” whose operations were enabled “by the ac- cumulation and tabulation of facts about the domain to be governed” (Rose and Miller 1992:185). Wherein lies the significance of crime statistics at the dawn of the twenty-first century? How do they figure, so to speak, in an age in which foundational assumptions ab- out society, citizenship, and order are called into question, in which social engineering is ever more suspect, in which the discourse of deviance is deeply discredited, in which go- vernment and public alike appear more concerned with personal security, suffering, rights, and risk than with social pathology – and in which the ontological status of “the” state is it- self is a matter of argument?

    The Neo South Africa, like most nation-states today, produces its own avalanche of numbers. The tide of statistics made publically available by the police service is swelled, in this Age of Neoliberalism, by the ever more state-like exertions of non-governmental or- ganizations and the private sector. Those figures feed a thoroughly modernist “lust for precision” (Hacking 1990:5), a fervid faith in the panacea of probability, and a populist sen- se that countering disorder begins with counting it properly. It is hardly surprising, then, that the crime statistic has taken on unprecedented sovereignty in this postcolony. Not only has it become diagnostic of the national health. It is also a discursive currency by means of which government speaks to its subjects, citizens speak among themselves, experts speak to every-persons, everyone speaks back to government – and the media mediate all the incessant talk, adding their own inventions, inflections, inflations.

    Three things are especially noteworthy about the rising sovereignty of the crime sta- tistic in this context. And about the pivotal place of quantifacts – statistical representations that make the world “factual” – in its public discourses. All of them are critical to our broad- er theoretical concerns here.

    The first is the paradox of dis/trust: while crime statistics constitute a widely-cited measure of the condition of the postcolony, they tend also to be distrusted, due largely to their susceptibility to abuse. They are, in short, at once a fetish and the object of a lively hermeneutic of suspicion. The second has to do with alienation and intimacy: counter to the commonplace that numbers displace visceral experience into the realm of pattern and probability – vide Mandela’s observation – it is arguable that they do just the opposite here. As they circulate and are mediated, these statistics reduce a mass of faceless felonies, awful things that occurred elsewhere, into the objects of first-person affect: revulsion, revenge, pain. The third thing arises out of the phenomenology of figures: for all the ambivalence with which they are regarded, crime stats are treated here not as a representation of reality, but as a reality in themselves, a reality in which is congealed material facts, moral order, collective identities, even the quality of life (cf. Urla 1993).

    In this excursion into the criminal anthropology of South Africa, then, we explore what, exactly, it is that crime statistics make real, how they take on a public life, by what means they convert the abstract into the intimate, tertiary knowledge into primary experien- ce, quantity into quality. And why it is that they have become so much more than the tools of criminologists and reformers, so pervasive a public passion, so deeply inscribed in nar- ratives of personal being, so vital to the construction of moral publics, so integral to deba- tes about the meaning of democracy, freedom, security, human rights. Conventionally fra- med as value-free information, these numbers appear to be taking on ever more political heft as the modernist state deregulates the functions of governance, as sovereignty is par- sed and privatized, as control over the means of violence is rendered ambiguous, as a cul- ture of “popular punitiveness” gains credence (Bottoms 1995; Haggerty 2001:197). As they do, and as citizens and communities claim more responsibility for their own welfare, modes of producing and deploying crime statistics themselves proliferate. Which – as we intimated a moment ago and shall see in exquisite detail – sets in train processes whose effects, of- ten unremarked, are deeply implicated in remaking the postcolonial nation-state, the nature of its governance, and citizenship within it. But we are running ahead of ourselves.

    SOVEREIGN STATISTICS: the alchemy of numbers

    Critical readings of the history of the industrial revolution and the rise of democracy return repeatedly to the dangerous alchemy of numbers. At work in processes of commodification and bureaucratization, they suggest, was the power of arithmetic to abstract value, to turn people into ciphers, to enable the alienation of humans from their essence and experience. Lefort (1988:18-19), for one, argues that the paradox of the modern idea of “society” is that it can never be made real: far from materializing “the people,” institutions like universal suffrage turn citizens into statistics as “[n]umber replaces substance.” Simmel (1978:297f., 444) thought differently. For him, money was the currency of counting. And while it served to reduce distinction and weaken personal ties, it also enabled the translation and commensuration of difference, giving rise to a society of morally interdepen- dent, self-sufficient persons in which individuals become real in relation to an impersonal mass. Novel modes of accounting, in other words, enable the production of new qualities, subjects, sensations. Even under the most rationalizing of conditions, the traffic between quality and quantity occurs constantly in the production of meaning and value.

    The contentious life of the crime statistic in South Africa makes it plain that enume- ration is never a mere flight from substance: measurement is always mediated by historical conditions as numbers are made to signify in various ways. Some of those ways – the idi- om of the actuarial state, the principle of majority will – have long been integral to the scaf- folding of democracy, sui generis; shades here of de Tocqueville, Weber, and much of the history of liberalism. Others are more specific. Thus apartheid South Africa tried to legiti- mate itself by dis-counting, literally, large sections of the population; its opponents used statistics, from land distribution through poverty datum profiles to mortality rates, to argue against “unrepresentative” rule. More recently, activists striving to persuade the state of its responsibility toward the homeless and HIV/AIDS sufferers have advocated “emancipatory” enumeration (Robins 2003:259-60).3 Indeed, in the “new modernity,” Beck’s (1992) “risk society,” where personal destiny is read in figures, improving one’s chances requires imp- roving the odds (Crawford 2004: 522). Even in colloquial terms, the quality of life is calcula- ted in relation to the law of large numbers: “I want government to provide more security for people like me,” an elderly Mafikeng man told us in 1999, “before I too become a statistic.”

    While the truth-value of numbers has been a focus of bitter debate between the “hard” and “soft” sciences, there have also long been efforts to grasp the statistic as a so- cial construction (Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963; Poovey 1998). One influential development of this concern has been inspired by Foucault’s analysis of enumeration as a means of go- vernance (Cohn 1987:224f.; Anderson 1991:163f.; Appadurai 1996); another emerges from science studies (Haggerty 2001:53: cf. Rose 1999), which have examined the produc- tion of various modes of calculation as “artifacts” yielded by the interplay of actors, institu- tions, and technologies (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Deleuze and Gauttari 1987). Each of these approaches offers insight into the nature of crime counts in post-apartheid South Af- rica; each has limitations. Thus we might ask, a la Foucault, why measures of lawlessness and victimhood have become so salient in defining populations here, overlaying class, race, and political disposition. Yet, pace Foucault, it is equally necessary to take note of a critical politics that has arisen in response to criminal accounting on the part of the state, a politics of the kind that challenges the Idea of “governmentality” as all-purpose social control. Similarly, in charting the tortuous life of numbers, there is much to be gained from tracing the manufacture and circulation of statistical artifacts in the science studies mode: in this instance, by following the argument that rages about official crime tallies, about their implications for the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of rule – itself a fractal drama in which government, the media, citizen-subjects, and other parties conjure the meaning of normality and emergency, state and nation. At the same time, as we shall see, this argument bears the imprint of larger forces than can be grasped from the perspective of scien- ce studies, with its stress on the contingent outcomes of actor networks.

    But let us begin our excursion into the criminal anthropology of the “new” South Afri- ca with the numbers themselves. In so doing, we enter the concrete world of quantifacts inhabited by its citizens, into the paradox of dis/trust with which statistics of state are nego- tiated, into the intricately scaffolded reality that crime counts make of life here.

    EXCURSIONS INTO THE UNREAL: counting crime in the postcolony

    From within the country, crime rates are seen as anything from dire to catastrophic – and, by many, as deteriorating.4 An American study conducted in 2004 found that 81% of the population take lawlessness to be a “serious threat to democracy.”5 Well, how bad is it? How awful a picture is painted by the numbers? In order to answer the question, we suspend disbelief for a moment and draw a synoptic, quick-and-dirty portrait, courtesy of the Criminal Information Analysis Centre (CIAC) of the South African Police Service – with commentary and complementary counts from critical criminologists and non-governmental research organizations. Our figures are for 2002.6

    Violent crime in South Africa is, by any measure, very high indeed. Almost 22,000 people were murdered in 2002, about 48 per 100,000 of the population. Even in the best of years since 1994, some 58 intentional homicides occurred on an “average” day. Add 35,012 attempted murders and 11,087 culpable (i.e. non-intentional) homicides, and the tally of dead and wounded bodies is considerable. Save, of course, next to those laid waste by AIDS, which, at last count,7 claimed 39% of all mortality in the country. By our calcula- tion, homicide, attempted homicide and culpable homicide have, together, yielded 590,098 victims since the transition – more or less 180 per day. Nor is this all the bad news. Three other serious crimes of violence are also noteworthy: in 2002, there were 119,185 recorded armed robberies, 264,399 grievous assaults, and 52,107 rapes. This last figure, important because sexual crimes are the object of particular national anguish, is a lot lower than some of the more dire ones that circulate as mythostats, according to which an incident oc- curs every 4, 11, 17, 35 or 36 seconds.8 The police aggregate is 16.81 times less than one every 36 seconds, the lowest of those faux figures; which means that 17 out of 18 would have to go unreported. The SAPS believes that it is one in three;9 independent victim sur- veys have it that “approximately half of all respondents who [suffer] rape report” it (Hirscho- witz, et al 2000:2). Still, the figure is frighteningly high. So is carjacking, at about 15,000 cases per annum, although they are counted under other offences by the police.

