Of Revelation and Revolution is at once a highly imaginative, richly detailed history of colonialism, Christianity, and consciousness in South Africa, and a theoretically challenging consideration of the most difficult questions posed by the nature of social experience. In this first of two volumes, Jean and John Comaroff explore the early phases of the encounter between British missionaries and the Tswana peoples of the South African Frontier. Tracing the cultural backgrounds of both parties, they pay particular attention to the rise of European modernity and its colonizing impulse, to the contemporary images of Africans embedded in that impulse, and to the complex worlds of precolonial Africa. They show how the efforts of evangelists to change the social and material practices of the Tswana produced new forms of consciousness in both colonizer and colonized – and subtle forms of agency, appropriation, and resistance on the part of the latter. The Comaroffs grapple in exciting new ways with issues of power and resistance, agency and intention, ideology and hegemony, culture and materiality that have long vexed social scientists and humanists They reveal how structures of inequality in the colonial encounter were often fashioned as much by quiet means of domination as by naked violence. In reflecting on “the colonization of consciousness and the consciousness of colonization,” the Comaroffs provide fresh insight into the dialectics of culture and power that shape all historical processes.
Applies To: Jean Comaroff
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Africa Observed
Excerpted from Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 1, Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in Colonial South Africa (1991), this analysis of early to mid-nineteenth century European images of Africa explores the ways in which the “dark” continent was represented in scientific, religious, and secular public discourse as a foil to emerging concepts of modernity and enlightenment, as their negative underside. It traces the rise of racist evolutionary models of the human condition and their moralizing corollaries, contemporary arguments about slavery and abolition, emerging religious and secular sensibilities concerning savagery, civilization, and salvation, personhood and reason; in short, discourses of the imperial imagination that constructed Africa as fertile ground for colonization.
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Postcolonial Politics and Discourses of Democracy in Southern Africa
Beginning with a critical reflection on the export of democracy from Europe and America to Africa, this essay–which opens with the birth of the “new” South Africa–explores a question of increasing significance across the continent: What might “democracy” actually MEAN in postcolonial Africa? How does it engage with vernacular cultures of participatory politics and with the construction of new public spheres? We take, as an example, Botswana, widely regarded as a “model” democracy–but where, in the 1970s, there was some demand for a one-party system. This case compels us to rethink, fundamentally, our understanding of processes of democratization, sui generis.
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Naturing the Nation
PROLEGOMENON
The White Heat of Apocalypse, or “The Week the Cape Burned”
Helicopters scampering over the blazing vineyards of Constantia became the “mo- tif” of the Cape of Storms this week as the Peninsula burst into flames producing scenes that could have been staged for a mega disaster movie. From the beaches of Muizenberg columns of smoke rising above the mountains…looked like Mount Vesuvius in full rage burying the fleeing victims of Pompeii…Overhead the tiny he- licopters buzz mosquito-like against the sky, heroic in purpose, but only adding to the sense of helplessness as they dash their toyish…waterbombs against the…advance of the lunatic flames.
Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 21-27 January 2000, p.61
What might “natural” disasters tell us about the ecology of nationhood? Or about the contempora- ry predicament of the postcolonial nation-state? How might the flash of environmental catastrophe illuminate the meaning of borders and the tortured politics of belonging? How might nature remake the nation under neoliberal conditions? How and why, to be more specific, do plants, especially foreign plants, become urgent affairs of state? And what might they disclose of the shifting relations among citizenship, community, and national integrity in an era of global capitalism? Pursuing these questions in South Africa, we run up against two faces of “naturalization” in the politics of the postcolony: one refers to the assimilation of alien persons, signs, and practices into the received order of things; the other, to the deployment of nature as alibi, as a fertile allegory for making people and objects strange, thus to forge critical new social and political distinctions. But we shall make our way back to such matters of theory – about naturalization, about the postcolonial state, about the ecology of nationhood – in due course. First, though, a dedication. This essay is written for Shula Marks, long-time friend and colleague, who has herself reflected astutely on the manner in which botanical knowledge, conservationism, and the aesthetics of nature – not least, in respect of the mountains of the Cape – have been mobilized “in the service of nationhood”.2 Possessed of a sharp appreciation of natural beauty and its social uses, she shares with us a deep emotional attachment to the human and horticultural landscape discussed here.
We begin our narrative with the fire.
Apocalypse, African Style
The turn of the millennium came and went in South Africa without incident; this despite public fears of violence and mass destruction. Then, two weeks later, Cape Town caught fire. On an unusually hot, dry Saturday afternoon the veld caught flared up suddenly in a number of places across the greater metropolitan area. Gale-force south-east winds carried walls of flame up the stately mountain spine of the Cape Peninsular, threatening historic homes and squatter settlements alike. As those in the path of the in- ferno were evacuated, SATV showed disjunctive images of civic collaboration: of the poor helping each other carry paltry possessions from doomed shacks; of the wealthy dropping their valuables in swimming pools and lining up to pass buckets of water.3
On Monday, as the bush continued to burn, airforce helicopters dumped thousands of tons of water on the flames. Volunteers aided emergency fire-fighters brought from as far afield as Pretoria, more than 1500km to the north. Round-the-clock reports told a distressing tale of cheetahs and ostriches grilled alive in local game parks, of landmark churches facing incineration, of world renowned vineyards razed to cinders. The Mother City sweltered under a blanket of smoke as ash rained down on her bou- levards and beaches. Air pollution increased by 20%, causing the closure of many major roads. At the national naval headquarters, shore leave for sailors was cancelled as flames devoured key administrative buildings.
In total, some 9,000 hectares burned. The mountains smoldered on sullenly for weeks. So, too, did the temper of the population. One man was charged with viciously assaulting a youth whom he suspected of starting a blaze along a rural road4 and attributions of blame flew in many directions, none of them politically random. Fire is endemic to the region and to the regeneration of its vegetation; those who profit from its bounty have no option but to live with the risk. But this, a conflagration of unprecedented scale, raised fears about the very sustainability of the natural kingdom in the “fairest Cape”. For weeks, the blaze, some termed it “the holocaust”, dominated public discourse. Its livid scars and apocalyptic proportions evoked elemental anxieties, calling forth an almost obsessive desire to construe it as an omen, an indictment, a call to arms. This public divination – the debate in the streets, the media, the halls of government – laid bear the complex social ecology whence the fire itself had sprung, enabling it to cast penetrating light on conditions-of-being in the postcolonial state.
Apocalypse, of course, soon becomes history, a process Davis aptly terms the “dialectic of ordina- ry disaster”.5 Thus, while early discussion of the fire was wild and contested, refracted along the divers facets of communal interest, it would reduce, over time, to a dominant interpretation. That interpretation was never shared by all. As we shall see, some people, barely audible in the media debate, had a different reading of the issues at stake. But the dominant view did draw a wide consensus; wide enough to authorize strong government action and broad civic collaboration. This, clearly, was an instance of “ide- ology-in-the-making”. As such, its efficacy rested, first, on producing a plausible, parsimonious ex- planation for the extent of the blaze. But it also succeeded in making the flames illuminate an implicit landscape of affect and anxiety, inclusion and intrusion, prosperity and loss. Through a clutch of charged references, it linked the conflagration to other domains of public experience, domains in which natural images frame urgent issues of being-and-identity. Especially being-and-identity in the body of the “new” nation-state.
In the initial heat of the event, stray cigarette ends and abandoned cooking fires were blamed for the blaze. But this was rapidly overtaken, in “official opinion”, by talk of arson, a theory supported by some circumstantial evidence; some even detected a new front in the campaign of urban terror, widely attributed to Islamic fundamentalism, that had gripped the Cape Peninsula for several years.6 Then the discourse abruptly changed direction, alighting on an etiology that took hold with extraordinary force: whatever sparked it, the calamitous scale of the blaze was a result of invasive alien plants that burn more readily and fiercely than native flora. Fire might be a “natural part” of the Cape ecosystem, government advisors attested, but the presence of invasive aliens had changed that system significantly.7 Outrage against these intruders grew steadily, particularly in the English-speaking press; the Afrikaans media had a somewhat different agenda (see below). Landowners who had allegedly allowed these interlopers to spread unchecked were denounced for putting life and limb, even “our natural heritage” itself, at risk.8
Note: “Our natural heritage”. Heritage has become a construct to conjure with as global markets erode the distinctive wealth of nations, forcing them to redefine their sense of patrimony. And its material worth: the mayor of Cape Town, for example, is wont to describe Table Mountain as “a national inspiration”, whose asset value is “measured by every visitor it attracts”.9 Not coincidentally, South Afri- ca is currently engaged in a bid to have the Cape Peninsula declared a “World Heritage Site” in recogni- tion of its unparalleled biodiversity. This heritage is embodied, above all, in fynbos (Afrikaans, “fine bush”; from the Dutch fijn bosch),10 the sclerophyllous or small-leaved, evergreen shrubs and heath that dominate the vegetation of the mountains and coastal forelands of the Cape.11 In recent decades, fynbos has become the prime incarnation of the fragile, wealth-producing beauties of the region; and, as it has, local environmentalists have become ever more convinced that it is caught up in a mortal struggle with alien interlopers, which threaten to reduce its riches to “impenetrable monotony”.12
The blaze brought all this to a head. “Wake Up Cape Town”,13 screamed front page headlines set against the image of a red fire lily poking, phoenix-like, from a deep bed of ashes. Efforts by botanists to cool the hysteria – to insist that “fire in fynbos [is] normal”, not a “train smash in terms of biodiversity”14 – had little effect on the public mood. A cartoonist, allowing a rare moment of irony to flicker amid millennial anxiety, drew a UFO hovering over Cape Town as the city sank into the globally-warmed sea, its mountain tops covered by foreign flora. Peering down, the occupants of the space ship declare: “They seem to have a problem with aliens”.15
A problem with aliens indeed! Whether or not he knew it, the satirist had touched a deep nerve: the anxiety over foreign flora gestured toward a submerged landscape of civic terror and moral alarm. – Significantly, when the fire was followed some two weeks later by ruinous floods to the north, another headline quipped: “First fires, now floods – next frogs?”16 By then, it was not altogether surprising to read that “huge forests of alien trees” were being held by experts to have “caused all the trouble” in the water-logged Mpumalanga Province.17 In this, one of the poorest regions in the land, “large stands of in- vading aliens”, the vast plantations of powerful logging corporations, were blamed for thwarting the capacity of indigenous plants to act as “natural sponges”.18 At much the same time, a lead story in the na- tional press, apparently unrelated, told how the Aliens Investigation Unit of the South African Police Ser- vices had swooped down on a luxurious club in Johannesburg, ostensibly because it employed a growing army of undocumented, unhealthy sexworkers from abroad.19 Within days, the South Africa public was promised, again in banner newsprint, a “US-style bid to rid SA of illegal aliens”.20
What exactly was at stake in this mass-mediated chain of consciousness, this litany of alien-nation? Why the propensity to “blame it on the weeds”, as one journalist put it?21 How much does it all tell us about the meaning of moral panics inside South Africa, or about perceived threats to the nation and its patrimony? Observers elsewhere have noted that an impassioned rhetoric of autochthony, to which alien- ness is the negative counterpoint, has edged aside other images of belonging at the end of the twentieth century; also that a fetishizing of origins seems to be growing up the world over in opposition to the libe- ral credo of laissez-faire.22 But why? Why, at this juncture in the history of postcolonial nation-states, and of South Africa in particular, has the question of boundaries and their transgression, of membership and citizenship, become such an incendiary issue? Why, in the face of the burning bush, has nature pre- sented itself as a persuasive alibi for the conception of nationhood and its frontiers? And how, in turn, does the naturalization of nationality relate to the construction of older identities framed in terms of his- tory, culture, race, ethnicity? Could it be that the anxious public discourse here over invasive plant spe- cies speaks to an existential problem presently making itself felt at the very heart of nation-states everywhere: in what does national integrity consist, what might nationhood and belonging mean, what moral and material entitlements might it entail, at a time when global capitalism seems everywhere to be threatening sovereign borders, everywhere to be displacing politics-as-usual?
These questions are not meant to cast doubt on the danger actually posed by fire or flood; nor on the effort to explain and manage them with reference to the effects of foreign flora. It is precisely because these matters are so real and urgent that they carry the charge that they do. But the extent to which aliens of all kinds became a public preoccupation in South Africa just after the millennium went far beyond the usual bounds of botany, far beyond the concerns of the environmental sciences, beyond even the imperatives of disaster control. It is with this excess that we are concerned here. For, as we have already hinted, the explosion of events, emotions, and arguments “after the fire” has a compelling story to tell about citizenship, identity and nation-building in this and other postcolonies.
THE POSTCOLONIAL NATION-STATE IN PERSPECTIVE, RETROSPECTIVELY
First things first, however. The postcolonial nation-state – and here we write specifically from an Africanist perspective – is not, for all the tendency to speak of it in the singular, a definite article. It refers to a labile historical formation, a polythetic class of polities-in-motion. South Africa, famously, is the latest country to join the class. As such, it reveals, with harsh clarity, many of the contemporary ob- sessions of postcoloniality, many of the contradictions which confront the effort to make modernist poli- ties in postmodern, neoliberal times. That effort, those obsessions, reach into diverse realms of collective being-in-the-world: into the struggle to arrive at meaningful terms with which to construct a sense of be- longing – and, hence, of moral and material community – in circumstances that privilege difference; into the endeavor to regulate sovereign borders under global conditions that not only encourage the transna- tional movement of labor and capital, money and goods, but make them a necessary condition of the wealth of nations; into the often bitter controversies that rage as people assert various kinds of identity to make claims of entitlement and interest; into troubled public discourses on the proper reach of twenty- first century constitutions and, especially, their protection of individual rights; into the complicated processes by which government, nongovernmental organizations, citizens acting in the name of civil so- ciety, and other social fractions seek to carve out a division of political and social labor; into the implica- tions of angst about the decay of public order, about crime both organized and random, about corruption and its policing.
Such issues have not always dominated the discourses of postcolonial nation-states – in the plural, note – or saturated their public spheres. These polities have long entertained mass flows of human, animal, and vegetable migrants across sovereign borders;23 but never before has the presence of aliens occasioned the same sort of alarm as it seems to nowadays.24 As this suggests, many things have changed since the dawn of the postcolonial age, an age still uneasily defined by a prefixation upon what it is not. Even at the most gross of levels, postcolonies have moved through two epochal phases, a passage from the past that casts into relief much about the present.
Epochal Shifts: from the past to the postcolony
The first was born, historically and figuratively, in India at midnight on 14 August 1947. It lasted forty years or so. This period is conventionally associated, in master narratives of Empire, with the deco- lonization of the Third World. It is also a period in which the new states of Africa found the promise of autonomy and growth sundered by the realities of neocolonialism, which freighted them with an impossi- ble toll of debt and dependency. Under these conditions, the master narrative goes on, the idyll of Euro- pean-styled democracy, the “black man’s burden” according to Basil Davidson,25 gave way to ever more authoritarian rule, itself buttressed by the coldwar imperatives of the First and Second Worlds. The details need not detain us. What is most important for now is that, in its formative years, postcoloniality was a product of the “old” international political order, of its organization of sovereign nations within the industrial capitalist world system. In that order, people, plants, commodities, and currencies moved ac- ross frontiers under more-or-less tightly enforced, normatively-recognized state regulation. Every so often, alarmists in Europe called for the repatriation of immigrants or for rigorous control over foreign flora and fauna. But cross border movement, mainly along the coordinates of former colonial maps – the British commonwealth, Greater France, the Black Atlantic – was regarded as a routine part of the bureaucratic work of governments everywhere.
The second epoch in the genealogy of postcolonial states, the epoch with which we are more im- mediately concerned, is very different. Its point of origin, says Bayart,26 it may be dated to 1989, when “most sub-Saharan African countries” began to experience “an unprecedented wave of demands for democracy”. These events were a product of the same world-historical movement that transformed Cen- tral Europe and reverberated across the planet at the time: the political coming of age – its economic roots and its ethos, patently, long predate the 1980s – of neoliberal global capitalism. This world- historical movement, the recitative now goes, metamorphosed the old international order into a more flu- id, market-driven, electronically-articulated universe: a universe in which supranational institutions burgeon; in which space and time are radically recalibrated; in which geography is perforce being rewrit- ten; in which transnational identities, diasporic connections, ecological disasters, and the mobility of hu- man populations challenge both the nature of sovereignty and the sovereignty of nature; in which “the network” returns as the dominant metaphor of social connectedness; in which liberty is distilled to its postmodern essence, the right to choose identities, subjectivities, commodities, sexualities, localities, and other forms of collective representation.
As this suggests, the second postcolonial epoch has been marked by a great deal more than just a move “back” to democracy. Indeed, while the renaissance of participatory politics has reanimated some of the institutions of governance eclipsed in Africa during the years after “independence”,27 its promise to empower “the public” in affairs of state came at a juncture when institutional power departed most states as never before, dispersing itself everywhere and anywhere and nowhere tangible at all: into transnational corporations and associations, into nongovernmental organizations, into syndicated crime, into shadowy, privatized parastatal cabals.28 Which may, in part, explain why there has been a strong countervailing stress on the reconstruction of civil society since 1989. We have argued in another context29 that, as a call to action, the force of latter – of “civil society”, that is – exists in inverse proportion to its density and content as a concept; that its appeal is largely underwritten by its inchoateness, its vacuity. We have also argued that its return as a dusted-off fetish in the late twentieth century bears strong parallel with its first rise in the late eighteenth. In each case, it has come to the fore under conditions of rapid transformation: conditions in which the present and future of economy and society, of community and family, of selfhood and the social division of labor have been called into question.
And, to be sure, the very existence of “society” is under scrutiny the world over at present; com- munity and family are said to be widely at risk; the nature of labor is seen to be changing uncontrollably; masculinity is felt to be compromised with the reconstruction of gender roles and relations. What is more, the politics of ideological struggle melt away into the politics of interest as the “me-generation” folds into the “we-generation”. And generation itself, in the guise of youth, becomes a major vector of political action, a problem, an ever more salient principle of social distinction.
For its part, “the” state, an ever more polymorphous entity, is held, increasingly, to be in perpetual crisis,30 its power ever more dispersed, its legitimacy tested by debt, disease, and poverty, its executive control repeatedly pushed to the limit and, most of all, its hyphen-nation – the articulation, that is, of the state to the nation, of the nation-state – everywhere under challenge.31 In the circumstances, offers Mbembe,32 “the postcolony” tends to be “chaotically pluralistic”, even when it evinces a semblance of “internal coherence”. Which is why, it is often said, postcolonial regimes evince a strong predilection to appeal to magicalities, especially, to anticipate what is to come, under the sign of autochthony. That ruling cadres rely on magical means to do the work of hyphen-nation is not new of course. But resort to mass-mediated ritual excess – to produce state power, to conjure up national unity, and to persuade ci- tizens of the reality of both – does feature prominently in the second postcolonial age; in rough pro- portion, perhaps, to populist perceptions of crisis. Thus, notes Worby, in those parts of Africa where the hold of government is stretched, its authority has become dependent on the performance of quotidian ce- remonial, extravagant in its theatricality; citizen-subjects, he goes on, live with the state in a promiscuous hybrid of accommodation and refusal, power and parody, embodiment and alienation.33
Belonging, Borders, Autochthony, Antipolitics
While these symptoms of the second age of postcoloniality are the stuff of anxious public discour- se across Africa, the stereotypically bleak portrait of states falling apart, of nations drifting into an unhy- phenated, Hobbesian state of nature, of nature itself out of control, is overdrawn; the political sociology of postcoloniality is much more complex, more diverse, than it allows. At the same time, both the contra- dictions and the perceptions of crisis experienced by many postcolonies are part of a broader condition. We refer, of course, to the much debated issue of the present and future of the nation-state under the impact of globalization. Elsewhere34 we have offered an extended commentary on this question, seeking to chart the transformation of the modernist polity in the Age of Neoliberal Capitalism. Here, however, it is enough to note just three things about that transformation.
The first arises out of the refiguration of the modernist subject-citizen. One corollary of the chang- ing face of nationhood in the neoliberal age, especially after 1989, has been an explosion of identity poli- tics. Not just of ethnic politics. Also of the politics of gender, sexuality, age, race, religiosity, economic combination, life-style, and, yes, social class. As a result, imagining the nation rarely presumes a deep horizontal fraternity any more.35 While most human beings still live as citizens in nation-states, they tend only to be conditionally, partially, and situationally citizens of nation-states. Identity struggles, ranging from altercations over resources to genocidal combat, seem immanent almost everywhere as selfhood is immersed – existentially, metonymically – into claims of collective essence, of innate substance and pri- mordial sentiment, that nestle within or transect the polity.
In short, homogeneity as a “national fantasy”36 is giving way to a recognition of the irreducibility of difference; so much so that even countries long known for their lack of diversity – Botswana, for example – are now sites of identity struggles. And culture, at once essentialized and open to constant re- invention, becomes yet another possession, a good to be patented, made into intellectual property, mer- chandised, consumed.37 All of this puts even greater stress – in both senses of the term – on hyphen- nation. The more diverse nation-states become in their political sociology, the higher the level of abstraction at which “the nation-state” exists, the more compelling appears the threat of its rupture. And the more imperative it becomes to divine and to negate whatever is perceived to endanger it. States, notes Harvey, have always had to conjure up “a definition of public interests over and above…class and sectarian” concerns.38 One solution that has presented itself in the face of ever more assertive claims on society and the state, of claims made in the name of different sorts of identity, has come to lie in autochthony: in elevating to a first-principle the ineffable interests and connections, at once material and moral, that flow from “native” rootedness, and special rights, in a place of birth. Nor is this merely a strategic solution that appeals to those caught up in the business of government; it resonates with deeply felt populist fears – and with the proclivity of citizens of all stripes to deflect shared anxieties onto outsiders.
Autochthony is implicit in many forms of identity, of course; it also attaches to places within pla- ces, parts within wholes. But, as a claim against aliens, its mobilization appears to be growing in direct proportion to the sundered hyphenation of the sovereign polity, to its popularly perceived porousness and impotence in the face of exogenous forces. Citizens in contemporary nation-states, whether or not they are primarily citizens of nation-states, seem widely able to re-imagine nationhood in such a way as to em- brace the ineluctability of internal difference: “multiculturalism”, the “rainbow nation”, and terms of similar resonance provide a ready argot of accommodation, even amidst bitter contestation. However, when it comes to the limits of that difference, autochthony constitutes an ultimate line. Whatever other identities the citizen-subject of the twenty-first century polity may bear, s/he is unavoidably either an autochthon or an alien. Nor only s/he. It too. As we have seen, and will see further, nonhumans may also be ascribed the status of indigene or other.
The second follows closely: it concerns the obsession of contemporary polities with the policing of borders – and, hence, with the limits of sovereignty. Much of the debate over the “crisis” of the nation-state hinges upon the contention that governments can no longer control the flow of currencies and commercial instruments, of labor and commodities, of flora and fauna, of information, illegal substances, and unwanted aliens. It is true, of course, that international frontiers have always been more-or-less porous. But technologies of space-time compression do appear to have effected a sea-change in patterns and rates of global flow, human and virtual. Which is why so many states, most maybe, act as if they were constantly subject both to invasion from the outside and to the seeping away of what should properly remain within. South Africa, for instance, laments its brain drain and the pull of the market on its sports stars39 – while anguishing, xenophobically, over the inflow of millions of immigrants, makwerekwere, who, as we shall see, frequently suffer gross violations of their human rights.40
Similar xenophobia is on the increase in Western Europe. Much of it focuses on “unassimilable” migrant workers; for which read “black”. But not always. Recall the British fear that the Channel Tunnel would open England up to rabies, that the coming of the Euro would herald the end of sterling as its sovereign currency, that the authority of the European courts would destroy its legal dominion;41 or the phobic French reaction against the infiltration of US cultural products; or the Italian effort to protect grappa, a beverage become national intellectual property, from foreign makers. All alike express anxiety, in the face of global flow, about boundaries and their breach. Globalization, after all, has provoked anta- gonistic responses not only among peoples of smaller and/or less powerful nation-states, for whom it rep- resents itself as colonialism in new, largely North American guise; nor only among the marginalized of the world. Jeremy Seabrook recently observed that the “European left scarcely distinguishes itself from a right whose faith in global laissez-faire is matched only by a hysterical defense of evaporated sovereignties and atrophied national powers”.42
Our object, though, is not just to remark the heightened concern with borders and their transgression. It is also to observe that this concern is itself the product of a paradox. Under contemporary global conditions, given the logic of the neoliberal capitalism, nation-states find themselves in a double bind. In order to partake of that economy, to garner the value that it spins off, governments require at once to op- en up their frontiers and to secure them: on one hand, to deregulate as far as possible the movement of currencies, goods, people, and services, thus to facilitate the inflow of wealth; on the other, to regulate them by establishing enclaved zones of competitive advantage so as to attract transnational manufacture and media, investment, information technology, and the “right” kind of migrants – among them, tourists, highly skilled personnel, NGOs, development consultants, even laborers who will work more cheaply and tractably than locals without claim to the entitlements of belonging. In this way, the nation-state is transformed, in aspiration if not always in reality, into a mega-management enterprise, a business in the business of attracting business; this for the benefit of “stakeholders” who desire simultaneously to be glo- bal citizens and yet corporate subjects with shares in the commonweal of a sovereign polity. The corollary is plain. The border is a double bind because national prosperity appears to demand, but is simultaneously threatened by, both openness and closure. No wonder the angst, the constant public de- bate in so many places, about what ought or ought not to be allowed in, what is or not in the collective interest. And for whom.
The third salient feature of the predicament of the nation-state is, baldly stated, the depoliticiza- tion of politics. The argument goes like this: neoliberal capitalism, in its triumphal, all encompassing glo- bal phase, offers no alternatives to laissez-faire; nothing else – no other ideology, no other political economic system – seems even plausible. The primary question left to public policy is how to succeed in the “new” world order. Why? Because this new order hides its ideological scaffolding in the dictates of economic efficiency and capital growth, in the fetishism of the free market, in the exigencies of science and technology. Under its hegemony, the social is dissolved into the natural, the biological, the organic.43 “Political choices”, as Xolela Mangcu puts it for South Africa,44 are depoliticized and given the aura of technical truth. Public policies that get implemented are those backed by “growth coalitions” which span government, business, the media and other interest groups… [These] shape national consensus on priorities.
Politics, then, are reduced either to the pursuit of pure advantage or to struggles over “special” interests and issues: the environment, abortion, health care, child welfare, rape and domestic abuse, human rights, capital punishment, and the like. In the circumstances, there is a strong tendency for urgent questions of the moment, often sparked by ecological catastrophe and justified with reference to the technical imperatives of nature, to become the stuff of collective action, cutting across older, ever more anachronistic lines of ideological and social commitment. Each takes the limelight as it flares into public awareness, becomes a “hot” issue, and then burns down, its embers consigned to the recesses of collective consciousness – only to flame up again if kindled by contingent conditions or vocal coalitions. Or both.
Our evocation here of the imagery of fire – now situated within in the imperatives of the postcolo- nial nation-state, its location in the global world of neoliberal capitalism, its contemporary political so- ciology, its altered forms of citizenship, its obsessions with boundaries, aliens and autochthony, its dis- placements of the political – return us to the apocalyptic events in Cape Town at the turn of the millennium..
NATURING THE NATION
…Ralph Waldo Emerson once commented on the impact of immigration: “A nation, like a tree, does not thrive well till it is engraffed (sic) with a foreign stock”.
Hopewell Radebe, The Star, 16 March 2000, p.1345
A Lesson from Fynbos
It is possible to read the burning bush as an epic instance of nature’s deadly caprice. Such, to be sure, is a construction to which “white Africans”, who are disproportionately represented in current con- servationist circles, are especially prone. But the full impact of the blaze arose, we would argue, from the capacity of those flowers and flames to signify charged political anxieties, many of them unnameable in everyday discourse. Also from the promise that there might arise, out of the ashes, a greater good: a distinctly local, “new” South African, sense of community, nation, civil society. But we are running ahead of ourselves. How exactly did those flowers and flames come to mean so much?
First, the flora. Flowers have long served as signifiers of modern states, of course. Protea cynaroi- des (Giant/King protea) – the bloom that most typifies fynbos – has been South Africa’s emblem for many years. Sui generis, as an inclusive category, however, fynbos is associated primarily with the autochthonous identity and patrimony of the Western Cape; it is the distinctive mark, the “rich cloak”, of the region.46 Also with Cape Town, whose emergence as a global city it has come to symbolize. To both, it stands in a relationship resembling that of classic African totemism: in a relationship of humans to nature, place to species, in which each enriches the other so long as the former respects, and does not wantonly consume, the latter. Thus, while the export of fynbos plants has developed into a huge industry since the 1960s – market demand has actually stimulated the development of many new “wild” cultivars47 – Cape Flora have simultaneously become the focus of ever greater conservationist concern. Even “passion”.48 This vegetation, the object of ever widening state protection, is commonly described by re- searchers as being under serious threat. It is a threat born, increasingly, by invasive aliens,49 whose significance in environmentalist discourse has overtaken that of human beings.50
It was not always so. None of it.
For a start, the use of fynbos to refer to the indigenous plants of the southwestern Cape – the “Fyn- bos Biome” – is quite recent. Described by early naturalists as “Flora Capensis”51 or “Cape Flora”,52 this vegetation was “officially christened” as the “Cape Floral Kingdom” in the early twentieth century,53 and was known as such for decades.54 Fynbos does appear in Acocks’ Veld Types of South Africa in 1953, but only as the Afrikaans translation for “Coastal Macchia”.55 Sometimes used colloquially used at times to refer to the narrow-leaved, evergreen plants of the region, the term did not become established , either in popular or botanical parlance until the lat 1960s and early 1970s.56 Note that this was precisely the time when international demand for Cape Flora began to take off, and a national association was formed to market them. It was also the point at which politicians began to dub fynbos a “natural asset” and a “trea- sure-chest”57 – and at which botanists began to argue that it merited conservation as a “unique biome type”.58
In sum, for all the fact that fynbos has come to stand for a “traditional” heritage of national, natu- ral rootedness, it emerged as unique, and uniquely threatened, at a particular moment in the history of the South African state; at a moment, too, in the historical development of global capitalism when new rela- tions were being forged between transnational markets and the fashioning of subnational identities, cul- tures, and ecologies that appear endangered by the very forces that produce them.59 Before then, Cape Flora seem to have been resilient.60 As recently as 1953, an authority on the subject actually described fynbos as an invader whose expansion threatened the mixed grassveld of the southwestern Cape.61 What is now said of aliens was being said, not long ago, of this “national treasure”.
Admittedly, the vegetation of this ecological niche has altered much since then. But so have the values that inform our perceptions of it. Where, once upon a time, farmers saw Cape Flora as useless, as poor grazing on barren soil,62 a “fynbos landscape” – rather than a landscape of grassveld or of trees that bind soil and provide fuel – is widely taken for granted as the “climax community”;63 i.e. an evolutionary end-point to be achieved and conserved. This despite the fact that other views are possible. One has it that a “fynbos landscape” might be less an end-point than “a stage in succession to forest”.64 In this light, the ideal of sustaining such a landscape in perpetual equilibrium might be seen as an instance of the kind of functionalism that, Cronon argues, “remove[s] ecological communities from history”.65
Encounter with Aliens
But it is not just as fragile heritage that fynbos has captured the imagination of the public in the postcolony. It is also as a protagonist locked in mortal struggle with alien invaders that threaten to co- lonize its habitat and choke off its means of survival. Foreign “plants currently use…3300m cubic meters of water each year,…7% of South Africa’s mean annual runoff”, declared the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry at a high level symposium on invasive species, held in Cape Town after the blaze.66 Anxiety about these invaders is not limited to South Africa. The issue has become urgent in other Western nations as well; among them, the USA, Australia, Britain and Germany. Ironically, in Australia, it is South African flora (like yellow soursobs and Capeweed) that are demonized;67 ironic because it was Australian species, vegetation that “grows taller and burns easier than fynbos”, that bore the brunt of blame for the Cape fires of January 2000,68 the “chief nasties” being wattles (including the infamous rooikrans), pines, bluegum, and hakea – this last, to close the ironic circle, a “Protea-type shrub”.69 There are, it is true, some telling contrasts between the other Western cases and the South African preoccupation with alien- nature.70 Still, alien plants do seem to have become the stuff of melodrama, of resonant allegory, on a worldwide scale. This, we shall argue, is because they transform and re-present diffuse political terrors as natural facts.
