Author: John Comaroff

  • Ethnicity, Inc.

    Ethnicity, Inc.

    In October 2000, Business Day, a leading South African newspaper, published an extraordinary story. Its title read: Traditional Leaders Form Private Firm for Investment.1 Contralesa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders, is the voice of ethnicity in this postcolony. It speaks for culture, customary law, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Also for the authority of chiefs who, as a power bloc, seek to change the national constitution. Their objective is a nation-state that accords them sovereign autonomy over their realms, a nation-state that puts the dictates of indigeneity before the universal rights of citizens.

    According to Business Day, Contralesa had decided to move ethnicity into the global market place: it was creating a corporation to investin mining, forestry, industry and tourism, that archetypical site for the commodification of culture. Said Patekile Holomisa, powerful Xhosa head of the organization: “We have concentrated for too long on the political fight for constitutional recognition.” The time had come to empower their peoples by venturing out from their traditional capitals into the realm of venture capital. Since then, Contralesa has become a truly cosmopolitan concern, a multi-million dollar business with interests carefully diversified across the planetary economy.

    Could it be, pace all social science orthodoxy, that the future of ethnicity – or, at least, a future – lies, metaphorically and materially, in ethno-futures? In taking identity into the market place? In hitching it to the world of franchising and finance capital? Leruo Molotlegi, King of the Bafokeng,2 a wealthy South African chiefdom, intimated as much in an address on “corporate ethnicity” at a leading American university. The Wealth of ETHNO-Nations is a topic about which he knows a lot. His people is famed throughout Africa for its lucrative platinum holdings. In 2000, soon after he succeeded to his throne, Leruo was picturedon the cover of Mining Weekly under the caption, “Meet the New CEO of Bafokeng Inc.”3

    Cut away to another time, another optic, another part of South Africa.

    In 1994, in the North West Province, there appeared an op-ed piece in The Mail, the local weekly,4 by one Tswagare Namane. “Our futures,” he predicted, are going to rely increasingly on tourism. To attract it, however, demands not just hotels or game parks. It requires “uncovering,” and marketing, “what is authentically Tswana.” Recourse to the cargo of cultural tourism, as we all know, has become a global panacea, an autonomic reflex almost, for those with no work and little to sell; this despite the fact that it seldom yields what it promises. But Namane had in mind something more than simply the tourist dollar. The commercialization of identity, he argued – pace Frankfurt School orthodoxy – does not necessarily reduce it to a brute commodity. Per contra: marketing what is “authentically Tswana” is also a mode of self-construction, of producing Tswana-ness. And an assertion, thereby, of universal being-in-the-world.

    I have searched for something genuinely mine; something I can cherish as the achievement of my forebears, something to affirm my humanity and my equality.

    This restless urge, he added, is most acutely felt by persons dispossessed of their past. Note the choice of term: “dispossession.” It connote of property, propriety, prosperity, paradise lost. “What I am reclaiming is my ethnicity, my heritage; not my ‘ethnicism’.” The distinction, a striking piece of vernacular anthropology, is critical. Ethnicity refers here to membership in a population with distinctive ways and means; ethnicism, to the tribal allegiances “propagat[ed by] apartheid.” Heritage, of course, is culture projected into the past, and, simultaneously, the past rendered into culture. It is identity in alienable form: identity whose objects and objectifications may be consumed by others and, therefore, delivered to the market. Its alienation, as Namane saw, has the curious capacity to confer upon ethnicity a currency at once social, political, moral, material and affective. Even more – and here is the irony – in solidifying the stuff of difference, of locality and indigeneity, the circulation of that currency also holds out the promise of universal recognition: of entry into what, from the perspective of the parochial, is a global cosmopolis. To have culture is to be human – in an age in which “humanity” is the key trope of species being. If they have nothing distinctive to alienate, many rural black South Africans have come to believe, they face collective extinction. As a Tswana elder once said to us: “if we have nothing [of ourselves] to sell… does it mean that we have no culture? No presence in the world?”

    To be sure, the sale of culture seems, in large part, to have replaced the sale of labor in the Brave Neo South Africa,5 whose industrial economy, founded on racial capitalism, is presently under reconstruction. A new breed of consultancy firm, like African Equations, has arisen to advise communities on how best to market themselves and their cultural products.6 There is a growing demand for their services. Ethno-businesses are opening up all over. Like Funjwa Holdings, established by the Mabaso Tribal Authority in KwaZulu-Natal and funded by a major bank, to “reap the sweets and cakes of free enterprise.”7 Seeking to draw “thousands of international visitors each year,” the “Mabaso people” have invested in a wildlife park offering such “authentic” African activities as bow-hunting – which, being Zulu, they never did.8 By these means they hopeto find “empowerment.” Mark this term. It has little to do with power or politics. What it connotes is access to markets and material benefits. Among ethnic groups, it is frankly associated with finding something essentially their own, something of their essence, to sell. In other words, a brand.

    This, patently, is not just true of South Africa, or Africa, or that part of the World formerly known as Third. It is as true in the US, where, as Marilyn Halter (2000) points out in The Marketing of Ethnicity, there is a large “industry [to remind] hyphenated Americans of how valuable heritage is no matter how remote or forgotten it may be” (our italics). According to brandchannel.com, this has “spawned an array” of culture-conjurers, a.k.a. “ethnic marketing experts,” whose commerce – referred to as the “ethnic industry,” in an unwitting parody of Adorno – yields $2b a year. Even in Britain, long known for its indifference to difference, that industry is growing quickly. The English and Celtic “heritage” business is expanding in direct proportion the decomposition of Great Britain as national imagining. Scotland the Brave has, literally, become Scotland the Brand.

    The juxtaposition of branding, marketing, culture, and identity – what Namane pointed to in seeking something “authentically Tswana” to sell – finds echoes in recent scholarly discourse. Thus Martin Chanock (2000:24-26) suggests that, in our age, in which “fantasies work where reality fails,” advertising technologies, those neoliberal weapons of mass instruction, replicate the production and alienation of culture.9 In particular, he says, the process of branding – of creating an attachment to a commodity, to both its object-form and to the idea of an association with it – is “full of clues to the ways in which allegiance to culture [is] made.” Note the term “allegiance to culture.” It translates, with little slippage, into ethnicidentity. But here is the heart of the matter. To survive, concludes Chanock, “[c]ultures, like brands, must essentialise. Successful, sustainable cultures are those that brand best.” This calls to mind a remarkable example of the willful “commodification of tradition” in South Africa (Oomen 2005:161). It concerns the koma, the initiation school of the Pedi of the Northern Province. Initiation rites, across Africa, are held to transmit “deep knowledge”; it is here that cultural secrets are passed on (cf. J. Comaroff 1985). For Pedi, the koma is also a lucrative business. This is not just because locals pay up to $250 to take part (p. 162, n.129). It is also because many non-local youths – for whom the fee is much higher – also enroll. Pedi brand koma has become a niche product in a regional culture market. In this immiserated economy, the alienation of vernacular knowledge is both a means of self-construction and a source of income. Cultural survival is giving way, in many places, to survival through culture. But with a twist: the more successful an ethnic group is in commodifying its difference, the quicker it may devalue itself. This is the irony, too, of the quest of those who consume exotic cultures-as-commodity: the more they pursue their alienated selves in the geist of others, the more that geist risks succumbing to the banality of the market (cf. Povinelli 2001).

    But not always. Ethno-commodities are queer things. Apart from all else, their aura does not, as critical theory would have had it, inevitably diminish with their mass production and circulation. As we have implied, ethnicity as a fact-of-being-and-becoming seems often to take palpable, credible, creative life in the very process of its commodification. Thus we read of Balinese dances, designed for tourist consumption, which so captured the imagination of “natives” that they ended up replacing the sacred, auratic originals previously performed only in the temple (Sanger 1988: 99-100). Observing similar things in China and elsewhere, Phillip Felfan Xie (2003) arrives at an unwitting, counter-intuitive syllogism: that, far from destroying cultural value, the commodification of “tradition,” insofar as it valorizes indigeneity, is as likely to be a “positive mechanism in the pursuit of authenticity,” a means of finding “true selves,” individual and collective, “through the appropriation of pastness.” The dialectic of banalization and enchantment is a complicated, unpredictable one. It is propelled, among other things, by the ever growing impetus of capital to create value by conjuring with difference. And, to invoke Źiźek (n.d.), by the enduring presence of unalienated otherness as the “necessary supplement” to a sense of dispassionate modernity.

    What conclusions may be drawn from all this? Could it be that we are seeing unfold before us a metamorphosis in the production of identity and subjectivity, in the politics and economics of culture, in the interpellation of indigeneity into worlds beyond itself, and, concomitantly, in the ontology of ethnic consciousness? If so, what lies behind this metamorphosis? Where is it leading? Does it have a telos of its own? Note that, in posing the problem thus, we treat ethnicity, culture, identity, and indigeneity not as analytic constructs but as signs variously deployed by human beings across the planet in their quotidian efforts to inhabit sustainable worlds.

    ETHNICITY, IN THE ONGOING PRESENT: one or two questions of theory

    Let us pause briefly here to offer two general observations about cultural identity. One is ontological, the other, orientational.

    First, ontology.

    The oldest, most foundational question of all about ethnicity, sui generis – ethnicity as consciousness, ethnicity as a sociological formation, ethnicity as a sentiment deep enough to die for – is whether it is primordial or an instrumentally-motivated social construction.10 Happily, this question – which once divided scholars, organic intellectuals, and militias – has receded in significance. Few social scientists would argue any longer for primordialism, pure and simple, although ethno-nationalists continue to kill for it. To many in academia, bromides about ethnicity really being both, part primordial and part social construction, offer a banal compromise, a way of distantiating an intractable problem. In fact, that compromise is itself incoherent, impossible: primordial attachment and the social construction of identity describe irreducibly different ontologies of being that cannot, logically or sociologically, dissolve into each other. Unless, of course, the primordial is treated not as an explanation for ethnic consciousness, but as a phenomenological description of how that consciousness is experienced from within by those who share it (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:49-67; J.L. Comaroff 1996). More important, for now, however, is the fact that the compromise itself – that ethnicity is part primordial, part social construction – actually mimics an ever more palpable social fact: the great existential irony that, in its lived manifestations, cultural identity is increasingly apprehended, simultaneously, as a function of voluntary self-production and the ineluctable effect of biology. In other words, as both construction and essence.11 This doubling, we would argue, is not a contradiction at all: it is an endemic condition of identity in neoliberal times. Of which more in due course.

    Second, orientation.

    It is a matter of observation that, across the positivist social sciences, treatments of cultural identity, where they extend beyond its modes of expression and representation, tend overwhelmingly to orient towards its political dimensions; perhaps this is itself the corollary of the triumph of constructionist perspectives, for which the fabrication of any collective consciousness is, by definition, a political act (cf. Hall 1996:442f). Which is why politics and identity are so often locked in conceptual embrace, as if each completes the other. So much is this the case that the economics, ethics, and aesthetics of ethnicity are, by extension, almost invariably reduced to a politics: to the pursuit of sharedsocial and material interests (cf. Jung 2001); to struggles for recognition in the face of homogenizing hegemonies; to redress for histories, real or imagined, of injury, suffering, victimhood (cf. Brown 1995); to the right to engage in “different” bodily and domestic practices, poetics, musics, moralities.

    Patently, the politics of ethnicity are critical. All the more so because “neoliberalism” is commonly said to disperse the political by submerging its ideological bases in the imperatives of economic efficiency and capital growth, in the fetishism of the free market, bioscience, and technology, in the dictates of security and social order, in the demands of “culture” (Comaroff 2001). At the same time, the continued privileging of the politics of ethnicity has a number of costs: it depends on an under-specified conception of the political; it reduces cultural identity to a utility function; and it confuses the deployment of ethnicity as a tactical claim to entitlement with the substance of ethnic consciousness. Indeed, it is arguable that ethnicity-as-political

    identity and ethnicity-as-cultural identity are quite different phenomena, despite being conditions of each other’s possibility. Ethnicity-as-political identity usually presents its cultural bases not in the “thick” terms of a living, inhabited order of signs and practices – i.e., of ethnicity-as-culture in its anthropological sense – but in the “thin,” second-order terms that, purged of density, refer to very general ethical values (cf. Jung 2001:22-4). Like Britishness, which stresses such things as fair-play and civilty. Or ubuntu, African “humanity,” usually glossed in South Africa as a socially-oriented sensibility by contrast to Western individualism.

    But, most of all, the stress on the political misses precisely what we began this lecture with. Recall Contralesa, the trustees of culture in South Africa, who have taken identity into the realm of venture capital; recall, too, the King of the Bafokeng, with his emphasis on corporate ethnicity. None of their visions lacked a politics. But what they recognized is that the institutional topography of the world has shifted: that the current age is one in which the political is no longer apprehensible as an autonomous domain, with sovereignty over material life; that politics and economics, inseparable as never before, are anchored together at once in the market and in the law. Nor is this revelation confined to South Africa. In China, says Arif Dirlik (2000:129), “ethnic groups, once defined politically, now perceive themselves as `natural’ economic groups.” Pay attention to the stress on natural economic groups. It will have echoes as we proceed.

    These observations lead, in turn, to a Big Issue. To the extent that theyare true, should it not follow that the context in which culture, identity, and politics are embedded is itself under radical reconstruction? That context is typically taken to be the nation-state and, ever more nowadays, the neoliberal order of which it is part. Or, more accurately, in which it is dialectically entailed.

    It has become commonplace to bespeak the metamorphosis of the modernist polity under the impact of globalization, neoliberalism, empire, whatever. The more difficult question is how precisely to make sense of this unfolding history. And how to do so in such a way as to illuminate the variant species of political subjectivity taking shape within it.

    THE NATION-STATE AND ITS SUBJECTIVITIES

    Modernist European polities, according to Benedictine history – Benedectine, as in Benedict Anderson (1983)12 – were founded on a fiction of cultural homogeneity, on an imagined, often violently effected, sense of horizontal fraternity. Much has been said about this imagining: that Euro-nationhood was always more diverse than its historiography allows, always a work-in-progress, always subject to a tenuous hyphenation with the states that ruled them. But that is another story, a narrative of the longue duree which begins with Westphalia and ends in the Failure of the West. (Now, tellingly, renamed the “global North.”) Since the late twentieth century, those polities have had increasingly to come to terms with difference. Historical circumstance has pushed them toward a more heterodox nationhood (J.L. Comaroff 1996:177). Hence the growingliteratures, scholarly and lay alike, on citizenship, sovereignty, multiculturalism, minority rights, and the limits of liberalism. Hence the xenophobia that haunts heterodoxy almost everywhere. Hence, too, our disciplinary concern with the curious counterpoint between cosmopolitanism and indigeneity, both variously understood. Hetero-nationhood seeks – usually for pragmatic, not ethical reasons – to accommodate cultural diversity within a civic order composed of universal citizens, all ostensibly equal before the law. And to embrace identity politics within a liberal, constitutionally-founded conception of national community. Especially since 1989, global neoliberalization has not merely transformed the sovereignty of nation-states. It has actively compounded the degree to which they are both polymorphous and porous: we scarcely need mention, here, the ever more mobile demographics of wage labor; or the incapacity of many Western cosmo-polities to reproduce their social infrastructures without the discomforting presence of “aliens”; or the impact of the electronic commons on the planetary circulation of virtually everything – and everything virtual. All of which, plainly, are corollaries of the hegemony of the market, of its power both to breach and to buttress borders, to curtail and to extend the regulatory reach of states, to valorize the local and to cast it into economic force-fields well beyond itself.

    In this world, in which the political and the ethical are also swept up under the sign of the market, freedom presents itself ineluctably as choice: most of all, as choice of identities and modes of fashioning them. Which is why it is that culture, the quintessential space of self-fashioning, has become an ever more animated site of politics; why those politics center less on the general good than on the pursuit of goods; why ideology is giving way to ID-ology, the -ology of identity, as a basis for mobilization (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003) – especially with the “globalspread of democracy,” which makes a fetish out of freedom-as-choice. But why should shared essence be such a compelling premise on which to define being and belonging? And to claim recognition? Because it appears to run to the very core of “life itself.” Note: “life itself,” a trope at once bioscientific and philosophical that has become the foundational obsession of our age, alike populist and specialist. From this vantage, in polities having to come to terms with diversity as never before – and in which class is so dispersed as not to provide a meaningful call to social action – there can be no more persuasive a ground on which to pursue collective interest than the assertion of an essential right to be different. Which is why, finally, in our Brave Neo World, cultural identity has become, simultaneously, a function of elective self-production and ascriptive biology.

    To the degree that it has, to the degree that ethnicity represents itself as both primordial connectedness and a commonality of interest, it follows that culture would congeal into a naturally copyrighted, legally protected collective possession; in other words, into genetically-endowed intellectual property (cf. Coombe 1998). A true fetish, it becomes a form of monopoly capital, yielding value to its owners as its products are soldfor profit.

    Note, here, the stress on legal instruments: on copyright, intellectual property, and the like. The modernist polity has always rested on jural foundations, of course. But, of late, there has been a palpable intensification in the resortto legal ways and means. The signsare everywhere: in the development of a global jurisprudence far more elaborate than its internationalist predecessor; in the epidemic of new national constitutions since 1989; in the proliferation of legal NGOs across the world; in the remarkable spread of human rights advocacy; in the subjection of ever more intimate domains of human life to litigation. In South Africa there is even a Law Train that traverses the land. It prompts citizens to seek redress for their troubles by recourse to the languages of legality. People across the planet are being encouraged to behave as homo juralis. And collectivities of all kinds are given ever more reason to mimic bodies corporate (Comaroff and Comaroff 2007).

    There is a critical corollary to all this. It concerns the relocation of politics into the legal domain. As Martin Chanock (2007:34) notes:

    In place of a politics in which rights were delivered through the political process, now jurisprudence is the site of important decisions. No longer part of the bargaining and struggle of the political arena, decisions about entitlement are de-politicised and rendered by means of the law.

    This is part of something to which we alluded earlier: the displacement of the political. More and more are differences of all kinds being fought out in the courts – whether they involve private freedoms, property rights, or national resources, access to medical treatment or titleto real estate, sovereignty or cultural knowledge. Politics may or may not be about class any more. But it certainly is about class actions. In ways unthinkable until recently, governments and their agencies, especially those that deal in death and taxes, are regularly sued by their citizens; and citizens are ever more litigious in respect of each other. What once happened in parliaments, street protests, and political councils now finds a new space of contestation. Even history is being re-politicized, redeemed, recouped in the courts. Britain, for one, is being sued by several formerly colonized peoples in East Africa, each demanding restitution for an old wrong: the Nandi, for the killing of their leader in 1905; the Nyoro for a land seizure in 1900; the Samburu for injuries inflicted by relict munitions. In all these class actions, the plaintiff is an ethnic group, reclaiming its past by jural means. And asserting a corporate identity in the process.13

    Project the legal subject onto the terrain of cultural identity, add the reduction of culture to property, mix it with the displacement of politics into the domain of jurisprudence, and what is the result? It is, to return to where we began, Ethnicity, Inc.”

    CASINO CAPITAL, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND INCORPORATION

    Neither the incorporation of ethnic groups nor the commodification of culture is new. In North America, it has had legal recognition since at least 1934, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. In1971, moreover, the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act explicitly re-organized indigenous peoples into corporations composed of shareholders whose rights were based on genealogy, whose traditional lands became private, alienable property, and whose cultural products, a growing proportion of them trademarked under the Silver Hand, were directed toward the market (Hollowell-Zimmer 2001).14 But the popular prototype of Ethnicity, Inc. in the US lies in the Native American casino-owning “tribe,” its apotheosis in the Mohegan Sun and the Pequot Foxwood Resort, two enormous monuments to ethno-marketing and the architecture of vernacular kitsch; at Foxwood are found such establishments as Ethnic Concepts International Gift Shop.15 As it turns out, the Native American cases of ethno-incorporation are bewilderingly complex; their identity economies stretch far beyond the gaming house. But most of them share five things that will turn out to be significant as we proceed.

    The first is obvious: the more like profit-seeking corporations indigenous groups become, the more the terms of membership privilege birth, blood, and biology over social or cultural attachments. And the more they tend to be contested.16 The second, by contrast, is counter-intuitive: not infrequently, it is commercial enterprise that begets an ethnic group, not the other way around. Vide the Pomo Indians – Pomo in both name and spirit – that, in the 1950s, consisted of two families, without tribe or territory. These families lived on land set aside for homeless Native Americans until they secured reservation land and a casino licence. Whereupon they became “the” Pomo. Or better yet, the case of the Augustine Cahuilla Indians, who consist of one woman, Maryann Martin, but who have been allowed to open a gaming house on an abandoned reservation in California. By these means does Ms. Martin constitute a certified ethnic group. Nor is she the only one-person ethno-corporation in North America.17

    The third notable thing about the US cases is that, in many of them, the creation of a corporate ethno-economy has been set in motion by venturecapital from outside. Its source is usually non-Indian financiers, for whom real or virtual “tribes” are franchises licenced to make a killing. As this suggests, ethno-enterprise is mandated by culture, but may not originate in it. In fact, several officially recognized bands have little connection to vernacular life-ways. Maryann Martin, the last living Augustine Cahuila, was raised African American. But, once on the road to incorporation, they typically begin to assert– if necessary, to discover or invent – their “traditions,” which may then be merchandized; hence the Ethnic Concepts store on the Pequot reservation – and, close by, a state-of-the-art Museum and Research Center of Culture. The content of identity, as we all know, is often produced in response to the market. So, sometimes, is indigeneity.

    The fourth matter of note is that, once recognized by the state, Native American groups tendto proclaim their sovereign autonomy against it.18 Thus, for example, Indian tribes, now major contributors to political campaigns in California, refuse to report their donations; as “nations,” they claim exemption from US law. Predictably, such assertions provoke reactions; the State of California has litigated against several Indian tribes.19 Similarly, when the governor of New York insisted that cigarette sales on the Mohawk reservation be licenced by his state, indigenous leaders invokedsovereign exclusion; the Mohawk make their own tobacco products and, acting under the sign of ethno-preneurship, were determined to protect their market.20

    Finally, the Indian cases indicate that ethno-incorporation strives for geo-spatial materiality.21 To be sure, it often involves a land claim. Which is not surprising: real estate held in patrimonial tenure – territory, that is – is typically taken to be a founding principle of sovereignty. Note these five points. They will, we repeat, turn out to be critical.

    The prototypical Native American instances of Ethnicity, Inc., those associated with casino ownership, presumed a cultural identity at their core. But the substance of that identity was incidental to their incorporation. There are exceptions to this. Or rather, inversions: “tribes” whose corporate history began not with casino capitalism22 but with the copyrighting of their cultures. Take the Zia Pueblo (Brown 1998:197), who successfully sued New Mexico a few years back for the unauthorized use of their sun symbol on state flags. The design, with its spiritual powers, they said, was their holy-owned property. Or, also in New Mexico, the Indians of Sandoval county who, over centuries, developed a ritually-valued variety of blue corn that, in the 1980s, became a fashionable health food. As a result, Five Sandoval Indian Pueblos, Inc. was established to superintend the sale of trademarked agri-goods, like “Hopi Blue” (Pinel and Evans 1994:45). Here, in sum, an ethno-corporation arose from distilling local knowledgeinto a brand that, in turn, sedimented sociologically into an ethnic federation; just the thing Chanock pointed to in saying that “sustainable cultures are those which brand best”(above, p.5).

    The branding of culture has been facilitated by an implosion, in recent times, in the domain of intellectual property: in the laws governing its possession, the rights accruing to it, and the spheres of existence over which it extends. This has persuaded the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization to recognize an “inherent” right of indigenous peoples to the fruits of their vernacularknowledge (see e.g. Posey 1994:227-233; Greene 2004:213) – one effect of which has been to accelerate yet further their incorporation in many places. Some of them quite unexpected.

    Which brings us to a Tale of Two Ethnicities, two instances of Ethnicity, Inc. that draw together the various strands of our narrative by addressing an unresolved dialectic at its core: the dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture. It should be clear by now that they are not the same thing. Hence the contrast between (i) those Native American groups, exemplified by casino capitalists, that became bodies corporate by virtue of being shareholders in enterprises enabled by their sovereign legal status and (ii) those made into corporations by virtue of a shared copyright in vernacular signs, knowledge, or practices. The relationship between these two tendencies, it turns out, completes the dialectic. But we are running ahead of ourselves. Our Tale of Two Ethnicities returns us to where we began: Southern Africa.

    ETHNO-FUTURES, AGAIN

    The first takes us to the edge of the Kahalari Desert, to the Land of the San – known, pejoratively, as Bushmen. It involves the hoodia cactus, xhoba, which they have imbibed since time immemorial. In the past, when hunting in the desert, it stayed their appetites and thirst; it is used these days to stave off the effects of poverty. San suffered severely from the predations of colonialism: stigmatized, victims of various forms of violence, removed from their ancestral lands, prey to illness and alcohol, their numbers diminished greatly. Over the past century, in fact, most of their communities dispersed into the immiserated reaches of the South African “coloured” population.

    The hoodia saga was to unleash a global media frenzy: In the USA, 60 Minutes attested to the efficacy of the plant and spoke in awe of its promise for the fat-fighting industry;23 the BBC sent a reporter “deep into the Kalahari desert,” to “one of the world’s most primitive tribes,” to sample the “extremely ugly cactus” that “kills appetite and attacks obesity with no side effects.”24 It all began in in South Africa in 1963, when the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) became interested in the medicinal properties of the cactus (Evans 2003); this was stimulated by reports of its use by San trackers deployed by the army in its wars against the enemies of apartheid. The CSIR corroborated its appetite suppressant capacities, identified their bioactive component and, in 1997, patented it under the label P57.

    The CSIR licenced P57 to Phytopharm, a British company – which, after extensive trials, licenced it on to Pfizer for $21m; ironic perhaps, since xhoba has some of the same properties as Viagra, Pfizer’s most famed product. It is at this point that the story becomes especially interesting.

    The San first heard about the patent when Phytofarm announced P57 to the media. Or, more precisely, it was Roger Chennells,25 a human rights lawyer, who read a quote from the head of Phytofarm, Richard Dixey, to the effect that the people from whom the knowledge of hoodia derived, were extinct. At the time, Chennells was representing the San in a land claim (see Robins 2003:12-14; Isaacson 2002), in the course of which there emerged an NGO, the South African San Institute (SASI), one of many such organizations that surfaced with the end of apartheid, with liberalization, and with the postcolonial politics of identity.26 Chennells told SASI that the San were victims of biopiracy, that the return on the patent could be huge – its value in the US is about $3b a year (Evans 2003:16) – and that this was an opportunity to assert a collective identity under the San Council, a new body created by SASI to give political shape to, and claim sovereignty for, their ethnic aspirations (Evans ibid:14).

    Richard Dixey may have been disingenuous in asserting the extinction of the San; the advantages to Phytofarm were plain enough. When the San Council protested to the CSIR, it acknowledged the error of its ways, Dixey confessed his “embarrassment,” and a profit sharing agreement was signed. Since then, Pfizer has given way as licencee to Unilever. Since then, too, the San Trust, set up to manage the incoming funds, has received its first royalties, has begun to tackle the problems of distribution among the San of South Africa, Nambia, and Botswana, and has filed suit against twenty-six illicit producers. Since then “the San,” as an ethno-corporation has taken ever more articulate shape.

    In point of fact, Dixey had not been altogether wrong. The San may not have been extinct, but their ethnocide had gone a long way. Having been cast out of their social ecology, “they” did not evince much by way of a collective identity; their dispersal into the gray racial space of South Africa made it impossible to do so. But the assertion of intellectual property – coupled, significantly, with the land claim that preceded it – reanimated San “identity.” And gave it ever “thicker,” more dense substance; a symptom of this, interestingly, being a sudden increase in people accusing each other, on biological grounds, of “not being real San .” 27

    Thus it is that there has been a language revival, that genealogies are being collected to create a population register; that SASI has initiated a “cultural resources management project”; that programshave been designed for “San-controlled income generation” using indigenous knowledge in a sustainable manner; that a legal platformhas been set up to protect the global interests and dignity of the San. All of which had the effect of re-indigenizing this “people” through the very act of interpellating them into a distinctly cosmopolitan sense of being-in-the-world. When we asked Roger Chennells whether a new ethnic identity had been produced in the process, he answered in the affirmative. He is correct. The presumption that “the” San actually had a sharedidentity– or a coherent ethno-sociology – prior to the colonial dispersal of a complex population of hunter-gatherers collectively called “Bushmen” is itself contentious: who or what “they” were has long been a subject of bitter debate.28 But that does not matter any more, at least not outside of the academy. Today they are a multi-national, ever more assertively cosmopolitan ethno-corporation: as we said, “the” San, and the San Council that makes manifest their sovereignty, now straddle three of the countries of southern Africa.

    The other story involves the Bafokeng, the people made wealthy by platinum, the people whose kings are spoken of as CEOs, the people actually referred to in South Africa as Bafokeng, Inc.29 The history of their incorporation begins, long ago, with land: one of their nineteenth century chiefs realized that, to protect their territory from white settlers, his people ought to purchase it outright (Cook n.d. [a]:5-6). So he sent young men to the diamond fields and commissioned their wages to buy as much terrain as possible. The subsequent history of South Africa did not make it easy to hold on to this land. But, by establishing the Bafokeng as a private, corporate owner, the purchase enabled their chiefs to defend it from seizure (Cook ibid.:6 et passim), especially after the discovery of platinum in 1924 and its leasing to Impala Platinum, a large company, in the 1960s.30 The greatest challenge, in this respect, came when the puppet homeland government of Bophuthatswana, set up by the apartheid state, exiled the chief of the Bafokeng, expropriated their mineral rights, and negotiated contracts directly with Impala; this sparked a lengthy series of legal actions which eventually yielded a victory for the “tribe” in 1999 – and, with it, a lucrative profit-sharing arrangement.31 All of which made the Bafokeng so adept at litigation that, as one journalist put it, “their traditional weapon became the law, not the club.” 32

    The corporate growth of Bafokeng, Inc. in the wake of these legal processes has been breathtaking. This nation of 300,000 shareholders – membership is defined by patrilineality – has largestakes in a complex network of companies; their interest in Impala alone yielded $80m in 2002.33 In addition, they have opened up two new mining operations each valued at $65m;34 established a profitable partnership with Exxon;35 bought a huge construction company;36 purchased 20% of South Africa’s second largest packaging plant;37 and own 33% of SA Chrome, now renamed Merafe Resources.38 Merafe is Setswana for “nations.” Nor does the story end there. Their sovereing government is vested in the Royal Bafokeng Administration; their global investments are overseen by Royal Bafokeng Finances; a Royal Bafokeng Economic Board managesdevelopment within the chiefdom; and their mineral interests are husbandedby Royal Bafokeng Resources (see e.g. Gray 2003:16) – which may soon become a public company.39 By these means, “the Bafokeng” chiefdom would become the ultimate ethno-enterprise: one in whose present holdings and futures you or we might purchase stock.

    What is missing in all this? The cultural element of Bafokeng cultural identity. King Leruo and his money managers have long presented themselves as highly cosmopolitan business people primarily concerned with a sustainable future: Vision 2020 is their ambitious plan to develop Bafokeng into a “self-sufficient,” fully employed, globally-oriented nation by, well, 2020 (Gray 2003:13-14). Of late, however, there has been much more culture talk, much more talk of indigeneity. Since being installed in a ritual saturated with the trappings of a tradition partly historical, partly made up, powerfully vernacular, the young king has taken to essaying “African values,” to celebrating “traditional governance,” and to arguing that, in moving toward “Afro-modernity,” his people must “affirm” their essence (see Gray ibid:14). In short, Bafokeng, Inc, the manifest commodification of Bafokeng identity, appears to be reaching toward a cultural sensibility in order to complete itself.

    Running the San and Bafokeng together, then, the dialectic at the heart of Ethnicity, Inc. reveals itself. Each of these cases evinces the five things foreshadowed in Native America, if in different proportions: membership in both has come to be defined genealogically, with some contestation either evident or imminent; in both, commercial enterprise has been instrumental either in crystallizing or in reproducing the sociological entity in which cultural identity is presumed to inhere; in both, venture capital and legal expertise from outside has been crucial; both have asserted their new-found sovereignty against the state; and both have based their incorporation on land claims, past or present. In both, moreover, the displacement of the political into the legal has been demonstrable: both have fought their battles by means of lawfare. In the process, they have both naturalized the trope of identity around which their “rights” adhere – and interpellated into it a significant measure of affect. This is particularly striking in the case of the San. It is arguable that knowledge of the hoodia was produced not by “the San” at all – who may or may not existed at the time – but by hunters of the Kalahari, a class defined by their relationship to a mode of production. The projection of a vernacular right to intellectual property onto “the San,” a putatively “primordial” collectivity, has the effect of extinguishing a class of producers as it distinguishes and materializes a cultural identity – and, as it does so, giving ontological primacy to the idea of identity itself. Thus, to reiterate, does ideology become ID-ology and hide itself in a sense of the natural, the inevitable, the given.

    Most of all, though, the stories of the San and the Bafokeng, precisely because they are such extreme instances, demonstrate how and why it is that Ethnicity, Inc. rests on a dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture; and, at another level, between indigeneity and the human cosmopolis. Whether it starts with the incorporation of identity, as in the Bafokeng case, or with the commodification of cultural property, as in Kalahari, the process evinces a drive to complete itself in the other. Thus it is that a dispersed group of former hunters and gatherers have become “the San,” replete with a sovereign sense of their own ethno-sociology, their own governance, their own affective economy, their own range of institutions to make it all real. Thus it is that Bafokeng, Inc is turning to vernacular ways and means in the name of an Afro-modernity which it may inhabit as it reaches toward 2020. Neither is fortuitous. After all, Ethnicity, Inc., to the degree that it naturalizes collective right, material entitlement, and sovereignty, does require both the incorporation of identity and cultural substance to realize, recognize, fulfill itself. Which is why it tends to begin in land, thence to make claims to sovereignty, to secure its cultural property, and to invest in the long-run. The future of ethnicity does seem to lie, at least in one important respect, in ethno-futures.

    CONCLUSION

    We have come not to praise to Ethnicity, Inc. Nor do we extol empowerment that depends on the commodification of culture or the Empire of the Market, let alone the creeping judicialization of politics or the naturalization of the ethno-trope of identity into a brute term of social being. Quite the opposite. Ethnicity, Inc. carries with it a host of costs and contradictions. What we seek to do here, in short, is to interrogate a world-wide phenomenon in the making; one that is much more complicated than it first appears.

    In so doing, we have stressed that Ethnicity, Inc. has deep roots and many precedents. After all, nation-states have long sought to distinguish themselves by marking as unique their national cultures, their heritage, their essence as embodied in both utilitarian and aesthetic objects. French champagne, Italian grappa, German opera, British tea and…china, have long been branded national products. In ever more cases they carry trademarks. Implicitly, in other words, the modernist nation has always been a brand, with some strange consequences; note, in this regard, Jonathan Franzen’s brilliant caricature of Lithuania, Inc. in The Corrections, the upshot of which is that its national economy is sold by a quite plausible mistake to a bank in Atlanta. Note, too, the fact that Silvio Berlusconi, CEO extraordinaire, often refers to his country as Azienda Italia, “Italy, the Company” (Muehlebach n.d.). Nor only nations. Religions too. Note how the judiciary of Pakistan, in deliberating the dispute between Ulema, religious authorities, and the Ahmediya, whom they style as blasphemers, has recently chosen to treat Islam as intellectual property (Ahmed 2006). And the process is proliferating in time as well as space: vide the recent efforts of the Israeli national archive to establish in a court of law that, because he was a Jew, Kafka’s works were rightfully the intellectual ‘assets” of the Israeli state as the guardian, in perpetuity, of Jewish heritage (Butler 2011). What is going on here, it seems, is the hyperextension of an old phenomenon. And its migration into places it has not gone before: into the domain of cultural being, where, as Clifford Geertz (1963) once reminded us, modernity was supposed to run up against its limits. But the ethnically-defined peoples of “traditional” Africa, Latin America, the USA, and Asia have become thoroughly modern, if each in their own ways. Even more, they have sometimes passed by the modern and, like that Indian tribe of which we spoke, leapt directly into the Pomo. Which, above all, distorts, exaggerates and sometimes renders absurd, the lineaments of modernity. We may or may not like what Ethnicity, Inc. promises. But we are going to have to live with it, and, even more, to fashion an engaged anthropology to deal with its unfolding logic, its ambiguous promises, its material and moral vision for times to come, the deep affective attachments that it engenders. All of which suggests that it is spreading with exponential speed, albeit on very different scales of elaboration. Why? Perhaps because Ethnicity, Inc. is the congealed product – a fusion both hot and cold, if you will – of three elemental features of the neoliberal tendency: the apotheosis of intellectual property and the reduction of culture to it; the migration of politics into the realm of the law; and the growing naturalization of the trope of identity as the taken-for-granted domain of collective action. Herein lies a critical station on the Road, if not to Damascus, then to a Brave Neo World.

  • Figuring Democracy

    Figuring Democracy

    12.01 a.m., 25 April 1994. Wale Street, Cape Town, South Africa: The last strains of the anthem of the ancien regime – part requiem, part death- rattle – drift off into the night. A local choir, carefully rehearsed for the occasion, begins to belt out the new national song, with its familiar, once- banned libretto of liberation, its hymnnotic harmony of hope. The old flag, long an emblem of colonialism and apartheid, is folded away for the last time. Its replacement, a brash, multicolored icon of consensus, is raised. The symbolism, by intent, is too obvious to miss. Calico curtains ring down and up as the world’s latest Midnight’s Child, the “new” South Africa, is born.

    1

    Perhaps it was sacrilegious, at that precise moment, that moment of unreserved optimism, to recall Malcolm Bradbury’s Doctor Criminale. In this novel about a postmodern philosopher, a fictional fusion of Foucault and Derrida, the Hungarian ex- wife of the hero, one Gertla Riviero, reflects upon the recent transition to democracy and free market economics throughout much of the contemporary world (1992:276):

    “Democracy, the free market,” she muses, “do you really think they can save us?…Marxism [was] a great idea, democracy [is] just a small idea. It promises hope, and it gives you [Kentucky] Fried Chicken.”

    Ms. Riviero’s commentary is sad, cynical, salutary. Especially so when read in the cooling afterglow of post-election South Africa. Especially so as we call to mind the queues that waited for hours outside polling stations in those last heady days of April, 1994, some in almost sacral silence, some in carnivalesque revelry. Those snaking, eternal queues reminded us of the interminable lines that graced McDonald’s in Moscow a few years back as people voted with their feet not merely for hamburgers or cheeseburgers, but for a market economy and capitalist consumerism. The association may seem irreverent. Yet Gertla Riviero’s question carries an obvious, ominous punch, precisely because it calls into doubt our taken-for-granted narrative of democratization, a heroic liberal myth which links the conventional practices of modernist politics to the prospect of material and social salvation. So, too, if in a different way, does the image of patient, passive people standing in millennial lines to choose either cheap food or political candidates; all the more so as we recall Bayart’s (1993) discomforting aphorism for African public life, to wit, “the Politics of the Belly.”

    Let us pursue this question, and follow these lines, for a while. They lead us into an unexpected encounter with very different philosophies of governmentality, democracy, and modernity.

    II.

    It became commonplace during the 1990’s, especially in Europe and North America, to ascribe the fin de siècle push for democracy in many parts of the world to the end of the cold war and the triumph of the free market over communism. In fact, as many have pointed out, this view was flawed from the first. Apart from all else, the push began well before 1989. But no matter: the association is itself a symptom, often misrecognized, of something much longer in the making, namely, a fundamental reconstruction of the modernist world-order. We have ourselves suggested before that the events of 1989 were evidence of an unfolding Age of Revolution, an epochal process akin to the one that began in 1789 – the European Age of Revolution, that is, which gave us modernity, the seeds of the nation-state form, industrial capitalism, the second colonialism, and much besides (J.L. Comaroff 1995). The present revolution has been marked, in particular, by the rise of a planetary political economy in which sites of production and consumption are widely dispersed; in which social class is rendered barely visible by being scattered promiscuously across the earth; in which finance takes precedence over fabrication, flexibility over fixity, the short-run over the long; in which the state outsources many of its received operations, not least those involving the exercise of violence; in which the nation is confronted by the irreducible fact of increasing demographic heterogeneity; in which governance is represented primarily in the argot of technical oversight; in which politics, more a matter of ID-ology than ideology (see Chapter 3), is increasingly focused on the simultaneous calculi of right, interest, and entitlement, often pursued by judicial means.

    For many, these things are cause for despondency. Let us return to Dr. Criminale, Bradbury’s figurative philosopher. Ours, he says (1992:330), is the media age, the age of simulation…The age of no ideology, only hyperreality…Too little reality, also too much. Everywhere, wild fantasies, everyone wants a violent illusion. Life is a movie, death a plot ending, no stories are real. And even the philosophers think in unrealities, [as] they describe a world of no ethics, no humanism, no self.

    In this new Age of Revolution, fear of the atomic bomb subsides. But anomic bombs explode all over the place. People across the globe – alienated, disempowered, dispossessed – commit extraordinary acts of violence in the name of ethnic and national aspiration. The “me” generation folds into the “we” generation. And the end of politics, at least politics as anything more than the pursuit of brute interest, appears visible on the horizon.

    The scenario, like Doctor Criminale himself, might be fantastic. It is, however, becoming ever less fictional, ever more recognizable.

    But how is this darkly pessimistic view of the contemporary world to be reconciled with the rise of late 20th century democratic movements in so many far-flung places? Were those movements not a positive, liberatory sign of the times in that premillennial moment, that Great Time of Signs? And how, in particular, ought we to understand them in Africa, long seen in the West as the continent-least-likely-to- democratize-itself?

    It is difficult to gainsay those who draw connections between the recent rise of democracy and the triumph of consumer capitalism – even if the line of causality that joins them is at once complicated and the subject of ongoing debate. Capitalism, to be sure, does not require democracy; it has done perfectly well under authoritarian regimes in the past, and continues to do so in many parts of the late modern world. But those nation-states that seek to democratize themselves appear, these days, to require at least the figment of a free market. An elective (or is it electoral?) affinity connects the ballot box to business. Nor is it a passive affinity (cf. Young 1993:299f). U.S. overseas aid has become largely conditional on the establishment of “democratic institutions.” For which read “regular elections.” To wit, in 1996, Robert Mugabe – then still a leader of some standing, now a discredited dictator who takes every opportunity to censure the West – drew a direct connection between ballot box, business and foreign involvement in African politics: “Western countries,” he said, push “multi-party [systems] for Africa because it enables them to “buy influence” and “manipulate parties” into creating congenial economic environments.2

    The contemporary Western concern with the democratization of the global south, however, is not reducible to utility alone, important though that may be. It has roots in the hegemonic, indeed ontological, association throughout the global north of freedom and self-expression with choice. Democracy has become to homo politicus what shopping has long been to homo economicus: a sacred, cosmic fusion of free will and righteous human satisfaction. They are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin, two regimes of consumption underpinned by the same mode of ideological and material and production.

    On 1 May, at 11.48 p.m., during the counting of votes after the first free election in South Africa, SATV Channel 2 broke into its local news coverage to broadcast a meta-advertisement, an advertisement for advertising. “ADVERTISING,” blared the message on the primal screen, “THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE.”

    It is no coincidence, then, as several theorists have observed, that democracy has increasingly been reduced, in practice, from the substantive to the procedural (e.g. Farer 1989; Barsh 1992); that, purged of any ideological density, it has come to connote little more than the periodic exercise of preference, the satisfying of desire, the physics of pure interest. To wit, it does not take a political theorist, or the fictional Ms Riviero, to make the point that, understood thus, democracy is a small idea, one that is more likely to bring with it Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald’s than an amelioration of the human condition. We might go yet farther: to argue that processes of democratization bespeak a historical paradox, namely, that “the people” are being empowered in the politics of state at the very moment when, as we have noted, the politics that count are moving elsewhere — to global processes and institutions, into the corporate world and non-governmental organizations, the media and the law, new social movements, “grass roots” coalitions, and other domains of civil society.

    To phrase all this in the interrogative voice, is it possible that Dr. Criminale is correct: that democratization is a product of the death of politics, of its dispersal to everywhere and anywhere and nowhere in particular? Is democracy rising because it has become politically beside the point?

    An echo here from home. Speaking of democracy in a workshop at the University of Chicago many years ago, Wayne Booth – author, tellingly, of The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) and The Rhetoric of Irony (1974) – observed that freedom of speech is guaranteed in America only to the extent that no one is listening; that, while everybody has a right to talk, nobody has an obligation to pay attention; that democracy disempowers by encouraging a cacophony in which voices cancel each other out.