    To what does all this add up? Over half a million (533,870) serious violent offences in 2002 – murders, attempted murders, culpable homicides, rapes, armed robberies, agg- ravated and indecent assaults, kidnapings, and abductions – in a land of 44.8 million souls. And this excludes the 315,623 residential burglaries and 256,593 common assaults. No wonder South Africa has a very anxious population. Vernacular realism here counts its truths, unsurprisingly, in the dramaturgy of damaged persons and seized property.

    Looked at over space and time, though, these gross numbers take on a slightly dif- ferent cast. First space. Perhaps the most striking thing about crime in South Africa is how unevenly distributed it is. For example, almost two-thirds of all murders occur in just three provinces: KwaZulu-Natal, which has the highest incidence, Western Cape, which has the highest rate, and Gauteng, which is reputed to be the homicide capital of the nation, but actually is not. Hijacking is also heavily concentrated: Gauteng (115.4 per 100k) is a hund- red times worse than the least afflicted province and almost four times worse than KwaZulu-Natal, which comes second.10 These patterns of distribution are not always predictable. Take a figure that most South Africans would treat with incredulity: the most violent province in the nation, measured by rates of attempted murder, rape, and grievous assault. KwaZulu-Natal? No, it is the least. Gauteng or the Western Cape, those scenes of televisual mayhem? Wrong again. Limpopo or Mpumalanga, site of frequent witch purgings and vigilante deaths? No. It is the Northern Cape, usually seen as a sleepy, featureless flatland in the arid heart of the country.11

    Patterns of variance become even yet marked as we move to micro-topographical levels. As the Commissioner of Police put it in his report for 2002/3 (see n.6), a huge dis- proportion of serious “contact” crimes occur in a few “township precincts”; specifically, those with high levels of “urbanization” and poverty, large informal settlements, and prolon- ged unemployment.12 This resonates with the received wisdom that, in a still segregated country, whites and Indians suffer attacks on their property, blacks and coloureds, attacks on their person. In fact, many of the latter also fall prey to robbery. And bloodshed does spill over into white and Indian neighborhoods. But, taken across the statistical terrain of South Africa, patterns of crime and victimhood are typically taken to follow lines of race and class; “extreme poverty and extreme risk,” notes Ulrich Beck (1992:41) tend everywhere to “attract” each other. Thus it is that, in December 2003, the Minister of Community Safety for the Western Cape – a portfolio that tells its own story about the contemporary imperati- ves of governance – assured the public that the “flashpoints for murder and rape” in the province “are Khayelitsha and Nyanga,”13 just the kinds of “township precinct” that the Commissioner had in mind. As if the containment of disorder to two of the poorest, most segregated parts of Cape Town should reassure everyone who does not live in them. Giv- en the proclivity to pin lawlessness on young black men – to situate it, that is, at the conflu- ence of race, gender, and generation – the “fact” that violence is highly enclaved plays into a mass-mediated view of “the” townships as breeding grounds of brutality. It also has the effect of erasing the implications of white collar crime, crimes for which whites tend to be collared, in producing the conditions for lawlessness in post-apartheid South Africa.

    As with space, so with time. “Crime, and the fear of crime,” notes Jonny Steinberg (2001:2), “is as old as South Africa itself.” But shifts in the manner of its counting, them- selves deeply political, make the assessment of long term trends difficult (see below). No- netheless, according to the SAPS, most violent offences have either leveled off recently or are on the decrease, some quite steeply; murder, for instance, has dropped by 19% or so since 1994. Nor are the police alone in asserting this. A 2003 national victim survey, done by the independent Institute for Security Studies (ISS 2004), makes even more opti- mistic claims. Its figures – which, like all victim surveys, elicit a high degree of trust among those who traffic in crime stats – show that the only felony to have increased between 1998 and 2003 was housebreaking, and then only slightly. The study also turned up other telling quantifacts. Of the decreasing percentage of people (24.5% to 22.9%) who fell victim to crime, by far the majority were hit by property offences. None of the five most common fe- lonies involved force; only two of the top ten did, assault and robbery. A victimization rate of less than 1% was recorded for murder, sexual assault, and car jacking (ISS 2004:102f.).. Despite these trends, most South Africans – among whom there is an inverse rela- tionship between fear of crime and the “actual risk of violence” (Leggett 2004b:6)14 – belie- ve lawlessness to be on the rise; although profiles of terror are inflected by race and other social considerations (ISS 2004: 40f.). Perhaps because it measures a wide range of inse- curities in a world of changing power relations, few accept at face value information that calls into question the national trauma. For example, in 1998, The Star, a major daily, publi- shed a feature entitled, “The Surprising Truth About Crime.”15 It argued, on strong empirical grounds, that the country had become safer than it had been under apartheid; that, with some exceptions, lawlessness had not “increased drastically in former white suburbs”; that most categories of offence were on a long-term downward spiral. But “people get angry when you say it,” noted Benty Naude, a professor of criminology. “The public perception is wrong,” she added. “Crime is not really as high as people think.” The inflation of mass fear, the article went on to say, is owed to the fact that media reporting is incident, not inci- dence, driven; its stress on sensational acts of violence has the effect of generalizing the singular, thus to feed the impression that criminality has come to saturate the country. The Star predicted the manner in which all this would be read. A host of angry letters to the paper asserted that South Africa remained the most most crime-afflicted place on earth. Is it? How, criminally-speaking, does South Africa measure up to the world? A parenthetic comment first, though. A “common way of ratifying shared belief,” says Seltzer (2004:560), “is to share in [its] suspension”; Americans, he observes, affirm some- thing by saying the opposite, like “its really unbelievable.” This is no less true in South Afri- ca, where the terrifying reality of violence is materialized in words like “unreal.” But a collec- tive sense of selfhood in the face of disorder is also conjured up, here, by evoking the argot of exceptionalism. This, it is said, is the “murder capital” of the world. It has the highest rate of rape. And so on. Nor is this altogether fanciful. While international comparisons are no- toriously difficult, among countries that report their crime figures in more or less commen- surable ways – less than half of those on the planet – South Africa does seem to have among the worst rates of most violent felonies;16 although there are some surprises, like the fact that a recent UN report showed Estonia and Canada to have over double its per capita incidence of rape.17

    On the other hand, South Africa ranks much lower for property offences. According to the Seventh United Nations Survey on Crime Trends (see n.16), it came only 18th, in 2000 for all categories of theft – behind many “developed” countries, including those to which scared South Africans have chosen to emigrate. Against its rate of 1,287.21, Austra- lia (3,514.65), New Zealand (3,313.25), England and Wales (3,257.52), and Canada (2,220.77) look far worse; so do the Netherlands (4,580.26), Norway (4,281.34), France (3,963.83), Germany (3,701.56), Denmark (3,633.73), Iceland (2,662.99), and Finland (2,207.71), all of them commonly seen as havens of peace, order, and civility. Similar pat- terns and rankings obtain for other property offences. In fact, on the United Nations “grand total of recorded crimes” for 2000, which includes violent offences, South Africa was 10th, after New Zealand, England and Wales, the USA, the Netherlands, and Canada. This rank is inflated, moreover: the “grand total” omits several nations, many of them thought to be crime-ridden, that did not submit figures to the UN. Over the long run, too, South Africa’s relative position seems to be improving, not least because felony rates have been going up fast across the world; note, in this connection, the argument, made by John Gray (1998) and others, that the downside of “the neoliberal project” is a destructive escalation in global incidences of lawlessness and imprisonment. Thus, between 1997 and 2001, robbery inc- reased on average by 24% in Europe and 128% in Japan; violent criminality, by 22% in the EU (50% in France, 35% in the Netherlands, and 26% in England and Wales) and 79% in Japan (Barclay and Tavares 2003:2). Against this, if we believe the SAPS and the 2003 victim survey, the South African picture looks less dire. But could this more positive, less exceptionalist gloss be a product of the fact that less crimes are brought to the attention of the police here than elsewhere? Not really. All the comparative evidence suggests that South Africans report crime as often as citizens in other countries (Louw 1998:12f.).

    There is, however, a qualification to be made at this juncture. A decade ago, Lorrai- ne Glanz (1994:10) declared, peremptorily, that it is impossible to “know precisely how much crime takes place in South Africa, or anywhere else.” Glanz should know. Or, rather, not know. She was to become the Director of Crime Statistics in the post-apartheid Department of Justice. What she was pointing to, implicitly, is the fact that police statistics every- where are erected on an edifice of indeterminacies and impossibilities.

    The most pervasive of those indeterminacies are pragmatic. Official figures are composited from cases either brought to the police by the public or turned up by their own investigations. As a result, they inevitably under-count the incidence of crime; in South Afri- ca, this is made worse by a historic mistrust of the law, by the belief that conviction rates are low, and by the uneven bureaucratic capacities of the SAPS. But felonies may also beover-reported. This is less remarked in South Africa, with its strong public predilection to stress the pathological. According to both the police commissioner and the press,18 there has been a palpable increase in false claims of late, largely for financial motives; bearing false witness to having suffered crime is itself becoming a major category of criminality. Nor is it confined to minor misdemeanors. It extends to robbery, hijacking, housebreaking, ass- ault, sexual violation, arson, even homicide.19 It is impossible, of course, to establish the precise extent of either under- or over-reporting. Together, they make the quantifactual world of crime impossible to plumb.