Time was when there was great enthusiasm at the Cape for plant imports. Already by the opening decades of the eighteenth century, species such as Mediterranean cluster pine had to be introduced to the mountain slopes in large numbers to cater for the timber demands of the settlers.71 By the mid nineteenth century, interest in horticultural borrowing had turned to Australia – the other antipodean British colony and South Africa’s enduring rival – whose heathlands constitute a Mediterranean biome so similar to the southwestern Cape that some posit an evolutionary convergence between them.72 In the effort to bind soils on the windswept Cape Flats, the most sizeable agricultural plain in the region, the then Colonial Secretary began bringing in Australian wattles and myrtle to provide screens and enable dune formation. By 1875, the government was encouraging large plantations of cluster pine and other imports, including hakea and Port Jackson, to shelter them. So eager were the authorities to see these exotics take root that they distributed millions of seeds and awarded prizes for the greatest acreages planted.73 This is in stark contrast to the present day: now there are moves to tax foreign seed and force landowners to clear their properties of these very same imports.74
What happened in the intervening hundred years? How did desirable imports become invasive aliens, “pests”, “colonizers”, even “green cancers”?75 For one thing, exotic species spread beyond the confines of plantations and gardens – both spontaneously and through human effort – establishing themselves with great success among Cape Flora. Experts note that, while this process as having gained ground through the twentieth century, it evoked little interest until quite recently among botanists, government, or the population at large; this despite the fact that some disquiet had already been voiced in the late nineteenth century, and legislation to curb some “noxious weeds” was passed, if ineffectually, as early 1937.76 It was only in the late 1950s and 60s that the Botanical Society of South Africa established a committee to promote awareness of the problem and voluntary “hack groups” first took to the veld to cut out the malignant growth.
During the 1970s and 1980s, plant invasion at the Cape came under increasing scrutiny. Botanists, noting that foreign “infestations” were visible even on satellite pictures,77 concluded that invasive weeds had “outgrown any merits they might have had in the fynbos region”. In 1978, the Department of Nature and Environment Conservation published a popular source-book, Plant Invaders: Beautiful but Dange- rous, and additional groups were founded in upper middle class rural white areas; although the effect of their efforts remained uncertain, as the aliens – like those in Hollywood B-movies – seemed to thrive on chopping and burning.78 At the same time, local expert opinion still had it that exotics, in controlled po- pulations, did have some utility; that, in any case, it was impossible to eliminate them altogether; and that, even if it were possible, “other species might appear as weeds in the future”.79 All of which implied a sense that botanical categories might shift over time, a view reflected in debates on the topic elsewhere – like Australia, where the line between the “naturalized” and the “native” is taken to be much more fluid (see n.70). At this juncture, too, threats to the Cape Flora were described in multidimensional causal terms, terms that embraced fire, climatic change, and human intervention.80
It was not always to remain so.
The 1990s witnessed a marked tendency to reduce multidimensional causes to monolithic agents – above all, to alien plants – in accounting for the fragility of Cape Flora. This becomes abundantly clear from the way in which attitudes to fire in the fynbos shifted over the decade, culminating in the “holo- caust” of January 2000.
Playing with fire
As we have said, fire has long been recognized as endemic to the Cape floral ecology;81 as even the earliest colonial observers noted, “natural” blazes consume large expanses every year, their rate and intensity varying with the age and state of the vegetation, with topography, and with prevailing weather conditions. Much burning is also intentional: African views of regeneration have long set great store on it, for instance – despite the fact that colonial authorities, unnerved by the prospect of natives playing with fire, applied stringent discouragements.82 Official disapproval continued until quite recently, when systematic research began to paint a more complicated picture of the forms and functions of fynbos com- bustion.83 Thus, while the media almost invariably labels these fires “devastating”,84 expert opinion acknowledges that the conservation of species diversity is “at least partly dependent” on burning.85 But these caveats were muted by the popular debate that raged after the millennial conflagration in Cape Town.
Most salient to our concerns here is the changing place accorded to aliens in arguments about the connection of fire to fynbos – not to mention in the politics and the perceptions that inform them. True, it has long been said that certain imports burn more intensely than Cape Flora, which is itself quite flamma- ble. But foreign vegetation was, in the past, only one of several factors held to produce fires of distinct kinds, scale, and effects. One authoritative report,86 for example, does not even discuss invasive plants; van Rensberg’s more recent popular guide to fynbos lists exotics only at the very end of a diverse list of possible combustible agents.87 As we have seen, not even the public discourse after the fires of 2000 alighted immediately on aliens. When it did, however, they became a burning preoccupation.
Not everybody blamed them. But dissenting voices were drowned out as the dialectic of disaster gained momentum. One view attributed the conflagration to global climatic change. It was given remar- kably short shrift;88 this, tellingly, was a calamity that seemed to demand an explanation grounded in lo- cal contingencies. Another line of argument was to be read in the Afrikaans press which, while it reported the same events, dealt with them rather differently. Indicative, here, was the stance of Die Bur- ger, major organ of the New National Party, which held a majority in the Cape provincial parliament. While the paper did say note experts blamed aliens for the blaze, it glossed the whole event as indictment of the ANC regime, of its inefficiency in government, its inability to deliver emergency services, its wanton neglect of the Cape, and so on.89
Such, of course, were divisions among more or less enfranchised fractions of the population; aside from echoing party political oppositions, they gave voice to the kinds of tension that often arise in post- colonies between regionalism and national governance. But many others were altogether excluded from the public debate. For some of them, alien plants had another significance altogether. We refer to the large numbers of poor and unemployed of the Peninsula – in particular, those living in informal settle- ments.
Squatter “camps” have loomed ever larger in the Cape metropolitan area since the late apartheid years. During those years, migrants to the city resisted forced removal to impoverished “homelands” and, in so doing, brought the savagery of the ruling regime to the attention of the world. Africans have long felt unwelcome in the Western Cape, which has long been predominantly the preserve of whites and co- loureds. But, since the transition, black in-migration has become a veritable flood. Informal communities have burgeoned along national roads and on mountain sides, many in close proximity to healthy populations of combustible alien trees – like the Australian rooikrans (acacia cyclops), fuel of choice for the braaivleis (“barbecue”), a key rite of white South African commensality.
What is extraordinary about many recent migrants to the Cape is the degree to which their lives are provisioned by alien timber.90 Unelectrified settlements in the hollowed-out bush comprise row upon row of square houses, most of them built of slim, laterally-laid logs of rooikrans and other Australian wattles. Threading between these abodes walk women and children, heads piled high with kindling of “imported” provenance; the search for fuel is a permanent feature of the lives of squatters, wherever they reside. Along the roadsides men sell small bundles of braai wood to commuters, the vast majority of them white and middle class, as they travel to leafy suburbs or the fynbos coast. Used in domestic food fests, these aliens, condemned in public, are, in private, the stuff of a hallowed cultural practice.91
Not surprising, then, that the first reaction to the blaze of wood vendor Thami Mandlana – one of only squatter camp residents interviewed by the press at the time – was to exclaim that “the price of logs will soar this month!”92 He was right. The cost of a bundle of rooikrans went up 50% after the fire. But its longer-term implications for these woodcutters was more alarming. Mandlana again:
[L]ots of people…cut wood around here and now there won’t we enough to go around. Our hearts are sore because of this fire …This is our only livelihood and now we hardly have any left.
This is the other face of the story of alien vegetation in the Western Cape. That vegetation has long been an integral part of the local economy – the underclass part, which is all but invisible to the more fortunate who touch its roadside edges. But in the postcolony, where wealth is ever more polarized and state provi- sion is largely absent, it is a vital part; a recent survey of “people’s plants” estimates the value of rooi- krans as fuel wood in the Cape at R30m p.a.93 But this touches hardly at all on the interests of those for whom aliens have become anathema, those by whom they are seen to jeopardize the future of a shared natural, national heritage. Where, in fact, imported flora does feed mainstream commerce, those who publicize its dangers have run into difficulty: Guy Preston (see n.7, 18), quoted as having blamed huge forests of non-indigenous trees for exacerbating floods in poverty-stricken Mpumalanga – where giant logging corporations are major employers – was later prompted to “clarify” his remarks. He went to some lengths to acknowledge that the planting of these forests was “usually acceptable”, that it provided much needed jobs and yielded foreign currency.94 The discourse of invasive aliens clearly has its limits. Still, as we shall see further, its ideological scope has become strikingly broad, encompassing the integrity and regeneration of the nation-state itself.
As Preston’s “clarification” makes plain, scholarly experts find themselves playing a delicate role as the drama of alien-nature has caught fire, fanned by an avid press. With the conservation of “natural heritage” being sucked deeper and deeper into a space of intense public passion, botanists are invoked as never before, their work taken to be a matter of urgent national import. But, as their findings become the stuff of political mobilization, nuances – like the fact that not all imported plants are aggressive invaders – are lost. To wit, polite protest to the media has added little subtlety to the escalating excitement.95
How has this ideological inflation occurred? To what anxieties, interests, emotions does it respond?
Aliens and the African Renaissance.
Until a few years back, the term “alien” had rather archaic connotations in South Africa, enshrined in laws – like the Aliens Act (1937) and Aliens Registration Act (1939) – which aimed to prevent an in- flux of European refugees prior to World War 2. This legislation remained largely intact until the 1990s,96 when “aliens” once again become a charged political issue, now in the “new” South Africa. It was at about the same time that foreign plants took on fresh salience; that they became both the subject of ecological emergency and an object of national renewal.97 Perhaps the most telling evidence of this was the Working for Water Programme (WFW), launched in 1995 by then Minister of Water Affairs and Fo- restry, Kader Asmal. Part of the post-apartheid government’s Reconstruction and Development initiative, the scheme centered squarely on the eradication of alien vegetation. Billed as a flagship public works project to create jobs and combat poverty, the Programme envisaged twenty years of bush clearing, at a cost of R600m p.a. Its tone was urgent: “[Alien plants] are similar to a health epidemic, spreading widely out of control”, declared the WFW home page;98 laws would be promulgated to prosecute landowners who failed to curb non-indigenous flora. Concerted intervention would not merely restore the productive potential of the land. It would also invest in “the most marginalised” sectors of South African society, thus to promote social equity. Unemployed women and youth, ex-offenders, even the homeless would be rehabilitated by joining alien eradication teams, and by working in industries that made invaders into marketable products. Meanwhile, the general public was exhorted not to buy or sell foreign plants – and to inform the authorities of anyone who encouraged their spread.
Alien-nature, in other words, was to become the raw material of communal rebirth. At first, the scheme met with mixed success. Financing eradication units in any sustained fashion proved difficult, al- though stirring pictures of the formerly unemployed hacking away at unwanted foreign growth appeared in the media. In July 1997, the Cape Argus reported that Minister Asmal had been “given the brush-off” by the Cape Metropolitan Council, which refused to fund the clearing of invasive plants on Table Mountain.99 Efforts to pass legislation were equally controversial: proposals to introduce levies on “water interception” (a.k.a. rainfall) and “alien seed pollution” drew strong protest from the forestry industry.100 But, while the eradication plan was made to “tread water” for a year or two, public anxiety about invasive species became ever more audible.
Thus, by the time the apocalyptic fires broke out in January 2000, there was no half-heartedness about attacking the alien. Ukuvuka, Operation Firestop, was launched within days of the blaze, and media and corporate sponsors stepped in to bolster the Working for Water Programme.101 Even the powerful Forestry Owners Association, formerly on “collision course” with the Programme, came to an uneasy compromise about clearing foreign flora from river banks.102 With popular feeling ever more sharply fo- cused on attacking the “scourge”, public commentators seemed intent on coaxing “a spirit of communi- ty”103 from the ashes. A newly elected Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry put it succinctly:104
The fire has united us all. All key stakeholders – the authorities, the commercial interests, the landowners and the general public – now can come together to ensure that we are never again placed at such risk. And the key to it all is the clearing of these alien plants…
There now appeared to be widespread faith in the fact that a purge of foreign flora had “huge potential for job creation”, itself a nation-making priority here. The Director of the Botanical Society of South Africa took the occasion to suggest that the “environmental sector” deserved 15% of the proceeds of that neoliberal substitute for the commonweal, the National Lottery.105 A national Water Week and Hack Day would soon follow, with special newspaper supplements illustrating the most offensive aliens, calling on the public at large to report those who harbored them, and appealing, in the name of patriotism, for recruits to voluntary hack groups.106
As time went by, politicians made ever more overt connections between the war against aliens and the collective prosperity of the nation. A symposium to discuss international cooperation in the control of invasive species, held in Cape Town a month after the blaze (see above), drew no less than four govern- ment ministers, one bearing a message from the state president. “We are all in this together”, pleaded the Minister for Water Affairs, “for alien species do not respect lines drawn on maps”. 107Global trade and tourism, it was noted, had created a class of “unwanted international travelers” like foreign flora and dis- ease-bearing insects.108 But the most portentous words of all were those of President Mbeki himself: Alien plants, he avowed, “stand in the way of the African renaissance”.109
FOREIGN OBJECTS: THE POLITICS OF ESTRANGEMENT IN THE POSTCOLONY
And so, in rhetoric that both mirrored and magnified the public mood, invading plants become em- broiled in the state of the nation. But this does not yet answer the questions we posed a moment ago: To what anxieties, interests, historical conditions does the allegory of alien-nature, the allegory fed by fire and flood, finally speak? What underlies the ideological inflation which began with the burning bush, went on to inflame patriotic passions, and has flared so fiercely as to endanger the African renaissance? An answer is to be found in a cluster of implicit associations and organic intuitions that, as they surfaced into the public sphere, gave insight into the infrastructure of popular consciousness-under-construction; in particular, into the way in which processes of naturalization made it possible to speak the unspeakable, to assail the unassailable, thus to deal with the contradictions inherent in the making of postcolonial na- tionhood under post-1989 conditions. Also to deal with the sense of apprehension that seems accompany it in this age of global flow, of borders at once open and closed, of people unavoidably on the move, of irreducible social and cultural difference, of compromised politics, of a shrinking commonweal.
Take this comment by a well-known newspaper columnist, satirist, and self-confessed cynic:110
Doubtless there are gardening writers who would not think twice about sounding off in blissful praise of something as innocent…as the jacaranda tree…But…you may be nothing more than…a racist. Subliminally that is…Behind its blossoms and its splendid boughs, the jacaranda is nothing but a water-hogging…weed-spreading alien.
As naturalized immigrants, plant imports used, in the past, to grace the nation. The jacaranda (Jacaranda mimosifolia) as “almost…South Africa’s national tree”.111 Now, in a bizarre drama in which flora signify what politics struggles to name, they are objects of estrangement, even racination; this in a land obsessed with who is or not a citizen, with constitutional rights and wrongs, with routing out all vestiges of racism from within the body politics, not least in the liberal press.112 A second columnist made this yet more ex- plicit in speaking of the “ethnic cleansing” of the South African countryside. For centuries, she wrote, people enjoyed the shade of oaks, the smell of roses – aliens all. Now, “floundering in the complacency of democracy”, they blame all evil on those very aliens.113 But it was a wry letter to the Mail & Guardian, perhaps South Africa’s most distinguished weekly, that made the political subtext most brutally plain.114
It is alien-bashing time again. As an alien…I am particularly prickly about criticisms of aliens even if they are plants …Alien plants cannot of course respond to these accusations. But before the Department of Home Affairs is dragooned into investigating the residence permits of these plants I, as a concerned fellow alien, wish to remind one and all that plants such as maize…soybean, sunflower…originated outside of the continent of Africa. In any case, did the fire-and-flood-causing alien plants cross the borders and establish plantations …by themselves?
For this interpolated alien, himself under no illusions, the allusions are obvious. They flow from the natu- ralization of xenophobia. Barely displaced in the kingdom of plants is a distressingly familiar crusade: the demonization of migrants and refugees by the state and its citizenry alike.
It has been noted that the migrant, and more recently the asylum seeker, is the “specter” on whose wretched fate the triumphal neoliberal politics of the “new” Europe has been founded (see n.42). In South Africa too, a phobia about foreigners, above all from elsewhere in Africa, has been the illicit offspring of the fledgling democracy – waxing, paradoxically perhaps, alongside appeals to the African Renaissance and to ubuntu, a common African humanity. That this is occurring among a people themselves familiar with exile, who in the past lived reasonably peaceably with in-migrating labor, seems all the more ironic – and all the more in need of explanation. Of late, the phobia, which started out as a diffuse sense of misgiving, has congealed into an active antipathy to what is perceived as a shadowy alien-nation of “illegal immigrants”; the qualifier has become all but inseparable from the sign, just as, in the plant world, invasive has become locked, adjectivally, to alien. Popularly held to be “economic vultures”115who usurp jobs and resources, who foster crime, prostitution and disease, these doppelganger anticitizens are accused – in uncanny analogy with non-indigenous flora – of spreading wildly out of control. And of siphoning off the rapidly diminishing wealth of the nation.116
Aliens are a distinctive species in the popular imagination. In a parodic perversion of the past, they are marked ineluctably by skin color and “native” culture. This is most dramatically revealed, as such things often are, at moments of mistaken identity – when South Africans are themselves thought to be outsiders and treated accordingly. Like the national volleyball star, apprehended by police because she looked too dark, or the son of a former exile, arrested eight times over the past few years because his “fa- cial structure” and accent marked him as foreign.117 Once singled out, “illegals” are seldom differentiated from bona fide immigrants or refugees.118 All are referred to as makwerekwere, a disparaging Sotho term for incompetent speech – and, by implication, for exclusion from the moral community.
Their fears are well-founded. With the relaxation of controls over immigrant labor, previously se- cured by intergovernmental agreements and electrified borders,119 South Africa has become the destination of choice for unprecedented numbers of people from troubled countries to the north; estimates vary from two to eight million.120 This influx has occurred amidst transformations in the domestic econo- my that have significantly altered relations of labor to capital.121 Not only has drastic downsizing, euphemized as “jobless growth”, cost some 500,000 jobs in the past five years, most of them held by blacks;122 even more noteworthy, over 80% of employers now opt for flexible, “non-standard” labor,123 much of it done by lowly paid, non-unionized “illegals”, whom farmers and industrialists see as essential to their survival in competitive markets.124 Small wonder, then, that unemployment is a ubiquitous an- xiety; that it is seen as a major impediment to postcolonial prosperity; that routing the alien,125 who has come to embody the threat to work and welfare, presents itself as a persuasive mode of confronting economic dispossession.
Thus it is that foreigners – in particular, black foreigners – are the object of consternation and con- testation across the new nation, from politicians and their parties, through the media and trade-unions, to street hawkers and the unemployed.126 In September 1998, a crowd returning by train from Pretoria, where they had been protesting the loss of work, threw three makwerekwere to their deaths for purpor- tedly stealing jobs.127 A few months later came reports of a gang of hoodlums in Johannesburg dedicated to the “systematic elimination” of aliens.128 Immigrants and their property have regularly been attacked by local communities, forced into “ghettos”, criminalized and scapegoated.129 A survey conducted in 1997 by the South African Migration Project, under the aegis of the Institute for Democracy, ranked the hostility of South Africans toward newcomers as one of the highest in the world. So acute is it that the Human Rights Commission has launched a “Roll-back Xenophobia Campaign” and various agencies of government are actively supporting cultural projects aimed at combating discrimination against out- siders.130
Yet the state is itself an ambiguous actor in this drama. On one hand, it strives volubly to uphold the standards of liberal universalism, insisting on the uncompromising protection of human rights; on the other, it sometimes contributes, wittingly or not, to the mood of xenophobia. Thus its law enforcement agencies have been unable to resist the temptation of attacking the foreign specter. As its ability to main- tain public order has increasingly been questioned, the Ministry of Safety and Security has grown propor- tionately more active in its war on non-citizens: while anxiety about invasive plants was escalating in the opening weeks of 2000, government announced its “US-style bid to rid SA of illegal aliens” (see above, n.20) and to penalize those who knowingly employed them. The parallel could not have been more clear. Not long after, police around the country carried out high profile raids on “gentlemen’s clubs” suspected of trafficking in undocumented sexworkers.131 Onslaughts on “illegals” in show business, the media, and the music industry followed.132 Then, within weeks, the Minister of Safety and Security personally initia- ted a “blitz” in Johannesburg on strongholds of immigrant business, vowing to “thoroughly ventilate all criminal elements and illegal immigrants out”.133 Senior police in Pretoria followed suit. Panic ensued as some 14,000 people were searched, over 1,000 arrested134 and, despite their protests, “honest, taxpaying citizens” were humiliated in the streets and in taxis.135 Reports reminiscent of the apartheid era told of violence on the sidewalks where refugees, desperate for documentation, camped outside the Home Af- fairs Department. Foreign nationals, held at a privately-owned deportation center, were said to have been harshly beaten, their property looted.136
Then began the reaction: amidst accusations of excess, respected commentators maintained that the clamp down had seriously backfired, putting human rights at risk. They and others voiced urgent calls for a more adequate, enforceable immigration policy.137 Meanwhile, suspicion started to surface, just as it did in the case of invasive plants, that the zeal for weeding out aliens was misplaced. Why this harassment of strangers? asked one “appalled citizen”. It was not as if they were guilty of the “rape, murder, hijacking and bank robberies” that South Africans were perpetrating on each other.138 The answer seems plain, at least to Steven Friedman, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg.139 Arresting “illegal” immigrants may do “nothing to reduce crime”. But it does create “the impression of activity and effectiveness” on the part of government, an illusion “often as important as reality”. Here, in short, is an instance of precisely the kind of symbolic activity of which we spoke ear- lier; of the mass-mediated ritual excess, directed to producing state power and national unity, that features so prominently in the second postcolonial age. It appears to work. According to a Human Sciences Research Council poll, notes Friedman, most citizens believed, in December 1998, that the regime had lost its capacity to contain crime and to assure public order. Now some 60% think that it actually does have some control – despite no change in the incidence of serious felonies.
ENDS AND MEANINGS
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh140 argue that the growing stress in Africa on autochthony – and, conco- mitantly, on the exclusion of the allogène, the stranger – departs in important respects from older ontolo- gies of being, belonging, and difference; most notably from ethnicity, with which it shares many features, among them a capacity to arouse strong affect and to justify the construction of unambiguous social boundaries. Autochthony, they suggest, is less specific, more protean in its substance, and thus more readily open to political manipulation on many levels at once; not least in reaction to the kinds of social and economic processes set in motion by “seemingly open-ended global flows”. Yet more may be said about its salience as a naturalizing allegory of collective being-in-the-world; also about its salience as a motor of collective action. But it is undeniable that, in post-apartheid South Africa, outrage against aliens has provided a versatile call to arms, uniting people long divided by class, color, and culture: it is enthusiastically mobilized by those who seek to conjure a new nation not merely by bridging familiar antinomies but by erecting finite frontiers under conditions that, by all appearances, threaten to dissolve them altogether. And, with them, the coordinates of material and moral community. We have spelled out those conditions. They lie in the particular historical circumstances of postcolonial nation-states at the close of the twentieth century, of their absorption into a global capitalist economy whose neoliberal ways and means have altered Fordist patterns of production and consumption, the articulation of labor to capital, the nature of sovereignty and civic identity, geographies of space and time, and much else be- sides. Hence the insistence earlier on situating our understanding of those nation-states not in a comfortable sociology of ideal-types, but in the hard-edged specificities of their second, post-1989 coming.
Here, then, lies one theme in the theoretical counterpoint that animates this essay: the conceptuali- zation of postcolonial polities. It is beyond our present scope to “theorize” those polities – whatever that might mean at this moment in the history of Western social thought. However, because of the manner of their insertion into world history, we have argued, they evince three notable features. Each is an intensifi- cation of the predicament of the contemporary nation-state sui generis, each a corollary of the changing face of capitalism, all of them interconnected. The first is the transfiguration of the modernist political subject: a move away from a sense of belonging in a homogeneously imagined community of right-bear- ing individuals towards one in which difference is endemic and irreducible, in which the polity subsumes persons with a range of diversely constituted identities and entitlements; from a stress on citizenship based on “deep horizontal fraternity” to which all other connections are secondary toward one in which each national is a “stakeholder” vertically rooted, like homegrown plants in soil, in a body corporate; from a notion that attachment may be acquired equally by ascription, residence, immigration, and naturalization toward the primacy of autochthony, making it the most “authentic”, the most essential of all modes of connection. The second is the contradictory logic of sovereign borders: the simultaneous necessity that they be open to various forms of flow – of finance, workers, commodities, consumers, infra- structure – and yet enclaved enough both to offer competitive advantage for global enterprise and to serve the material interests of a national citizenry; in other words, to husband the kinds of difference, the kinds of distinction between the local and the nonlocal, from which transnational capital may profit and rich nations protect their spheres of influence. The third is the depoliticization of politics, their displacement from the realm of the social and the cultural, the moral and ideological, into the technical, apparently value-free dictates of the market – and its attendant forms of economic and legal “rationality”. Also into the imperatives of nature, however those come to be constructed, disseminated, taken-for- granted.
Put these things together, and the moral panic about strangers becomes overdetermined. Take human aliens. Their very existence embodies the contradiction of borders and boundaries in the age of global capital. On one hand, by crossing those borders they import value into the heart of the polity, be it as cheap, manageable labor for agribusiness or industry, as traders who undersell indigenous merchants to the advantage of local consumers, as people with skills in short supply, or whatever. On the other, they are held to take away jobs and benefits from nationals, to undercut the struggles of local workers, to bring contagion, and, by trafficking in drugs, bodies and contraband, to commit the kinds of crime that unravel the social fabric itself. Moreover, their presence raises difficult questions about the changing nature of political citizenship in the postcolony: given that South Africa, like other nation-states, fe- tishizes human rights – rights, that is, which transcend parochial identities and borders of all kinds – should outsiders not enjoy them like any autochthon? What precisely ought to separate the entitlements of the citizen from those of any other human being? On what basis is discrimination against foreigners justified in a society dedicated to “nonracism”, in a nascent national culture that speaks the language of ubuntu, a common Africanity? Taking into account the apotheosis of the free market, why should strangers be the target of local protectionism? This, in sum, is where the liberal ideology of universal inclusion runs up against a politics of exclusion whereby identity is mobilized to create “closed” spheres of interest within “open” neoliberal economies. Note here, too, the depoliticization of politics in the treatment of the alien-as-specter, of their displacement into a technicist discourse about demography and economic sociology, about health and disease, about social pathology and criminality.
Much the same may be said of alien vegetation. We have seen how that vegetation may, simulta- neously, be one person’s livelihood and another’s apocalypse. The passage across frontiers, among plants as among people, illuminates all the contradictions of openness and closure, of regulation and deregula- tion, of otherness and indigenization: Is the jacaranda, “almost the national tree”, a naturalized South Af- rican? Or a hateful interloper? The fact that it has become the subject of ironic comment about subliminal racism and ethnic cleansing – something almost unthinkable a short while ago – makes clear how much the concern with borders, belonging, autochthony, and alien-nation has imploded in very recent times. It is, of course, but a short step to posing the same questions about humans. Who, exactly, is a South Afri- can? As this suggests, the transference into the floral kingdom of profoundly political questions is a dra- matic instance of the process of depoliticization of which we have spoken. While there is no doubt that real issues of ecology are raised by the effect of imported vegetation on fire and flood – as we have said, their gravity is not to be underestimated – the effort to construct a nation with reference to a rhetoric of exclusion, a rhetoric validated by appeal to the apparent value-free exigencies of botany and the environ- mental sciences, is a cogent instance of naturalization. To which, now, we return.
Before that, however, a parenthetic remark. Self-evidently, South Africa is not alone in its obses- sion with aliens and alien-nature. Earlier we noted that many countries, some of them postcolonies some not, are caught up in similar moral panics. These nation-states share a common feature: all are former la bor importers and centers of capital – and, as such, nexes of wealth within a vastly unequal world economy – into which job-seekers and fortune hunters are popularly imagined to be pouring, usually across ill- regulated borders, in order to take scarce work and resources away from locals. This standardized night- mare evokes exactly the same anxieties as those to which we have alluded in South Africa. It has his- torical precedents, as we all know. Similar panics about immigration and belonging, about inclusion and exclusion, have characteristically occurred at the close of imperial epochs, when people from former “overseas possessions” have sought entry to the “mother country” only to find themselves barred, as colonial subjects, from citizenship – and from the sovereign benefits that accrued to it.
But this leaves one remaining topic not yet resolved: Why nature? Here lies the other strand of our theoretical argument. It concerns naturalization. Central to our analysis are the claims (a) that the apoca- lyptic fire in Cape, under-determined by the proximate events themselves, became the lightning rod for a panic about non-indigenous vegetation, a panic (b) which crystallized inchoate fears about alien-nature, named them, and called them into the heart of public consciousness; (c) that this is owed, overdetermin- edly, to the fact that the anxiety concerning foreign flora, while real enough in and of itself, was, at the same time, also a metonymic projection of more deep-seated questions facing the postcolonial state about the nature of its sovereign borders, about the right to citizenship within it, about the meaning and the pas- sion inherent in national belonging – and, in particular, about the tendency to invoke autochthony in ans- wering those questions, both pragmatically and figuratively.
This is where naturalization enters the picture. Recall that classically, as we noted, it has had two contrary connotations. One is the assimilation of alien persons, signs, and practices into a world-in-place; its prototype is the metamorphosis of outlanders into citizens of the liberal nation-state. The other, whose genealogy stretches from Marx through Gramsci to Foucault, is the deployment of nature as alibi, as a fertile allegory for rendering some people and objects strange, thereby to authenticate the limits of the (“natural”) order of things; also to interpolate within it new social and political distinctions. It is tempting, in the South African case, to invoke yet another connotation – one owed to Durkheim – according to which processes in nature are taken to be a direct reflection of processes in society. Some local commentators did just this, as we have seen, finding in the panic about invasive plants a mirror for the angst about immigrants. But such a reading of the events in question is insufficient. Nature is every- where more directly, more dynamically implicated in the social practices by which history and ideology make each other. The unfolding controversy about indigenous plants and alien-nature became the vehicle for a public debate, as yet unfinished, over the proper constitution of the polity, over the limits of belonging, over the terms in which the nation, the commonweal, and the stakeholding subject are to be constituted in the age of global capitalism and universal human rights. In so doing, it permitted a vocalization of anxieties and conundrums not easily addressed by politics-as-usual. Even more, the dis- placement of the argument about outsiders into the floral kingdom made it possible, by analogy, to contemplate and legitimate discrimination against those humans not embraced in the body of the nation, those cast adrift on the currents of the new world order. And sanctioned, albeit unwittingly, a new, post- racist form of racism; a form of racism that, by concealing itself in the language of autochthony and alien-nature, has come to co-exist seamlessly with a transnational culture of universal rights.
As this implies, discourses of nature cast a sharp light on the everyday actions and events through which definitions of belonging and citizenship – and their dark underside, the politics of exclusion – are being reframed in the postcolony. In particular, they illuminate the question of why it is that autochthony – a form of attachment that ties people to place, that natures the nation, that authorizes entitlement – has become so central in an epoch when nationhood seems at once critical and yet in crisis, when borders everywhere present themselves as paradoxes, when a beleaguered political imagination strives to make sense of social being in a world of laissez faire.
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Giovanni Arrighi Array
“As the editors point out in their insightful introduction, rising criminality in postcolonies is not merely an antisocial response to poverty, exclusion, or scarcity; nor is it simply the result of a breakdown in the state monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. It is also the expression of a “dialectic of law and dis/order, framed by neoliberal mechanisms of deregulation and new modes of mediating human transactions.” As such, “criminal violence does not so much repudiate the rule of law or the licit operations of the market as appropriate their forms—and recommission their substance.”… In a short review it is impossible to do justice to the richness of the ethnographic material presented in the individual chapters. This material not only shows the variety of situations in which we can detect the dialectic of law and dis/order that the Comaroffs theorize in their introductory summation. Equally important, they point to new directions in which the theorization can be usefully developed.”
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Sally Engel Merry Array
This provocative book is critically important reading for anyone seeking to understand the economic and political transformations of the current period in both the global South and North. It offers a broad theoretical framework along with detailed and fascinating case studies. The book is valuable for law and society scholars, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, criminologists, and anyone interested in understanding the postcolonial world. It is also a very good text for graduate and advanced undergraduate students interested in socio-legal studies, conflict and violence, criminology, and globalization.
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Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice:
Once upon a time, not so long ago, culture, in the lower case, was primarily an anthropological preoccupation. Not any more. It is hardly news that peoples across the planet have taken to invoking it, to signifying themselves with reference to it, to investing it with an authority, a determinacy, a superorganic unity of which even the most conservative anthropologist would be wary. Culture, now capitalized in both senses of the term, has come to provide the language, the Esperanto, of difference spoken in the active voice. And, as it has, its world-historical effect has been to unsettle all sorts of modernist certainties. Notable among them have been some of the premises and promises of Liberal Theory, its hegemonic conceptions of civilization and civitas, its obsession with reason and rationality, its idea of universal truth, its authorization of positivist empiricism. As never before, the liberal nation-state – the political apotheosis of that Theory, in the upper case – is being embarrassed by heterodoxy: by Culture as (i) a primordial alibi for naturally different identities, each of which warrants respect, recognition, room for self-expression, entitlement, and (ii) a solvent that, to the degree that it overlays race, class, generation, gender, and citizenship, reduces politics to what Tom Vanderbilt (1997:140) has dubbed “a host of special interest groups clamoring in the trading pits of pluralist relativism.”