    Put these two things together – the reduction of the Idea of Democracy to the exercise of choice and the decentering, de-institutionalization of politics – and what do we get? For one thing, some of the concerns that many Africans, academics and intellectuals and every-persons alike, raise about the export of modernist European models to the global south: that they are founded on an “extremely narrow” conception of public life, one that places too much emphasis on “votes and free-market economics”3 and too little on the realization of universal human rights, civil liberties, the commonweal, and transparent, accountable government – all of which, according to recent survey research, tend to be embraced in popular African definitions of democracy (cf. Bratton 2002:5), definitions that also take on heavy local inflictions across the continent. Given that the meaning of the term is hardly unambiguous or uncontested in the global north, as Mahmood Mamdani (1986, 1990, 1992) has noted – we paraphrase him heavily here – how much more murky does it become in Africa, whose vast array of dynamic, evanescent cultures have their own theories and practices of politics, of personhood, of power, of representation. As this suggests, the cultural transitivity of the concept cannot simply be presumed, as it so often is by comparative political scientists. The more general implication? That the common presumption in the West according to which Africa ought to adopt the liberal modernist Euro-American model (see e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001), an ideology floating free of its social and historical moorings, leaves Africans with a unenviable dilemma: to opt for either (i) a highly un-African political order, wherein the body politic is composed of autonomous, individualized, right-bearing citizens whose primary political being is congealed in the exercise of the ballot;4 or (ii) an “indigenous” alternative, usually characterized as anti-modern, ethnically-based, patriarchal, traditionalist, customary, communalist, clientalist, and authoritarian – and/or, more insidiously yet, populist. What kind of choice is this? Even more fundamentally, what, in its own terms, might democracy actually mean in Africa?

    Mikael Karlstrom (1996:485) observed, in the mid-1990’s that, notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on democracy in contemporary Africa, surprisingly little heed had been paid to this last question. As long as it is not adequately addressed, he added, we have little hope of grasping postcolonial politics at all, little hope of making sense of such things as, say, the Ugandan insistence that political parties are inimical to representative government. But there is yet another corollary here. Some African counter-discourses on democratization, as we have already intimated, are grounded in a vernacular political anthropology that offers a substantive critique of conventional Western political theory and practice. By confronting this narrative we stand not merely to understand African politics better than we do now – to understand what lies beyond the “politics of the belly,” beneath the “banality of power…in the postcolony.5 We might also arrive at a more reflexive, critical appreciation of our own received political forms.

    On the Levi-Straussian principle that one good case may illuminate an entire world, let us offer an exemplary instance to make our argument. Our choice will be surprising perhaps. We do not take a country in which representative government or electoral politics have been repudiated, subverted, or misappropriated. Such examples are either too easy or too stereotypic to be useful. Rather, we take Botswana, the African nation-state most widely regarded as a “model” democracy6 – and the closest, by common agreement, to the Western ideal. This very similarity, at least in appearances, will serve to underscore a brace of revealing differences.

    III.

    Consider the following facts. In October 1974, Botswana held its third national elections, in which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won an emphatic 85 per cent majority of the seats in the national assembly.7 Both before and after the ballot there was a great deal of public discussion, seemingly spontaneous and unprovoked, of the advantages to be gained from the introduction of a one-party state. Many people, clearly, favored a move away from the existing British-style multiparty system; so much so, in fact, that the president at the time, Sir Seretse Khama, felt compelled to comment repeatedly on the subject, to refuse even to ponder the possibility – and to encourage people both to vote and to consider the merits of all parties. His public statements were featured prominently in the Botswana Daily News at the time.8

    In hindsight, and from the vantage of the global north, this expression of popular support for a one-party system would seem odd. First, it did not come primarily from BDP voters. Adversaries of the government were among its more enthusiastic protagonists; to wit, Puo Phaa, official organ of the opposition Botswana National Front – which was led by Bathoen Gaesitsiwe, the ex-ruler of a large chiefdom – urged the formation of a “national government, fusing all political groupings into a single administration.9 Second, it was not engineered by a cadre of bosses or captains in the name of a mass ruling party. At the time, as Colclough and McCarthy (1980:41) note, the BDP was anything but that: “indeed it scarcely exist[ed] between elections.” Third, in refusing insistently to change existing electoral arrangements, much to the delight of South Africa and other Western powers,10 the Khama regime was aware that the BDP was passing up its best chance to gain a legitimate monopoly of the organs of state. Fourth, and most puzzling of all, demands for a one-party system were typically justified on the ground that it would foster both better government and more participatory democracy.

    These demands resonated with informal views we encountered in rural Botswana at the time, especially in the south.11 As we shall see, they were consistent with the way in which village populations tended to participate in electoral processes. What is more, they echoed opinions we had heard before. During the previous general election, in 1969, we had been delivered a memorable lesson in comparative political anthropology by a local teacher, an organic intellectual from the edge of the Kalahari. This man, who described himself as “neither a radical nor a traditionalist,” had argued that one-party systems were the “only true social democracies.” With due respect for old European verities, he added politely, the very idea of a multiparty democracy is a contradiction in terms. It abases politics, shrinking them to nothing more than an occasional act of choice. And, by erasing all real government accountability between elections, it licenses the indifference of regimes in power both to popular participation and to public criticism – thereby alienating the citizenry at large from the everyday functioning of the state. President Khama seems to have been aware that views of this ilk had been gaining currency among people in the countryside. Speaking before the 1974 election at Oodi, a small town near the capital, he went to great lengths, in defending multiparty democracy, to stress that “the Government’s intention was not to fetter or discourage… criticism.” That, he said, would be “against our Setswana tradition.”12 Of which more later.

    How, then, do we explain such manifestations of antagonism against multiparty democracy, especially where it seems to have taken root so successfully? Why did it appear to these people as an oxymoron, as antithetical to participatory politics, even as an elaborate Western mystification? What accounts for the positive light in which a one- party system came to be regarded here? And to historicize these questions, one or two more: Was this outburst of vox populi merely a passing moment in the history of the public sphere in Botswana, its civil society crying out, ever so briefly, against the postcolonial state? Or did it speak to something more enduring. If so, what? And how?

    After all, foreign observers have been quick to comment on the non-involvement – “apathy” or, worse yet, “ignorance” are the words commonly used – of the electorate in matters affecting national politics in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

    In order to address these issues, we begin by turning to so-called “traditional” Setswana political theory and practice, a vernacular theory and practice that, albeit contested and constantly transforming itself, persisted through the colonial epoch; then to its conjuncture with the postcolonial politics of the nation-state. For it is here, we believe, that the answers lie. Observe, in all this, that we have three subtexts, three not- so-hidden agendas. One is to show that African political anthropology, despite repeated criticisms of theoretical aridity, has something yet to add to the analysis of world- historical phenomena. The second grows out of an old axiom. Long ago, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940:4) said that Western political philosophy, because of its lack of comparative perspective, has had nothing useful to say to political anthropology. We seek to turn this on its side: to argue that a political philosophy found in another social world may be the basis of a critical anthropology of our own. The third is to provide a corrective to the persisting tendency in the global north to reduce Africa to adjectives – communalist, clientalist, patriarchal, and the like – thus to reproduce tired racist archetypes. And, worse yet, to mistake those archetypes for empirical descriptions in which to ground political theory.

    IV.

    Botswana, until 1966 the Bechuanaland Protectorate, is usually said to be made up of eight distinct chiefdoms (“tribes”). These, prior to incorporation within the British Empire in 1885 and with modifications during the colonial period, were the major, but not the only,13 political communities into which indigenous populations were grouped.14 Although the system of local government has changed over the years, and chiefs have been denuded of much of their authority,15 the eight chiefdoms still exist. Some of the larger ones are today (more-or-less) coterminous with the jurisdictions of districts and their councils. Moreover, while its urban centers have grown enormously, Botswana is stereotypically seen as a predominantly rural nation: much of its citizenry was raised in, and sustains active links with, “villages.”

    While chiefdoms varied in size and in the minutiae of their institutional arrangements, the dominant features of their political organization, cultures, and ideology were broadly shared. These have been thoroughly documented;16 although there does remain some controversy about the politics of succession to high office17 – and an unfortunate tendency among Western social scientists to typify the public sphere in Tswana communities, often glossed as “the kgotla system” (see below), in rather too simple terms.18 For present purposes, the briefest of summaries will do.

    From the earliest documentary accounts we have of centralized “Bechuana” polities, dating from the first half of the 19th century, three things are clear.19 The first is that the chiefship was seen to be the axis mundi of the social world. It was, as one Tshidi-Rolong elder said to us in 1969, like the pinnegare, the central pole, of houses of old. Everything – the fertility of the earth and the abundance of the rains, security from attack and success in war, the passing of the seasons and “giving of the seed-time,” material wealth and spiritual well-being, the crafting of legislation and courts that judged fairly – all these things, and much besides, turned around the apical office. Its holder, in principle at least, personified his people, signified their sovereignty and subjectivity, embodied their essence. He was known by an honorific whose form was the metonymic singular of the name of his “nation” (morafe): Mokwena, the ruler of the Bakwena (mo-, sing; ba-, plural), Mongwaketse, the ruler of the Bangwaketse, and so on.

    But, second, a clear line was drawn between chiefship (bogosi) and chief (kgosi), office and incumbent. The former stood for the very existence of the polity. It was the public sphere incarnate, the morafe made manifest and represented back to itself as a political principle. The authority vested in it – albeit historically shifting over the long-run – was taken, at any moment in time, to be beyond question. The latter, by contrast, was merely human. He might be more or less effective a ruler, more or less influential, more or less adept at mobilizing the political capital available to him. Early European visitors to the Tswana were impressed by the charisma and command of some “kings” who, it is said, struck awe into their followers and whose slightest whim elicited the strictest compliance. But they were also fascinated by the frankly critical way in which most sovereigns were addressed at their own courts. And by the fact that their power was often constrained by the sheer unwillingness of their subjects to do their bidding.20 Elsewhere (e.g. J.L. Comaroff 1975, 1978; see n. 17) we have shown that a chief who lost all legitimacy, who was said publicly to be “not fit to rule” (Campbell 1822,2:157), was likely to find his genealogical status successfully contested by a rival. This in spite of the prevailing rules of ascription according to which sovereigns held office by virtue of birth, not election. It was always possible to unfix the fixities, to unscrew the inscrutabilities, of ascribed rank by reconstruing the relations that gave rise to it.

    The third thing of note is that great store was placed here on what might be glossed as “good government.” Substantively speaking, chiefs were responsible for all aspects – political, judicial, administrative, material, spiritual – of collective well-being; that is, for everything in the public domain. This, furthermore, is to be understood in historical terms: sovereign responsibility embraced the fluid realities of time, space, and situation. Where transformed conditions demanded, say, that the colonial state be dealt with in a particular fashion, or that dams and storage depots be built for purposes of agrarian “development,” rulers were held to account for the discharge of these functions. But, and this is the crucial point, the ideology of good government paid less attention to the content of public affairs than to the means by which they were managed.

    Tswana ideas about the proper means of governance were elaborate, nuanced, and enduring; we heard any number of discourses on the topic in the 1970’s. Above all, they stressed (i) the participatory, consultative aspect of the public sphere, in which there was, ostensibly, “perfect freedom of debate” (Philip 1828,1:133), and in which all male citizens (more recently, all adults)21 were entitled to a voice – just as they had the right to be represented by headmen on chiefly councils; (ii) the proportional relationship between the performance of any ruler (assessed against the cannons of good government) and his legitimacy (as indexed in his recognized capacity to wield control over people, policy, and public life); and (iii) the fusion of what, in Western social science, is nowadays distinguished as civil society and the state.

    In sum, chiefs were expected to rule “with” the people. Kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe went the most quoted adage in the Tswana political lexicon; “a chief is chief by the nation.” What this meant, in practice, is that sovereigns were expected to surround themselves with advisors to guide the everyday life of the polity, men for whose advice and actions they were held responsible; to hold regular meetings of councils of headmen and other chiefly conclaves; to summon public assemblies of various kinds from which emerged policy that reflected popular views and attended to the common weal; to ensure that the hierarchy of courts over which they presided did not favor the rich over the poor, royals over commoners, or men over women (even though the latter, as “jural minors,” had to be represented by male kin); to be open always to approach by their subjects, whose physical welfare they were also obliged to heed, redistributing food and other requisites in times of need.

    In Southern Tswana chiefdoms, in fact, past rulers were — in some places they still are – recalled by the legislation they introduced (cf. Schapera 1943) and by the wisdom of those whom they recruited as advisors. They are also remembered by their capacity to bring rain, itself a sure spiritual gauge of political mastery; but that is another story. Ultimately, in this respect, chiefly success was numbered in observable achievements: “improvements,” in the Protestant-saturated language of modernist governance. But delivering improvements, in turn, hinged on the public cooperation that a ruler could command. Which, tautologically, depended on the degree to which he was seen to measure up to the ideals of good government. Note, by way of example, the following text, which we published more than thirty years ago (J.L. Comaroff 1975:145). It comes from a speech made by a local elder statesmen in February, 1970 at the installation of Besele, the new ruler of the southernmost chiefdom of Barolong:

    A chief can only be judged by what he does…If you treat [people] with respect, they will treat you with respect. If you shun them, they will shun you. And if you frighten them they will run away… We will be watching to see whether you are going to make improvements. Chiefship is not an easy job. A chief never sleeps. A chief does not discriminate. Batswana say that a chief is chief because of the nation. If we cannot see you in the court [kgotla] we shall draw away from you. And if we do will you still call yourself chief?

    In analyzing this text when we first published it, we noted, in particular, how it underscored the significance attributed, in the local political imaginaire, (i) to the Hegelian interdependency between ruler and subject; (ii) to the measurability of chiefly success in terms of practical, palpable accomplishment (“what he does, his industry…[his] improvements”); and (iii) to the possibility that an authoritarian or an inattentive sovereign may be repudiated [“shunned”], even removed (“if we [draw ourselves away from you, will you still [be able to] call yourself chief”), notwithstanding the ideology of ascription in terms of which succession to high office is represented (see above; also n.17).

    This, self-evidently, implied the existence of a model of incumbency, a paradigm of political legitimation in terms of which the actions of rulers were evaluated and their authority negotiated; by which, that is, the equation of performance to power was given practical, realized form. At the core of this equation was a simple socio-logarithm: the willingness of political subjects to comply with the commands of a chief was held to depend on the degree to which he could demonstrate, in public, that he had properly discharged the obligations of his office.

    It follows – pace received wisdom that goes back to African Political Systems (1940) and persists in some quarters – that the “rights and duties” of Tswana (and, for that matter, other African) sovereigns was never immutable, never fixed by “tradition.” To the contrary. Their authority varied widely. As we have already said, some appeared, alike to their subjects and to outsiders, as mighty kings. Having established their legitimacy, they could exercise almost dictatorial power. Others found it hard to impose their wills, or their executive decisions, at all. Most, however, traversed the line between these extremes during their reigns.22 To be sure, many of the scholarly arguments that surround the analysis of Tswana politics, past and present, flow from an inattention to precisely this capacity for transformation over time and space.

    How, then, did the model of incumbency, the equation of performance-to-power, work out in everyday practice? The answer to this question begins with the fact that, whatever their formal agendas, public meetings were also forums in which chiefly regimes were subjected to debate and evaluation. The process was founded on a crucial assumption: that there existed, tacit but nonetheless well understood, an incremental scale of sovereign authority; that, as the legitimacy of a ruler increased, the more inclusive (and exclusive) became his recognized right to regulate the various ways and means, the instruments and institutions, of governance23 – expanding, potentially at least, until it embraced virtually all aspects of social life. Thus, for example, before the passage of the Tribal Land Act (1968), a strong chief enjoyed, among other things, sole control over the distribution of fields, pasturage, and residential plots – either allocating them himself or appointing surrogates to do so – and a monopoly over the creation of new political constituencies (wards, sections, villages, provinces), along with the offices that ruled over them. He also could expect to be obeyed when he summoned labor for communal works and improvement projects, to receive sundry forms of tribute, to minister over the timing of the ritual and agricultural cycles, and to have his legislative initiatives, executive orders, and legal judgments implemented with dispatch.24

    Conversely, a ruler who lost his legitimacy, a process that occurred slowly rather than suddenly, found it ever more difficult to exert control as, cumulatively, he forfeited the various rights of office. The exact composition of this scale of rights differed from chiefdom to chiefdom. But it appears to have existed in some form everywhere; again, with contrasting degrees of explicitness. In Barolong, for instance, the first thing a chief would lose was his sway over the activities of voluntary associations, which were likely to listen to him politely and then ignore him utterly; thence he would forego his monopoly over the allocation of land, this usually being effected by public demand that a committee be appointed to “help” him make decisions. Next went the taken-for- granted presumption that judgments and sentences handed down in his court would be executed without question. This was followed by the erosion of other capacities and entitlements: to call people to labor on public works, to enact legislation, to establish new constituencies or regulate space and time, to demand tribute, finally even to summon meetings.

    But this leaves one part of the question unanswered. By what rhetorical means and concrete measures was the indigenous equation of performance to power actually resolved? How was the legitimacy of a reigning chief – the substance and scope of his command over the public sphere — actually negotiated? How, in short, did sovereign authority actually come to expand or contract?

    Through mahoko, words. Words spoken in kgotla, in the public sphere, which were assumed to have great pragmatic power to affect the world; words spoken in the genre of political oratory, a genre not specifically named in Setswana but one for which Tswana are justly famed. Theirs is a rich aural culture, in which the aesthetics of utterance are potent indeed. And in which the negotiation of chiefly legitimacy takes on a very particular form.

    Before saying more about that genre, however, a point of clarification. The kgotla might have been where chiefly authority was negotiated, but the production of that authority, and the power that lay behind it, was an altogether more complex matter. To hold that legitimacy was determined by the unconstrained consent of the governed, that it was decided purely by argument in town meetings, or that rulers bore passive witness to their own evaluation – all of which is implicit in the vernacular model of incumbency – is to simplify reality. Public debate, always the object of careful strategy and management, was a site of struggle, not a neutral enactment of vox populi. The distribution of support to which it gave voice depended, in major measure, on prior power relations, relations forged in offstage dealings of various kinds. The discourse of chiefly evaluation provided a medium by which the invisible calculi of patronage and influence congealed into social “facts,” collectively recognized lines of alliance and antagonism. There is a tautology here, of course: civic discussion was taken both to reflect and to determine sovereign legitimacy. But the tautology is more apparent than real. Verbal exchanges in kgotla made manifest, and so converted into the currency of politics, all the transactions that occurred, dispersed and individuated, across the axes of everyday life.

    Tacit in all this is a political dynamic of some moment for the more general question at hand. Inasmuch as discourses of chiefly evaluation expressed alliances and antagonisms, support and opposition for the ruler – inasmuch, that is, as they were a partisan theater of the political, they tended to be articulated around identifiable factions. The existence of (usually a pair of) such factions was endemic in local public life. (The reasons for this are too complex to go into here. They flow from the fissiparous character of Tswana polities of the past, which were often wracked by rivalries over the chiefship. These invariably pitted the reigning sovereign against an agnatic adversary, thus dividing the morafe into two blocs, each around its royal leader.) One of the factions was always composed of “king’s men,” core supporters from among whom the personnel of his regime were drawn; 19th century missionaries, tellingly, sometimes referred to them as “the chief’s party.” The other, which might be more or less articulate(d), bounded, and assertive, depending on circumstance, typically clustered around senior royal patrikin who were, potentially and often in practice, the ruler’s primary adversaries for position and property. Again, all this been well documented. The point, as far as we are concerned, was the taken-for-granted, almost inevitable presence of factional alignments in local politics. For out of these blocs came the primary players, the dramatis personae, of the public sphere — as well, significantly, as the political and dialogical motivation that gave shape to discourses of chiefly evaluation.

    The aesthetics of public discourses about governance and chiefly performance – the poetic play, that is, of form and substance – held the key to their politics. The latter derived from the juxtaposition, in “parliamentary” speeches, of two kinds of utterance; two styles, whose difference was closely connected to the vernacular distinction drawn between office and incumbent. One style (elsewhere we have referred to it as a “formal code”; J.L. Comaroff 1975) spoke of the ideals of good government, and of the regnant ideology of chiefship, largely in idiomatic form; phrases like kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe (see above), batho ga se ba melamu, ba bokwa ka lotlhare (“people are not ruled with clubs, they are waved with winnowing fans”), and others that specified expectations of office-holders. These utterances relied heavily on formulaic speech, were rarely phrased in the first person singular, their author usually being the collective “we” (“We Barolong say that…;” “It is our way/custom…” “Our fathers taught that…”). What is more, because they invoked shared values, they presupposed the consensual agreement of speaker and audience.

    Strikingly different to these formulaic utterances, the second kind addressed the performance of the chief. Phrased always in the first person singular (“I must speak my mind, Chief!…”; “I have heard what others say. It is my view that …”), statements made in this register were not formulaic at all. Typically frank and forthright, sometimes even brutally censorious, they tended to be syntactically more elaborate, to deploy a wider vocabulary, to rely more on evidentiary argument than on shared assumptions, and to be voiced with a view to their persuasive force. These statements were made in a spirit of political argumentation. In observing such speech acts, we were also struck by the fact that, in contrast to more formal utterances – which, at best, were heard in polite silence – they were typically listened to in rapt attention.

    These two styles were deployed in careful counterpoint to one another during the course of most political speeches. For their part, “king’s men” sought to convince the public at large of the convergence between the ideals of good government and the reigning incumbent’s record of actions and accomplishments; this by iterating the first, in formulaic speech, as a point of reference, a template almost, against which to mount first-person polemics, propositional claims and political arguments. Conversely, opposition factions would try to force the greatest plausible divergence between the mantras of good government and the material performance of the office-holder, at least as they construed it in their narratives of failure.

    For chiefly protagonists, it follows that the greater the degree of convergence they could establish in the public eye between ideal and performance, the broader the claims they could make for expanding the authority of the ruler. Ultimate success, in theory, was when office and office-holder became as one, when statements in the formulaic mode about the first might be said to apply to the second; in practice, this condition of absolutism was never reached in Tswana polities, there being counter- forces which put constraints on the accumulation of sovereign power beyond a certain point. The inverse is also true. For opposition blocs, final victory occurred when the divergence between the ideal of good government and the performance of an office- holder became so great – and, concomitantly, sovereign authority so truncated – that the ruler was no longer a “real chief.” Whereupon, as we implied earlier, he could well be deposed.

    Participation in discourses of chiefly evaluation was not confined to those who identified with one or other faction, although the close supporters and active antagonists of a ruler were likely to be most vocal; also the most caught up in the political tactics and intrigues that often lay behind, and broke through to the surface, in the dramaturgy of public dialogue. The unaligned, however, did not merely add their voices to the debate. They acted, at once, in the manner of a chorus and a jury, echoing or disagreeing with the arguments of those more partisan, commenting on their plausibility and persuasivess, and suggesting implications that might follow for the standing of the chief. From these interventions a measure of consensus was likely to emerge as speakers began slowly to draw closer in their views; this measure serving to confirm, expand, or redelimit the state of sovereign authority for the time being.

    In sum, the kgotla was more than a forum for the discussion of social policy, although it certainly was that too. Nor was it just an African analogue of the classical polis (see n.18). It was also (i) a context for ongoing discourse about governance and sovereign authority – and, simultaneously, (ii) a space of contestation in which the powers of a living ruler were negotiated and given social currency. Its primary constituencies were factions rather than political parties, one a chiefly bloc and the other an opposition. These constituencies, patently, did not differentiate themselves according to ideology or matters of principle. Their arguments, recall, were about the means of government, not its content. In striking contrast to Western nation-states, where policy is seen from within to be the provenance of partisan politics, here it was taken to be a product of public discourse.

    There is much more to the subtleties and the substance of Tswana political culture, past and present. Also to the workings of its public sphere. Enough has been said, however, to allow us to revisit, and to make sense of, contemporary discourses of democracy and the postcolonial politics of this nation-state.

    Two brief, final observations before we do.

    One is that there has been a revisionist tendency, in some circles, to portray “the kgotla system” as an altogether more repressive, more authoritarian institution than we and others allow. Good (1992:70; cf. Parson 1984:6f), for instance, says that “the kgotla essentially operated to facilitate social control by the leadership,” the implication being that it had less to do with the politics of public deliberation than with the sheer exercise of power by ruling cadres (cf. van Binsbergen 1995). This might have been true, some of the time, of some of the stronger, more centralized chiefly regimes – such as that of the Ngwato, the largest of all “tribal” polities in Botswana and the one usually treated as paradigmatic. But, as a general statement about the Tswana public sphere, the claim does not bear scrutiny. The documentary record shows that the kgotla was always a site of active political contestation in which, far from merely being exercised, sovereign authority had to be negotiated. And could be forfeited as well as fortified, withdrawn as well as won.

    The other point is that, in the passage from the past to the postcolonial, the kgotla has remained a crucial element in the political imaginaire of Botswana. This in spite of its roots in the “village.” Or its “traditionalist” connotations. Since independence, in fact, public forums, called “freedom squares,” have been created all over the country, including in urban contexts. The resonance with an older vernacular public sphere could not be more obvious. Furthermore, as we shall see in a moment, national politicians have found themselves drawn back to the kgotla even in the course, and cause, of distinctly nonparochial political processes. In short, what we speak of here is far from a quaint anachronism, a romantic remnant of days gone by. It describes a cultural context, and a set of discursive practices, that are very much of the continuing present.

    V.

    Let us return, then, to postcolonial politics and discourses of democracy.

    In 1965, some months before Botswana became independent, national elections were held for the first time. Here, as in many other parts of Africa, decolonization – in the formal, political sense of that term – was fairly rapid. Three years earlier, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had been established under the leadership of Seretse Khama and “other bourgeois nationalists” (Good 1992:72) drawn largely from a cattle-owning elite with strong connections to the countryside. From the start, the BDP promised to relegate chiefship and “tribalism” to the peripheries of postcolonial governance. It pledged itself to the evolution of a secular liberal nation-state, European in style; to the growth of a secure capitalist economy based on a mix of agrarian and industrial development, conventionally conceived; to a politics of moderation, the rule of law, and broad principles of social justice.

    From the start, too, as Picard (1987) notes, the BDP groomed itself to be a “government party.” Enjoying strong support from the colonial administration, it acquired “a monopoly of the resources and apparatus of the state” (Good 1992:72). Other parties were formed as well, some of them earlier. But they never approached the levels of organization, the material and cultural capital, or the broad-based following of the BDP. The latter was helped by the fact that its members of parliament and district councillors “frequently [had] close kin ties with the traditional aristocracy” (Colclough and McCarthy 1980:41). Although the party set out to marginalize chiefs, and to distance post-independence Botswana from its indigenous political culture/s, there is no question that Seretse’s own popular status at the grassroots was due, in part, to his royal rank –which had been dramatically underscored by imperial intervention. Heir to the Ngwato chiefship, he had famously been forced, by Her Majesty’s Government, to renounce his rights to office as a condition of return from an involuntary exile occasioned by his marriage to a white woman.

    That first election, as we said above, yielded an overwhelming victory for the BDP. What was most notable about it, though, was the very high turnout: 74% of all those registered. This was in spite the fact that, in some parts of the country, voter education had been severely limited. Moreover, because distances to polling places were often large and transport was not always available, it was physically difficult for many actually to cast a ballot. Nor was the organization of the election entirely problem- free. All of which made the high rate of participation altogether remarkable. And interesting, too, in light of accusations, voiced in the media and by foreign observers in the 1980’s, that a disturbing proportion of the populace of Botswana evinced indifference to, or ignorance of, the democratic process. It is even more striking in light of what was to happen later.

    What, then, did happen later?

    Several things, of which four stand out. The first was a radical drop in voter turnout in subsequent elections, down, for example, to 31% in 1974. There is one conspicuous exception, however: 1984, the national ballot after Seretse Khama’s death, when his successor, Quett Masire, had to go to the country as its new president-in- waiting. And go to the country he did. Literally. He went from kgotla to kgotla in an effort to persuade people to vote, to prove his willingness to listen to their demands, and to assure them that he would govern them well (Shepherd 1984:28.) An explanation for these patterns of voter turnout? According to Holm (1987:124), “a segment of the public” thought that, “as has always been the case with a chief, there is no need to reelect the President. Thus they do not go to the polls until a new President is chosen.” He is correct to draw the parallel, although we would take it further. As incumbents of apical offices, chiefs and presidents were subject to similar ideologies of governance (cf. Charlton 1993:331): both were expected to demonstrate their acumen and accomplishments in office; neither could assume their legitimacy; each was held to account for his actions, for the wisdom of his advisors, for the performance of his regime; and each had to subject himself to evaluation – all of which Masire appears to have appreciated. But, as long as they ruled “with the people,” and delivered the fruits of good government, there was no particular need to vote for or against them; under which conditions, ironically, as Colclough and McCarthy (1980:44) conclude, “declining turnout [may] be taken as a mark of approval.” Indeed, Holm (op. cit.) implies, it is only when a new incumbent has to be designated, for reasons of death or deposition, that there is a felt need for an expression of mass public opinion. Then, too, the process runs in close parallel. In each instance, a candidate is identif ied by a ruling cadre (the majority party in the case of the president, powerful royal factions in the chiefdoms), and is presented to the polity for its consideration. Hence the high turnouts in 1965 and 1984. And the indifference on most other occasions.25 In such circumstances, procedural democracy – defined (i) by elections whose primary justification is the abstract passage of time, (ii) by an ethos of choice and change, and (iii) by mass public participation – seems a somewhat curious creature. Of which more in a moment.

    In this respect, second, another statistic is noteworthy. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, it was said that only a small proportion of the populace “knew” their parliamentary representatives, except where they were major public figures. Struck by this at the time, we did a preliminary survey, asking the question of 105 people in five southern villages. Around 55% said that they had no idea of the person concerned. Another 30% could give a name, but nothing else. Just under 15% answered in the affirmative. Yet more remarkable was the fact that over a quarter offered, unsolicited, that it made little real difference: that BDP members of parliament were the advisors and councillors of the president and that he was responsible both for appointing them and for their actions. Echoes, again, of a model of governance whose genealogy stretches deep into setswana, “Tswana ways.” In point of fact, politicians have become less anonymous in recent years. Still, one part of the idea, that a leader is responsible for the personnel of his/her regime, remains firmly intact.

    Third, notwithstanding low voter turn out and the relative anonymity of political representatives, election meetings held by the BDP tended to draw crowds in the countryside. Among the opposition parties, in contrast, only those visited by important personages – an ex-chief back home, a charismatic with a big following, and the like – were well attended. We sat at many with only the candidate and a few of his friends. At BDP meetings, too, local people expected the president or a “close advisor” (i.e. a cabinet minister), to present themselves. Constituency politicians, those parliamentarians whom they “did not know,” were not good enough. After all, and this is the point, these meetings were knowingly modeled on the kgotla, that space of intersection between civil society and the state, between the public sphere and the politics of incumbency. Their object was not just to discuss matters of social concern, to play at popular, consultative democracy. It was also to evaluate the performance of the president and his party. And to hold him accountable for the extent to which the BDP had met the demands of good government. In this light, it seems injudicious to conclude, as van Binsbergen (1995:25-8) does, that the appeal to “the kgotla system,” dubbed a “neotraditional facade,” is merely a cynical effort by an authoritarian “state elite” to subjugate, appropriate, and manipulate local institutions. This was not the spirit in which Masire went to the country in 1984, nor the tenor of the BDP meetings which we attended over the years. Perhaps, though, it is the trend of the present and future. But that is another story.

    In both their poetics and their politics, BDP election meetings evoked earlier discourses of chiefly authority. Speakers tended to line up into blocs of pro- and antagonists – the former being local party members, the latter, a coalition of dissent – surrounded by an unaligned public. Most of them spelled out the requirements of good government, typically in formulaic terms and in the authorial name of the transcendant “we” of nationhood and/or setswana. And then they offered their appraisals, often in starkly frank, pragmatic prose, always in the first person singular. In so doing, depending on their political positioning, they either proclaimed a convergence or a divergence between ideal and reality. Supporters, in particular, told a teleological tale of improvement. They spoke of the very successful “material performance of the post- independence state” (van Binsbergen 1995:27); also, usually, of the disbursement of resources “to all parts of the country equally” and the absence of clientelism (Charlton 1993:341). Others disputed just these things. The specifics of their counter arguments were contingent on place and circumstance, but they were frequently couched in accusations that government had “forgotten them.” (A popular pun in the south played on the name of the capital, Gaborone, named for the local chiefly dynasty; BDP critics called it ga re bone, “it does not see us.”) On both sides of the debate, however, there was the tacit assumption, utopian perhaps, that the BDP could only expect to enjoy legitimacy and the cooperation of the populace to the degree that it established the quality of its governance.

    This is not to say that the electoral process mimicked the workings of the kgotla, past or present. The politics of the nation-state were not those of the chiefship writ large, nor are they today. Nonetheless, they did converge in two things. One was a deep aversion to autocracy at all levels of governance; hence Khama’s insistence that to “fetter criticism” is “against…Setswana tradition.” The other was the unspoken conviction, widely distributed across the various publics of Botswana, that substantive democracy depended on the simultaneity of (i) discourses of policy, seen here, as we said, to be the product of deliberative processes, not of partisan interest; and (ii) discourses of accountability, in which the proportionate relationship between performance and power was negotiated. The outcome of that negotiation, expressed in a quantum of sovereign authority, might have been heavily influenced by offstage dealings, by the capillary workings of the state, and by the social capital mobilized by ruling elites. And it might have been perverted by the covert forms of authoritarianism of which van Binsbergen speaks. But, for now, what is significant is this: underlying all public spheres was a civic culture that specified the means of producing a certain kind of participatory politics, a politics grounded in an articulate, popular ideology of good government.

    In this civic culture, it will be clear, elections were important to the degree that they opened up a space, periodically at least, for substantive democracy. On the other hand, voting – procedural democracy – was much less salient, save at moments of crisis. Which is why people in the countryside would attend protracted political meetings and then often not cast a ballot, or do so more to express their dis/approval for the governing party than to exercise choice. Thus, for example, in 1974, the Botswana National Front (BNF) candidate from Barolong, O.B. Marumolwa, voted for the BDP – against himself. After hearing the president and a cabinet minister speak at several meetings, and give account of their performance, he declared that they should remain in office. “You do not just remove a ruler,” added Marumolwa, himself of royal descent.

    This brings us, fourth, to the curious character of political parties here. Recall Colclough and McCarthy’s (1980:41) comment that the BDP was “not a mass party” at all; that it barely existed between elections; that it was, more than anything else, an immanent reservoir of support centered on the president and his cabinet. Nor, for their part, have any of the minority parties been an enduringly significant presence in the public domain. Even at their most active, these parties have served less as coherent ideological alternatives to the BDP than as a critical opposition, pure and simple. Some of them have been odd ideological hybrids. The BNF, for one, grafted a “traditionalist” wing, headed by a former chief, onto a “radical” one, led by a left wing Euro-intellectual. Custom and communism partying together is hardly what Weber had in mind in his classic typification of this species of voluntary association. In fact, both the BDP and BNF seem to have behaved more like the factional blocs we encountered in kgotla. This impression is reinforced by their conduct in the national assembly (Colcough and McCarthy 1980:46):

    [T]he daily business of the National Assembly is conducted in a manner closer to the best of the African one-party states than to the Westminster model. The alignment is not so much the government benches against the opposition as Ministers against the backbenchers. Sometimes, indeed, opposition members are seen to support the Government when its own backbenchers are critical. Thus the role of the National Assembly, like that of the traditional Kgotla, is to audit proposals made by those in authority: to approve them and occasionally reject them. The Ministers respect this function of the assembly.

    Talk here, once more, of a one-party state, and its juxtaposition to the workings of the kgotla, brings us full circle to the problem with which we began, and to the denouement of our argument.

    VI.

    Put together these various points and it will be clear what the call in the 1970’s for a one-party state was all about. It was an argument, in effect, against procedural democracy. Against democracy as the mere exercise of electoral options. Against the idea that freedom may be equated with choice. Against democracy, to return to Gertla Riviero, as a small idea, the kind of European export that promises the world and delivers Kentucky Fried Chicken. Given their own conception of participatory politics, their own ideologies of sovereign authority, legitimacy, and accountability, it is obvious why so many citizens of Botswana were alienated by the Western model, at least as presented to them. And why, by threatening to confine mass public involvement to a fleeting season every five years, it opened up a chasm between the state and civil society. For some, the very fact that the BDP leadership was so keen to sustain a Euro- styled multi-party system was itself an indictment.

    More positively, the agitation for one-party government – towards which, interestingly, the national assembly was then moving in its own routine procedures – was a demand for a (re)turn to substantive democracy, to a civic culture in which participatory politics would be the stuff of everyday life. And in which the ruling regime was authorized to act for the nation in proportion to its warranted performance in office. Put another way, it called for a vernacular, indigenously rooted version of the kind of liberal democracy that Euromodernity has long idealized but scarcely realized – let alone implanted successfully elsewhere, especially when other interests have intervened. In hindsight, the gesture might appear to have been utopian, quixotic even. It also dated to a particular moment in the early history of this postcolony. But it gave voice to a deeply felt critique of taken-for-granted European political practices and institutions.

    That critique spoke of a specifically African alternative, one that demanded not less popular sovereignty but more, not less accountability but more, not just choice but a public culture of criticism. All of which, of course, the global north has been moving steadily away from in recent times; prescient here is Julius Nyerere’s piquant comment, made already in the 1960’s, to the effect that the United States has “only one political party, but…[has] created two versions of [it].”26 Euro-American heads of state tend these days to act with ever greater impunity, to claim ever wider executive authority, and to promise as little government as possible. Concomitantly, large numbers of their citizens appear willing to forego freedoms, sovereignty, and the rule of law in the name of security and material well-being; vide the Patriot Act in the USA and the introduction of detention without trial in the UK, both post-9/11 measures that recalled the days of high apartheid in South Africa. Except in moments of rupture, moreover, levels of political involvement in the north seem steadily to wane, amidst accusations of epidemic apathy. In some European countries – Spain, Portugal, and Sweden being notable cases – an even smaller proportion of voters are currently able to name electoral candidates than was the case in Botswana in the first years of its independence (Norris 2004:230-48).27 As citizens of that nation-state sought ways to move from procedural toward substantive politics, so the West seems intent to move in the opposite direction.

    In September 2009, a public intellectual and journalist in the USA, well known for his centrist political views, could quite plausibly title a widely syndicated essay on contemporary America, “One-Party Democracy.” Echoes of Nyerere, several decades on.28

    The process that we have described here, we reiterate, was firmly located in the social realities of Botswana at the time: in its comparative ethnic homogeneity, its small size, its proximity to a particular historical past, all of which made the dream of a demos founded on popular sovereignty and direct state accountability appear eminently viable. These realities do not obtain everywhere. To the contrary: Botswana was, and is, relatively unique. And yet the vernacular political forms found there bear strong similarities to others in Africa (cf. Chabal 1986), some of them clearly visible, some submerged, some violently suppressed. Which raises a familiar conundrum, if in unfamiliar terms: Why it is that, for the most part, “democracy,” however it may be defined, is so fragile across the continent? What is it that intervenes between the conditions of its possibility, which are patently present, and its practical realization? How is it that the possible is rendered, if not quite impossible, then so difficult to accomplish? Why, where “democracy” may be said to prevail in the nation-states of the global south, does it seem more procedural than substantive, more “thin” than “thick”? Could it be that Euro-America’s contemporary move in the same direction, toward a “thinned out” version of representative government, provides a clue? That Africa has merely seen the emptying out of the large idea, its reduction to a small one, before the global north? That, in this regard too, the latter is evolving toward the former? And for the same reason, namely, that politics itself is escaping the formal public sphere and the institutions of state more and more as it migrates elsewhere. Could the de- democratization of north and south simply be a devolutionary counterpoint coming to us everywhere as part of the neoliberal age — an age in which, Archbishop Ndungane of Cape Town recently argued,29 citizens everywhere are valued purely as “voter fodder,” in which “good government, transparency, accountability, integrity and honesty” are known largely by their absence? If so, does it not demand that we address this counterpoint in taking on the Big Question of Theory, ca. 2010: Wherein lies the future of politics and the public sphere, sui generis, as the new century unfolds? Is it, as we have begun to suggest in previous chapters, in new social and religious movements and other forms of mass action, in politics of life, their strident mobilization of “the street,” their ever more assertive resort to lawfare, their deployment of the internet, and all the other means of experimental insurgency that have emerged so powerfully in the south and appear to be migrating northward?

  • Foreward: Everyday State and Democracy in Africa

    Foreward: Everyday State and Democracy in Africa

    Everyday State and Democracy in Africa: Ethnographic Encounters, notable for both its timeliness and breadth of vision, mobilizes the distinctive, decentering perspectives of ethnography to capture the living practices, the everyday vernaculars, of the state and democracy in contemporary Africa. It exemplifies the turn in African studies—perhaps, more accurately, return—to treating these phenomena, in the first instance, as ordinary activities of world-making rather than as formal institutions or enshrined sovereignties; although, to be sure, those ordinary activities animate the manifest architectures of governance, the concrete abstractions, that bear down on the human beings who create and inhabit them.

    The volume finds uncanny resonance in what, on the face of it, is a starkly different take on the enigmas of African politics today, politics at once mundane, material, mythic: William Kentridge’s haunting Shadow Procession (1999) and its sequel, More Sweetly Play the Dance (2015). These animated films depict a recurring progression of moving images, the relentless march of history across the African continent—embodied here in anonymous human forms tramping en masse across the dystopic landscape of Johannesburg, amid the detritus of abandoned mines, industrial ventures, im/possible futures (Maltz-Leca 2018, 178). Some figures stumble or limp on prosthetic limbs. Some drag their possessions or tote the master’s burden. Some wear robes, bearing aloft palm fronds. Others march in coordinated defiance, striving, it seems, to interrupt the inexorable flow. A jubilant female soldier, up high on a platform, pans the horizon with an oversized gun as an associate waves a mammoth flag. A third holds aloft what looks like an iron cage in which he appears entrapped. Max Weber’s modernity on the move— economy, society, state, democracy?—going who-knows-where. Then a giant megaphone strides by on legs of human scale, as if broadcasting in the “language of stateness” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 5).

    These visual metaphors trace the predatory, performative, self-inflating logics of power, the ostensibly immaculate authority of ruling hegemonies; what Kentridge, artfully, calls “concepts on legs.”1 But they also make poignantly plain that it is ordinary walkers—and how better to capture the distinctive, self-mobilizing quality of the human?—who, in their joy, inspiration, or vengeance, breathe life into the larger visions and vehicles, the ways and means, of political society. We have no idea where the interminable stream, a regiment of load-bearing walkers, comes from or where it is headed. But it presses ever onward, flowing over barriers and around obstacles, thus to trouble the integrity and fixity of established forms (Fischer 2018). All this renders manifest a democracy in, and of, practice: it enacts, for whoever may be watching or listening, the endless mystery of what it takes to make and unmake a conscience collective, to produce society, to conjure into being that other fetish-on-the-hoof, the state.

    William Kentridge’s relentless walkers reiterate what he terms the “fugitive nature of anything you might be tempted to think of as an essence.”2 All social forms, in sum, are artifacts, structures of longer or shorter duration, constructed by people on the move, migrants of one sort or another, as they traipse across time and space. This, he insists, is a general truth that is less escapable in Africa than elsewhere; in places, that is, where normative fictions appear more sustainable, more resolutely “factual.”3 Similarly, we suggest, with ethnographically grounded social analysis. The point of the ethnographic gaze, not least when it is directed toward settled concepts like democracy and the state, is to look behind surface forms, elective affinities, and narrated certainties in real time, on the ground. By these means may everyday social and cultural practices be made to reveal “how realities become real, how essences become essential, how materialities materialize.” And how they persist, or melt into air (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 20).

    The turn to the everyday, the handmade, the unfinished, the transient might seem especially apposite to the experience of our precarious, deregulated times; times in which performativity, impermanence, self-making, and “responsibilization” are leitmotifs of public discourse. But it also speaks to a more enduring truth about the variable, evanescent life span ofall social forms and conventions, past and present. And to their rootedness, however stable and structured they may appear, in the practical activity of sentient agents, existing in labile symbiosis with wider human and nonhuman worlds. While early functionalist anthropologists might have fashioned timeless, ideal-typical models of “traditional” African societies, these were self-consciously systematized renderings of colonized communities whose internal political arrangements were no less under constant construction, no less pragmatically constituted, than those of liberal-modernist, putatively democratic postcolonies; after all, over the centuries, Africa witnessed the birth, rise, fall, and demise of precolonial states, including empires and kingdoms.