    But indeterminacies inhere in other things as well. Some are purely actuarial, like the fact that crime rates are necessarily calculated against size of population – which, in South Africa, is affected by the presence of an unknown, if often wildly-guessed-at, number of “aliens.” Others lie in record-making itself. For example, the eventual disposition of felony figures often depends on whether a reported episode is coded as, say, attempted rape, sexual abuse, or aggravated assault, as murder or culpable homicide, kidnaping or abduction. A high level of arbitrariness is unavoidable. What is more in this respect, official statistics do not re-classify dockets once they have gone through the courts. Thus a death listed as murder that turns out to have been suicide, a car jacking or burglary or rape that morphs into a fraud case, an abduction that becomes a homicide; each of these will remain where they were originally tallied, there to disfigure official numbers in ways that are well-nigh impossible to ascertain – numbers that can, at best, paint a highly schematic, distorted picture of law and disorder in South Africa.

    Yet another species of indeterminacy derives from a quite different source. Because crime statistics are the dual products of police work and public reporting, it follows that they will fluctuate in proportion to the efficacy of the SAPS and the trust placed in it by the popu- lation. Hence, paradoxically, rising crime rates may be less an indicator of rising crime than it is of increased confidence in, and the success of, policing; less, in other words, a function of lawbreaking than of law enforcement. Or, which is most likely, of a complicated dialectic of the two. But the disfiguration of the real lies not only in the production of crime statistics. It also inheres in their circulation. There is, it appears, a proportional relationship between the generality of a quantifact and its capacity to travel as knowledge. The more inflected or refined any number, the less likely it is to survive the rigors of movement or mediation. It is only the most gross, least qualified – those that erase the differences which make a difference – that become national truths. Thus, to return to our example for all seasons, South African murder figures are cited constantly as a symptom of the state of disorder in the land. Rarely is reference made to the highly inflected geography that restricts most kill- ing to relatively confined spaces, spaces with a specifiable sociology. In this respect, the social geography of violence resembles those of countries like the USA or Brazil, which have lower homicide rates, but whose death zones in inner cities and favelas are not all that dissimilar from the sites of greatest danger here; indeed, relative enclaving is, arguab- ly, a better key to the calculus of risk than are national aggregates.

    When fully parsed, then, crime patterns in South Africa – even read through a haze of indeterminate numbers – are less exceptional than public discourse allows. But such ni- ceties are erased in the circulation of quantifacts. Among other things, this reasserts the contemporary mythos of a society at risk, its populace equally endangered. Which, as a large body of research shows, the population here is not. It also leaves intact the racial ar- chetype according to which the source of disorder lies overwhelmingly at the hands of young black men who are – in a metaphor that will prove both apt and unfortunate – hold- ing the country to ransom. Lost, too, is the fact South Africa has a social history, and a poli- tical sociology, in which statistics have come to mean different things to different people.

    To the extent that the crime stat is a mode of objectification, alike a means by which realities are realized and a lens through which a nation may see itself, they take on special salience in South Africa. Why? Most immediately, because, under the ancien regime, they did not circulate as a free currency of social knowledge; matters of law and order were ma- naged by the state as part of its racial politics of security. Besides which, black-on-black crime was under-counted because blacks did not count. Indeed, it has been said that, be- fore 1994, “the ‘real’ state of crime” was never reported (Marsh 1999:76; Shaw 1997; Em- mett 2000:290). But something more profound has happened than the mere provision of new, improved information. It is only with the opening up of a democratic public sphere – or, rather, of variously articulated spheres – that South Africa, as an undivided polity, has been able to reflect on itself, on its social order, on the spirit of a polity reborn. And in that process, crime statistics have become a standardized measure of disorder, marking out a new emergency to replace those of old. They are, as it were, a medium of populist dis- course that appears, also, to be a message.

    To say that the “real” extent of lawlessness in South Africa is unknown, that official statistics are a fact-making fiction, is not to deny the reality of crime. Or the brutal truths to which the numbers speak. Nor is it to deny that South Africans encounter criminality in visceral, concrete terms – whether it be at first hand, by anecdotal narration, or by a barra- ge of mediated incidents that, in their repeated re-telling, take on a perceptual mass of their own. As they do, these encounters morph from incidents to incidence, read in “the public mind” as the state of the nation, as the law in disorder, as a world under threat. Thus it is that numbers become a vehicle for the experience of the unreal, an experience that transforms the abstract into the sensate, general into the particular, the unknowable into the known. All of which serves to conjure up, once more, our reality-producing aphorism: Crime in South Africa is unreal. Therein, if we may be forgiven the pun, lies its truth value.

    THE CALCULUS OF POLITICS

    “They are now treating [crime statistics] like they are national security secrets.” Ted Leggett, BBC News, 7 October 2003.20

    In July 2000, Steve Tshwete, then Minister for Safety and Security, announced a moratorium on all official statistics. Due to grave doubts about their accuracy, he said, no more would be published for the while: the Police Commissioner had ordered a revision of prevailing procedures of data gathering and calculation. During the hiatus, government would continue to collect figures for its own purposes. But not for public consumption. Then, almost a year later, and as suddenly, the silence came to an end. On 31 May 2001, Tshwete declared that a re-tooled technology of number production was in place: the SAPS had a new, computerised Crime Administration System, new manuals, new staff, new training arrangements and equipment, more precise definitions of felonies, even fresh crime statistics.21 A New Era of Enumeration had dawned. The flow of figures began again.

    Once more, South Africa was awash in a stream of stats.
    When he announced the moratorium, the Minister seems to have sensed what was to come. The ban, he insisted, was “not an attempt at secrecy.” But then, as if to confirm suspicions to the contrary, he berated those who “bl[e]w South Africa out of existence by blowing up the levels of crime.”22 As he anticipated, the announcement was greeted with outrage. Opposition politicians accused the African National Congress of “an absolute abuse of power…outrageous in…a democratic country.”23 Independent researchers, noting that South African figures were the best on the continent, said that the withholding of crime information would “foster mistrust between the rulers and the ruled.”24 Could it be, asked one, “that the police…do not like what the statistics say?”25

    Perhaps the loudest protest came from the print media, for whom crime figures are a daily staple, their febrile fluctuations marking the pulse of national life. In the void left by the blackout, reporters set about doing their own counts “in the public interest.” The Cape Times called on readers for accounts of violent incidents on the notoriously crime-ridden N2 highway, a vital artery that has long been a corridor of conflict between the dispossess- ed and the prosperous who drive by to and from Cape Town. By compiling “an accurate picture” of risk, the paper hoped to goad the SAPS into action.26 Soon after, Independent Newspapers, arguing that the moratorium violated the Constitution, took legal action ag- ainst the Minister of Safety and Security and the Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape Province.27 Joining the chorus, the opposition Democratic Alliance alleged that, in the absence of proper statistics, it was impossible to “evaluate the performance of government” in discharging one of its most fundamental duties: ensuring the security of citizens.28 Public opinion was as vociferous: “Surely one of the best ways to counter the negative impact of crime…is the greatest possible degree of transparency from our public representatives?” wrote a typically angry correspondent to the Cape Times, indignantly offering a tally of his own recent encounters with crime.29

    The argument continued as long as the ban itself. Nor did it abate fully when the moratorium ended. This furore makes clear how crime statistics have become objects of struggle, how they crystalize debate among disparate parties in an expansive political process. As gauges of disorder, they are now the diagnostic index of the effectiveness of governance; which is why their publication is a vital sign of the transparency now synony- mous with democratic rule. As lawlessness eclipses other threats in the popular ima- gination, citizens regard this information as an inalienable right. And government, itself an increasingly complex amalgam of public and private interests whose functions are defined in terms of service provision, is seen above all as a guarantor of law and order to the citizen-consumer – even in South Africa, where there is still some commitment on the part of the state to public welfare amidst neoliberal devolution.

    Small wonder, then, that ruling regimes should feel compelled to produce credible crime counts. And to put a favorable spin on them for public consumption. Small wonder, too, that scholars, commentators, and the population at large should be wary of these counts, suspecting them of various sorts of misinformation. Nor is this a specifically South African problem. In September 2002, criminal justice experts in the U.S. expressed con- cern that the Attorney General was “exerting political control” over previously independent agencies responsible for collecting crime statistics.30

    To count crime, in short, is to produce the stuff of politics (cf. Dixon 2002). This has three dimensions. The first is epistemic. It lies in the nature of measurement itself. As we saw above, “true” rates of lawlessness are unknowable, “accurate” comparisons in space and time are all but impossible, and felony figures are an indeterminate product of the in- terplay of law-breaking and law enforcement. All of which lays the ground for a more calcu- lating play on quantifacts, one that seeks make them signify in different ways for different ends. This is the second dimension of the politics of crime statistics, the strategic, one much in evidence in the controversy over the moratorium. Here all parties “argued with numbers,” using them to confirm their own assertions and to discount those touted by others. Thus, where critics censured the withholding of data that reflected poorly on the state, and victims published counts in order to highlight statistical subterfuges, government accused the media of an unpatriotic inflation of levels of crime.