Not only the trading pits. Also the law courts. From the world over come ever more legal challenges to Euromodernist ways and means, challenges made in the name of otherness, of different kinds of cultural and confessional reason. Like the struggle by Muslims to have their daughters wear head-scarves in French schools, or Sikhs employed by London Transport to don turbans, or Orisha worshipers in the USA to sacrifice animals for ritual purposes, or Christian Scientists to refuse medical intervention. As these examples suggest, the phenomenon is not new, but there seems to have been an exponential increase in landmark cases since the late years of the last century. Most have involved relatively small, disempowered minorities, people who seek, sometimes with moderate success, to assert their difference, phrased as a right to freedom of belief, against the constitutional hegemony of the liberal modernist nation-state; female Muslim cops in Britain, for example, may now don a hijab fringed in the design of the Metropolitan Police.1 But, in postcolonies like South Africa, the situation is more complicated. Significantly so. Here, heterodox practices – some of them long criminalized by the colonial state, some of them regarded as dangerous by the canons of liberal modernity – are claimed by the majority of the population. Indeed, by the very citizens in whose name anticolonial struggles were fought. And to whose empowerment postcolonial democracy is ostensibly dedicated.
In postcolonies, in short, the challenge of Culture to the sovereignty of the state, to its constitution and its rule of law, seems everywhere immanent. Note, in this respect, the assertive practice of female circumcision in countries that have legislated against it. Or the ascendance, recently, of Islamic sharia in the criminal law of northern Nigeria. Or, at the southern tip of the continent, the anti-constitutional practice of compulsory circumcision by some “traditional” authorities,2 many of whom joust openly with the law of the land under the sign of custom. The examples are endless. In South Africa, the issue takes on especially stark proportions. This, after all, is a postcolony whose government, the African National Congress, is trying to fashion a highly enlightened democracy under the banner ”One Law for one Nation” – and yet, at the same time, to free itself from a legacy of Eurocentric domination; a postcolony rooted in a modernist culture of legality that seeks, explicitly if uneasily, to make space for cultural diversity and customary authority; a postcolony whose Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Penuell Maduna, has expressed regret, publicly, that its Euromodern Constitution is not informed by “African jurisprudence.”3
But to what extent is this possible? What are the limits of liberalism in accommodating difference? Can a Euromodernist nation-state, founded on the sovereignty of “One Law,” actually infuse itself with another jurisprudence? Would it not invite a descent into Hobbesian – or, worse yet, Huntingtonian – pluralism? And why, in this equation, does the law keep raising its head? The equation itself, moreover, presupposes a Manichean opposition between Euromodernity and an Africanist politics of Culture. Is this the most appropriate way of phrasing the problem of heterodoxy in the first place? More consequentially, what happens in countries like South Africa, where cultural beliefs enjoy a large measure of constitutional protection (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[a]), when customary usages do run up against the One Law for One Nation? Could this – the immanent clash between Culture and the Law – be the corollary of a contradiction built into the very scaffolding of all postcolonies, which, as we shall see, are erected, simultaneously, on singularity and difference? If so, how is it to be resolved? Elsewhere (loc.cit.) we argue that it is actually unresolvable within the canons of liberal theory and practice. Assuming that this the case, what do human beings actually do when heterodoxy hits the limits of legal tolerance? How do they address the contradiction? And what are the historical implications of their actions for the ever more voluble confrontation, across the world, between Euromodernist universalism and cultural relativism?
We approach these questions, in South Africa, by way of a particular instance of the conundrum: the challenge to the state and to the One Law of the Nation posed by cultural practices deemed “dangerous” – dangerous because they imperil persons and property, defy received categories of legal reason, and flout the ways and means of Euromodern criminal justice. Of those practices, the killing of witches is perhaps the most acute affront to governance. Not only does it subvert the state monopoly over legitimate violence. It also calls into question the extent of cultural recognition actually afforded by the Bill of Rights. After all, the action taken against witches is justified by the belief that they present a clear and present danger to the lives of their compatriots and the well-being of their communities (cf. Auslander 1993; Ralushai et al. 1996; Geschiere 1997); also, by the allegation that government is putting citizens at risk, and thereby violating their rights, by failing to safeguard them from injury and death by witchcraft – an allegation given circumstantial weight by the incapacity of the severely over-taxed South Africa Police Services to cope with the forces of crime and disorder perceived to be pervading the country (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[b]).
Patently, this kind of cultural policing is a scandal that no modernist state can ignore; it inevitably calls forth efforts to police culture. And yet, under the new South African constitution, traditional African practices cannot simply be criminalized. Herein then, at its most raw, lies the contradiction, the antinomy between Culture and the Law, of which we have been speaking. It has provoked some extraordinary responses on the part of both the judiciary and those who appear before it; one of them being to play ingeniously on the difference between the procedures of criminal and civil law, another to ply the space between judgment and justice. This is most readily visible in the countryside, at a distance from the centers of governance. Here there is more room for experimentation in coping with the implications of Culture for everyday life in the postcolony. Here, too, the pragmatics of the African vernacular make themselves most pressingly felt. Here, tellingly, is where an Afromodernity is being forged – in the teeth of the formal stand-off between liberal universalism and the demands of difference – by ways and means ways that vex such tired notions as “hybridity” or “syncretism.”
Since the problem of the limits of liberalism and the pragmatics of difference – at least where we are concerned with it – has a great deal to do with postcoloniality, sui generis, we begin with a lateral move: a brief excursion into the life and times of “the” postcolonial nation-state in Africa.
REFLECTIONS ON THE POSTCOLONY
It is scarcely necessary any longer to note that “postcoloniality” – one of many contemporary terms marked by a prefixation on what they are not – refers to more than just “[the time] after colonialism” (Prakash 1995). Or to rehearse the fact that it means very different things to different people (cf. Darian-Smith 1996; McClintock 1992), be it a subaltern, “oppositional consciousness” (Klor De Alva 1995:245), a particular sort of “politics of…struggle” (Mishra and Hodge 1991:399), or the historical grounding of a species of literary criticism.4 And yet, in all the efforts to associate the term with a kind of sensibility, there has been a tendency to treat “the” postcolonial nation-state as something of a cipher on whose terrain arguments about the past, about identity, citizenship, consciousness, and other things, may proceed unencumbered by the bothersome details of actual histories, economies, or societies. Clearly, this is not the place in which to “theorize” postcoloniality, sui generis, whatever that may mean in this day and age. But, if sense is to be made of emerging forms of governance, politics, and popular subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa, or elsewhere, a few thoughts on the topic are in order.
They have to do primarily with hyphe-nation, with the link between nation and state, state and nation. Some of them, perforce, reprise things we have discussed in other places (e.g. 2000, 2001).
The modernist nation, to recall Benedict Anderson (1983) and others, was erected on the often violent fiction of cultural homogeneity, on an imagined, if unevenly enacted, sense of “horizontal fraternity.” That imagining, it is often said, has always been more an aspiration than an achievement: the European polity, after Westphalia, is perhaps best viewed not as a singular, fully- realized, definite article but as an ongoing work-in-progress, one that has evinced a great deal of variation across time and space as it has sought to harness the forces of industrial capitalism – forces that have never been fully under its control. Furthermore, for all the idea, the idyll, that it was composed everywhere of right-bearing persons equal before the law, it excluded many from its political embrace and its commonweal. Typically, too, it was inhospitable to difference. Nonetheless, the fiction of a unity of essence, affect, and interest, of common purpose and civitas, underwrote the legitimacy of the state as sole guarantor of the collective well-being and individual entitlements of its citizens. Hence the hyphe-nation, the indivisibility of nation from state.
Much has been said in recent times of the so-called “crisis” of the modernist polity under the impact of global capitalism: of its shrinking sovereignty; of its loss of control over economic policy, cultural production, and the flow of people, currencies, and commodities; of a growing disjunction between nation and state (cf. Appadurai 1990). Whether or not “the” nation-state is alive and well, ailing, or metamorphosing – we prefer the third alternative – one thing is patent. The received notion of polities based on cultural homogeneity and horizontal fraternity, real or fictive, is giving way to imagined communities of difference, of multiculturalism, of “ID-ology” (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[b]).5 This is true even in places as long antagonistic to heterogeneity as the United Kingdom, which, despite recent race wars on the streets of its northerly towns, now projects itself, with apologies to Benetton, as United in its tolerance of Color and Culture. And in ones like Botswana, perhaps the only democracy in the world with a claim never to have imprisoned anybody because of her or his political convictions, and long regarded, if not altogether accurately, as relatively homogeneous. To be sure, the rising incidence of cultural struggles and ethnopolitics since 1989 has called forth a torrent of scholarly argument (see J.L. Comaroff 1996). There is no need to retrace that argument here. For present purposes, we merely need to note the fact.
For most postcolonial nation-states6 the politics of difference are not new. Heterogeneity has been there from the first. Born of long histories of colonization, these polities typically entered the new world order with legacies of ethnic diversity invented or exacerbated in the cause of imperial governance. Colonial regimes, intent on the management of racial capitalism, never constituted nations in the Euromodernist sense of the term, even where they gave their “possessions” many of the ceremonial trappings of nationhood. In their wake, they tended to leave behind them not just an absence of infrastructure, but a heritage of fractious identity struggles. This has been further attenuated, since fin de siecle, by some of the cultural and material corollaries of neoliberalism: the movement across the planet of ever more people in search of work and opportunities to trade; the transnational mass-mediation of signs, styles, and information; the rise of an electronic commons; the growing hegemony of the market and, with it, the distillation of culture into intellectual property, a commodity to be possessed, patented, exchanged-for-profit. In this world, freed is reduced to choice: choice of commodities, of life-ways, and, most of all, of identities. This at a moment when the moral and material processes that drive desire and fulfilment seem, ironically, to be less and less under local control. And when access to the means of survival, of accumulation and profit, are ever more polarized both within and across nation-states.
As this implies, postcolonies evince many features common to the modernist polities on which they have had, to a large degree, to model themselves. In coming to terms with the implications of global neoliberalism, they appear, in fact, to exaggerate – or, more accurately, to hyper-extend – those features; all of which makes it seem as if, in their temporal aspect, they are running slightly ahead of the unfolding history of the Euromodern nation-state. Perhaps they are harbingers of the postmodern future. But that is a topic for another time. Our focus here is on two corollaries of the founding of postcolonies not on homogeneity but on difference, not on deep horizontal fraternity but on a social contract among persons who are at once right-bearing individuals and identity-bearing subjects.
The first corollary has to do with the refiguration of citizenship. The explosion of identity politics after 1989, most notably in post-totalitarian societies, has manifested itself in more than just ethnic consciousness. Difference is also vested, ever more deeply, in gender, sexuality, generation, race, religion, life-style, and social class. And in constellations of these things, sometimes deployed in highly contingent, strategic ways. While most human beings continue to live as citizens in nation- states, they tend only to be conditionally citizens of nation-states: their composite personae may include elements that disregard political borders and/or mandate claims against the commonweal within them. In consequence, identity struggles of one kind or another appear immanent almost everywhere as selfhood is immersed into collective essence, innate substance, and primordial destiny (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). What is more, the assertion of autochthony – which elevates to a first principle the interests, “natural” rights, and moral connectedness that arise from rootedness in a place of birth – has become an increasingly significant mode of exclusion within national polities; this, as Americans learned after 9/11, in proportion to the extent to which outsiders are held to undermine the Security of the Homeland or the Wealth of the Nation. It is, putatively, in the name of the latter that the state is becoming a metamanagement enterprise in the neoliberal world (loc. cit.):7 in the name of subjects who, even as they seek to be global citizens in a planetary economy of commodities and cultural flows, demand also to be shareholders in the polity-as-corporation. Herein, then, lies the complexity. The fractal nature of contemporary political personhood, the fact that it is overlaid and undercut by a politics of difference and identity, does not necessarily involve the negation of national belonging. Merely its uneasy, unresolved, ambiguous co-existence with other modes of being-in-the-world. It is this inherent ambiguity, we suggest, that makes the ostensible concreteness of concepts like “citizenship” and “community” so alluring.
Of the modes of being that constitute the twenty-first century political subject, cultural attachments are often taken, popularly, to run deepest. In many postcolonies, they are also the most marked. As we have said, ethnicity, like all ascribed identities, represents itself as grounded at once in blood and sentiment, in a commonality of interest, and, by extension, in “natural” right; one of the great ironies of our time is that identity has become, simultaneously, a matter of volition and self- production through consumption and a matter of ineluctable essence, of genetics and biology. Add to this the fact that culture is increasingly seen, and legally protected, as intellectual property (cf. Coombe 1998) – even more, as a “naturally” copyrighted collective possession – and the conclusion is unavoidable: we are witnessing the dawn of the Age of Ethnicity, Inc. (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[c]). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that several ethnic groups have formally incorporated as limited companies; that a large number of others have established themselves as businesses to sell not their labor power but their heritage, their landscape, their knowledge, their religious practices (loc. cit; see also, e.g., Halter 2000; Oomen 2002:135); that yet others have successfully sued for the unlicenced reproduction of their symbols, sacred and secular; that serious scholars are beginning to see the “sustainability” of cultures to lie in their marketing and branding (Chanock 2000:26). Even in modern China, Dirlik (2000:129) tells us,“ethnic groups…which were defined earlier through political classification, are… beginning to perceive themselves also as `natural’ economic groups”; note, here, the stress on natural. Thus it is that identity, in the age of partible, conditional citizenship, is defined, ever more, by the capacity to possess and to consume;8 that politics are treated, ever more, as a matter of individual or collective entitlement, of ID-ology; that social being in general, and social wrongs in particular, are translated, ever more, into the language of “rights.”
Self-evidently, in this light, the term “multicultural(ism)” is insufficient to describe the fractious heterogeneity of postcolonies. Demeaned in popular usage, it evokes images of Disney’s “Small World,” of college courses in non-Western literatures, of ritual calendars respectful of human diversity, and the like; in short, of benign indifference to difference. Neither as noun nor as adjective does it make clear the critical limits of liberal pluralism: that notwithstanding the utopian visions of some humanist philosophers, the tolerance afforded to culture in modernist polities falls well short of allowing claims to autonomous political power or legal sovereignty. In postcolonies, in which ethnic assertion plays on the simultaneity of primordial connectedness, natural right, and corporate interest, the nation-state is less multicultural than it is policultural. The prefix, spelled “poli-,“ marks two things at once: plurality and its politicization. It does not denote merely appreciation on the part of a national majority for the customs, costumes, and cuisine of one or another minority from one or another elsewhere. It is a strong statement, an argument grounded in a cultural ontology, about the very nature of the pluri-nation: about its constitution and the terms of citizenship within it, about the spirit of its laws and the division of its spoils, about its governance and its hyphe-nation. In South Africa this takes the form of an ongoing confrontation between Euromodern liberalism and variously expressed, variously formulated notions of “traditional” authority. And, by extension, the manner of their coexistence.
Talk of rights, of culture as property, of citizenship, constitutions, and contestation, brings us to the second corollary that flows from the heterogeneous social infrastructure of postcolonies. Whether weak or strong, intrusive or recessive, autocratic or populist, the regimes that rule them share one thing: they speak incessantly of and for themselves in the name of “the” state. Like those born of Euromodernity, postcolonial African states are statements (cf. Corrigan and Sayer 1985:30). They give voice to more or less authoritative worldviews, sometimes backed by military might, sometimes by carnivalesque ritual (Mbembe 1992), sometimes by mass-mediated shows of rhetorical force. But their language is not arbitrary.9 It is the language of the law. The modernist polity, of course, has always been rooted in a culture of legality. Its subject, as Charles Taylor (1989:11-2) reminds us, was, from the first, an individual whose humanity and dignity were formulated in a grammar of rights and legal privilege. The global spread of neoliberal capitalism has intensified the grounding of citizenship in the jural:this because of its contractarian conception of all relations, its celebration of “free” markets, and its commodification of virtually everything, all of which are deeply inscribed in the vernacular of homo juris. It has also required that received modes of regulation be redesigned to deal with new forms of property, possession, consumption, exchange, and jurisdictional boundaries (cf. Jacobson 1996; Salacuse 1991; Shapiro 1993).
All of this reaches its apotheosis in postcolonies, precisely because their hyphenation is so highly attenuated, because they are built on a foundation of irreducible difference, because they are endemically policultural. In them, the ways and means of the law – constitutions and contracts, rights and remedies, statutory enactments and procedural rituals – are attributed an almost magical capacity to accomplish order, civility, justice, and empowerment. And to remove inequities of all kinds. Note, in this respect, how many new national constitutions have been promulgated since 1989. Note also the explosion across the planet of law-related NGOs, Legal Resource Centers, Lawyers for Human Rights, and the like, whose offices are now to be found in the most remote of African villages. In South Africa, the language of legality has become so ubiquitous, the Constitution (in the upper case) so biblical, that virtually every organization has its own (lower case) analogue. There is even a Law Train that travels around the countryside offering free legal advice; its volunteer lawyers take pains to encourage all citizens to pursue their rights, and to address wrongs, by legal means.10 In the upshot – and, as we shall see, in ways both overdetermined and unexpected – the terminology of torts has come to loom large in the discourses and practices of the postcolony.
But why this fetishism of the law? In policultural nation-states, the language of legality affords an ostensibly neutral medium for people of difference to make claims on each other and on the state, to transact unlike values, to enter into contractual relations, and to deal with their conflicts. In so doing, it produces an impression of consonance amidst contrast: of the existence of universal standards which, like money, facilitate the negotiation of incommensurables across otherwise intransitive boundaries. Hence its capacity, most obvious under conditions of social and ethical disarticulation, of the loss of political ideology, to make one thing out of many, to carve concrete realities out of fragile fictions. Hence, too, its hegemony, despite the fact that it is hardly a guarantor of equity. As an instrument of governance, it allows the state to represent itself as the custodian of civility against disorder – and, therefore, as mandated to conjure moral community by exercising a monopoly over the construction of a commonweal out of inimical diversities of interest (Harvey 1990:108). It is this, to return to our point of a moment ago, that is made manifest in the rash of new constitutions written over the past decade or so. Each domesticates the global-speak of universal human rights, an idiom that individuates the citizen and, by treating cultural identity as a private asset rather than a collective possession, seeks to transmute difference into singularity.
It is an open question whether or not these constitutions, this obsession with human rights – indeed, the language of legality itself – yield empowerment to those who previously lacked it. They do not, after all, guarantee the right to a living, only to possess, to signify, to consume, to choose. Nonetheless, the alchemy of the law, like all fetishes, lies in an enchanted displacement, one that resists easy demystification: the notion, not altogether unfounded, that legal instruments have the wherewithal to manufacture something that was not there before, to yield social value, to achieve political ends, even to orchestrate social harmony (cf. Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994). Its charm also lies in the fact that it obscures the most brutal of truths: that, in the ordinary course of things, it is power that produces rights, not rights power; that law is itself a product of the political, not a prime mover in constructing social worlds; that it, alone, is not what separates order from chaos or an equitable society from a state of savagery.
Put together the fetishism of the law and the policulturalism of the postcolony, and the outcome seems overdetermined: a polity in which struggles over difference – in particular, struggles over the authority to police the practices of everyday life – tend to find their way into the legal domain. Often, indeed, into the dramaturgical setting of the courtroom. But here, surely, there ought to be an abrupt end to our South African story. To the extent that contestations over things cultural land up in the realm of the juridical, and to the extent that this realm is dominated by institutions of state, what chance of success have claims made under the sign of “tradition” against the hegemony of the Constitution, against the Laws of the Nation, against the ideological infrastructure of Liberal Democracy? This rephrases, in more general terms, a question we asked earlier. In a world regulated by Eurocentric jurisprudence, should we not expect that any assertion of Afromodernity, or any argument for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Custom, would have little prospect of prevailing? Would not the latter simply fade away of its own accord – or under the pressure of the former? American critical legal theory would probably concur, given its tendency to align the law with the power of the state; others, not least those who see multiculturalism as inimical to democracy, would hope that they were correct.11 The matter, however, is not so straightforward. Reality turns out to be much more complicated, much more protean.
Apart from all else, the Kingdom of Custom is not dying out here. In some parts of South Africa, in fact, it is thriving (e.g. Oomen 2002); so much so that, in spite of the history of contempt evinced by the African National Congress for vernacular ethnicity – some of its cadres still regard “African tradition” as a colonial vestige – its official line has, increasingly, been to pay respect to cultural difference and to the authorities who rule in its name (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.[a]). Recall, in this regard, Penuell Maduna’s plea for an African jurisprudence. At the same time, the ANC has tried hard to circumscribe the political salience of ethnic affiliations, among other things, limiting the role of local chiefs and kings largely to the ceremonial, the diplomatic, the pedagogic – and to the administration of minor disputes and matters of economic management (loc. cit.). This, self-evidently, is an outworking of the contradiction of which we spoke earlier, a contradiction framed, in South African public discourse, as a zero-sum opposition between Liberal Democracy and African Custom. But there is yet more to the story.
FROM TOUGH JUSTICE TO ALIBIS OF UNREASON
The Man Who Took his Neighbor for a Bat: Culture as Mistake
In South Africa, the voices of legal universalism have a ready response to relativism, especially relativism in the guise of “dangerous” customary practices. It is to insist on a clear distinction between culture and crime. As Seth Nthai, a former provincial Minister in Charge of Police, once put it, “Belief is not a problem of law and order. Violence is a problem of law and order.”12 The Constitution may allow citizens to believe in witchcraft;13 to act on that conviction, however, to kill a witch, is a felony. For its part, the judiciary, given its ideological grounding, has no option but to sustain this distinction: if a Euromodern system of justice is to work at all, it has to presume that the causes and consequences of illicit behavior are matters of empirically-verifiable fact. In so far as the motives for that behavior are taken to arise out of generic conditions of human being, out of anger, jealousy, desire, need, greed, they must, logically, override Culture – and, by extension, the relevance of culturally-specific imperatives.
As it turns out, a principled distinction between crime and culture is often hard to sustain, particularly in the remote reaches of the country, where the compelling force of custom is most keenly felt. And where the presence of the state is stretched thin. It is not merely that, to paraphrase Bourdieu (1977:2), there is a always some distance between the official road maps of “objective” law and the lived pathways of practice. We appear to be witnessing a historical shift: a shift arising out of the growing impact of a policulturalism that contests any hint of the criminalization of culturally-sanctioned life-ways. To make sense of this shift, let us take a step backward in order to move forward.
Note the following case, heard in the Venda Supreme Court in the late apartheid years.14 One Naledzani Netshiava, a 25-year-old, had killed his neighbor, Gumani, with an axe. Netshiavha pleaded guilty to culpable homicide, and provided a statement through his council:
I plead not guilty to murder.15 I deny that I intentionally caused the death of Gumani. I plead guilty to culable homicide in that I unlawfully and negligently caused [his] death. I had mistaken [him for] a bat and only later realised that I had struck a human being. The reasonable man would have foreseen that it was a human being and would not have killed [him]. I did not comply with the standard of the reasonable man, thus I accept [that I acted negligently].
Netshiavha added that he had always been on good terms with Gumani and had not wished him dead. But he had been very “frightened by what had been happening.” The bench, represented by one Judge Klopper, evinced no interest whatever in what might have prompted a man of indisputable sanity to confuse his neighbor with a bat. The question of belief or cultural motivation was never addressed. Klopper concluded that Netshiavha had indeed intended to kill and, seeing nothing to mitigate the crime, found him guilty of murder.
We shall return to this case. The judgment was later to be reversed. But mark here the invocation of the “reasonable man.” A concept with a venerable history alike in Roman-Dutch Law, in the South African courts, and in legal anthropology, it has loomed large in analytic discussions of comparative rationality; also in efforts to equate other ontologies with Western jural reason in evaluating intent and culpability across cultural divides (Gluckman 1965, 1967; cf. Wilson 1970). Interestingly, it is enjoying a new lease of life – both in jurisprudence and in popular discourse – as the Laws of the Land try to make peace with pluralism. Its invocation by Netshiava recalls a precedent, an appeal heard in the Umtata Circuit Court in 1933. That case, for reasons to be revealed in due course, has become something of a cause celebre. Here, too, the defense had argued that a killing was not murder but culpable homicide; again, on the ground that it had been committed in the “mistaken” belief that “a human being was an evil spirit.”16 The accused, Mbombela, had put a child to death on the assumption that it was a “tikolosh,” a witch familiar. In the original hearing, the judge had directed the jury to consider whether this “was a reasonable belief.” The standard to apply, he said, was not that of an “18-year-old native living…in his kraal,” but that of ”any reasonable person of his age.” Not surprisingly, the plea of culpable homicide was dismissed. Found guilty of murder, Mbombela was sentenced to death.
In the appeal, the presiding judge, Judge De Villiers noted that there was no suggestion that Mbombela was of unsound mind. Under Roman-Dutch law, as a result, he could only be excused by mistake of fact if that mistake was rooted in a bona fide belief – and a “reasonable” one. De Villiers went on to say that, “by the law of this country there is only one standard of reasonable man.” If a special plea could be made for “a native aged 18 years and living…in his kraal,” it would follow that “in each and every case the standard would have to be varied so as to suit the… accused,” his “mental and moral and temperamental and racial idiosyncrasies.” At the same time, he found it undeniable that Mbombela actually did believe that he was killing an evil spirit. On that ground he reduced the conviction to culpable homicide and commuted the death sentence, quite dramatically, to twelve months in prison.
Here we have an instance of what was to become a common strategy for reconciling legal universalism with cultural difference: the law saying one thing and doing another, muting its own convictions by commuting its sentences. We shall return to this as well. Let us merely underscore here the fact that, as the Mbombela case makes plain, for a killing to be exonerated, the killer had either to be “insane” or “mistaken.” If the latter, the mistake had to be based on a demonstrably rational belief. The tautology is obvious. It reduced African cultural reason to a cosmic error.
Alibis for Unreason: Culture as MadnessAlthough Mbombela and Netshiavha were tried over half a century apart, there was little difference between the ways in which the respective judges translated acts and facts deeply rooted in culture into the conceptual terms of the criminal law. Legal formality continues to demand that, when matters arising out of cultural alterity come to court, they be distilled into conventional judicial categories – murder, assault, and the like – and be evaluated according to “one standard” of individual responsibility.
And yet there is growing pressure, in the policultural world of the postcolony, to recognize that collective beliefs and practices do have consequences for criminal justice. In recent times, South African courts have begun to concern themselves more frequently, and explicitly, with cultural conviction – and, if we may be permitted the pun, with cultural convictions. The problem they face is how, precisely, those convictions are to be dealt with under the still hegemonic terms of Euromodernist legal rationality. One solution has been to allow that culture, rather than being treated as mistaken belief, be regarded as a legitimate mitigation of crime. Which also has unexpected implications.
Consider, in this regard, a case, fairly typical of its kind, from the High Court at Mmabatho, in the North West Province. Heard in 1995, it involved five young men accused of murdering Motlhabane Makolomakwa, the most prominent resident of Matlonyane village.17 Insisting that he had killed their fathers and turned them into zombies, the youths burned their victim to death (cf Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). The judge in the case did not hesitate to convict them of murder; each was ordered to serve twenty years. But he allowed two mitigating factors. One was “a belief in witchcraft”; the other, that, “on the day in question the [defendants] had also drunk liquor.” Here, then, culture is addressed directly. But it is a treated as a source of diminished responsibility, of a temporary loss of reason, on a par with intoxication. This decision echoes popular perceptions of the effects of witchcraft on those who kill under its influence: jailed murderer Anderson Tshibalo, for example, told a national TV audience in 1997 that those overcome by witches “lose consciousness” of their deeds.18
The invocation of cultural beliefs in mitigation by South African courts remains uneven,
however. Sometimes it rests on quite capricious assessments of the “sincerity” of those beliefs. This is particularly ironic because it is the alleged caprice of Culture, its irrationality, that is often used to justify the uncompromising application of universal legal reason – and to argue against any recognition of moral relativism. Indeed, the equation of Culture with unreason, coupled with judicial efforts to establish the sincerity of belief, can produce some odd effects. Thus an official of the Mpumalanga provincial government, charged with theft in 1998, pleaded that he had been bewitched to commit the crime. He was found guilty. Why? Because, said the magistrate, psychological testing had proven him “sane and aware of the consequences of his actions.”19 In other words, his claim to have been the victim of occult influence was a sham. Only if it could be established, scientifically, that he had been honest in that belief, that he had been unaware of the effects of his actions – and was, therefore, insane – could his behavior be explained by (un)reason of his cultural convictions. Which, at a stroke, were translated, by the language of the law, into a form of madness.20
These strategies, we stress, are all contingent ways of reconciling the law of the land with the policulturalism of the postcolony; a postcolony whose liberal Constitution presumes the juridical indivisibility of the nation-state and yet treats cultural difference as a matter of right. However well- intended they may be, they are notably unsystematic, sometimes incoherent. But they are not the only solutions to the problem of Culture discernible across the broad terrain of a criminal justice system whose own social geography is expanding in direct ratio to the recruitment of black legal functionaries. Other, more substantive efforts to deal with the problem are taking root elsewhere, often unnoticed – and in terms which, while framed in the hegemonic language of the law, strive to remap its lived semantics.
MIDPOINTS AND MEDIATIONS
The law is no good. The courts don’t believe in witchcraft… They should bring a proven witch into the court room. That would convince them. – Inspector Jackson Gopane21
An early foreshadowing of these efforts is to be found in a case of which we spoke earlier, the case of the man who mistook his neighbor for a bat. In 1990, over two years after he was convicted, Netshiavha was given leave to appeal.22 His wife, the first to testify, told how, on the night in question, she had heard a scratching sound and had seen a bat hanging from the rafters. Her husband – whom, she stressed, harbored no ill feelings for Gumani, the deceased – went to fetch an axe. One of his brothers then told the court how Netshiavha had left the house and “chopped a creature that resembled a bat.” Later, the two men had seen an unknown beast crossing a fence nearby. Netshiavha had followed it and hit it with the axe. Another sibling added that he had seen “strange animals” en route home that night. Reaching the village, he found his two brothers standing next to a body: it was a small boy with the face of a man. He went to call the headman. By the time they came back, however, the corpse had turned itself into that of the victim. The next day, the police found Gumani’s clothes and money neatly wrapped and covered by a stone; sure signs, these, of witchcraft. They also discovered the remains of two wild animals, apparently killed by a car on the road.
In addressing the court, defense counsel noted the difficulty of weighing up evidence in cases involving the occult. He stressed the absence of a motive for the murder. Presiding judge Richard Goldstone, now a Constitutional Court Justice, concluded:Objectively speaking, the reasonable man postulated in our law does not believe in witchcraft. However, a subjective belief in witchcraft may…have a material bearing upon the accused’s blameworthiness…As such it may be a relevant mitigating factor…In my opinion…it offers the only explanation for the [killing].23
Goldstone insisted that Netshiavha had been negligent in wielding an axe against a man who had not threatened him. But he commuted the sentence to four years; in effect, to time served. In recalling the case, Justice Goldstone said to us, “I let him go.”
The fact that this case was revisited, and the manner of its hearing, pointed toward a growing recognition of the gravitas of difference in South Africa at the dawn of the postcolonial age. In the appeal, a much wider range of contextual evidence was allowed to establish a meaningful frame within which the rationality of Netshiavha’s actions might be read. True, judgment stops short of permitting Culture, as a collectively inhabited reality, to inflect the notion of the reasonable in law; being a matter of “subjective” belief, it did not remove culpability. But the court’s decision suggested a new seriousness in addressing the relationship of “African custom,” however illunderstood, to criminal justice.
That this judgment foreshadowed the spirit of the New Age is born out in another medium: popular cinema. Late in the 1990’s, a South African lawyer-film maker, Gavin Hood, made a movie entitled – over-determinedly, given what we have said – A Reasonable Man (Pandora Cinema, 1999). Hood, in fact, retrieved the record of the Mbombela case and updated it to explore the continuing ironies of crime, culture, and legal reason in the “new” South Africa. He himself plays a young advocate, a veteran of the apartheid era war in Angola, who happens upon a homicide in Kwazulu. A seventeen-year-old had killed the infant son of a neighbor, whom he took to be a tikolosh – recall, a fearsome witch familiar – moving under a blanket in the dark. As the case unfolds, Hood’s character is drawn into defending the fictional Mbombela. He is motivated by a parallel between the young man’s act of violence and a guilty secret of his own: under fire during a raid over the border some years earlier, he too had killed a child, misrecognizing its presence behind a door for that of a dangerous enemy. As it turns out, this device undermines the argument of the movie. For it shifts attention from the relativism of the “reasonable man” to the exoneration of the “reasonable mistake,” implying that the homicide was as much a justifiable error as it was a consequence of a compelling, culturally-validated reality – the tikolosh. Still, the film goes to great lengths to establish that ontological difference is an ineffable fact of life in the postcolony.
As the drama plays itself out, the liberal lawyer is sucked into the Zulu occult, culminating in a surreal encounter with a sangoma, a traditional healer, who exorcizes his own repressed demons – and forces him to realize that her beliefs are as capable as any other of producing compelling truths, of redressing deadly conflict, of dealing with disorder. Thus enlightened, he throws himself into an impassioned defense of his client before the judge, an upright embodiment of the ancient regime. On the epic terrain of South African history, he pleads, European “civilization” has been every bit as capable of giving rise to misdeed, even atrocity, as has African culture. Indeed, any culture. At least the would-be tikolosh-killer sought to protect his kith and kin. The voice of the law seems unwilling to acknowledge comparative rationalities, however: even if the beliefs of the accused were not unreasonable in their own context, his action indisputably was. To second-guess universal reason is to invite an infinite regress into chaos. In the end, the movie, like its protagonist, is undone by this liberal paradox. It fails to make the case that difference is less random disorder than ordered variation, that all systems of reason are bound by cultural and historical particularity. Instead, filmic fiction follows factual precedent, settling for a solution of the sort we have already come to expect. It allows the law to repudiate culture by adjudging Mbombela guilty, but to take it centrally into account in handing down an almost exonerating sentence. By this means – by allowing judgment to ignore difference but justice to be determined by it – the two sides of the equation are, if not finally resolved, then at least reconciled.