    Of course, Africanist political anthropology has, from the first, challenged many of the Euro-normative axioms of political science—and done so in a manner directly relevant to the perspectives and objectives of the present volume. Recall that, in his preface to African Political Systems, Radcliffe-Brown (1940, xiii, xxiii) famously asserted that the empirical observation of “simpler societies” could not be accommodated by the received paradigms of Western political philosophers or economists. Scholars of comparative institutions, he observed, were wont to depict the state as “an entity over and above the human individuals who make up a society,” attributing to it “something called ‘sovereignty,’ and ‘will,’” But states do not “exist in the phenomenal world” in this form. What do exist are a “collection of [individuals] . . . connected by a complex system of relations,” who together seek to control and regulate the use of brute force.

    Radcliffe-Brown, it scarcely needs saying, was proudly structural-functionalist. Yet he was quite nuanced in his denunciation of naked positivism: without “new and fruitful ideas,” he wrote, “method in itself gives birth to nothing” (1940, xiii), a point well taken in the era of big data and neo-empiricism. In his insistence on deflating the phantasmic supremacy of the state as a “fiction” obscuring the actually existing substance of political life, he anticipated one of the genealogies to which this collection is heir: a rich seam of grounded theoretical writing in anthropology and beyond that has shown, in fastidious detail, how dispersed practices of governance and sovereignty generate the effects of the state as a reified, hegemonic form of “politically organized subjection” (Abrams 1988, 63; see also Sharma and Gupta 2006). Also, how rites of conviviality, consumption, even terror crank the handle that inflates images of stateness (Mbembe 1992)—much like the magic through which ritual and mimesis generate “society” as something sui generis, something metaphysical (Foucault 1991; Taussig 1997; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Mazzarella 2017).

    But the charmed life of reified abstractions like “the” state or democracy—and the aspirations they inspire—are never above the socio-material forces of history. However much energy is given to the work of their everyday production, they remain vulnerable to discrepancies between the vision they articulate and the realities of life-as-lived: between, on one hand, the idyll of equality, rights, inclusion, security, well-being—the elemental components, these, of consociality—and, on the other, the disruption, disempowerment, immiseration, and necropolitics that render tenuous the legitimacy of their claim to be anything other than the self- serving rhetoric of plutocratic elites (Ake 2000, 7). The slippage between promise and realization has been all too evident since the end of the Cold War, a period, as we all know well, that has seen dramatic shifts in the global political-economic order; specifically, in the triangulation of state, democracy, and market, exacerbated by the planetary consolidation of financially founded corporate power. The implications of these transformations have been particularly acute in Africa. The impact here of liberalization, deregulation, and the outsourcing of the operations of state—ostensibly to decentralize authoritarian rule and to free economic enterprise from predatory accumulation—have opened up new modalities of “private indirect government” (Mbembe 1999), rogue accumulation, and the expropriation by capital of communal assets (Peters 2018). All of which has driven ever larger numbers of unwaged people into what Kentridge has called the recurring “procession of the dispossessed” (Maltz-Leca 2018, 176).

    Again, that Shadow Procession. Again, More Sweetly Play the Dance—an allusion to Paul Celan’s “Todesfuge” (“Death Fugue”), a poem from 1940s Germany—which speaks of “a way of living through violence and a way of dying by it.”4 The questions raised by the current moment, questions arising out of the rearticulation of state, democracy, and market, questions about whether the procession leads to new ways of living or hitherto unimaginable ways of dying, are these: With the state itself becoming ever more the institutional instrumentation of the market, ever more “captured” by capital, ever less bound by any sort of social contract, wherein lies the place of a politics of ordinary life? How, under these conditions, might everyday practices engage in making a democratic politics, and, even more, sustainable sociality? What sorts of statements might they, do they, make about the predicament of the present, a present in which the state and liberal-modernist democracy, far from having entered a new symbiosis at fin de siècle, may be caught up in their own danse macabre, a negative dialectic? Given that African Political Systems, the founding text of political anthropology, began by problematizing the state and the fictions hidden by its reification—given, also, that several studies contained in that volume addressed the richness of indigenous democratic practices—what does revisiting the nature of both, of both the state and democracy, eighty years on tell us about them? And about the kinds of quotidian activity that seek to address them, animate them, live them in the here- and-now? This is the clutch of questions toward which Everyday State and Democracy in Africa: Ethnographic Encounters leads us. It is an intellectual procession out of the shadows, less a danse macabre than a lively scholarly tournament of ideas, ethnographically choreographed, about the present and future of political life in Africa, and in the world in which it is situated.

  • The Wealth of Ethno-nations

    The Wealth of Ethno-nations

    The significance of ethnicity – of ethnicity understood as a foundational basis for forging selfhood and collective identity, feelings of primal attachment and shared affect, political claims to rights and the protection of interests, even for national belonging – has grown visibly over the past few decades. Needless to say, the phenomenon itself is hardly new.1 As a slippery, polyvalent concept of collective being, it had already troubled Max Weber (1968, 387ff.) a century ago – although, as a common noun, it only appeared in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary in 1961 and entered the anthropological lexicon relatively recently (Surak 2010, 152; Comaroff and Comaroff 2011, 68-72). What has been especially striking of late, however, has been its explosive entry into the market place. Of course, the merchandising of cultural difference – of the emblems, effects, capacities, and embodiments of “otherness” – dates back deep into to the mists of time. But the commercialization of culture and the corporatization of identity, the two constitutive elements of what has come to be referred to as “ethnicity, inc.,” have intensified greatly across the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century with the triumph of the maret as the ur-ideological nexus of world-making. Nor is it just that such things as heritage tourism, the sale of vernacular musics and art, or the financialization of the exotic have expanded rapidly in scale. It is that ethnic identity itself has been repurposed, taking on more objectified, commodified form. In so doing, it has animated novel species of value, claims to sovereignty, territory, and property, kinds of sociality and sensibility, and claims to distinctive skills.

    More than a decade ago, in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), we explored the impact of these transformations on peoples and populations across the globe: on the sense of personhood, sociality, ownership, and belonging they conjured into existence, on the emotive energies they engendered, and on the conscience collective they shaped. We tried, in other words, to plumb the impact of the commodification of difference in terms that went well beyond reducing ethnicity, inc. to the rise of global neoliberalism: terms that addressed the reifying, rationalizing effects of the commerce in things, qualities, and people – and, simultaneously, the slippages, spillages, and mutations spawned by that commerce. In short, we argued that the commodification of ethnic and national identity appeared to be generating new social and productive relations, revitalized affiliations, refigured aspirations, all of them with consequences yet to be fully determined. Nor is this occurring in a vacuum: it is part and parcel of an epoch in which the very essence of personal and political subjectivity, of economy and society and culture, of nation and state, has been under radical reconstruction; an epoch, also, in which the growing salience of identity is manifesting itself in the changing nature of labor, in the transnational migration of ethnically-marked workers in pursuit of livelihoods, and in the emergence of new, culturally-assertive diasporic networks and communities.

    The commodification of identity and, in particular, the imbrication of ethnic enterprise in the changing global order raised a number of critical questions. Would, could, the identity business deliver on the empowerment it appeared to promise, especially where received forms of livelihood, local work, and security were under threat? And, if it did, for whom? How sustainable were the relations of production, distribution, investment, and ownership it conjured into existence? When and where did that business fail to take root or flourish. At stake, too, were the sorts of ambitions authorized by identity-as-business – and how they might relate to other kinds of ethno- politics, including those inflamed by violence. Even more pressing was the question of whether ethnicity, inc. was a passing phenomenon at this particular historical conjuncture, or part of an enduring shift in the economic, judicial, expressive, and existential nature of cultural identity. And, equally relevant here, a related matter. To what extent has ethnicity, inc. masked another side, a dark underside, of identity-in-the- market: the devaluation and discounting of ethnically marked labor, especially that of unskilled migrant workers – in response to demand in the extractive, agri- and service industries – with their own affective and material investments in the identity economy?

    These questions pose another one, one that remains significant. Does the stress on the economics of ethnicity underplay its continuing political significance? After all, is it not the case that any assertion of ethnic self-determination, not to mention the incorporation of ethnic groups,2 takes shape within the overarching sovereignty of the nation-state and its legal Lebensraum (Surak 2010, 156-7)?3 Or, indeed, that any claim to recognition made in the name of identity is always, in the first instance, a political act? This, to be sure, echoes a core assumption of much anthropological and sociological theory-work on ethnicity; also the practical consciousness of a great deal of activism. But the framing of the question in these terms – which, in the spirit of liberal orthodoxy, treats the political and the economic as discrete institutional domains – misconstrues the very essence of ethnicity, inc.: that, in the new order of things, the political, the economic, the social, and the cultural dissolve into each other, mediated by the juridical, itself the frame of reference that validates economic rights and political claims. Put another way, even when the assertion of difference is voiced purely as a matter of politics, even when it disavows the economic, it always carries material, moral, affective, and jural entanglements along with it, whether or not they are made audible or visible.

    In the age of deregulation, in sum, when capital subdues labor and statecraft is largely shaped by the demands of the market, it is impossible any longer to treat “the political” as a discrete domain unto itself. The identity economy, we shall argue, is at once a political economy, a moral economy, a cultural economy, an affective economy. What is more, nation-states, themselves ever more corporate in form and function, have been drawn deeper and deeper into that economy. Many of them now brand themselves, actively market their intellectual property and creative capacities, celebrate an essential ethno-national character, and assert their putative cultural homogeneity against difference. In the upshot – even when they are constituted, ideologically, as civic, liberal democracies – nations have come increasingly to resemble ethnic groups writ large, especially those ethnic groups that have incorporated themselves, commodified their cultures and human capital, and entered assertively into the identity business.

    But we are running ahead of ourselves.

    The Enduring, the Emergent, and the Unforeseen

    Far from being a passing phenomenon, a conjuncture purely of the short-run, corporate identity has continued to manifest itself widely among peoples marked by their difference. All available evidence affirms the fact that populations that self-define as bioculturally distinctive have increasingly come to regard themselves as rights- bearing, asset-holding entities, their material and immaterial cultural products resources by law in the same way as is true of any limited liability company (Meiu, Comaroff, and Comaroff 2020). In the age of mass production and planetary circulation, moreover, commodities locally produced, and authenticated under the sign of indigeneity, tend to acquire added value – and, as they are interpolated into the economic mainstream, sometimes serve to revitalize struggling communities and defunct industrial margins (Colloredo-Mansfield 2011).

    Some culturally assertive, well-established ethno-corporations have continued to grow into major businesses, ever more firmly situated in the global economy; vide the Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. (STOFINC.com), whose income in 2019 was $853.84m,4 whose asset value is estimated to have risen to $12bn, whose brands now cover a wide range of industries, and whose holdings currently pay an annual dividend of $128,000 to every man, woman, and child in the Seminole Nation.5 Nor, it appears, are they the biggest or fastest growing Native American business in the USA. That honor, it is said, belongs to the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux of Minnesota; their entertainment operations and diversified holdings are reported to yield a yearly distribution of approximately $1m to every member of the four hundred and eighty strong community.6 In South Africa, famously, the Royal Bafokeng Nation – or Bafokeng, Inc. (e.g. Cook 2011; Kriel 2010), the object of a fair bit of anthropological attention – has expanded its financial and business interests, as have other ethnic mega-firms all across the world. And between them and those that struggle to eke out a sparse living through selling culture, are any number caught somewhere in the middle, striving to incorporate successfully and command a niche in the existential business of marketing products and skills under the sign of their identity.

    At the same time, a number of fine-grained ethnographies have begun to address the inverse situation: that in which corporate ethnicity fails to emerge where it might be expected to fluoresce. Such in the case, for instance, in Australia (Darian- Smith 2020); its government has largely crushed the autonomous efforts of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples to trade their internationally known, highly valued arts – itself part of what many see to be an oppressive “cultural backlash against minority peoples” – by subsuming them into national tourist industry (ibid., 241-2). This points to the significance of the state in the process of ethno-incorporation. Australia is not alone in discouraging indigenous populations – by means coercive or constitutional or managerial, for reasons stated or unstated – from entering into the moral and material economy of the market on their own account. By contrast, others have actively encouraged ethnic enterprise and even incorporation – like the USA, where the Indian Reorganization Act (1934) and Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) made “Recognized Tribes” into legally-founded corporations,7 although many have ended up in brute poverty. For identity to be minimally viable, and to become the stuff of enterprise, some validation of a legally-recognized right to difference must exist in the wider political context. Or be assertively claimed – all the more so since, otherwise, it risks being devalued, racialized, discounted.

    But it is not just state action that may intervene in processes of incorporation and the commodification of identity. There are also cases of endogenous refusal, not least when ethno-populations mistrust the market, believing that alienating their cultural products, their labor, or their knowledge, may lead to alienating themselves from their identity and its core values. Hence the long-time unwillingness of the Navajo and Hopi to join the Native American world of “reservation capitalism,” which only dissipated in the face of deep economic crisis.8 There are contexts, as well, in which the very idea of incorporation or the commodification of culture – indeed, even the assertion of ethnicity – provokes frank ambivalence. This is true of Roma, who are scattered all across (especially Eastern) Europe. A significant proportion of their number appear to doubt whether, in fact, they have customs or an identity in common; some actually hide that identity for fear of evoking a long history of stigmatization. Or worse. This is in spite of strong encouragement, coming from UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and sundry other protagonists, for them to “reclaim” their intangible heritage in the form of language and culture; also in spite of efforts by the activist Romani Movement to assert not just a collective identity, but “non-territorial nation” status (see e.g. Petrova 2003; Covrig 2004).9 And so we have, today, such entities as the Romani Cultural and Arts Company (http://www.romaniarts.co.uk/), registered in 2009, but as a non-profit, itself an ambivalent entry into the world of ethnic incorporation – a half way house, of sorts, on the road to ethnicity, inc.

    It goes without saying that some populations evince a simple lack of inclination – rather than outright refusal or indecision – to incorporate themselves and/or market their cultures. Moreover, ethno-business, at base, requires something to sell, something that others can be persuaded to buy. Many ethnic groups simply do not have anything much to merchandise. The ecology of cultural production excludes them from the wherewithal to engage in the identity business, except perhaps from their availability as relatively unskilled, even abject, labor. Where they do engage, however, and do so actively, the marketing of culture-as-commodity, its objectification and enclosure, is seldom free of argument. More often than not, it sparks bitter dispute and invariably requires careful choreography to disambiguate the messages it conveys. This is a point persuasively made by Tatiana Chudakova (2020) in respect of the contested effort to market Buddhist merit in Buryatia, eastern Siberia, and by Finola Kerrigan, Jyotsna Shivanandan, and Anne-Marie Hede (2012) on the ongoing struggle of the Incredible India Campaign to brand the kaleidoscopic, volatile, hybridizing cultural commonweal of the world’s largest democracy. It is also evident in Andrew Graan’s (2013) analysis of the fractious local response to efforts by Macedonia’s rulers to refigure Skopje as a historic European capital.

    These accounts illuminate some of the complexities involved in ethno- commodification: in the symbolic and material labor invested in making and retailing the tangible stuff of difference, thus to transform identity into capital. They also underscore the fact that the more power it packs, the more the process of incorporation is likely to become the object of argument. And the fact that, when it does, it brings into sharp focus latent ambivalences over the financialization of culture itself. This is not in the least surprising. For those who see themselves as sharing it, “a” culture, duly reified, has transcendent value. It is taken to be above the market, beyond price, vested with existential, timeless worth. And yet culture, sui generis, has never been entirely outside of the market or beyond price. As a form of monopoly capital, moreover, it promises to yield recognition, rights, royalties, and returns to those who “own” it. But only if and when it is rendered into – its relative worth determined by – a currency of universal valuation. Monetized, that is. And sold.

    Rudi Colloredo-Mansfield (2011) has sought to cast further light on the kinds of activity on which ethno-commodification depends. Bringing cultural objects to the market and securing a sustainable niche for them, he shows, rides on, among other things, the intensification of local production, the mastery of new technologies and expertise, and mobilizing external sources of investment and merchandising. The viability of ethno-commerce, he adds, is often threatened from within by efforts to privatize shared vernacular knowledge, skills, or hereditary status – and from outside by those who seek to profit from that commerce by investing in it on exploitative terms. Conversely, the intellectual property law used by individuals or sub-groups to appropriate (i.e., “enclose”) shared cultural practices and possessions can also be deployed in the name of the ethno-commons to protect joint heritage from its privatization.

    Colloredo-Mansfield (2011, 53) makes another important claim: that, rather than being regarded as discrete or opposed spheres, commerce and the commons frequently “grow…up together.” Like the gift and the commodity, we would add, ground zero of economic anthropology. The very idea of the commons in its contemporary sense, he suggests, is a consequence of market development, not a vestige of precapitalist relations. Hence the conviction of many resource activists that, if the business success of ethnopreneurs can be sustained, it would enhance their power, on behalf of the collective good, to limit the potential damage wrought by commodification, especially at the hands of outsiders. Not coincidentally, it is primarily against the rapacious tendencies of global capital that indigenous movements have grown up all over to champion stewardship of the commons: many local communities have taken a strong stand against the commercial erosion of their territories and, with it, the basis of a secure local livelihood. Witness, in this connection, the quest of the population of Haida Gwaii to preserve the custody of their terrain in British Columbia, Canada (Weiss 2018). Or the eight-year-long battle of Saami (also rendered Sami or Sámi) reindeer- herding cooperatives in northern Finland to retain control of their historic grazing lands (Sanders 2015).

    This strange symbiosis of market and ethno-commons is evident, too, in contemporary development discourse. For some time now, and increasingly, marketing strategists have stressed the competitive advantage of rooting translocal production, even of mainstream commodities in locally grounded sites, as Apple, Inc. has done in Cupertino, California, for instance. This is said to confer on them a distinctive “geographical indication,” or GI, a tag recognized by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to denote “the possess[ion] of qualities or a reputation…due to [their] origin.”10 In enhancing product identity, “geographical indication” is thought, in prospect at least, to invigorate the local cultural terroir and its generativity (Colloredo- Mansfield 2011, 51) – as though it were ethnicized. But not always. In practice, resort to GI may be, and often is, patently tenuous. Michele Fontefrancesco (2012), for example, notes that the “crafting of locality” in Valenza, Italy – where distinctive jewelry is manufactured in ostensibly traditional fashion – is belied by the rigid enforcement of techno-scientific norms from outside. In the age of finance capital and deregulation, the narrative of the commons and commonality is often just that: a narrative that, with ever greater intensity, romances vernacular authenticity, productivity, creativity, and togetherness while still being commandeered by those who control the means of manufacture and marketing. Meanwhile, the policies of more traditional development agencies, those aimed at populations on the margins of established economies, display a newfound emphasis on the capacity of inalienable heritage to generate alienable value. In the upshot, they have taken to urging people/s marked by their difference to regard alterity itself as a species of unlimited monopoly capital, an “abundant,” profitable source of wealth waiting to be harvested (see Hirsch 2020).

    The very intangibility of ethno-cultural heritage enables and enriches the rhetoric of value without limit, of the conjuring of money from nothing (cf. James 2015). To the degree that it does, investors and developers also have continued to push financialization, encouraging competitive ethnoprise and the recognition of indigeneity as a site of abstract investment capital (Nakassis 2013, 118), however uncertain it may be to yield returns of any magnitude. All too often, the discourse of natural abundance reverberates cynically, often alchemically, in marginal environments, environments already stripped of other assets or employment opportunities. In such places, as noted in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009, 41-42), the concept of “human capital” can take on ever more unnerving concreteness. Not only their culture or their natural habitat, but the very bodies of ethnic subjects increasingly become the source of exploitable – and for venture capital from outside, sometimes highly profitable – value in the form of branded raw material: for genomic and pharmaceutical research (Abu El-Haj 2012; Benjamin 2015; Petryna 2009), for “natural” prowess in sports,11 for innate musicality (Copeland n.d.), military force (May 2020), and exotic sexuality (Meiu 2017; 2020), or for other aptitudes and skills, including taxing physical labor.

    It seems clear, then, that, over the past several decades, ethnicity, inc., has been on the rise in many places, some of them unexpected. Such is the story of the Griqua, a marginal population in the South African interior (see Schweitzer 2015), who, at one point in their history, were said scarcely to exist and who have based their “reinvention of indigeneity…[and] the commodification of [their] ethnic history and culture” in a struggle for land rights (Zips 2015). Or, half way across the world, in Tibet, where, Martin Saxer (2013, 201) tells us, being Tibetan “serves as a commodity or asset . . . [as] actors engage, willingly or not, in the economy of Tibetanness.” Some mass media have picked up on the global story: the Vancouver Sun, for one, published a report in early 2018 under the title “The Rapid Growth of Ethnic Economies.” These economies, it said, had increased dramatically in both geographical scatter and visible incidence over the previous few years.12 We could go on ad infinitum: the phenomenon, patently, has entered the realm of the new normal.

    This is not to deny, as we have already made plain, that the spread of ethnicity, inc., founded conjointly on the commodification of culture and the incorporation of difference, has been very uneven, that it has sometimes been flatly repudiated, iconoclastically redeployed, or paid no heed. Moreover, it has had positive effects for some and steep downsides for many others, typically along pre-existing lines of inequality; worst yet, it has reaped brute exploitation where marginalized populations have nothing to sell but their ethnically-branded labor power in a market in which the commodification of difference meets the logic of racial capitalism (Maldonado 2009). But at base, there is no question that ethnicity, inc. – as a constructed sociological, political-economic, affective, and ethical reality – has sunk deep roots and, however haphazardly, is spreading. Nor only spreading. It’s framing logic is also extending itself further and further into the heartland of collective conscious and material life. Just as it is radiating out horizontally across the geoscapes of the planet, so is it upscaling vertically, to more embracing forms of being in the world – including nationality, which itself appears to be becoming ever more ethnicized. And in both its horizontal and its vertical extensions, identity, inc. is interpolating itself deeper and deeper into the contours of the labile, constantly mutating global economy. In fact, the strident efforts by marketers everywhere to invest commodities, producers, and brands with a distinctive essence, to particularize, exoticize, and root them in a given terroir, underlines a core feature of the identity economy: the more that culture is made marketable, the more the commodity itself is rendered cultural, thus to resonate with the desires of identity-seeking consumers. Commodification is, indeed, a queer process

    Ethno-Economics: Scaling out, Scaling up

    Perhaps the most immediate expansion of the reach of ethnicity, inc., is to be found in its original locus classicus: ethno-communities in postcolonial states and former settler colonies, emergent “nationalities” in postsocialist societies, and culturally marked minorities in (more or less) liberal democratic polities. Here, where they are positioned to do so, ethnic corporations tend to make claims for political and legal recognition as they widen their horizons in pursuit of business opportunity, some of it an intensification of older kinds of commerce, some of it new: in, among other things, heritage, eco-, and thanatourism (“dark tourism,” e.g. Hartmann 2014; Light 2017);13 in enclaved enterprises such as gambling and licensed big-game hunting (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Yatsuka 2018); in mining, forestry, transport, and communication (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009); in the marketing of indigenous knowledge, arts and crafts, ritual performances, music and vernacular theater (ibid.), even in “living museums” that offer menus from which visitors may purchase culture at “fixed prices” (Zips 2018, 22).

    In Africa, moreover, there is now wide acknowledgment of the “rebirth” of the “kingdom of custom,” the sovereign terrain of indigenous rulers, a number of whom – like the King of the Royal Bafokeng Nation (above, p.00) – have emerged as powerful corporate figures, even CEOs (Comaroff and Comaroff 2018). The liberalizing thrust of structural adjustment policies, under the Washington Consensus, played a significant role in this turn of events. It actively encouraged the devolution of aid and investment away from national capitals toward so-called “local communities,” thereby (re)legitimizing their rulers as their sovereign representatives – with fiduciary jurisdiction over their often considerable material and cultural interests (Comaroff and Comaroffibid.; Geschiere 2018). It is no wonder that many of these rulers have become skilled dealers in ethnic patrimony, willing real estate and labor brokers with mining companies, and adept venture capitalists on their own account (e.g. Coyle 2018; J. Smith 2018). Or that, emboldened by a mix of authority at once corporate and customary, some have taken to challenging the sovereignty of the state (e.g. Buthelezi and Skosana 2018). These cases illuminate, yet again, the entanglement of politics and economy at work in ethnicity, inc,: how it may potentiate unprecedented inflows of value and, in so doing, reconfigure “traditional” modes of empowerment – while opening the door to new, or repurposed, vectors of inequity, exclusion, even despotism (Darian- Smith, 2020).

    Outscaling: From the Country to the City

    As it has continued to move beyond its “traditional” terrain at a quickening rate, identity- based enterprise has become ever more caught up in the force-fields of mainstream regional and national economies. Where the commodification of culture takes shape at the interface with state-level institutions – and the local meets its exteriors – it often gives rise to remastered categories of subjectivity and belonging.

    Take two examples.

    One concerns a process of emerging ethnopreneurial citizenship in the tourist industry of mainland China. In a village in the southwest, reports Mengqi Wang (2012), people who identify as Buyi (or Boutei) have responded to government development initiatives by establishing a museum that has turned their everyday household goods into protected cultural artifacts. There is nothing new in this, but, as Wang shows, the attempt to make the village itself into a timeless open-air diorama of traditional culture has been undermined by the very process of museumization. For the largely script- based rendering of Buyi life as ossified essence to be consumed by outsiders, itself an act of “internal orientalism,” has thrust their micro-universe into the currents of national history. And economy. In the upshot, the villagers have begun to live these scripts both in their daily interactions and in their dealings with the state, enabling them to become energetic agents of their own commercial enterprise – thereby proving, too, that “they needed to be traditional first…if they want to be modern and ‘developed’” (ibid, 452). In the Age of Ethno-commerce, like so many others elsewhere, they find themselves pushed to be both at once to qualify for recognition and its returns. Thus does locality extends itself outward in time and space. Of course, “the local” can only be recognized as such, and take on meaning, in relation to other localities, other geographies, beyond itself; it is never given, never simply “there,” always produced (Appadurai 1995).

    The other example dates back a decade or so to Bogotá, Colombia. At the time, the local Asociación de Cabildos Indigenas, an organization of urban ethnic groupings, was trying to form a coalition of Kichwa, Ambika-Pijao, and Muiscas; these ethnic communities are not legally recognized as such under the Colombian constitution because they lack their own territories. Their objective? As Ati Quigua, a well-known activist leader, explained to anthropologist Diana Bocarejo (2007; 2015),14 they wished to build an “indigenous shopping mall” in order to “generate resources, income and sustainable projects.” But “what would an indigenous mall actually look like?,” asked Ms. Bocarejo, given that the plan was to have the mall also house all the usual major stores in a somewhat conventional, high-end retail palace. To “symbolize indigeneity,” replied Ms. Quigua. But there was more to it. As a Kichwa notable added, the point was to “have a…space where we can display our cosmology…[I]t will narrate the history of the place, there will be small plazas where we will do, as they say in North America, our pow wow, what we call a minga’,” a vernacular term that refers to collective ceremonial work. There would also be theaters in which to “perform our dances, our rituals…where people,” not least tourists, ”can be with us.” Where better for commodified custom and custom-made commodities to converge, and to infuse each other, than an urban shopping mall in the regional and national capital? Where better “to anchor and fix modern indigeneity”? (Bocarejo ibid.)

    As far-flung as these two cases are, they exemplify processes of identity management found increasingly across the planet: processes of scaling outward upward, that is, in which the material assertion of collective being and the commodification of culture transcend the local, seeking to realize themselves in worlds beyond their own visible horizons. When this happens, when ethno-incorporation takes root, expands its reach, and asserts itself, it may challenge state sovereignty and national belonging, not least by (re)fashioning and claiming the primacy of bioculturally based citizenship. And styling themselves as “nations” in their own right: hence the Seminole Nation, the Great Sioux Nation, the Royal Bafokeng Nation, the Griqua Nation, to mention just a few. Of this, more in a moment.

    The interpolation of ethnic subjectivity into the conscience collective of the larger body politic, and its materialization in regional, national, and global economies, has also become a rapidly growing concern of the mass-marketing industry; palpably more so than it was in the early years after the millennium. The emerging practices of this industry are revealed in a burgeoning literature on ethnicity and advertising. Shalini Shankar’s (2012; 2015) studies of merchandising to Asian Americans in the US, for instance, suggest that mainstream copywriters – not themselves Asian American – engage in a complex set of identitarian marketing strategies. They aim to fashion common brand identities in ways that reconcile received stereotypes of a homogenous Asian identity with the internal diversity of the population categorized as Asian- American, thus to embrace “their” difference in the market at large. The overriding aim of their messaging is to transform this population into targeted consumers for their products; this by way of a process of “racial naturalization” that makes them visible as fully-fledged citizens on the endemically-plural but putatively inclusive US cultural landscape (Shankar 2015, 15).

    As minority populations come to constitute lucrative target markets in their own right, ethnic publicists, as distinct from mainstream marketeers, seek to sell their cultural products back to those populations as much as to others. Arlene Dávila ([2001] 2012), one of the first scholars to explore ethnicity inc. in North America, wrote of the ambiguous implications of this endeavor in Latinos, Inc., which explores the multibillion- dollar Hispanic advertising industry in the US. Insider efforts to harness the potential of the Latin American “nation within a nation” (ibid., 4) and to brand its diversity, she notes, have turned out to be only a little less reductive, homogenizing, and exoticizing than the exertions of mainstream marketers – thereby abetting the tendency of the latter to render the Latino population marginal to the larger (i.e., white) consumer public. Not surprisingly perhaps, the reception by Hispanic Americans of these vernacular marketing strategies has been deeply ambivalent. They have provoked estrangement, anger, bemusement – and vigorous debate not merely about the politics of Latino identity, but also about the perverse pleasures of consumer recognition. Like other instruments of merchandising, advertising seeks to mobilize the creativity of market forces as an abstract form of capital, one that has the capacity, in and of itself, to generate value. As such, it has emerged as both a means and an object of collective action. Not surprisingly, then, the argument of images within Latino marketing has become complicated, ironic, and ever more sophisticated as widening cultural and class diversity among Hispanics resists stereotypy or encompassment. And as “Hispanic business,” like “Asian American” business, becomes more and more entangled with the wider US and the transnational economy.

    Again, much the same may be said of the outscaling effects of ethno-marketing on other culturally-defined populations, east and west, north and south.

    Upscaling: From Ethno- toward Nationality, Inc.

    Talk of the Hispanic “nation within a nation” points, in turn, to the upscaling of the identity economy; specifically, to Nationality, Inc. This phenomenon has gained a good deal more visibility, traction, and scholarly attention of late, all the more so as nationhood has itself become more explicitly ethnicized; all the more so too, perhaps, as, in counterpoint, many ethnic groups – recall the Seminole, the Sioux, the Bafokeng, and the Griqua – style themselves as nations. Orthodox political theory, famously, assumes the reverse (Tamir 2019, 425-6). It takes ethnicity-as-polity to be a primordial form of association, derived from “‘hot” attachments of ancestry and blood relations – and destined, with the advent of modernity, to give way to “cooler” ties of solidarity, vested in a social contract and rational-legal authority (e.g., R. Smith 1986; Kamenka 1975). Critics have long been skeptical of this evolutionary telos and the ideal-typical opposition on which it rests. In some contexts, ethnicity, inc. and nationality, inc. merge seamlessly into one another. This is especially so in those polities that actually see themselves as ethnonations, polities whose citizens, ostensibly united in blood and soil, language, culture and faith, are held to share a unique, primal substance. Germany, Israel, Russia, Malaysia, and post-socialist Eastern European countries, among others, are often given as examples, although the matter is more complicated, since ideology, sociology, and demography do not always line up seamlessly with one another. But even modern civic nations, as Benedict Anderson (1983, 7) reminds us, hold to the fantasy of cultural homogeneity and shared heritage, a fantasy that also is often racially-inflected – and, in any case, grows in part out of the suppression of their ethnic undersides, their local “tribalisms.” Even in western Europe, heartland of the liberal democratic state, ethnic and civic nationalism typically infuse each other (Tamir 2019), their difference, despite often shrill claims to the contrary, more a matter of degree than kind (Weber 1968, 925; Povinelli 2006, 197; Tilly 1990). What is more, nation-states of both sorts long foreshadowed ethnicity, inc., having acted, almost from the first, as proto-corporations, concrete abstractions that possess sovereign territory, invest themselves in signs of distinction, and marshal their economic and cultural interests by recourse to law and war.

    Ethnicity and nationalism, to be sure, are political artifacts of a broadly similar sort (Weber 1968, 392), both being mythopoetic fictions and imagined communities (Anderson, ibid.) sustained by idioms of genealogy and family. And mobilized under the sign of existential solidarity, exclusivity, and a commonweal. The former, moreover, is seldom ever erased by the latter: nationhood is a perpetual work-in-progress – a “daily plebiscite,” as Ernest Renan (1992) once famously quipped,15 a “cry of passion, a tug of war against reason,” noted Ernest Gellner (1965, 149; in T amir 2019, 422) – not least because heterogeneity almost always remains present to trouble it. This is most overtly so in postcolonies, whose histories have left them with a legacy of “tribalism” invented or exacerbated by the violent divisiveness of colonial rule (Mafeje 1971). But, with the turn to the political logic of neoliberalism – its celebration of deregulated economic interest over collective solidarity, privatization over a social contract, rights over responsibilities, locality over centralization – the sovereignty of civic nation-states has increasingly been challenged by claims made against it in the name of biocultural difference.

    That challenge has provoked energetic push-back framed in emphatically ethnonationalist terms: hence Brexit in a Britain formerly known as Great; hence, too, the Trumpist call, amidst the ebbing global hegemony of the USA, to “Make America Great Again,” a coded euphemism for “white ethnic”; hence the appeal, in a Russia devoid of the Soviet Empire, of Russkii, broadly understood as Russian ethnic culture, language, and “traditional” values (Blakkisrud 2016);16 also the assertive rise of Hindutva, an exclusionary Hindu nationalism, in India (Basu 1996); and the strident efforts of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) to essay “Germany [only] for the Germans.”17 These populist movements, and there are many more, have been fueled by the worldwide increase, under economic and political duress, of migration and other kinds of traffic across state boundaries; they speak to a crisis of coherence, of solidarity, of the ability actually to imagine community amidst fragmentary interests and impulses. Referred to by Anna Triandafyllidou (2021) as “neo-tribal nationalism,”18 this push-back invokes the homogenized nation-as-identity, claiming to defend the integrity of its culture, heritage, autochthony, and patrimony against difference-as-dissolution. As one observer put it in explaining the attraction of Brexit for so many Britons, “[it asserted] “a sense of rightful ownership”19 amidst, in the phrase of another, “the anger that some genuine British identity – remembered or misremembered – was being drowned within the shallow waters of the European Union…”20

    It is in this context that the contemporary salience of nationality, inc., as a distinctive, late modern phenomenon, is to be understood. While the state might always have been a corporation in the broadest sense of the term, in recent times it has become corporate sensu stricto: a metabusiness, so to speak. It acts an und für sich, subcontracting and franchising out its operations to the private sector, financializing its biogenetic endowment, its intellectual property, and its other assets, commodifying its collective Geist to attract commerce, and creating a conducive fiscal environment for its stake-holder citizens. No longer simply a custodian of the treasury or a guarantor of the welfare of those citizens, government under “neo-liberal political rationality” (Brown 2003) has largely relinquished its role as a mediator among “class and sectarian interests” in the cause of a greater public good (Harvey 1990, 108). It is itself ruled by the logic of the market (Foucault 2008; see above).

    As the state mimics a holding company, as the aforementioned line between politics and economics gives way, as the social contract is translated into the language of stake-holding, so nation branding becomes a potent vehicle of collective representation and so-called “world-making.” Increasingly, ruling regimes are told by their subjects: “market us” (Graan 2013, 281). Increasingly, the market is where the alchemy of legitimation and vitalization lies. And so heads of state become businessmen, and some businessmen become heads of state, be they Silvio Berlusconi or Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron or Cyril Ramaphosa, Mark Rutte or Tihomir Oreškoviæ.21 On occasion, countries that lack a CEO-president call for their leaders to act like one: in Kenya, when Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002, he was told “we want [you] to operate like the chief executive of a company and…ensure that the country ‘makes profit.’”22 The convergence between CEOs and presidents, suggests Tom W.C. Lin (2014, 1351f.), is not surprising: the two “form a double helix of executive power” at the center of contemporary economy, law, and society. This, he adds, is itself “reflective” of “the convergence of the public sphere of government and the private sphere of business,” along with the “trend towards the privatization of government functions” (p.1353). Hence the “construct of the President as CEO” (p.1354; emphasis added). And the nation as a brand to be managed and marketed, its being-in-the-world to be monetized.

    From Ethnic to Nation Branding . . . and Its Undersides

    As it seeks to recast twenty-first-century nationhood in the mold of the commodity form, nation branding echoes and extends the cultural and material logic of ethno- commodification. Now highly developed, widely theorized, thoroughly fetishized, the former is an analogical projection of the latter into the digital era. Yet conjuring the civic nation in ethnic terms always involves addressing a challenge. Because civic nationhood lacks the essential and essentializing coherence that ethnicity presumes, it has to assert homogeneity, fraternity, and a sense of affective connection in the face of social difference, cultural heterogeneity, and internal dissent; in the face, also, of the fact that the metaphors of kinship and genealogy on which nations draw tend to stretch thinly across their typically diverse scapes.

    This is why politicians, confronted by forces that pull against national integrity – global capital, world religions, transnational movements and migration, the planetary electronic commons, border-breaching social media, and the like – invoke the emotive power of autochthony: of inalienable belonging rooted in a homeland by virtue of birth (Geschiere 2009). And why branded, culturally-authenticated commodity images are enlisted in essaying and enacting the value, and values, of nationhood. Ours, after all, is an age in which trade is taken to be the prime engine and index of wealth; in which diplomacy is displaced by professional marketing and the enchantments of advertising (Coombe 2012; Marsh and Fawcett 2011); in which the international order, formerly composed of more-or-less bounded national economies, melts into a largely boundless emporium for transacting the emblematic objects of national je ne sais quoi; in which patriotism may be explicitly asserted in shopping for homegrown brands, even in places where one might not expect it – like China, for instance, currently “undergoing a consumer brand revolution,” encouraged by the state, in which a nationalistic “young generation is…actively looking for brands that align confidently [with] Chinese identity.”23

    Recent work on nation branding makes clear quite how pervasive it has become.

    Professional ad men and women have grown adept at hyping their “indispensable” ability to engender esteem, trust, and investment potential for their client nation-states, especially in uncertain times.24 They point to an array of triumphal achievements: how stagnant, strife-torn Tatarstan elevated itself from the dreary Russian periphery by rediscovering a masterful medieval history and sense of ethno-national purpose; how Cape Verde, an arid archipelago off the African coast, became an attractive “melting pot of cultural flavour”; how the minuscule West Indies polity of St Kitts and Nevis became the world’s most patronized and popular – but far from the only25 – purveyor of citizenship (and second passports) acquired in exchange for a hefty investment in local real estate or donation to the country’s Sustainable Growth Fund.26

    As this suggests, branding promises to exceed ordinary means and ends. In so doing, it is like the transformative magic of ritual. But is it ever unambiguously efficacious? It is never without excess, argues Constantine Nakassis (2013), never without a surfeit of meaning, always open to contestation, redeployment, even parody. As semiotic confections, brands invariably run up against other signs circulating in the world – and, in the process, often spawn unexpected associations. We have seen how, in the case of Latino, Inc., efforts to interpolate ethnic consumers by marketing “their” culture seldom take place without friction, often producing doubt, dispute, or censorship. Nation branding, like ethnic branding, traffics in a double abstraction. On one hand, it calls into being a collective identity, a tangible imagining, the very stuff of fetishism. On the other, it turns the content of that identity into a currency, a species of capital (ibid., 117). But as a medium of investment and speculation, its alchemic capacity to animate commodities and produce wealth is open to demystification the moment it fails to deliver.

    And it has failed to deliver quite visibly of late, in tandem with recurring economic crises, rising rates of mass debt, and government-by-austerity. As often as not, states find it hard to back up hype with substance, thus to make good on the vaunted power of commodity images to stimulate production and/or consumption – especially where marketing seeks, by means magical and mimetic (Mazarella 2017), to breathe life into postindustrial urban wastelands and postcolonial or postsocialist peripheries. Efforts to brand and market Malta some years back, to cite one vivid example, were declared a “total failure,” and a costly one at that.27 Romania, to cite another, is said to have had a long history of unsuccessful attempts to sell itself and its cultural products.28 This, of course, presumes that success and failure are actually measurable in a meaningful way, itself a dubious claim (see e.g. Browning 2016).

    Some ethno-nations brand themselves without relying on the ad industry to market their putatively unique capacities and commodities. Take, for instance, the Philippines. In 2008, an essay appeared in Nation-Branding.info urging the state not to employ expensive “market gurus.” Better to establish its own brand by directly selling its culture with more real substance, with its “true spirit and essence,” to the world, in order to “add value to practically everything associated” with the Philippines. In their own words, “Filipinos ARE the brand.”29 In 2011, the government formed a National Branding Council to “shape the…brand” And to create a “stronger [sense of] nationhood and national pride.”30 Of all the things that the Philippines offers in its own branded self- image, however, perhaps the most notable is “caring for others.” It is taken to be “innate in the Filipino culture,” embodied in malasakit (empathy).31 As a Manila newspaper put in, in 2017, “[b]eing a caregiver is not only a matter of profession …[It is] about deep love, respect and care to someone of old age or anybody else who needs treatment…This is something rooted in Filipino culture and an identity as a Filipino.”32 And something that has been steadily financialized. The country relies heavily for its economic well-being and social reproduction on remittances from migrant laborers employed abroad – not least from the very many women in the care sector, for which the Philippines has become known globally.33 The assertion of their culturally-validated expertise in this sector is also an effort to dignify and valorize low-paid service work.

    As this suggests, it is not just cultural objects that have come to embody ethno- nationality in the global market place. So, in many contexts, has ethnically-indexed labor power. Indeed, it is here that the underside of ethnicity-in-the-marketplace becomes visible: in the long history of mobilizing difference as a critical mark of contrasts in human capacity and worth. Simply put, different ethno-racial populations are held to have dissimilar skills and capacities for work – menial or managerial, blue or white collar, cerebral or physical – and are deployed, managed, and remunerated in the planetary division of labor accordingly. Hence the bleak, often violent history of capital accumulation founded on brute ethno-racial exploitation, a.k.a., racial capitalism (Robinson 1983); hence, too, the long history of (more or less coerced) translocal labor migration. With the ever more complex division of productive labor across the world in the age of liberalization, with rising planetary inequality, and with mutating global supply chains, the flow of people on the move in search of wage work has been dramatically intensified. So, also, have the efforts of nation-states – both the exporters and the recipients of labor – to interpolate themselves into, and profit from, the traffic. Migrant workers stereotypically coded in ethno-national terms, patently, vary in their situation in labor market hierarchies, ranging from, for example, high-level Indian computer technicians and Pakistani doctors through professional Fijian soldiers to lowly paid, abject Mexican fruit pickers and Uyghur cotton workers; both of the latter, the fruit and cotton pickers, being part of a planetary pattern in which an overburdening percentage of debased agricultural work is done by ethnically-marked migrants.

    It is into this context that Filipino care work fits. In 2006, the Manila Bulletin, one of the country’s most widely read publications, posted a prominent ad featuring then president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and a woman named Mary Joy Bunil, both dressed in super-hero capes, along with 30 other women in maids’ uniforms (Guevarra 2014:130). Highlighting “the latest Philippines export commodity, the Supermaid” (italics added), the commercial portrayed these women as a “different kind of domestic worker.” It cited malasakit and repeated the claim that a special skill in caring for others is “innate” in Filipino culture. But the prominence of Filipino workers at the frontlines of transnational domestic and residential labor – which reflects a “crisis of care” across the world, especially in the Global North (Hochschild 2000) – has a less happy face to it. Filipino female labor migration, patently, is not new. It dates back to the time of US colonization in the early 1900’s. However, ethno-nationally driven labor brokerage has grown exponentially since 1970’s, using gendered and racialized tropes to sell migrant carers as preferred domestic workers – not least because they are notoriously vulnerable, being frequently unprotected by national labor standards, and hence open to exploitation and abuse (Nasol and Francisco-Mernchavez 2021).