    The play of political strategy has been most palpable in relation to the national homi- cide rate, not least because it remains the standardized nightmare of most South Africans, a measure of the obscenity of a people wallowing in its own blood. Predictably, the state has reacted strongly to the assertion that the country is the “murder capital of the world.” One official response has been to try to counter South Africa’s alleged exceptionalism by placing its statistics in favorable light. Thus, in its first quarterly report after the moratorium (CIAC 2001), the SAPS presented a set of bold global contrasts; among them, the fact that, where Washington, D.C. had a homicide rate of 69.34 per 100,000 for January-June 1998, Pretoria’s was 41.12. While the logic at work in this comparison might not be totally arbitrary, it drew a sharp riposte: D.C. was the city with the steepest rate in the US, chided criminologist Ted Legget (2003); Pretoria was far from that here. Local figures for murder, rape, and aggravated robbery, went the counter-argument, are still “terrifyingly high” (Louw and Schönteich 2001:45). But the efforts of government to “spin” South African statistics continue unabated: housebreaking and assault are worse in Australia, we are told, car theft more prevalent in Canada, personal safety levels lower in the UK, and so on. At issue, in this counterfactual conjuring with comparison, is the production of a state of normality – and, hence, a normal state. To argue, both for domestic and foreign consumption, that rates of violent disorder are declining, at worst “stabilizing,” or that the police are “winning the war against crime,” is to assert that state, to assert the state.

    As this suggests, crime statistics have become inflated political tender. Among other things, they are an index of national worth in a global marketplace in which southern poli- ties must meet northern scrutiny in respect of democratization, stability, and credit-worthi- ness, and the like. In contention are such prizes as investment, foreign aid, tourism, world sports events. Spiking the public argument about numbers is the sense that what is “really” at issue are unspoken and unspeakable matters of race. African politicians and cultural commentators often suggest that the exaggeration of lawlessness in white media is an insi- dious form of racism, disparaging the ability of a black government to maintain order, of black police to enforce the law, of black youth to behave with civility. Conversely, many whites feel themselves to be the victims of a system in which violent crime is a form of racial revenge (van Rooyen 2000).

    Tangible in the controversy over crime figures has been the paradox of dis/trust of which we spoke earlier. Allegations about the abuses of enumeration seem only to affirm the faith in their revelatory potential, raising their value and intensifying the quest for ever more rigorous measurement. Thus it is that, despite suspicions about the distorting effects of statistics, especially in the service of a calculating government, hope remains in the re- demptive power of “accurate” – i.e. unmediated – numbers. Herein lies their quality as fe- tish. Note, in this respect, the enthusiasm for two internationally-acclaimed techniques of enumeration recently introduced in South Africa, victim surveys and geographical informa- tion systems (GIS). Far from being subjected to critique, they are widely held to offer a more exact purchase on levels of disorder. But these are not purely technical instruments: they have social and political implications, marking notable shifts in the ways that crime is conceived and counted. And how it is made to signify in public discourse.31

    It is precisely at the level of discourse that we must seek the third, the constitutive dimension of crime statistics. Because of the way they circulate, these numbers translate large vectors of danger into personal and collective markers of risk, subjectivity, identity. In so doing, they render numinous forces of disorder into concrete, communicable “facts,” conjuring up citizens, moral communities, the nation. Herein lies their “politics” in the lower case: their capacity to contrive or reproduce meaningful social categories. Nor is this merely a matter of official figures, victim surveys, or geographical information systems. Vernacular statistics, everyday forms of counting crime, are also tropes of popular interaction in South Africa; they feature centrally in narratives of lawlessness, themselves a vital idiom of public culture here. The semiotics of popular accounting turn out to be integral to the figuration of self, community, and society in the postcolony. It is to this, the constitutive dimension of statistics, that we devote the rest of this essay.

    CONSTITUTING THE CITIZEN-VICTIM
    “I want to reclaim my right to be wounded without my pain having to turn me into an example of woman as victim.” Njabulo Ndebele, The Cry of Winnie Mandela, 2003

    Victim surveys have gained currency across the world over the past thirty years; evi- dence, this, of a shift of attention in criminology from perpetrators to those whom they harm (Fattah 1986; Maguire and Pointing 1988). In 1987, an International Crime Victim Survey was proposed by the Council of Europe; a standardized version has now been carried out in over 50 countries. In the US and UK, national surveys are done on a regular basis. The method, which involves questioning a sample of people about their experience of a range of offences over a stipulated period of time, is said by its advocates to enhance official sta- tistics, casting light on the “dark figure of crime”: offences, like sexual abuse and assault, routinely under-reported, most of all among the poor and powerless (Banks 1997:11). These claims have been given wide credence, though some critics insist that underclasses are less likely to report “minor crimes” (Cramer 1995; Kleck 1991:175-6), that subjective recollection is always unreliable, and that the method is “not ideally suited” for collecting incidents of an intimate sort, registering a lower rate than do police statistics in respect of offences such as rape (ISS 2004:126).

    For those who champion them, these surveys are more than just an improved measure of crime. The technique has been propelled by an international movement, part of a world-wide politics of suffering, that has lobbied against a global “establishment” allegedly prejudiced against victims, victims held to be excluded from criminal justice processes for being “emotional and vindictive” (van Dijk 1996:1; Camerer 1997:1).32 In South Africa – where the rights of the injured were dramatically endorsed by the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission soon after the end of apartheid – the first national survey was conducted by the Department of Safety and Security in 1998.33 A second, the one mention- ed above, was done by the Institute for Security Studies in 2003 (ISS 2004).

    The methods employed in victim surveys resemble those of market research. As neoliberal political culture comes ever more to define citizens as consumers, casualties of crime seem most aptly depicted as customers ill-served by government. For advocates of “victimology,” the consumer perspective is crucial to rethinking received, state-centric app- roaches to law and disorder. “Get tough” policies have had little success in curbing crime, they note; evidence from across the world suggests that police resources are better spent protecting those at risk (Camerer 1997:1; Farrell and Pease 2001). But more than address- ing state policy, these surveys aim to be vehicles of popular empowerment. “By shifting the focus of the inquiry from the offender” say Camerer et al (1998:1), they “provide information which enables victims themselves to take preventive action against further victimization.” Victims themselves turns out to be the key phrase.

    Displaying a generically neoliberal suspicion of government, the victim movement is wary of having its cause hijacked as an alibi for harsher “law and order.” It accuses the state of “stealing” crime from those who suffer it – and of redefining it as an offence against itself. “Victims,” proponents maintain, “are victims in their own right,…an end in themselves” (Camerer et al 1998:2). They seek to mobilize “civil society” behind “victims’ charters,” de- manding compensation from ruling regimes for their failure to maintain order.34 This stress on self-advocacy resonates with a more general tendency to displace politics into the do- main of the law and to reduce it to redress and punishment (Brown 1995:27; J. Comaroff n.d.; Comaroff and Comaroff 2003). Victim surveys, then, are part of an encompassing set of forces reshaping governance, public culture, and politics at the point at which the risk- bearing subject meets the right-bearing subject.35

    From the perspective of these surveys, “each member of society is an indirect or vi- carious victim of crime” (Glanz 1989:1), either a victim or a potential victim. While their data inform prevention strategies, they are directed largely at the public, being widely circulated by the media, often in dramatic form. In this manner, they become one many mechanisms – from NGO’s promoting civil protections to ubiquitous ads for home security – that encourage people to view themselves as prey; in this manner, too, they may create what they measure. Thus one study of Durban (Robertshaw et al 2001), having asked respondents about their perceptions of lawlessness, concluded that “many South Africans feel helpless and trapped by the fear of crime.” A wealth of evidence confirms that citizens identify them- selves ever more in terms of vulnerability to violation. And they organize on this basis too: support groups mobilize around rape victims, neighborhood watches form in the wake of attacks, petitions circulate in the name of the injured. Even felons see themselves as casu- alties: “Criminality, you have made me your victim!” declared an inmate at a spirited hiphop and poetry performance inside Cape Town’s Pollsmoor prison.36 Similarly an article in The Big Issue, organ of the “marginalized and unemployed,” which described youths in custody as “helpless animals, dumb and resigned behind their bars” (Kretzmann 2004:17).