Intriguingly, a similar solution motivates an episode of the multilingual TV series, Justice for All, broadcast on SABC in 2000, which deals with a witch-killing in one of the northerly provinces. In it, a clear tension is portrayed between cultural justice and criminal justice. On one hand, the killer is treated by his community as a local hero, a perpetrator of cultural justice in the fight against evil; on the other, the criminal justice system handles the case as yet another superstition-driven homicide. Unable to dissolve the antimony, the court, cutting no slack to traditional beliefs, convicts the accused – and then, in the name of those very beliefs, suspends his sentence entirely. As he walks free, his kin and neighbors celebrate the result as a vindication of the force of custom.
Both in Goldstone’s Netshiavha decision and in media representations of postcolonial law, then, we see harbingers of a resolution to the problem of culture in the “new” South Africa; albeit one that, in principle, leaves intact the antinomy between legal reason and relativist heterodoxy, crime and custom. But how far does the strategic separation of judgment from justice really take us? Are there other ways of opening up a dialogue between liberal universalism and the dictates of difference?
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AGAIN
Let us pursue the question in another setting, a magistracy in the Tswana-speaking North West, where the law, ever more under African supervision, comes into daily contact with the pressing demands of Culture. Here, at the nether end of governance, legal code and local custom act upon each other in supple, surprising ways. Just how supple is exemplified by a case that deals differently with the same issues we encountered above: dangerous practices, occult beliefs, reasonable conduct.
We have seen that witch-killers may be tried in courts of law. Witches, however, are notoriously hard to indict under the provisions of Western jurisprudence; to wit, enlightenment reason denies the very existence of their arcane powers. It is still illegal, in South Africa, to accuse a person of witchcraft, even though most citizens actively believe in it; new legislation, currently under discussion, appears unlikely to accord the reality of its occult aspect any greater recognition than it now enjoys. That is why litigation arising out of magical malevolence has been so rare in the past; why, when it occurs, it is typically framed in terms that conceal its enchanted content; why, also, it is here that the problem of Culture for liberal modernism is most acutely posed. For there is, as we said earlier, a widespread perception that the post-apartheid state has failed to protect its subjects from the scourge of mystical evil. Nor is the perception new: colonial authorities also refused to accept the magical as a material fact, and insisted on criminalizing witch-finding, leaving African peoples feeling defenseless – and convinced that the Europeans were abetting the malevolent forces in their midst (Fields 1985).24 Many South Africans maintain that the Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1957 served to drive ritual malpractice underground (cf. Commission on Gender Equality 1999:22).25 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the advent of the postcolony, in the early 1990’s, saw the rise of assertive efforts on the part of local communities to rid themselves of an alleged upsurge of witchcraft, an “epidemic” that the ANC regime was no more capable of containing than had been its colonial predecessor. Precisely because of this – because they continue to confound secular reason and the legal capacities of the state – conflicts arising out of the African occult provide glimpses of the ways in which Euromodernist and Afromodernist sensibilities have perforce to reconfigure the ground on which they confront each other.
The conflict with which we are concerned here came to the Lehurutse magistrate in May 2000 on appeal from the chief’s court at Dinokana.26 It involved a healer, witchcraft, adultery, and attempted murder, though in the end, the matter was not defined in any of these terms. The magistrate, Noah Makabanyane, thought for some time about how to define the dispute, opting finally for breach of contract, and electing to sit with two assessors famed for their knowledge of Tswana custom.
The applicant in the case, Koketso Mogorosi, was an infant school teacher of limited means. The defendant Jameson Ntebalang, was a traditional healer, well known in Lehurutse for his mystical powers. Mogorosi testified that the dispute had begun in March 1997, when she had reason to engage a healer. She had been introduced to Ntebalang as a bona fide specialist, and while he did not examine her, he asked about her “troubles” (ditlalèlò; also distress, anxieties); she was in a menage a trois with a local headman and his spouse, whom she needed his help “to drive away.” Ntebalang told her that he would go to Botswana to procure the necessary medicine.
According to Mogorosi, Ntebalang duly gave her two packets of “herbs” at the cost of R470.27 She withdrew all her savings from the bank, some R400, to pay him; although the medicine, she said, lasted only two days. The healer then requested the rest of his fee, and a further R1500, the price of a beast, for the man who had actually “dug” the herbs. Mogorosi protested that she had yet to see results, but Ntebalang disagreed: she had, he insisted, “got her man.” She had not, though. Her rival remained living in the headman’s homestead.
Further treatments of various kinds had proved equally fruitless. But the healer nevertheless pressed Mogorosi for his fee. When she flatly denied any obligation to pay,28 Ntebalang took his case to the local headman, who found against him. Undaunted, he appealed to the chief at Dinokana, who ruled in his favor, ordering Mogorosi to pay a fine of R200 and the outstanding R1500. It was this judgment that Mogorosi was contesting in Makabanyane’s court.
Ntebalang was then permitted to cross-question Mogorosi, a Tswana jural practice not usual in South African magistrate’s courts. The healer advanced a very different story. Had Mogorosi not asked him for medicine to “deal” with – kill, that is – the legal wife of her lover? Had he, Ntebalang, not responded that he did not have “that sort of medicine,” but could procure it in Botswana at a price to which she had agreed? Mogorosi denied this. The two assessors then questioned her further: Was it not wrong to pay the healer without witnesses, and to engage in such a transaction without her parents’ knowledge?” Had Ntebalang really not examined her? On what grounds was he demanding R1500? The magistrate then intervened: Was Mogorosi still involved with the headman? No, she replied. He had subsequently made off with her own daughter.
For his part, Ntebalang reiterated that Mogorosi had approached him to dispose of her lover’s wife; he had responded by telling her that treatment of this kind was costly. She had agreed to a fee, which she undertook to pay once the medicine had done its job. Not long after, when he saw her in the village with a bandaged finger, she told him that she had come to blows with her rival at a social gathering. This, said the healer, was a sure “sign that the dipheko (medicine) was working.” And so he had set about trying to collect his due. She, however, claimed that, since she was no longer living with her “boyfriend,” the headman, there was no debt to pay. Ntebelang disagreed. Which is when he took his case to the traditional authorities.
Mogorosi then cross-questioned Ntebalang: If he really was a traditional doctor, why had he not examined her by means of divining bones? Why had he used his medicines against her, afflicting her rather than her enemy? One assessor then tried to gauge the extent of his professional competence; the other inquired whether he was actually claiming money for “chasing a married woman from her home.”29 Was this sort of activity acceptable to the “Dingaka Association,” the national guild that claims to regulate traditional healing in South Africa? Ntebalang said that he thought that it was.
At this point the case was adjourned. When it resumed, months later, Ntebalang was accompanied by a witness, his wife. She supported his version of events, elaborating on one point only. When Mogorosi had made her lethal request, the healer had warned her that it was “painful” to put a person to death; her phrasing here implied both moral and physical distress, distress to both victim and perpetrator. He had recommended a less drastic potion: one that would simply destroy all affection between the man and his wife. Both parties had agreed to this, she insisted, her testimony being designed to counter the implication that Ntebalang was guilty of witchcraft at its most lethal. But the assessors challenged her evidence. Their final questions were telling: “If a traditional doctor causes a person to flee from home, is that witchcraft or healing?” one asked. “It is witchcraft,” answered the wife. “Should a witch be paid for his actions?” “No,” she said, “but the medicines must still be paid for.”
In light of the lateness of the hour, the case was adjourned until 4 February 2001, but the defendant was unable to attend court that day. The proceeding was thus remanded for a further five months. As the due date approached, Magistrate Makabanyane told us that Ntebalang was in prison for petty theft. It looked like Mogorosi’s appeal might be postponed indefinitely.
The court recorder, a middle-aged woman, agreed that the case might never reach conclusion, albeit for different reasons. Whatever the assessors might have implied, she said, Ntebalang was a potent practitioner. Among his powers was an uncanny capacity to elude detection and to escape custody. Once, when apprehended during the 1980’s, he simply disappeared from his cell during a lunch recess. Someone later suggested to us that he might, on that occasion, have turned himself into a bat. In another celebrated instance, as he was being chased for house-breaking, he is said to have transformed himself into an anthill. A policeman, the story goes, actually leaned on him – or, rather, on the anthill – without realizing what, or who, he was up against. We did not think it appropriate to ask why, with these talents, Ntebalang had been unable to extract his money from Koketso Mogorosi. For his part, the magistrate was less taken by the defendant, whom he referred to, with legal precision, as a “so-called ngaka (healer).” He should know. Noah Makabanyane, chief magistrate of Lehurutse, had himself grown up in the household of a particularly eminent healer.30
Although it ended inconclusively, this dispute opens up a unusual angle of vision onto the discursive place of the law in the postcolony. It also cuts a stunning swathe through the spare lives of people at the impoverished edges of the North West Province half a decade after the end of apartheid. Ostensibly about an unpaid debt, it embraced many things, all of them of great salience in rural communities: how women seek to sustain domestic relationships amidst economic uncertainty and moral flux; how the occult is mobilized to that end; how, in an era of rampant fraud, the bona fides of healers may be verified; how contracts are to be enforced; how fragile are the norms that govern interpersonal interactions under conditions of extreme scarcity. In short, how culture, in the vernacular sense of the term, is pondered and policed from the bottom up.
We have noted that, under the prevailing Act, itself a reformulation of British colonial law, it is illegal to practice or accuse a person of witchcraft.31 We have also noted that new legislation is unlikely to grant the reality of the African occult, preferring to reduce it to a species of material practice – notably, to the use of indigenous pharmacopeia and, in particular, poisons – thus to displace a critical problem of Culture into the simple empiricism of criminal forensics (Commission on Gender Equality 1999:22).32 Meanwhile, as Mogorosi v. Ntebalang shows, the ways and means of the arcane arts, in all their cultural clothing, are openly entertained in African magistrate’s courts; vide how, in this case, the knowledge and skills of a healer were put to the test by expert assessors. There was never any hint that their interrogation would not be part of the official proceedings. Neither the legal status nor the facticity of witchcraft are on trial here. On the contrary, they underpin the judicial process. Magistrate Makabanyane told us that, like several other colleagues, he was planning to include a ngaka, a traditional doctor, as a permanent assessor on his bench.33
Here, then, in a remote court run by a Tswana magistrate, is an instance in which the contradiction between Law and Culture in the “new” South Africa is confronted – and, in the most mundane, most unobtrusive of terms, a radical dialogue charted. Here contemporary African concerns are addressed without offending Euromodern legal reason, without taking even the shortest step down the slippery slope of eth(n)ical relativism into a Hobbesian world of moral chaos. There is, it seems, something beyond Leviathan. What we have seen through the window of an unassuming public building in Lehurutse may be peripheral. But it tells us something important about the present and future of the question of heterodoxy in South Africa. About the manner in which Afromodernity – a labile, more or less self-conscious ensemble of signs and practices, dispositions and discourses, theories and forms of knowledge, with reference to which a specifically African sense of the contemporary is being fashioned – is assuming its place in a world of liberal modernities.34 About Culture less as heritage or commodity, less as a sign of racial marking or an alibi for difference than as the description of a more-or-less open repertoire of styles, a mode of conduct, a set of pragmatic values always under (re)construction. Less as a proper noun, that is, than as an adjective: a thoroughgoing qualification to everyday life in the postcolony.
CONCLUSIONS, OF VARIOUS KINDS
Three observations are to be made about the ways in which matters cultural entered the realm of legal reason in Noah Makabanyane’s court.
The first, to which we have already alluded, concerns the framing of the case. While patently about witchcraft – about a criminal conspiracy to attempt murder by arcane means – the suit was phrased as a breach of contract, with reference not to the legalities of Ntebalang’s occult activities per se, but to their implications for the social and material relations in dispute. In this way, a “dangerous,” exotic cultural practice was treated as neither dangerous nor exotic. Rather, it was made justiciable – although, by the letter of the law, it should not have been. Of course, the evidence in the record could, technically, have been used to indict the healer for his mystical machinations and Mogorosi for conspiring in them. But, even if the state had wanted to prosecute them, it would have been very difficult: apart from anything else, nobody could be shown, forensically, to have suffered from their conspiracy. In instances of alleged occult practice, after all, it is usually impossible to establish a direct link between cause and effect. Which is what makes it occult in the first place.
Second, the Lehurutse tribunal refused to regard the African occult as a question of belief. It assumed, as do all Tswana, that witchcraft (boloi) belongs to the domain of cultural knowledge and everyday conduct. But a critical qualification here, one that recalls what we said earlier of culture, sui generis, in the lower case: Setswana, the local version of things African, has always been a labile, growing, more-or-less open ensemble of ways and means (see e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991), one that, in its encounters with other worlds, has absorbed and experimented with, transformed and appropriated their practices – including, significantly, aspects of European jurisprudence (Schapera 1943), democracy, and other elements of modernity; in this respect, African customary law, which has always been responsive to historical conditions (Schapera 1970b; Roberts and Comaroff 1978), is much more like the common law in Europe than the dehistoricized, timeless chimera made of it under colonialism (see e.g. Moore 1986). The fact that Makabanyane’s court treated this case as arising out of a collective lifeworld, had a number of corollaries. Above all, it removed the need to evaluate the sincerity of the parties involved. Once cultural usages and expectations are no longer seen as a matter of personal persuasion, once they are taken to be the contextsensitive frame in which humans live out their lives, they become, by extension, the salient terms in which disputed behavior is to be assessed. Moral relativism, under these conditions, gives way to social contextualization: actions are judged by virtue of standards – Afromodern standards being wrought, in the pragmatics of the present, out of Setswana, the common law, the new Constitution, and whatever else comes to hand – deemed normatively apposite to the circumstances of the conflict. It is such norms, not abstract canons of universal reason, that are the measure against which the court decides culpability. Thus, while Makabanyane acknowledged the power of traditional healing, while he understood why Mogorosi might have gone to a specialist for help, while he appreciate the customary calculations that infuse the kind of agreement in question here, he did not exempt Ntebalang from legal or ethical evaluation. Law and Culture, in other words, did not require to be reconciled here because no antinomy between them was recognized to begin with. In the end, of course, Mogorosi won a victory of sorts: her appeal might not have been resolved, but, for practical purposes, Ntebalang’s disappearance voided her debt to him – and, with it, the finding of the chiefly court.
The third point is procedural, but crucial. It moves us back, from Lehurutse and postcolonial South Africa, to the generic question of law, culture, and difference. Ntebalang v. Mogorosi, observe, was tried not as a criminal matter but as a civil suit; not as arising out of a conspiracy to commit murder, or out of a fraud, or out of any other kind of felony, but out of breach of contract. This is in line with much “traditional “ African jurisprudence, which makes no distinction between the criminal and the civil; it also resonates with a global explosion in the resort to tort law to settle scores that elude conventional political and legal mechanisms. Because the case was handled thus, it escaped the purview of the Witchcraft Suppression Act, indeed the criminal law tout court. Civil actions require different standards of evidence everywhere: they are less concerned with forensics than with the circumstantial; with evidence, that is, which is socially and culturally sensitive to the context out of which the dispute arose. As a result, questions of abstract reason and legal principle are rendered secondary. And more flexible procedures may be followed. Remember how Noah Makabanyane allowed the litigants to cross question each other and encouraged ritual experts to interrogate both of them; all of which interpolated vernacular judicial routines into the formal workings of the justice system. The general point is clear. Once criminal cases are transposed into civil ones – once criminal justice becomes cultural justice – practices like witchcraft may be treated as a matter-of-fact reality.
In sum, what we have here, in Noah Makabanyane’s court, is a practical philosophy under construction (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937). Thus it is that “dangerous” practices are made more tractable to legal reason. Thus it is that the conundrum of heterodoxy may be confronted. Thus it is that, largely unremarked, an organic African jurisprudence comes to infuse the One Law for One Nation. Thus it is that the distinction between Euromodernity and Afromodernity is renegotiated, the content of each redrawn. Thus it is that colonialism gives way to postcoloniality. How common are the processes we have described? Hard to say. But the signs, many of them, are readily evident in the courts of the North West. Clearly, as we have said, there is greater leeway for experiment in more remote institutional contexts and in situations perceived to pose little threat to public order. Homicide, for example, is an altogether different, more difficult species of problem; although, as the two O.J. Simpson trials demonstrated in the USA, civil proceedings may yield judgments in cases of violent felonies that are much more socially acceptable, and credible, than those of the criminal justice system.35 It is also a matter of record that there have been campaigns – among them, one in the Netherlands in the 1980’s – for the radical reduction of criminal (in favor of civil) justice, even in the instance of murder; similarly, that, in banning capital punishment, the South African constitutional court invoked, as one of its justifications, ubuntu, the principal of African humanity, thereby interpellating into the law of the land a fundamental sociomoral tenet of Afromodernity. But, more important here, it is not spectacular felonies that make up the vast bulk of journeyman jurisprudence, day in and day out, over the length and breadth of the country. It is the most mundane of misdeeds and misdemeanors. The very kinds of thing that brought Ntebalang and Mogorosi before magistrate Noah Makabanyane.
It is not only in the legal domain that the ways and means of an Afromodernity are being actively forged. Parallel process are occurring in the spheres of religion, education, business, the media, the expressive arts, and elsewhere. But the challenge of policulturalism to Euromodernity is most acutely felt in the realm of the juridical – precisely because liberal democracy, and with it the hyphenated scaffolding of the postcolonial nation-state, is so deeply inscribed in the sovereignty of One Law. This is all the more so in neoliberal times: times in which the promise of constitutional empowerment, of liberation, meets the privations of a deregulated economy; times that are not just postcolonial but post-proletarian; times marked by a growing inequality of means; times in which the appeal to Culture, as a primordially-ordained “natural” right, has become part of the quotidian language of entitlement; times in which ideology gives way, in quickly measured steps, to ID-ology. In these times, a politics is emerging that, for reasons we have spelled out, turns autonomically to the law to redress social disarray, moral decay, material deficit. That this politics fails to engage the architecture of the new capitalism in South Africa, that it merely skates its surfaces, is a constant, and serious, plaint of social critics; turning class actions into class action, or into any other kind of cogent collective dissent, appears as an anachronism. But the mutating landscape of the law – or, more precisely, the metamorphosis of politics into law – is changing the terms in which postcolonial realities are experienced, understood, negotiated.
What we have narrated, then, is a dialectic-in-motion, an historical process that pivots on the horns of a contradiction. Dating back to the dawn of colonialism, when the earliest evangelists of Euromodernist enlightenment sought to rule peoples they defined as parochial and culturally other, this contradiction is reproduced in especially acute form in neoliberal polities. As we have said, there is no resolution to the antinomy between (i) the One Law for One Nation, its unremitting commitment to legal universalism under the new Constitution of South Africa, and (ii) the primordially-sanctioned demands of heterodoxy in this policultural society. Progressive philosophers and jurists may wish there were a resolution; some have written programmatic blueprints for plural democracies, appealing to concepts like multiculturalism, hybridity, and syncretism in pursuit of a vision that, so long as it seeks to encompass diversity within the hegemony of a Eurocentric liberalism, must remain entrapped in its own paradoxical formulation (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d. [a]). But, as long as the Bill of Rights and the precepts of Custom diverge, as long as the former is given priority over the latter, until one relinquishes sovereign authority to the other – which is highly unlikely, given the political demography of difference in South Africa – the contradiction will not, cannot, go away.
Nonetheless, as the Lehurutse case indicates, those who toil within that contradiction, those who have perforce to produce a practical jurisprudence at the impasse between Law and Culture, find contingent means of doing so, means that often go beyond both the Law of the Land and the Kingdom of Culture. In this, they resort less to “hybrids” or “syncretisms” than to a living, growing vernacular modernity. This Afromodernity is being fashioned out of constituent elements taken from a wide variety of (re)sources. It is the voraciously creative process out of which the postcolony is being made. In seeding itself on ground long monopolized by Euromodernity, the Afromodern gives play to a pragmatics of difference in ways that challenge the limits of liberalism as never before. From the bottom up. Thus are humble new beginnings, new imaginaries, being forged in those undersides, those margins, of the “new” South Africa that most of its citizens call home.
Postscript:
In December 2002, Limpopo Province police announced that they were to indict a sangoma, a healer, for performing a “magic ritual” on two murder suspects: he had allegedly smeared them with goat’s blood to make them invisible to officers of the law.36 What the healer had done, they said, was no different, legally, from harboring a fugitive. Optimistic that they would win a conviction, they insisted that the act of abetting a felony, even if by witchcraft, is itself always a crime of commission. Note here, one last time how protean, in practice, is the distinction between Culture and Criminality. By these lights, of course, Ntebalang would probably have been charged of conspiracy to commit a homicide and found guilty. The public prosecutor in the Limpopo incident, Jan Henning, was less sanguine about the ease with which matters magical reduce to criminal forensics: “It is going to be very interesting…to see how the courts handle evidence on whether ritual to make the boys invisible was effective. It could turn out to be a very difficult case.” -
Arjun Appadurai Array
This major collection, with a masterful introduction by the editors, presents new ways to understand how the globalized legal order bears the signs of its colonial heritage while providing a hyperlegal space for new negotiations about order, crime and justice in many postcolonial societies. It offers a feast of empirical insights that bring the anthropology of legality into the very center of postcolonial studies, places the South African experience in a highly original perspective, and shows that the relationship between law and legality is both contradictory and generative.
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Law and Disorder in the Postcolony
From Keynote Roundtable, Law and Society Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, “Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: Celebrating Ten Years in Print and Practice,” 2016.
Are postcolonies in Africa and elsewhere haunted more by unregulated violence, un/civil warfare, and disorder than are other twenty-first century nation-states? The reflex answer to this question, from critical scholars, conservative intellectuals, and the popular media, is yes. Law and Disorder in the Postcolony argues that the question itself is misplaced: that the predicament of postcolonies arises from their situation in a contemporary global order dominated by new modes of governance, new sorts of empires, new species of wealth – an order that tends to criminalize poverty, race, and social marginality, entraps the global “south” in relations of corruption, and displaces politics into the realms of the market, criminal economies, and the law. But, as these essays show, there is another side to the story. While many postcolonies evince signs of endemic disorder, they also fetishize the law, its ways and means. Even where they are mocked and mimicked, those ways and means are often central to the politics of everyday engagement, to practies of authority and citizenship, to the interaction of states and subjects. New constitutions are repeatedly written, appeals to rights repeatedly made, claims of material and moral inequity repeatedly litigated. How is this to be explained, this coincidence of disorder with a fixation on law? And, more generally, what does it tell us of more general significance about the unfolding history of the nation-state? Law and Disorder in the Postcolony addresses these questions, entering into dialogue with such theorists as Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, and Carl Schmitt. It also demonstrates how postcolonies have become especially critical sites for the production of social theory, not least because they are harbingers of a global future under construction. -

Beasts, Banknotes, and the Color of Money in Colonial South Africa
Introduction
Once upon a time it was little more than a cliche ́ to remark the material(ist) underpinnings of colonialisms, old and new. Classical Marxist political eco- nomy, its various Marxoid offshoots, and liberal economic histories alike took for granted that materialities motivated and conditioned colonial encounters everywhere. This, almost in a caricature of Hegelian dialectics, produced its antithesis in the 1990s – the so-called ‘culturalist’ approach, which argued that, above all else, those encounters were exercises in the imposition on widely dispersed ‘others’ of new orders of knowledge, new ways of being- in-the-world, new modes of self-awareness. In retrospect, this theoretical opposition now seems Procrustean. Colonialism everywhere has always been a process simultaneously material and meaningful, violent and capillary. Materialities – the concrete, ecologically founded activities of production, exchange and consumption – are always mediated by cultural categories and dispositions, themselves less a closed system of ‘symbols and meanings’ than a field of evanescent, differentially valued, variably contested signs and practices; conversely, those categories and dispositions are constantly revalued by the conditions of the concrete world in which they are firmly embedded. To be sure, meanings, messages and values are often materialized in objects that carry their force more compellingly and unobtrusively than words. Which is why the material record often reveals things about large- scale historical processes that the documentary record does not.
It is for this reason that close attention to materialities affords a privileged insight into the workings of colonialisms everywhere; they open up an otherwise refractory angle of vision onto the regimes of value that underlie the interactions, over the short, medium and long run, between colonizers and those whom they would bring under their dominion.
But regimes of value – and, even more, encounters between different regimes – presume mediation, translation and communication among the currencies, at once verbal and material, that objectify them. Which, in turn, depends on mechanisms of commensuration, that render negotiable otherwise inimical, apparently intransitive, orders of signs and practices. Without such mechanisms, which have often been the object of conflict and contestation, colonialism, as modernist project, would have made no sense, neither as a world-historical undertaking on the part of colonizers nor as a lived reality to those upon whose worlds it was wrought.
The following essay, then, interrogates the role of commensuration in the colonial encounter and, by extension, in the production of society and history. It explores a very specific obsession with very general historical implications: the effort of colonial evangelists to introduce coinage, to replace beads and cattle with banknotes, among Tswana peoples in South Africa. At its broadest, it posits a post-Marxist argument about the salience of commensuration in the modernist construction of society and history, and, above all, in the forging of empires. For at the heart of all ‘modern’ colonialisms, a condition of their possibility perhaps, were mundane mechanisms that made inimical kinds of value, with different cultural roots, at once objectifiable, comparable and negotiable. Commensuration and objectification, standardization and abstraction, equilibration and convertibility, of course, all feature prominently in classic theories of commodification, also in theories of the workings of money. But their significance in the construction of modernity as an ideology of global scale, and in the encounter between Europe and its others, has not been adequately plumbed. Nor, we believe, have their various media, their poetics and magicality, been adequately theorized.
In order to make our general point, and to explore its further theoretical consequences, we analyse processes of commensuration in one African colonial theatre, focusing on the material transactions they enabled across semantic frontiers; on their diverse and differently endowed media, alike indigenous and imported; on their implications of the long run for cultural constructions of wealth; on their material effects upon all involved. We ask why it was that the campaign to convert Tswana to Christianity, and to the ways of the West, concentrated so centrally on recasting their currencies – on teaching them to use cash, to do good by buying and selling goods, to commodify their labors by transforming the wages of sin into virtuous incomes. We trace how these ventures were challenged by African conceptions of value, how they called into being hybrid tokens of exchange, how they set in train struggles to domesticate new alchemies of enrichment while striving to protect local means of storing wealth. We shall show that, for 19th- century colonial evangelists in South Africa, saving savages meant teaching savages to save. Also to produce providentially, using God’s gifts to bring forth the greatest possible abundance. Or at least marketable surpluses. Drawing ‘native’ communities into that body of corporate nations meant, first and foremost, persuading them to accept money, the ultimate currency of conversion, commerce, civility, salvation. In their efforts to do this, the Protestant missions took the waxing spirits of capitalism, its specie and its signifying conventions, on a world-historical journey.
In recuperating that journey, we seek to make visible the hidden hand, sometimes the sleight of hand, behind the political economy of 19th- century European colonialism. Which returns us to the broad outlines of our argument: (i) inasmuch as the building of empires depended on processes of commensuration, on rendering epistemically equivalent and transitive once incomparable objects and ideas, signs and meanings, it demanded media – beads, coin, contracts and the like – with the capacity, simultaneously, to construct, negate and transfigure difference; and (ii) inasmuch as those media, those currencies of conversion, opened up new lines of distinction, new languages of value, new forms of inequity, new objects of desire, new possibilities of appropriation and exploitation, they took on magical properties; this because (iii) they appeared, in and of themselves, to objectify history-in-the-making, even to make history of their own accord. Which, we shall demonstrate, is why banknotes, beads and bovines became the objects of a protracted struggle in the South African interior; why, more generally, they became metonymic of the differences of value on which the colonial encounter, tout court, was played out.
Figure 1 Map of South Africa in the early 19th century.
As this suggests, we seek here to make two species of theoretical claim. Both are instantiated by our South African story, both extend far beyond it. One is about ‘modern’ European colonialism, whose historical logic, we propose, is incomprehensible without an understanding of the processes of commensuration and conversion that allowed various worlds to be brought into the same orbit of being, both imaginatively and concretely. The other is about commensuration itself and about the media upon which it depends; media fetishized not merely because they congeal labour power and/or obscure relations embodied in processes of production, nor because they displace unspeakable passions from people to objects or vice versa, but because, being uniquely endowed things, they take on a social life of their own. Their genius, we shall show, does not lie in their being empty, or emptied, signifiers, just as their meaning does not derive from their relations to other, equally empty, signs. It is owed in part to their intrinsic properties, in part to the moral, material and magical work they are made to do in the exigent course of history.
Species of values, value and specie
Christian political economy: secular theology, sacred commerce If early modern European political economy was a secular theology (Hart 1986, 647), contemporary Nonconformist theology sanctified commerce. During the ‘second reformation’ of the late 1700s, British Protestantism had refashioned itself with cultural fabric milled by the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, the interplay of church and business, realms never fully separate, produced a rich discourse, at once religious and temporal, about value and its production (Hempton 1984, 11; Waterman 1991, 3f). Evangelicals of the 18th century, Rack (1989, 385f) claims, had been more influenced by the language of practical reason than their espousal of scripture and spirituality might suggest.
But the discourse of political economy was particularly congenial to the spirit of the great evangelical societies. While liberal theory per se was seldom a subject of open discussion among missionaries to South Africa, most of them were guided by its material and moral principles. Evangelical societies were run like businesses, with men of commerce actively investing their resources and managing their affairs (Helmstadter 1992, 10). ‘Business’, in fact, seems to have served as a synecdoche for human action in the world (Smith 1976 (1776), 14), just as ‘usefulness’ conveyed a sense of virtuous efficacy (Helmstadter 1992, 9). In the field, the Nonconformists put their trust in the power of money to bring progress, and to place all things, even God’s grace, within human reach. This faith in the creative powers of cash recalls Simmel’s Philosophy of money, perhaps the most refined statement of the 19th-century European belief in the transformative power of coin. For Simmel (1978, 291), man was by nature an ‘exchanging animal’ and, by this token, an ‘objective animal’ too; exchange, in its ‘wonderful simplicity’, made both the receiver and the giver, replacing selfish desire with mutual acknowledgement and objective appraisal. Transaction, he went on, begets rationalization. And the more that values are rationalized, ‘the more room there is in them, as in the house of God, for every soul’. Because of its unlimited convertibility (Simmel 1978, 292), money was uniquely capable of setting free the intrinsic worth of the world to be traded in neutral, standardized terms. And so it enabled the construction of an integrated society of morally dependent but psychically self-sufficient persons (Simmel 1978, 297f).
While they might never have put it in just these terms, Nonconformist missionaries in South Africa devoted much of their effort to making Africans into ‘exchanging animals’, an enterprise in which cash played a pivotal role. They, too, nurtured the dream of an expansive civil society built not upon savage barter but upon transactions among self-possessed, moneyed persons. According to this dream, the liberation of ‘natives’ from a primitive dependence on their kin and their chiefs lay in the creation of a higher order, a world of moral and material interdependence mediated by stable, impersonal media: letters, numbers, notes and coin.
There was, as everyone knows, another side to money: its long-standing Christian taint as an instrument of corruption and betrayal. In part this flowed from the power of cash, indeed all instruments of commensuration, to equate disparate forms of value. It could dissolve what was unique, precious and personal, reducing everything to the indiscriminate object of private avarice. What was more, the ability of coin to transpose different forms of worth enabled profitable conversions to be made among them; in particular it allowed the rich to prosper by using their assets to control the productivity of others. Bloch and Parry (1989, 2f; cf. Le Goff 1980) remind us that this sort of profit was anathema to the medieval European church, which saw productive work as the only legitimate source of wealth and condemned, as unnatural, the effortless earnings of merchants and moneylenders. Capitalism was to exploit the metabolic qualities of money in unprecedented ways, of course – especially its capacity to make things commensurable by turning distinct elements of human existence, like land and labour, into alienable commodities. Protestantism would endorse this process by sanctifying desire as virtuous ambition, and by treating the market as a realm of provident opportunity. Yet its medieval qualms remained. As Weber (1958, 53) stressed, those Christians who most aptly embodied the spirit of capitalism were ascetics. They took little pleasure in wealth per se. For them, making money was an end in itself, a transcendental value. It gave evidence of ceaseless ‘busy-ness’ and divine approval.
Insofar as money remained demonically corrosive, there was only one way to avoid its corrupting qualities: to let it go. If it was to generate virtue, it had visibly to circulate. Hoarded wealth was ‘the snare of the devil’ (Wesley 1986, 233). It made men forsake the inner life for superficial pride, luxury and leisure. The Divine Proprietor required that his stewards put his talent to work either by cycling it back into honest business or by giving it away in charity; the proper movement of wealth was both creative and positive. By those lights, exchange was production (Parry 1989, 86). Nonconformists like Wesley still held to a labour theory of value, but now the notion of industry was cast in terms of manufacture and the market, of wage labour, the circulation of wealth, and the productive character of capital.