    The Philippine state is not alone in relying heavily for its economic well-being and social reproduction on the underside of its ethno-national brand, its exported, culturally- certified labor power. To the contrary, it illuminates a much more widespread phenomenon; vide the cases of, among others, India and Pakistan, the nations of Central America, and much of West Africa. Nationality, inc., especially but not only among the poorer polities of the planet, is frequently Janus-faced. Nation-states seek to sell their commodity image and branded cultural products on one set of global markets while, simultaneously, augmenting their coffers from the remittances of subjects who alienate their ethno-nationally validated labor power on other, equally global markets elsewhere.

    Coda

    Ethnicity and nationality, inc., then – primed by their commodity-branding, by the logic of the market in goods and labor, and by prevailing political, material, and social rationalities – seem here to stay, be it as accomplished social facts, active aspirations or unrealized fantasies. So, too, are other modes of incorporation that replicate them in substance and/or spirit. To be sure, the temporalities and trajectories of the identity economy lead in all directions. They run from nation to ethnicity, ethnicity to nation, and both to many other species of imagined community: locality, region, religion, race, and so on. All alike are vested in the commodification of culture and the presumption of shared essence – manifest in material and immaterial property, in human capital and labor.

    But the identity economy is itself a symptom, not a cause. So, too, are the forms of commodification and incorporation in which it is imbricated. The rise of that economy is a corollary of the rush to financialize life itself. And to financialize the different forms of sociality, solidarity, and affect, of cultural affinity and conscience collective, in which life invests itself. It scarcely needs saying any more that our bodies, our selves, our quotidian activities, our very being world are all under threat of being reduced to a greater or lesser cash value; this in times in which trust in most forms of civic community – beyond the most immediate “hot” ties of blood and soil, and perhaps faith – have been . As the contemporary world places ever more pressure on us to become entrepreneurs of ourselves, both individually (as “me”) and collectively (as “we”), are encouraged to see our human capital lying in an essentialized personhood mediated by, among other things, race and class, gender and generation, sexuality and ethnicity. That is not all we are, patently, not by a very long way. Nonetheless, in these, the early decades of the twenty-first century, identity increasingly appears as an economy – and, reciprocally, economy appears irreducibly caught up in identity.

  • Theory from the South

    Theory from the South

    There appears to be a growing echo, slowly reverberating around the world, that, for good, ill, or both, Africa is the future, a harbinger of Europe’s history-to-come. Experts may debate the reasons for this: among them, a significant population bulge heavily skewed toward youth; an urban “revolution” unique in the current era; burgeoning consumer markets, rising middle classes, and accelerating techno-development; also, a propensity to repurpose material practices both foreign and homegrown, thus to remake modernity for late modern times. Says Keith Hart (2017:2), basing his prediction on the long historical relationship between demography and economy, “Sooner or later, Africa and Europe will change rank order.” The former – Africa, the continent that once signified the West’s prehistoric past and remains a perennial “basket case” in the jaundiced eyes of Euro-America – is now frequently taken to prefigure what lies ahead for humanity at large.

    A decade or so ago, our Theory from the South explored this proposition and its implications for the social sciences, one of them being that Africa, as an “ex-centric” location (Bhabha 1994) and ground-zero of the Global South, has become a privileged axis from which to theorize the emerging world order of the twenty-first century. In so doing, it provoked a great deal of argument and, among northern intellectuals unused to the idea that their hemisphere may not be the font of all knowledge and theory-work, frank skepticism.

    Reduced to its essence, the thesis of the book is this. While Euro-America and its antipodes are caught up in the same world-historical processes – each being entailed with the other in a counterpoint of reciprocal remaking, of “creolization” – the South has tended to feel their effects before the North. And much more intensely. There are good reasons for this. Most significant, perhaps, is the familiar fact that the imperial expansion of modern capitalism into colonies across the planet laid the basis for the violent exploitation of human labor and local ecologies, of raw materials and real estate, without the legal, moral, or political constraints that governed life at the metropole. The colony, site of rampant “primitive accumulation,” was, in short, the dark secret of Empire, its working laboratory for the refinement of the means and ends of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983). For all the talk of a civilizing mission, of progress and development, the social, economic, and governmental infrastructures of the liberal nation-state were never put securely in place here; as a result, a southern, illiberal variant of capitalist modernity, with none of the liberal conceits of individual freedom, rights-bearing citizenship, or equality before the law, took firm root. Which left postcolonial populations open to brute exploitation with the dawn of a new age of empire; the age, that is, of structural adjustment, of largely unregulated, highly mobile corporate capital, of the hollowing out of state, civil society, and democracy, of the displacement of welfare with the fetishism of rights – all under the magical sign of the market.

    In the upshot, the “advanced” edges of post-Cold War political economy – its profitable re-engineering of legal and regulatory instruments, of taxation and labor arrangements, of modes of extraction and enclaved sovereignty – rooted themselves deeply in Africa; so much so that, in 2010, Newsweek declared the continent to be “at the very forefront of emerging markets…Like China and India, [it is]…illustrative of [the] new world order” (Guo 2010:44). “Africa Rising” duly became the meme of the moment: The Economist editorialized about it,[1]a YouTube documentary dramatized it,[2] a fashion magazine was named for it,[3] scholars debated it,[4] an IMF conference was held to discuss it,[5] a sustainable development program took it on as a charter,[6] and an eminent professor of marketing invoked it as call for shrewd global business investment (Mahajan 2009). The basis for all this? A major influx of Foreign Direct Investment earning high returns; healthy GDP numbers and growth rates in many countries; the rise of homegrown African mega-corporations; the increasing presence of transnational firms; and thriving local informal economies marked by flexible, strikingly inventive enterprise, some of it, alike licit and illicit, having grown out of performing outsourced services for northern firms. And so new regimes of work and time, new perceptions of futurity, new modes of sociality and livelihood, have taken root – regimes with analogues that are becoming ever more visible in Euro-America.

    At the same time, and for the same reasons that have made the continent so exploitable for capital, so open to the siphoning off of value to worlds outside, the dystopic aspects of our times have also been most readily evident in the South. Material inequality, human disposability, mass un- and under-employment, epidemic illness and homelessness, eco-despoliation, crippling private and public debt, violent crime, and social exclusion remain endemic. Indeed, it was this counterpoint of promise and dystopia, of creative life-making and destructive death-dealing, that we sought to detail in Theory from the South. It is a counterpoint whose trajectory is under-determined. And it is full of surprises; an unruly dialectic, if you will, that does not recapitulate the telos of modernity or its reverse, defying both received Marxisms and liberal modernization theories of one sort or another. Sometimes it also defies expectation in almost uncanny ways: just as many African economies weathered the global recession of 2008-9 more successfully than did those of the north, growing at unanticipated rates as others struggled, so Africa has weathered the Covid-19 pandemic better than most, perhaps because it has had a long history of dealing with public health and economic crises.

    But this is just half of our story. The other half has to do with contemporary Euro-America, site of rising carceral populations, of spiraling inequality, poverty, precarity, and debt, of a crisis of social reproduction, a silently ticking generation war, and increasing real joblessness, most of it unmeasured; all of these things, usually taken to be symptomatic of so-called “developing nations,” are now endemic to much of the World  formerly known as “First.” The “new normal” of the North, it seems, is replaying the recent past of the South, not least because many of the rights and protections of citizenship once associated with liberal democratic societies have been eroded, leaving their a rising proportion of their populations, especially the poor and racialized, in something like the predicament long endured by colonial, and subsequently postcolonial, subjects – although, to be sure, there is good cause for seeing Africa less as postcolonial than as Afropolitan (Selasi 2005; Mbembe XXXX), if in its own singular, endogenous ways. This is why, in so many respects, Africa, Asia, and Latin America appear to be running ahead of Euro-America, prefiguring its history-in-the-making. And why Euro-America, tracking behind the antipodes, appears to be “going south.”

    Take, for just one example, the rotting urbanism spreading through parts of the Global North. When it is said, for example, that Lagos augurs the future of the modernist city (Koolhaas and Cleijne 2001) it is not because northern conurbations also have rising homeless populations, ever more stricken neighborhoods, and pathological patterns of inequality. (Nor is it because real estate on Victoria Island is more expensive than its equivalent in Manhattan, or that “smart city” experiments are mushrooming across the continent, abetted by Chinese capital.) It is because urban scapes, as planetary phenomena, have strongly convergent tendencies: among other things, their rhizomatic patterns of sociality; their fractured political rationalities and the claims made to sovereignty within them; the gating off of their elites and the privatization of their civic amenities; the segmentary sprawl of impermanently housed, radically under-resourced populations which, at very best, enjoy only partial citizenship; their economies, including the burgeoning informal (sharing, caring, criminal, affective, i.e. “gig” ) economies arising under the impact of radical changes in labor markets everywhere. These are all corollaries of the ways in which capital, and its cultural mediations, are playing themselves out under parallel, globally-emergent sociological and infrastructural conditions, conditions that began to manifest themselves in the South earlier than they did in Euro-America. And are most graphically visible in Africa.

    In Theory from the South we explore a wide range of phenomena of which the same things can be said: that they presented first in the South, and tend to be more hyperbolically visible there than they are in the North. These extend to such things as the changing nature of personhood and political subjectivity; the erosion of democracy and the crisis of liberalism; the shift from a politics of ideology to the politics of ID-ology, a politics of right/s in which identity takes precedence over all other forms of claim and mobilization; the radical transformation of labor as capitalism – itself taken ever more to be a millennial, indeed enchanted, solution to all social problems – is treated the primary force determining world history-in-the-making. The book also asks a number of foundational questions: What, exactly, is meant by theory in this day and age? And what is “the South,” given that it is a shifting signifier which cannot easily be pinned down? Given, also, the fact that “it” is not, as some would have it, simply the antithesis of “the North,” a mythic geography within which exist unreconstructed, untouched indigenous worlds whose vernacular life ways may offer rescue or redemption from the contradictions, deformities, and disfigurements of global modernity. But these are topics for another time, another blog. Theory from the South is intended as an ongoing conversation about the contemporary global order and how we are to make sense of it.

  • Reflections on Youth, From the Past to the Postcolony

    Reflections on Youth, From the Past to the Postcolony

    PROLEGOMENON

    philosophy does not concern itself with children. It leaves  them  to pedagogy, where they’re not in very good hands. Philosophy has forgotten about children.

    Bernhard Schlink, The Reader, p.141

    There has long been a tendency in the public discourse of the West to speak of youth as a transhistorical, transcultural category. As if it has existed everywhere and at all times in much the same way. This is in spite of the fact that anthropologists and historians have insisted, for almost as long, that the cultural meanings and social attributes ascribed to “youth” have varied a great deal across time and space; recall Malinowski and Margaret Mead, not to mention Philippe Ariès. It is also an anthropological truism that the way in which young people are perceived, named, and represented betrays a lot about the social and political constitution of a society. Thus it is that, in nineteenth-century Britain, down-class juveniles were referred to as “nomads’; their terrains, the internal colonies of the industrial metropole, were called “Jungles,”  even “Africas” (Hebdige 1988:20). Similarly, in late twentieth-century North America and South Africa (Seekings 1993:xii, citing David Everatt), white pre-adults are typically termed “teenagers” while their black counterparts are “youth”; adolescents with attitude, so to speak. In this manner, language racializes and demonizes difference without explicitly marking it. “Words,” Joseph Conrad (1957:11) once said, are “the great foes of reality.” But they also open a window onto its secrets.

    Far from constituting a universal category–a social status generated by the abstract sociological principle of generation– youth, as we speak of them here, are the historical offspring of modernity; modernity, that is, as the ideological formation which arose during the Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (cf. Hobsbawm 1962), and was honed in the fraught dialectics of empire; modernity as an ideological formation which naturalized its own telos in a model of human development (Lukose 2000) that casts “youth”  as both the essential precondition and the indefinite postponement of maturity.1 Industrial capitalist society has been

    1

    Constructs like “racial adolescence,”  deployed by civilizing missions abroad to measure the (lack of) “progress”  of more-or-less unique in making childhood into a site of self- conscious cultural reproduction, releasing its young from the workplace so that they might enter the rarified world of education; the latter being the space in which the nation-state seeks to husband its potential, in which it invests in its human capital, in which, says Foucault (1976:81), it “hides its dreams.” Yet juveniles are also the creatures of our nightmares, of our social impossibilities and our existential angst.

    It is in this latter sense that, for Hebdige (1988:17), youth enter modernist narratives only when they stand for trouble. But the matter is more ambiguous than this suggests. Trouble, Butler (1990:vii) insists, need not merely be cast in the negative. It can also imply the productive unsettling of dominant epistemic regimes under the heat of desire, frustration, or anger. Youth, in other words, are complex signifiers, the stuff of mythic extremes (Blanch 1980:103); simultaneously idealizations and monstrosities, pathologies and panaceas. This has been true for a very long time. Witness the ambivalent appearance of the young in Dickensian London, on one hand as orphans and artful dodgers, yet also as the bearers of Great colonized peoples toward “modernity,”  demonstrate the ideological uses of this form of developmentalism; see W.C. Willoughby (1923:239) for a South African instance.

    Expectations. Or the discordant images of juvenile activists in late twentieth-century Africa: contrast, for example, the preternatural child soldiers of Mocambique or Siera Leone, the very epitome of civil disintegration (Honwana 1999), with the heroic “young lions”  of South Africa, who were the harbingers of democracy and the end of apartheid. Such contrasts are likely to persist: in Brazil, homeless children have come to symbolize both the collective shame of the nation-state and its future resurrection through proper planning and legal intervention (Veloso n.d.).

    In short, “youth” stands for many things at once: for the terrors of the present, the errors of the past, the prospect of a future. For old hopes and new frontiers (cf. De Boeck in this volume). In all of these tropic guises, of course, they are figures of a popular imagination far removed from more nuanced social realities.2 This is crucial to keep in mind as we interrogate the place of young people in the late twentieth- century nation-state–especially those neoliberal nation-states currently in difficulty–in Africa and elsewhere.

    Apart from all else, “youth” are always only a fraction of those not yet adult: that fraction whose anomalous agency asserts itself in honor or breach of communal order. Often they are the mutant citizens of the modern nation, purveyors of its violent undersides. This is a point to which we shall return.

    Generation  Trouble

    The meaning of globalization, at least as an analytic concept, might still be in dispute in some circles. But few would deny that one global feature of the contemporary world–from Chicago to Cape Town, Calcutta to Caracas–is a sense of crisis surrounding the predicament of juveniles. Although it is always locally mediated and modulated, that predicament appears to arise out of the workings of neoliberal capitalism and the changing planetary order of which it is part. It takes many forms, patently. But it seems everywhere to be founded on a counterpoint, a doubling, a contradiction perhaps. On one hand is the much remarked exclusion of the young from national economies, especially from their shrinking, metamorphosing productive sectors. As the frenzied expansion of the free market runs up against the demise of the welfare state, a process that manifests itself in an ever widening gulf between rich and poor, the commonweal of all but few sovereign polities has been drastically eroded. In the upshot, most are unable to sustain previous levels of social services and benefits, to afford the cost of infrastructural reproduction, or to underwrite a labor market in which there is regular or secure employment in any abundance.

    Even in advanced industrial societies, the modernist dream of infinite progress–a narrative according to which each generation does better than its predecessor–is constantly mocked; mocked by conditions that disenfranchise many people,3disproportionately the young and unskilled of the inner city and the countryside, from full waged citizenship in the nation-state.4 This despite the claims by some that the current generation of mainstream American “kids”  is more compliant, less cynical than those who came before them (Howe and Strauss 2000). To be sure, patterns of polarization and exclusion, among youth and across the age spectrum at large, is ever more palpable in these neo liberal times.

    This theme was sounded repeatedly by proponents of Ralph Nader’s Green Party in the recent US elections. Michael Moore, radical film-maker and anti-corporate activist, described Nader as the champion of “young people, who feel disenfranchised and dispossessed by mainstream American politics”  (special election report, 848, National Public Radio, November 6, 2000).

    While it might be argued that, constitutionally, citizenship in liberal democracies has never included a right to work, the provision of unemployment benefits, worker’s compensation, and pensions to the nationals of welfare states has implied entitlement to an income. Such benefits are widely under threat in this neoliberal age, but the obligation to sustain the highest possible levels of employment continues to be one of the taken-for-granted expectations of government everywhere, notwithstanding the ferocious realpolitik of market competition. In this paper, we use the notion of “waged citizenship”  to imply social and moral membership in the national commonweal.

    On the other hand is the recent rise of assertive, global youth cultures of desire, self-expression, representation; also, in some places, of potent, if unconventional, forms of politicization to go along with them. In the cyberspace age, juveniles have an enhanced capacity to communicate in, and act effectively on, the world at large. Generation has become a concrete, quotidian principle of social mobilization, inflecting other dimensions of difference; notably, race, gender, ethnicity and class.5Transnational youth activism, and the mutually comprehensible signifying practices on which it is based, are facilitated by planetary flows–of currencies, people, value– across old sovereign boundaries (cf. Venkatesh n.d.[a]:6; Appadurai 1990). The young have taken to the internet and to the streets in growing numbers as post-Fordist economics recast relations between capital and labor, profoundly altering global geographies of production. More of this below.

    This is not to imply that youth forms a “homogeneous, sociological category of people which thinks, organizes and acts” in coherent ways (Seekings 1993:xiv); but the same may be said of “working class politics” (pace Seekings, loc.cit.). Youth, like the working class, is a politically constructed category; both are rooted in their relationship to production and consumption. Most notably, immigrant workers and non-autochthonous minorities; see Comaroff and Comaroff (2000b).

    Increasingly, moreover, they are entailed in each other (cf. Corrigan and Frith 1976; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000a). In the late twentieth century, in sum, youth have gained unprecedented autonomy as a social category an und für sich, both in and for themselves. This is in spite, or perhaps because, of their relative marginalization from the normative world of work and wage. In many Western contexts they, along with other disenfranchised persons,6add up to an incoherent counter-nation with its own illegal economies of ways and means, its own spaces of production and recreation, its own parodic patriotisms.

    Elsewhere (1999b), we use the term “alien-nation” to describe the phenomenon; in like vein, Zizek (1997:127f) treats these disenfranchised persons as the “symptoms”  of late-capitalist universalism, whose imminent logic ensures that their equivalent deprivations never find unified voice in some “rainbow coalition”, notwithstanding progressivist liberal hopes and expectations. As this suggests, youth embody the sharpening contradictions of the contemporary world in especially acute form. Take South Africa for example. Here, in the apartheid years, the juvenile black counter-nation had a palpable opponent in the racist state. With the demise of the ancien regime, the dispossessed won the right to enter the workplace as “free” individuals. But, in a tragic irony, this occurred just as the global impact of neoliberal capitalism began to kick in. Now large-scale privatization, the loss of blue-collar employment, and the erosion of working-class identities vitiate the prospects of building an inclusive social democracy. Young people of color, would-be citizens of the “new” millennial order, must find their place in a society whose hard- won nationhood is already subverted by forces that compromise the territorial sovereignty of its political economy.

    But we are running ahead of ourselves. In order to push our understanding of the contemporary predicament of youth beyond the merely superficial, to explore further the doubling–the ambiguous threat and promiseB-inherent in its formation, it is necessary to dig a little deeper into the modernist archaeology of the category. For it is here that we are likely to find the source of contemporary generation troubles. Or, at least, our apprehension of them.

    A BRIEF HISTORY OF YOUTH

    Foucault (1976:80) may or may not have been correct in claiming that modern Western society is unique in accentuating the gulf between children and adults. But we do appear to have romanticized and commodified that space, making it a site wherein immature carelessness confronts full-grown desire, wherein an irrepressible sense of invincibility seems to drive precocious power. Of course, the nation-states of Europe were not alone in marking out “youth” as a life-phase whose liminal force could be tapped for the collective good. Age-based societies in Africa mobilized premarital warriorhood to this end as well; indeed, those who languish between corporeal and social maturity, debarred from marrying or establishing families, have become the footsoldiers of adult hegemony in many places. Youth, from this perspective, is everywhere a potential category of exclusion and exploitation, a source of surplus value.

    It is arguable that twentieth-century European polities– with their technologies of mass production, communication, and coercion–have been singularly well positioned to idealize and utilize the physical and imaginative resources of the young. Yet one of the hallmarks of the present moment, of the age of globalization and postcoloniality, has been a diminishing of the capacity of governments’-if not of the market forces they foster–to control adolescent bodies, energies, or intentions. From the spread of global youth cultures and environmental politics to the sprouting of urban gangs, soccer armies, and neoNazi cadres, the nation-state plays host to forces that it can no longer adequately reign in. Often, moreover, the more radical of these forces name themselves–Hip Hop Nation, Gay Nation–in ways that both mimic and mock it, all the better to trouble its sovereignty. Thus the phalanxes of football supporters in the new Europe, who savage people and property, assault police, and transgress barriers and borders at home and abroadB-all in the name of national pride (Buford 1993). Likewise the rise of libertarian militias, whose youthful troops declare war on established government in the name of purer forms of patriotism, albeit often at the behest of more cynical, less visible father figures.

    How has this come to be? Whatever its resemblance to comparable usages in other periods and places, the Euro-construction of “youth,”  we repeat, is the outworking of a specific set of social conditions; its evolution, still ongoing, bespeaks a submerged history of modernity and its imperial underbelly. While those covered by the term have long had their deviant identity thrust upon them (see below)–and, since World War II, sold to them–they have increasingly made it their own. A brute deus ex machina propels this unfolding story: the complex relationship between capital and the nation-state. Industrial capitalist economies were capricious in the ways in which, Janus- faced, they both begat and undermined equalities of citizenship and entitlement; their post-industrial counterparts have cumulatively subverted national sovereignty and the substantive rights of subjects. The sanguine expectations that once framed bourgeois cultures of progress and their civilizing missions abroadB-ideals that vouchsafed the young a future under the sign of “development”–are, as we have already said, sorely compromised by the growing inequalities wrought in the name of neoliberal capitalism. Postmodernity is often characterized as modernism bereft of its hopeful, utopian thrust.

    Concomitantly, the new age of globalism might be seen as one in which the world-wide fabrication of desire, of the promise of infinite possibility, meets the impossibilities occasioned by widening disparities of wealth, itself a corollary of the devolution and decommissioning of economies of manufacture. In the face of all this, many youthful entrepreneurs, having been raised in advanced commodity cultures, find their own ways and means. Sometimes these involve the supply of hitherto unimagined “services”; sometimes the recommissioning of the detritus of consumer society; sometimes the resale of purloined property of the state; sometimes the short-circuiting of existing networks of exchange. For a burgeoning number, they entail entry into the lower reaches of the transnational trade in drugs, and/or into a netherworld in which the deployment of violence becomes a routine mode of production and redistribution–often in a manner that replicates the practices of international business. And visibly corrodes the authority of the state. But more of this in due course.

    If, to return to the earlier moment, it was the rise of industrial capitalism that first created the conditions for the emergence of a semi-autonomous category of “youth,” it was in the exploding cities of modern Europe that this category first took on a manifest sociological reality. Hebdige (1988;19f; see above) has argued that the young first showed their insolent face, across modern Britain, in the “delinquent” crowds that gathered in manufacturing towns, where the offspring of the rising working-class were often left to survive, and to create their own social worlds, independent of paternal or patrician control (Blanch 1980; Gillis 1974; Jones 1984). Observers were particularly disturbed by children and adolescents in urban slums, by the “wandering tribes” or “young Arabs”  who inhabited the internal colonies at the heart of London and Manchester (Mayhew 1851:277f). These were the artful dodgers of the Dickensian inner city, to whom we alluded above, the mutant citizens of its alien-nation. They inspired a civilizing crusade, prompting the founding of Ragged Schools and Reformatories, and, in due course, a compulsory system of state education; also a pedagogic mission to “the dark places”  of the earth. One might note, with the hindsight of history (Willis 1977), not least South African history, that state education would not so much eradicate the alien-nation as reproduce it by different means. The South African Broadcasting Corporation, in collaboration with the Department of Education, recently commissioned a team of the country=s most gifted young film-makers to make a docudrama on post-apartheid schooling. 7They painted a chilling portrait of endemic frustration and routine violence, prompting widespread and anguished national debate.

    Youth as a sign of contradiction, as the figuration of mythic bipolarity, is enshrined in the foundations of the modern collective imaginary. In the abstract, the term congeals pure, utopic potential. In everyday reality, however, “youth”  is a collective noun that has all too often indexed a faceless mass of persons who were alike underclass, unruly, male, challengingly out of place–and, at once physically powerful and morally immature, always liable to seize the initiative from their elders and betters. They personify the failure of moral reproduction, the dangerous obverse of capitalist optimism, the limits of a meliorist, bourgeois social vision. The tensions embodied in this pre-adult population, exacerbated where differences of race or creed color those of generation, have peaked in periods of economic slump. For, as surplus citizens, youth are not born. They are made by historical circumstances. And rarely as they like.

    Yizo Yizo, a thirteen part series, aired on SATV3 in 1998. It was created and written by Mtutuzeli Matshoba and Angus Gibson, and directed by Angus Gibson and Teboho Mahlatsi.

    But if these young people have embodied the threat of civil disorder, they can also be harnessed for state projects of organized violence; in particular, for mobilization as soldiers. Often, those not yet deemed ready to live as full citizens of the nation-state have been called upon to die for it. (Remember, in this respect, the Africans who served the colonial powers in both world wars; see e.g. Bent 1952). This is the flip side of the story of youth and modernity: adolescence as the infantry of adult statecraft, as the ever more reluctant blood and bone of national aspiration. At the core of the making of “modern” youth, then, has been the role of the state in naturalizing, exploiting, and narrating the relationship between juveniles and violence, a relationship all too neatly eclipsed in the disciplinary logic of peacetime discourses about adolescent deviance.

    And so it is that the association of juveniles with the threat of precocious, uncontained physicalityB-sexual, reproductive, combativeB-has haunted popular and scholarly perceptions alike in the twentieth century. In the 1920s, a rapidly professionalizing sociology (first in America, then in Europe) depicted “youth” as a disruptive masculine force in the city, as purveyors of violent crime and ready recruits to the barbarities of life in gangs. Functionalist sociology turned historical contradiction into social pathology, and took these youth to be its epitome. They were tribal, feral beings who hunt in packs, anti-citizens, an affront to bourgeois family values and social order. Delinquent, down-class, male, and violent, they were also increasingly black. Nor is this true only in the northern and western hemispheres. Recent South African history is another instance. In the final years of struggle against apartheid, the category of “youth” expanded to include diverse classes of freedom fighters: students, workers, even criminals.

    In this story, it is true, not all young blacks are youth. But all youth are black. Also overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, male. And if some people never become “youth,” others seem unable to outgrow the label, even in middle age (cf. Buford 1993; Seekings 1993:11). Shades here again of Mannheim’s foundational insight, recalled by Bundy (1987:304) in the African context, that generation is a social, not a chronological, category. It is also a political one. With deep material roots.

    The Rise of Global “Youth Culture”

    The rise of neoliberal capitalism on a planetary scale has further complicated the modernist construction of youth. Often associated with the events of 1989, this epochal transformation was heralded by the thoroughgoing shifts in global power, economy, and modes of communication set in motion in the wake of World War II; shifts that would reshape the structure of international capital and intensify its workings. As we shall see, those shifts would not merely reconstruct colonial relations, national economies, and international markets in goods, services, and signs. They would also globalize the division of labor, remake human subjects, alter the relationship between production and consumption, and reform identities and citizenships across the world. While in no sense homogenizing, this process involved novel forms of space-time compression, as well as the reformulation of boundaries and localities everywhere. It also ushered in a new moment in the history of youth; to be sure, as we noted earlier, an electronically mediated “youth culture” was one of its earliest, most expansive cultural expressions, providing a lexicon for the ever more explicit assertion of juveniles across the globe as agents in and of themselves.

    It is significant, in this respect, that the USA–“the only victor” of the Great War (Fussell 1975:317)–emerged as the major economic and cultural force on the international scene after 1945. For here, where postwar affluence and pronatalism combined to usher in a fresh phase of expansionist capitalism, the “teenager” became the new model consumer-citizen, the term itself an invention of the marketing industry (Cook 1998). Equipped with disposable wealth to spend on commodities and “leisure” (Cohn 1969; Hebdige 1988:30), this was the first generation set loose to craft itself in large part through consumption. Capitalists for the first time saw youth as a market with its own infinitely cultivable needs. “Fawning like mad” (Cohn 1969:15), they manufactured the means–clothes, music, magazines, dances–for creating age-based collectivities with unprecedented self- awareness, visibility, and translocal potential.

    The capacity of the languages of youth culture to mark emergent identities and consciousness was shown when the “rebels without a cause” of the 1950s became rebels with causes aplenty, from the romance of white hippy flower power to militant Black Panther antiracism. And while the naive self-absorption of lifestyle politics and rock resistance might have been evident from its roots in Haight Ashbury, the mass protests against the Vietnam War demonstrated that a self-conscious youth counter- culture could engage mainstream politics. Artful dodgers became draft dodgers, and the right of states to commandeer the means of violence, especially in the bodies and purposes of youth, was seriously challenged. Neither was this a purely parochial struggle; that much was attested by simultaneous upheavals among restive students in many parts of the world. The historical significance of these youth uprisings remains an open question.

    But one thing about them is clear: youth activism was a precursor of new sorts of social movements, movements born of the creative refiguring of local means and ends in light of global, media- driven identities, ideologies, and vocabularies. The sounds of the sixties, perhaps the true Age of Youth, traversed a multicentered, electronically unified planet, fueled by transnational commercial interests. Amidst a rapidly proliferating flow of signs and values (Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1989), youth culture began to construct an “elsewhere”–a universe-wide, alienated age-grade–that gave pre-adults the language for an identity apart from the “soiled and compromised parent culture” (Hebdige 1988:30).

    This age-grade, purely a figurative community of course, was inherently tenuous and virtual. Its imagining could seldom fully transcend the limitations imposed by the commodity-dependence of mass cultural forms. As actors-through-consumption, teenagers bought–literally–into mainstream interests at the same time as they contested them. In so doing, they typified the predicament of would-be subversives in advanced capitalist contexts; of those who struggle to seize control of commodified signs and practices, thus to use them in ways that do more than merely reaffirm the status quo. Located far from sites of primary production, theirs is often a politics of style. Its iconoclasm is effected on camera ready bodies; or, more recently, along digital frontiers where hackers and “cyberpunks”  protest freedoms lost as computer technology becomes ever more subject to corporate control (Coleman n.d.). To the critically minded, like Hebdige (1988:35), their exertions appear ambiguous, as “neither affirmation nor refusal.” Their iconoclastic play with mainstream commodity forms often signal subversionB-as in the case of Punk and RapB-and may discomfort the guardians of property and propriety. But it must always struggle to remain ahead of encroaching market forces, forces that threaten to neutralize its effects by reducing its creativity to bland consumer goods.

    Beyond the Politics of Metaphor

    Still, we mistake the possibilities of the moment if we see youth culture simply as a “politics of metaphor” (Hebdige loc. cit.). It is a mistake that flows from focusing more on the products of that culture, on its disembodied images and texts, than on their situated production and use. The potential of its signs and objects to be (re)deployed, to be “cut and mix[ed],” have made them easily available for the fashioning of a wide variety of identities and projects; identities and projects whose sometimes subversive strain, itself often acted out rather than spoken out, underlie the ambivalences endemic to the late twentieth-century representation of the young, sui generis. Also, perhaps to the political spirit of the age writ large. For the productive aspect of “youth culture”  has expanded as juveniles have come to participate on a global scale in shaping their own markets, both legal and illegal; as their signifying practices have connived with those species of post-Fordist capital that owe little loyalty to local establishments or economies. Youth have been integral to the opening up of new economic spaces of unprecedented profitabilityB-the fertile Silicon Valleys, where young “nerds,”  eschewing academic credentials and professional regulation, have become multimillionaires; the childlike insouciance that typifies this field, in image if not in terms of real control, being legible in the bespectacled boyishness of an aging Bill Gates.

    The libertarian possibilities of electronic technologies that simultaneously privatize and globalize the means of communication are intrinsic to the effects of capitalism in its neoliberal guise, and have generated new openings for juvenile adventurers, ostensibly unfettered by a gerontocratic establishment. This is captured in the equivocal figure of the “hacker,” an underage outlaw bent on maintaining the freedom of the information highway, and redeeming his (more rarely her) creative potential from the grasp of evil corporations and imperious governments (Coleman n.d.). A string of American movies (like Hackers, Wargames, and Johnny Mnemonic) rehearse popular nightmares of electronic whizkids breaking into top security enclaves, and threatening to hold the state and its guardians to ransom. Recent reports in the US media, interestingly, tell of teenage e-traders amassing huge fortunes in their bedrooms while putatively doing their school “homework.”

    But suburban cyberbrats are hardly unique in their capacity to mine the potential of new economic frontiers. Every bit as inspired and ingenious have been the ventures of less advantaged young people from the inner cities, from postcolonial and postrevolutionary societies, and from other terrors incognita, who seek to make good the promise of world-wide laissez-faire.

    Here, too, liberalization has created room for youthful entrepreneurs to manoeuver beyond the confines of modernist modes of production, polity, legitimacy. Take the burgeoning “bush economies”  of Cameroon and Chad, where “market boys”  cross borders, change passports, trade currencies, and traffic in high-risk cargo like guns and drugs; in so doing, they invent fresh ways of getting rich on the margins of global markets (Roitman n.d.). Or consider the ferociously escalating teenage diamond trade-Banother amalgam of danger, desire, and deregulationB-that provisions armies in West and Central Africa, setting up innovative configurations of libertarian commerce, violence, and profit (De Boeck n.d.). Or observe the young Mouride men from Senegal who have taken to translocal enterprise with such energy that they talk of New York as “a suburb of Dakar;”  their remittances finance major reconstruction of urban neighborhoods at home, transform local power relations, and, concomitantly, highlight the dwindling capacity of the nation-state to sustain its infrastructure (Mamadou Diouf, personal communication; Buggenhagen n.d). These fluid economies are usually not altogether free of gerontocratic control, of course. Nor do they supplant all formal political and economic arrangements, with which they have complex and multiple interconnections. But they do circumscribe and relativize them in significant ways, thereby challenging their exclusive sovereignty.

    In sum, youth culture, in an epoch of liberalization, has shown itself uniquely able to link locales across transnational space; also to motivate the kinds of material practices that, in turn, have redrawn the maps of high modernism. Contemporaneity is its essence. In this, it echoes present-day pop, whose fast moving “sampling” distends the normative by juxtaposing sounds in startlingly labile ways, not least when it cannibalizes ethnomusics from across the planet. Small wonder that our nightmare adolescent–wearing absurdly expensive sports shoes, headphones blaring gangsta rap, beeper tied to a global underground economy–is a synthesis of street child and corporate mogul.

    A qualification here. The marginalization of young people, at least in its present-day form, may be a very general structural consequence of the rise of neoliberal capitalism. And “youth culture” may be increasingly global in its reach. But this does not mean that the predicament of juveniles, or the manner of its experience, is everywhere the same, everywhere homogenized.

    Neither in its social nor in its cultural dimensions is this the case. It takes highly specific forms, and has very different material implications, in Los Angeles and Dakar, London and Delhi. Hip hop, Air Jordans, and Manchester United colors might animate youthful imaginations almost everywhere, often serving as a poignant measure of the distance between dream and fulfillment, between desire and impossibility, between centers of great wealth and peripheries of crushing poverty. But these signs are always domesticated to some degree. Otherwise they would have very little density of meaning. Appropriated and re-contextualized, they are translated into hybrid languages capable of addressing local concerns. Thus it is that rap music is inflected in one way on the Cape Flats, another on the streets of Bombay or Havana.

    Writes Richard Ssewakiryanga (1999:26):

    Today in Uganda, rap music is not only received in its American form, but repackaged by borrowing from some of the traditional folklore to fill in the incomprehension…suffered by the audience listening to the poetics of American rappers.

    Imported images, he notes, quickly penetrate local repertoires of humor, irony, anger. At the same time, these media remain points of intersection, points of connection between here and elsewhere, between sameness and difference, between received identities and a global imaginary.

    Partly as a result of all this, youth tend everywhere to occupy the innovative, uncharted borderlands in which the global meets the local; this often being audible in the elaboration of creolized argots–like Street Setswana and Kwaita in South Africa–that give voice to imaginative worlds very different from those of the parental generation. 8These frontiers are also sites of tension, particularly for young people who confront the contradictions of modernity as they try to make good on the millennial promise of democracy and the free market in the newly liberalized states of Africa and Eastern Europe. In the late twentieth century, we have suggested, the image of youth-as- trouble has gained an advanced capitalist twist as impatient adolescents try to “take the waiting out of wanting,” thus to lessen the gulf between hope and fulfillment. In the process they have felt their power, power born of a growing willingness and ability to turn to the use of force, to garner illicit wealth, to hold polite society to ransom. Bill Buford (1993:264f) has said that it is only in moments of concerted violence that riotous British soccer fans experience a real sense of community, a point others have extended to gangland wars in US cities, to witchburning in the northerly provinces of South Africa, and to cognate social practices elsewhere. Is it surprising, then, that so many juveniles see themselves as ironic, mutant citizens of alien-nations, finding scant reflection of themselves in the rites and rhetoric, the provisions and entitlements, of a liberal democratic civic order?

    8 For an excellent study of Street Setswana in the North West Province of South Africa, see Cook (1999).

    ENDNOTE

    It was the ANC manifesto that proclaimed “jobs for all at a living wage”…Where are the promised youth brigades? Where are the jobs? Where is the living wage? Now is the time.

    Shaheed Mohamed, Cape Times, 7.xxix.99

    Elsewhere (2000a) we explore the (onto) logic of neoliberal capitalism; or “millennial capitalism,” as we refer to it, thus to index not merely its epochal rise at the end of the century, but also the fact that it has become invested with an almost magical, salvific capacity to yield wealth without work, money without manufacture. There we seek to show that structural transformations in the material, moral, and signal relationship of production to consumption have altered the very essence of labor and social reproduction; also the essence of–and mutual bleeding into each other–of class, race, gender, and generation. 9 In the final analysis, it is this epochal history, this analytic ur-narrative, that holds the key to any understanding of the present and future predicament of youth; even of its unfolding construction as a category an  und  fur sich. Here we have sought to lay out, somewhat cavalierly, bits and pieces of the genealogy of that ur-narrative.

    9 Age and generation, as the marxist anthropology of precapitalist societies has long pointed out, may coalesce in self-reproducing structures of exploitation. In many of these societies, youthful cadres provided the labor power, and hence surplus value, for their elders. The parallel with neoliberal capitalism is obvious. Increasingly, “youth” and “underclass,” both ever more racinated and ethnicized, run together; note, here, Abdullah’s (1998) suggestive use of the term “lumpen youth culture.”

    In so doing, we have sought to complicate current talk, at least in populist discourses, of “the crisis of youth”; talk that portrays the predicament of the younger generation in monochromatically bleak terms. And 10 if all were entropy, all catastrophe, all impossibility in this Age of Futilitarianism, this age in which rampant self-interest meets rampant pessimism (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). It is not that these terms are inaccurate. Nor that deep concern is unwarranted. To the contrary. The metamorphosis of the global economy is marginalizing many people before they grow to full maturity, excluding them from the prospect of regular employment, treating them increasingly as adults before the law when they transgress the bounds of the normative, demonizing them as they turn to crime in the absence of any other means of livelihood. The young of today, it seems, are more than ever enfranchised as consumers-welcomed into the marketplace in the immediate interests of corporate capital–often then to be excluded from the benefits of mainstream economic participation, political acknowledgement, and civic responsibility (cf. Venkatesh n.d.[b]).

    But this is only a part of the story.

    10 No less problematic are statements of unqualified optimism about a new and undifferentiated “millennial generation”  in the US, bereft of the cynicism and rebelliousness of their parents (Howe and Strauss 2000).

    For one thing, as we have said, the attribution to unruly youth of the standardized nightmares of polite society–not unlike the witch in precolonial and colonial Africa (Wilson 1951)–goes back to the genesis of industrial capitalism and its bourgeois sensibilities. It is on the back of those situated in the liminal space between childhood innocence and adult responsibility that modernist sociomoral anxieties have tended to be borne. For another thing, it is crucial, if we are to make any real sense of the contemporary predicament of youth, of its neomodern construction as a category in and for itself, that we stress its intrinsic bipolarity, its doubling. Youth is not only a signifier of exclusion, of impossibility, of emasculation, denigration, and futility. Nor, by all accounts, is it experienced as such. While they may not, for the most part, have captured the mainstream–and may, indeed, constitute an infinitely exploitable market, an inexhaustible reservoir of consumers, an eternal font of surplus value to be extracted–the young remain a constant source of creativity, ingenuity, possibility, empowerment. A source of alternative, yet-to-be- imagined futures.

  • Privatizing the Millennium

    Privatizing the Millennium

    The first is from post-apartheid South Africa.

    The New Life Church in Mafikeng-Mmabatho, capital of the North West Province, was established just before the fall of apartheid. It typifies a brand of upbeat, technically-hyped Pentecostalism that aspires to fill the moral void left by a withering of revolutionary ideals and civic norms in the postcolony. While New Life is the creation of a talented pair of pastors, a husband and wife who have shaped it independently of denominational oversight, their community belongs to the International Federation of Christian Churches; this is a global network of congregations, all of which combine a lively charismatic realism with a frank materiality, the latter embodied in a subject not embarrassed by this-worldly desire. Congregants pay a tithe, and are encouraged to expect that their investment, both spiritual and monetary, will yield tangible empowerment. They are offered a range of services, from marriage guidance to financial counseling, that recast the pastoral in a distinctly service-oriented, therapeutic key. As in many such movements, the stress on divine manifestation is accompanied by a preoccupation with cutting-edge media: “It might sound heretical,” noted the founding pastor, “but we strive above all to make our services exciting, affecting. Our competition, after all, is the video arcade, the movie house, and the casino.” Remember the casino. We shall return to it. In New Life’s sparkling suburban sanctuary, a sophisticated sound stage replaces the altar. Services are punctuated by lilting hymns and love songs to Jesus, crooned by a modishly dressed, youthful band–or “worship team”–equipped with electronic instruments. Overhead, a large karaoke screen flashes the lyrics; in a booth to the rear, a technician monitors the acoustics. Meetings draw large crowds that span a wide spectrum of race, age, and class. They center on stylized personal testimonies that narrate, in psychological terms, a self-reborn into an individualized world of transparency, purpose, and prosperity.

    The second comes from post-Soviet Russia.
    The messiah has arrived. He is to be found in East Siberia, wherein lies “the Promised Land of the Future.” More prosaically, he lives in a compound near Minusinsk Depression, east of Abakan. Sergei Torop by name, he prefers to be called Vissarion. He had his own webpage in the 1990s,1 on which he explained that Vissarion–also the name of Stalin’s father–means “giving the life” in “the language of the Universe.” In the event that that language is not understood by ordinary mortals, seven more conventional vernaculars conveyed his cyber-message, which promised that his Word would soon spread across the World. The 40-ish year-old, ethereal looking savior established the Last Testament Church in 1991, after the repressed memory of two millennia flooded back to him, after he came to realize that he was not the child of Siberian construction workers but the Son of God, after he learned that “all religions are inserted in him”; the origin myth of the movement, significantly, dates these revelations roughly to the fall of the USSR. Vissarion acquired a substantial following during the 1990s, the Vissariontsi, composed largely of “disenchanted [former] Soviet intellectuals and idea lists.” While their exact number is uncertain–it is said to run into tens of thousands today–they soon attracted the attention of the Orthodox Church, which took to monitoring them carefully; also of the state, which appears to have left them alone, largely because the arrival of the church breathed life into a dying local economy. The movement has a strong green orientation, seeing itself as “A Siberian Global Experiment targeting Human Survival under Circumstances of Social and Natural Cataclysm.”

    Vissarion himself was a traffic warden until he turned messiah, persuaded his disciples to hand over their earthly wealth to him, and established the City of Sun, which is what he calls his rural dominion. This dominion is reminiscent of a Soviet collective— although, some time back, it formed a joint stock company, Tabrat Ltd., to bankroll its material existence. In short, the Second Coming here envisages a future in the past, a hereafter (or there-before?) that revivifies the glories of a socialist commune by lodging it securely in the global capitalist economy. Vissarion has not escaped skepticism. He has been portrayed as an enchanted entrepreneur who earns a lucrativeincome from service delivery in the God business, a business flourishing anew in these turbulent times,2 a business, suggested Tom Whitehouse in 1999, that often yields high profits to its High Priests. Torop, he went on to note, lived in lavish circumstances. No wonder that Orthodox clergy saw him as an “evil pyramid schemer,” an image which we shall have cause to revisit. Whether or not he is a charlatan, a con man with a Christ- like appearance and a creative line in income redistribution, is beside our present point. The various features of his religious movement–its entry into the world of the joint stock ventures, its presence on the web, its global outreach, its appeal to eco-technical solutions for planetary problems, its promise of instant redemption at a price in hard currency, its well-requited head of operations–are all of a piece. They tell a story at once very old and very new.