    The victim surveys published and publicized in South Africa to date offer insight into the unintended ways in which enumeration implies evaluation. The results of the national survey of 2003, for example, were released so as to have maximum impact on public dis- cussion in the run up to the general election of 2004, in which crime was a emotive issue. They received prominent coverage. The media stressed that, despite the stabilization of lawlessness since 1998, the public felt less safe than it had five years before.37 Whatever else they conveyed, their reports gave graphic, pigmented accounts of people in fear. “Race Group’s Views of Safety Differ,” said a typical headline.38 In surveys of this sort, by contrast to official statistics, victimization and the anxieties to which it gives rise are heavily profiled in terms of hard-edged classifications of race, gender, age, and location. While they reveal persisting inequities in risk and security, these measures also reify old catego- ries at a time when identities and relations among them are under reconstruction. A widely reported study by Ted Leggett, for example, asserts that “Coloureds [are] twice as likely to be murdered,” and are much more likely to be jailed, than are blacks, whites, and Indians; his evidence is based on numbers from the Cape Flats, a terrain on which identities are often rendered highly ambiguous. The Director-General of Labor in the Western Cape, who found the study “disturbing,” remarked that it lent itself to the “demoniz[ation] and iso- lat[ion] of a whole group of South Africans.”39

    Undoubtedly, victim surveys expand received understandings of crime. Undoubtedly, too, they provide a counterpoint to official data, albeit sometimes as much for their similarities as for their differences. But, like all social measures, they are also complex discur- sive processes. As Wendy Brown (1995:21) argues, efforts to protect those with injury-for- ming identities may entrench the very thing they denounce. In seeking to counter insecurity by showing who is most susceptible to attack, profiling reinforces risk by reproducing cate- gories of victim in need of protection. And by instilling a culture of fear. This sense of vulne- rability is the ironic underside of liberalization, of a climate in which subjects are held to be “active participants in their own governance” – and government is, in theory at least, a me- chanism for the adjudication of decision-making (Rose 1993). Which is why politics, increa- singly, is centered on recognition, often through the law, for the entitlements of the relatively disadvantaged; why the disempowered are no longer a class but claimants in class actions; why social movements, formed out of shared disabilities, pursue rights to reverse wrongs. Citizenship here is defined as personal fulfilment: as a process of ongoing risk avoidance that rests on “incessant calculations” (Rose and Miller 1992: 201). But devolution has its limits, which are made manifest where freedom and choice run up against the real threat of victimhood.

    It is at this juncture that the paradoxical role of the state becomes visible. In calling for more policing, ordinary South Africans insist that an ordered world is impossible without regulation on the part of an interventionist state; hence the mantra that democracy is en- dangered by criminality. While the victim movement keeps its distance from government, a heightened awareness of the entitlements of citizens translates into a demand that the administration get tough on crime. Not only is there broad skepticism about “human rights policing,” believed to favor criminals over their prey, but there are continuing demands to bring back the death penalty, a topic we revisit below. This mood of popular punitiveness is the under-side of “minimal governance”: it is the animating force that allows the latter to transpose itself into its opposite when, in the name of emergency, executive authority over- rides civil liberties. The line between neoliberal government and fascism-lite, as the history of the present shows, is gossamer thin.

    In all this, the victim has a double-valence. S/he is claimed both by the state as it declares war on crime and by civil activists seeking recompense for the injured (van Dijk 1996:123). “The public,” meanwhile, becomes an aggregate of the imperilled, in which identity and difference are defined in terms of hurt and trauma. And entities like “community” and “neighborhood,” constructs with little other sociological salience, are given fresh life in the search for security, a search that begets new public-private institutions, new forms of surveillance, new modes of control.

    CRIMINAL GEOGRAPHY

    If victim surveys reduce the sociology of disorder to probabilities of injury over time, geographical information systems plot insecurity in space. In essence, GIS overlays one slice of information on another produce a single layer of previously unseen associations. Focusing primarily on criminal incidents, offender movements, and profiles of “targets, it has increasingly incorporated the “victim” as a category of analysis – for example, in dis- cerning the role of location in repeat victimization. As this implies, the two approaches may complement one another: one charts patterns from on high, the other from subjective ex- perience. Rose and Miller (1992:202) see this kind of complementarity as typical of the re- gulated autonomy of neoliberal polities, in which a stress on self-assertive citizenship exists alongside mechanisms for “governing at a distance.” But the two modes of measurement can also come into conflict. Some critics contrast the grounded truth of victim experience with the reified data generated by GIS, questioning the fetishism of its technology and the faith placed in its explanatory powers.

    In the era of “intelligence-led” policing (Read 2001:xxi), the expanded use of GIS un- derlines the ever more prominent role of statistics as vehicles of communication across the dispersed agencies – state, public, corporate, academic – that comprise the “partnerships” of neoliberal rule. Crime statistics circulate not merely as information, but as mediated discourse about the nature and efficacy of governance itself. Unlike victim surveys, which have been used as much to challenge state institutions as to inform them, GIS is a synoptic instrument (Obermeyer 1995:81) most useful in the centralized management of disorder. It has also been deployed in the development of methods of surveillance-from-a- distance, like CCTV, the advent of which has raised questions across the world about violations of privacy (Cho 1998:162). The recent announcement that new British crime-fighting initiatives would include the satellite tracking of serial offenders prompted at least one journalist to remind the Prime Minister of the Human Rights Act.40 But for the most part, such scruples succumb to the popular desire for security. In South Africa, GIS has largely been deployed, more modestly, to map incidents reported to the police. Yet enthusiasm for it has been marked: in 2001, the Minister for Safety and Security announced that it had been introduced at 340 police stations and would “greatly enhance…operational planning.”41

    A virtue of GIS, it is said, is its power to “influence people” by translating statistical analysis into accessible visual displays (Hirschfield and Bowers 2001:6). It is also held to reveal otherwise invisible risk factors for various sorts of offence by situating hotspots of reported attacks in their physical locale. But how exactly does an elaborate mapping of the distribution of lawlessness advance our understanding of its incidence? Ken Pease (2000: 228f), reflecting on the British scene, worries that the visual seductiveness of GIS – and a measure of technophilia – may inflate its importance at the expense of other ways of ap- proaching crime. Mapping belies the fact that victimization is not always structured along spatial lines, he argues. Nor does it capture the experience of those who share anything other than location.42 In short, the claim that GIS enables information to be “seen at a glance” is misleading. Note though, that “victimization,” the actual experience of the injured, re- mains the naked truth that GIS ought to be able to explain.

    Pease has hit on a critical problem here. The invocation of space as source of deter- mination in GIS derives not from a principled criminological theory. It is owed to techniques capable of making patterns of disorder seem so tangible as to be self-explanatory. But space is always, in the first instance, a product of human practice, both material and mean- ingful. As Merleau-Ponty (1962) and others (e.g. Soja 1989) have insisted, it does not exist in unmediated form, as a thing with determinations of its own. If this is true, it cannot, in it- self, reveal hidden causes – however it may be mapped.43 Yet GIS and victim surveys pre- sume that they can, casting their data into categories – “inner city,” “suburb,” “township,” “informal settlement” – that turn race and class into space. And attribute to it an inordinate explanatory weight (see e.g. Robertshaw et al 2001:68; Louw et al 1998:20f.).

    The deployment of crime maps in official reports and public media says much about their role as vehicles of inscription and communication – and about their effects on popular perceptions of space, danger, identity. If maps of state mark out the terrain of the nation, GIS “hotspots” show, vividly, the limits of governance. They delineate where order ends, where disorder prevails. Here the panoptic eye is ambiguous. It is not that of the criminal justice system. It is the dispassionate gaze of a technology that may be deployed, alike by private interests or by ruling regimes, for policing, scientific research, commerce. Even organized crime. If these qualify as instruments of “government at a distance,” to return to a more general issue to which we alluded above, what exactly is government? Foucauld- ians, eager to avoid the reification of the state, deploy the term to gloss the “shifting al- liances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facts of economic activity, social life and individual conduct” (Rose and Miller 1992:174). But surely this reifies “governance” instead, fudging critical questions about the effects of privatization and technicization on organized power; questions about the collaboration, in our Brave Neo World, of different sorts of regulation – from law enforcement, through the regulation of intellectual property, to the management of markets. The term seems even less adequate in disclosing how technologies like GIS serve as modes of social control.

    Take an instance of the deployment of crime maps in the South African media: a full-page spread, “Pinpointing Our Crime Hotspots,” in the Saturday Star in 1999.44 It cen- ters on a map of Gauteng, embellished with graphics of a gun, prone bodies, a relict infant, a pair of cuffed hands. Box inserts tabulate figures for the “top-ten hit parade”: the policing areas with the highest concentration of serious crimes. The text situates the reader on this chart of terror: “Tourists and locals alike are familiar with Gauteng’s reputation as South Africa’s crime capital,” it begins, “but there are certain areas where you are more likely to be the victim of a specific type of crime than others.”

    Here it becomes clear how statistical renderings intersect, in “real life” situations, with other genres of representation, giving rise to the total crime fact. The communicative powers of GIS are extended for maximum impact, being overlaid by a montage of melodramatic images drawn from a standard repertoire. This graphic is framed by headlines that sport the grit-and-flash of classic crime reporting. The prose translates the panoptical data on the map into the implications for the reader-as-potential-victim. Together, they illuminate how so-called risk-reducing data information triggers trauma by tying victimhood to identity. “Women living in Johannesburg, Soweto, and Vaalrand should exercise extra caution be- cause in these areas between 43 and 216 women are raped for every 100,000,” says the text. “If you live in Pretoria or Johannesburg, ensure you have a good security system or a fierce dog, because the two cities are equally susceptible to housebreaking.” Finally, “[i]f you are able to dodge hijackers, be careful where you park your car: Avoid Pretoria and Johannesburg’s city center….” and so on. The report garnered considerable attention. In Mmabatho, where the Saturday Star has a large readership, it prompted one Tswana family to consider bringing their daughter back from college in Gauteng. Such “authoritative” interventions, like terror alerts issued by the US Department of Homeland Security since 9/11, are a common feature of official communication in the risk society. They announce serious threats that – while highlighting vulnerable people and places – are agonizingly vague. Risk, as the word itself suggests, is terminally uncertain, at once “both real and unreal” (cf. Beck 1992:29). Which is why it is always open to exploitation.