Read in this light, it is clear that the economic emphasis of missionary practice in South Africa expressed more than a mere effort to survive or even to profit. It expressed the spirit of liberal modernity, being part of the attempt to foster a self-regulating commonwealth, for which the market was both the model and the means; to foster, also, what Unsworth (1992) has aptly termed a ‘sacred hunger’, an insatiable desire for material enrichment and moral progress. As we shall see, the task proved onerous, for the ‘mammon of unrighteousness’ was never easily befriended. By the mid- 1820s some of the more radical evangelicals in England were denouncing the reduction of human qualities to price. And, in the mission field, the Nonconformists were caught, time and again, in the double-sided implications of money. Meanwhile, the kind of value carried by coin would come face to face with African notions of worth, setting off new contrasts, contests and combinations.
Other kinds of value The southern Tswana world of the early 19th century bore some similarity to the one from which the missionaries set out. Stress was laid here, too, on human production as the source of value. Here, too, communities were understood as social creations, built up through the ceaseless actions and transactions of people eager to enhance their fund of worth. Here, too, exchange was facilitated by versatile media that measured and stored wealth, and permitted its negotiation from afar.
These parallels, we have argued (Comaraoff and Comaroff 1992, 127f), are sufficient to cast doubt on the exclusive association of commodities and competitive individualism with industrial capitalism. Or with modernity. But, by the same token, similar practices do not necessarily have the same genesis, constitution or meaning. Although southern Tswana subscribed to a fundamentally humanist sense of the production of wealth, their understanding of value – and the way it vested in persons, relationships and objects – was different from that of their interlocutors from abroad. Thus, while early missionaries thought they detected in the Africans a stress on self- contrivance, a dark replica of Western economic man, they found, on longer acquaintance, that this person was a far cry from the discrete, enclosed subject they hoped to usher into the church. Indigenous ‘utilitarianism’, Tswana literati like Molema (1920, 116) insisted, was unlike European ‘egoism’; the evangelists referred to the ‘native’ variant as ‘selfishness’. Indeed, closer engagement of previously distinct economies on the frontier would reveal deep distinctions behind superficial resemblances. And it would give birth to a dynamic field of hybrid subjects and signs.
The Setswana verb go dira meant ‘to make’, ‘to work’, or ‘to do’. Tiro, its noun form, covered a wide range of activities – from cultivation to political negotiation, from cooking to ritual performance – which yielded value in persons, relations and things. It also produced ‘wealth’ (khumoˆ), an extractable surplus (of beer, artefacts, tobacco, stock and so on) which could be further deployed to multiply worth. Sorcery (boloi) was its inverse, implying the negation of value through attempts to harm others and/or unravel their endeavours. Tiro itself could never be alienated from its human context and transacted as mere labour power; that experience still awaited most southern Tswana. Rather, it was an intrinsic dimension of the everyday act of making selves and social ties.
This vision of the production of value, based on close human interdepen- dence, bore little resemblance to that of liberal economics. For Tswana, wealth inhered in relations. Which is why its pursuit involved (i) the construction of enduring connections among kin and affines, patrons and clients, sovereigns and supporters, men and their ancestors; and (ii) the extension of influence by means of exchanges, usually via the medium of cattle, which secured rights in, and claims over, others. But, while these rights and claims were constantly contested, the productive and reproductive properties of a relationship, be it wedlock or serfdom, could not be separated from the bonds that bore them (Molema 1920, 125; Schapera 1940, 77). The object of social exchange was precisely not to accumulate riches with no strings attached; the traffic in beasts served to knit human beings together in an intricate weave, in which the density of linkages and the magnitude of value were one and the same thing.
Because they were the means, par excellence, of building social biographies and accumulating capital, cattle were the supreme form of property here; they could congeal, store and increase value, holding it stable in a world of flux (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 139). Not surprisingly, their widespread use as currency in human societies was noted by early theorists of political economy (Smith 1976 (1776), 38; Marx 1967, 183). While Adam Smith judged them ‘rude’ and ‘inconvenient’ instruments of commerce, he appreciated that they embodied many of the elementary features of coin, being useful, alienable, relatively durable objects. Although standardized as species, moreover, stock come in different sizes and colours, genders and ages, and so might be utilized as tokens of varying quality and denomination. (Many African peoples, famously, have long elaborated on the exquisite distinctions among kine). True, cattle are not as divisible as inanimate substances like metal and tend, therefore, to be more gross, slow-moving units of trade. But, as we shall see, southern Tswana took this to be one of their advantages over cash, whose velocity they regarded as dangerous. Herds were movable, of course, especially for purposes of exchange, a fact stressed by Marx (1967, 115); for him, the apparent self-propulsion of currency was crucial to its role in animating commodity transactions. Affluent Tswana men exploited this ambulatory quality, dispersing bridewealth to affines and loaning stock to clients as they strove to turn their resources into control over people. They also rotated animals among dependents, and between cattle-posts, both as a hedge against disaster and as a way of hiding assets from the jealous gaze of rivals (Schapera 1938, 24).
It is as exchange value on the hoof, then, that cattle occupied a pivotal place in southern Tswana political economy. Their capacity to objectify, transfer and enhance wealth endowed them with almost magical talents. Much like money in the West. The beast, goes the vernacular song, is ‘god with a wet nose’ (modimo o nkoˆ e metsi; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 127). This is a patent instance of fetishism in bovine shape – of the attribution to objects, that is, of value produced by humans – which suggests that the commodity is not specific to capitalism. At the same time, the case of Tswana stock also shows that commodification need not be an all-or- none process, that it is always culturally situated in a meaningful world of work and worth. Here, for example, while animals enabled rich men to lay claim to the labours of others, they did not depersonalize relations among people. Quite the contrary. They drew attention to the social embeddedness of those very relations – while making them seem part of the natural order of things.
The complex qualities of cattle currency would intervene in mission efforts to transform the southern Tswana sense of value. For beasts were enough like money to be identified with it, yet enough unlike it to make and mark salient differences. On the one hand, they could abstract value. On the other, they did the opposite: they signified and enriched personal identities and social ties. The capacity of animals in Africa to serve both as instruments and as signs of human relationship has often been noted; the so-called ‘bovine idiom’ is an instance of the more general tendency of humans to use alienable objects to extend their own existence by uniting themselves with others (Mauss 1954; Munn 1977). Both in their individual beauty and their collective association with wealth, kine were ideal – and idealized – personifications of men. A highly nuanced vocabulary existed in Setswana to describe variations in colour, marking, disposition, horns and reproductive status (Lichtenstein 1973, 81; Sandilands 1953, 342). Named and praised, they were creatures of distinction. Not only did they bear their owners’ stamp as they traversed social space (Somerville 1979, 230), they also served as living records of the passage of value along the pathways of inheritance, affinity, alliance and authority.
The intricate patterns of stock deployment among Tswana made it difficult for early European visitors to assess their holdings. Longer-term records suggest a history of fluctuations in animal populations, with cycles of depletion being followed by periods of recovery, at least until the end of the 19th century (Grove 1989, 164). But there is clear evidence of the existence, at the beginning of that century, of large and unequally distributed herds. Observers were struck by blatant discrepancies in cattle ownership, and by the unambiguous association – Burchell (1822–24, ii, 272) used the word ‘metonymy’ – of wealth in kine with power (cf. Lichtenstein 1973, 76f; Molema 1920, 115). Thus the chief was the supreme herdsman (modisa) of his people, a metaphor that captured well vernacular visions of value and political economy. Situated atop the morafe (‘nation’), he presided over a domain marked not by fixed boundaries but by an outer ring of waterholes and pasture – in other words, a range (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 141). Royal stock also built relations beyond the polity, being used to placate and to trade with other sovereigns.
It was not only chiefs who mobilized cattle as a currency of power; other men of position also accumulated stock and set up networks of alliance and patronage. Ordinary male citizens, however, relied on inheritance, bridewealth and natural increase to build their modest herds. Some had no animals at all. They made up what Burchell (1822–24, ii, 348) termed an ‘ill-fated class’, eternally dependent on their betters. In the bovine economy of the southern Tswana, in sum, an indigenous ‘stock exchange’ underwrote inequalities of class, gender, generation and rank. As the pliable media used to forge all productive relations, human and superhuman alike, cattle were the quintessential form of social and symbolic capital.
Cattle were also a prime medium in the exchanges that, by the late 18th century, linked southern Tswana to other peoples on the subcontinent, yielding beads from the Kora and Griqua to the south, and iron implements, copper jewellery and tobacco from communities to the north and north-east (Lichtenstein 1930, 409; Stow 1905, 449, 489). Bovine capital also gave access to the ivory and pelts desired by white travellers, who arrived in growing numbers from around 1800 (Shillington 1985, 11). And pack-oxen enabled the long-distance haulage of sebiloˆ, a sought-after hair cosmetic, from its source in Tlhaping territory (Campbell 1813, 170). But the earliest European explorers already noted that Tswana were reluctant to trade away their beasts. Somerville’s (1979, 140) expedition to the interior failed in its mercantile objectives because of the natives’ ‘unwillingness to part with their cattle’. The Englishman found this ‘difficult to account for, since they convert them to no useful purpose whatever’.
Nonetheless, regional exchange networks were active enough to persuade the Europeans that they had stumbled upon the ‘essential principles of international traffic’, or ‘mercantile agency in its infancy’ in the African veld (Burchell 1822–24, ii, 555; original emphasis). Andrew Smith (1939, 251), in fact, observed that chiefs managed production explicitly to foster alliances; they tried, as well, to monopolize dealings with foreigners and to control commerce across their realms (Campbell 1822, ii, 194). Indeed, whites found these men aware of discrepancies in going rates for such items as ivory, and keen to profit from them. Notwithstanding the reluctance to sell beasts, occasions to traffic with Europeans – in the early years for beads, later for guns and money – were eagerly seized.
We shall come back, shortly, to the entry of the civilizing mission into southern Tswana commerce. Already, however, two things are clear. The first is that the Africans had long channelled their surpluses into trade, bringing them a range of goods from knives and tobacco to widely circulating forms of currency. The second is that, of the latter, beads had become the most notable. According to Beck (1989, 220) beads were introduced into southern Africa by the Portuguese, and continued to find their way into the interior in small quantities after the establishment of the Cape Colony (Saunders 1966, 65). Only at the turn of the 19th century, however, did sizeable mass- produced stocks arrive from abroad (Somerville 1979, 140). Metal rings and beads, especially of brass and copper, seem to have pre-dated glass imports in long-distance trade (Stow 1905, 489).
By the early 19th century mass produced beads were serving as media of transaction that articulated local and global economies, linking the worlds of cattle and money (cf. Graeber 1996). Along with buttons, which were put to a similar purpose, they were portable tokens that, for a time, epitomized foreign exchange value beyond the colonial frontier. Beads were ‘the only circulating medium or money in the interior’, Campbell noted (1822, i, 246), adding that every ‘nation’ through which they passed made a profit on them. Different kinds composed distinct regional currencies; Philip (1828, ii, 131) tells us that no importance was attached to particular examples, however beautiful, if they were ‘not received among the tribes around them’. At the same time African communities showed strong preferences, in the early 1800s, for specific colours, sizes and degrees of transparency (Beck 1989, 220f).
Even as they became a semi-standardized currency for purposes of external trade, beads served internally as personal adornments; in this they were like many similar sorts of wealth object. Their attraction seems to have stemmed from the fact that particular valuables could be withdrawn from circulation for display, itself a form of conspicuous consumption.1 But men of means also accumulated hidden stocks: ‘their chief wealth, like that of more civilized nations, [was] hoarded up in their coffers’ (Campbell (1822, i, 246; cf. Graeber 1996). Market exchange was, at this point, a sporadic activity directed at specific exotic objects. It was set apart from everyday processes of production and consumption.
Some observers stressed the monetary properties of beads: ‘They answer the same purpose as cowrie shells in India and North Africa’, Campbell (1822, i, 246) wrote, ‘or as guineas and shillings in Britain’. But others were struck by the differences. For a start, aesthetic qualities seemed integral to their worth. ‘Among these people’, offered Philip (1828, ii, 131), ‘utility is, perhaps, more connected with beauty than it is with us’. Simmel (1978, 73) would have said that the separation of the beautiful from the useful comes only with the objectification of value; the aesthetic artefact takes on a unique existence, sui generis; it cannot be replaced by another that might perform the same function. Such an artefact, therefore, is the absolute inverse of the coin, whose defining feature is its substitutability.
Among southern Tswana the increasing velocity of trade did render some media of exchange – first beads, then money – ever more interchangeable. But the process was never complete. And it did not eliminate other forms of wealth in which beauty and use explicitly enhanced each other. Indeed, the longevity of cattle currencies in African societies bears testimony to the fact that processes of rationalization, standardization and universalization are always refracted by social and cultural circumstance. In the cow, aesthetics and utility, uniqueness and substitutability complemented each other, colouring Tswana notions of value in general, and of money in particular.
Objects that come to be invested with value as media of exchange vary greatly over time and space, a point well demonstrated by the emergence of new currencies as formerly distinct economic orders begin to intersect. Marx (1967, 83) once said that, when the latter happens, the ‘universal equivalent form’ often lodges arbitrarily and transiently in a particular commodity. So it was with beads, which had been mass produced for different ends in the West, but turned out to serve well, for a while, as a vehicle of commerce beyond the colonial border. Marx also added that, as traffic persists, such tokens of equivalence tend to ‘crystallize…out into the money form’. So, once again, it was with beads. While Tswana would accept various articles as gifts, these were of little use in trade. ‘They want money in such a case’, Campbell (1822, i, 246) found, ‘that is, beads’. As transactions increased in volume, standards of value in the worlds linked by this new currency began to affect each other; merchants noted that rates charged by Africans in the interior rose and became more uniform.2 By the 1820s the demand for beads at the Cape had driven up prices dramatically, to the extent that missionaries tried to secure supplies from England at one-third of the cost (Beck 1989, 218f).
The bottom soon fell out of the frontier bead market, however (although not so further north; see Chapman 1971 (1868), 127). That market seems to have been sustained by the dearth of fractions of the rixdollar, the currency at the Cape in the early 1800s (Arndt 1928, 44–46). After 1825 Britain introduced its own silver and copper coinage to its imperial possessions, and paper dollars were replaced by sterling. Once the new supply had stabilized, and had filtered into the interior, its effect on bead money was devastating.
Ironically, while Tswana came to reckon in money, many traders preferred to deal in kind. But, even more important than changes in the cash supply, a shift was occurring in the structure of wants and in local notions of value. It was encouraged, above all, by the presence of the evangelists and by the entry onto the scene, at their urging, of a cadre of itinerant merchants and shopkeepers.
Here, then, were two distinct regimes of value, one European and the other African, whose engagement would have a profound impact on the colonial encounter. To the Nonconformist evangelists economic reform was no mere adjunct to spirituality; virtue and salvation had to be made by man, using the scarce material resources bequeathed by providence for improving the world. Commercial enterprise allowed the industrious to turn labour into wealth and wealth into grace. Money was the crucial medium of convertibility in this. It typified the potential for good and evil given as a birthright to every self-willed individual. Southern Tswana, upon whom the evangelists hoped to impress these divine possibilities, also inhabited a universe of active human agency, in which riches were made through worldly transactions. Exchange, in their case, was effected primarily through cattle. In contrast to cash, stock socialized assets, measuring their ultimate worth not in treasures in heaven but in people on earth. We move, now, to examine how these regimes of value, already in contact in the early 1800s, were brought into ever closer articulation.
Extending the invisible hand
Civilizing commerce, sanctified shopping: the early years British observers in the early 1800s might have acknowledged that southern Tswana showed a lively interest in exchange. But they also stressed the difference between ‘native commerce’ and orderly European business. Thus Burchell (1822–24, ii, 536–39) noted that ‘mercantile jealousy’ had produced competing efforts to monopolize traffic with the colony to the south. He proposed a ‘regulated trade for ivory . . . with the Bichuana nations’, to be vested in an authorized body of white merchants who would institute ‘fair dealing’ to the advantage of all. Like liberal economies before and since, his ‘free’ market required careful management.
The founding evangelists shared this trust in the beneficent effect of trade. Some said that the very ‘sight of a shop’ on mission ground roused savages to industry (Philip 1828, i, 204–5). The equation of civilization with commerce might have become one of the great cliche ́s of the epoch. But, for the Nonconformists, it was far from a platitude. The point was not to create an exploitable dependency, although that did happen. Nor was it simply to play on base desire to make people give ear to the Gospel, although that happened too. It ran much deeper. Trade had a capacity to breach ‘the sullen isolations of heathenism’, to stay the ‘fountain of African misery’ (Livingstone 1940, 255). All of which made material reform an urgent moral duty. The optimism of the missionaries in this respect was to falter in the face of the stark realities of the colonial frontier. The Christians had eventually to rethink their dream of a commonwealth of free-trading black communities, actively enhancing their virtue and wealth. But they continued to hold that the market would rout superstition, slavery, sloth; this even when, later in the century, market forces undercut their own idyll of independent African economies, compelling ‘their’ peoples to become dependent on wages.
There was, in other words, more to championing commerce among heathens than merely making virtue of necessity, as some have suggested, although it is true that many pioneer evangelists had to exchange to survive (Beck 1989, 211). In fact, the most ardent advocates of free enterprise were often those most opposed to clergy themselves doing business. Livingstone (1857, 39) held that, while missionary and trader were mutually dependent, ‘experience shows that the two employments can not very well be combined in the same person’. Ironically, he was to be accused of gun-running by the Boers. But then, on the frontier, the lines between prestation, purchase and profit were very fine indeed – and frequently in dispute. While traffic with peoples living beyond colonial borders was forbidden by law, missionaries were de facto exempt, except for the ban on selling liquor, weapons and ammunition. Dealings with Africans often went well beyond the procuring of necessities, involving considerable capital outlay. In the upshot, competition and accusations of dishonorable practice among the brethren soon became common (Beck 1989, 214).
From the first, Tswana associated evangelists, like all whites, with barter. The clergymen tended to be less than open in their formal correspondence about their dealings. Cooperation between the Nonconformists and merchants was close; traders journeying beyond the Orange River tended to lodge at mission stations and often accompanied evangelists on their travels (Livingstone 1960, 141).
The Nonconformists also gave out goods for purposes other than trade. Early on they dispensed tobacco, beads and buttons to encourage goodwill, only to find that prestations came to be expected in return for attending church and school.3 Few Tswana seem initially to have shared the European distinction between gifts and commodities, donations and payments. Yet one thing was widely recognized: that whites controlled desirable objects. As a result, they soon became the uncomfortable victims of determined efforts to acquire those objects. Their correspondence declared that all Africans, even dignified chiefs, were inveterate ‘beggars’, that they persistently demanded items like snuff, which the missions were assumed to have in large supply, and that their behaviour violated Protestant notions of honest gain (Moffat and Moffat 1951, 63). It took a while for the Christians to realize that ‘begging’ was also a form of homage to the powerful (Price 1956, 166; Mackenzie 1871, 44f).
As Beck (1989, 224) confirms, the evangelists introduced more European goods than did any other whites at the time. Their dealings eroded the local desire for beads and buttons in favour of a complex array of wants, primarily for domestic commodities like clothes, blankets and utensils. But this transformation, as we have suggested, entailed far more than the mere provision of objects. Changing patterns of consumption grew out of a shift in ideas about the nature, worth and significance of particular things in themselves. Which, in turn, was set in play by the encounter of very different regimes of value. Thus, even where their uses seemed obvious, such goods as clothes and furniture were given meanings irreducible to utility alone, meanings which often made the Europeans uneasy (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, chapter 5).
Yet more basic than this was the fact that, as the century wore on, it was less missionaries than the merchants they brought in their wake who were responsible for the supply of goods. Discomforted by the image of men of God haggling over the price of trinkets (Beck 1989, 213), most evangelists encouraged independent traders to settle on their stations. By 1830 John Philip (1828, i, 204f) had already publicized the success of his ‘experiment’ to have one open a store at Bethelsdorp. Money, he said, had gone up in the people’s estimation. They had begun, enthusiastically, to bring produce to the trader to exchange for goods. Bechuanaland soon followed Bethelsdorp. The introduction of stores in this manner – all the better to instruct non-Western peoples in ‘the economic facts of life’ – was a high priority among British Protestants in many parts of the world.
Time would mute the idyll of cooperation between missions and merchants. Already in 1841 Mary Moffat (1967, 18), while reiterating the need to foster a desire for commodities, bemoaned the high prices charged by local dealers for ‘worthless materials’. While the whites squabbled over their dealings with Africans, Tswana sovereigns had their own reasons for being wary of merchants. The latter paid scant respect to long-standing mores or monopolies, being ready to buy from anyone who had anything desirable to sell; the purchase of ivory and feathers from Rolong ‘vassals’ in the Kalahari, for instance, cost the life of one businessman and his son (Mackenzie 1871, 130). Such friction was frequent beyond the mission stations (Livingstone 1959, ii, 86). But even when storekeepers operated under the eyes of the evangelists, their behaviour often gave offense. Brawling, theft and sexual assault were common. No wonder that local rulers developed a ‘well-known’ reluctance to allow itinerant traders to traverse their territories (Mackenzie 1871, 130), or that, later in the century, strong chiefs would try to subject European commerce to strict control (Parsons 1977, 122).
The evangelists would have to wrestle constantly with the contradictions of commerce. In embracing its virtues, they had to deal with the fact that the two-faced coin threatened to profane their sacred mission. Yet the merchants were essential in the effort to reform local economies by hitching them to the colonial market – and to the body of corporate nations beyond.
Object lessons And so the merchants remained on the mission stations, where they prospered. Storekeepers stocked all the quotidian objects deemed essential to a civil ‘household economy’ (Moffat 1842, 507, 502f): clothes, fabrics, furniture, blankets, sewing implements, soap and candle moulds; the stuff, that is, of feminized domestic life, with its scrubbed, illuminated interiors. Shops also carried the implements of intensive agriculture, and the guns and ammunition required to garner the ‘products of the chase’, increasingly the most valuable of trade goods. Colonial whites abhorred the idea of weapons in African hands. But, by the 1830s, ‘old soldier’s muskets’ were being sold for ‘6, 7 and 8 oxen’, and three or four pounds of gunpowder for a single animal (Smith 1939, 232).
Mission accounts from the late 1800s show that European commodities had begun to tell their own story in the Tswana world. Ornaments, cooking utensils and consumables were widely purchased, as were coffee, tea and sugar. The foreign goods that seemed everywhere in use spoke of far-reaching domestic reconstruction.
At least in some quarters. The acquisition of these commodities required surplus production and disposable income, which was restricted to the emerging upper and middle peasantry. At the same time, despite their taste for European things, many wealthy men remained reluctant, save in extremis, to sell stock (Schapera 1933, 648). On the other hand, the market was particularly attractive to those excluded from indigenous processes of accumulation. Client peoples, for example, were easily tempted to turn tribute into trade – which is why some chiefs lost their monopolies over exchange (but cf. Parsons 1977, 120). Especially along the frontier, ever more Tswana, citizens and ‘vassals’ alike, entered into commercial transactions; as a result, they acquired manufactured goods well before the South African mineral revolution of the 1870s and the onset of large-scale labour migration. Small objects may speak of big changes, of course. Rising sales of coffee, tea and sugar marked important shifts in patterns of nutrition and sociality. They also tied local populations to the production and consumption of commodities in other parts of the empire (cf. Mintz 1985). As George Orwell (1962 (1937), 82) once said, in this respect, ‘changes in diet are more important than changes of dynasty or even of religion’.
But mission accounts also suggest that things had veered out of mission control. Wookey (1884, 304), for instance, admitted that the material developments promoted by the evangelists had not been an ‘unmixed good’; in this he anticipated the concerns of African critics, voiced later, about the impact of sugar, alcohol and imported provisions on the health of black populations. Not only had new diseases appeared, but drink had become ‘one of the greatest curses of the country’. The most profitable and addictive of commodities, its effects were a sordid caricature of the desire to make ‘natives’ dependent on the market.
As new industrial centres sprang to life around the diamond fields, the satanic underside of commerce came all but to the Nonconformists’ door. And, as it did, it exposed their naivety in hoping to introduce Tswana to the market in a controlled, benevolent manner. By then, in any case, the traders they had brought into their midst had already helped to set a minor revolution in motion through the ‘magic’ of their commodities. That magic had ambiguous effects. It led, at one extreme, to the contrivance of a polite bourgeois life-world; it led also, among ordinary people, to forms of consumption in which objects were deployed in new designs for living, newly contrived identities, all of them stylistic fusions of the familiar and the fresh. At the other extreme, it left a trail of addiction and poverty (Holub 1881, i, 236). To be sure, the merchants had also given southern Tswana practical lessons in the exploitative side of enlightened capitalism. From the very first, these entrepreneurs had engaged in the infamous practice of buying local produce for a pittance and then, when food was short, selling it back at exorbitant profit.
The missionaries themselves had also played a crucial role in determining the ways in which Western objects and market practices had entered into Tswana life, however; as we have stressed, there is more to commodification than the mere provision of goods. The Christians had set out to instil a ‘sacred hunger’, a sense of desire that linked refined consumption to a particular mode of producing goods and selves and encouraged continuing investment in civilizing enterprise. Above all else, this required a respect for the many talents of money.
The objectification of value and the meaning of money
Insofar as colonialism entailed a confrontation of different regimes of value, the encounter between Tswana and the missionaries was most clearly played out – and experienced – through the media most crucial to the measure of wealth on either side: cattle, money and the trade beads that, for a while, strung them together. Encounters of this sort, especially when they involved European capitalism in its expansive form, often ended in the erasure of one currency by another. But they sometimes gave rise to processes a good deal more complex than allowed by most theories of commodification. For value is borne by human beings who seek actively to shape it to their own ends. Along the frontier, cash and cows became fiercely contested signs, alibis of distinct, mutually threatening modes of existence.
To Tswana, it will be recalled, beasts were the prime means of storing and conveying wealth in people and things, of embodying value in social relations. In fact, control over these relations was one of the objects of owning animals. Thus, while cattle were indeed sometimes dealt on the foreign market, the bulk of both internal and long-distance trade seems to have been directed towards acquiring more stock.4 In ordinary circumstances barter never drew on capital. Beads, here, stood for worth in alien and alienated form, circulating against foreign goods, or against those which had been freed from local entanglements. By being transacted with neighbouring people for animals, they could also be used to convert value from more to less reified forms.
But this currency had its own logic. With the increasing standardization of the bead market across the interior in the early 19th century, the value of certain resources in Tswana life was rendered measurable, and more easily negotiable. Articles formerly withheld from sale, or given only for cattle (such as karosses, made as personal property; Lichtenstein 1930, 389), became purchasable (Moffat and Moffat 1951, 262, 267). The Nonconformists encouraged this process of commodification, although their real objective was the introduction of money. Hence they used the token currency themselves to put a price on inalienable things, such as land and labour. Not only did they pay wages in it, but, in 1823, used it to acquire (what they thought was) the freehold on which their station was built (Moffat and Moffat 1951, 189, 113). Beads were also bartered for agricultural surpluses by both missionaries and merchants.
The effort of the evangelists to commodify African land, labour and produce, and to foster a desire for domestic goods, eventually helped to reorient the bulk of trade from the hinterland towards the Cape. This had the effect of limiting the viability of bead currency itself. The latter had served well as long as token transactions remained relatively confined in space and time, as long as they involved a narrow range of luxuries from a few external sources of supply, as long as exchange was sporadic and did not extend to the procurement of ordinary utilities. But once the ways and means of everyday life began to be commodified, and increasingly to emanate from the colonial economy, a more standardized, readily available and widely circulating currency was needed to buy and sell them. And so, as Tswana engaged with a broadening range of manufacturers and middlemen in the 1830s, money quickly became the measure of worth. This, in turn, posed a threat to vernacular regimes of value, which before had been kept distinct from foreign traffic. Even where coin did not actually change hands, it came to stand for the moral economy, the material values and the modes of contractual relationship propagated by the civilizing mission – and its world.
In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the first attempts of the missions to teach the value of cash were not a success. Tswana evinced distrust in European tender, most notably in paper money. Not only was it suspected of being an easy medium of fraud, but its lack of durability was also a worry. For good reason. Between 1806 and 1824, rixdollar notes were infamously fragile, and were thought unreliable by many whites as well (Arndt 1928, 44, 62). Later in the century, traders would pass illiterate Africans false bills – issued, in one case, by the ‘Bank of Leather’, entitling the bearer to ‘the best Value’ in ‘London or Paris Boots & Shoes’ in exchange for diamonds (Matthews 1887, 196).
Given the uncertainties of colonial currency, the evangelists did not always entrust the introduction of money, or the dissemination of its qualities, to the workings of the market. Occasionally they took matters into their own hands. Thus the Rev. Campbell had, on a tour beyond the colonial frontier in 1812–13, decided that the Griqua merited consolidation both as a ‘nation’ and as a base for expanding London Missionary Society operations into the interior (Parsons 1927, 198). Crucial to the venture was a proper coinage (Campbell 1813, 256):
It was likewise resolved, that as they had no circulating medium amongst them, by which they could purchase any small articles . . . supposing a shop to be established amongst them . . . they should apply to the Mission Society to get silver pieces of different value coined for them in England, which
Figure 2 Examples of Griqua Town coins.
the missionaries would take for their allowance from the Society, having Griqua town marked on them. It is probable that, if this were adopted, in a short time they would circulate among all the nations round about, and be a great convenience.
God’s bankers indeed! This mission money would be dubbed ‘one of the most interesting emissions in the numismatic history of the British Empire’ (Parsons 1927, 202; see also Arndt 1928, 128). Campbell set about ordering supplies of special coinage from a well-known English diesinker. We have record of four denominations, two each in silver and copper. Shipped to South Africa in two consignments in 1815 and 1816, this money established itself in limited circulation (pace Arndt 1928, 127), a few examples turning up in places like Kimberley in later years.
The evangelists also deployed other means to foster respect for money. At issue, as we have said, was a moral economy in which its talents measured enterprise and enabled the conversion of wealth into virtue. If there was no cash in the African interior it had to be invented – or its existence feigned. The evidence shows that, even when little coinage was in circulation, the Nonconformists used it as an invisible standard, a virtual currency, against which to tally the worth of goods, donations and services.
Amidst a barter economy the missions reckoned accounts with numerical exactitude. In the 1820s the Methodists on the eastern Cape frontier encouraged offerings of beads and buttons that would be rendered in shillings and pence according to current ‘nominal’ values (Beck 1989, 223). Also at issue in this small grinding of God’s mills was the effort to encourage calculation. Counting – adding up, that is, the margins of profit and loss – enabled accounting, the form of stock-taking that epitomized Puritan endeavour. The evangelists associated numeracy with self-control, exactitude, reason; school arithmetic, for example, was taught mostly in fiscal idiom, computation being inseparable from the process of commodification itself.
Numbers provided a tool with which to equate hitherto incomparable sorts of value, to price them, and to allow unconditional convertibility from one to another. Quantification was iconic of the processes of standardization and incorporation, the erasure of differences in kind, at the core of cultural colonization. But it was also salient to the exacting logic of evangelical Nonconformism, with its need to measure conquests and count treasures. This emphasis on numbers cannot be taken to imply a trading of quality for quantity, however, as Simmel (1978, 444) might have implied in arguing that the reduction of the former to the latter was an intrinsic feature of monetization. The Protestants were also preoccupied with the morality of money, with the exchange of riches for virtue above price. They sought ceaselessly to reconcile these two dimensions of value. For, just as time always entails space, quantity always entails quality.
Still, by promoting the commodification of the Tswana world – where, in fact, cattle had long been counted – colonial evangelism spawned a shift from the qualitative to the quantitative as the dominant idiom of evaluation. This shift had important consequences for control over the flow of wealth, as men of substance were quick to grasp. In effecting it, the Nonconformists were helped, and soon outstripped, by the European traders. Ironically, while these men preferred to do business by barter, they used monetary values to compute all transactions (Philip 1828, i, 205f) – including the wholesale purchase of local produce, for which they gave goods set at well-hiked retail rates, and the extension of loans, from which they extracted high interest (Shillington 1985, 221; Livingstone 1940, 92). In attempts, later on, to exert influence over prices and profits, some Tlhaping farmers would persuade merchants to pay them in cash for their crops (Shillington 1985, 222). But coin remained scarce for a long time and struggles to elicit it from white entrepreneurs would go on well into the next century in some rural areas (Schapera 1933, 649). Not only did storekeepers benefit from conducting business by barter, mediated through virtual money; by using goods as token pounds and pence, they also limited the impact of rising prices in the Colony on those they paid in the interior. This form of cash in kind was a species of signal currency that had its (inverted) equivalent in Tswana ‘cattle without legs’, or cash as kine. Such were the hybrid media of exchange born of the articulation of previously distinct, incommensurable regimes of value. They expressed the efforts of the different dramatis personae to regulate the conversion of wealth in both directions. We return to them below.