    The third is from the American heartland.

    In Columbus, Indiana, a small town some four hours drive from Chicago on Highway 64, there is an extraordinary array of churches. Columbus is known for its public architecture because the local captains of industry came to a decision, at some point in the past, to make their town into a shrine to the built form. As a result, many internationally famous “names” erected buildings across the flatlands of this otherwise unprepossessing corner of the Midwest. One of them is a profoundly beautiful, profoundly spiritual, edifice. Designed by Eero Saarinen, the North Christian Church houses a congregation of Disciples of Christ, whose journal, Cutting Edge, is unusually revealing. Volume 29 no.2 of 2000 is dedicated to the topic of “Buildings for the Post- Christendom Church” (Blankenship 2000: 1-2). “Christendom,” it declares, “is dying” (p.1). What began in the fourth century of the common era is over, a new reformation is under way. But what, precisely, are its signs? Among other things, “the adoption of market driven planning to replace tradition”; this in order to appeal to a generation that wants “choices, convenience, quality, and specialized services” in religion as in everything else (p.2; after Schaller 1999). By extension, church facilities, like prayer itself, require “above all [to be] useful, adaptable, and marketable.” And so, in the most conservative crannies of Christian America, the church enters the new millennium by making common cause not with a capitalist ethos grounded in virtuous work, in the production of the self through the production of value, but with a world of convenience and consumption, of free choice and flexibility; a world in which the provision of services, religious services like other customer services, is paramount.

    Each of these vignettes evokes the ghost of Max Weber. Each speaks of a new moment in the history of capitalism, of its Second Coming, this time in neoliberal guise, this time on an even more global scale than before. They also speak of a new religious spirit to go with that moment, a spirit which, as we shall see, is rampant in Africa. But not only in Africa. Note that our three instances come from what used to be called, respectively, the third, second, and first worlds.

    All of which raises a number of conundrums for our understanding of economy and society, culture and history, faith and identity in the early years of the new millennium. Some of the corollaries of the Second Coming –“plagues of the ‘new world order’,” Derrida (1994:91) calls them–have occasioned heated debate. Thus, for example, populist polemics have dwelt on the planetary conjuncture, for good or ill, of “homogenization and difference” (e.g. Barber 1992); on the simultaneous, synergistic spiraling of wealth and poverty; on the rise, like a disfigured phoenix, of a “new medievalism” (Brownlee et al 1991; cf. Connelly and Kennedy 1994). For its part, scholarly debate focused, at the turn of the century, on the confounding effects of rampant liberalization: on whether it engenders truly transnational flows of capital or drains them off to a few major sites (Hirst and Thompson 1996); on whether it weakens, sustains, or reinvents the nation-state (Sassen 1996); on whether it frees up, curbs, or compartmentalizes the movement of labor; on whether the current fixation with democracy, its resurrection in so many places, betokens a measure of mass empowerment or an “emptying out of [its] meaning” (Negri 1999:9; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). Equally in question is why the present infatuation with civil society has been accompanied by alarming increases in civil strife; why, in like vein, the politics of consumerism, human rights, and entitlement has coincided with puzzling new patterns of exclusion, patterns that refract long-established lines of gender, sexuality, race, and class (Gal 1997; Yudice 1995); why, also, there has been a palpable rise in many countries of domestic violence, rape, child abuse, prison populations and, most dramatically of all, criminal “phantom-states” (Derrida 1994:83; Blaney and Pashsa 1993); forms of organized crime, in short, that mimic the state, arrogating its powers and providing some of its services for a fee.

    Other features of our present predicament were less remarked at the millennium, although they have become more so in recent times. Among them are the odd coupling of the legalistic with the libertarian, constitutionality with deregulation, and–at the core of our concerns here–hyper-rationalization with the exuberant spread of innovative occult practices and money magic, of pyramid schemes and prosperity gospels; the enchantments, that is, of a decidedly neoliberal economy, whose ever more inscrutable speculations seem to call up fresh specters in their wake. Note that, unlike others who have discussed the “new spectrality” of that economy (Negri 1999:9; Sprinker 1999), we do not talk here in metaphorical terms. We seek, instead, to draw attention to the distinctly pragmatic qualities of the messianic and the millennial; not merely in the tenor of organized religion, of which we shall have a lot to say, but of capitalism itself as a gospel of salvation. As this suggests, in speaking of Millennial Capitalism we intend not merely capitalism at the millennium–capitalism, that is, in its chronological contemporaneity–but also capitalism in its messianic, salvific, even magical manifestations; capitalism as a cultural and moral economy with the capacity, if harnessed properly, to enrich the poor and further enrich the wealthy, to solve social problems, to heal the sick, to elicit divine favor, to add material value to the commonweal.

    The question, patently, is why? Why has capitalism taken on these features? What is new about them? And how, exactly, have they reconfigured the religious world in their wake? It is on this last issue that we focus here.

    Let us, then, cut to the heart of the matter. If we are to understand the spirits of our age, the place to begin, as Marx noted for another historical juncture, is with epochal shifts in the constitutive relationship of production to consumption. This is not to say that the essence of neoliberal capitalism is reducible purely to that relationship. Quite the opposite: there is now a large literature on the various dimensions of the new global economy–from the workings of finance capital, the electronic commons, and transnational corporations through the changing, labile character of work and labor, its mobility and its transience, its gendered and generational inflections, to the impact of space-time compression, of flexible accumulation, and of the planetary flow of signs, styles, and commodities upon old sovereignties, old loyalties, old identities. All of these things are crucially important in understanding the shape of the world we live in (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). For now, however, we have perforce to take them for granted. In any case, we would suggest, it is specifically by interrogating the shifting articulation of production to consumption, of the pro to the con in capitalist economics, that we might make sense of the emergence of new forms of enchantment–and of the kinds of Neoprotestantism to which they appear to be giving rise in postcolonial Africa. And elsewhere.

    Capitalism at the millennium, millennial capitalism

    Consumption, recall, was the hallmark disease of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: of the First Coming of Industrial Capitalism, an age in which the ecological conditions of production, its consuming passions, ate up the bodies of producers. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first, semiotically transposed, it is often said to be the “hallmark of modernity,” the measure of its wealth, health, and vitality. An over- generalization? Maybe. Yet the claim does capture popular imaginings. It also resonates with the growing Eurocultural truism that the (post)modern person is a subject made with objects. Nor is this surprising. Consumption, in its ideological guise–as “consumerism”–refers to a material sensibility actively cultivated, for the common good, by Western states and commercial interests, particularly since World War II. Also by some noncapitalist regimes: in the early 1990s, even Deng Xiaoping advocated “consumption as a motor force of production” (Oirlik 1996:194).

    As consumption became the moving spirit of the late twentieth century, so there has been a concomitant eclipse of production; an eclipse, at least, of its perceived salience for the wealth of nations. This has heralded a shift, across the world, in ordinary understandings of the nature of capitalism. The workplace and labor, especially work- and-place securely rooted in a stable local context, are no longer prime sites for the creation of value or identity (Sennett 1998). The factory and the shop, far from secure centers of fabrication and family income, are increasingly experienced by virtue of their replacement at the hands of nonhuman or “nonstandard” means of manufacture. Or by their removal to an elsewhere–where labor is cheaper, less assertive, less taxed, more feminized, less protected by states and unions; in South Africa, for example, 80% of employers prefer to hire non standard workers. Hence the paradox, in many economies, of high official employment rates amidst stark deindustrialization, joblessness, and growing carceral populations. In the upshot, production appears to have been superseded, as the ur-source of wealth, by less tangible ways of generating value: by control over intellectual property, copyrights, franchises, and licensees; by owning the means of communication and the conveyancing of people and things; by the provision of services; and, above all, by the capacity to direct the flow of finance capital.

    Symptomatic in this respect, we argue in another essay (2000b), are the changing historical fortunes of gambling. Risk has always been crucial to the growth of modern economies. But, removed from the dignifying nexus of the market, it was treated until recently, alike by Protestant ethics and populist morality, as a “pariah” practice. Casinos were set apart from the workaday world, being situated in liminal places of leisure rather than sites of honest toil. Living off the proceeds of this form of speculation was, normatively-speaking, the epitome of immoral accumulation: the wager stood to the wage as sin to virtue. Over a generation, betting, in its marked form, has changed moral valence and invaded everyday existence almost everywhere, being routinized in high risk dealings in stocks, bonds, and funds whose fortunes are governed largely by chance. It also expresses itself in a fascination with “futures” and their populist counterpart, the lottery. Here the mundane meets the millennial: “Not a lotto tomaro,” proclaimed an ironic, inner-city mural in Chicago in 2000, large hands grasping a pile of casino chips, beside which nestled a motherless baby;3 this at a time when, increasingly “operated and promoted” by government, “gambling [had become not just] the fastest growing industry in the US,” but one “tightly woven into the national fabric.”4 Indeed, life itself is now a common object of bookmaking; it is no longer the sole preserve of the “respectable” insurance industry. Take, by way of an example that has always fascinated us, a report in Newsweek from early 1999:5

    In America’s casino culture, no wager is outre. So how about betting on how long a stranger is likely to live? You can buy part or all of his or her insurance policy, becoming a beneficiary. Your gamble: that death will come soon enough to yield a high return on the money you put up. The Viatical Association6 of America says that $1 billion worth of coverage went into play last year.

    In the era of millennial capitalism, securing instant returns is often a matter of life and death. Also in 1999, the India Tribune7 reported that one of the Indian states, Madya Pradesh, was “caught in a vortex of lottery mania” which had led to several suicides. It described “extreme enthusiasm among the jobless youth towards trying their luck to make a fast buck.” More mundanely, efforts to enlist divine help in tipping the odds, from the Taiwanese countryside to the Kalahari fringe, have become a regular feature of what Robert Weller (2000:482) terms “fee for service” religions. These are locally- nuanced fantasies of beating capitalism at its own game by drawing a winning number at the behest of unseen forces.

    The change in the moral valence of gambling also has a public dimension. In many countries, lotteries have become a favored means of filling national coffers and generating cultural capital. The defunct machinery of a growing number of welfare states, to be sure, is being turned by the wheel of fortune. With more and more governments depending on this source for quick revenue fixes, notes George Will, a well-known conservative commentator in the U.S., betting has “been transformed from a social disease”–subjected, not so long ago, to scrutiny at the hands of Harvard Medical School8–“into social policy.”9” Once a dangerous sign of moral turpitude, “it is now marketed almost as a ‘patriotic duty.”10

    And yet crisis after crisis in the global economy, and growing income disparities on a planetary scale, make it painfully plain that there is no such thing as capitalism without production. Apart from all else, Fordist manufacture has not disappeared. It has been transformed, dispersed, and reorganized–with the effect that sites of fabrication have been removed from sites of consumption in such a way as to give the appearance that proletariats, sensu stricto, are a thing of the past. This displacement, this rendering absent of visible production, has convinced the likes of Derrida (n.d.; after Rifkin 1995) that we have reached the end of “the world of work” as we know it: the end of the epoch of homo faber, of class consciousness, of the modernist idea of self-construction through virtuous labor. All identities seem to be contrived through self-fashioning, all wealth by means of the entrepreneurial. All of which, tautologically, affirms the putative primacy of consumption. And makes the operations of capital appear arcane, quixotic, magical. If Western scholars have been somewhat slow to reflect on why this is so, their “others” have not; especially those others who live in places where there has been a sudden infusion of commodities, an explosion of new forms of wealth, and a simultaneous shrinking of the labor market. Like South Africa. Many, to be sure, have been quick to give voice to their perplexity at the secret of this wealth: of its sources and the capriciousness of its distribution, of the mysterious forms it takes, of its slipperiness, of the opaque relations between means and ends embodied in it. Our concern here grows directly out of these perplexities: out of world-wide speculation, in both senses of the term, provoked by the shifting conditions of material existence at the end of the twentieth century. The revalorization of speculation, we have also argued before, is itself a corollary of the experiential paradox, the doubling, at the core of neoliberal capitalism, of capitalism in its millennial manifestation: the fact that it appears to produce desire on a global scale yet to decrease the certainty of work or the security of persons; that it appears to magnify class differences but to undercut class consciousness; above all, that it appears to offer up vast, almost instantaneous riches to those who master its spectral technologies–and, simultaneously, to threaten the very being of those who do not.

    This doubling is most visible in postcolonies; especially in those like South Africa- -set free by the events of 1989 and their aftermath–that entered the global arena with distinct structural disadvantages. A good deal is to be learned about the historical implications of the current moment by eavesdropping on the popular anxieties to be heard in such places: on the mounting disenchantment with liberty under libertarian conditions; on the nostalgia for past regimes, some of them immeasurably repressive; on moral panics occasioned by rapidly rising suicide rates; on the upsurge of assertions of identity and autochthony; on the widespread fears, in many parts of Africa, Asia, and Central Europe alike, concerning the apparently preternatural production of wealth. The close of the Cold War–and, in its wake, the death of apartheid in South Africa and democratization movements elsewhere on the continent–fired utopian imaginations. But liberation under neoliberal conditions has been marred by a disconcerting upsurge of violence, crime, and disorder. The quest for democracy, the rule of law, prosperity, and civility threatens to dissolve into strife and recrimination, even political chaos. Everywhere there is evidence of an uneasy fusion of enfranchisement and exclusion; of xenophobic reaction to the bleeding of national borders; of the effort to realize modern utopias by decidedly postmodern means; of the waxing, in many places, of conspiracy theories; of the fetishization of human rights, the rule of law, and civil society, a construct whose populist appeal seems everywhere to rise in rough proportion to its inchoateness as a principle of praxis.

    Gone is any official-speak of egalitarian futures, work-for-all, or the paternal government envisioned by the freedom movements of yore. Transformed, too, is the modernist nation-state as we once knew it, its hyphenation more or less ruptured under the impact of global economic and electronic integration, amidst unprecedented flows of people, commodities, and currencies, amidst changes in the very nature of citizenship and the construction of identity. These transformations have expressed themselves increasingly in a spirit of deregulation, with its taunting mix of emancipation and limitation. As those citizens not fortunate enough to win the lottery of life try to find salvation in enterprise, they find themselves battling the eccentric currents of the “new” world order, which shortcircuit received sovereignties, received means and ends, received connections between personhood and place. And as the great containers of modern social order have been fractured, so have the cultural, ethical, and spiritual coordinates on which they were founded; coordinates that charted a conceptual and institutional terrain long taken for granted in classic Western (for which read JudaeoProtestant) ideology and its civil extension–among them, the dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, the transcendent and the temporal, the material and the moral, the pious and the pecuniary, and, most of all, modernity and enchantment. Which, by turn, focuses our gaze on occult economies and new religious movements?

    Occult economies and new religious movements

    A striking corollary of the Age of Millennial Capitalism has been the global proliferation of “occult economies.” These economies have two dimensions: a material aspect founded on the sustained effort to conjure wealth–or to account for its accumulation–by appeal to techniques that defy practical reason; and an ethical aspect, grounded in the moral discourses sparked by the manufacture of value, either real or imagined, by arcane, “magical” means. It is difficult, of course, to quantify the presence of the occult–and, therefore, to make any claim that it is on the increase. As we have already noted, finance capital has always had its spectral enchantments, its modes of speculation based on less than honest toil, on less than rational connections between means and ends. Both its underside (the pariah forms of gambling of which we spoke a moment ago) and its upper side (a fiscal industry embracing everything from insurance to stock markets) have been rooted, from the first, in two inscrutables: a faith in probability, itself a notoriously unreliable way of predicting the future from the past, and a monetary system which depends for its existence on confidence, a chimera knowable, tautologically, only by its effects. Wherein, then, lies the claim that occult economies are presently on the rise? In the specific context of South Africa, we have demonstrated (1999a) that there has been an explosion of occult-related activity–arising out of accusations of ritual killing, witchcraft, and zombie conjuring–since the late apartheid years; also of fantastic Ponzi schemes, of the sale of body parts for “magical” purposes, of allegations of satanic practice, even of tourism based on the sighting of fabulous monsters. Middle class magazines run “dial-a-diviner” advertisements, national papers carry front page articles on medicine murders, prime-time television broadcasts dramas of sorcery, and more than one “witchcraft summit” has been held. Whether or not the brute quantum of occult activity exceeds that of times past, it is clear is that their reported incidence, written about by the mainstream press in more prosaic terms than ever before (Ford red 1999), has forced itself upon the public sphere, rupturing the flow of mediated news. It is this rupture–this focus of popular attention on the place of the arcane in everyday production–to which we refer when we speak of a global proliferation of occult economies.

    It is not difficult to catalogue the presence of these economies in different places across the planet. In West Africa, for example, Geschiere (1997) has shown how zombie making is an endemic feature of everyday life, how sorcery has entered into postcolonial political economy, how magic has become as much an acknowledged aspect of mundane survival strategies as it is indispensable to the ambitions and machinations of the powerful. Nor is all of this based in rural situations or among poor people. In Nigeria’s lively national press, Bastian (1993: 133f) shows, witchcraft is a frequent topic, both in quality broadsheets and in tabloids. Far from falling into the domain of the “customary” or the “exotic,” it is a vital idiom for understanding contemporary life–urban and rural, political and personal. One might add, parenthetically, that accounts of Nigerian supernaturalism are frequently recycled in the popular American press, where they have an avid readership, both black and white.

    Occult economies thrive in various parts of Asia, too, as Rosalind Morris (2000) indicates. In Thailand–where fortune telling has been transformed by global technology and email divination has taken off–one “traditional” seer, auspiciously named Madam Luk, reports that her clients nowadays ask three questions to the exclusion of all others: “‘Is my company going broke?’ ‘Am I going to lose my job?’ and ‘Will I find other employment?,,,11Here, as well, the fallout of neoliberal capitalism is having a profound impact on magical practice, a process splendidly captured in Morris’s account of the career of one of Thailand’s most renowned spirit mediums, who recently staged a dramatic, mass-mediated confession: he declared himself a fake. This, no less, so that he might take up a career as a distributor for Amway, a global pyramid scheme run by two Christian patriarchs in a small rural town in Michigan. Such schemes, says Morris, are the economic counterpart of mediumship: they “occult” the production of value with a disarmingly personalized, hyper-real directness. The verb is hers, after Zizek (1997:10); of the point itself, more in a moment.

    Sometimes dealings in the occult have a more visceral, darker side. Throughout Latin America in the 1990s, as in Africa and Asia, there have been mass panics about the clandestine theft and sale of the organs of young people, usually by unscrupulous expatriates (Scheper-Hughes 1996); violence against children has become metonymic of threats to social reproduction in many ethnic and national contexts, the dead (or missing) child having emerged as the standardized nightmare of a world out of control (J. Comaroff 1997). There, and in other parts of the globe, this commerce–like international adoptions, mail-order marriage, and indentured domestic labor–is seen as a new form of imperialism, the affluent north siphoning off the essence of poorer “others” by mysterious means for nefarious, often ritual ends. All of which gives evidence, to those at the nether end of the global distribution of wealth, of the workings of potent magical technologies and insidious modes of accumulation.

    That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itself: hence the scares some years back, in several countries, about the sexual and satanic abuse of children (La Fontaine 1997);12 also about the theft and abuse of human tissue and genetic material by an unholy alliance of Godless scientists and corporate Frankensteins. An extreme instance is the urban myth that traversed the internet in 1997 about the secret excision of kidneys, by arcane means, from business travelers waylaid at international airports. Several police departments, moral commentators, and mass media in the USA took these stories seriously enough to investigate them.13

    Note a persistent theme in all this: the anxiety that has come to surround transformations in the everyday economic world occasioned by two things. The first is the opening up of new kinds of translocal markets, of an inscrutable traffic in people, labor, services, and things; the second, the explosion of new forms of financial speculation and investment that are at once seductive and dangerous. If the former is epitomised by the sale of persons and their bodies, part or whole, the latter reaches its apex in the extraordinary intensification, lately, of pyramid schemes, many of them tied to the electronic media. These schemes and a host of scams allied with them–a few legal, many illegal, some alegal–are hardly new. But their recent mushrooming across the world has drawn a great deal of attention; this partly because of their sheer scale and partly because, by crossing national borders and registering at addresses far from the site of their local operation, they insinuate themselves into the slipstream of global capital, thereby escaping control. Recall those whose crash sparked the Albanian revolution early in 1997, several of which took on almost miraculous dimensions for poor investors; one pyramid manager in Albania was “a gypsy fortune teller, complete with crystal ball, who claimed to know the future.”1414 Even in the tightly regulated stock markets of the USA, there has been a huge rise in illicit dealings that owe their logic, if not their precise workings, to Ponzi operations; this because investors have become ever more “disposed to throw dollars at get-rich-quick schemes.” $6 billion, infact, was lost to scams on the New York Stock Exchange in 1996.15 Voodoo economics is alive and well at the financial center of the Western World.

    These scams also bring to mind others, different yet similar, that arise from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation; also of enchantment, mystery, even salvation. This was the case with the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, a US pyramid created “to change the world for the glory of God.” On the basis of a promise to double their money in six months, its founder, John Bennett, persuaded 500 nonprofit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million.16 Miracle 2000, a South African “empowerment” scheme that promised a 220% return on investments in 42 days, also had a strongly millennial side to it. So popular did it become that it drew crowds from across the land to the East Rand home of its 39-year- old founder, Sibusiso Radebe, crowds that would wait days to make their deposits. When an elite crime-busting unit of the South African Police Services cracked down on the scheme, arresting Radebe, hundreds of outraged investors marched on the Directorate of Public Prosecutions in Pretoria, carrying placards that proclaimed him as their “Messiah.” He was, they said, “doing more to alleviate poverty than the government.”17 In something akin to a memorial service, these protestors sung hymns and prayed for the return of both their savior and their savings.18 When Radebe was eventually released on bail, “ululating investors carried [him] shoulder-high and described him as a biblical Moses, who had delivered the downtrodden Israelites to God’s promised land.”19

    All of these things have a single common denominator: the allure of conjuring wealth from nothing. In this respect, while they recall older magicalities, they are the offspring of the same animating spirit as casino capitalism; indeed, perhaps they are casino capitalism for those who lack the fiscal or cultural capital–or who, for one or another reason, are reluctant to gamble on more conventional markets. Like the wizardry that made straw into gold (Schneider 1989), these alchemic techniques defy reason in promising to return unnaturally large profits on small investments, to yield wealth without work, to produce value without effort. Here, again, is the specter, the distinctive spirit, of neoliberalism in its triumphal phase. In its shadowy penumbra, the line between Ponzi schemes and prosperity gospels is very thin indeed.

    This, in turn, brings us to the spread of new religious movements across the planet. These, we suggest, may be seen as the apotheosis of the occult economies of which we have been speaking; as their holy-owned subsidiaries, if we may be forgiven the pun. Such movements take on a wide variety of guises. Some, like the Vissariontsi with which we began, sound perennial themes of apocalypse and utopian communitarianism, albeit tuned to a distinctively local key. But the followers of Vissarion also share a good deal with other Neoprotestant denominations elsewhere, among them the New Life Church in South Africa: a propensity for seeing congregations as joint stock companies, offering the faithful a tangible return on their investments; a fascination with new technologies and media that seem to condense the numinous magic of global enterprise; an eclipse of the ideal of patient toil and paradise postponed by the promise of prompt reward; the fusing of a millennial spirit with the speculative force of finance capital, so that the instant accumulation of wealth becomes synonymous with the unmediated power of God; a tendency, because of all this, to be viewed by orthodox believers as being mercenary, Satanic, magic-ridden.

    These features are even more palpable in the socalled “fee-for-service” faiths, those consumer cults alluded to above, which are challenging established Christian denominations in Africa and elsewhere. Typical of them is the Brazilian movement, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reina de Deus), which, since 1994, has grown rapidly all over southern Africa. Controversial in its country of origin, this church is reforming the Protestant Ethic with enterprise and urbanity. It owns a major television network in Brazil, has an elaborate website, and sponsors high- profile religious rock groups and soap operas (Kramer 1999). Above all, it promises swift payback to those who embrace Christ, denounce Satan, and “make their faith practical” by “sacrificing” all they can to the movement.20 Here Pentecostalism meets neoliberal enterprise head on; here the theological waxes psychotherapeutic. In its African churches, most of them–literally–storefronts in town centers, prayer meetings respond to candidly mercenary motives, offering everything from cures for depression through financial advice to remedies for unemployment; itinerant passers-by, clients and customers really, select the services they require. Even the smallest churches have elaborate electronic sound systems; pounding music, indistinguishable from any other rock music to all but the best trained ear, beats out a distinctly this-worldly ethos. A collage of advertisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorned the altar in one such church that we visited. Above it was the banner heading: “Delight Yourself in the Lord and He Will Give You the Desires of Your Heart (Psalms 37: 4).” Tabloids stuck to walls and windows carried stories, told in the first person, about those whose rebirth in the fold was rewarded by a rush of wealth or an astonishing recovery of health.

    The ability to deliver in the here-and-now, itself a potent form of space-time compression, is offered as the measure of a genuinely global God, just as it is taken to explain the lively power of Satanism. Both have the instant efficacy of the magical and the millenniary. As Kramer (1999:35) says of Brazilian Neopentecostals, “innerworldly asceticism has been replaced with a concern for the pragmatics of material gain and the immediacy of desire … [T]he return on capital has suddenly become more spiritually compelling and imminent … than the return of Christ.” This shift is endemic to many new religious movements nowadays. For them, and for their many millions of members, the Second Coming evokes not a Jesus who saves, but one who pays dividends. Or, more accurately, one who promises a miraculous return on spiritual venture capital.

    It might be argued that, as neoliberal forces have eroded the provenance of liberal democratic states in respect of education, health, and welfare, religious movements– above all, those flexible “prosperity” movements that mimic the workings of business– have expanded their institutional reach into formerly “secular” public domains. In South Africa, as a rising sense of entitlement runs up against the reality of privatization and limited state resources, churches have invested ever more heavily in building schools, clinics, and sports centers. They have extended their ministry in time and content, offering a host of individualized, special services–from exorcism to book-keeping–to members and nonmembers alike. Ever more aware of their role in civil society, these denominations involve themselves actively in current politics, both local and national. As a consequence, notions of the sacred and profane, of membership and congregation, of the calendar and the institutional scope of organized religion are all being reshaped. So, too, are the means of mediating and manifesting divine power.

    Why? How, to put the matter more generally, are we to account for the current spread and impact of occult economies and prosperity cults? In framing the problem, of course, we have already pointed in the direction of some answers.

    Toward a privatized millennium

    To the degree that millennial capitalism fuses the modern and the postmodern, hope and hopelessness, utility and futility, the world created in its image presents itself as a mass of contradictions: as a world, simultaneously, of possibility and impossibility. This is precisely the juxtaposition associated with cargo cults and chiliastic movements in other times and places (Worsley 1957; Cohn 1957). But, as the growth of prosperity gospels and fee-for-service movements illustrates, the chiliastic urge in neoliberal times expresses itself in a privatized millennium, a personalized rather than a communal sense of rebirth. In this, the messianic meets the magical. In the here-and-now, the cargo, glimpsed in large part through TV and the Internet, takes the form of huge concentrations of wealth accruing, legitimately or otherwise, to the rich of the new planetary economy. It is enigmatic wealth, derived mysteriously, as we said earlier, from financial investment and management, from intellectual property and other rights, from electronic expertise and the command of cyberspace, from transport and its cognate operations, and from the supply of various sorts of post-Fordist services. All of this points to the fact that the covert mechanisms of changing markets, not to mention abstruse technological and informational knowledge , hold the key to hitherto unimaginable fortunes: to capital amassed by the ever more rapid flow of value, across time and space, into the fluid coordinates of the local and the global.

    Herein, of course, lies the other side of the coin: the sense of impossibility, even despair, that comes from being left out of the promise of prosperity, from having to look in on a global economy of desire from its immiserated exteriors. Whether it be in post-Soviet Central Europe or postcolonial Africa, in post-Thatcherite Britain or the neoliberal USA, in a China edging towards its own form of capitalism or in Neopentecostal Latin America, the world-historical process which came to be symbolized by the events of 1989 held out the prospect that everyone would be set free to accumulate and speculate, to consume, and to indulge repressed cravings in a universe of less government, greater privatization, more opulence, and infinite enterprise. For the vast majority, however, the millennial moment passed without visible enrichment.

    The implication? That, in these times–the late modernist age when, according to Weber and Marx, enchantment would wither away–more and more ordinary people see arcane forces intervening in the production of value, diverting its flow toward a new elect. They also attribute to these arcane forces their feelings of erasure and loss: an erasure, in many places, of community and family; a loss of human integrity, experienced in the spreading commodification of persons and their bodies, in the unyoking of the market value from the social value of objects and relations, in the substitution of quantities for quality, abstraction for substance. None of these perceptions is new, as we have said. Balzac (1965 [1847]) described them for France in the 1840s, as did Conrad (1957 [1911]) for prerevolutionary Russia, and neither were alone. Gluckman (1959) spoke long ago of the “magic of despair” which arose in similarly dislocated colonial situations in Africa.

    Nonetheless, to reiterate, many people across the world are experiencing these disruptions right now in ways that make them appear ever more acute, ever more devastating, ever harder to grasp or to rationalize to themselves. Which is why the ethical dimensions of occult economies are so prominent, why the mass panics of our times tend to be moral in tone, why they so often express themselves in religious movements that pursue instant material returns and yet condemn those who enrich themselves in unGodly ways. And why, more generally, occult economies consist, at one level, in the constant quest for new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends, and yet, at another, voice a desire to sanction, even eradicate, people held to have accumulated assets by those very means. Satan and salvation, it seems, remain the conditions of each other’s imaginings.

    In sum, occult economies in general, and Neoprotestant religious movements in particular–in Africa and elsewhere–are a response to the perception of an epochal shift in the constitution of the lived world: a world in which the most promising way to create real wealth seems to lie in forms of power/knowledge that transgress the conventional, the rational, the moral, thus to multiply available techniques of producing value, fair or foul. In their cultural aspect, these economies bespeak a resolute effort to come to terms with that power/knowledge, to account for the inexplicable phenomena to which it gives rise, to plumb its secrets–a byproduct of which is the invention of new occult specters. Thus, for example, the unprecedented manifestation of zombies in some parts of the South African countryside has grown in direct proportion to the shrinking labor market for young men (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b). The former provide a partial explanation for the latter: the living dead are commonly said to be killed and raised up by older people, by witches of wealth, to toil for them, thereby rendering rural youth jobless. There are, in this era of flexitime employment, even part-time zombies, a virtual working c1ass–of pure, abstract labor power–that slaves away at night for its masters. In this context, moreover, the angry dramas through which ritual murderers are identified often become sites of public divination. As they unfold, the accusers discuss, attribute cause, and speak out their understanding of the forces that make the postcolony such an inhospitable place for them. This is an extreme situation, obviously. But in less stark circumstances, too, changing moral and material economies tend to spawn simultaneous strivings to garner wealth and to make transparent the means by which that wealth may be produced.

    As all this suggests, appeals to the occult in pursuit of the secrets of capital generally rely on local cultural technologies: on vernacular modes of divination or oracular consultation, on spirit possession or ancestral invocation, on sorcery busting or forensic legal procedures, on witch beliefs or prayer. Whatever. We stress, though, that the use of these technologies does not imply an iteration of, a retreat into, “tradition.” Per contra, their deployment in such circumstances is frequently a means of fashioning new techniques to preserve persisting values, of retooling culturally familiar signs and practices. As in cargo cults of old, this typically involves the mimicking of powerful new ways of producing wealth (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993:xvf).

    The rise of occult economies–amidst and alongside more conventional modes of economic practice, shading into the murky domains of crime and corruption–seems overdetermined in the early twenty-first century. This, after all, is an age in which the extravagant optimism of millennial capitalism runs up against an increasingly nihilistic, thoroughly postmodern pessimism. As the connections between means and ends grow increasingly opaque, the occult becomes an ever more semantically saturated metaphor for our times. Note how commonplace it is nowadays to pepper media-parlance, science-speak, new age psychobabble, and technologese–even the law21–with the language of enchantment. But, we insist, occult economies are not reducible to the symbolic, the figurative, or the allegorical alone. Magic is, everywhere, the science of the concrete, aimed at making sense of and acting upon the world–especially, but not only, among those who feel themselves disempowered, emasculated, disadvantaged. The fact that the turn to enchantment is not unprecedented, that it has precursors in earlier times, makes it no less significant to those for whom it has become an integral part of everyday reality. Maybe, too, all this describes a fleeting phase in the long, unfinished history of capitalism. But that makes it no less momentous. Especially in the white heat of the millennial moment.

    Towards a beginning

    However we wish to characterize this Uncommon Age–as an epoch of death (of ideology, politics, the subject) or rebirth (of the spirit of Marx, Weber, and the Adams, Ferguson and Smith)–ours are perplexing times; times caught uneasily between Derrida’s “end of work” (n.d.; see above) and Zizek’s (1997) “plague of fantasies”; times in which the conjuncture of the strange and the familiar, of stasis and metamorphosis, plays tricks on our perceptions, our positions, our praxis. This conjuncture appears at once to endorse and to erode our understanding of the lineaments of modernity. And its post-ponements. Here, plainly, we have tried to do no more than offer some preliminary observations about the passage from the apocalyptic perplexities of the present to the mundane realities of the future, interrogating, with due respect to Max Weber, the elective affinity between the spirit of a rising millennial capitalism, the occult economies which are growing up in its penumbra, and those Neoprotestant religious movements that give voice to its ethos.

    As we have already intimated, and as we all know well, the inscription of materiality in moral economy, of the pursuit of this-worldly wealth in other-worldly religious faith is hardly new. In the Protestant Ethic, Weber (1958: 175) himself italicizes a passage from John Wesley that says: “we must exhort all Christians gain all they can, and to save all they can; that is, in effect, to grow rich.” What, then, is new? We have suggested that the answer lies in a historically concrete conjuncture. One side of that conjuncture is a post-Fordist, salvific form of capitalism, a capitalism that no longer waits for the messiah–with due respect to Vissarion–but acts like one. It is a form of capitalism that is experienced, to invoke Marx’s camera obscura, upside down; that appears to have done away with production, and productive labor, as its fundamental source of property, personhood, family, identity, community, moral order, even “society”; that has altered the sovereignty of the nation-state and displaced its established public institutions; that has reconstituted space and time, expanding their virtual and global coordinates; that has elevated consumption into a prime mover, into the foundation of being in the world, into an epistemic act that makes the legal, psychotherapeutic, self-contracting individual of the “new” world order into a stakeholder, itself a trope that fuses gambling with corporate citizenship.

    On the other side of the conjuncture is the religion of the Vissariontsi in Siberia, of the New Life Church in South Africa, of those Disciples of Christ in Indiana, and many others besides. It is a religion of free choice and a flexible architecture, of instant materialities and dealmaking with the divine, of radically voluntarist subjects and repressed memories, of mass-mediations, global imaginings, and enchanted investments. Old time religion, it seems, is, at least in its Neoprotestant manifestation, being compressed into space-time religion. Thus it is that, as the past becomes the future, new spiritual movements, especially in African postcolonies, seek to harness the numinous magic of global enterprise, to fuse a messianic spirit with the speculative force of finance capital, thereby “taking the waiting out of wanting.” And thereby separating salvation from saving and/or this-worldly ascetism. This is not to say that the [old] Protestantism is dead and gone. Quite the contrary: there are many contexts in which it is putting up animated resistance, in which the first incarnation of Max Weber is alive and well. However, a Second Coming seems imminent in more and more places across the planet. It is a Second Coming that heralds a new Protestant Ethic, a new Spirit of Capitalism, and a new historical anthropology to make sense of both.

    Postscript

    In 2002, as we were walking on a street in Cambridge, Massachusetts, we were given what looked like a check by an eager, clean-cut young man. It was a check. Issued by the “Jesus Christ Bank of Unlimited Resources” (Matthew 6:33), dated “Now,” and made out to “Whosoever Will” (John 1:12) for the sum of “Eternal and Abundant Life” (Romans 6:23), it bore the signature of “The Blood of Jesus Christ” (Matthew 26:28). The account number, in the name of Love, Grace and Face – which sounds like a combination of a 1960s rock group and a law firm – is Romans 5:8/Ephesians 2:8,9. On the back are instructions for cashing the check “Secure your heavenly passport and visa today,” they advise. “Cash this check daily for your every need as you strive to stay away from sin…And if you need prayer and counseling, contact Pastor S@prodigy.com.” We share this promissory note in the spirit of its final message: “Please pass this tract on.”

  • Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa

    Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa

    Christian evangelists were intimately involved in the colonial process in southern Africa.

    This essay distinguishes two dimensions of their historical role, each associated with a
    different form of power. In the domain of formal political processes, of the concrete
    exercise of power, the effect of the nonconformist mission to the Tswana, as elsewhere
    in Africa, was inherently ambiguous. However, in the domain of implicit signs and
    practices, of the diffuse control over everyday meaning, it instilled the authoritative
    imprint of Western capitalist culture. But there was a contradiction between these
    dimensions: while the mission introduced a new world view, it could not deliver the
    world to go with it. And this contradiction, in turn, gave rise to various discourses of
    protest and resistance. [South Africa, Tswana, colonialism, Christianity, missionaries,
    power, domination and resistance, historical agency and cultural discourse]

  • Ethnicity, Inc.

    Ethnicity, Inc.

    PROLOGUE: toward the ethnologist-future

    In October 2000, Business Day, a leading South African newspaper, published an extraordinary story. Its title read: Traditional Leaders Form Private Firm for Investment.1 Contralesa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders, is the voice of ethnicity in this postcolony. It speaks for culture, customary law, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Also for the authority of chiefs who, as a power bloc, seek to change the national constitution. Their objective is a nation-state that accords them sovereign autonomy over their realms, a nation-state that puts the dictates of indigeneity before the universal rights of citizens.

    According to Business Day, Contralesa had decided to move ethnicity into the global market place: it was creating a corporation to investin mining, forestry, industry and tourism, that archetypical site for the commodification of culture. Said Patekile Holomisa, powerful Xhosa head of the organization: “We have concentrated for too long on the political fight for constitutional recognition.” The time had come to empower their peoples by venturing out from their traditional capitals into the realm of venture capital. Since then, Contralesa has become a truly cosmopolitan concern, a multi-million dollar business with interests carefully diversified across the planetary economy.

    Could it be, pace all social science orthodoxy, that the future of ethnicity – or, at least, a future – lies, metaphorically and materially, in ethno-futures? In taking identity into the market place? In hitching it to the world of franchising and finance capital? Leruo Molotlegi, King of the Bafokeng,2 a wealthy South African chiefdom, intimated as much in an address on “corporate ethnicity” at a leading American university. The Wealth of ETHNO-Nations is a topic about which he knows a lot. His people is famed throughout Africa for its lucrative platinum holdings. In 2000, soon after he succeeded to his throne, Leruo was picturedon the cover of Mining Weekly under the caption, “Meet the New CEO of Bafokeng Inc.”3

    Cut away to another time, another optic, another part of South Africa.

    In 1994, in the North West Province, there appeared an op-ed piece in The Mail, the local weekly,4 by one Tswagare Namane. “Our futures,” he predicted, are going to rely increasingly on tourism. To attract it, however, demands not just hotels or game parks. It requires “uncovering,” and marketing, “what is authentically Tswana.” Recourse to the cargo of cultural tourism, as we all know, has become a global panacea, an autonomic reflex almost, for those with no work and little to sell; this despite the fact that it seldom yields what it promises. But Namane had in mind something more than simply the tourist dollar. The commercialization of identity, he argued – pace Frankfurt School orthodoxy – does not necessarily reduce it to a brute commodity. Per contra: marketing what is “authentically Tswana” is also a mode of self-construction, of producing Tswana-ness. And an assertion, thereby, of universal being-in-the-world.

  • The Madman and the Migrant

    The Madman and the Migrant

    At its broadest, this essay explores the nature of historical consciousness among a South African Tswana people. On the basis of the imagery of two Tswana men – a “madman” institutionalized by the apartheid regime and a former migrant laborer – it examines the content of Tswana historical consciousness as expressed in vernacular cultural practices, specifically in relation to productiv work and wage labor. These differ from the narrative modes of representation associated with “history” in Euromodernist contexts, and build on various poetic devices – most strikingly, on the rhetoric of contrast – to give voice to contemporary experience and its historical roots. Thus the opposed concepts of productive work and wage labor, one associated with Setswana (Tswana ways) and the other with Sekgoa (European ways), are major tropes through which Tswana construct their past and present. It is argues that this excursion into the poetics of history in South Africa illuminates very general questions concerning the connection between consciousness, culture, history, and the poetics of representation.

  • Alien-Nation

    Alien-Nation

    What might zombies have to do with the implosion of neoliberal capitalism at the end of  the twentieth century? What might  they  have to do with post–colonial, post-revolu­tionary nationalism? With labour history? With the “crisis” of the modernist nation-state? Why are these spec­tral, floating signifiers making ;in appearance in epic, epidemic pro­portions in several parts of Africa just now? And why have immigrants­ those wanderers in pursuit of work, whose proper place is always elsew-

    • here-become pariah citizens of a global order in which, paradoxically, old  borders are said everywhere  to be dissolving? What, indeed, do any of these things, which bear the dis­tinct taint of exoticism, tell us about the hard-edged material, cultural, epistemic realities of our times? Indeed, why pose such apparently perverse questions at all when our social world abounds with practical problems of immediate, unremitting gravitas?

    So much for the questions. We shall cycle slowly back toward their ans­ wers. Let us move, first, from the interrogative to the indicative, from the conundrums with which we shall be concerned to the circumstances whence they arise.

    Spectral capital, capitalist speculation: From production to Consumption

    Consumption

    In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was the hallmark illness of the First Coming of Industrial Capitalism. Of the age in which the ecological conditions of production, its consuming passions (Sontag1978; cf Comaroff 1997), ate up the bodies of producers. Now, at the end of the twentieth, semantically trans­posed into another key, it has be­come, in the words of van Binsbergen and Geschiere (n.d.:3), the “hallmark of modernity”. Of its wealth, health, and vitality. Too vast a generalization? Maybe. But the claim captures popular imaginings, and their mass-media representation, from across the planet. It also reso­ nates with the growing Eurocultural truism that the (post) modern  per­ son is a subject made by means of objects. Nor is this surprising.

    Consumption, in its ideologicai guise-as   “consumerism”-refers    to a material sensibility actively cultiva­ ted, ostensibly for the common good, by Western states and com­ mercial interests, particularly since World War II.’ In social theory, as well, it has become a Prime Mover (loc. cit.), the force that determines definitions of value, the construction of identities, even the shape of the global ecumene.’ As such, tellingly, it is the invisible hand  that animates the political and material impera­ tives, and the social forms, of the Second Coming of Capitalism; of capitalism in its neoliberal, global manifestation. Note the image: the invisible hand. It recalls a moving spirit of older vintage. a numinous force that dates back to the Time of Adam. Adam Smith, that is. Cone is the deus ex machina, a figure too mechanistic, too industrial for the post-Fordist era.

    – consumption has become the moving spirit of the late twentieth century, so there has been a concomi­tant eclipse of production; an eclipse, at least, of its perceived salience for the wealth of nations. With this has come a hidespread shift, across the world, in ordinary understandings of the nature of capitalism. The work­ place and honest labour, especially work-and-place securely rooted in local community, are no longer prime sites for the creation of value. Per contra, the factory and the workshop, far from secure centres of fabrication and family income, are incrtasingly experienced byvirtueof their closure: either by their removal to somewhere else-where labour is cheaper, less assertive, less taxed, more feminized, less protected by states and unions-­ or by their replacement by non­ human means of manufacture, which, in turn, has left behind, for ever more people, a legacy of part­ time piece work, menial make work, relatively insecure, gainless occupa­ tion. For many populations, in the upshot, production appears to have been replaced, as the Jons et ongo of capital, by the provision of services and the capacity to control space, time, and the now of money. In short, by the market and by speculation.