    The technical aura of the map in the Saturday Star coexists with the mis-en-scene of sensational media crime. Risk avoidance is written in a register calculated to induce fear: the hapless addressee is asked to pondering odds of surviving in Johannesburg, where simply being female is a mortal threat, where owning property requires a fierce dog, where driving a car invites a joust with jackers. No wonder that more than one survey has shown that South Africans, especially bourgeois city-dwellers, are becoming ever more fearful of crime. This imploding terror is the outcome of various intersecting processes, among them, the desire to perfect the measurement of disorder, an active private market in security, and an eagerness to sell newspapers.

    But the value that accrues to these maps as they circulate, as they invoke appre- hensive subjects and publics, is conditioned also by a wider social context: one in which violence has become a currency of politics and of economic enterprise; in which govern- ment both abhors the threat of disorder, yet uses it for its own ends; in which citizens are at once repelled and fascinated by lawlessness; in which other urgent threats, like poverty and ill-health, are eclipsed, making it more likely that crime serves as a routine mode of production and representation. The publication of evocative maps owes much to a deregu- lation of the means of enforcement, to an effort, in the words of a community policing spokesman, to get individuals and neighborhoods to “take responsibility…”45 Yet as we have said, these attempts seem to achieve precisely the opposite, fueling ever more insis- tent calls on government to treat crime “like the national emergency it is” – calls that make repeated appeal to statistics to substantiate their cause. 46

    TRAUMA TESTIMONIES AND MYTHOSTATS: figuring popular experience

    Crime rates, we have argued, are a psychic barometer. They measure the fall of old lines of separation, old securities – and the rise of new modes of integration, expectation, redistribution. But how exactly do they feature in popular discourse? What prompted us to contradict Nelson Mandela in asserting that, far from rendering it alien, numbers give substance to experience?

    A telling statistic of the recent South African past is that 58% of its metropolitan population (49% overall) had discussed crime in the prior two weeks (ISS 2004:49f.). Narratives of lawlessness rival the weather and sport as a topic of common talk, cutting across existing lines of difference: testimonies to transcendent truths, they root their cre- dibility in the fidelity of ordinary experience. These narratives are mundane melodramas whose endless retailing appears to wrest order from chaos. Tokens of a type, they evince several common features. One is to distill circumstantial evidence into fact by enumerating incidences. Not only does this signal veracity. It imparts primary value to second or third- hand happenings, translating a multiplicity of events into a shared subjective reality. The play between quantity and quality involves a humdrum hermeneutic that seeks to spell out the social proportions of risk and uncertainty. Vide this story, told us in June 2000 by a Tswana woman in her mid-70’s:

    Taxis have become very dangerous here in Mafikeng. My daughter had a terrifying experience last November: she hailed a taxi that was traveling to town. By the time it got to the main road, she was the only passenger in the van. The driver, who was drunk, turned sharply in the wrong direction and picked up speed. When L. called out to him, he pointed a gun over his shoulder and kept going. Luckily, he was for- ced to slow down behind a donkey cart, and she leapt out, rolling dow n a bank at the side of the road. She was badly bruised, and lost her purse. This is now the third case I have heard of recently in which women have had trouble in taxis. We really can’t travel around the way we used to in this town, even to wakes or funerals.

    This testimonial evokes the complicity of the listener by voicing several indices of verisimi- litude. It begins with a fact for which the tale is evidence: the risks of taxi-riding, itself iconic of the mobility brought by liberation and liberalization. The legitimacy of the speaker as witness, and the status of the story as evidence, derives from the relationship of narrator to victim; in this case, mother to daughter. Detailing personal connections assimilates the events to the terms of intimate experience. “We” – black, petit-bourgeois, peri-urban women – are meant to feel terror as an ordinary ride becomes a nightmare journey, death just the flick of a drunken trigger-finger away. And so crime produces its own subjects and sensations of the real, its culture of vicarious victimhood. Her story is our experience. It is all too real: we are all victims of taxi assault, we have all lost our freedom to violence.

    Tales of this kind are less about uniquely horrifying events than about the “fact” that such things have become commonplace. The incident in the taxi invoked other instances, however imprecise their comparability. “This is the third case I have heard of” turns random occurrence into a condition of public being and suffering. A letter to the Cape Times from a recently-returned emigre, written during the moratorium on statistics, deploys a similar semiotics of (ac)counting:

    In the 12 weeks I have been back…I have personally “encountered” 10 criminal acts against friends and acquaintances…At nearly one incident per week these statistics are mind-bending. If this is happening in my relatively affluent and sheltered life, I can only imagine what life must be like in less protected areas.47

    Again we see how the idiom of calculation makes visible the limits of order and, thereby, gains purchase on a people united in its vulnerability against the state. Street statistics are a means of embracing otherwise unimaginable sectors of society (“the less protected”) into a nation in search of security. The writer computes a home-made victim count, multiplying his “personal encounters” tenfold, thus assimilating third-hand incidents to first-hand experience. The numbers here make evident a hidden truth to which “the public” has a right – and, at the same time, inflate the menace.

    Here, as in the taxi tale, quantity turns into a qualifact: that the nation is in trouble. In this world, shared truths, about crime or anything else, come from the victims. “How many more innocent people have to die before the government will admit that its so-called law and order is a sick joke,” wrote Patsy Tyler to the Cape Argus in July, 2003.48 Tyler challenges the public to “stand up and be counted.” Anyone who has suffered crime should submit an account, and the media should declare a day on which to publish them, so that “every story has been told.” A “comprehensive list” of offences inflicted on its citizens would “shame our government in the eyes of the world.”

    But the popular calculus of crime also works by magnifying epic events into mytho- stats: events that, in their singularity, come to signify collective being and trauma – and, in turn, give rise to the most terrifying statistic of all, namely, that everyone “knows” one or more people who have suffered brutal attack. Spectacular violence tends to be a ne- cessary condition for an incident to have this effect. Other social considerations also add uncommon sign value to particular episodes; their occurrence, for example, in relatively en- closed populations hitherto largely free from violence. Like the slaying of 52-year-old Mot- lhabane Makolomakwa in the quiet North West village of Matlonyane. Known as “Ten-Ten” after a famed soccer star, the victim was the most prominent resident of his impoverished community; a successful farmer, former mid-level government employee, and chair of the local “tribal council,” he had also sponsored a football team. In 1994, five youths hacked and burned him to death in his own truck. They insisted that he had killed their fathers and turned them into zombies – this being a common explanation nowadays for why some become rich while others, especially young males, remain jobless. Found guilty, the “boys” were each sentenced to twenty years.49 The murder and High Court trial, which were avidly covered by local media, riveted the Tswana-speaking population of the province. They made plain just how much the division between young and old had been exacerbated by fears of escalating crime. Older citizens returned repeatedly to the incident as evidence of a loss of community and respect for authority among “the children.” For them, it underlined the virtues of “traditional” discipline. Young men, on the other hand, took the case to illust- rate the negative effects of the monopolization, by their seniors, of the means of producing wealth. Among both, it hardened lines of generation and intergenerational conflict.

    Another set of collective identities materialized when, in January 2003, nine men were murdered in a male massage parlor in Sea Point, on Cape Town’s Atlantic seaboard, their throats cut before they were shot in the head.50 The site, scale, and bloodiness of the killing pointed to a hate crime. The Gay and Lesbian Equality Project of South Africa quick- ly became involved, its representatives meeting with the assistant police commissioner. Police reported a huge response to the request for leads, and, unusually, sex workers and gay organizations “joined hands” with the ANC in a memorial service.51 While the case re- mained unique in its proportions, its meaning grew murky as the SAPS became convinced that the motives for the crime were more routine: that it was drug-related, perhaps, or the aggravated consequence of a robbery.52 Yet the atrocity retained its mythic proportions, entering public discourse as an index of heightened risk to all gays. Just how such episo- des generate terrors of their own became clear in June 2004, when the Gay and Lesbian Alliance lodged a complaint against a website that, among other offensive statements, said – with obvious reference to the massacre – that homosexuals should be “Sizzled.”53

    This case makes plain how epic crimes may evoke and intensify a sense of citizen- ship in communities of identity. Mass mediation is integral to the process, converting extra- ordinary happenings into a generic intimacy, a shared sensation of fear. Their victims are at once unusual and horrifically commonplace: you, I, could be next. Derrida (2002:248) observes that each murder is “singular, thus infinite and incommensurable” (original em- phasis); yet, ironically, its capacity to bespeak the general, to instill a sense of common predicament, derives from that very singularity. Mythic crimes signify by means that go bey- ond identification or transference. In their suffering and annihilation, the socially-marked casualty substitutes for the self and the collectivity for which s/he comes to stand: youth, the elderly, women, gays, whites, property-owners, the nation. Hence the tendency to claim those who, like sacrificial victims, redeem their kind with their innocent blood. By their dramatic erasure they spell out the minimal conditions of humanity and moral community.

    Particularly galvanizing in this regard was the kidnaping of Leigh Matthews, 21-year- old daughter of a Johannesburg businessman in July, 2004.54 In South Africa as we have seen thousands of persons, young and old, go missing each year. Yet this case mobilized an “overwhelming” response from people across the land.55 Why?