While familiarity with the value of money did not always translate into the circulation of cash, it did bear testimony to the growing volume of Tswana production for the market. Most lucrative were the fruits of the hunt. As they gained access to guns, African suppliers became ever more crucial to the capital-intensive colonial trade in feathers and ivory – until natural resources gave out (Shillington 1985, 24). But agriculture was also important, especially among the middle and upper peasantry. Surpluses were sold in increasing quantities, permitting the purchase of cattle, farming implements, wagons and other commodities. With the discovery of diamonds, but before the territory was annexed by Britain in 1871, Tlhaping, Kora and Griqua took part in the new commerce, finding stones and selling them to speculators for cash, wagons and beasts (Shillington 1985, 38; Holub 1881, i, 242). Matthews (1887, 94f) writes that, once this trade had been outlawed, traffic was conducted in an argot in which gems were referred to as ‘calves’.
Although southern Tswana soon lost all claim to the diamondiferous lands, many remained implicated in the local economy around Kimberley – wherever possible converting their profits into livestock. Indeed, a report in the Diamond news in 1873 voiced the worry that, by turning their cash into animals, blacks were avoiding wage work (Shillington 1985, 68). Such anxieties were not baseless. But they focused only on Africans of means, underestimating the growing impoverishment of the interior. While most resources, even water, now had a price in southern Bechuanaland (Holub 1881, i, 231, 246), the majority of Tswana were in no position to benefit from new market opportunities. Those with stock and irrigated lands might have been able to provision the diamond fields; however, as John Mackenzie observed, the ‘poorer classes . . . [were] often sadly disappointed’.5 Many had already begun to sell their labour either to rural employers or in the Colony.6
Of the ironic history of southern Tswana proletarianization we have written elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; 1997, chapter 4). Here it will suffice to make two points. First, the workings of the colonial economy, of the very mechanisms supposed to ‘civilize’ and enrich Africans, did more than just eat away at their material lives. It also perverted the effort of the Protestant mission to instill in them a commitment to the idea of self-possessed labour and enlightened commerce; to seed among them the persuasive hegemony of the market as sacralized place, practice and process; to replace their ‘primitive communism’ with a lifestyle centred on refined domesticity, the nuclear family and money. Second, as this suggests, most ordinary southern Tswana remained reluctant proletarians, with strong views about the terms on which they were willing to sell their labour. Even when hunger was rife, and jobs at the diamond fields were scarce, they were loath to toil on the Transvaal goldmines, where there was a great demand for employees, but where workers were known to be ill treated (Van Onselen 1972, 486; Cape of Good Hope 1907: 20). In fact, observers noted repeatedly that labour migration was not driven by brute necessity. Among other things, it was tied, as an inspector of native locations observed in 1908 (Cape of Good Hope 1909: 32), to the state of cattle-holding; also, as we have said, to the desire of Tswana to invest, through various forms of stock exchange, in local social relations and political enterprises. It was just this, of course, that decades of colonial evangelism had been designed to transform.
Stock responses
Cattle, currency and contests of value By the close of the 19th century southern Tswana communities had become part of a hybrid world in which markets and migration were more or less prominent, in which money had become a ubiquitous standard of worth, in which coin undercut all other currencies, including cattle. For many, this last development was neither inevitable nor desirable. Turning cattle into cash was not a neutral act. It entailed the loss of a distinctive form of wealth and endangered their autonomy. Especially older men, whose power and position derived from their herds, sought to reverse the melting of everything to money. Even more, as we have noted, they tried constantly to convert all gains from the sale of labour or produce into beasts. Their orientation contrasted with that of the rising Christian literati, for whom universalizing media – cash, education, consumer goods – promised entry into a modernist, middle-class commonwealth. Not that these families ceased to invest in beasts; correspondence among southern Tswana elites at the time makes frequent mention of transactions in kine.
The missionaries knew that livestock enabled southern Tswana to sustain their independent existence – and to resist the invasive reach of Christian political economy. Efforts to persuade men to harness their beasts to arable production might have been reasonably successful. But, for the most part, the evangelists had failed to decentre the ‘alien order’ inscribed in animals. They had not convinced Tswana to dispense with their herds or the social relations secured by them. Quite the contrary; in 1881, in Kuruman, the people were still ‘almost all engaged in pastoral pursuits – either being themselves the owners of cattle, or as servicing those who are’.7 What is more, their stock gave the Africans a potent resource – their own cultural expertise – in their dealings with whites. Here, to their obvious satisfaction, they were on home ground; here their own local knowledge gave them a clear edge; here, within the colonial economy, was one domain, one site of contest, from which they profited (Mackenzie 1887, i, 80). The corollary? By investing in wealth that served as a hedge against the market they made themselves less dependent, conceptually and bodily, on the cycle of earning and spending on which the missions had banked to change their everyday life-ways. Through such ordinary deeds were grand colonizing designs eluded. For a time.
Other whites, in particular those eager to employ black labour, shared the uneasiness of the missionaries over the enduring African preoccupation with cattle. They, too, were aware that stockwealth allowed ‘natives’ some control over the terms on which they entered the market economy. From the very start the colonization of southern Tswana society involved the gradual, deliberate depletion of their herds and the dispossession of their range. It was a process that gained momentum through the century. Early on, Boer frontiersmen tried to press Rolong communities into service by plundering their beasts, seizing their fountains and invading their pastures. Later, in the annexed territories of Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, settlers impounded ‘stray’ African stock in such numbers that government officials were moved to express concern (Shillington 1985, 99f). Exorbitant fees were charged for retrieving these beasts, cash that had to be borrowed from traders at the cost of yet further indebtedness. The Tswana sense that ‘money eats cattle’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 151) owed much to such experiences.
Apocalypse, then: rinderpest Several of the evangelists working on the unsettled frontier protested the blatant expropriation of African stock.8 At the same time, they did not mask their relief when the rinderpest pandemic of 1896 seemed, along with overstocking and deteriorating pasture, to deal a fatal blow to Tswana herds. Clergy elsewhere in southern Africa reported that stricken populations were seeking refuge at missions (Van Onselen 1972, 480f). Many of them cheered the apparent demise of pastoralism. A few, though, pondered its implications for the lingering ideal of viable Christian communities in the countryside. While the scourge would probably help their cause, mused Willoughby at Palapye, it had reduced ‘the capital of the country’ by some 50% to 60%. And it had deprived Tswana of their protection from drought, their income from transport riding and their main means of locomotion.9
The Tswana experience of rinderpest was unquestionably apocalyptic in the short run. Stockowners large and small lost millions of beasts (Molema 1966, 196). The southernmost peoples, who were already land-poor and widely dependent on wage labour, never fully recovered. Some communities in semi-arid regions turned to agriculture for the first time, only to be struck by locusts and drought. Over the longer run, in fact, herds did recover in most places. But the impact of the devastation was inseparable from that of wider political and economic processes unfolding at the time – most immediately from the protracted, at times violent, struggle of the Africans to withstand those who would deprive them of their autonomy. Beasts were often implicated in acts of rebellion along the frontier; they became highly charged objects of contestation on both sides. When government agents sought to halt the implacable advance of the pandemic by shooting entire herds of Tswana stock,10 they were met with acute disaffection. Rumours spread that the authorities had introduced the rinderpest to reduce blacks to servitude (Van Onselen 1972, 487). In the end, some rulers complied with the administration and received compensation. From cattle to cash once more.
Africans in the Cape called the rinderpest masilangane, ‘let us all be equal’ (Van Onselen 1972, 483), a sardonic reference to its levelling effects and to the power of beasts to make or break people. While the pandemic was ruinous, it did not diminish the value of stock among Tswana. Exploiting the transport crisis caused by the shortage of oxen, the upper peasantry were first to rebuild their herds – and, with them, the distinctions that comprised their world. Their understanding of the economic forces at work was epitomized in the relation of cattle to coin. Not only could coin eat cattle, but the replacement of the second was made possible by the first. And yet animals remained the preferred form in which to store money; a form which, barring catastrophe, allowed it to grow into, and accumulate, social worth. The association of beasts with banks became a commonplace, making livestock synonymous with wealth at its most generative (cf. Alverson 1978, 124). In the event, cash came to be seen as the most fitting recompense for kine (Schapera 1933, 649), kine the optimum medium for the storage of cash. As we said earlier, they were alike special commodities. Both had an ‘innate’ capacity to equate and translate different sorts of value. And to produce riches. It is this capacity to commensurate that gives such media their magic. Because of it, they seem to bring about transformations, and so to make history, in their own right.
But cash and cattle were also different in one respect that no European political economist could have anticipated: their distinctive colours, their racination. Money was associated with transactions controlled by whites. It was also a highly ambiguous instrument. On the one hand, it opened a host of new possibilities, typifying the culture of the mission and its object-world, and it made thinkable new materialities, new practices, new passions, new identities. Yet, on the other, in its refusal to respect personal identities, it also undermined ‘traditional’ monopolies, eroded patriarchal powers, displaced received forms of relationship. ‘Money’, the vernacular saying goes, ‘has no owner’ – madi ga a na mong. In democratizing access to value, it put a great deal of the past at risk, sometimes in the cause of transitory desire. Formerly inalienable, intransitive values might now be drawn into its melting pot. And, in the name of debt, tax collectors could attach Tswana cattle and force men to sell their labour to raise cash.
Government stock, live stocks Meanwhile, many observers were announcing the death of African pastoralism. Prematurely, it turns out. The Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903–4 (South Africa 1905, 54), concluded that ‘money [has become] the great medium of business where formerly cattle were used’. In a post-pastoral age, it went on, Africans should be encouraged to use government savings banks. But the matter was not so straightforward. In 1909 a resigned Rev. Williams wrote to his superiors that, to Tswana, cattle were already like government bonds:11
the Native is very slow to part with his cattle…Too often he will see himself, wife and family growing thin, whilst his cattle are increasing and getting fat, but to buy food with any portion of them is like draining his life’s blood . . . His cattle are like Government Stock which no holder will sell for the purpose of living on the Capital unless forced to do so.
The reference to ‘life’s blood’ is telling. Williams understood that beasts, here, enabled a particular kind of existence. It was this, for Tswana, that made them capital in the first place. Indeed, any asset that did the same thing might be treated as if it were stock. Even coin. But all too often coin did the opposite, consuming cows and threatening relations made through them. Ironically, it was referred to in Setswana as madi, an anglicism and a homonym for “blood.” But this was blood, or perhaps blood-money, in a less sanguine sense. It connoted the alienable essence of the labourer, that part of her or him from which others profited (J. Comaroff 1985, 174). As Williams implies, selling cattle under coercive conditions was tantamount to selling lifeblood.
Figure 3 Cattle being herded in Mochudi (photo taken by Isaac Schapera in the early 1930s and made available by the Botswana National Museum and the estate of Isaac Schapera).
The Rev. Williams went on to say that in fact Christian teaching had made inroads into the Tswana reluctance to sell beasts, that many were now willing to part with cattle when corn was scarce. But prices had fluctuated wildly on local markets. No wonder, Williams concluded, contradicting what he had just said, that Tswana were slow to retail their stock. Returns on agricultural produce were also erratic. As a result, money was often scarce. Under these conditions, the capacity of kine to serve as the ‘safe custody’ of wealth was underlined. Hence the fact that they were exchanged only for coin or other forms of capital, particularly wagons, ploughs and guns, which had become the primary means of producing wealth in a receding rural economy.
But, as importantly, cattle were also shares – live stocks, as it were – in a social community and a moral economy whose reproduction they enabled. In southern Tswana chiefdoms, patronage continued to be secured through the loan of cows; young, educated royals seem, in the early 1900s, to have used their cultural capital to shore up family herds, and vice versa. Court fines were levied in kine and marriage involved the transfer of animals late into the 20th century. Significantly, where bridewealth came to be given in cash payments, the latter was often spoken of as token beasts, ‘cattle without legs’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 148).
Endings, continuities
Livestock, in sum, were still the medium for making the social connections that formed and re-formed a recognizable social world. These ‘signal transactions’ (Sansom 1976, 145) – in nominal animal currency at a rate well below prevailing prices – distinguished privileged exchanges from ordinary commercial dealings. Legless cattle were a salient anachronism, an enclave within the generalizing terms of the market. Counted in cows but paid in coin, this notional cash in kine was the inverse of the cash as kind deployed by merchants to compel Africans to barter at non-competitive rates. Both virtual currencies served as modes of surge control that tried to harness the flow of value, if in opposite directions, by putting a brake on the rapid conversion from one form to another.
It was precisely because they experienced colonization as a loss of control over the production and flow of value that so many Tswana pinned their hopes on cattle in the early 20th century. In them, it seemed, lay the means for recouping a stock of wealth and, with it, a sense of self-determination. This did not imply an avoidance of money or wage work. The Africans had been made dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on the colonial marketplace; their access to beasts and other goods – not to mention cash – lay increasingly in the sale of their produce and/or their labour. Neither did it imply opposition to Christianity. By the turn of the century most chiefs had joined the church, and many of their people followed suit, even if they were not, in the main, pious converts. The significant contrast in this world did not lie between Christian and non-Christian. It was between those for whom the values and relations inscribed in cattle remained paramount and those more invested, ideologically and materially, in the capitalist economy of turn-of-the-century South Africa. Cows, and the ways in which they were used, were the markers of this contrast. Rather than the bearers of a congealed, unchanging tradition, they were the links between two orders of worth. Thus, even where they served as icons of setswana, they were hybrid signs of identity in the here-and-now; identity that was itself a matter of shifting relations and distinctions.
Remember too, in this respect, that stockwealth was not repudiated by those of more modernist bent; they tended to treat it like other forms of capital in a world of mercantilism, commerce and commodities. It was they – the educated children of old elites, the upper peasantry, and the petite bourgeoisie cultivated by the mission – who were heirs to the liberal vision of the early evangelists. Others, less able to ride the contradictions of colonial political economy and Protestant modernism, remained marginal to the conventions and the cultural practices of the marketplace. They sought to garner what they could of its wealth,12 and to invest it in the social and material assets they knew and appreciated. This was to be an enduring strategy, visible even as the forces of global capital reshaped the post-apartheid southern African periphery in the late 20th century. In August 1995 the Gaming gazette of the Sun International Corporation carried the story of a man, apparently of modest means, from Ramotswa in Botswana. He had hit the jackpot on a slot machine at the Gaborone Sun Hotel. Ralinki, his given name, would use his winnings to buy beasts. For Tswana, he explained, ‘cattle are . . . wealth, and it is traditional to have as many as possible to pass on to your sons’.13
Which brings us back to the matters with which we began. World historical movements of social incorporation – nation-building, colonialism, globalization and the like – are all founded on a logic of commensuration and conversion, on the demand that inimical sorts of value – in respect of language and culture, wealth, beauty, even the idea of God – are made equatable and translatable. Irreconcilable forms of difference among people and things are rendered reducible, imaginatively and concretely, to common denominators. As our case shows, such processes of commensuration and conversion, and above all their enabling currencies, have often been the focus of concern, indeed of struggle, among people caught up on all sides of colonial encounters. These people tend to be minutely sensitive to the capacity of diverse media – money, beads, stock or whatever – to make or to resist convertability and, therefore, the modes of exchange, abstraction, exploitation and incorporation they allow, modes that sustain or threaten the autonomy, distinctiveness and control we often associate with the ‘local’. That is why currencies of conversion often come to be fetishized, why they seem to have a power all of their own, why they loom so large at times of great historical changes of scale in economy, society and culture. Hence the obsession on the part of European missionaries with inducting Africans into the use of money – and the equally impassioned investment, among Tswana, in retaining their wealth in kine. Conversion, after all, was not merely a matter of religious reform. It was the key mechanism of imperialism at large.
-
Roger Bastian Array
For the Comaroffs, capitalism at the end of the millennium is also millenarian capitalism. Globalization can be thought of as an economic process radically
addressing the nature of labour and provoking responses that highlight the occult or
spectral power of the global economy. Moreover, the nature of these responses is
dualist: it entails both the enchanted pursuit of wealth and the moralizing rejection of this pursuit by others as ‘satanic’. In this regard, globalization is a process with eschatological, indeed apocalyptic, dimensions. As the forces of Gog and Magog battle it out for the global space, the Comaroffs prophetically offer us a sense of this struggle’s inevitability. What is different from, say, the era of cargo cults is that, where these cults supposedly expressed the shock of the new on the imperial fringe and would eventually be swallowed by their own irrational absurdity, capitalist-inspired uncertainty is now everywhere and everywhere the cults of capitalism emphasize the role of unseen forces. -

Popular Justice in the New South Africa
For all the hope stirred by the end of apartheid, the transition to democracy in South Africa, beginning in 1994, opened up a social and moral vacuum—not to mention a huge wealth-gap—in which violence and disorder, real and imagined, became commonplace. By the late 1990s, a police service regarded as incompetent, toothless, and overzealously committed to human rights was struggling to cope with rising rates of murder, rape, robbery, and car jacking. Frightened citizens, irrespective of race, class, geography, or gender, came to believe that the inability of government to guarantee their safety mocked their newfound freedoms.
-
Donna Perry Array
Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism “brings together nine informative
and insightful essays that address ‘the confounding effects of liberalization’ and prompt
new ways of thinking about the transnational contours of capitalism. Each contribution
offers an eye-opening analysis—grounded in solid research and, as with four of them,
in fieldwork—of capitalist crises involving consumption and speculation, labor and class
issues, mobility, autochthony, indigenous forms of religion, the global reach of
technologies and the media, and tourism capital. Reproductions of popular artwork,
photographs, and advertisements throughout the book reflect its global scope and
complement the text in intriguing ways. In the first essay, ‘Millennial Capitalism: First
Thoughts on a Second Coming,’ editors Jean and John L. Comaroff scrutinize ‘the
distinctly pragmatic qualities of the messianic, millennial capitalism of the moment: a
capitalism that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; a capitalism that, if rightly
harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the
marginalized and disempowered.’” Laura Savu, University of North Carolina, Symploke.
“Comaroff and Comaroff begin the book with a compelling overview of millennial
capitalism’s distinguishing characteristics. It is a regime built upon consumption rather
than production, in which the value of labor has been eclipsed by the magic of capital.
As capital becomes distanced from the sites of production, an amoral ethos of gambling
and speculation comes to reign. Although finance is now popularly viewed as the prime
mover of millennial capitalism, the editors point to the continuing relevance of labor:
there are more industrial workers today than ever before. This global proletariat is more
feminized, more fragmented, and more removed from the centers of investment and
consumption. Moreover, this proletariat is increasingly mobile and decreasingly
regulated by states. The dismantling of the national arenas upon which class conflicts
traditionally raged inhibits the development of class consciousness, which in turn opens
up a subjective space increasingly filled by alternative identities and agendas: gender,
race, ethnicity, and, particularly, generation emerge as the salient tropes around which
individuals build self-consciousness…” Donna Perry, Western Oregon University,
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History. -

Nations With/out Borders:
Anthropologists are fond of stories and riddles. The stranger, the more puzzling, the better. So let us first pose a riddle, then tell a story.
The riddle: What might the Nuer, a remote Nilotic people in the southern Sudan, have to do with Carl Schmitt, the noted German philosopher, notorious apologist for Nazism, and, of late, one of the most quoted social theorists in the English-speaking world? For their part, the Nuer are famous among anthropologists, not least because, in the 1940s, they were held to pose an epistemic challenge to received Western political theory (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:4). This was largely due to the fact that they had a political system without government. According to Evans-Pritchard (1940a, 1940b), their storied ethnographer, they lived in ‘ordered anarchy’: a state of being without a state to rule over them. In this respect, they were the archetype of so- called ‘acephalous’ African political systems, systems that were later to be evoked, by Michael Barkun (1968) and others, in efforts to account for the segmentary oppositions on which the fragile coherence of the Cold War world system sustained itself. Contra Hobbes, order here did not congeal in offices or institutions, in courts or constabularies, in finite territories or fixed geo- graphical borders. It inhered, rather, in a virtual logic of action encoded in the idiom of kinship: in an immanent socio-logic of fission and fusion, of relative social distance, that brought people together or forced them apart in situations of conflict. Thus, if a homicide occurred within the ‘tribe’, it was dealt with by established means of self-help and retribution; if it occurred beyond its margins, what followed was warfare between polities. Practically speaking, though, those boundaries between inside and out were renegotiated, dialectically – they were objectified and made real – in the process of dealing with the very transgressions that breached them. The Nuer polity, in sum, was a field of potential action, conjured by the need to distinguish between allies and antagonists, law and war.
Which is where Carl Schmitt comes in. In his study of the nature of the political, Schmitt (1966) portrays politics, Nuer-like, as a pragmatic matter of the will to make life-or-death dis- tinctions between friend and enemy. In other words, as a matter of making order by drawing lines: of inscribing the political in collective identities, at once physical and metaphysical, carved as much out of the logic of who we are not as who we are; indeed, of entailing the one in the other and both in the sublime act of arriving at unequivocal oppositions when they count. Like those, for example, of radically different theologico-civilizations caught up in an apocalyptic clash between the good and the bad in the ugly days after 9/11; days in which the planet was terrified by uncertainty because it was so uncertain about terror, specifically, by the capacity of violence without sovereign signature to ambiguate formerly clear axes of global geopolitics; days in which US came to spell not just the United States but ‘us’. As Nuer might have put it, in an orderly world, a world of absolutes, everything is relative since all things are relatives. Except those who are not, who fall beyond the law, beyond the ethical margin and who, therefore, are to be excised, outlawed or, in extremis, unsacrificially disposed of (cf. Agamben 1998). Order, in short, is wrought from disorder, political existence from anarchy, by virtue of drawing the line. It is at that line that the riddle is resolved: that line where the Nuer and Schmitt meet, there to agree on the inscription of the normative in a grammar of difference, made manifest by enacting boundaries at once existential, ethical and legal – and, as we shall see, immanently violent.
Fire, last time
So much for the riddle, to which we shall return. Now for the story. It is about a fire, about aliens, about a nation-in-the-making and about its borders, both internal and external. It is also about a world in which borders, sui generis, are becoming ever more enigmatic, ever more troublesome. We have recounted this story before, but think it worth revisiting in light of recent global events. It raises a host of questions: What might natural disasters tell us about the architecture of twenty-first-century nation-states? How might the sudden flash of catastrophe illuminate the meaning of borders and the politics of belonging? And to what extent are those two things, borders and belonging, morphing – along with the substance of citizenship, sovereignty and national integrity – in this, the neoliberal age, an age frequently associated with states of emergency? These questions have a number of deeper historical implications hidden in them. But we are running ahead of ourselves. Let us title our tale …
Apocalypse, African style
The millennium passed in South Africa without incident; this despite public fears, before the event, of murderous violence and mass destruction. Then, two weeks later, Cape Town caught fire. On a hot, dry Saturday, the veldt flared up in a number of places across the greater metropolitan area. High winds carried walls of flame up its mountain spine, threatening historic homes and squatter settlements alike. As those in its path were evacuated, the TV projected disjunctive images of civic cooperation: of the poor helping each other their carry paltry possessions from doomed shacks; of the wealthy, having dropped their silverware into their swimming pools, lining up to pass water buckets to those dousing the flames.1 As the bush continued to burn, helicopters dumped ton after ton of water on it. Round-the-clock reports told horrific tales of beasts grilled alive, of churches incinerated, of vineyards razed. The city sweltered beneath a blanket of smoke as ash rained down on its boulevards and beaches.
In total, 9,000 hectares burned. The mountains smouldered sullenly for weeks. So did the tempers of the populace. Blame flew in many directions, none of them politically random. Fire is endemic to the region. But, being of calamitous proportions, this one raised fears about the very survival of the natural kingdom at the Cape. Its livid scars evoked elemental anxieties, saturating public discourse as it called forth an almost obsessive desire to construe it as an apocalyptic omen, an indictment, a call to arms. The divinations that ensued – in the streets, the media, the halls of government – laid bare the complex social ecology whence the conflagration itself had sprung, casting a sharp light on the state of a nation then barely six years old.
Apocalypse, of course, eventually dissolves into history. Therein, to borrow Mike Davis’s phrase, lies the ‘dialectic of ordinary disaster’ (Davis 1995). Thus, while early discussion of the fire was wild and contested, it reduced, in time, to a dominant interpretation, one that, while not universal, drew enough consensus to authorize strong state action and broad civic collaboration. Here, clearly, was an ‘ideology in the making’. As such, it played upon an implicit landscape of affect and anxiety, inclusion and intrusion, prosperity and loss. Via a clutch of charged references, it linked the fire to other public concerns – concerns about being and identity, about organic society and common humanity, about boundaries and their violation – at the heart of contemporary nationhood. But its efficacy in this respect rested, first, on producing a plausible explanation for the extent of the blaze.
Initially, cigarette ends and cooking fires were held responsible. But this soon gave way to talk of arson, pointing, specifically, to a campaign of urban terror attributed to Muslim fundamentalism that had gripped the Cape long before 9/11.2 Then the discourse abruptly changed direction, alighting on an aetiology that took hold with unusual force: whatever sparked it, the catastrophic scale of the fire was blamed on alien plants, plants that burn more readily and fiercely than does native vegetation. Outrage against those plants grew quickly. Landowners who had allowed them to spread were denounced for putting the population, and its ‘natural heritage’, at risk.3
Note: ‘natural heritage’. Heritage has become a construct to conjure with as global markets and mass migration erode the distinctive wealth of nations, forcing them to redefine their sense of patrimony. And its material worth. A past mayor of Cape Town, for example, was wont to describe Table Mountain as a ‘national asset’ whose value is ‘measured by every visitor it attracts’.4 Not coincidentally, South Africa was then engaged in a bid to have the Cape Peninsula declared a World Heritage Site in recognition of its unparalleled biodiversity. This heritage is embodied, above all, in fynbos (Afrikaans, ‘fine bush’).5 These small-leaved evergreens that cover the mountainous uplands and coastal forelands of the region have come to epitomize its organic integrity and its fragile, wealth-producing beauties. And, as they have, local people have voiced ever more anxiety that their riches are endangered by alien vegetation, whose colonizing effect is to reduce it to ‘impenetrable monotony’ (Hall 1979:134). Ours, to be sure, is an age in which value and profit reside, perhaps more than anything else, in the creation of variety, difference, distinctiveness.
The blaze brought this to a head. ‘Wake up Cape Town’, screamed a newspaper headline set against the image of a lone red fire lily poking, phoenix-like, from a bed of ashes. Efforts by botanists to cool the hysteria – to insist that fire in fynbos is not abnormal – had no effect. A cartoonist, casting his ironic eye on the mood of millennial anxiety, drew a flying saucer above Cape Town. Peering down on the city as it sinks into a globally-warmed sea, its mountain covered by foreign flora, a diminutive space traveller exclaims ‘Glork plik zoot urgle’: ‘They seem to have a problem with aliens’.6
The satirist touched a raw nerve: the obsession with alien plants gestured toward a scarcely submerged sense of civic terror and moral panic. Significantly, when the fire was followed two weeks later by floods to the north, another headline asked: ‘First fires, now floods – next frogs?’.7 By then, it was not surprising to read that vast forests of alien trees, owned by logging corporations, were held to have ‘caused all the trouble’.8
What exactly was at stake in this mass-mediated chain of consciousness, this litany of alien nature? What does it tell us about perceived threats to the nation and its patrimony? To the conception of social cohesion, ethical citizenship and shared humanity at its core? Observers elsewhere have noted that an impassioned sense of autochthony, of birthright – to which alienness is the negative counterpoint – has edged aside other images of belonging at the end of the twentieth century; also, that a fetishism of origins seems to be growing up the world over in opposition to the effects of neoliberal laissez-faire.9 But why? Why, at this juncture in the history of the modernist polity have boundaries and their transgression become so incendiary an issue? Could it be that the public anxiety here over invasive plant species speaks to an existential conundrum presently making itself felt at the very heart of nationhood everywhere: In what does national integrity consist, what might polity and society mean, what moral and material entitlements might it entail, at a time when global capitalism appears almost everywhere to be dissolving sovereign borders, almost everywhere to be displacing politics-as- usual?
In order to address these questions – in order to make sense both of our narrative of catastrophe and of the more general matter of why it is that aliens of all kinds have become such a widespread preoccupation – we must take a brief detour into the interiors of ‘the’ late- modernist nation-state.
The nation-state in perspective, retrospectively
Euro-nations – as Benedict Anderson (1983) has emphasized – were founded on the fiction of cultural homogeneity: on an imagined, often violently effected sense of fraternity. Much has been said about that imagining: that Euro-nationhood was always more diverse than its historiography allows, always a work in progress. But that is another story. Since the late twentieth century, those polities have had increasingly to come to terms with difference. Historical circumstance has pushed them, often unwillingly, toward ever greater heterodoxy. Hence the growing concern, scholarly and lay alike, with citizenship, sovereignty, multiculturalism, minority rights and the limits of liberalism. Hence, too, the xenophobia that haunts contemporary nationhood almost everywhere, of which more later.
The move toward heterodoxy is itself part of a more embracing world-historical process, one in which 1989 figures centrally. That year, symbolically if not substantively, heralded the political coming of age, across the planet, of neoliberal capitalism. While its economic roots lie much deeper, this, retrospectively, is typically taken to have been the juncture at which the old international order gave way to a more fluid, market-driven, electronically articulated universe: a universe in which supranational institutions burgeon; in which space and time are recalibrated; in which geography is rewritten in four dimensions; in which a new global jurisprudence displaces its internationalist predecessor, overlaying the sovereignty of national legal systems; in which transnational identities, diasporic connections and the mobility of human populations transgress old frontiers; in which ‘society’ is declared dead, to be replaced by ‘the network’ and ‘the community’ as dominant metaphors of social connectedness; in which governance is reduced to a promiscuous combination of service delivery, security provision and the fiduciary; in which liberty is distilled to its postmodern essence, the right to choose identities, subjectivities, commodities, sexualities, localities and almost everything else. A universe, also, in which older institutional and instrumental forms of power – refigured, now, primarily as biopower – depart most states as never before, dispersing themselves everywhere and anywhere and nowhere tangible at all: into transnational corporations and NGOs, into shadowy, privatized parastatal cabals, into syndicated crime and organized religion, and into unholy fusions of all of these things.
In the upshot, ‘the’ state, an entity ever more polymorphous and amorphous, is held, increasingly, to be in constant crisis: its legitimacy is tested by debt, disease, poverty and corruption; its executive control is perpetually pushed to the limit; and, most of all, its hyphen- nation – the articulation, that is, of state to nation, nation to state – is everywhere under challenge. This is especially so in postcolonial nation-states, whose ruling regimes often rely on theatrical means to produce state power, to conjure national unity, and to persuade citizens of the reality of both (Mbembe 1992; Worby 1998). They are not alone in this, of course. Resort to mass-mediated ritual excess – not least ritual orchestrated in the name of security – features prominently right now in the politics of states in many places.
This broad historical transformation – the move, that is, from an imagined homogeneity to the inescapable realities of heterodoxy – has any number of corollaries. For present purposes, we raise just three.
The first is the refiguration of the modernist subject-citizen. One corollary of the changing face of nationhood, of its growing diversity, has been an explosion of identity politics. Not just of ethnic and cultural politics, but also of the politics of, among other things, gender, sexuality, age, race, religiosity and style. While most human beings still live as citizens innation-states, they tend only to be conditionally citizens of nation-states. Which, in turn, puts ever more stress on their hyphen-nation. The more diverse nation-states become, the higher the level of abstraction at which ‘the nation-state’ exists, the more dire appear threats against it. And, at least for those affectively attached to it, the more urgent become the need to divine and shadowy, privatized parastatal cabals, into syndicated crime and organized religion, and into unholy fusions of all of these things.negate whatever endangers it. States, notes David Harvey (1990:108), have always had to sustain a definition of the commonweal over and above sectarian concerns. One solution that has presented itself in the face of ever more assertive claims made against it in the name of identity is an appeal to the primacy of national autochthony: to the ineffable loyalties, the inter- ests and affect, that flow from rootedness in a place of birth (see above). Nor is this just a tactic, one that appeals to those in the business of government. It resonates with deeply felt populist fears – and with the proclivity of citizens of all stripes to deflect shared anxieties onto outsiders.
Autochthony is implicit in many forms of identity of course; it also attaches to places within places, parts within wholes. But, as a specifically national claim against aliens, its mobilization appears to be growing in direct proportion to the sundered hyphenation of the sovereign polity, to its popularly perceived porousness and impotence in the face of exogenous forces. Citizens in many contemporary states, whether or not they are primarily citizens of those states, seem able to reimagine nationhood in such a way as to embrace the ineluctability of internal difference: ‘multiculturalism’, ‘rainbow nation’ and terms like them provide a ready argot of accommodation, even amidst political conflict. However, when it comes to the limits of that difference, autochthony constitutes an ultimate line, the fons et origo of fealty, affect, attachment. Whatever other identities the citizen-subject of the twenty-first century may bear, s/he is unavoidably either an autochthon or an alien. Nor only s/he; it too. Non-humans, also – flora, fauna, commodities, cultural practices – may be autochthons or aliens.