    Symptomatic, in this respect, are the changing historical fortunes of gam­ bling. Until very recently, living off its proceeds was, normatively spea­ king, the epitome of immoral accu­ mulation; the wager stood to the wage, the bet to personal  better­ ment, as did sin to virtue. Now it is routinized in a widespread infatua­ tion with, and  popular participation in financial “investments” that take the form of vast, high risk dealings in stocks and bonds and funds whose rise and fall appear to be governed purely by chance. It also expresses itself in a fascination with  futures and with their downmarket counter­ part, the lottery; banal, if symbolical­ ly saturated fantasies these of abun­dance without effort, of beating capitalism on its own terms by drawing a winning number at the behest of unseen forces.’ Once again thal, invi­ sible hand. At a time when taxes are anathema lo the majoritarian politi­cal centre, gambling has become a favoured means of raising revenues, of generating cultural and social assets, in what were once welfare states. Some even talk or the ascen­ dance of “casino capitalism”. Argues Susan Strange (1986:1-3; cf. Harvey 1989:332; Tomasic 1991), who likens the entire Western fiscal order to an immense game of luck, undignified even by probability “theory”:

    Something rather radical has happened to the international financial system to  make it so much like a gambling hall. V. iat that change has been, and how it has come about, are not clear. What is certain is thatit has affected everyone … [It] has made inveterate, and largely involuntar)’. gam­ blers of us all.

    The gaming room, in other words, has become iconic of the central impetus of capital: its capacity to make its own vitality and increase seem independent of all human labour (Hardt 1995: 39), to seem like the natural yield of exchange and consumption.

    Something rather radical has hap­ pened to the international financial system to make it so much like agam­ blinghall. What that change has been, and how it has come about, are not clear.

    And yet crisis after crisis in the global economy, and growing income dis­parities on a planetary scale, make it painfully plain that there is no such thing as capitalism sans production; that the neoliberal stress on consumption as the ur-source  of value is palpably problematic. At once in perception, in theory, in practice. Indeed, if scholars have been slow to reflect on the fact, people all over the world-not least those in places where there  have been sudden infusions of commodi­ties, of wealth without  work-have not. Many have been quick to give voice, albeit in different registers, to their perplexity at the enigma of this wealth. Of its origin and the capri­ciousness of its distribution, of the opaque, even occult, relation bet­ween means and ends embodied in it

    (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; van Binsbergen and Geschiere n.d. :3). Our concern in this paper grows, directly out or these perplexities, these imaginings: out of world-wide speculation, in both senses of the term, at the spectres conjured up by real or imagined changes in the conditions of material existence at the end of the twentieth century.

    We seek here, in a nutshell, to inter­ rogate the experiential contradic­tion at the core or neoliberal capita­lism in its global manifestation: the fact that it appears to offer up vast, almost instantaneous riches to those who control its technologies-and, simultaneously, to threaten the very livelihood of those who do not. More specifically. our objective is to exp­ lore the ways in which this conun­drum is resolved, the ways in which the enchantments of capital are addressed, through efforts to plumb the mysterious relation of consumption to production; efforts that take a wide variety of local, culturally­ modulated forms; efforts that reveal much about the nature of economy and society, culture and  politics in the postcolonial, post-revolutionary present. As anthropologisLS are wont to do, we ground our excursion in a set of preoccupations and practices both concrete and historically parti­cular: the obsession, in rural post­ apartheid South Africa, with a rush of new commodities, currencies, and cash; with things whose acquisition is tantalizingly close, yet always just out of reach to all but those who unders­tand their perverse secrets; with the disquieting figure of the zombie, an embodied, dis-spirited phantasm widely associated, with the produc­tion, the possibility and impossibility, of these new forms of wealth. Although they are creatures of the momenL, zombies have ghostJy fore­ bears who have arisen in periods of social disruption, periods characte­ rized by sharp shifts in control over the fabrication and circulation of value, periods that also serve to illu­minate the here-and-now.

    We shall argue that the half-life of zombies in South Africa, past and present, is linked to that of compromised workers of another kind: immigrants from elsewhere on the continent, whose demonization is an equally prominent feature of the postcolonial scene. Together, these proletarian pariahs make visible a phantom history, a local chapter in a global story of changing relations of labour to capital, of production .to consumption-indeed, of the very’ pro and con of capitalism–on the cusp of the millennium. Their mani­festation here also allows us to pon­ der a paradox in the scholarly litera­ture: given that the factory model of capitalist manufacture is said now to infuse all forms of social production (e.g. Deleuze 1986), why does labour appear less and less to undergird the social order of the present epoch (Hardt 1995: 39)?

    Thus we bring you the case of the Zornbie and the (Im) Migrant; this being the sequel to an earlier inqui­ry into work, labour, and the nature of historical consciousness in South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987). But first a brief excursion into the problematic status of production in the age of global capital.

    Labour’s lost

    The emergence of consumption as a privileged site for the fashioning of society and identity, it may be argued, is integrally connected to the changing status of work under contemporary conditions. For some, the economic order of our times represents a completion of the intrinsic “project” of capital: namely, the evolution of a social formation that, as Tronti (1980:32) puts it, “does not look to labour as its dyna­mic foundation” (cf Hardt 1995:39). Others see the present moment in radically different terms. Lash and Urry (1987:232[). for instance, declare that we are witnessing not the denouement but the demise of organized capitalism; of a system in which corporate institutions could secure compromises between employers and employees by making appeal to the national interest. The internationalization of market forces, they claim, has not merely dislocated national economies and state sovereignties. lt has led to a decline in the imponance of domestic pro­duction in many once inrlustrialized countries. All of which, along with the worldwide rise of the semce sec­ tor and the feminization of the work­ force in many places, has dramatical­ly eroded the bases of proletarian identity and its politics-dispersing class relations, alliances and antino­mies, across the four comers of the earth. The globalization of the division of labour reduces workers everywhere to the lowest common denominator, to a disposable cost, compelling them to compete with sweatshop and family manufacture.’ It has also put such a distance bet­ ween sites of production and consumption that their relationship becomes all but unfathomable, save in fantasy.

    Not that Fordist fabrication has disappeared. Neither is the mutation of the labour market altogether unprecedented. For one thing,  as Marx (1967: 635) observed, the deve­lopment of capitalism has always conduced to the cumulative replace­ment of “skilled labourers by less skilled, mature labourers by imma­ture, male by female… “. For another, David Harvey (1989:192!) reminds us, the devaluation of labour power has been a traditional response to falling profits and periodic crises of commodity production. What is more, the growth of a global free market in commodities and semces has not been accompanied by a cor­respondingly free flow of workers; most nation-states still regulate their movement to a greater or lesser extent. Yet the likes of Harvey insist, nonetheless, that the current moment is different, that it evinces significant features which set it apart, rupturing the continuing history of capital-a history that   “remain (s] the same and yet-[is] constantly changing”.’ Above all else, the explo­ sion cf new monetary  instruments and markets, aided by ever more sophisticated means of planetary co­ ordination and space-time compres­ sion, have allowed the financial order to achieve a degree of autono­ my from “real production” unmatched in the annals of modern political economy. Indeed, the ever more virtual qualities of fiscal circu­lation enable the speculative side of capitalism to seem increasingly inde­pendent of manufacture, less con­strained either by the exigencies or the moral values of virtuous labour.

    The internationalization of market forces… has not merely dislocated national economles and state sove­ reignties. It has led  to a decline in the importance of domestic produc• tion in many once industrialized countries.

    How might any of this be connected to conditions in contemporary South Africa, to the widespread preoccupation there with reserve armies of spectral workers? What might we learn about the historical implications of the global age by eavesdrop­ ping on popular anxieties at this co­ordinate on the postcolonial map? How do we interpret mounting local fears about the preternatural pro­duction of wealth, about its fitful flow and occult accumulation, about the destruction of the labour market by technicians of the arcane?

    The end of  apartheid might  have fired utopian imaginations around the world with a uniquely telegenic vision of rights restored and history redeemed. But South Africa has also been remarkable for the speed with which it has run up against problems common to societies, especially to post-revolutionary societies, abruptly confronted with the prospect of libe­ration under neoliberal conditions. Not only has the miraculously peace­ful passage to democracy been marred by a disconcerting upsurge of violence and crime, both organized and  everyday. The  exemplary quest for Truth and Reconciliation  threa­tens to dissolve into recrimination and strife, even political chaos. There is widespread evidence of an uneasy fusion of enfranchisement and exclu­sion, hope and hopelessness; of a radically widening chasm between rich and poor: of the effort to realize modern utopias by decidedly post mo­dern means. Gone is any official­ speak of an egalitarian socialist future, of work-for- all, of the welfare state envisioned in the Freedom Charter that, famously, mandated the struggle against the ancien regime.’ Gone, too, are the critiques of the free mar­ket and of bourgeois ideology once voiced by the antiapartheid move­ments, their  idealism re-framed by the perceived reality of global econo­mic forces (cf. Sharp 1998:245!).” Elsewhere (1999), we have suggested that these conditions, and similar ones in other places, have conduced to a form of ‘millennial capitalism’. By this we mean not just capitalism at the millennium, but capitalism invested with salvific force: with intense faith in its capacity, if rightly harnessed, whol­ly to transform the universe of the marginalized and  disempowered.  At its most extreme, this faith is epitomi­zed by forms of money magic, ran­ging from pyramid schemes to pros­perity gospels, that pledge to deliver immense, immediate wealth by large­ly inscrutable means: in its more mun­dane manifestation, it accords the market itself an almost mystical capa­city to produce and deliver cash and commodities.

    Of course, as we intimated in spea­ king of consumption and specula­ tion, market redemption is now a world-wide creed. Yet its millennial character is decidedly more promi­nent in contexts-like  South Africa and Central Europe-where   there has been an abrupt conversion to laissez-faire capitalism from tightly regulated material and moral econo­ mies: where evocative calls for entre­preneurialism confront the  realities of marginalization in the planetary distribution of resources: where totalizing ideologies have suddenly given way to a spirit of deregulation, with its taunting mix of desire and disappointment, liberation and limitation. Individual citizens, many of them marooned by a rudderless ship of state, attempt to clamber aboard the good ship Enterprise by whatever they have at their disposal. But, in so doing, they find themselves battling the eccentric currents of the “new” world order, which forge expansive connections between the  local and the trans local, short-circuit establi­shed ways and means, disarticulate conventional relations of wealth and power, and render porous received borders, both within and between nation-states. In the vacuum left by retreating national ideologies-or, more accurately, by ideologies increasingly contested in the name of identity politics-people in these societies are washed over by a flood of mass media from across the earth; media depicting a cargo of animated objects and life-styles that affirm the neoliberal message of freedom and self-realization through consump­tion.

    In the vacuum left by retreating natio­ nal ideologies–or, more accurately, by ideologies increasingly contested in thename of identity politics­ people in these societies are washed over by a flood of mass media from across the earth; media depicting a cargo of animated objects and life­ styles that affirm the neoliberal mes­sage of freedom and self-realization through consumption.

    Under such conditions, where images of desire are as pervasive as they are inaccessible, it is only to be expected that there would be an intensification of efforts to make sense of the hidden logic of supply and demand, to restore some trans­ parency to the relation between pro­ duction and value, work and wealth. Also to multiply modes of accumula­tion, both fair and foul. The occult economies of many postcolonial societies (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999), and the spectacular rise within them of organized crime, are alike features of millennial capita­lism, disturbing caricatures of mar­ket enterprise in motion, of the impetus to acquire vast fortunes without ordinary labour costs. Yet, distinctive as they are, the conditions of which we speak here are not unprecedented. In Africa at  least, they recall an earlier moment of glo­bal expansion, of dramatic articula­tions of the local and the translocal, of the circulation of new goods and images, of the displacement of indi­ genous orders of production and power. We refer to the onset of colo­nialism. It, too, occasioned world-transforming, millennial aspirations (cf Fields 1985).

    With this parallel in mind, we turn to contemporary South Africa.

    The nightshift: Workers m the alternative economy

    …. no job; no sense

    Tell him, Joe,

    go kill

    Attention,

    quick march…

    Open your lap,

    stand at ease

    Fall in,

    fall out,

    fall down…

    Order: dismiss! ‘

    Zombie’, Fela Anikulapo Kuti & Africa 70′

    There can be no denying the latter­ day preoccupation with zombies in rural South Africa. Their existence, far from being the subject of elusive tales from the backwoods, of fantas­tic fables from the veld, is widely taken for granted: As a simple matter of fact. In recent times, respectable local newspapers have carried ban­ner headlines like ‘”Zombie’ Back From The Dead”, illustrating their stories with conventional, high-rea­list photographs;” similarly, defence lawyers in provincial courts have sought, by forensic means, to have clients acquitted of murder on grounds of having been driven to their deadly deeds by the zombifica­tion of their kin;” and illicit zombie workers have become an issue in large scale labour disputes.” Public culture is replete with invocations of the living dead, from popular songs and prime-time documentaries to national theatrical productions.” Not even the state has remained aloof. The Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders (Ralushai et al. 1996), appointed in 1995 by the Northern Province administration to, investi­gate an “epidemic” of occult violen­ce, reported widespread fear of the figure of the zombie. The latter, it notes in a tone of ethnographic neu­trality (p.5),
    is a person who is believed to have died, but because of the power of a witch, he is resurreted … [and] works for the person who has turned him into a zombie. To make it impossible for him to communica­te with other people, the front part of his tongue is cut off so that he cannot speak. It is believed that he works at night only…[and] that he can leave his rural area and work in an urban area, often far from his home. Whenever he meets people he knows, he vanishes.

    Speechless and unspeakable, this apparition fades away as soon as it becomes visible and knowable. It is a mutation of humanity made mute.

    The observations of the Commission are amply confirmed by our own experience in the Northwest Province since the early 1990s; although our informants added that zombies (dithotst!la; also diphoko)” were not merely the dead-brought­ back-to-life, that they could be killed first for the purpose. Here, too, refe­ rence to them permeates everyday talk on the street, in private backyards, on the pages of the local press, in courts of law. Long-standing notions of witchcraft, boloi,have come to embrace  zombie-making, the brutal reduction of others-in South Africa, largely unrelated neighbours-to instruments of pro­ duct.ion; to insensible beings stored, like tools, in sheds, cupboards, or oil drums at the homes of their creators (cf Ralushai et al. 1996: 50). In a world of flexitime employment, it is even said that some people are made into “part-time zombies” (cf Ralushai et al. 1996:224-5), whose exhaustion in the morning speaks of an unwit­ting nocturnal mission, of involunta­ry toil on the night shift.

    Thus do some build fortunes with the lifeblood of others. And, as they do, they are held to destroy the job market-even more, the very essen­ ce of self-possessed labour-in the process. Those typically said to conjure up the living dead tend, unsurprisingly, to be persons of conspicuous wealth; especially new wealth, whose source is neither visible nor readily explicable. Such things, of course, are highly relative: in very poor rural communities, where (almost) all things are rela­tives, it does not take a great deal to be seen to be affluent. In point of fact, those actually accused of the mystical manufacture of night wor­kers, and assaulted or killed as a result, are not always the same as those suspected: much like peoples  assailed elsewhere as witches and sor­cerers, they are often elderly, relict individuals, mostly female. Note: not all, although there is a penchant in much of northerly South Africa to refer to anyone alleged to engage in this kind of magical evil as “old women”.” Conversely, their primary accusers and attackers, more often than not, are young,  unemployed men (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).

    Zombie-makers are sexual perverts whose deformed genitalia and poiso­ nous secretions make them wtable toreproduce; they fuse, in a single gro­ tesque, the very essence of negative value: the simultaneous, reciprocaldestruction of both production and reproduction.

    Zombie-makers, moreover, are semiotically saturated, visually char­ ged figures. In contrast to their victims, who are neutered by being reduced to pure labour power, they are stereotypically described as sexual perverts whose deformed genitalia and poisonous seo·etions make them unable to reproduce; worse yet, to make them likely to spoil the fertility of others. Also, by extension, of the collectivity at large, be it a clan, a village, a town. Which is why they have become iconic of a perceived crisis of household and community in rural South Africa.1• In this respect, they fuse, in a single gro­tesque, the very essence of negative value (cf Munn 1986): the simultaneous, reciprocal destruction of both production and reproduction. On one hand, by manufacturing spectral workers, they, annihilate the very possibility of productive employ· ment, imaginatively if not manifestly; on the other, by taking jobs away from young people, they prevent them from securing the wherewithal to establish families and to repro­duce-and so make it impossible for any community to ensure its future. No wonder that, in one of the most poignant witch-killings of the 1990s, the old woman set alight by morally outraged youths-determined to save their community by removing all evil-doers-was to hear, in her final agony. the words:

    ‘Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!’ (Ralushai 1996:193f; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).

    Discourse in a range of overlapping public spheres, from ‘customary’ tri­ bunals and provincial courts through local religious and political assemblies to the print and broadcast media, makes it clear that, for many, the threat of a spectral workforce is all too concrete. And urgent. On more than one occasion, large crowds have gathered in towns in the region to watch the epic effort of healers to “liberate” zombies from their captors; in vernacular parlance, to “return them home”. Here the spectral becomes spectacle. The fan­tasy of forcing underground evil into public visibility, of reversing the arcane alienation that creates  phantom workers, is a palpable feature of the domestic cultural scene. The media, widely Africanized since the fall of apartheid,  have been crucial in all this. They have taken the conventions of investigative repor­ting far beyond their orthodox ratio­nalist frame in order to plumb the enigma of new social realities ( Fordred 1998); harsh realities whose magicality, in the prevailing historical circumstances, does not permit the literary conceit of magical realism. demanding instead a deadly serious engagement with the actuali­ty of enchantment.

    Thus a long-running saga in 1993 on the pages of Mail-formerly the Mafikeng Mail, a small town newspaper, now a Northwest provincial weekly with large circulation in the region-in which a pair of journa­lists sought to verify the claims of a healer, one Mokalaka Kwinda. Kwinda had claimed that he had re­vived a man who had been living for four years as the ‘slave’ of witches in the nearby Swartruggens district; this before the “eyes of his”, the zombie’s “weeping mother”.” Likewise a quest that same year to cover the efforts of four diviners to “retrieve” a “zombie woman” from the clutches of a male­ volent in the nearby Luhurutshe dis­trict.20 These stories marry the sur­real to the banal, the mystical to the mundane: in the former case. the healer told the reporters that his elu­sive patient was undergoing ‘prelimi­nary’ treatment, so that he might be “able to speak and return to normal life”.” Nor are such events confined to the cutback. In Mabopane, in the eastern part of the Northwest Province, “hundreds of students and workers” reportedly filled the streets one weekday in May 1994, eager to witness a “zombie hunt”.”

    The fear of being reduced to ghost labour, of being abducted to feed the fortunes of a depraved stranger, occurs alongside another kind of spectre: a growing mass, a shadowy alien-nation, of immigrant black wor­kers from elsewhere on the conti­nent. So overt is the xenophobic sen­timent that these workers are disrup­ting local relations of production and reproduction-that they usurp scarce jobs and resources, foster prostitution, and spread AIDS-that they have been openly harassed on South African streets. Like zombies, they are nightmare citizens, their rootlessness threatening to siphon off the remaining, rapidly diminishing prosperity of the indigenous population. Interestingly, like zom­bies too, they are characterized by their impaired speech: the common term for immigrant, makwerekwere, is a Sesotho word implying limited competence in the vernacular. Suggesting a compromised capacity to engage in intercourse with autochthonous society, this usage explains why migrants live in terror that their accents might be detected in public.”

    ‘Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!’

    Their apprehension is well-founded. In September 1998, for example, a crowd returning by train from a march in Pretoria-held, significant­ly, to protest mass unemployment­ threw three makwerekwere to their deaths, purportedly for stealing scarce jobs; two were Senegalese, one from Mozambique.” Three months later, in December, there came alarming reports of a band of hoodlums in Johannesburg who seemed bent on the “systematic elimina­tion” of foreign nationals… Immigrants from neighbouring countries, and from further abroad, have worked in industry, on farms, and across the service sector  in South Africa for over a century. But, in the 1990s, the tight regulation of these labour flows has given way to less controlled, often subcontracted, sources of supply.” Employers are ever more attracted by the potential of this cheap labour; it is said that as many as 80% of them use casual, “non-standard” workers (Horwitz, cited in Adam et al. 1998:209). A recent investigation shows that, while the preponderance of immigrants in the past decade have actually been male entrepreneurs plying their trade in large cities, a great number do find their way into other areas of the economy, often in provincial towns;” some, especially those lac­king legal documentation (frequent­ly, women and children) land up in the highly exploitable reaches of rural agriculture-in places like the Northwest Province. v\lherever they land up in South Africa, immigrants take their place on a fraught histori­ cal terrain. Anxieties about unem­ployment have reached unpreceden­ted levels: by common agreement, the rate is much higher than the unofficial 38% to which the state admits. According to one estimate, 500,000 jobs, virtually all of them held by blacks, have evaporated over the last five years. And this is proba­bly a conservative reckoning, based primarily on shrinkage in the formal sector.  “No jobs means our youth are destroyed,” a resident of Soweto told a reporter from The Chicago Tribune in February 1999. Even the eternal optimist Nelson Mandela, his retirement imminent, recently quipped: “In a few months, I’ll be standing by the road with a sign: Please help. Unemployed with a new wife and a big family.”

    In the northerly provinces, which are among the poorest in the country, there has been scant evidence of the prosperity and redistribution that was expected to follow the fall of apartheid. True, the newly deregula­ted economy has granted some blacks a larger share of the spoils: postcolonial South Africa has seen a raised standard of liiving for  sections of the African middle class, most notably for the ‘liberation aristocra­cy’, a few of whom have become ins­tant millionaires and living personifi­cations of the triumph of nonracial, neoliberal capitalism (Adam et al. 1998:203) . In spite of all this, or per­haps because of it, the so-called “transition” has, as we noted earlier, kindled a millennial faith in the opportunities of “free” market enter­prise, now ostensibly open to all . “I want every black person to feel that he or she has the opportunity to become rich and only has himself to blame if he fails, ” declared Dan Mkhwanazi, launching the National Economic Trust (Adam ct al. 1998:217).”

    But, for the vast majority, millennial hope jostles material impossibility. The much vaunted Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), de­signed to root out endemic poverty, has thus far had minimal impact. Indeed, its broad reformist objec­tives, which harked back to the age of the welfare state, soon hardened into GEAR, the government’s Growth, Employment And Recon­struction strategy, which privileges development understood in terms of privitization, wage flexibility and massive public service cutbacks (Adam et al. 1998:206) Little of the positive effect of these policies, or of recent post Fordist expansion in domains like tourism, finds its way into rural landscapes of the North or the Northwest Provinces. Here a living has to be eked out from pitiful small-scale subsistence farming and (very) petty commerce; from such things as brewing, sex work and the refashioning of used commodities, classically the pursuit of women. Such assets as pensions, paltry though they may be, have become the subject of fierce competition; their beneficiaries, mainly widows and surviving old men, are prime targets of bitter jealousy and allegations of avarice. Meanwhile, the regular migrant labour wages  that had long subsidized agrarian endea­vours, and had given young men a degree of independence, are noticea­bly diminishing; this, in turn, has exa­cerbated their sense of threatened masculinity, and has under-scored the gendered, generational conflicts of the countryside. which is why the overwhelming proportion of those accused of witchcraft and zombie­ making are older and female. And why their accusers are overwhelmin­gly out-of-work young adult males.

    At the same time, provincial towns in these northerly provinces are home to small but bustling black elites, many of them spawned originally by the late “homelands,” into which the apartheid regime pumped endless resources over several decades. Well positioned to soak up novel business opportunities and to engage in behind-the-scenes dealings, they have quickly taken charge of a sizeable proportion of retail marke­ting and the provision of services in the countryside. For them, increasin­gly, the conspicuous consumption of prized commodities-houses, cars, TVs, cell phones–does more than just signal accomplishment. It also serves to assuage the inequities of the colonial past. But, as it does, it also marks the growing inequities of the postcolonial present. These distinctions, to those who gaze upon them from below, also seem to be a product of enchantment; given that they have appeared with indecent speed and with little visible exertion, their material provenance remains mysterious. So, even more, does the cause of joblessness amidst such obvious prosperity. In the upshot, the two sides of millennial capitalism, post apartheid style, come together: on one is the ever more distressing awareness of the absence of work, itself measured by the looming figure of the immigrant; on the other is the constantly reiterated suspicion, embodied in the zombie, that is only by magical means, by consuming others, that people may enrich themselves in these perplexing times.

    The symbolic apotheosis of this syllogism is to be found in a commercial advertisement run by a “traditional healer” in Mmabatho, capital of the Northwest. It appears, in of all places, the Mafeking Business Advertiser, a local trade weekly. Top among the occult skills on offer is a treatment which promises clients to “get a job early if unemployed.” The healer in question, Dr. S. M. Banda, should know. He is an immigrant.

    Precursors: The ghosts of workers past

    On the face of it, much of this is new. When we did research in the Northwest in the late 1960s and  mid­ 1970s-it was then the Tswana ethnic “homeland”-most males were, or had been away as migrants in the industrial centres. There was barely a black middle class to speak of and no manifest anxieties about immigrants. Labourers had long come from elsewhere to seek employment in local towns and on the farms of the neighbouring Western Transvaal; and there were “foreigners” (Zimbabweans, and Xhosa descen­dants of those who had built the rail­road at the turn of the century, for instance) who lived quite amicably with Tswana-speaking populations. There was also no mention of zom­bies at the time. True, many people spoke of their concern about witch­craft, understood as an unnatural means of garnering wealth by “eating” others and absorbing their capacity to create value. On occa­sion, moreover, malevolents would cause young migrants to loose their moorings, to forsake their kin at home and to eschew the demands of domestic reproduction.” But there was nothing like the current preoc­cupation with the danger of humans being made into toiling automatons; nor with the sense that a spectral economy. founded on the labour of these and other aliens, might be draining the productive or repro­ductive potential of the community at large.

    Yet these late twentieth-century preoccupations are not entirely unprecedented either. In disinter­ring vernacular conceptions of work, labour and consciousness during the high years of apartheid (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:169), we noted that Tswana regarded certain modes of migrant toil (mmi:reko) as aliena­ting; that they spoke of the way in which its disciplined routines re­duced humans to draft animals, even to “tinned fish”.” These tropes implied a contrasting notion of self­ possessed work (tiro), typically work­ at-home, which created social value. By contrast to selfish activity, this form of exertion constructed person­ hood in a positive key through the simultaneous building up of others. And, concomitantly, of a centred col­lective world. But the historical record indicates that Tswana ideas of estranged labour are not limited  to the experience of proletarianization alone. Accounts from earlier this century tell of a condition linked to the eclipse, typically by witches, of self-possession and, with it, the capa­city to accumulate wealth and social power. An individual affiicted in this manner was “alienated from fellow­ship with his kith and kin,” noted.Tom Brown (1926:137-8), a missio­nary-ethnographer with a well deve­loped grasp, of SetSwana. He goes on, in the real-time ethnographic present:

    … they apply to him a name (sebibi or sehihi). which signifies that though the body lives and moves it is only a grave. a place where something has, died or been killed. The essential manhood is dead. It is no uncom­mon thing to hear a person spoken of as being dead when he stands before you visi­bly alive. When this takes place it always means that there has been an oveshadowing of the true relationships of life …

    Here, patently, we have a precursor of the zombie. But, whereas the lat­ter is conjured from a corpse, either killed for the purpose or already deceased, sehihi is a state of eclipse effected by the appropriation of the essential selfhood of a living person, leaving behind a sentient shell as mute witness to the erasure of the social being it once housed. Moreover, where sehihi entailed the loss of all human creativity-often said to have been eaten whole by witches to enhance their own physi­cal, political, and material potency­ the zombie is transformed  purely into alienated labour power, abduc­ted from home or workplace, and made to serve as someone else’s pri­vatized means of production.”

    Evidence from elsewhere in sou­ thern Africa fills out this phantasma­ goric history of labour,  enabling  us to track its fitful figurings, its conti­nuities and breaks. Thus Harries’s (1994:221) study of the world of Mozambican migrants to South Africa between 1860 and 1910 shows that witches (baloyi), held to be pre­valent on the mines, were said to seize the “life essence” of others, for­cing them to toil for days as zombies (dlukula) in closed-off subterranean galleries, where they lived on  a diet of mud. The poetic particularity of phantom workers-here, as else­ where-is sensitive register of shif­ting experiences of labour and its value. The introduction of compen­sation pay for miner’s phthisis, for example, quickly led to a notion that zombies returned from below ground with numbers-potential payouts, blood money-chalked on their backs. Junod (1927:298-9;5 l 3; cf Harries 1994:221). classic ethno­ grapher of early south-eastern Africa, remarked on similar fears in the southern Mozambique country­ side around 1910. “Modernized” witches there, anticipating their lat­ ter-day South African counterparts, were thought capable of reducing their fellows to a nocturnal agrarian workforce, masquerading by day as innocent children.” Some could even induce young men to wander off to the Witwatersrand mines, never to return. Once more  we see the zombie as a “walking spectre,” an object of collective terror and desire, to use Clery’s (1995:174) description of the “terrorist genre” of haunted Gothic fiction in late eighteenth cen­tury England, where industrializa­tion was similarly restructuring the nature of work-and-place. Like these “Horrid Mysteries,” zombie tales dra­matize the strangeness of what had become real; in this instance, the problematic relation of work to the production  of social  being secured in time and place.

    Other instances of ghost workers in Africa underline the point. Take Ardener’s (1970) piquant narrative of zombie beliefs among the Bakweri of West Cameroon. These beliefs­ an intensification, it appears, of older ideas about  witchcraft-arose at the time of the Great War, with the relatively sudden penetration of German colonisers into this fertile agricultural region. Their land expropiiated for the establishment of plantations manned largely by foreigners, the Bakweri found them­ selves crowded into inhospitable reserves; as a result, they entered a period of impoverishment and redu­ced fertility. It was then that the zombie labour force (vekongi) first made itself felt, sheltering in tin houses built by those locals who had somehow managed to profit from the unpromising circumstances. The living dead, many of them chil­dren, were said to be victims of the murderous greed of their own close kin; they were sent away to work in distant plantations, where witchmas­ters had built a town overflowing with modem consumer goods.

    Here, as in newly colonized Mozambique, we see the sudden conjuncture of local world-in which production is closely tied to kin groups-with forces that arro­gate the capacity to create value and redirect its flow. Above all, these forces fracture the meaning of work and its received relation to place. Under such conditions, zombies become the stuff of “estranged reco­gnition” (Clery 1995:ll 4): recognition not merely of the commodifica­tion of labour, or its subjection to deadly competition, but of the invi­sible predations that seem to congeal beneath the banal surfaces of new forms of wealth.

    In their iconography of forced migration and wandering exile, of children abused and relatives viola­ted, the living dead comment on the disruption of an economy in which productive energies were once visibly invested in the reproduction of a situated order of domestic and com­munal relations; an order through which the present was, literally. kept in place. And the future was secured.

    Ardener (1970:l 48) notes the com­plex continuities and innovations at play in these constructions, which have, as their imaginative precondi­tion, ideas of the occult widely distri­buted across Africa and, the New World; in particular, the idea that witches, by their very nature, con­sume the generative force of others. Zombies themselves seem to be born, at least in the first instance, of colo­nial encounters: of ilie precipitous engagement of local worlds with imperial economies that seek to exert control over the essential means of producing value, means like land and labour, space and time. It is in this abstract, metaphorical sense that Rene Depestre (1971:20) declares colonialism to be “a process of man’s general zombification”.” In purely historical terms, the affinity between colonization and zombification is less direct: colonialism does not always call forth zombies, and zombies are not always associated with colonia­lism. What they do tend to be associa­ted with, however, are rapidly chan­ging conditions of work under capita­lism in its various guises; conditions which rupture not just established relations of production and repro­duction, but also received connec­tions of persons to place, the material to the moral, private to public, the individual to the communal, past to future. In this respect, the living dead join a host of other spectral figures­ vampires, monsters, creatures of Gothic “supernaturalism”- who alike have been vectors of an affective engagement with the visceral implica­tions of the factory, the plantation, the market, the mine (cf Ardener 1970: 156; Clery 1995: 9).

    As this suggests, however abstract a set of ideas may be embodied in the living dead sui generis, any particular zombie congeals the predicament of human labour at its most concrete, its most historically specific. How, then, might those we have encoun­tered in rural South Africa be linked, in more precise terms, to the late twentieth-century transformations with which we began? Or to the impact of millennial capitalism in this postcolony?

    Conclusion

    These questions have been anticipa­ted, their answers foreshadowed, elsewhere. Thus Harries (1994:221) has argued that, among early twentieth-century Mozambican miners in the Transvaal, zombie­ making magic was a practical res­ponse to the unfamiliar: specifically, to the physical depredations of under­ ground work and to the explosion of new forms of wealth amidst abject poverty. Witchcraft, in a virulently mutated strain, he says, became a proxy for capitalist exploitation; witch-hunting, a displacement of class struggle. Niehaus (1995, 1993, n.d.:16), writing of the rural Northern Province at the other end of the century, arrives at a similar conclusion: mystical evil is a “cultural fantasy” manipulated by the domi­nant to defend their positions of pri­vilege. Explanations of this sort belong to a species of interpretation that brings a critical understanding of ideology to Evans–Pritchard’s (1937) classic conception of witchcraft as a “socially relevant” theory of cause (Geschiere n.d. ; Ferguson 1993; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). Many would agree with their underlying premise: that witches and zombies are to be read as etiological principles which translate structural contradictions, experiential anomalies, and aporiahs – force-fields of greater com­plexity than is normally implied by “class struggle”-into the argot of human agency, of interpersonal kin­ship, of morality and passion.

    But here lies the rub. How does this very general truism, as valid for early colonial witchcraft as it is for latter­ day zombies, relate to the implosive, shifting histories of which we have spoken? If the living dead are merely walking spectres of class struggle, why have they not been a permanent fixture of the modern South African scene? What accounts for their comings and goings and, to return to our opening conundrums, for the dramatic intensification of their appeal in the postcolony? How, furthermore, do we make sense of the particular poetics of these fantasies, whose symbolic excess and expressive exuberance gesture toward an imagi­native play infinitely more elaborale than is allowed by a purely pragmatic, functionalist explication.

    We have tried, in the course of this narrative, to show that the mounting preoccupation with zombies and immigrants here is owed to a precise, if large-scale set of historical condi­tions; that these conditions underlie a postcolonial moment experienced, by all but the rnostt affluent, as an unprecedented mix of hope and hopelessness, promise and impossi­bility, the new and the continuing. They have their source in social and material transformations sparked by the rapid rise of neoliberal capita­lism on a global scale, a process that has intensified market competition; translocalized the division of labour; rendered national polities and eco­nomies increasingly porous, less sovereign; set many people in motion and disrupted their sense of place; dispersed class relations across international borders; and widened the gulf between flows of fiscal circu­lation and sites of concrete produc­tiion, thus permilting speculative capital to appear to determine the fate of post-revolutionary societies. What is more, because industrial capital chases cheap, tractable labour all over the earth, searching out optimally (de) regulated environ­ments, it often erodes the social infrastructure of working communi­ties, adding yet further to the stream of immigrants in pursuit of employ­ment-and to the  likelihood that they will be despised, demonized, even done to death.

    The backwash of this process, as we have seen, is readily evident in contemporary South Africa. where rapid deregulation, increasingly la­bile employment arrangements, and the gross shrinkage of the job market have altered the generic meaning of labour, the specific relationship of production to reproduction, and the connection of work-to-place. Where, also, labour migralion-which had become a rite of passage to social manhood-has all  but vanished.  In the void left behind, especially in the countryside, there have risen new, unaccountable manifestations of weallh; wealth not derived from any discernible or conventional  source. In this void, too, jobs seem available only for “nonstandard” workers: those, like immigrants, who will take anything they can get. Zombies, the ultimate “nonstandard” workers, take shape in the collective imaginary as figurations of these conditions. In their silence they give voice to a sense of dread about the human costs of intensified capitalist production; about the loss of control over the terms in which people alienate their labour power; about the de­mise of a moral economy in which wage employment, however distant and exploitative, had “always”·been there to support both the founding of families and the well-being of communities. This bears its own measure of historical irony. In the colonial epoch, the migrant contract system was regarded as a social, moral, and political travesty, brea­king up black households and for­cing men to toil under exacting conditions for pitiable earnings; then a frequent object of protest, it is seen, in retrospect, as having been one of the secure foundations of the social landscape. Shades, here, of earlier revolutions, earlier metamor­phoses in the articulation of capital and labour.

    Here, then, is what is unique about the moment in the Soulh African postcolony; what it is that has called forth an alien-nation of pariah prole­tarians, dead and alive. It is a histori­cal moment that, in bringing toge­ their force-fields at once global and local, has conduced to a seismic mutation in the onlological expe­rience, of work, selfhood, gender, community, and place. Because the terms of reference for this expe­rience are those of, modernist capi­talism-indeed, these are the only terms in which the present may be reduced to semiotic sense-and-sensi­bility-it is framed in the language of labour lost, factories foreclosed, communities crumbling. Which is why the concern with zombies in the northerly reaches of the country, while in many ways a novel confec­tion, replays enduring images of alie­nated production. In Adorno’s (1981:96) phrase, “it sounded so old, and yet was so new”. Much like the story of labour itself which, in an abs­tract sense, is still subject to the fami­liar “laws” of capitalism; yet, as concrete reality, has been substan­tially allered by the reorganization of the world economy as we know it. To reiterate: it all remains the same and yet [is] constantly changing”.

    One final point. Although we have tried to subdue the fantasy of spec­tral labour by recourse to histoiical reason, its key animus still eludes us. What, finally, are we to make of its symbolic excess? What does the intri­cate discourse about alien workers tell us of the sublerranean workings of terror, of the life of standardized nightmares in a world of “daylight reason” (Duncan 1992:113)?,. There is little question that this discourse gives motive and moral valence to disturbing events; that, in the classic manner of ideologies everywhere, it links etiology to existing orders of power and value. But zombie-speak seems to do much more: its produc­tive figurations feed a process of fer­vent speculation, poetic elaboration, forensic quest. The menacing dan­gers of zombification-the disorien­ted wanderings, the loss of speech, sense, and will, the perverted prac­tices that erase all ties to kith and kin-serve to conjure with inchoate fears, allowing free play to anger and anguish and desire. Also to the effort to make some sense of them. Like Gothic horror, the elaboration of these images ‘encourage[s] an experience of estranged recognition’ (Clery 1995:114) . And not only at the immiserated edges of polite society. The hardboiled social analyst might insist that the obsession with the living dead misrecognizes the sys­temic roots of deprivation and dis­tress. But its eruption onto the ferti­le planes of post-apartheid public culture-via sober press reports, TV documentaries and agitprop theatre–has  had a  tangible  impact. It has forced a recognition of , the crisis in the countryside, of the plight of displaced youth, of an alien­ nation within the postcolony itself.

    As the very conditions that call forth zombies erode the basis of conventional politics of labour and place and public interest, we would do well to keep an open mind about the pragmatic possibilities of these creatures of the collective dread; about the provocative manner in which they, perhaps more than anything or anybody else, are compelling the state to take note. Even to act.

  • Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction

    Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction

     

    Consider the following four fragments, four notes from postcolonial South Africa. Each is drawn from the archaeology of the fantastic in this new global age:

    The first. In 1996, in a far north-eastern village, a baboon, taken to be a witch in disguise, was killed by “necklacing,” the infamous way in which collaborators were dealt with during the late apartheid years. Baboons have long been thought of as potential witch familiars; indeed, a state commission recently referred to them as “professor(s) of witch-craft.” The animal in question “was huge…and was carrying a plastic [shopping] bag”–this last object suspect since it signalled an all-too-human capacity to transact and transport ill- gotten goods. Said the woman who set off the alarm, “There was definitely witchcraft here. Just look at how long [the beast] took to catch alight and at how small its body is now that we have…killed it.”

    The second. “Is it a duck? No, it’s the Howick monster,” wrote Ellis Mnyandu, also in 1996. Curious crowds are visiting the Howick Falls, in KwaZulu-Natal, to glimpse a myste- rious 25 foot creature. Says Absolom Dlamini, there is “a fearsome spirit here which makes you feel like you are being dragged [in]… [It] proves there is a monster down there.” Bob Teeney, a businessman, claims to have photographs of mom, pop, and baby monsters. But a local anthropologist, disappointingly matter-of-fact, assures us that there is nothing there at all; that the story recuperates an old Zulu myth about a water serpent. Still, people flock to the place. One sculptor, a crippled craftsman from Zaire, has become a convert. “First I believe in God and then the monsters,” he says. “I am making more money than [ever before]. I call it monster-money.”

    The third. Since 1994, notes Lumkile Mondi, there has been an explosion of pyramid schemes in the countryside. These undertake to pay three times the initial stake, de- pending for their viability on ever more people signing on. But many investors were not taking their money at maturity, waiting rather to cash in huge sums later. Mondi says that the management of one scheme found itself with R46m [$9], more than it could handle. So it asked a team of authorities–including Mondi himself–to intervene under the Bank Act. Mondi goes on to say that he had been manning a toll free line to answer investors’ questions. The callers had disconcerted him: accused of abetting government efforts to subvert local economic initiatives, he was even threatened with “necklacing.” Apartheid, they told him, had made them desperately poor. And the postcolonial state had not helped much. So “God brought the scheme and changed their lives.” Similar schemes are also rampant among whites. One, entitled “Rainbow,” demands a R10,000 stake and is run in great secrecy by an anonymous cabal with a Liverpool address. It is said to “conduct [meetings] with an almost religious fervour.”

    The fourth. Johannesburg, April 1996. A man is arrested in a shopping mall after “trying to sell a pair of blue eyes.” This incident, wrote the city’s largest newspaper, was “linked to the murder of street children for…traditional medicines.” Body parts, it added, were regularly used in potions for fertility, for success in business, and for luck in love. Those of white children fetched the best prices. The local press has been full of such cases, and courts have been kept busy trying those accused of disembowelling their victims, and either retailing organs or using them for their own magical ends. Not only body parts; who- le persons too. Witches are said to bring the dead back to life to work for them. Thus, in KwaZulu-Natal, two years ago, kin of 11 children killed in a bus crash refused to allow them to be buried because “witches [had] abducted them after bringing them back to life.” The bodies in the mortuary were no longer those of the people they knew. Soon after, an old woman, suspected of the evil, was dragged from her home and killed by schoolmates of the deceased, who, in turn, were jailed.

    These fragments may appear lurid from the cool distance of Academia Europa. In their own context they are not that at all. Each of them, moreover, has parallels elsewhere: those parts of Europe and the USA beyond the ivory tower, where ordinary people live, produce their own fair share of the fantastic. The Howick Monster recalls not only Loch Ness, which it is said to resemble. It also resonates with celluloid cosmologies of the Jurassic kind, making a mammoth montage of the Spielberg mindscape, the Scottish landscape, and Zulu mythology–all the while tapping into an increasing obsession with the return of extinct sub- yet superhuman creatures. The Leviathan of Natal belongs to a planetary species whose existence conflates the virtual with the veritable, the cinematic with the scientific, gods with godzillas, the prophetic with the profitable.

    Likewise the pyramid schemes. These recall the ten or so whose crash sparked the Alba- nian revolution in 1997. They also bring to mind other scams and stratagems, different yet similar, that flow from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation. Such schemes are springing up all over the place, especially in post-revolutionary societies. Often registered at addresses halfway across the earth from the site of their local operation, they escape control by insinuating them- selves into the slipstream of the global economy. These schemes cover a wide gamut, from chain letters, through national lotteries and offshore gambling, to aggressively speculative investment in the stock markets of the world, now heavily into global funds, which has led to an upsurge of “pump and dump” swindles. These things have a single common denominator, “the magical allure of making money from nothing.” Like efforts to weave gold from straw, an alchemy associated with an earlier transition in the economic history of Europe, they promise to deliver preternatural pro- fits, to yield wealth sans perceptible production, value sans visible effort. In its millennial moment, capitalism has an effervescent new spirit–a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist–waxing close to its core. Vide the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, an American pyramid scheme created “to change the world for the glory of God,” which persuaded 500 non-profit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million–on the promise of doubling their money in six months. So much for rational economics. And for the disenchantment of modernity.

    Neither are the narratives of witchcraft, body parts, and the brutalization of children uniquely South African. Everywhere the confident contours, and the boundaries, of the human are being called into question; hence the fascination with cyborgs, the fear of invasion by aliens cloth- ed in humdrum bodily form, the dangerous promise of cloning and genetic mutation. And from everywhere come stories of not-quite-human transactions in the corporeal. Postcolonial Africa is replete with accounts of the way in which the rich and powerful use freakish familiars and monstrous means to appropriate the life-force of their lesser compatriots in order to strengthen themselves and to satisfy consuming passions. Similarly, Latin America has, throughout the 1990s, witnessed mass panics about the theft and sale, by greedy gringos, of the organs of infants and youths. There, and in other parts of the world, this traffic–like the international commerce in adoption and mail-order matrimony–is seen as a new form of imperialism, the west siphoning off the essence, even appropriating the offspring, of impoverished “others” for ends both occult and ordinary. All of which gives ample evidence, to those at the nether end of the planetary distribution of wealth, of the workings of insidious forces, of potent magical technologies and mys- terious means of accumulation. That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itself: note the recent scares about the satanic abuse of children; also reports, some now well-documented, of a transnational trade in people, again particularly women and young people, for sexual slavery.