    What made this event so compelling was not just the media melodrama or the voy- euristic curiosity aroused by the private suffering of the attractive and the affluent. Neither was it the appeal of its blond victim, pictured again and again in a satin ball-gown, on the poignant brink of womanhood. It was the way in which these things, occurring at the inter- section of race and class, worked together to make it seem at once exceptional – “Touched By an Angel,” ran one headline56 – yet capable of typifying the state of the nation-as-trau- ma. Ms. Matthews was singled out by social circumstance: reports noted that her kid- nappers had probably done research into her father’s income.57 Yet, as You magazine not- ed on its cover, “not only [the] rich” are targets. “You could be a victim.”58 The dialectic between singularity and representativeness at work in the image of Leigh Matthews is evident, too, in a report in a national Sunday paper:59 “Hundreds of South African families are tormented by the anguish of not knowing when their missing loved one might be found,” it read. “More than 1800 adults and nearly 1300 children were reported missing…last year” Missing, but not kidnaped. There is a wealth of difference between abductions, runaways, and kidnapings. A wealth of difference and a difference of wealth. Child abductions have long been prevalent in poor communities all over the country.60 These ca- ses seldom merit media attention, a point forcibly made by several black callers to talk shows in Cape Town at the time; one community network, Bush Radio, refused to cover the event for this reason. The discrepancy is underscored in Michael William’s perspicacious detective thriller, The Eighth Man (2002), which follows the parallel deaths, in the Western Cape, of two young people separated by race and class. By contrast to those of middle-class white children, Williams’s story tells us, the bodies of impoverished young blacks often still do not count.

    Leigh Matthews is set apart from these faceless victims. Her case had proved a challenge, said the head of the Missing Person’s Bureau, “because kidnaping for ransom [i]s not…common.”61 This is disputable. SAPS figures indicate that it became much more frequent during the 1990’s; though just how frequent is a subject of disagreement.62 A spokesmen for a corporation that markets “risk assessment” and “crisis management” across the world suggests that it has become a brazen industry in search of quick turn- over.63 This corporation, which trains wealthy, nervous South Africans in “pre-incident” and anti-kidnap techniques – its courses are covered by ransom insurance – insists that the vast majority of those kidnaped are returned alive.

    Not in this case. A cash ransom was delivered by Mr. Matthews.64 But his daughter was not returned. As the days went by, the “public” coalesced ever more visibly around the incident. Police set up a 24-hour line to deal with the “flood of information” coming in; hund- reds of South Africans, including many abroad, posted messages of support on a special website.65 Strangers in the street, in elevators, in taxis exchanged information, particularly in Johannesburg. The tragic discovery of her body eleven days later drew forth an outpour- ing of emotion: “Country mourns for Leigh,” intoned a typical headline, above a photograph of a diverse group of fellow students signing a book of sympathy on the elite private univer- sity campus from which she was snatched.66 A petition was launched on the internet calling on government to reinstate the death penalty:67 “Do it for Leigh Matthews,” it read. Nelson Mandela, the State President, and representatives of all major political parties offered public condolences. “Leigh Matthews was a flower, the lifeblood of the nation,” said an ANC spokesman. “We can’t unite…if these sick elements are in our midst.” But, ironically, it is precisely around events like these that the nation does unite, hyperreal events that become the measure of a traumatized citizenry transcending its differences, if only for an instant. “Something like this could happen to any of us,” wrote the Matthews family to the Sunday Times; “we need to come together as a community, as a nation, and take a stand against such wickedness.”68 Obscured here is the place of this tragedy in a larger pattern of lawlessness, one heavily inflected by race, class, and gender: one in which, as we have seen, rates of injury remain heavily concentrated among the black urban poor. The fact that the suspect subsequently arrested for the killing was a young white man, the son of a Baptist minister and a fellow student – not, as widely anticipated, a Nigerian gangster – merely adds to the irony.69

    Such is the alchemy of numbers in everyday discourse – in which crime stories are a privileged register not just for calculating the quality of life and the state of the nation, but for mobilizing mass action. In making the singular into the plural and vice versa, we repeat, this arithmetic bypasses the sociology of crime. Narratives of lawlessness might console, enthrall, indict, particularly among the classes that take personal safety as a right and have property to protect; one effect of the Matthews kidnaping, after all, was to magnify levels of terror among paler, more prosperous citizens. A politics of indignation comes not far be- hind: “It is our country and our right to be able to live free of fear,” said that same internet petition in the name of Ms. Matthews. While such exchanges, mulled over in private, may do little to address the structural bases of insecurity, they do a lot to prime the culture of dread, and the sense of immanent victimhood, that they seek to redress.

    CONCLUSION

    “It is a terrible space to be living in; in what must be one of the best societies on earth and not allowing yourself to enjoy it.” Mondli Makhanya, Sunday Times, September 200470

    In Lewis Nkosi’s play, The Rhythm of Violence, published in 1964, the main action takes place in a makeshift police station in the Johannesburg City Hall, overlooking a square in which a protest meeting is in progress. The crowd yells (p.3),

    “Freedom in our lifetime!”
    Jan ( [a young white policemen] nervously): ”How many of us are here? “
    Piet (his senior) ”Two hundred men at the ready to shoot…”
    Jan (more nervous still): “You think that number is enough?”
    A voice from the square, across the dialogue: “Can they rule by the gun forever?”

    In this brilliant cameo, Nkosi captures a telling moment in the tortured history of numbers in South Africa. Critical episodes in this history are figured in stark fractions, the proportions of which have not changed as much as we might like to think. The brutal percentages of apartheid rule – 13% of the people with 87% of the land – have morphed into new mea- sures of inequality: grossly uneven rates of victimization, a close correlation of poverty with violence and disease, and the like. Now, as before, politics crystalizes in ratios, and not just in respect of crime. Few issues loom as large in the battle over AIDS than statistics that purport to describe the pandemic. This, too, is evidence for one of our contentions: that, in their very abstraction, numbers make real phenomena otherwise ungraspable in human experience. But, in so doing, they produce new indeterminacies. And P/politics in both the upper and the lower cases.

    These politics, we argue, are more complex than is implied by the Foucaultian link between numbers and biopower. This is not only because “governmentality” fails to grasp neoliberal collaborations between the private and public sectors. It also glosses over the degree to which quantifacts are the stuff of contestation. As we have seen, official felony counts are routinely debunked, and often appropriated, in the cause of new species of so- cial action. When governance is reduced to law, order, and service delivery, and when citi- zenship hinges on security, crime rates become a prime currency of public culture, a prime index of order, a prime gauge of effective rule – and a prime suspect in efforts to detect a politics of bad faith.

    In South Africa, in sum, levels of lawlessness are made to bear witness to the suc- cess or failure of post-apartheid democracy and, by extension, to the legacy of colonialism. They are the benchmark against which reconciliation and enfranchisement are evaluated. And the specter against which a sociological imagination is shaped, moral reform is moot- ed, and grass-roots mobilization takes flight. In all this, whatever they may or may not actually measure, crime statistics fill the space between the unknowable and the axiomatic, defining subjects and populations as they do. As this suggests, they are uncommonly good to think with – which, in part, is why enumeration is not limited to state bureaucracies or even to those who count in the public interest. Tallying lawlessness is a mundane communicative practice, a mode of figuring the relationship between incidents and incidence, epic events and everyday existence, uncertainty and order.

    But, as we have seen, vernacular accounting is no more capable of eliminating un- certainty than is any other form of calculation. The endless recycling of experience – its re- counting, in the double sense of the term – may seek to probe reality and reduce ambigui- ty, to tame horror by resort to repetitive narration. But, by making third-hand happenings into first-person sensations, it amplifies vulnerability, reiterating a state of apprehension, a frisson to be replayed, a trauma hard to transcend. Which may explain why such anger is evinced by evidence that South Africa is not as exceptional as it may seem. At the same time, numbers do not mean the same everywhere across the social spectrum. Recall one last time that those most at risk are also least likely to see crime as a transcendent danger – in part because they face other life-threatening challenges. It is also the case that the vic- tims who count most, who escape “becoming a statistic” by attaining mythic status, are sel- dom those for whom suffering is part of their generic condition. But it is such epic felonies, like the Makolomakwa burning, the Leigh Matthews kidnaping, or the Sizzlers massacre, that become iconic of collective identities, of publics, of a nation said to be sinking into a sea of criminality. Therein lies the standardized nightmare, the abomination, from whose jaws social order it to be wrested. Therein lie the perverse politics and the peculiar produc- tivity of crime. Therein lies the criminal anthropology of the Brave Neo South Africa.

    AFTERWORD

    Just after this essay was completed, in September 2004, the South African Police Service published its new statistics for the financial year 2003/4. They showed that the incidence of most violent felonies – the major exception being armed robbery, much of it street mugging – had decreased perceptibly. What is more, figures for the provinces indicated that patterns of variance had increased; for example, the homicide ratio of Khayelitsha, the township mentioned earlier, and Camps Bay, a famously rich, white seaside neighborhood, was 358:1. In sum, the patterns described above were, if anything, further emphasized. Also affirmed was our observation of the tendency of South Africans, especially South Africans of privilege, to disbelieve “good news” or to discredit official numbers that might salve the national trauma. The reaction to these new statistics was striking: they were greeted, wrote the Cape Times, with the same “outrage,…anger and displeasure” that annual police reports always seem to evoke.71 The flood of letters to the press is best captured, perhaps, in a single caption: “We, the People, Victims of Horrific Crime, Know the `Good News’ is a Lie.”72 Nor did such responses come only from the lay public. Women’s and children’s rights activists, offended at the under reporting of rape and abuse, expressed themselves volubly. So much so that President Thabo Mbeki counter-attacked at length in his weekly letter published on the African National Congress website, ANC Today.73 “When,” he asked, “is good news bad news?” When it is read, he said, answering his own question, through the kind of psychosis that produces a fear of freedom. Perhaps. The argument continues.