The second transformation of the modernist polity concerns the regulation of borders – and, hence, the limits of sovereignty. Much of the debate over the ‘crisis’ of the nation-state hinges upon the contention that governments no longer control the mobility of currencies and commercial instruments, of labour and goods, of information, illegal substances and unwanted aliens. What is more, goes the same argument, they tend to enjoy limited or no dominion over enclaved zones, the frontiers within their realms, under the sway of organized crime, religious movements, corporations and the like; all of which has led many contemporary nation-states to resemble patchworks of sovereignties, laterally arranged in space, with tenuous corridors between them, surrounded by terrains of ungovernability (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). National frontiers have always been more-or-less porous, of course. But technologies of space– time compression do appear to have effected a sea change in patterns and rates of global flow – of the concrete and the virtual, of humans, objects, signs, currencies, communications. Which is why so many states, most maybe, act as if they were constantly subject both to invasion from the outside and to the seeping away of what ought properly to remain within. South Africa, for instance, laments the pull of the market on its human capital,10 while anguishing, xenophobically, over the inflow of migrants. And the global North, despite its so-called ‘demo- graphic winter’, agonizes over the ubiquitous presence of racially marked, criminally inflected ‘others’ of various provenances, not to mention the spectre of a future Muslim Europe.
Our object, though, is not just to remark the heightened concern with borders and their transgression. It is also to observe that this concern is the product of a paradox. Under current global conditions, given the logic of the neoliberal capitalist economy, states find themselves in a double bind. In order to garner the value spun off by that economy, they are required at once both to open up their frontiers and secure them: on the one hand to deregulate the movement of currencies, goods, people and services, thus to facilitate the inflow of wealth; on the other, to establish enclaved zones of competitive advantage so as to attract transnational manufacture and media, investment, information technology and the ‘right’ kind of migrants – tourists, corporate personnel, NGOs and the sorts of labourer who will work cheaply and tractably without the entitlements of citizenship. In this way, the nation-state is made, in aspiration if not always in reality, into a meta-management enterprise: a business both in itself and in the business of attracting business. In sum, part franchise, part licencing authority. This in the interest of its ‘stakeholders’, who desire simultaneously to be global citizens and yet also to be corporate national subjects with all the benefits that accrue to membership of a sovereign nation. The corollary is plain. The border is a double bind – ‘schismogenic’, to recall Gregory Bateson’s (1972) term – because the commonweal appears to demand, but is threatened by, both openness and closure. No wonder the angst, the avid public debate in so many places, about what should or should not be allowed entry, what is or is not in the collective interest. And who ought to share it. Hence the arguments, also, between those who would globalize capital by erasing all barriers and those protective of the national patrimony.
The third salient feature of the predicament of the nation-state is the decentring of politics into other domains: into the law, religion, the media, the non-governmental sector and, above all, the economy.11 The conventional argument goes like this: neoliberal capitalism, in its triumphal, global phase, appears to offer no alternative to laissez-faire; nothing else seems even thinkable. The primary question left to public policy is how to succeed materially in the ‘new’ world order. Why? Because this order hides its ideological scaffolding in the dictates of the ‘free’ market, of capital growth and the accumulation of wealth, in the exigencies of technology, in the imperatives of national security, in drawing sharp lines between friend and foe. Older axes of ideological commitment seem ever more anachronistic as public action tends to be articulated around urgent questions of the moment, often sparked by catastrophe, be it ecological, terrorist or whatever. Each takes the limelight as it flares into public awareness, becomes ‘hot’ for a while, and then burns down, its embers consigned to the recesses of collective consciousness – only to flame up again if kindled by contingent conditions or vocal coalitions – or both.
Our evocation of the imagery of fire returns us to South Africa, but to a South Africa now situated, if all too summarily, in the contemporary history of capitalism, governance and the nation-state: a history that implicates altered forms of citizenship, an obsession with boundaries, aliens and autochthony, and various displacements of the terms of modernist politics as we have come to know it.
Naturing the nation
A lesson from fynbos
The full impact of the fire in January 2000 flowed from the capacity of the burning bush, of the flowers and flames, to signify. To signify charged political anxieties, many of them unnameable in everyday discourse. To signify the aspiration that, from the ashes, might arise a distinctly local, new South African sense of community, nationality, civil society. The question, patently, is how: How did those flowers and flames come to mean so much?
First, the flora. Flowers have long served as national emblems. The giant protea (Protea cynaroides) which typifies fynbos, has been South Africa’s for many years. It stands in a totemic relationship to the nation; a relationship, that is, of people to nature, place to species, in which the latter enriches the former – so long as it is venerated and not wantonly consumed. But it is also a fetish, a natural displacement of emotively charged identities rooted in acts of ethno- racial exclusion.
It was not always so.
For a start, the use of the term fynbos for the indigenous plants of the southern Cape is recent. It was only at the end of the 1960s that the word, and the category to which it now refers, became established in either popular or botanical parlance.12 This was precisely the time when international demand for local flora took off, and a national association was formed to market it; fynbos export is now a huge industry. It was also the point at which statesmen began to dub these flora a ‘natural asset’ – and at which botanists first asserted that they were a fragile species worthy of conservation as a ‘unique biome type’ (Kruger 1977). Not long before then, in 1953, an authority on the subject actually described fynbos as an invader that threatened the local grassveld (Acocks 1953:14, 17). What is now said of aliens was being said, a half-century ago, of this ‘South Africa treasure’, this passionately protected icon of national, natural rootedness.
But it is not just as fragile natural heritage that fynbos has captured the imagination of the South African public. It is also as a protagonist locked in mortal struggle with invasive aliens that threaten to take over its habitat and choke off its means of survival. A parenthetic note here: similar anxieties about plant invaders have manifested themselves in other Western nations as well: nations, tellingly, where human in-migration is a mass concern – in the USA for example, and in Australia, where, ironically, South African flora are demonized (Carr et al. 1986; Wace 1988); also Britain, where huge expanses of alien rhododendrons, once very popular, are to be removed at great cost from National Trust properties.
Time was when there was great enthusiasm for non-indigenous vegetation. In the high colonial age, British expatriate rulers encouraged the import of exotics for what seemed, at the time, like good, ‘modern’ ecological reasons (Hall 1979). It took a long while for desirable imports to become ‘invasive aliens’, ‘pests’, ‘colonizers’, even ‘green cancers’.13 It was only in the 1950s that the Botanical Society of South Africa started to promote awareness of the problem; only in the 1960s that the first volunteers took to the veldt to cut down the interlopers; only in the 1970s that the Department of Nature and Environment Conservation at the Cape published its popular sourcebook, entitled, like a pornographic work of science fiction, Plant Invaders, Beautiful but Dangerous (Stirton 1978); only in the 1980s that ‘hack groups’ spread in upper-middle-class rural white areas. And it was only in the 1990s that aliens came to be held largely accountable for the fragility of Cape flora. This is abundantly clear from the way in which attitudes to fire in the fynbos has shifted over the past decade, culminating in the catastrophe of January 2000.
Playing with fire
Which takes us to the matter of fire: as we have said, fires are endemic to the Cape. While the media usually speak of them as ‘devastating’ (Fraser and McMahon 1988:140), expert opinion acknowledges that the conservation of biodiversity actually depends on natural conflagration (van Rensberg 1986:41).
Such caveats, however, were muted in the debate that raged after the millennial blaze in Cape Town. Most salient to us here is the changing place accorded to aliens in this argument, and in the politics and the perceptions that informed it. In the past, foreign plants were only one of many factors held to produce fires of distinct kinds; in fact, an authoritative report on the topic published as late as 1979 does not even list them as a concern (see Kruger 1979). Neither, remember, did public blame in 2000 alight immediately upon them – although when it did, they became a burning preoccupation. Literally.
As we said earlier, not everybody held alien flora to account (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). One view attributed the inferno to global climatic change.14 It was paid no heed. This was a calamity that seemed to demand a local explanation. Another argument came from the Afrikaans press, which glossed the event as an indictment of the African National Congress, of its inefficiency in government.15 For yet others, excluded altogether from the public debate, foreign plants have a totally different value. Many of the jobless poor who reside in informal settlements around the city, a large number of them recent migrants, depend on those plants for their survival.16 Their unelectrified communities in the bush comprise row upon row of square shacks built mainly of thin slats of Australian wattle (Acacia Cyclops; Afrikaans, rooikrans). This ‘imported’ kindling is their chief fuel (van Wyk and Gericke 2000:284). It is also a vital source of income for them: they sell it at roadsides to white commuters for whom alien trees, like rooikrans, are an important component of the braaivleis (barbecue), a key ritual of commensal sociality in South Africa. Non-indigenous vegetation, in short, has long been a critical part of the local economy – the underclass part, which only tangentially touches the lives of those for whom aliens are held as anathema; and those by whom they are seen to jeopardize civic order and national heritage. Not unexpectedly, the material salience of foreign flora to the poor did not divert the drama of alien nature as it became a public passion play.
But how, precisely, did that passion play take shape? To what anxieties, interests and emotions did it – does it – respond? Which brings us to …
Aliens and the African renaissance
Until the fall of apartheid, the term ‘alien’ had archaic connotations in South Africa, being enshrined in laws aimed primarily at barring Jewish entry in the 1930s. These laws remained in place until amended in the mid 1990s (when they were replaced by the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 and subsequent amendments), when immigrants became a fraught issue in a society seething with a surplus of the unemployed, the unwaged and the unruly. It was at the same time that foreign plants became both the subject of ecological emergency and an object of national renewal (Hall 1979:138). The most striking symptom of this was the Working for Water Programme, launched in 1995. Part of the post-apartheid Reconstruction and Development Plan, the scheme, a flagship project to create jobs and combat poverty, centred on routing out alien vegetation. Its tone was urgent: alien plants are like ‘a health epidemic, spreading widely out of control’, said the programme’s home page.17 Out-of-work women and youth, ex-offenders, the disabled, even the homeless would be rehabilitated by joining eradication teams – and by toiling in industries that turned the invaders into commodities. Meanwhile, the public was exhorted not to buy foreign plants. Alien nature, in other words, was to be the raw material of communal rebirth.
The blaze in Cape Town gave yet further impetus to this. As popular feeling focused on the foreign ‘scourge’, the African National Congress seemed intent on coaxing ‘a spirit of community’ from the ashes. Ever more overt connections were made, in official discourse, between the war against aliens and the prosperity of the nation. A much-publicized symposium was held to discuss international cooperation in dealing with invasive species, drawing four ministers of state and several high-level representatives from other nations – notably Australia, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom – all of which evinced similar anxieties.18 Global trade and tourism, the participants noted, had created a new class of ‘unwanted traveler’ in foreign flora and disease-bearing insects.19 But the most portentous words were those of President Mbeki: alien plants, he said, ‘stand in the way of the African renaissance’.20
Foreign objects: the politics of estrangement in the postcolony
And so invading plants became embroiled in the state of the nation. But this does not yet answer our key question. To what precise anxieties, interests and historical conditions did the allegory of alien nature speak? An answer is to be found in the public discourses of the time: in a cluster of implicit associations, indirect allusions and organic intuitions that, together, give insight into the infrastructure of popular consciousness under construction – specifically, into the way in which processes of naturalization made it possible to voice the unspeakable, thus to address the challenge of constructing a nation under neoliberal conditions. Conditions, that is, that involve precisely the transformations of which we spoke earlier: the changing meaning of citizenship and belonging, borders at once open and closed, people unavoidably on the move, irreducible social and cultural heterodoxy, the displacement of politics and a shrinking commonweal. Take this satirical comment by a well-known South African journalist:
Only the truly patriotic can be trusted to smell the roses
Doubtless there are gardening writers who would not think twice about sounding off in blissful praise of something as innocent … as the jacaranda tree … But … you may be nothing more than … a racist. Subliminally that is21 … Behind its blossoms and its splendid boughs, the jacaranda is nothing but a water-hogging … weed-spreading alien.
In times past, the jacaranda was regarded as ‘almost South Africa’s national tree’ (Moll and Moll 1994:49). Now, in a bizarre drama in which flora signify what politics struggles to name, it has become an object of estrangement, even racialization. It is not happenstance, then, that, in the heat of the millennial moment, public discourse went as far as to bespeak the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the countryside.22 This in a land obsessed with who is or is not a citizen, with constitutional rights and wrongs, with routing out all vestiges of racism. But it was a wry letter from a West African scholar to the Mail and Guardian, the nation’s most serious weekly newspaper, that made the political subtext most brutally plain.
It is alien-bashing time again. As an alien … I am particularly prickly about criticisms of aliens even if they are plants … Alien plants cannot of course respond to these accusations. But before the Department of Home Affairs is dragooned into investigating the residence permits of these plants I, as a concerned fellow alien, wish to remind one and all that plants such as maize … soybean, sunflower … originated outside of the continent of Africa. In any case, did the fire-and-flood-causing alien plants cross the borders and establish plantations … by themselves?23
For this human alien, ecology had become the site of a distressingly familiar crusade: the demonization of migrants by the state and its citizenry alike.
It has been noted that the migrant is the spectre on whose wretched fate the triumphal neoliberal politics of the ‘new’ Europe has been founded.24 In South Africa too, a phobia about foreigners – above all foreigners from elsewhere in Africa – has been the offspring of the fledgling democracy, waxing, paradoxically, alongside appeals to ubuntu, a common African humanity. Over the past decade that phobia has congealed into an active antipathy to what is perceived as a shadowy alien nation of ‘illegal immigrants’. The qualifier (‘illegal’) has become inseparable from the sign (‘immigrant’), just as, in the plant world, ‘invasive’ has become locked, adjectivally, to ‘alien’. Popularly held to be ‘economic vultures’ who usurp jobs and re- sources,25 and who bring crime and disease, these anti-citizens are accused – in uncanny ana- logy with non-indigenous flora – of spreading uncontrollably, and of siphoning off the wealth of the nation.26 This is in spite of the fact that their role in its economy, especially in the ‘informal’ market sector, is wealth-producing, and often remarkably innovative.
Aliens, then, are a distinctive species in the popular imagination. In a parodic perversion of the past, they are ‘profiled’ by colour and culture, thence to be excluded from the moral community. Once singled out, ‘illegals’ are seldom differentiated from bona fide immigrants.27
All are dubbed makwerekwere, a disparaging term for incompetent speech. Not surprisingly, they live in terror that their accents will be detected.
The fear is well founded. With the relaxation of controls over immigrant labour, South Africa – Africa’s ‘America’ – has become the destination of choice for many people from the north; a decade ago, estimates already ran as high as 8 million.28 This influx has occurred amidst transformations in the domestic economy that have altered relations of production, leading to a radically downsized job market in which over 80 per cent of employers opt for ‘non-standard’, casualized work (Adam et al. 1998:209), much of it done by low-paid, non- unionized ‘illegals’, whom farmers and industrialists claim are essential to their survival in competitive global markets.29 These transformations have also placed a strong emphasis on entrepreneurial initiative and small business ventures, a domain in which many migrants from elsewhere in Africa have prospered. Small wonder, then, that routing ‘the’ alien – who has come to embody the threat to local work, wealth and welfare – presents itself as a persuasive mode of confronting economic dispossession and regaining a sense of organic community.
Thus it is that dark strangers have become objects of hatred, of hostility, even of homicidal violence across the nation,30 a process in which the state is an ambiguous actor. On the one hand, it insists volubly on upholding universal human rights and has supported a ‘Roll- back Xenophobia Campaign’.31 On the other, it contributes to that xenophobia: its law enforcement agencies, their capacity to deal with rampant crime and lawlessness deeply in question, have taken to ‘waging war’ on the foreign spectre. Every now and again, official announcements are made of ‘US-style bid[s] to rid SA of illegal aliens’.32 So-called ‘gentle- men’s clubs’ said to traffic in undocumented sex workers have been subject to high profile raids.33 So, periodically, have immigrant businesses, all in the name of removing ‘all criminal elements and illegal[s]’.34 At the Lindela Repatriation Centre, a privately owned deportation facility, foreign nationals – and some South Africans mistaken for aliens – have been harshly beaten, their human rights seriously violated, their property looted.35 The state has taken no steps to put a stop to this. And public outrage has been, at best, muted.
Reference here to the ‘US style’ of alien management is telling. In the United States, too, shows of decisive action in the face of the ‘immigrant problem’ exist alongside an almost farcical legal paralysis on the issue at a national level. A long history of official double-speak makes plain how acutely that ‘problem’ underscores the paradox of borders at once porous and assiduously policed, highlighting the contradiction between sovereignty and deregulation, neo- conservatism and neoliberalism, national protectionism and a globalized division of labour. In the United States, too, spectacles of enforcement serve as futile attempts to redress the anomaly of strangers who have become essential to domestic reproduction; who mix intimate local knowledge and foreign loyalties, real or imagined, raising spectres of crime and terror; who are simultaneously indispensable and disposable, visible and invisible, human and abject; who reside ambiguously inside and yet beyond the law. In December 2006, for example, ‘dozens of armed immigration agents, supported by local police in riot gear’ stormed a meat-packing factory in Greeley, Colorado, one of five simultaneous, well-publicized raids on similar facilities across the nation.36 Termed Operation Wagon Train, these raids were hailed by US Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE by name and nature – as a ‘major blow’ in its ‘war against illegal immigration’. Many of those deported were back within a week. Their labour, like that of an estimated 12 million other undocumented workers, is essential to American industry, agriculture and the service sector; this being evidence of just the kind of late modern boundary-making impasse we witnessed in South Africa – although, in the United States it is exacerbated by the conflict between transnational agreements like NAFTA, which liberate capital, and local politicians, who seek to criminalize foreign labour and keep it imprisoned within the ‘developing world’. Here, observes Gary Younge, the politi- cal border is no longer coterminous with the physical borders of the nation-state. The former, the de facto frontier, is now more a matter of ‘economic expediency and political opportunism than either law or order’. And it criss-crosses the country, mobilizing ethnic profiles and securing the homeland by dividing citizens from aliens wherever they might be, which is how, on that December day, ‘the border came to Greeley’, a town more than 700 miles from the nearest national boundary line.
Shades, here, of the kind of contingency we identified at the outset as characteristic of the Nuer polity and Schmittian philosophy. In Nuer politics, recall, in the absence of fixed geographical borders, the objectification of boundaries between inside and out occurred in the process of dealing with the very transgressions that breached them. For Schmitt, the essential political gesture lay in drawing the line, making life-and-death distinctions, between friend and enemy. This is exactly what happens when aliens in South Africa are flushed out by the police, with little attention to their rights, legal or ‘human’ – or worse yet, summarily killed by vigilante mobs of unemployed locals. It is also what happens in the United States, where would- be illegal migrants may be apprehended not only at points of entry into the country, but anywhere that their difference from nationals comes to light, anywhere that lines are crossed, anywhere that they may be espied and reported by citizens. Operation Wagon Train is no arbitrary turn of phrase. Its cavalier reference to the conquest of the Wild West frontier – a historical process, incidentally, that made America’s first autochthons into aliens – reveals a deeper truth. It returns the United States to a language of state-making as a species of colonial heroics, in which, as one anti-immigrant group put it, ‘citizen control’ is to be re-established.37 Seen in this light, armed raids on migrant enclaves might not seal the border, but they do create an ‘impression of effectiveness’ on the part of the state in a political context in which illusion has become, perforce, ‘as important as reality’.38 Here, in short, is an instance of the sort of symbolic activity of which we spoke earlier: the mass-mediated ritual excess, directed at producing state power and hyphen-nation that features so prominently in efforts to secure sovereignty in a neoliberal age.
Ends and meanings
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) have noted the growing stress, in Africa, on the exclusion of the stranger, not least in reaction to the kinds of social and economic uncertainties, and the destabilization of borders, set in motion by ‘global flows’. This is true of post-apartheid South Africa, where outrage against aliens has provided a versatile call to arms, forcing a new line of separation that unifies a home-grown population otherwise divided by class, colour, culture and other things; not fully or finally, of course, but nonetheless visibly and volubly. Nor, as we have intimated, is South Africa alone in this. Similar processes are evident more or less everywhere that the nation-state is perceived to be plagued by conditions that threaten to dissolve it borders, opening them up to unwanted aliens of all sorts, undermining the coordinates of moral and material community – and making them seem more like contested colonial frontiers than the secure boundaries of the Euro-modernist polity, at least as conventionally imagined.
The ambiguation of those boundaries, we have noted, arises from the absorption of contemporary nationhood into a global economy whose neoliberal ways and means have altered received patterns of production and consumption, the articulation of labour to capital, the movement of persons and commodities, the nature of sovereignty and civic identity, geographies of space and time, normative expectations of order and security, and much else besides. Because of their particular histories, postcolonies like South Africa manifest these transformations in especially acute form. But, in many respects, they are merely condensed, hyper-extended prefigurations of what is becoming increasingly visible elsewhere. Indeed, almost everywhere. As Western states resort more audibly to the language of ‘wagon trains’ and frontiers, as journalists talk of an ‘apartheid planet’,39 as the post-Cold War seems ever more to be giving way to a state of ‘ordered anarchy’, we may be forgiven for thinking that the colonial societies of the global South were less historical inversions of the metropole than foreshadowings of what, in a postmodern world, the global North might become.
This speculation is not idle. European colonial regimes managed the political and economic contradictions inherent in early capitalist modernity by means of a politics of spatial separation. The segregation of metropole from colony, their distantiation, not only obscured their material and cultural interdependence. It also served to keep well apart the humanitarian, rule-governed, rationalizing, freedom-seeking geist of liberal democracy from the exclusionary, divisive, violently secured forms of subjection and extraction on which it was erected. Colonial societies were zones of occupation, sites in which the civilizing mission was counterposed against the immediate dictates of command, control and profit – and against the need to secure the contested frontiers seen to insulate order from chaos. Defending those boundaries in the name of ‘progress’ often warranted the suspension of enlightened ways and means, even in the face of humanitarian outrage and righteous resistance.
The long process of decolonization that set the stage for a new, twenty-first-century Age of Empire has disrupted this spatial logic. The Cold War era might have marked time between two imperial epochs, but it came undone when economies were deregulated and capital moved offshore, escaping state control, globalizing its day-to-day operations, deterritorializing sovereignty and jurisdiction, trafficking in ever more abstract, virtual species of wealth and scrambling received relations between politics and production. As neoliberalized enterprise relocated its polluting factories to distant sites of cheap labour and low or no taxation, new forms of enclaved colonial extraction were invented, extraction with minimal costs, sans state apparatuses, safety restrictions, legal liability or civilizing missions. At the same time, workers who could move from devastated postcolonies sought access in exponentially greater numbers to the underclass reaches of cleaner, post-Fordist, Western economies. In the process, the structural and geographical segregation of metropole and colony has been deeply eroded. And as it has, camps for illegal aliens and asylum seekers, inner-city wastelands, zones of occupation and burning banlieus project colonial conditions and modes of governance into the heart of First World polities – there to draw the line, once again, between friend and enemy, law and war. Reciprocally, states in the South and East take on many of the features of the global North, from the growing preoccupation with democracy and the law to an inventive engagement with modern urbanism, electronic communications, global finance and the like.
In the face of all this, liberal democratic models of society and politics have undergone drastic revision in the West – among scholars and statesmen alike. The image is fading of an organic society, suivant Comte and Durkheim, in which divisions of class, race, religion and culture were contained, ideally at least, within national boundaries; in which, also, criminals and other pathogenic fractions of the population were believed, through welfare and reform, to be recoverable ‘citizens in waiting’. On the rise is a rather different archetype, that of the polity as citadel: of national territory as embattled homeland; of prisons as sites not of recuperation but of the warehousing of those deemed disposable; of borders as elusive lines to be drawn and redrawn within the nation-state and beyond against the endless onslaught of enemies who threaten its moral and corporeal integrity – enemies who take the form of aliens, migrants, terrorists, home-grown saboteurs, felons, criminals, deviants, the indigent poor. This, once more, is the world of Carl Schmitt, in which politics is less about national participation and redistribution than about securing the frontier between autochthon and intruder, good and evil, citizenship and subjection. It is also the world of the Nuer, with their constantly shifting lines between inside and out, law and war. Is it any wonder, then, that conditions that nurture phobias of alien nature and campaigns of ethnic cleansing should also have generated a newly animated, newly designated industry, the so-called ‘homeland security sector’? Or that the signature products of this industry, which is rapidly gaining ground on a global scale, are ‘high-tech fences, unmanned drones, biometric ID’s, video and audio surveillance gear, air passenger profiling and prisoner interrogation systems’, many of them originating in Israel, recently des- cribed as ‘a living example of how to enjoy relative safety amid constant war’? [36] All this may seem a world away from allegories of alien plants and natural autochthony. But the link between them is patent. Both speak to efforts to bring to order the anarchy of our late modern age. Or, to be more precise, to make sense of, and act upon, some of the contradictions and contingencies, the uncertainties and insecurities, the ambiguities and ambivalences, that come with a world-historical disjuncture: the disjuncture, that is, between the modernist universe as we once knew it and the neoliberal universe now rapidly taking shape around us.
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Theory from the South
The idea is very simple really, although its implications could be quite radical. We have essayed it many times over the past two decades. So have many others.1 Especially “other” others.
It is this. Western enlightenment thought has, from the first, posited itself as the wellspring of universal learning, of Science and Philosophy, upper case; concomitantly, it has regarded the non-West – variously known as the ancient world, the orient, the primitive world, the third world, the underdeveloped world, the developing world, and now the global south – primarily as a place of parochial wisdom, of antiquarian tradi- tions, of exotic ways and means. Above all, of unprocessed data. These other worlds, in short, are treated less as sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw fact: of the minutiae from which Euromodernity might fashion its testable theories and transcendent truths. Just as it has long capitalized on non-Western “raw materials” by ostensibly adding value and refinement to them. In some measure, this continues to be the case. But what if, and here is the idea in interrogative form, we invert that Order of Things? What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the so-called “global south” that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large? That it is from here that our empirical grasp of its lineaments, and our theory-work in accounting for them, ought to be coming, at least in major part? That in working the contradictions inherent in the suspect, North-South dualism might enable us to move beyond it, to the larger dialectic processes of which it is a product. What follows is a reflection on the con- temporary Order of Things approached from a primarily African vantage, one which invites us to see familiar things in unfamiliar ways.
Euro-American social theory, as writers from the South have observed, has tended to treat modernity as though it were inseparable from the rise of Enlightenment reason. Not only is each taken to be a condition of the other’s possibility. Together, they are assumed to have animated a distinctively European mission to emancipate humankind from a prehistory of bare necessity, enchantment and entropy. Whether the Enlightenment is seen as an epoch or an “attitude,” as vested in Kantian critique or positivist science, in self-possessed subjectivity or civic democracy, in Arendt’s (1958:4) “laboring society” or Marx’s capitalist mode of production, in the free market or liberal humanism – or in various ensembles of these things – the modern has its fons et origo in the West; this notwithstanding the fact in the West itself, the term has always been an object of contestation and ambivalence. Pace Cheikh Anta Diop (1955), the Senegalese polymath for whom civilization arose in Egypt thence to make its way northward,2 other “modernities” are taken to be either transplants or simulacra, their very mention marked by ironic scare quotes. The accomplishment of anything like the real thing, the Euro-original, is presumed, at best, to be deferred into a distant, almost unimaginable future – to which, as Fanon put it (1967:121), if the colonized ever do arrive, it is “[t]oo late. Everything is [already] anticipated, thought out, demonstrated, made the most of.” To the degree that, from a Western perspective, the global south is embraced by modernity at all, then, it is as an outside that requires translation, conversion, catch up.
Take two diverse instances, both involving north-south representation. One is literary. It is J.M. Coetzee’s (2003:51) story, “The Novel in Africa,” set on a cruise ship called, not coincidentally, Northern Lights. The narrative hinges on a conversation between a Nigerian writer and Elizabeth Costello, the Australian novelist who serves as Coetzee’s alter ego. “[H]ow can you explore a world in all its depth,” Costello asks the man, “if at the same time you are having to explain it to outsiders?” To Europeans, that is. From the standpoint of enlightenment, African prose is taken to be a performance of otherness, not an act of “self-writing” (Mbembe 2002). As Žižek (n.d.) observes, the uni- versality presumed by Western liberalism “does not reside in the fact that its values (hu- man rights, etc.) are [treated as ]universal in the sense of holding for ALL cultures, but in a much more radical sense: it lies in the fact that individuals relate to themselves as `universal;’ it is as if they participate in the universal dimension directly, by-passing any particular social position.” But the African author is foreclosed from writing in the cosmopolitan voice taken for granted by literati in Euro-America. If s/he speaks Out of Africa, it requires “explanation,” conversion into the lexicon of liberal universalism and the humanist episteme on which it is based. My other example comes from the social sciences. For Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000:89), European historicism allows only one trajectory to non-Western societies if they are to be recognized as part of the grand human story: they must undergo a visible metamorphosis – fast or slow, effective or otherwise – to western capitalist modernity. Their diverse, variously animated life-worlds have to be translated into the “universal and disenchanted language of sociology” whose telos decrees: “First in Europe, then elsewhere” (p.7).
Coetzee and Chakrabarty echo a long, slowly rising tide of critique. To be sure, the object of much postcolonial theory has been to disrupt the Western telos of moderni- ty, to trouble the histories it presumes, to “provincialize Europe” (Chakrabarty 2000), to “renarrate” empire (Makdisi 1992) – all the better, Homi Bhabha (1994a:6) insists, to move the project of theory-making to an “ex-centric site,” thus to capture the restless, re-visionary energy that comes from the vast reaches of the planetary population whose genealogies do not reach back directly into the European Enlightenment. Bhabha’s call is echoed by those who have pointed to the qualifications brought by non-Western ex- perience to mainstream discourses about the nature of modernity itself. It is also echoed, as George Orwell (1933) and W.E.B. du Bois (1933) long ago reminded us so graphically, in the life-stories of those within the metropole – southerners in the north, so to speak – who are largely excluded from its human fellowship.
More immediately, though, despite decades of postcolonial critique, the modern- ist social sciences – not excluding those of more radical bent – tend still to “bypass… the third world,” its narratives of modernity and the work of its ‘local’ intellectuals, in writing the planetary history of the present. Even critical theorists take the “driving engine” of late capitalism to lie wholly in Euro-America (Chakrabarty 2000:7). In the upshot, the south continues to be the suppressed underside of the north. Which is why, in an important, early intervention on the topic, Gayatri Spivak (1988) censured post-structuralism for failing to give account of geopolitics in its analyses of ‘Power’ and the ‘Sovereign Subject.’ By ignoring the impact of the international division of labor on discourse everywhere, she argued, and by rendering ideology invisible, post-structuralism participated in an economy of representation that has kept the non-European other “in the “shadow” of the Western “Self” (p.280) – thereby allowing the Universal Subject to remain securely on Euro-American terrain.
Spivak’s point is well taken. But, in dissecting the technologies of Eurocentrism, she courts the very psychic self-obsession that she faults in post-structuralism. By focu- sing on the colonial narcissism of Europe, a narcissism that obliterates “the trace of [the colonized] Other in its precarious Subject-ivity” (1988:281), she brackets the very social and material conditions to which she herself drew attention. As a result, the subaltern is so fully eclipsed by an omnipotent Western selfhood as to be rendered inaudible, unspeaking and unspeakable. But they – the colonized were, and are, a social category, after all – are not quite that easily effaced, despite their multiple displacements. Even at their most inarticulate, the unsettling presence of those others has always troubled im- perial aspirations, demanding constant oversight. Like Rochester’s West Indian wife in the attic who, as Edward Said (1983:273) noted of Bronte’s Jane Eyre, repeatedly threatened to disrupt polite society at the metropole.
What is more, because colonial societies were complex formations, they entered into complex, unpredictable relations with Europe. Metropole and colony, after all, were co-constitutive elements in a rising world capitalist order – entailed, that is, in what De- leuze and Guattari call a double capture, “an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that enter into a joint becoming” (Toscana 2005:40). Hence the now well-known claim that colonies were critical sources of value and innovation for the modern nation-states of the north. At the same time, the colonized were excluded from full citi- zenship in those “imagined communities.” Worse yet, colonial polities were sustained by acts of violence that flew in the face of the tenets of liberal European law and civility. For imperial frontiers were places of partial visibility, where working misunderstandings bred reciprocal fetishisms, unwritten agreements, unruly populations, and protean social ar- rangements, held to require forceful techniques of control (Pietz 1985-88; Stoler 2006:9).
Above all, these frontiers fostered conjunctures of Western and non-Western desires, conventions, and practices, fusions that fueled the destructive, innovative urges of Euromodernity, but with little of the ethical restraint that reigned them in “back home.” Nor is this all in the distant past. In 2000, US Republican senator Tom Delay, prevented legislation barring sweatshop conditions in the Northern Mariana Islands, an American territory in the Western Pacific; said Delay to the Washington Post, “the low-wage, anti-union conditions of the Marianas constitute a ‘perfect petri dish of capitalism.’5
As this suggests, modernity was, almost from the start, a north-south collabora- tion – indeed, a world-historical production – albeit a sharply asymmetrical one. However hard it may seek to “purify” itself (Latour 1993), it has always consisted of diverse significations, materializations, and temporalities – perpetually contested, hard to pin down, historically labile. As an ideology, it has never been dissociable from capitalism, from its determinations and social logic (cf. Amin 1989); although, to be sure, fascism and socialism have sought their own versions. Hyphenated, capitalist-modernity has realized itself, if very unevenly, in the great aspirations of liberalism. But it has alsoexcluded many populations from just these things, especially those in colonial theaters who have been subjugated to its modes of extraction.