    Precisely because they are at once parochial and translocal, these fragments raise the same conundrums. Why now? Why now does there appear to be a dramatic intensification–none of these things is new, of course–of appeals to enchantment, to the use of the bodies of some for the empowerment of others? Why now the acute moral panics? What, if anything, has any of this to do with processes of globalization and the forms of capitalism associated with it? With postcoloniality? Or with the sociology of post-revolutionary social worlds? We pose the problem both as a general matter of anthropological concern and, more specifically, of contemporary South Africa. Is it not extraordinary, for example, that the African National Congress saw it necessary, among its first gestures in government, to appoint a commission of enquiry into witchcraft and ri- tual murder in one of the new provinces? That it found itself presiding over an epidemic of mys- tical evil? That this epidemic, far from abating with the end of apartheid, is on the increase? That, according to the head of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services– itself a curious creature–the devil actually seems to be making a “revolutionary re-appearance” here?

    Finally, what might these things have to do with the memory of Max Gluckman? Or with the present and future of anthropology, about which he had such strong ideas? As we shall see, they challenge us with the problem of doing ethnography on an awkward scale, neither unambiguously local nor, obviously, “global”–but on a plane that, somehow, captures the dialectics of their mutual determination. And their indeterminacies.

    Let us take the last question first. Our memories of Max Gluckman go back to the early 1970s, toward the start of our professional careers, toward the end of his. We came to Manchester having read and heard a great deal of debate about his work, and not a few critiques–most of them emanating from certain institutions south of the Watford Gap. None of this, however, prepared us for our encounter with charisma, Mancunian-style. Or with conflict structural-functionalism as propounded, in the flesh, by Gluckman himself, a formidable interlocutor if there ever was one. Maxism, it is true, was not quite Marxism; very much a creature of its day, many of its founding principles are now dated. But they were essayed with vigor, certitude, and a bold sense of possibility. Anthropology, for Gluckman, was both a mission and an invitation to an argument; – though, in point of fact, he was always easier to argue with when not actually present, or, more permanently, when dead. His combative, creative spirit lives on, in our consciousness, for two things above all else. It is these that provide the mandate for our lecture today.

    One was his–emphatically pre-postmodern–insistence on discerning design in, on abstracting order from, an “illogical assortment” of disparate details, minutiae, even trivia (1963:1); recall his introduction to Order and Rebellion, which notes, with approval, how a co- herent anthropology grew out of “the study of oddments by eccentrics.” Max, of course, was not lacking in oddness or eccentricity himself. And coherence is no longer valued all that much. But so be it. The serious, if simple, corollary is that our skills and sensibilities ought to be put to the effort of detecting–from diverse, discordant acts and facts–emergent social processes and patterns; that the sacred charter of the discipline is to explain the existence of such partly-obscured, barely audible, often nascent phenomena in the world. Sometimes these phenomena, like the unruly events so memorably described in his Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (1940), bring into sharp focus, and serve to bridge, cultural and material forces of dramatically different magnitude or scale; as they do, they compel us to address the evanescent, ever present connec- tions between local concerns and world-historical movements. Herein, in this challenge, lies the essential distillate of the Gluckman heritage.

    The second thing is more specific. Max Gluckman is justifiably famed for his work in legal anthropology, for his studies of political and social processes, and the like. Amidst his lesser quo- ted essays, however, is one which warrants special attention today. Entitled “The Magic of Des- pair” (see n.1), it tries to make sense of the ritual practices of Mau Mau. Not only that. Those practices are run up against Central African witchcraft movements (Richards 1935), millennial cults of the middle ages (Cohn 1957), Melanesian cargo cults (Worsley 1957), zionist prophets in South Africa (Sundkler 1948), and various forms of social banditry (Hobsbawm 1959). The point? To explain why Africans should seek recourse to the occult in situations of rapid social transformation; under historical conditions, that is, which yield an ambiguous mix of possibility and – powerlessness, of desire and despair, of mass joblessness and hunger amidst the accumulation, by some, of great amounts new wealth (1963:3f). These circumstances, added Gluckman (p.145) presciently, do not elicit a “reversion to pagan ritual.” Just the opposite. “New situations,” he wrote, citing Evans-Pritchard (1937:513), “demand new magic.”

    Put these various pieces together–Gluckman’s concern to decipher patterns-in-the-making from oddments and fragments, his insistence on seeing connections among phenomena of widely different scale, his interest in mystical responses to contradictory historical situations–and the argument of this lecture begins to take shape. So, too, do our answers to the Big Questions.

    The essence of our narrative goes like this. The Howick monster and the pyramid schemes, the epidemic of witchcraft and the killing of those suspected of magical evil, the moral panic about markets in body parts; all are, alike, symptoms of an occult economy fourishing up behind the civil surfaces of the “new” South Africa. This economy, itself an integral feature of millenial capitalism, is an odd fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of hope and hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its perversions. Its roots do not lie simply in poverty, however cruel it may be; nor are they merely a reflex of “social change.” They are to be found, rather, in a doubling, the very doubling spoken of by Gluckman in “The Magic of Despair.” On one hand is a perception, authenticated by glimpses of the vast wealth that passes through most postcolonial societies and into the hands of a few of their citizens: that the mysterious mechanisms of the market hold the key to hitherto unknown riches; to capital amassed by the ever more rapid, often immaterial flow of value across time and space. On the other hand is the dawning sense of chill desperation at- tendant on being left out of the promise of progress, of the telos of liberation. In South Africa, after all, the end of apartheid held out the prospect that everyone would be set free to speculate and accumulate, to consume and to indulge repressed desires. But, for many, the millennial moment has passed without palpable payback.

    The implication? That something has gone seriously awry; that arcane forces are intervening in the production of wealth, diverting the flow of value for evil purposes. This, in turn, underlies the essential paradox of occult economies, the fact that they operate on two inimical fronts at once. The first is the constant pursuit of new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends. The second is the effort to eradicate people held to enrich themselves by those very means; through the illegitimate appropriation, that is, not just of the bodies and things of others, but also of the forces of production and reproduction themselves.

    Partly because of the nature of the struggle to end apartheid, partly because of the legacy of apartheid itself, partly because of the dawning of a new epoch in the history of production, most of those who experience postcoloniality here as privation, and who engage the commerce in enchantment, are young. It is they–the worldly progeny of an electronic age–who held out the greatest expectations for “the revolution.” They are the repressed for whom the promise of post- colonial return is most obviously blocked by the hardening materialities of life at this coordinate on the map of global capital. As a result, rather than the more familiar axes of social division– class, race, gender, ethnicity–the dominant line of cleavage here has become generation. But entry into the occult economy, on both its fronts, is not confined to youth alone; ultimately it transects color, culture, age, and sex.

    Like Gluckman, we have argued before that the practice of mystical arts in postcolonial Af- rica does not imply an iteration of “tradition.” Per contra, it is often a mode of producing new forms of consciousness; of expressing discontent with modernity and dealing with its deformities; in short, of retooling culturally familiar technologies as new means for new ends. New magic for new situations. Nor is this true only in Africa. It is characteristic of a surging, implosive economy of means and ends popping up all over the planet nowadays, albeit in a wide variety of local guises.

    As it does, it posits fresh ways of producing immense wealth and power–against all odds, at super- natural speed, and with striking ingenuity. We have hinted that the things of which we speak have to do with global processes; or, more precisely, with specific intersections of the global and the local. And we have implied that there is a lesson in them for the practice of anthropology. Before we can give either claim any cre- dence, however, it is necessary to focus on a particular ethnographic setting, one in which realities appear more than usually fragile, fluid, and fractured. We turn to the northerly provinces of the “new” South Africa, just before and after the end of apartheid.

    III.

    The Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province was established by the new provincial government in March 1995 in response to a mounting sense of emergency in the countryside. Official commissions were the stock-in-trade of colonial rule. But these are postcolonial times, in which politics often masquerades as culture. This commission was an unprecedented hybrid of government and ethnography. Chaired by a re- tired Professor of Social Anthropology it comprised nine members, all but one black. Their Report is a rich amalgam of informant accounts, case records, first-hand observation, and recommenda- tions. These recommendations reveal a tension between (i) civic rationalism, expressed in a call for rigorous control of witch-related violence, including a possible reinstatement of the death penalty; and (ii) frank, even assertive relativism. In respect of the latter, says the Report, most Af- ricans regard magical attacks as “normal events of everyday life,” a reality incompatible with Euro- pean law, which criminalizes witchfinding. What is more, it adds, the vast majority of black police believe in witchcraft and are reluctant to intervene when suspects are attacked. The conclusion? That there is “no clear-cut” solution to the legal problem. The commissioners went on to advocate various means of stemming the brute force with which accused witches are hunted down. But they did not question the actuality of witchcraft itself.

    On the contrary. The urgent tone of the Commission is underscored by a rising demography of violence: from 1985 to 1995 300 cases of witch-related killings were recorded in the North; in the first half of 1996 there were 676. No wonder people fear that witchcraft is “runn- ing wild.” The mood of alarm is well captured in the opening remarks of the Report: “as the Pro- vince continued to burn,” as “witchcraft violence and ritual murder” was becoming endemic, “something had to be done, and very fast.”

    The countryside was burning alright. But there were lots of ironies in the fire. For one thing, this was a moment, much heralded, of exodus from colonial bondage. And yet rural populations were convinced that their neighborhoods harbored trenchant human evil; that their familiar landscapes were alive with phantasmic forces of unprecedented danger; that the state had failed to shield them from malignity, leaving them to protect themselves. For another thing, it was young men, not people in authority, who felt most moved to execute “instant justice” and to cleanse the country. They marked Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, viewed by the world as a sign that reason had prevailed at last, with a furious spate of witch burnings–often to the chanting of freedom songs. All this was accompanied by a burgeoning fear that some people, usually old people, were turning others into zombies; into a virtual army of ghost workers, whose lifeblood fuelled a vibrant, immoral economy pulsing beneath the sluggish rhythm of country life. The – margin between the human and the inhuman had become ever more permeable, transgressed by the living dead and their monstrous owners. Along with a grisly national market in human body parts, these zombies bore testimony to a mounting confusion of people with things.

    As we have said, none of this is new. It is now clear that, in much of Africa, the colonial encounter played on pre-existing enchantments. At times, it multiplied the sorts of frictions that ignite witch hunts. Witchcraft has proven to be every bit as protean as modernity itself–thriving on its contradictions and its silences, usurping its media, puncturing its pretensions. Shifts in the cultural conception of witches often register the impact of large-scale transformations on local worlds. Indeed, their very durability stems from a genius for making the language of intimate, interpersonal affect speak of more abstract forces. It is this that underlies the sudden intensification of witch-finding in postcolonial South Africa–and elsewhere. The parochialism of witches, it seems, is an increasingly global phenomenon.

    Because they distil complex material and social forces into palpable human motives, then, witches tend to figure in narratives which write translocal scenes onto local landscapes, translocal discourses into local vocabularies of cause-and-effect. In rural South Africa, the recent rise in witchfinding has coincided with an efflorescence of other magical technologies that link the occult and the ordinary by thoroughly modern, even postmodern, means; means that parody the mechanisms of the “free” market.

    Thus ritual murder is said to have become “big business” across northern South Africa. In 1995, for example, stories spread widely about the discovery of dismembered corpses in the freezer of a casino in Mmabatho, in the Northwest Province. The casino was built for tourists during the apartheid years, when betting and inter-racial sex were illegal in South Africa but not in the ethnic “homelands”; here, over the border, in the grey interstices of the transnational, white South Africans came to purchase sexual services and to gamble. In the “new” South Africa, black bodies were again for sale, but in different form; the macabre trade now nested comfortably within the orbit of everyday commerce, circulating human organs to whomever had the cash to buy them in order to abet their undertakings. Much the same thing was apparent, too, in all the talk about the “fact” that some local entrepreneurs were turning their fellows into working zombies, a practice which simulates a foundational law of capitalism; namely, that rates of profit are inversely related to labor costs. But the most fabulous narratives were about Satanism, held in the Northwest to be the most robust, most global of all occult enterprises. Less a matter of awesome ritual than of mundane greed, dabbling in the diabolical was said to be especially captivating to the young. In 1996, when Mmabatho TV broadcast two programs on the subject, the ex-Satanists featured were all juveniles. As they took calls from the public they told, in prosaic terms, of the translocal power of the black arts–among them, an ability to travel great distances at miraculous speed to garner enormous wealth at will.

    We shall return to the substance of these things–to ritual murder and zombies and satanism–in due course. Here we note merely that what is at issue is an expanded array of enchanted, often unnervingly visceral, means of producing value. Visceral, yet also strangely banal. In colonial times, divination involved a private, clandestine consultation with an expert. Now anxieties about witchcraft, money magic, and unnatural death are ventilated in churches and comic strips, on the radio, TV, and the internet; almost every day, newspapers and magazines advertise “dial-in-diviners.” The public, multi-mediated quality of this communication is reflected in innovative ritual technologies. One is divining by “mirror” or “television.” An electronic update of water bowl oracles, the procedure requires that clients imbibe a fermented drink and watch a white cloth mounted in a darkened “screenroom.” Figures of miscreants take shape on the screen; their transmission and appearance mimic the manner in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and the long-distance magic of witches condense images, objects, and sounds from afar. While an adept might help to unscramble the ethereal pictures, these are received directly by his “customers”–mark the term–who sit in the archetypal posture of family viewing-and-listening.

    Who are the protagonists in these theaters of the banal, these mundane magical dramas? Who are the witches? And who takes responsibility for killing them? According to the Witchcraft Commission,

    …the youth who are called “comrades” are in the forefront. Note: ages of the accused range between 14-38 years. Not only were young men the most identifiable perpetrators of witch-related violence, but they seem often to have forced neighbors and ritual experts to do their bidding. The purported male- volents, on the other hand, were the usual suspects of African witchcraft–men and women of conspicuous, unshared wealth–although those who were physically attacked were overwhelmingly old and, often, weak and defenseless.

    Let us take a closer look at the most extended case recorded by the Witchcraft Commission, the Ha-Madura Witch-Hunt. The defendants, who ranged from fourteen to thirty- five, were charged with having murdered an elderly woman by “necklacing.” They were also accused of attacking two others, both of advanced age. Witnesses recounted that, in the afternoon of 21 March 1990, “the youths” of Madura–most of them unemployed, most of them with little to do– gathered near the Primary School. After speakers urged them to exterminate the witches in their midst, they went off in search of suspects. Neither of their first two intended victims was home, so they torched their property and assaulted a man suspected of raising the alarm. They then moved on to the yard of the deceased, doused her with petrol, and set her alight. She fled across her maize field and crawled through a fence, where the crowd caught her. At this point she wailed: “Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?” Her assailants responded: “Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!” Garlanding her with a rubber tyre, they applied more petrol and ignited her one final time.

    There could hardly be a more bald statement of intergenerational antagonism. For these rural youth, “mass action” might have delivered the vote. But it brought them no nearer to the wealth and empowerment that the overthrow of apartheid was supposed to yield. Quite the re- verse. Trade sanctions had dramatically increased unemployment, especially in the countryside.

    The cruel irony of South Africa is that, as one of the world’s last colonies, it won its right to secular modern nationhood just as global processes were compromising the sovereignty and material in- tegrity of the nation-state, sui generis. Multinational capital is capricious: once apartheid had end- ed, it found cheaper, more tractable labor, and less violence, elsewhere. As a result, many corporations did not return and money flowed in other directions. What is more, alterations in the world economy during the 1990s–the dramatic rise of tourism and post-Fordist production, of the entertainment industry, the electronic market place, and new-age commerce–have made few inroads into the “backveld.” They engage uneasily, or not at all, with rural enterprise, and are experienced primarily as stories-from-the-city or as traces on television screens. The new era, it is true, has raised the living standards for sections of the African middle class. Very visibly. But, overall, work is harder to come by and poverty is still dire.

    It is no coincidence that the most spirited witchfinding occurs where conditions are most straitened. Also, where raw inequality has become most blatant. The north is, aggregatively, the poorest province in the country, and the remote regions of the northwest come not far behind. Agriculture, much of it on a pitiably modest scale, continues to be practiced, largely by women and, to a lesser extent, by older men. Petty business–beer-brewing, sex work, wood-cutting, thatching, carpentry, refashioning the detritus of used-up commodities for resale–supplements many household budgets. On the other hand, the migrant wages that had long subsidized faltering agrarian endeavors, and had granted young males a modicum of autonomy, are now diminishing. Concomitantly, cash resources vested in the elderly, like pensions, have risen in relative value; as disposable income, they are the object of fierce jealousy and mystical activity (cf Ritchken 1994:361). In addition, the establishment of the ethnic “homelands” under apartheid facilitated and funded the emergence of small new elites marked by their palpable prosperity and con- spicuous consumption. And so, in towns like Madura, new material distinctions, of widely variable magnitude, have become discernible among neighbors. Such differences are made incarnate, per- sonified even, in prized commodities: in houses, automobiles, televisions, cell-phones. The alleged witch of Madura was the occasional employer of several of her attackers, and sometimes let them watch her TV. The petrol that consumed her was seized from the few local men who now could afford cars.

    There is, in short, a good deal of evidence of widespread anxiety about the production and reproduction of wealth, an anxiety that translates into bitter generational opposition. Witch- hunting youth in the Northern Province acted much like an age-regiment in Sotho-Tswana society of old. Ridding the countryside of baloi, witches, was all of a piece with the other forms of “mass action” that had sought to subvert an oppressive social order; not long ago, it should be noted, urban “comrades” demonized the parental generation as passive “sellouts” to colonial oppression. Indeed, the war against mystical evil fused, in a synthetic of set of practices, political and ritual means of both recent and older vintage. In addition to singing songs of freedom as they carried out their exorcisms, “comrades” also intoned one of the best known local circumcision chants.

    Age, of course, is a relational principle. The youthful comrades forged their identity against the foil of a sinister, secretive, gendered gerontocracy; significantly, those attacked were referred to as “old ladies,” even when they were men (p.211). The antisocial greed of these predators was epitomized in the idea of unnatural production and reproduction, in images of debauched, un- generative sexuality. The Commission, for example, makes repeated reference to the inability of witches to bear children, to their red vaginas, and to their “rotten” sperm. Killing “perverts” by fire–itself a vehicle of simultaneous destruction and rebirth–bespoke the effort to engender a more propitious, constructive, mode of reproduction.

    Threats to local viability, as we said before, were also associated with the creation of the zombie workforce. Thus the following fragment from a case record:

    On a certain day, [when] the accused arrived, [people] shouted from the street that she is a witch with a shrinked [sic] vagina. They said she had killed people by lightning and has a drum full of zombies. They also said that her son “Zero” has no male seed and could not impregnate a woman.

    It is hard to imagine a more pointedly transparent portrait of perversion: of the zero-sum economy of witchcraft and its negation of life-giving material, sexual, and social exchange. In place of fertile procreation, the witch makes ghost workers out of the able-bodied, cannibalizing others, and robbing the rising generation of a legitimate livelihood and the wherewithal to marry or establish their own families; indeed, to become fully adult and to reproduce.

    Precisely this sense of illegitimate production and reproduction pervades youthful discourses of witchcraft in much of South Africa. Many young blacks blame their incapacity to ensure a future for themselves on an aged elite that controls the means of generating wealth without working. Their concern is underscored, with particular clarity, by the preoccupation with zombies, long a feature of Caribbean vodoun but new here. Testimony to a diasporic flow of electronic images–but evocative of a state of “living-death” (sefifi) described by early missionaries to the Tswana–zombies have been spliced into local mystical economies and have taken on the color of their surroundings. As one of our opening fragments suggests, they are missing persons who are thought to have been killed and revived by witchcraft. These living dead exist to toil for their creators. Bereft of tongues to give voice to their affliciton, they are believed to work after dark, mainly in agriculture, but can also be magically transported to urban centers to accrue riches for their owners. In this era of increasingly impermanent employment, there are even “part-time zombies”: people who wake up exhausted in the morning, having served unwittingly in the noc- turnal economy to feed the greed of a malign master.

    Although they have no tongues, zombies speak of a particular time and place. The end of apartheid, as we said, was in part the product of a global moment, one in which the machinations of multinational capital and the fall of the Soviet Union drastically restructured older polarities. When black South Africans at last threw off their colonial constraints, much of the rest of the con- tinent had already learned the harsh truth about the postcolonial predicament, having experienced unprecedented marginalization and economic hardship. Or, at the very least, striking new distinctions of wealth and privation. Such conditions disrupt grand narratives of progress. But they do not necessarily dispel their animating desires; to the contrary, they may feed them. Hence the situation that Roitman (n.d.), writing of the Cameroun, describes as “negotiat[ing] modernity in a time of austerity.” In these circumstances there tends to be an expansion both in techniques of producing value and in the meaning of wealth itself. It is an expansion which often breaks the bounds of legality, making crime, as well as magic, a mode of production open to those who lack other means. Which is why violence, as an instrument of income redistribution, is such a ubiquitous feature of postcolonial economies, in Africa and elsewhere.

    The zombie is the nightmare citizen of this parallel, refracted modernity. Reduced from humanity to raw labor power, he is stored up in petrol drums or sheds like tools. His absent pre- sence suggests a link to otherwise inexplicable accumulation. Being solely for the benefit of its owner, the toil of the living dead is pure surplus value: it has, as Marx (1976:325) might put have it, “all the charms of something created out of nothing.” Zombie production is thus an apt image of the inflating occult economies of postcolonial Africa. As spectral capital, it will be evident why these forms of extraction are typically associated with older people of apparent means; why they are thought to have multiplied as wage work has become scarce. Not only does the rise of a phan- tom proletariat consume the life force of others. By yielding profit without cost, it destroys the labor market, conventional patterns of reproduction, and the legitimate prospects of “the commu- nity” at large.

    But zombie production is merely one means among several. Recall that there has also been an increase in the incidence of so-called “ritual murder,” of killing for the purpose of harvesting body parts. Hence our opening fragment about eyes for sale in Johannesburg. As the Witchcraft Commission explains:

    These body parts are used…to secure certain advantages from the ancestors. A skull may be built into the foundation of a new building to ensure a good business, or a brew con- taining human parts may be buried where it will ensure a good harvest.

    These practices seem to have been relatively rare in the past. But now a great deal of evidence confirms that, in this domain too, market forces have stimulated production; indeed, newspapers publish the going rate for various parts: R5,000 for testicles, R1,000 for a kidney, R2,000 for a heart ($1=R4.85). This commerce seems to be eroding conventional social, cultural, and moral margins; in December 1994, a white policeman was charged with having removed the insides of a cadaver at a state mortuary in Johannesburg for retailing as medicine. Meanwhile, in different parts of the country, two young couples, both jobless and expecting babies, confessed in court to slaying young girls for their organs. These young people acted on the understanding that the oc- cult economy feeds the malevolent ambitions of their elders, to whom the purloined parts were to be retailed: already in 1988 it was noted that any disappearance of persons, especially children, was “immediately linked to businessmen and politicians” by young activists.

    We reiterate, yet again, that the traffic in human organs is neither new nor restricted to South Africa; that there is now a global economy in body parts, which flow from poor to rich coun- tries, from south to north, east to west, young to old; that some national governments are widely rumored to raise revenue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to East Asia, mysterious malevolents are believed to extract blood, fat, members, and living offspring from the unsuspecting. At issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise is a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself. Among Sotho and Tswana, as elsewhere, people speak, ever more apprehensively, of a relentless process that erodes the inalienable humanity of persons, rendering them susceptible as never before to the reach of the market.

    Notice the emphasis on distance. The translocal dimension of dealings in the occult economy is crucial to the way in which its workings are understood in rural South Africa. Throu- ghout the north, people ponder the interplay of mobility and compression in the production of new forms of wealth. These appear to be a consequence of the capacity to siphon goods, people, and images across space in no time at all. Movement, especially instant movement, adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? As South Africa casts off its pariah status and seeks ever greater integration with world markets, the growing velocity of long-range transaction is dis- cernible all around. In the rural Northwest, as we observed earlier, its impact is made manifest in, among other things, the rapildy growing interest in Satanism.

    Once more, however, a planetary phenomenon takes on a strikingly particular local form. Among rural Tswana, discourses of the diabolical center widely upon the most recent in a long line of missions from “overseas,” the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God of Brazil. This new Protestant denomination promises instant goods and gratification to those who embrace Christ and denounce Satan; it is also rumored to issue charmed credit cards which register no debt whatsoever. Here Pentecostalism meets neoliberal enterprise: the chapel is, literally, a store-front in a shopping precinct. It holds services during business hours, appealing frankly to mercenary motives, mostly among the young. Tabloids in its windows feature radiant witnesses speaking of the employment, health, and wealth that followed entry into the Church; eloquent testimonies, these, to rapid material returns on a limited spiritual investment. The ability to deliver in the here and now, again a potent form of space-time compression, is given as the measure of a truly global God. Bold advertisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorn the altar, under the legend: “De-light in the Lord and he will give you the desires of your heart” (Psalms 37:4). The immediacy of this, of religion at its most robustly concrete, resonates with a pragmatic strain long evident in black Christianity in South Africa.

    For those middle-class Tswana schooled in a more ascetic Protestantism, however, the hordes that pack the store front are being lured by the devil; this notwithstanding his ostentatious denunciation. With the radical reorientation of local contours of desire and despair, of wealth and inequality, the diabolical has been invested with provocative and ambiguous powers. Its interven- tion into everyday life is hotly debated. We were ourselves witness to an intriguing argument among history graduate students at the University of the Northwest: Is the Universal Church the work of the Antichrist or a vindication of Max Weber? To be sure, if Satan did not exist, crusading Christianity would have had to invent him: in order to assume its global mandate, neo-Pentecos- talism summons up a world-endangering antagonist to conquer. Like the Universal Church–with its page on the world wide web–Satanism is a globalizing discourse: “The devil and his demons,” it says on that web page, “have been deceiving people all over the world.”

    Remember, in this respect, the television programs we mentioned earlier; the ones in whi- ch “reformed” devil worshippers spoke to callers. When asked to explain the relationship of the diabolical to boloi (witchcraft), one laconic young man said, in a mix of Setswana and English: “Satanism is high-octane witchcraft. It is more international.” By such means are old ideas extended and novel tropes domesticated to meet altered conditions. These devil worshippers were rumored to travel far and wide, fuelling their accumulation of riches with human blood. The “high octane” petrochemical image suggests that the basis of their potency was a capacity, as David Har- vey (1990:31) puts it, to “ride the tiger of time-space compression”: to move instantly, that is, between the parochial and the translocal–here and there, then and now–thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of this new, postcolonial epoch.

    IV.

    Perhaps the overriding irony of the contemporary age–this Age of Futilitarianism, in which the promises of late capitalism run up against postmodern pessimism–is how unanticipated it was by modern social thought. None of the grand narratives of the orthodox social sciences came anywhere near predicting the sudden transformation of the twentieth-century international order, the fall of the Soviet Union, the crisis of the nation-state, the rapid deterritorialization of culture and society, the ascendance of an unevenly regulated global economy. The surprising recent past of South Africa is one refraction of this world-historical process. Here, too, the end came unexpectedly.

    Apartheid might not have ended in a bloodbath or a race war. But the birth of the “new” nation has nonetheless been tempestuous. Most perplexing, to many, is the apparently post- political character of the turbulence. Violence, by common agreement, is epidemic. Almost none of it, though, is clothed in an ideological agenda, a social vision, a political program. Not yet. Which is why, perhaps, it is traumatizing the populace at large. The new nightmare is of street terror run amok; of a state in retreat; of crime as routinized redistribution; of police unwilling to protect ordinary citizens, preferring to profit from the privatization of force and the sale of arms; of a new topography of public space marked by few zones of safety and many of danger; of gated communities and uncivil city scapes contested by youth gangs, Islamic vigilantes, drug dealers, car- jackers; of an economy, as much underground as above board, in which “new” black bureaucrats and businessmen, politicians, celebrities, and criminals grow rich while the rest struggle to survive.

    This, we stress, is a popular nightmare, a fast materializing mythos for the post-revolutionary moment. Sociological reality, as always, is much more complex, much less coherent. Not all is apocalypse. In the wake of apartheid, all sorts of legitimate new ventures flourish alongside older ones. From the quiet backyards of rural homesteads through the teeming taxi ranks of large “townships” to sedate urban corporations, inventive African entrepreneurs “do business.” Postcolonial commerce ruptures and dissolves long-standing racial lines in its millennial pursuit of virgin markets. A politics of optimism is actively purveyed by the ANC, not altogether in vain; refreshingly, the media envisage a future in which black is not bleak. What is more, some forms of cultural production–often exhilaratingly experimental–thrive just off the meanest of streets. Still, the fright nightmare persists. Indeed, it grows increasingly baroque, medieval almost, as it is represented with ever greater facticity.

    Reports of escalating witchcraft and ritual murder, of zombies and satanism, must be situated on this restless terrain. The specter of mystical violence run wild is a caricature of post-apartheid “liberty”: the liberty to transgress and consume in an unfettered world of desire, cut loose from former political, spatial, moral, sexual, and material constraints. Socialist imaginings, like utopian ideas of a new society, falter. In their place reigns the rhetoric of the market, of free- dom as the right to exercise choice through spending or voting or whatever, of personhood as constructed largely through consumption. Talk in the public sphere about violence gives voice to a pent up lust for all that apartheid denied, from iconic objects (notably, the BMW) and an omnivorous sexuality to extravagant self-fashionings and the flamboyant sense of independence communicated by the cell phone. But it also evokes a world in which ends far outstrip means, in which there is a high velocity of exchange and a relatively low volume of production. And yet, we repeat, it is a world in which the possibility of rapid enrichment, of amassing a fortune by largely invisible means, is always palpably present.

    The preoccupation with the occult is closely connected to all this. At one level, it is about the desire and the effort to discover the secret of those invisible means; at another, it is concerned to stem the spread of a macabre, visceral economy founded on the violence of extraction and abst- raction (i) in which the majority are kept poor by the mystical machinations of the few; (ii) in which employment has dwindled because of the creation of a virtual labor force from the living dead; (iii) in which profit depends on learning the secret of compressing space and time, on cannibalizing bodies, and on making production into the spectral province of people of the night; (iv) in which the old are accused of aborting the natural process of social reproduction–and youth, reciprocally, are demonized. The fact that none of this is truly new makes it no less sig- nificant to those for whom it has become an existential reality.

    Witch hunts are, among other things, instruments of social divination, dramatic discourses of discovery in the public sphere, whose unspoken object it is to yield explanations, to impress cla- rity on bodies and persons. That ambiguity concerns many aspects of the “new” South Africa: the rights of citizens, the role of the state, the significance of cultural identity and of social difference, the meaning and the point of post-apartheid politics, the infinitely complex articulations of race, class, and ethnicity; the legitimacy of an economic order that has sanctioned dramatic polarities of wealth and caused intense jealousy among neighbors. But, most of all, there is perplexity–in this Hobbesian universe where everything appears at once possible and impossible–about the very nature of human subjects: about their secret appetites, about dark practices of the heart that show themselves in spectacular new fortunes and orgies of consumption.

    Here, then, are the answers to our questions. It will be clear now why, in the South African postcolony, there has been such a dramatic intensification of appeals to enchantment. And why it is, in a world alleged to be filled with witches and ritual murders and zombies, that generational antagonisms loom so large. The rise of occult economies here and elsewhere in postcolonial, postrevolutionary societies seems overdetermined. For one thing, these tend to be societies in which the promise of the free market confronts the realities of neoliberal economics; of unpredictable shifts in centers of production and labor markets; of the difficulties of exercising stable control over space, time, or the flow of money; of an end to old political alignments, without any clear lines, beyond pure interest, along which new ones take shape; of uncertainty surrounding the proper nature of civil society. Such are the corollaries of the rise of millennial capitalism as they are felt in much of the contemporary world. Perhaps they will turn out to be en- tirely transitory, a mere passing moment, in the longue dureé. But this makes them no less mo- mentous now.

    Which takes us to our final question, our final point. What is the relevance of our narrative for the present and future of the discipline, for a postcolonial anthropology of the global age?

    “Globalism” and “globalization,” as everyone knows, have become tropes for our times. Like all catch-words and clichés, they are cheapened by over-use and under-specification, by confusing an expansive metaphor for an explanatory term. As a result, much of what is currently being written about them in the social sciences is Anthropology Lite, fact-free ethnography whose realities are more virtual than its virtues are real. At the same time, it is important not to overreact: not to treat anything labelled “global” either as a feckless fashion or as a threat to the existence of a discipline traditionally concerned with the parochial; this last by dissolving all things culturally contingent and close to the ground into the great Eurocentric solvent of late ca- pitalism. In point of fact, the processes involved in the rise of novel forms of planetary integration and compression–especially in the electronic economy, in mass communications, in flexitime flows of labor and capital, in the instantaneous circulation of signs and images, in the translocal commodification of culture, in the diasporic politics of identity–challenge us by re-presenting all the most fundamental question of our craft: how do human beings construct their life-worlds at the shifting intersections of here, there, elsewhere, everywhere.

    This, finally, is a problem of scale: of determining, in respect of any given ethnography– contemporary, historical, or both–the stretch of relations, concrete processes, imaginings, spatial planes commensurate to its realization. “Locality” is not everywhere, nor for every purpose, the same thing; sometimes it is a family, sometimes a town, sometimes a nation, sometimes a flow or a field, sometimes a continent or even the world; often it lies at the point of articulation among two or more of these things. Similarly, translocal, planentary connections and forces do not impinge equally or in like manner on all aspects of human thought, action and interaction. In this respect, it is important not to forget that “the local” and “the global” do not describe received empirical realities. They are analytic constructs whose heuristic utility depends entirely on the way in which they are deployed to illuminate historically specific phenomena. Which is why we have taken such pains here to trace the causal determinations of the occult economy in post-apartheid South Africa across generations and genders, villages and provinces and regions, and a nation-state intransition–not to mention along the labile vectors of a post-Fordist, millennial economy.

    As all this implies, there is little to be gained any longer from avoiding the methodological challenge posed by the global moment, a strategy effected, on the part of some anthropologists, by retreating back into the local. This move is typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neoprimitivism, the capacity of “native” cultures to remain ass- ertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this conjures up an anachronistic, ahistorical idea of culture. Of culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism. It is also to misrepresent the hybrid, dialectical, historically evanescent character of all contemporary social designs.

    Here lies one future for anthropology, at least as the discipline looks from the vantage of the South African postcolony. It is to interrogate the production, in imaginative and material prac- tice, of those compound political, economic, and cultural forms by which human beings create community and locality and identity, especially on evanescent terrains; in terms of which they fabricate social realities and power relations and impose themselves on their lived environments; through which space and time are made and remade, and the boundaries of the local and the glob- al are actualized. Observe the stress on the active voice: from this perspective, the epistemic objects of our enquiry are no longer nouns–culture, society, institutions, or whatever–but compound verbs describing the construction and deconstruction of more-or-less stable practices, conventions, forms, commodities, abstractions. As we have before (1992), even the most overdetermined, most complex, most inchoate of world-historical forces–colonialism, the global market, cyberspace, “late” capitalism–take shape in sociocultural processes that inhabit particular places during particular periods in particular persons. Without human agents, without specified locations and moments and actions, realities are not realized, objects not objectified, nothing takes place, the social is not socialized, the present has no presence.

    These locations and moments, people and practices–to return one last time to the spirit of Max Gluckman–comprise the fragments from which an anthropology of millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism is to be constructed; from which we may recuperate, by positing imaginative sociologies and legible processes, the mechanisms by which the local is globalized and the global localized. For in these processes lies an explanation for the most parochial of things, like the new occult economy in South Africa. Also for the most universal. Like the fact that enchant- ment, far from slipping away with the resolute march of modernity, seems everywhere on the rise.

  • Millennial Capitalism, Occult Economies, and the Crisis of Reproduction in South Africa

    Millennial Capitalism, Occult Economies, and the Crisis of Reproduction in South Africa

    At its broadest, this essay explores the nature of historical consciousness among a South African Tswana people. On the basis of the imagery of two Tswana men – a “madman” institutionalized by the apartheid regime and a former migrant laborer – it examines the content of Tswana historical consciousness as expressed in vernacular cultural practices, specifically in relation to productiv work and wage labor. These differ from the narrative modes of representation associated with “history” in Euromodernist contexts, and build on various poetic devices – most strikingly, on the rhetoric of contrast – to give voice to contemporary experience and its historical roots. Thus the opposed concepts of productive work and wage labor, one associated with Setswana (Tswana ways) and the other with Sekgoa (European ways), are major tropes through which Tswana construct their past and present. It is argues that this excursion into the poetics of history in South Africa illuminates very general questions concerning the connection between consciousness, culture, history, and the poetics of representation.

  • Millennial Capitalism

    Millennial Capitalism

    We live in difficult times, in times of monstrous chimeras and evil dreams and criminal follies.

    Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes

    Slouching Toward Bethlehem

    The global triumph of capitalism at the millennium, its Second Coming, raises a number of conundrums for our understanding of history at the end of the century. Some of its corollaries—“plagues of the ‘new world order,’” Jacques Derrida (1994: 91) calls them, unable to resist apocalyptic imagery—have been the subject of clamorous debate. Others receive less mention. Thus, for example, populist polemics have dwelt on the planetary conjuncture, for good or ill, of “homogenization and difference” (e.g., Barber 1992); on the simultaneous, syn- ergistic spiraling of wealth and poverty; on the rise of a “new feudalism,” a phoenix disfigured, of worldwide proportions (cf. Connelly and Kennedy 1994).1 For its part, scholarly debate has focused on the confounding effects of rampant liberalization: on whether it engenders truly global flows of capital or concen- trates circulation to a few major sites (Hirst and Thompson 1996); on whether it undermines, sustains, or reinvents the sovereignty of nation-states (Sassen 1996); on whether it frees up, curbs, or compartmentalizes the movement of labor (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, in this issue); on whether the current fixation with democracy, its resurrection in so many places, bespeaks a measure of mass empowerment or an “emptying out of [its] meaning,” its reduction “to paper” (Negri 1999: 9; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997).2 Equally in question is why the present infatuation with civil society has been accompanied by alarming increases in civic strife, by an escalation of civil war, and by reports of the dra- matic growth in many countries of domestic violence, rape, child abuse, prison populations, and most dramatically of all, criminal “phantom-states” (Derrida 1994: 83; Blaney and Pashsa 1993). And why, in a like vein, the politics of con- sumerism, human rights, and entitlement have been shown to coincide with puz- zling new patterns of exclusion, patterns that inflect older lines of gender, sexual- ity, race, and class in ways both strange and familiar (Gal 1997; Yudice 1995). Ironies, here, all the way down; ironies, with apologies to Jean-Paul Sartre, in the very soul of the Millennial Age.

    Other features of our present predicament are less remarked, debated, ques- tioned. Among them are the odd coupling, the binary complementarity, of the legalistic with the libertarian; constitutionality with deregulation; hyperrational- ization with the exuberant spread of innovative occult practices and money magic, pyramid schemes and prosperity gospels; the enchantments, that is, of a decidedly neoliberal economy whose ever more inscrutable speculations seem to call up fresh specters in their wake. Note that, unlike others who have discussed the “new spectral reality” of that economy (Negri 1999: 9; Sprinker 1999), we do not talk here in metaphorical terms. We seek, instead, to draw attention to, to interrogate, the distinctly pragmatic qualities of the messianic, millennial capitalism of the moment: a capitalism that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; a capitalism that, if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the marginalized and disempowered (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b).

    Such interrogatory observations point to another, even more fundamental question. Could it be that these characteristics of millennial capitalism—by which we mean both capitalism at the millennium and capitalism in its messianic, salvific, even magical manifestations—are connected, by cause or correlation or copresence, with other, more mundane features of the contemporary historical moment? Like the increasing relevance of consumption, alike to citizens of the world and to its scholarly cadres, in shaping selfhood, society, identity, even epi- stemic reality? Like the concomitant eclipse of such modernist categories as social class? Like the “crises,” widely observed across the globe, of reproduction and community, youth and masculinity? Like the burgeoning importance of gen- eration, race, and gender as principles of difference, identity, and mobilization? The point of this essay lies in exploring the possibility of their interconnection; even more, in laying the ground of an argument for it.

    As this suggests, our intent in this special issue of Public Culture is to animate further debate on the enigmatic nature of millennial capitalism, and also on its implications for theorizing history and society at the start of the twenty-first cen- tury. However we wish to characterize our current moment—as an age of death (of ideology, politics, the subject) or rebirth (of the spirit of Marx, Weber, and the Adams Ferguson and Smith)—ours are perplexing times: “Times of monstrous chimeras” in which the conjuncture of the strange and the familiar, of stasis and metamorphosis, plays tricks on our perceptions, our positions, our praxis. These conjunctures appear at once to endorse and to erode our understanding of the lin- eaments of modernity and its postponements. Here, plainly, we can do no more than offer preliminary observations and opening lines of argument on a topic whose full extent can only be glimpsed at present.

    Let us, then, cut to the heart of the matter: to the ontological conditions-of- being under millennial capitalism. This begins for us—as it did for the “fathers” of modernist social theory—with epochal shifts in the constitutive relationship of production to consumption, and hence of labor to capital. This requires, in turn, that we consider the meaning of social class under prevailing political and economic conditions, conditions that place growing stress on generation, gender, and race as indices of identity, affect, and political action. In light of these reflec- tions we go on to explore three corollaries, three critical faces of the millennial moment: the shifting provenance of the nation-state and its fetishes, the rise of new forms of enchantment, and the explosion of neoliberal discourses of civil society.

    First, however, back to basics.

    The political history of capital [is] a sequence of attempts by capital to withdraw from the class relationship; at a higher level we can now see it as the history of the succes- sive attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working class. Mario Tronti, “The Strategy of Refusal” (Tronti’s emphasis)

    Specters, Speculation: Of Cons and Pros Consumption, recall, was the hallmark disease of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the First Coming of Indus- trial Capitalism, of a time when the ecological conditions of production, its con- suming passions (Sontag 1978; cf. Jean Comaroff 1997a), ate up the bodies of producers.3 Now, at the end of the twentieth century, semiotically transposed, it is often said to be the “hallmark of modernity” (van Binsbergen and Geschiere n.d.: 3), the measure of its wealth, health, and vitality. An overgeneralization, maybe, yet the claim captures popular imaginings and their representation across the earth. It also resonates with the growing Eurocultural truism that the (post)mod- ern person is a subject made with objects. Nor is this surprising. Consumption, in its ideological guise—as “consumerism”—refers to a material sensibility actively cultivated, for the common good, by Western states and commercial interests, particularly since World War II. It has even been cultivated by some noncapital- ist regimes: In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping advocated “consumption as a motor force of production” (Dirlik 1996: 194).

    In social theory, as well, consumption has become a prime mover (van Bins- bergen and Geschiere n.d.: 3). Increasingly, it is the factor, the principle, held to determine definitions of value, the construction of identities, and even the shape of the global ecumene.4 As such, tellingly, it is the invisible hand, or the Gucci- gloved fist, that animates the political impulses, the material imperatives, and the social forms of the Second Coming of Capitalism—of capitalism in its neolib- eral, global manifestation. Note the image: the invisible hand. It evokes the ghost of crises past, when liberal political economy first discerned the movements of the market beneath swirling economic waters, of “free” enterprise behind the commonweal. Gone is the deus ex machina, a figure altogether too concrete, too industrial for the “virtualism” (Carrier and Miller 1998) of the post-Fordist era.

    As consumption has become the moving spirit of the late twentieth century, so there has been a concomitant eclipse of production; an eclipse, at least, of its per- ceived salience for the wealth of nations. This has heralded a shift, across the world, in ordinary understandings of the nature of capitalism. The workplace and labor, especially work-and-place securely rooted in a stable local context, are no longer prime sites for the creation of value or identity (Sennett 1998). The factory and the shop, far from secure centers of fabrication and family income, are increasingly experienced by virtue of their erasure: either by their removal to an elsewhere—where labor is cheaper, less assertive, less taxed, more feminized, less protected by states and unions—or by their replacement at the hands of nonhu- man or “nonstandard” means of manufacture. Which, in turn, has left behind, for ever more people, a legacy of irregular piecework, of menial “workfare,” of rela- tively insecure, transient, gainless occupation. Hence the paradox, in many West- ern economies, of high official employment rates amidst stark deindustrialization and joblessness.5 In the upshot, production appears to have been superseded, as the fons et origo of wealth, by less tangible ways of generating value: by control over such things as the provision of services, the means of communication, and above all, the flow of finance capital. In short, by the market and by speculation.