  • Brave Noir World

    Brave Noir World

    Crime stories – in literature, art, film, theater, music – are now a global vernacular. Their popularity reflects the modernist fascination with the promise that detection — part intuition, part empirical reason – can unravel the mysteries of human evil, wrest law from lawlessness, return order to an unruly social world. But this history also bred a rogue, noir genre, ever more intent on questioning that order, and the very possibility of setting crime apart from innocence.

    In fact, the political economy of crime-as-representation seems to be undergoing a transfiguration. Not that the older modernist genre has disappeared: mythic supercops, CSI techno-magicians, and preternatural sleuths still solve the mystery and bag the felon. But the rising new noir is more given to ironic, open-ended explorations of late modern scapes, their dreads and discontents. Its protagonists display a desire for, yet distrust in, criminal justice, a sense of the impossibility of its mandate, the unreliability of its truth-claims.

    Ernest Mandel (1984) first noted this shift. With the rise of capitalism, he argued, the criminal became the antisocial enemy of bourgeois property and civility; his nemesis being the upright, crusading detective. His late modern counterpart, harking back to social bandits of earlier times, is less antisocial than entrepreneurial. Enjoying ambivalent popular admiration – think Tony Soprano, Omar Little, Walt White — he plays on both the erosion of bourgeois values and the growing entanglement of big business, government, and criminality; the cynical cops and vigilantes who pursue him are themselves more skeptical of the idea of an “absolute good,” more likely to breach the lines of il/legality. This changing economy of representation is perhaps most evident in television and film, especially in post-totalitarian, postcolonial societies, where changing ethico-legal regimes highlight the relativism of the law.

    In South Africa, for instance, a vibrant filmic tradition is being repurposed for post-apartheid times. Johannesburg, epicenter of a history of colonial extraction and pulse point of the national pysche, is itself widely viewed as a crime scene. If, under apartheid, white media were haunted by fears of black terror, ordinary Africans were ruled by what Bloke Modisane famously dubbed “the banditry of the law,” in whose wake a lively strain of black crime writing took shape. Centered on the fabled Drum Magazine, it blurred the line between fiction and reportage, drawing on the Harlem Renaissance, gangster genres of the 1930s, and cinema noir to forge its own granular realism. Drum was preoccupied with the luminous figure of the outlaw, or tsotsi. Its sassy heroes foreshadowed the provocative postcolonial culture – youthful, black, urbane, roguish, chic – canonized in a novel genre of movies at the century’s end.

    That culture was termed mapantsula, also the title of the nation’s earliest ant-apartheid feature film (1988), a Bildungsroman shot in Soweto that throbbed with “township jive.” It depicted the life of a petty thief ironically named Panic, a cool, streetwise hustler who disavowed formal politics for a defiant ethic of his own as he robbed wealthy, white beneficiaries of the racist regime. The film probes the moral ambiguity of life after colonialism, and also after liberalism: the limits and legitimacy of the law, the changing map of power in a world of deregulated capital. Mapantsula anticipates criminal life in the global postcolony, gesturing forward to the edgy genre of Jozi Noir, which would include features like Tstotsi, Gangster’s Paradise: Jerusalema, and Hijack Stories, productions that explore the often scary freedoms of the neo, noir world.

    Tsotsi (2005), Oscar winner for Best Foreign Language Film in 2006, is based on a novel by Athol Fugard, in which a young thug finds unlikely salvation. It opens with a game of craps: life is determined by a roll of the dice, the odds still stacked against the black underclass. Tsotsi, orphaned by AIDS, has come of age in a colony of street kids, living amidst the detritus of the modern city. A cold-hearted killer, he makes a cut-throat living off an urban ecology in which nothing matters but money and survival. One day he jacks a BMW, only to find a bright-eyed baby in the back. Given Tsotsi’s world, the odds are not favorable for a triumph of the good. His eventual decision to honor life at its most vulnerable – he returns the baby to its parents – sits uneasily with the dispassionate alienation, and sardonic realism, of the life-story portrayed in the film.

    Gangster’s Paradise: Jerusalema (2008) is an altogether more charged coming-of-age allegory. Jerusalema, the New Jerusalem, is Johannesburg, vortex of a postcolony most of whose black citizens now have law without order, desire without means. Lucky Kunene is a sharp township kid who cannot afford Business School, but sets about becoming a wise-guy of another sort. He extends the techniques of carjacking into the realm of inner-city real estate: his crew seize crime-ridden buildings owned by slumlords who exploit their pitiably poor tenants. Here the criminal economy finds a home in the ruins of the former metropolitan center, producing new kinds of wealth-in-property, indistinguishable from legitimate business. Again, the film draws it’s mise en scéne from life: Kunene, on whom the story is based, is in reality one of Jozi’s most notorious hoods. In the 1990’s, he perfected a scheme to jack apartment blocks from their rapacious owners, his thugs “ridding” the properties of drug dealers, pimps, and hookers, and winning over the residents.

    In doing the same thing, the fictive Kunene becomes the proprietor of the “Hillbrow People’s Housing Trust.” A hoodlum philosopher, he juggles references to Donald Trump and Karl Marx. “Can capitalism be made to yield new forms of ‘win-win,’ post-racial redistribution?” The fictive Lucky presumes a universe in which one makes one’s own Luck. He is eventually apprehended, only to outsmart the police: Jerusalema looks for justice beyond the limits of the law. Like Tsotsi, it brooks no easy conclusion. The film ends with the bandit hero citing Marx: “After every revolution comes a new order,” he intones, “but before that comes opportunity.”

    Movies like this are part of an intertextual, multimedia conversation that flows expansively through TV drama, talk radio, stand-up comedy, advertising, investigative journalism, and hiphop. A distinct visual aesthetic is part of this impulse, purveyed by seductive commodity-images that mix look, sound, allure, and cunning. It is a quality made flesh by those noir stars who play cynical picaros, like Rapulana Seiphemo. Seiphemo featured as Lucky Kunene, had a role in Tsotsi, and acted the charismatic hood in Hijack Stories (2000), a film that focuses more explicitly than any of the others on the ways in which crime fiction informs, and is informed by, ordinary experience in South Africa. Like other examples of this genre, it depends heavily on the sensibility of a streetwise black cast. The film opens with a man in a sharp business suit, leaving a store for his luxury car – to be set upon by gun-toting thugs. At its most terrifying moment, the scene is abruptly cut. We have been watching another kind of shooting: a TV show about a fictional township hood. Hijack Stories is about the interplay of violence and image, method acting and gangsterism, legitimate and criminal labor. The story is assertively postcolonial: it follows the quest of a young, educated black actor, Sox Moraga, who sets his heart on landing a role in a popular gangsta series. The very one, in fact, being filmed in that first scene of the Hijack Stories.

    Sox is the offspring of the new South Africa, his parents having left the township to raise him in the sanitary suburbs of Johannesburg. Street thugs call kids like him “Mandela se goeters,” Mandela’s stuff/playthings. But it is not these cosseted “coconuts” who draw women, drive fancy cars, and capture the popular imagination. It is flashy hoodlums. Sox is too soft to “do township” with conviction. So he returns to the hood to “learn the moves” from gang-leader Zama – literally, “take a chance”– played by Seiphemo Rapulana. Disdainful of Sox’s desire to derive profit by mimicking a tsotsi, Zama gives him a lesson he will never forget. Crime is a skilled performance, one whose glamor inheres in its risks, and the film explores the dangerous erotics of a criminal mode of production. A profitable hit fuels orgies of consumption, in which the value “liberated” – the cash, cars, drugs, designer goods – circulates with sensuous abandon. All is fair in this “winner-takes-all” economy, driven by an endless interplay of incitement and consummation.” Racketeering, once again, is merely an intensified form of all risky business, one performance among many. The only real crime, here, is to misjudge the moves. Drawn into the game as a voyeur, Sox is all but undone by it. Meanwhile Zama goes to the TV studio to audition in his stead – and secures the role. It is the robbers, not the cops, who grasp the truth about life in the new, noir world.

    Taken together, these movies make the point that, just as there is little to set criminal labor off from its legitimate counterpart, or truth from fiction, there is also little to restrain the mutual hijacking of life and image, of civic order and uncivil underworld, that has always been with us. And continues to be, albeit in reconfigured, hyperbolic form.

  • Through the Looking-Glass

    Through the Looking-Glass

    Notwithstanding Gramsci or Foucault. there remains a tendency, in historical sociology. to explain processes of domination in terms of political and economic forces. In the study of state formation and imperialism. realpolitik is given precedence over ritual, material factors over the moral suasion of the sign. Yet European colonialism was also a cultural project. In Southern Africa, nonconformist missions. the vanguards of empire, conjured up new maps, new systems of relations, new notions of time, production and personhood. From their very first encounters with native communities, it is argued, they sowed the state of colonialism on which the colonial state and a more enduring condition of dependency was founded