Precisely because it has plied its abrasive course in so many disparate contexts, in other words, modernity has always been both one thing and many, always both a uni- versal project and a host of specific, parochial emplacements, a force for equality and simultaneously, a producer of difference. This is self-evidently true in Europe, where national imaginings have never been all alike, neither within nation-states, nor between them. But it has been even more so in Europe’s distant “peripheries,” where, in the sha- dow of various metropoles, modernity was made at a discount. Colonies were pale proxies, subsidiary holding companies as it were, for sovereign Western powers.
Here, then, is the point. To the degree that the making of modernity has been a world-historical process, it can as well be narrated from its undersides as it can from its self-proclaimed centers – like those maps that, as a cosmic joke, invert planet earth to place the south on top, the north below. But we seek to do more than just turn the story upside down, thus to leave intact the Manichean dualism that holds Euro-America and its others in the same, fixed embrace. We also seek to do more than merely note that many of the emergent features and concealed contradictions of capitalist modernity were as readily perceptible in the colony as in the metropole – or that the former was of- ten a site of production for the ways-and-means of the latter. What we suggest, in addition, is that contemporary world historical processes are visibly altering received geographies of core-and-periphery, relocating southward not only some of the most innovative and energetic modes of producing value, but the driving impulse of contemporary capitalism as both a material and cultural formation. It is in this light that we propose that the history of the present may be more acutely grasped, alike empirically and theoretically, from the vantage of what have been dubbed the antipodes. In making this claim, Theory from the South is built on two closely interwoven arguments. We develop them, as we intimated earlier, by taking Africa as our point of departure.
AfroModernity, in practice and theory
The first argument is that modernity beyond is not adequately understood as a derivative or a doppelganger, or a counterfeit, of a Euro-American “original.” To the contrary: it demands to be apprehended and addressed in its own right. African moder- nities, for instance, have a deep, highly self-conscious history, as South African scholar, Ntongola Masilela shows (n.d., 2003), being mutating ensembles of discourse and practice in terms of which people across the continent have long made their lives; this partly in dialectical relationship with the global north and its expansive imperium, partly with others of the same hemisphere, partly in localized enclaves. As in the North, modernity in Africa has manifested itself in a number of registers at once. And, as in the North, it has been mired in contestation, and “entangled meanings” (Deutsch, Probst, and Schmidt 2002; Nuttall 2009; Táíwò 2010:13). Should Africans see themselves as part of a universal enlightenment, of Christianity and civilization, of Shakespearean English and scientific reason, as some black South African intellectuals argued in the early twentieth century (Masilela n.d.:6)? Or should the strive to “combine the native and the alien, the traditional and the foreign, into something new and beautiful” as H.I.E. Dlhomo wrote in 1939 (1977)? In point of fact, there has been a steady move toward the second option; a move, that is, toward the mimetic, understood – a la Achille Mbembe – as a process that “establish[es] similarities with something else while at the same time inventing something original” (2008:38f, after Halliwell 2002). Like its European counter-part, self-conscious modernity in Africa has entailed a re-genesis, an awareness of new possibilities, and a rupture with the past – a past that, in the upshot, was flattened out, detemporalized, and congealed into “tradition,” itself a thoroughly modern construct.
African modernities, in sum, have long had their own trajectories, giving moral and material shape to everyday life. They have yielded diverse-yet-distinctive means with which to make sense of the world, to fashion beings and identities, to act effectively on contemporary conditions. Africa, for instance has generated what are arguably the most dynamic instances anywhere of iconic modern cultural forms, like popular Christianity, or mass-mediated musical genres, or cinematic genres, as evident in the mighty Nollywood straight-to-video movie industry. Such creativity has been at once productive and destructive in flouting, repudiating, remaking European templates. Sometimes the process has been strikingly self-conscious, as among Xhosa intellec- tuals of the 1880’s (Masilela 2003:506f) and, later, black South Africans of the New Af- rica Movement who famously insisted that the continent not be compared with Europe since it had its own genius; to be inseminated, we might add, by other influences from the south, from the likes of Mohandas Ghandi to the African diaspora in the New World.
Much the same rhetoric was to suffuse anticolonial movements and post-inde- pendent nationalisms; also the assertive alterities of Pan-Africanism, Negritude, and Afrocentrism; in experiments with communitarianism, democracy; in high-minded visions, like Ubuntu, the call for a generically “African humanity” and, even more ambitiously, the “African Renaissance.” Nor is it best labeled an “alternative modernity,” singular or plural.8 It is a vernacular – just as Euromodernity is a vernacular – wrought in an ongoing, situated engagement with the unfolding history of the present.
It is important, in this respect, to distinguish modernity from modernization (cf. Appadurai 1996), a point that takes us onto more general terrain for a moment. Modernity refers to an orientation to being-in-the-world, to a variably construed and variably inhabited Weltanschauung, to a concept of the person as self-conscious subject, to an ideal of humanity as species being, to a vision of history as a progressive, man-made construction, to an ideology of improvement through the accumulation of knowledge and technological skill, to the pursuit of justice by means of rational governance; to a relentless impulse toward innovation whose very iconoclasm breeds a hunger for things eternal (cf. Harvey 1989:10). Modernization, by contrast, posits a strong, normative teleology, a unilinear trajectory toward a particular vision of the future – capitalist, socialist, fascist, whatever – to which all humanity should aspire; to which all history ought to lead and all peoples should evolve, if at different rates. This telos has expressed itself in progressive movements, both secular and religious, in expansive models of improvement, and in “objective” scientific paradigms, among them, “moderni- zation theory” in sociology. It has also been censured for the contradictions between its promises and its effects: between, for example, the promise of a more equal humanity and the burgeoning biopolitics of difference across the world. I am less concerned here with these contradictions, than with the confusion between modernization and modernity. It underpins a recent debate about the latter, about modernity as category of critical analysis, and raises a clutch of theoretical issues salient to our argument.
Frederick Cooper (2005:113),, whose own scholarly oeuvre is also deeply rooted in Africa, has recently complained that modernity is ever more imprecisely used as a technical term in the academy. We agree, having remarked ourselves on its vagueness, its tendency to melt into air under scrutiny (1993:xii). We concur, too, with his observa- tion that its analytic and everyday connotations are often confused and conflated (ibid:xiif); although this is as true of other constructs in the vocabulary of the human sci- ences, like colonialism, identity, politics, liberalism (cf. Duara 2007:295). Even theory. In point of fact, it is precisely the protean quality of modernity that has made it so produc- tive as a trope of worldly claim-making, as a political assertion, and as an object of analysis. “Modernity,” plainly, is what linguists term a ‘shifter’ (Silverstein 1976). Its meaning is dependent on context, serving to put people in particular times and places on the near-or-far side of the great divide between self and other, the present and prehistory, the general and particular; oppositions that are mobilized in a range of regist- ers from theologies to party platforms, from policy documents to black letter law, from maps of social space to the classification of populations.
The positivist social sciences have also deployed this grammar of oppositions, of course; hence the embrace of such foundational contrasts as mechanical versus or- ganic solidarity, status vs. contract, precapitalist vs. capitalist, and so on. Modernization theory, ascendant in sociology from the 1950’s, was no exception. Despite having been subject to repeated critique, Cooper argues (2005:9ff), both the conceptual foundations and the Eurocentric telos of the modernization paradigm linger on in colonial/postcolonial scholarship. As a result, he says, the latter “reinforce[s] the metanarratives [it] pre- tend[s] to take apart” (p.9), thereby muddying rather than illuminating the question of – modernity [in Africa and elsehwere], of what it actually is and how we might typify it. For theorists like Cooper, the problem is to be solved by a strong dose of rigorous historical research, as though a protean phenomenon of this sort might finally be pinned down by recourse to frank empiricism.9 Ironically, by the canons of just such empiricism, colo- nial/postcolonial studies are not so easily dismissed. Work in that tradition has taken pains to transcend the assumptions and methods of modernization theory. Constructs like “alternative modernities” have their problems. But they were developed precisely to move beyond the binary opposition between the premodern and the modern, and to avoid conflating modernization with Westernization.10
But there is something else here, something more general. The effort to counter indiscriminate uses of the term “modernity” underscores why it is so important not to mistake it for modernization, or to use modernity as analytical construct without also considering the conditions of its material existence. Cooper laments that, with the repudiation of modernization theory, “everything” tends to be treated as “simultaneously modern” (p.132). But that, in part, was the very object of the critique: to show that, while modernization-as-Western-ideology might represent non-Western societies as just so many not-yet-modern outsides, the capitalist imperium to which it is joined has no real exteriors, although it has many peripheries. Its exclusions and its margins, as critical theorists of various stripes have stressed, are a requisite condition for the growth of its centers. What is more, to reveal the negative impact of “modernizing” processes perpe- trated in the name of universal advancement is not necessarily to be “against mo- dernity,” as is sometimes suggested. Or for it for that matter. It is to subject its history to critical interrogation.
The point, surely, is to pay heed to the ineluctable reality that many disadvan- taged people across the world desire much of what they understand by the modern. And, to the degree that they can, to fashion their own versions of it, even as they live with its many constraints and contradictions. Which is where the empirical fact of “multiple modernities” came from to begin with. Acknowledging the widespread yearning for the elusive promise of “progress,” patently, does not preclude recognizing its destructive effects, or challenging the Eurocentric myth that there is only one authentic, patented instance of it. Nor, by accepting that there may be more than one modernity, do we ipso facto neglect the real inequalities that exist between centers and margins, a legitimate fear expressed by James Ferguson (2006:33, 176f). It is not that people in the global south “lack modernity.” It is that many of them are deprived of the promise of modernization by the inherent propensity of capital to create edges and undersides in order to feed off them.
Modernity is a concrete abstraction. It has realized, manifest forms, being a product of human activity, but also exists as a reified order of transactable value. In this sense, it is a Big Idea, refering both to something general and to things particular, both to the singular and to the plural. And to the relations between them. It embraces the tangible dimensions of life in specific times and places – and, simultaneously, it connotes the epochal and the universal. Multi-valent constructs of this kind are as integral to theory-work in the social sciences as they are to the everyday discourses of mass culture; the need to make sense of their practical semiosis would appear self-evi- dent. Can one really argue, as Cooper does (2005:116), that to treat it as more than a vernacular category, to elevate it to an abstraction at all, is to give it “artificial coheren- ce”? What exactly is artificial about it, beyond the fact that every concept mobilized by the human sciences is, ultimately, an artifice? Why should it be that to recognize mo- dernity to be one thing and many is to fall into “confusion” (ibid)?12 To bring this back to our own argument, it follows from what we have been saying that modernity in Africa is both a discursive construct and an empirical fact, both a singularity and a plurality, both a distinctive aspiration and a complicated set of realities, ones that speak to a tortuous endogenous history, still actively being made. A history, as it turns out, not running behind Euro-America, but ahead of it.
The Global South:
This brings us to our second argument. Contrary to the received Euromodernist narrative of the past two centuries – which has the so-called global south tracking behind the curve of Universal History, always in deficit, always playing catch up – there is good reason to think the opposite: that, in the here-and-now, it is regions in the south that tend first to feel the concrete effects of world-historical processes as they play themselves out, thus to prefigure the future of the former metropole. It is this that I seek to capture in my pointedly provocative, counter-evolutionary undertitle, How Euro-America is Evolving toward Africa.
Put another way: while Euro-America and its antipodes are caught up in the same all-embracing world-historical processes, old margins are becoming new frontiers, places where mobile, globally-competitive capital finds minimally regulated zones in which to vest its operations; where industrial manufacture opens up ever more cost-efficient sites for itself; where highly flexible, informal economies – of the kind now expanding everywhere – have long thrived; where those performing outsourced services for the north develop cutting edge info-tech empires of their own, both legiti- mate and illicit; where new idioms of work, time, and value take root, thus to alter planetary practices. Which is why the global north appears to be “evolving” southward. In many respects, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America seem to be running ahead of the Euromodern world, harbingers of its history-in-the-making.
There are many dimensions to this, many cultural mediations: like the fact that European nation-states, having had to come to terms with demographic diversity and the realsociology of difference on an unprecedented scale, are beginning to resemble policultural postcolonies. Or the fact that European and North American legal systems, are becoming demonstrably more like African jurisprudence, which typically treats most breaches, even homicides, as torts, not as crimes against the state.
Or take what in South Africa is called “living politics” (Chance n.d.), a force to be reckoned with as unemployment and homelessness burgeon, as state services are privatized and class politics eclipsed, as rapacious new forms of capital displace ever larger populations to the limbo of transit camps. [Harvard investment]. Here social action centers on what Arendt (1958:100), after Locke, termed “the condition of human life itself,” life vested in the quest for full membership in the polis. Like similarly assertive movements elsewhere, from Cochabamba to Mumbai, Chiapas to Cairo, the South African versions seek to secure what are glossed as “services”– the minima of a “dignified” existence: clean water, housing, sanitation, medical care, basic income. Drawing on a diverse global archive, from Marx, Gandhi, and Fanon, through the Book of Revelations to the Zapatistas, to born-again faiths and human rights crusades, these forms of social action are enabled by novel, liberalized social media, often set out explicitly to develop a critical consciousness, fostering new forms of mobilization, and debate about the nature of theory and who rightly ought to be producing it (Desai 2002); they also decry the limited horizons of procedural democracy and politics-as-usual. In large part, theirs is a post-colonial, post-totalitarian enterprise, informed by a legacy of struggle, often in sharp contrast to the north, where critics frequently bemoan the loss of the political, or rue the cynicism that surrounds the idea of a public good. But the wave of popular protests against austerity measures recently introduced by national governments in Europe has brought something akin to a living politics to the streets of Athens and London. Under the sign of economic emergency, new progressive projects have been championed, among them, the push for society-wide basic income grants, or something akin to them. Again, the south provides a paradigmatic model: Brazil’s Bolsa Famlia, a massive cash transfer program, initiated in 2003. Retooling social-redistribution in the idiom of neoliberal “human capital,” it uses debit cards to make small monthly payments to poor families, usually to women, which are then augmented if they invest in such things as educational and health services for their children (Morton n.d.).
One could go on and on. Here, however, we are concerned with more general processes, processes that run to the very heart of contemporary capitalism and its moral economy: to the means of primary production associated with it, to its preferred forms of labor extraction, to its modes of accumulating wealth and signifying value, to its political and legal geographies, to its interpellation in the institutions of governance. As is widely acknowledged, in recent decades, capital, with its growing stress on flexibility, liquidity, and deregulation, has yet again found untapped bounty in former colonies, where postcolonial states, anxious to garner disposable income and often put in desperate need of “hard” currency, have opened themselves up to business; spe- cifically, to corporations – now often based in China, India, the Gulf – that have little compunction in pressuring ruling regimes to offer them tax incentives, to waive environmental controls, wage restrictions, and worker protections, to limit liability and discourage union activities, even to allow them to enclave themselves – in short, to bow to laissez faire at its most sovereign. As a result, it is largely in the south, Tom DeLay’s preferred “petri dish,” that the practical workings of neoliberalism have been tried and tested; in them that the outer bounds of its financial operations have been explored –thence to be re-imported to various Euro-American locales.
The north, of course, is now experiencing those practical workings ever more palpably as labor markets contract and employment is casualized, as manufacture moves away without warning, as big business seeks to coerce states to unmake eco-laws, to drop minimum wages, to subsidize its infrastructure from public funds, and to protect it from loss, liability, and taxation, as center-right governments cut public spending, public institutions, and public sector jobs; 13 this, often, over unavailing protests from civil society. Which is why so many citizens of the West – of both laboring and middle classes – are having to face the insecurities and instabilities, even the forced mobility and disposability, long characteristic of life in the non-West. It is also why public intellectuals are now publishing mass-circulation books with titles like Third World America (Huffington 2010). The so-called “New Normal” of the north is replaying the recent past of the south, ever more in a major key.
At the same time, some nation-states in the south, by virtue of having become economic powerhouses – India, Brazil, South Africa – evince features of the future of Euro-America in other ways, having opened up frontiers of their own and having begun to colonize the metropole: vide the seizure of global initiative in the biofuel economy by Brazil, or the reach of the Indian auto industry into Britain, or the impact of the Hong Kong banking sector on the development of new species of financial market. Or, in an- other register, the emergence of South Africa, a major force in the international mineral economy, as the America of Africa, eager to experiment with constitutional law, populist politics, and, if hesitantly, post-neoliberal forms of redistribution. Or, in yet another, the rise of new forms of urbanism, as in Nigeria, where, according to Joshua Comaroff and Gulliver Shepard (1999), “many of the trends of canonical, modern, Western cities can be seen in hyperbolic guise…Lagos is not catching up with us, they show in exquisite detail. Rather, we may be catching up with Lagos.” Lagos, adds Rem Koolhaas, is “a paradigm for [the] future” of all cities. A “megalopolis” whose prime real estate is as expensive as property in Manhattan (Guo 2010:44), it is at “the forefront of globalizing modernity” (Koolhaas and Cleijne 2001:652-3). Note: not of an alternative modernity. Of modernity sui generis. The irony of this will be obvious to those familiar with Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other (1983). The question now is not whether the West ignores the “coevalness” – i.e. the contemporaneity – of the non-West with the West. It is whe- ther the West recognizes that it is playing catch-up with the temporality of its others.
In large part, however, it is the lumpen end, of the story that is worked out first in the south, where much of the working class of the world is dispersed. This, perhaps, ac- counts for the fact that some of the earliest critiques of the neoliberal turn – and the most skeptical responses to free market fundamentalism – have come from those very undersides (see e.g. Lomnitz 2006; Desai 2002; Amin 2010), this being yet another respect in which the global north has tracked behind its antipodean counterparts.15
But why? Why has Africa in particular, and the south in general, come, in signifi- cant respects, to anticipate the unfolding history of Euro-America? Why, for good or ill, are the material, political, social, and moral effects of the rise of neoliberalism so graphically evident there? We have already begun to address the question: the answer begins with the past, with the fact that most colonies were zones of occupation geared toward imperial extraction. To the degree that neocolonial politics and economics have conspired to keep them that way, postcolonies have remained dependent and debt-strapped, tending still to export their resources as raw materials and unskilled labor rather than as value-added commodities or competencies; this even as some of them – like Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and, again, South Africa – have experienced real growth in their manufacturing industries, in their service sectors, and in urban consumer spending.16 Furthermore, (i) because large sectors of their populations have long wor- ked under conditions designed to depress wages and disempower potentially dange- rous classes, (ii) because market forces in Africa have never been fully cushioned by the existence of a liberal democratic state and its forms of regulation, and (iii) because governance there has frequently been based on kleptocratic patronage – all these things also being, in part, legacies of colonialism and its aftermath – African polities have been especially hospitable to rapacious enterprise: to asset stripping, to the alie- nation of the commons to privateers, to the plunder of personal property, to foreign bribe-giving. In sum, to optimal profit at minimal cost, with little infra-structural invest- ment.
The rapid increase of foreign direct investment south of the Sahara over the past decade17 – capital inflows to Africa rose by 16 percent in 2008, while falling 20 percent worldwide (Guo 2010:44) – has led James Ferguson (2006:41), among others, to speculate that African countries might be less sites of “immature forms of globalization” than “‘advanced,’ sophisticated mutations of it.” A recent report on African economies by the McKinsey Global Institute supports this view (Roxburgh et al 2010; see n.16). So does Brenda Chalfin’s (2010) case-study of Ghana which has become a “neoliberal pacesetter” (p.29) by putting into play new regulatory techniques at a time when customs mandates are expanding everywhere in response to burgeoning transnational trade. “Ghana…functions in many respects as a laboratory for the testing out and…sha- ping of global modalities of governance,” she notes (p.29-30). Again, for better or for worse, Africa is ahead of the curve. It is precisely the melange of its inherited colonial institutions and its availability to neoliberal development that make Ghana, and other nations of the south, a vanguard in the epoch of the market. As Newsweek put it in early 2010, Africa is “at the very forefront of emerging markets…Like China and India, [it is ] perhaps more than any other region,..illustrative of a new world order.” The US and Europe have colluded in this by imposing their future-vision – in/famously, under the sign of structural adjustment – on Africa, Asia, and Latin America, inadvertently giving early warning of what would lie in store for themselves. George Stiglitz (2002) has ar- gued that the doctrinaire insistence on the liberalization of trade and capital markets, and the privatization of public assets precipitated the Asian crisis of 1997, a history of failed development in Africa, and the meltdown in Argentina. The fallout provided a chilling preview of the effects of the global economic implosion of 2008. In terms that now sound prophetic, Stiglitz described how the nations of the East were thrown into chaos; how, in order to protect international markets, the IMF rushed in with massive bailouts directed mainly at corporate creditors, leaving ordinary citizens to carry the costs; how financial stabilization rather than job creation became the prime objective (Stiglitz 2002:73). How was it that the over-analyzed Asian and Latin American financial crises, or the ill-effects of structural adjustment in Africa, sounded no warning bells for the fu- ture of the global north? Could it be because these things occurred outside of Euro-America? Or because, blinkered by our own narratives of Universal History, we have simply been unable to see the coming counter-evolution, the fact, so to speak, that the north is going south?
To be sure, the north had foretaste of the downsides of market fundamentalism well before the crisis of 2008. The contradictions that brought it to a head, after all, were long in the making: the relentless reduction of manufacturing heartlands into rustbelt wastelands has long traced the de-industrialization of Euro-America – and, recently, has given rise to calls for re-industrialization, ironically, by repatriating Fordist manufacture exported to, and re-engineered in, the south – which, under present conditions, is a structural impossibility. Those contradictions also flash into the public eye more dramatically from time to time: In the US, the implosion of Enron in 2004 made plain the fragility of an economy built on corporate voracity and voodoo accounting. (The Economist a month or two ago referred to all this as deja voodoo!) A year later, Hurri- cane Katrina revealed to middle Americans the hidden effects on national infrastructure of the unregulated privatization of many of critical functions of the state, not to mention the deep fissures of race and class among them. Brutal conflict in the banlieus of Paris, attacks on immigrants in the UK and Sweden, and the demonization of Muslims in much of Europe have played out similar themes, making clear how, despite their preoccupation with democracy and human rights, the nations of the north are witnessing rising tides of ethnic conflict and xenophobia; of violent criminality, rampant corruption in government and business, and shrinking, insecure labor markets; of afflicted middle classes, lumpen youth, and much more besides (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006a, 2006b). Africa, it seems, is becoming a global condition.20 Or, at least, Africa as imagin- ed in Euro-America. Its own, endogenous reality is more complex, more, as I have suggested an encapsulation of the vectors and polarities of late capitalist modernity as a whole.
Just as it has been in the past, the continent is also a source of inventive respon- ses to the contingencies of our times, responses driven by a volatile mix of necessity, possibility, deregulation, space-time compression. Hence, among other things, the ex- traordinary, if uneven expansion of its formal sectors and endogenous capital, the massive growth of “informal” commerce, the rise of profitable economies built on coun- terfeit and mimicry, and the emergence of new modes of service provision and the traf- fic in care, security, intimacy, affect. The south has also led the way in the efflorescence of “ethnoprise,” what elsewhere we term Ethnicity, Inc. (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). The boom in the identity economy is having thoroughgoing implications for the ways in which ordinary people experience collective being, social capital, and political attachment. And it is diffusing northward, toward those metropoles that once saw themselves as beyond ethnic parochialism or “tradition.” As this suggests, the global south is producing and exporting some ingenious modes of survival – and more. It is often those adversely affected by modernity who recommission its means most effec- tively and most radically, thus also to bring to light long suppressed elements of its intrinsic nature. Indeed, it is precisely this dialectic that has pushed Africa, Asia, and Latin America to the vanguard of the epoch, making them the contemporary frontiers of capitalism – which, in its latest, most energetic phase, to reiterate, thrives in environ- ments in which the protections of liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the labor contract are, at best, uneven. It is here that our two theses converge: here where the first, the claim that modernity in Africa exists sui generis, not as a derivative of the Euro-original, meets the second, the counter-evolutionary assertion that, in the history of the present, the global south is running ahead of the global north, a hyperbolic prefiguration of its future-in-the-making. Note, in this regard, that, just a month ago, the South African Minister of Education unveiled a “Charter for Social Theory.” The time has come, he said, for the south to take a lead in the production of social science theory, all the better to understand the perplexing times in which we now live. This at the very moment when, across the global north, governments are closing down sites of intellectual production and becoming increasingly anti-theory. Perhaps Euro-America is not evolving toward Africa quickly enough.
Coda
What might be the impact of all of this for the very idea of the “Global South?
What do we actually mean by the term?
Despite the fact that it has replaced “the third world” as a more-or-less popular usage, the label itself is inherently slippery, inchoate, unfixed. At its simplest, the shift expresses the collapse of the tripartite divisions of the Cold War era, in which there were two major ideological paradigms for configuring the political economy of modernity – each with its “less developed” others. In the age of neoliberal capitalism, the measure of modernization is more crass: it lies everywhere in success or failure in the global marketplace. In the upshot, “the South,” technically speaking, has more complex connotations than did the World formerly Known as “Third.” It describes a polythetic ca- tegory, its members sharing one or more – but not all, or even most – of a diverse set of features. The closest thing to a common denominator among them is that many were once colonies or protectorates, albeit not necessarily during the same epochs (cf. Coronil 2004). “Postcolonial,” therefore, is something of a synonym, but only an inexact one. What is more, like all indexical categories, “the global south” assumes meaning by virtue not of its content, but of its context, of the way in which it points to something else in a field of signs – in this instance, to its antinomy to “the global north,” an opposition that carries a great deal of imaginative baggage congealed around the contrast between centrality and marginality, free-market modernity and its absence. Patently, this opposition takes on a hard-edged political and economic reality in some institutional contexts, like the G-8 and world bond and credit markets. But it obscures as much as it describes.
Two things in particular.
I have already alluded to both. The first is that a number of nation-states of the south, far from being marginal to the global economy, are central to it. Although this is not reducing mass immiseration or lowering Gini coefficents in those places, it does ensure that they will become ever more integral to the operations of capital, not to men- tion cultural imaginations, across the planet. However it may be imagined, as Balibar puts it (2004:14; cf. Krotz 2005:149), “the line of demarcation between ‘North’ and ‘South,’ between zones of prosperity and power and zones of ‘development of underde- velopment,’ is not actually drawn in a stable way.” Per contra, that line is, at best, por- ous, broken, often illegible. Even if it could be definitively drawn, moreover, many na- tion-states defy easy categorization: On which side, for example, do the countries of the former USSR fall? Or, if economic development is the primary criterion, where are we to place those powerhouses to which we keep returning, the likes of India, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria, which seem to straddle the cleavage between hemispheres? And this is not to mention the most portentous player of all, China. On the one hand, these are among the more dynamic economies on the planet. Yet, still being highly polarized, they are geo-scapes in which enclaves of wealth and order feed off, and sustain, large stretches of scarcity, violence, and exclusion. Microcosms of the so-called north-south divide. Which is also true, increasingly, of Euro-America. In short, there is much south in the north, much north in the south, and more of both to come in the future.
The second thing, which follows as both cause-and-effect of the inchoateness of the line between the hemispheres, is the deep structural articulation – indeed, the mutu- al entailment – of their economies. This, after all, is what makes global capitalism global, not merely international. Not only are the working classes of Euro-America, those who produce its means of consumption, situated ever more at southern margins, but, as we have noted, southern capital buttresses, even owns, many signature Euro-American businesses, all of which is yet further complicated by the world of finance, whose laby- rinthine capillaries defy any attempt to unravel them along geopolitical axes. In the com- plex hyphenation that links economy to governance and both to the enterprises of eve- ryday life, then, the contemporary world order rests on a highly flexible, inordinately intri- cate web of synapses, a web that both reinforces and eradicates, both sharpens and ambiguates, the lines between hemispheres. As a result, what precisely is north, and what south, becomes ever harder to pin down. All the more so as Euro-America evolves toward the world of its former colonies.
Which is why “the global south” cannot be defined, a priori, in substantive terms. The label bespeaks a relation, not a thing in or for itself. It is a labile signifier whose content is determined by everyday material and political processes. Analytically, though, to return to the point made by Homi Bhabha (1994b:6), whatever it may connote at any given moment, it always points to an “ex-centric” location, an outside to Euro-America. For our purposes here, its importance lies in that ex-centricity: in the angle of vision it provides us from which to estrange our world in order better to make sense of its present and future.
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Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism
The essays in Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism pose a series of
related questions: How are we to understand capitalism at the turn of the twenty-first
century? Is it a singular or hydra-headed creature? What are we to make of the culture
of neoliberalism that appears to accompany it, taking on simultaneously local and
translocal forms? To what extent does it make sense to describe the present juncture in
world history, after the end of the Cold War, as an “Age of Revolution,” one not unlike
1789–1848 in its potential to change the world? In exploring the material and cultural
dimensions of the Age of Millennial Capitalism – carefully laid out in a wide-ranging
theoretical introduction by John and Jean Comaroff – the contributors interrogate the
so-called ‘crisis’ of the nation-state, the triumph of the free market and its more or less
hidden effects, rising tides of violence and cultures of exclusion, and the growth of new
forms of identity politics. The collection also investigates the tendency of neoliberal
capitalism to produce a world of increasing inequality, environmental degradation,
heightened flows of people and value across the planet, moral panics and social
impossibilities, bitter generational antagonisms and gender conflicts, yawning class
distinctions, and “pariah” forms of economic activity. In the process, it opens up an
empirically grounded, conceptual discussion about the world-at-large at a particularly
momentous historical time—when the social sciences and humanities are in danger of
ceding intellectual initiative to the masters of the market and the media. -
Achille Mbembe Array
I would like to acknowledge how difficult it is, in this noisy age of ours…to nurture a scholarly and public voice that can be legitimately regarded as daring, original and authentic. Yet, this is exactly what Jean and John Comaroff have achieved not only throughout their previous scholarly works (the depth and breadth of which have been widely lauded), but specifically in this new book…The voice in this new book is unmistakably theirs—the eloquence, the prose, a certain kind of rhetorical style, a new lexicon that makes new thought, even moments of polyphony, possible. Theirs is also an effort to work from, within, through, and at times against the archive of their first love, anthropology. Time and again, in this book as in Rules and Processes, Body of Power, Ethnicity Inc., Millennial Capitalism, Law and Disorder and countless other essays, they return to the centers of their discipline while, at the same time, mining its peripheries, They play the peripheries of the discipline against its centers and other bodies of knowledge against anthropology itself. This is because theirs is a mode of thought whose primary object is to delineate the crucial fault lines and turbulences that constitute our world today as well as the world of contemporary criticism. Reading this many-faceted book, a complicated tapestry threaded with multiple strands and sub-themes but with one master thesis, we are faced once again with what we have come to expect from them – a generosity of spirit and a polymorphous intelligence capable of sweeping claims, starting with the seemingly outrageous (and yet plausible) idea that “Euro-America is evolving toward Africa”; or the more heuristically productive one that “in the present moment, it is the Global South that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large,” which is why, in accounting for these workings of the world, “our theory-making” ought to be coming from there, ‘at least in significant part.
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Charles Piot Array
Jean and John Comaroff put forward their case in the strongest possible terms, and they do so with flair, eloquence, and brilliance: that Africa in particular and the global South more broadly are in the vanguard of world history, generative of global futures and theory to match. This is a book that will be debated with vigor and profit.
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Theory from the South
“The Global South” has become a shorthand for the world of non-European, postcolonial peoples. Synonymous with uncertain development, unorthodox economies, failed states, and nations fraught with corruption, poverty, incivility, and strife, it is that half of the world about which the “Global North” spins theories. Rarely is it seen as a source of theory and explanation for world historical events. Yet, as many nation-states of the northern hemisphere experience increasing fiscal meltdown, the state privatization, populist authoritarianism, corruption, ethnic conflict, and other crises, it seems as though they are “evolving” southward, so to speak, in both positive and problematic ways. Is this so? How? In what measure? In this volume, anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff take on these questions, seeking to reverse the usual order of things. Drawing on their long experience of living in Africa and teaching in Europe and the US, they address a range of familiar themes – democracy, law, national borders, labor and capital, religion and the occult, liberalism and multiculturalism – with the imagination, theoretical acuity, originality, and agile prose for which they are well- known. In particular, they ask how we might understand these things anew with theory developed from the south. Their ethnographic eye stresses the salience of the local without losing sight of the large-scale processes in everyday lives are everywhere enmeshed. This view from the South renders key problems of our time at once strange and familiar, giving an ironic twist to the explanatory pathways long assumed by social scientists – and offering fresh insights into the workings of the twenty-first century global order.
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Elizabeth Hull Array
Ethnicity, Inc. is a thought-provoking and novel commentary on this widely recognizable phenomenon and offers an important contribution to the classical anthropological themes of ethnicity, culture, and globalization… [T]he authors’ approach is not limited by the usual conventions of anthropology but, rather, takes the reader from one global example to another. These illustrations are woven into a comparative, far-reaching discussion that describes succinctly an emerging global phenomenon.