    Symptomatic in this respect are the changing historical fortunes of gambling. The latter, of course, makes manifest a mechanism integral to market enterprise: it puts the adventure into venture capital. Financial risk has always been crucial to the growth of capitalism; it has, from the first, been held to warrant its own due return. But, removed from the dignifying nexus of the market, it was until recently treated by Protestant ethics and populist morality alike as a “pariah” practice. Casinos were set apart from the workaday world. They were situated at resorts, on reservations and riverboats: liminal places of leisure and/or the haunts of those (aristocrats, profligates, “chancers”) above and beyond honest toil. Liv- ing off the proceeds of this form of speculation was, normatively speaking, the epitome of immoral accumulation: the wager stood to the wage, the bet to per- sonal betterment, as sin to virtue. There have, self-evidently, always been differ- ent cultures and mores of betting. However, the activity—whether it be a “flut- ter” on the horses or a domestic card game, on a sporting contest or an office pool—has generally been placed outside the domain of work and earning, at best in the ambiguous, nether space between virtue and its transgression. Over a generation, gambling, in its marked form, has changed moral valence and invaded everyday life across the world.6 It has been routinized in a widespread infatuation with, and popular participation in, high-risk dealings in stocks, bonds, and funds whose fortunes are governed largely by chance. It also expresses itself in a fascination with “futures” and their downmarket counterpart, the lottery. Here the mundane meets the millennial: “Not A LOT TO TOMAR, OW!” proclaims an ironic inner-city mural in Chicago (see Millennial Transitions, in this issue), large hands grasping a seductive pile of casino chips, beside which nestles a newborn, motherless babe.7 This at a moment when “gambling [is] the fastest growing industry in the US,” when it is “tightly woven into the national fabric,” when it is increasingly “operated and promoted” by government.8

    Life itself has become the object of bookmaking; it is no longer the sole pre- serve of the “respectable” insurance industry, of its abstract argot of longevity statistics and probability quotients. A recent article in Newsweek sports the head- line “Capital Gains: The Lottery on Lives”:

    In America’s fin de siècle casino culture, no wager seems outré. So how about betting on how long a stranger is likely to live? You can buy part or all of his or her insurance policy, becoming a beneficiary. Your gamble: that death will come soon enough to yield a high return on the money you put up. The Viatical Association of America says that $1 billion worth of coverage went into play last year.9

    A much better bet, this, than the sale of the Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Inflation notwithstanding.

    In the era of millennial capitalism, securing instant returns is often a matter of life and death. The failure to win the weekly draw was linked with more than one suicide in Britain in the wake of the introduction of national lottery in 1994; in 1999, the India Tribune reported that one of the biggest central Indian States, Madya Pradesh, was “caught in the vortex of lottery mania,” which had claimed several lives.10 Witnesses described “extreme enthusiasm among the jobless youth towards trying their luck to make a fast buck,” precisely the kind of fatal ecstasy classically associated with cargo cults and chiliastic movements (Cohn 1957). More mundanely, efforts to enlist divine help in tipping the odds, from the Taiwanese countryside to the Kalahari fringe, have become a regular feature of what Weller (in this issue) terms “fee-for-service” religions (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b). These are locally nuanced fantasies of abundance without effort, of beating capitalism at its own game by drawing a winning number at the behest of unseen forces. Once again that invisible hand.

    The change in the moral valence of gambling also has a public dimension. In a neoliberal climate where taxes are anathema to the majoritarian political cen- ter, lotteries and gaming levies have become a favored means of filling national coffers, of generating cultural and social assets, of finding soft monies in times of tough cutbacks. The defunct machinery of a growing number of welfare states, to be sure, is being turned by the wheel of fortune. With more and more governments and political parties depending on this source for quick revenue fixes, betting, says George Will, has “been transformed from a social disease”— subjected, not so long ago, to scrutiny at the hands of Harvard Medical School—“into social policy.”11 Once a dangerous sign of moral turpitude, “it is now marketed almost as a ‘patriotic duty.’ ”12

    Put these things together—the explosion of popular gambling, its legitimate incorporation to the fiscal heart of the nation-state, the global expansion of highly speculative market “investment,” and changes in the moral vectors of the wager—and what has happened? “The world,” answers a reflective Fidel Castro, has “become a huge casino.” Because the value of stock markets has lost all grounding in materiality, he says—anticipating a point to which we shall return —their workings have finally realized the dream of medieval alchemy: “Paper has been turned into gold.”13 This evokes Susan Strange (1986: 1–3; cf. Harvey 1989: 332; Tomasic and Pentony 1991), who, in likening the Western fiscal order to an immense game of luck, was among the first to speak specifically of “casino capitalism”: “Something rather radical has happened to the international finan- cial system to make it so much like a gambling hall. . . . [It] has made inveterate, and largely involuntary, gamblers of us all.” Insofar as the growth of globalized markets, electronic media, and finance capital have opened up the potential for venture enterprise, the gaming room has actually become iconic of capital: of its “natural” capacity to yield value without human input (Hardt 1995: 39), to grow and expand of its own accord, to reward speculation.

    And yet crisis after crisis in the global economy, and growing income dispari- ties on a planetary scale, makes it painfully plain that there is no such thing as capitalism sans production, that the neoliberal stress on consumption as the prime source of value is palpably problematic. If scholars have been slow to reflect on this fact, people all over the world—not least those in places where there have been sudden infusions of commodities, of new forms of wealth—have not. Many have been quick to give voice, albeit in different registers, to their per- plexity at the enigma of this wealth: of its sources and the capriciousness of its distribution, of the mysterious forms it takes, of its slipperiness, of the opaque relations between means and ends embodied in it. Our concern here grows directly out of these perplexities, these imaginings: out of worldwide speculation, in both senses of the term, provoked by the shifting conditions of material exis- tence at the end of the twentieth century.

    We seek, here, to interrogate the experiential contradictions at the core of neoliberal capitalism, of capitalism in its millennial manifestation: the fact that it appears both to include and to marginalize in unanticipated ways; to produce desire and expectation on a global scale (Trouillot 1999) yet to decrease the cer- tainty of work or the security of persons; to magnify class differences but to undercut class consciousness; above all, to offer up vast, almost instantaneous riches to those who master its spectral technologies—and, simultaneously, to threaten the very existence of those who do not. Elsewhere (1999c) we have argued that these contradictions, while worldwide in effect, are most visible in so-called postrevolutionary societies—especially those societies that, having been set free by the events of 1989 and their aftermath, entered the global arena with distinct structural disadvantages.14 A good deal is to be learned about the historical implications of the current moment by eavesdropping on the popular anxieties to be heard in such places. How do we interpret the mounting disen- chantment, in these “liberated zones,” with the effects of hard-won democracy? Why the perceptible nostalgia for the security of past regimes, some of them immeasurably repressive? Why the accompanying upsurge of assertions of iden- tity and autochthony? How might they be linked to widespread fears, in many parts of Eastern Europe and Africa alike, about the preternatural production of wealth?

    The end of the Cold War, like the death of apartheid, fired utopian imagina- tions. But liberation under neoliberal conditions has been marred by a disconcert- ing upsurge of violence, crime, and disorder. The quest for democracy, the rule of law, prosperity, and civility threatens to dissolve into strife and recrimination, even political chaos, amidst the oft-mouthed plaint that “the poor cannot eat votes or live on a good Constitution.”15 Everywhere there is evidence of an uneasy fusion of enfranchisement and exclusion; of xenophobia at the prospect of world citizenship without the old protectionisms of nationhood; of the effort to realize modern utopias by decidedly postmodern means. Gone is any official- speak of egalitarian futures, work for all, or the paternal government envisioned by the various freedom movements. These ideals have given way to a spirit of deregulation, with its taunting mix of emancipation and limitation. Individual cit- izens, a lot of them marooned by a rudderless ship of state, try to clamber aboard the good ship Enterprise. But in so doing, they find themselves battling the eccen- tric currents of the “new” world order, which short-circuit received ways and means. Caught up in these currents, many of them come face to face with the most fundamental metamorphoses wrought by the neoliberal turn: the labile role of labor in the elusive algorithm connecting production to consumption, the pro to the con of capitalism.16

    Which brings us back to the problematic status of production at the turn of the new century.

    Labor’s Pain: Producing the Class of 2000 The emergence of consumption as a privileged site for the fabrication of self and society, of culture and identity, is closely tied to the changing status of work under contemporary conditions. For some, the economic order of our times represents a completion of the intrinsic “project” of capital: namely, the evolution of a social formation that, as Mario Tronti (1980: 32) puts it, “does not look to labor as its dynamic foundation” (cf. Hardt 1995: 39). Others see the present moment in radically different terms. Scott Lash and John Urry (1987: 232–33), for instance, declare that we are seeing not the denouement but the demise of organized capitalism, of a system in which cor- porate institutions could secure compromises between management and workers by making appeal to the national interest. The internationalization of market forces, they claim, has not merely eroded the capacity of states to control national economies. It has led to a decline in the importance of domestic produc- tion in many once industrialized countries—which, along with the worldwide rise of the service sector and the feminization of the workforce, has dispersed class relations, alliances, and antinomies across the four corners of the earth. It has also put such distances between sites of production and consumption that their articulation becomes all but unfathomable, save in fantasy.

    Not that Fordist fabrication has disappeared. There is a larger absolute number of industrial workers in the world today than ever before (Kellogg 1987). Neither is the mutation of the labor market altogether unprecedented. For one thing, as Marx (1967: 635) observed, the development of capitalism has always conduced to the cumulative replacement of “skilled laborers by less skilled, mature laborers by immature, male by female”—also “living” labor by “dead.” As David Harvey (1989: 192–93) reminds us, the devaluation of labor power has been a traditional response to falling profits and periodic crises of commodity production. What is more, the growth of global markets in commodities and services has not been accompanied by a correspondingly unrestricted flow of workers; most nation- states still try to regulate their movement to a greater or lesser extent. The simul- taneous “freeing” and compartmentalizing of labor, Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh (in this issue) point out, is a tension long endemic to capitalism.

    Nonetheless, Harvey insists, if not in quite the same terms as Lash and Urry (1987), that the current moment is different: that it evinces features that set it apart, fracturing the continuing history of capital—a history, Engels once said, that “remain[s] the same and yet [is] constantly changing” (quoted by Andre Gunder Frank [1971: 36]). Above all, the explosion of new markets and mone- tary instruments, aided by sophisticated means of planetary coordination and space-time compression, have given the financial order a degree of autonomy from “real production” unmatched in the annals of political economy (cf. Turner n.d.: 18). The consequences are tangible: “Driven by the imperative to replicate money,” writes David Korten (1996: 13; cf. McMichael 1999: 98), “the [new global] system treats people as a source of inefficiency”: ever more disposable. The spiraling virtuality of fiscal circulation, of the accumulation of wealth purely through exchange, exacerbates this tendency: it enables the speculative side of capitalism to act as if it were entirely independent of human manufacture. The market and its masters, an “electronic herd” (Friedman 1999) of nomadic, deterritorialized investors, appear less and less constrained by the costs or moral economy of concrete labor.

    If capital strives to become autonomous of labor, if the spatial and temporal coordinates of modernist political economy have been sundered, if the ontological connection between production and consumption has come into question, what has happened to the linchpin of capitalism: the concept formerly known as class?

    Denunciations of the concept, Fredric Jameson (1999: 46–47) laments, have become “obligatory.” Even for Marxists. This in spite of the fact that class names an “ongoing social reality,” a persistently active dimension of “post-Cold War maps of the world system.” He is, moreover, unconvinced by claims that it no longer makes sense of the transnational division of labor; nor is he persuaded that gender, race, and ethnicity are more constitutive of concrete experience in the contemporary moment. For Jameson, gender and race are too easily reconciled with the demands of liberal ideology, with its solutions to social problems, with the sorts of politics it proffers. Class, finally, remains more intractable and more fundamental. Thus Tom Lewis (1999: 151): the failure to recognize it as “the most effective subject position” through which to organize against racism and sexism is “particularly regrettable.”

    But surely the matter runs deeper than this? Subject positions are multiply determined, shaped less by political expediency than by the compelling truths of sense and perception. As Jameson himself notes (1999: 49), “Nothing is more complexly allegorical than the play of class connotations across the . . . social field.” Our task, surely, is to examine how consciousness, sentiment, and attach- ment are constituted under prevailing conditions; why class has become a less plausible basis for self-recognition and action when growing disparities of wealth and power would point to the inverse (cf. Storper, in this issue); why gender, race, ethnicity, and generation have become such compelling idioms of identification, mobilizing people, both within and across nation-states, in ways often opposed to reigning hegemonies.

    Once again, this problem is hardly new. There has long been debate about the two big questions at the nub of the historical sociology of class: Why do social classes seem so seldom to have acted for themselves (für sich)? And why have explicit forms of class consciousness arisen relatively infrequently, even under the worst of Fordist conditions (see, e.g., Wallerstein 1972: 173; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987)? Complex, poetically rich, culturally informed imaginings have always come between structural conditions and subjective perceptions—imagin- ings that have multiplied and waxed more ethereal, more fantastic, as capitalist economies have enlarged in scale. Neither the absolute increase in industrial workers across the globe nor the fact that 70 percent of the population in advanced capitalist societies “structurally belong to the working class” (Lewis 1999: 150–51) dictates that people will experience the world, or act upon it, in classic proletarian terms.

    Quite the opposite. As we have already said, the labile relation of labor to capital may have intensified existing structures of inequality, but it is also erod- ing the conditions that give rise to class opposition as an idiom of identity and/or interest. Key here is the dramatic transnationalization of primary pro- duction (this by contrast to trade in raw materials and finished products, which has long crossed sovereign borders; see Dicken 1986: 3). A world-historical process, it is having profound effects on the configuration, and the cognition, of social relations of production everywhere: (1) By undermining the capacity of states to sustain economies in which “production, plant, firm and industry were essentially national phenomena” (Hobsbawm 1979: 313), it renders obsolete the old system of bargaining in which labor and capital could negotiate wages and conditions within an enclaved territory (Lash and Urry 1987: 232–33; see above); (2) by subverting domestic production in industrialized countries, it encourages the cutting of labor costs through casualization, outsourcing, and the hiring of discounted (female, immigrant, racinated) workers, thereby either making blue-collar employees redundant or forcing them into the menial end of the service sector; (3) by widening the gulf between rich and poor regions, it makes the latter—via the export of labor or the hosting of sweatshops and maquiladoras—into the working class of the former; and (4) by reducing pro- letarians everywhere to the lowest common denominator, it compels them to compete with little protection against the most exploitative modes of manufacture on the planet.

    To the extent, then, that the nation-state is, as Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 318) says, “the terrain on which actual class conflicts take place,” it follows that the global dispersal of manufacture is likely to fragment modernist forms of class con- sciousness, class alliance, and class antinomies at an exponential rate. It is also likely to dissolve the ground on which proletarian culture once took shape and to disrupt any sense of rootedness within organically conceived structures of production. Already, in many places, there has been a palpable erosion of the con- ventional bases of worker identity. Thus, while it is possible to argue, with Terence Turner (n.d.: 25; cf. Cox 1987: 271), that transnational flows of capital and labor have replicated “internal” class divisions on an international scale, exist- ing relations among labor, place, and social reproduction—and, with them, the terms of class conflict itself—have been thoroughly unsettled for now.

    While the contours of the global proletariat are ghostly at best—and while middle classes seem everywhere to be facing a loss of socioeconomic security, their center ground ever shakier (cf. Storper, in this issue)—a transnational capitalist class is taking more and more tangible shape. Here, again, there are questions of nuance about the old and the new: international bourgeoisies are, arguably, as old as capitalism itself. Dependency theorists have long insisted that they were a critical element in the making of modern European states and their national economies; also that their exploitation of colonial wealth was indispensable to the development of the Western metropoles. The new transna- tional capitalist elite—its frequent-flier executives, financiers, bureaucrats, professionals, and media moguls—may appear to be the planetary version of those older cosmopolitan bourgeoisies, its cadres centered in the imperial capi- tals of the world. But, as Leslie Sklair (1998: 136–37) argues, this new elite is distinctive in several ways. Above all, its interests are vested primarily in glob- alizing forms of capital: capital whose shareholder-driven imperatives are unrelated to any particular local enterprise, metropolitan or colonial. Hence, while its business ventures might loop into and out of national economies, this does not, as Saskia Sassen (n.d.) stresses, make them “national” enterprises. The entrepreneurial activities of this class are conceived in terms of markets, monetary transactions, and modes of manufacture that transcend national bor- ders. They seek to disengage from parochial loyalties and jurisdictions, thus to minimize the effects of legal regulations, environmental constraints, taxation, and labor demands.17

    Decontextualization, the distantiation from place and its sociomoral pres- sures, is an autonomic impulse of capitalism at the millennium;18 crucial, in fact, to its ways and means of discounting labor by abstracting itself from direct con- frontation or civic obligation. The poor are no longer at the gates; bosses live in enclaved communities a world away, beyond political or legal reach. Capital and its workforce become more and more remote from each other: frequent fliers and frequent friers seldom meet on the global highways they travel—in contrapuntal rhythm. Here is the harsh underside of the culture of neoliberalism. It is a culture that, to return to our opening comment, re-visions persons not as producers from a particular community, but as consumers in a planetary marketplace: persons as ensembles of identity that owe less to history or society than to organically conceived human qualities.

    This logos does not go uncontested, of course—neither by popular nationalisms nor by social movements of various stripes, left and right, North and South, especially among the marginal (Sklair 1998: 137; Turner n.d.). But the gospel of laissez-faire is a potent presence in contemporary capitalist societies, its axioms reinforced by quotidian experience and its truths instilled in its subjects by the remorseless commodification of ever more finely targeted areas of everyday life. Witness the following interpolation:

    You are at one with the world. . . . The real world where time treads with a leisure measure. You express your commitment to the new age . . . in the way you think, the way you talk, the way you dress. Leisure time dressing is YOU.”

    The off-the-peg poetics of this call to postproletarian identity comes from a label attached to a pair of women’s shorts marketed in a climate of “patriotic capital- ism” by a South African chain store.19 The thickening hegemony to which it speaks is borne also by the global communicative media, themselves seeking to construct a planetary “ecumene” (see n. 4 above), whose satellite signals and fiber-optic nerves reach the widest possible audience. Those signals are designed to evade control exercised by states over flows of images and information— flows once integral to the creation of political communities and national “publics” (cf Anderson 1983:63).

    For all their transformative power, as anthropologists have repeatedly insisted, these material and cultural forces do not have simple, homogenizing effects. They are, in some measure, refracted, redeployed, domesticated, or resisted wherever they come to rest. What we call globalism is a vast ensemble of dialectical processes (J. L. Comaroff 1996; Jean Comaroff 1997b), processes that cannot occur without the grounded, socially embedded human beings from whom they draw value. Nor can these processes occur without the concrete, cul- turally occupied locales—villages, towns, regions, countries, subcontinents—in which they come to rest, however fleetingly. Still, they are re-forming the salience of locality, place, and community in ways that often bypass the state. Hence the proliferation of attachments at once more particular and more univer- sal than citizenship (Turner n.d.: 8)—from those based on gender, sex, race, and age through those organized around issues such as environmentalism and human rights to those, like the Nation of Islam or the hip-hop nation, that mimic nation- hood itself.

    The paradox of class at the millennium, in sum, must be understood in these terms. Neoliberalism aspires, in its ideology and practice, to intensify the abstrac- tions inherent in capitalism itself: to separate labor power from its human con- text, to replace society with the market, to build a universe out of aggregated transactions. While it can never fully succeed, its advance over the “long” twen- tieth century has profoundly altered, if unevenly in space and time, the phenom- enology of being in the world. Formative experiences—like the nature of work and the reproduction of self, culture, and community—have shifted. Once-legible processes—the workings of power, the distribution of wealth, the meaning of politics and national belonging—have become opaque, even spectral. The con- tours of “society” blur, its organic solidarity disperses. Out of its shadows emerges a more radically individuated sense of personhood, of a subject built up of traits set against a universal backdrop of likeness and difference. In its place, to invert the old Durkheimean telos, arise collectivities erected on a form of mechanical solidarity in which me is generalized into we.

    In this vocabulary, it is not just that the personal is political. The personal is the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional valence. By extension, interpersonal relations—above all, sexuality, from the peccadillos of presidents to the global specter of AIDS—come to stand, metonymically, for the inchoate forces that threaten the world as we know it. It is in these privatized terms that action is organized, that the experience of inequity and antagonism takes meaningful shape. In this sense, Jameson (1999: 47) is correct. There is no autonomous discourse of class. Certainly not now, if ever. Oppositions of gender and race, even if not in themselves explicit vehicles for that discourse, are frequently “reinvested” in its practical dynamics and express its stark antagonisms. This is inevitable. Reigning hegemonies, both popular and academic, may separate the construction of identity from the antinomies of class. But the market has always made capital out of human dif- ference and difference out of capital, cultivating exploitable categories of workers and consumers, identifying pariahs, and seeking to silence enemies of established enterprise. As lived reality, then, social class is a multiply refracted gestalt. Its contrasts are mobilized in a host of displaced registers, its distinc- tions carried in a myriad of charged, locally modulated signs and objects— from the canons of taste and desire to the niceties of language use, the subtle discriminations of advertising to the carnal conflict of sport.

    In short, as neoliberal conditions render ever more obscure the rooting of inequality in structures of production, as work gives way to the mechanical soli- darities of “identity” in constructing selfhood and social being, class comes to be understood, in both popular and scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice. Which is why it, like citizenship, is measured increasingly by the capacity to transact and consume; why politics is treated as a matter of indi- vidual or group entitlement; why social wrongs are transposed into an issue of “rights”; why diffuse concerns about cultural integrity and communal survival are vested in “private” anxieties about sexuality, procreation, or family values; why the fetus, neoliberal subject par excellence, becomes the focus of a macabre nativity play, in which, “vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,” moral antago- nists lock in mortal battle over the right to life (Jean Comaroff 1997a; Berlant 1997). Analytically, of course, it is imperative for us not to take these things at face value. The problem, rather, is to explain why, in the millennial age, class has become displaced and refracted in the way that it has. Which is why, finally, its reduction, to the mere “experience of inferiority,” as Jameson (1999: 47) would have it, is insufficient. The concept of class so reduced captures neither the com- plex construction of contemporary experience nor the crises of social reproduc- tion in which much of the world appears to be caught.

    Generating Futures:Youth in the Age of Incivility That sense of physical, social, and moral crisis congeals, perhaps more than anywhere else, in the contempo- rary predicament of youth, now widely under scrutiny (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.). Generation, in fact, seems to be an especially fertile site into which class anxieties are displaced. Perhaps that much is overdetermined: it is on the backs of the pubescent that concerns about social reproduction—about the viability of the continuing present—have almost always been saddled. Nonetheless, genera- tion as a principle of distinction, consciousness, and struggle has long been neglected, or taken for granted, by theorists of political economy. This will no longer do: the growing pertinence of juveniles — or, more accurately, their impertinence—is an ineluctable feature of the present moment, from Chicago to Cape Town, Calcutta to Caracas. Preadulthood, of course, is a historically constructed category: while, in much of the late-twentieth-century English-speaking world, young white persons are teenagers, their black counterparts are youth, adolescents with attitude. And most often, if not always, male.

    There are startling similarities in the current situation of youth the world over, similarities that appear to arise out of the workings of neoliberal capitalism and the changing planetary order of which we have spoken. These similarities seem to be founded on a doubling, on simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. On one hand is their much remarked exclusion from local economies, especially from shrinking, mutating blue collar sectors. As the expansion of the free market runs up against the demise of the welfare state, the modernist ideal in which each generation does better than its predecessor is mocked by conditions that disen- franchise the unskilled young of the inner city and the countryside (cf. Abdullah 1998). Denied full, waged citizenship in the nation-state, many of them take to the streets, often the only place where, in an era of privatization, a lumpen pub- lic can be seen and heard (cf. Appadurai forthcoming). The profile of these pop- ulations reflects also the feminization of post-Fordist labor, which further disrupts gender relations and domestic reproduction among working people, creating a concomitant “crisis of masculinity”: a crisis as audible in U.S. gangsta rap as in South African gang rape, as visible in the parodic castration of “The Full Monty” as in the deadly machismo of soccer violence or the echoing corridors of Columbine High. This crisis is not confined to youth or workers, of course— world cinema has made that point cogently in recent years—but it is magnified among them.

    On the other hand is the recent rise of assertive, global youth cultures of desire, self-expression, and representation; in some places, too, of potent, if unconventional, forms of politicization. Pre-adults have long been at the frontiers of the transnational: the waxing U.S. economy in the 1950s was marked by the emergence of “teens” as a consumer category with its own distinctive, interna- tionally marketable culture. This, however, intensified immeasurably during the 1980s and 1990s. To a greater extent than ever before, generation became a con- crete principle of mobilization, inflecting other dimensions of difference, not least class, in whose displacements it is closely entailed (cf. Corrigan and Frith 1976). Youth activism, clearly, has been hugely facilitated by the flow of infor- mation, styles, and currencies across old sovereign boundaries. The signifying practices on which it is based appear to flourish, more than most things, with space-time compression.

    This is not to imply that the young form a “homogeneous, sociological cate- gory of people which thinks, organizes and acts” in coherent ways (Seekings 1993: xiv). The fact that youth culture is increasingly capacious in its reach does not mean that the situation of “kids,” or the nature of their social experience, is everywhere the same. But it is to say that, in recent times, this segment of the population has gained unprecedented autonomy as a social category an und für sich, both in and for itself; this in spite, or maybe because, of its relative margin- alization from the normative world of work and wage. In many Western contexts they, along with other disenfranchised persons (notably the homeless and the unemployed), constitute a kind of counternation: a virtual citizenry with its own twilight economies, its own spaces of production and recreation, its own modali- ties of politics with which to address the economic and political conditions that determine its plight (Venkatesh 1997).

    As a consequence, youth tend everywhere to occupy the innovative, uncharted borderlands along which the global meets the local. This is often made manifest in the elaboration of creolized argots, of streetspeak and cybertalk, that give voice to imaginative worlds very different from those of the parental gener- ation. But these borderlands are also sites of tension, particularly for disadvan- taged young people from postrevolutionary societies, from inner cities, and from other terrors incognita who seek to make good on the promises of the free mar- ket; also for anyone who jostles against the incivilities, illegalities, and importu- nities of these precocious entrepreneurs. In the late twentieth century, the image of youth-as-trouble has gained an advanced capitalist twist as impatient adoles- cents “take the waiting out of wanting” by developing remarkably diverse forms of illicit enterprise20—from drug trafficking in the urban United States, through the “bush” economies of West and Central Africa, which trade diamonds and dollars, guns and gasoline over long distances (Roitman 1999; De Boeck 1999), to the supply of services both legal and lethal. In this they try to link the poles of consumption and production and to break into the cycle of accumulation, often by flouting received rules and conventions. The young have felt their power, power born partly of the sheer weight of numbers, partly of a growing inclination and capacity to turn to the use of force, partly of a willingness to hold polite society to ransom.

    Bill Buford (1993: 264–65) has suggested that British soccer fans experience a compelling sense of community in moments of concerted violence. Others have said the same of gangland wars in North American cities, witch burning in the northerly provinces of South Africa, and cognate social practices elsewhere. Is it surprising, then, that so many juveniles see themselves as ironic, mutant citizens of a new world order? Or that the standardized nightmare of the genteel main- stream is an increasingly universal image of the adolescent, a larger-than-life fig- ure wearing absurdly expensive sports shoes, headphones blaring gangsta rap, beeper tied to a global underground economy—in short, a sinister caricature of the corporate mogul? Is this not a dramatic embodiment of the dark side of con- sumerism, of a riotous return of the repressed, of a parallel politics of class, social reproduction, and civil society?

    Precisely because of its fusion of monstrosity, energy, and creativity, this fig- ure also subsumes some of the more complex aspects of millennial capitalism, if in the manner of a grotesque: its tendency to spark the pursuit of new ways and means for the production of wealth; its ambivalent, contradictory engagement with the nation-state; its play on the presence and absence of civil society. It is to these three faces of the “rough beast, its hour come round at last,” that we now turn.

    Three Faces of Millennial Capitalism

    Liberal democracy . . . has never been . . . in such a state of dysfunction. . . . Life is not only distorted, as was always the case, by a great number of socio-eco- nomic mechanisms, but it is exercised with more and more difficulty in a public space profoundly upset by techno-tele-media apparatuses and by new rhythms of information and communication, . . . by the new modes of appropriation they put to work, by the new structure of the event and its spectrality. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx

    Occult Economies and New Religious Movements: Privatizing the Millennium A striking corollary of the dawning Age of Millennial Capitalism has been the global proliferation of “occult economies.”21 These economies have two dimen- sions: a material aspect founded on the effort to conjure wealth—or to account for its accumulation—by appeal to techniques that defy explanation in the con- ventional terms of practical reason; and an ethical aspect grounded in the moral discourses and (re)actions sparked by the (real or imagined) production of value through such “magical” means. It is difficult, of course, to quantify the presence of the occult—and, therefore, to make any claim to its increase. As we note above, finance capital has always had its spectral enchantments, its modes of speculation based on less than rational connections between means and ends. Both its underside (the pariah forms of gambling of which we spoke a moment ago) and its upper side (a fiscal industry, embracing everything from insurance to stock markets) have been rooted, from the first, in two inscrutables: a faith in probability (itself a notoriously poor way of predicting the future from the past) and a monetary system that depends for its existence on “confidence,” a chimera knowable, tautologically, only by its effects. Wherein, then, lies the claim that occult economies are presently on the rise?

    In the specific context of South Africa, we have demonstrated (1999b, 1999c) that there has been an explosion of occult-related activity—much of it violent, arising out of accusations of ritual killing, witchcraft, and zombie conjuring— since the late apartheid years. These also include fantastic Ponzi schemes, the sale of body parts for “magical” purposes, satanic practices, tourism based on the sighting of fabulous monsters, and the like. Here middle-class magazines run “dial-a-diviner” advertisements, national papers carry headline articles on medi- cine murders, prime-time television broadcasts dramas of sorcery, and more than one “witchcraft summit” has been held. Patently, even here we cannot be sure that the brute quantum of occult activity exceeds that of times past. But what is clear is that their reported incidence, written about by the mainstream press in more prosaic, less exoticizing terms than ever before (Fordred 1999), has forced itself upon the public sphere, rupturing the flow of mediated “news.” It is this rup- ture—this focus of popular attention on the place of the arcane in the everyday production of value—to which we refer when we speak of a global proliferation of occult economies.

    It is not difficult to catalogue the presence of occult economies in different parts of the world. In West Africa, for example, Peter Geschiere (1997), among others, has shown how zombie conjuring is becoming an endemic feature of everyday life, how sorcery and witchcraft have entered into the postcolonial political economy as an integral element of a thriving alternative modernity, how magic has become as much an aspect of mundane survival strategies as it is indis- pensable to the ambitions of the powerful (see also Bastian 1993). Nor is all of this based in rural situations or among poor people. In South Africa a recent case involved a well-known physician: she was “turned into a zombie” by a “Nigerian devil-worshipper,” who, having rendered her insensate, took a large sum of money from her bank account.22 By labeling the accused a Nigerian devil wor- shipper, the report ties the menace of the satanic to the flow of immigrants across national borders.

    Nor is this only an African phenomenon. In various parts of Asia occult economies thrive, often taking surprising turns (see Morris, in this issue). In Thai- land—where fortune-telling has been transformed by global technology and e- mail divination has taken off—one “traditional” seer, auspiciously named Madam Luk, reports that her clients nowadays ask three questions to the exclu- sion of all others: “‘Is my company going broke?’ ‘Am I going to lose my job?’ and ‘Will I find another job?’ ”23 In the United States, too, the fallout of neolib- eral capitalism is having its impact on magical practice. There is, for instance, a growing use (“seeping into the grassroots” of the U.S. heartland and taking its place beside other millennial pursuits) of tarot readings as a respectable form of therapy—described by the director of the Trends Research Institute as a low- cost “shrink in the box.”24 By these means are psychology, spirituality, and for- tune-telling fused.

    Sometimes dealings in the occult take on a more visceral, darker form. Throughout Latin America in the 1990s, as in Africa and Asia, there have been mass panics about the clandestine theft and sale of the organs of young people, usually by unscrupulous expatriates (Scheper-Hughes 1996). Violence against children has become metonymic of threats to social reproduction in many ethnic and national contexts, the dead (or missing) child having emerged as the stan- dardized nightmare of a world out of control (Jean Comaroff 1997a). There, and in other parts of the globe, this commerce—like international adoptions, mail- order marriage, and indentured domestic labor—is seen as a new form of impe- rialism, the affluent North siphoning off the essence of poorer “others” by mys- terious means for nefarious ends. All of which gives evidence, to those at the nether end of the global distribution of wealth, of the workings of insidious forces, of potent magical technologies and modes of accumulation.

    That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itself. Hence the recent scares, in several countries, about the sexual and satanic abuse of children (La Fontaine 1997); about the kidnapping and murder of street “urchins,” most recently in Ger- many by “Russian gangs,” for purposes of organ harvest and export; about the alleged “trafficking in women [especially] from . . . nations of the former Soviet bloc” for prostitution, labor, and other “personal services” in Western Europe, the Americas, Japan, and China.25 Again, the United States is not exempt from anxi- eties over the pilfering of human bodies and body parts for profit. Note, for just one extreme instance, the urban myth that traversed the Internet in 1997 about the secret excision of kidneys, by apparently incredible means, from business travelers.26

    In other contexts, the occult concentrates itself in purely financial dealings. Thus there seems to have been an extraordinary intensification of pyramid schemes lately, many of them tied to the electronic media. These schemes, and a host of scams allied with them—a few legal, many illegal, some alegal—are hardly new. But their recent mushrooming across the world has drawn a great deal of attention—partly because of their sheer scale and partly because, by crossing national borders and/or registering at addresses far from the site of their local operation, they insinuate themselves into the slipstream of the global econ- omy, thereby escaping control. Recall the ten or so whose crash sparked the Albanian revolution early in 1997, several of which took on almost miraculous dimensions for poor investors. One pyramid manager in Albania, according to the New York Times, was “a gypsy fortune teller, complete with crystal ball, who claimed to know the future.”27 Even in the tightly regulated stock markets of the United States there has been a rise in illegal operations that owe their logic, if not their precise operation, to pyramids: another New York Times report attributes this to the fact that investors are presently “predisposed to throw dollars at get- rich-quick schemes.” Six billion dollars were lost to scams on the New York Stock Exchange in 1996.28 These scams also bring to mind others that arise from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation, among them, the notorious Nigerian-based “419,” a truly transnational con that regularly traps foreign busi- nessmen into signing over major assets and may actually have fabricated a national election at home (Apter 1999); also the Foundation for New Era Philan- thropy, a U.S. pyramid created “to change the world for the glory of God.” On the basis of a promise to double their money in six months, its founder, John Benett, persuaded five hundred nonprofit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million.29 The line between Ponzi schemes and evangelical prosperity gospels is very thin indeed.30

    All of these things have a single common denominator: the allure of accruing wealth from nothing. In this respect, they are born of the same animating spirit as casino capitalism; indeed, perhaps they are casino capitalism for those who lack the fiscal or cultural capital—or who, for one or another reason, are reluctant— to gamble on more conventional markets. Like the cunning that made straw into gold (Schneider 1989), these alchemic techniques defy reason in promising unnaturally large profits—to yield wealth without production, value without effort. Here, again, is the specter, the distinctive spirit, of neoliberal capitalism in its triumphal hour. So much for the demise of disenchantment.

    Speaking of the neoliberal spirit, occult economies have close parallels in the spread of new religious movements across the planet. To wit, the latter may be seen as holy-owned subsidiaries of the former. These movements take on a wide variety of guises. In the case of the Vissariontsi, “disenchanted Soviet intellectu- als” who follow a traffic warden-turned-messiah, members renounce their earthly wealth for life in the City of Sun, a congregation in Siberia that recalls a commu- nist farm. The Second Coming here, led by a man with a sense of both history and irony—a City of Sun, in Siberia? A career in Russian traffic management for the Son of God?—envisages a future in the past, a hereafter (or therebefore?) that recaptures the glories of a socialist commune.31 But the renunciatory orien- tation of the Vissariontsi is not usual among new religious movements at the mil- lennium. Much closer to the global mood of the moment are fee-for-service, con- sumer-cult, prosperity-gospel denominations. These creeds are well exemplified by any number of neo-Pentecostal sects; best perhaps by the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus), a denomination of Brazilian origin which, true to its name, has opened up outposts in many parts of the world (Kramer 1999).

    The Universal Church reforms the Protestant ethic with enterprise and urban- ity, fulsomely embracing the material world. It owns a major television network in Brazil, has an elaborate web site, and, above all, promises swift payback to those who embrace Christ, denounce Satan, and “make their faith practical” by “sacrificing” all they can to the movement.32 Here Pentecostalism meets neolib- eral enterprise. In its African churches, most of them (literally) storefronts, prayer meetings respond to frankly mercenary desires, offering everything from cures for depression through financial advice to remedies for unemployment; casual passersby, clients really, select the services they require. Bold color adver- tisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorn altars; tabloids pasted to walls and windows carry testimonials by followers whose membership was rewarded by a rush of wealth and/or an astonishing recovery of health. The ability to deliver in the here and now, itself a potent form of space-time compression, is offered as the measure of a genuinely global God, just as it is taken to explain the power of satanism (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b); both have the instant efficacy of the magical and the millennial. As Kramer (1999: 35) says of Brazilian neo-Pentecostals, “Inner-worldly asceticism has been replaced with a concern for the pragmatics of material gain and the immediacy of desire. . . . The return on capital has suddenly become more spiritually compelling and imminent . . . than the return of Christ.” This shift is endemic to the new religious movements of the late twentieth century. For them, and for their many millions of members, the Second Coming evokes not a Jesus who saves, but one who pays dividends. Or, more accurately, one who promises a miraculous return on a limited spiritual investment.

    Why? How—to put the matter more generally—are we to account for the current spread of occult economies and prosperity cults?

    To the degree that millennial capitalism fuses the modern and the postmod- ern, hope and hopelessness, utility and futility, the world created in its image presents itself as a mass of contradictions: as a world, simultaneously, of possi- bility and impossibility. This is precisely the juxtaposition associated with cargo cults and chiliastic movements in other times and places (Worsley 1957; Cohn 1957). But, as the growth of prosperity gospels and fee-for-service movements illustrates, in a neoliberal age the chiliastic urge emphasizes a privatized millen- nium, a personalized rather than a communal sense of rebirth; in this, the mes- sianic meets the magical. At the end of the twentieth century, the cargo, glimpsed in large part through television, takes the form of huge concentrations of wealth that accrue, legitimately or otherwise, to the rich of the global economy—espe- cially the enigmatic new wealth derived from financial investment and manage- ment, from intellectual property and other rights, from cyberspace, from trans- port and its cognate operations, and from the supply of various post-Fordist services. All of which points to the fact that the mysterious mechanisms of a changing market, not to mention abstruse technological and informational expertise, hold the key to hitherto unimaginable fortunes amassed by the ever more rapid flow of value, across time and space, into the fluid coordinates of the local and the global; to the much mass-mediated mantra that the gap between the affluent and the indigent is growing at an exponential rate; and to the strange convolutions in the structural conditions of labor, discussed above, that seem at once to reduce and produce joblessness by altering conventional terms of employment, by feminizing the workforce, and by deterritorializing proletariats.

    This, of course, is the flip side of the coin: the sense of impossibility, even despair, that comes from being left out of the promise of prosperity, from having to look in on the global economy of desire from its immiserated exteriors. Whether it be in post-Soviet Central Europe or postcolonial Africa, in Thatcherite Britain or the neoliberal United States, in a China edging toward capitalism or neo-Pentecostal Latin America, the world-historical process that came to be symbolized by the events of 1989 held out the prospect that everyone would be set free to accumulate and speculate, to consume, and to indulge repressed crav- ings in a universe of less government, greater privatization, more opulence, infi- nite enterprise. For the vast majority, however, the millennial moment passed without visible enrichment.

    The implication? That, in these times—the late modernist age when, accord- ing to Weber and Marx, enchantment would wither away—more and more ordi- nary people see arcane forces intervening in the production of value, diverting its flow toward a new elect: those masters of the market who comprehend and control the production of wealth under contemporary conditions. They also attribute to these arcane forces their feelings of erasure and loss: an erasure in many places of community and family, exacerbated by the destabilization of labor, the translocal- ization of management, and the death of retail trade; a loss of human integrity, experienced in the spreading commodification of persons, bodies, cultures, and histories, in the substitution of quantity for quality, abstraction for substance.33 None of these perceptions is new, as we have said. Balzac (1965: 418, 117) described them for France in the 1840s, as did Conrad (1957) for prerevolutionary Russia; Gluckman (1959), moreover, spoke of the “magic of despair” that arose in similarly dislocated colonial situations in Africa. Nonetheless, to reiterate, such disruptions are widely experienced throughout the world as intensifying at a frightening rate at present. Which is why the ethical dimensions of occult economies are so prominent; why the mass panics of our times tend to be moral in tone; why these panics so often express themselves in religious movements that pursue instant material returns and yet condemn those who enrich themselves in nontraditional ways. To be sure, occult economies frequently have this bipolar character: At one level, they consist in the constant quest for new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends; at another, they vocalize a desire to sanction, even eradicate, people held to have accumulated assets by those very means.

    Occult economies, then, are a response to a world gone awry, yet again: a world in which the only way to create real wealth seems to lie in forms of power/knowledge that transgress the conventional, the rational, the moral—thus to multiply available techniques of producing value, fair or foul. In their cultural aspect, they bespeak a resolute effort to come to terms with that power/knowl- edge, to account for the inexplicable phenomena to which it gives rise, and to plumb its secrets. The unprecedented manifestation of zombies in the South African countryside, for instance, has grown in direct proportion to the shrinking labor market for young men. The former provides a partial explanation for the latter: the living dead are commonly said to be killed and raised up by older peo- ple, witches of wealth, to toil for them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b), thereby rendering rural youth jobless. There are, in this era of flexitime employment, even part-time zombies, a virtual working class—of pure, abstract labor power—that slaves away at night for its masters. In this context, furthermore, the angry dramas during which ritual murderers are identified often become sites of public divination. As they unfold, the accusers discuss, attribute cause, and give voice to their understanding of the forces that make the postcolony such an inhospitable place for them. This is an extreme situation, obviously. But in less stark circumstances, too, these economies tend to spawn simultaneous strivings to garner wealth and to put a stop to those who do so by allegedly misbegotten means.

    As all this suggests, appeals to the occult in pursuit of the secrets of capital generally rely on local cultural technologies: on vernacular modes of divination or oracular consultation, spirit possession or ancestral invocation, sorcery bust- ing or forensic legal procedures, witch beliefs or prayer. But the use of these technologies does not imply an iteration of, a retreat into, “tradition.” On the con- trary, their deployment in such circumstances is frequently a means of fashioning new techniques to preserve older values by retooling culturally familiar signs and practices. As in cargo cults of old, this typically involves the mimicking of pow- erful new means of producing wealth (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993: xv–xvi).

    In short, the rise of occult economies—amidst and alongside more conven- tional modes of economic practice that shade into the murky domains of crime and corruption—seems overdetermined. This, after all, is an age in which the extravagant promises of millennial capitalism run up against an increasingly nihilistic, thoroughly postmodern pessimism; in which the will to consume out- strips the opportunity to earn; in which, relatively speaking, there is a much higher velocity of exchange than there is of production. As the connections between means and ends become more opaque, more distended, more mysteri- ous, the occult becomes an ever more appropriate, semantically saturated metaphor for our times. Not only has it become commonplace to pepper media parlance, science-speak, psychobabble, and technologese with the language of enchantment; even the drear argot of the law is showing signs of the same thing.34 And we all remember voodoo economics, that Reagan-era insult to the rationality of Caribbean ritual practice. But, we insist, occult economies are not reducible to the symbolic, the figurative, or the allegorical. Magic is, everywhere, the science of the concrete, aimed at making sense of and acting upon the world—especially, but not only, among those who feel themselves disempow- ered, emasculated, disadvantaged. The fact that the turn to enchantment is not unprecedented, that it has precursors in earlier times, makes it no less significant to those for whom it has become an integral part of everyday reality. Maybe, too, all this describes a fleeting phase in the long, unfinished history of capitalism. But that makes it no less momentous.

    Of all the enchantments that accompanied the First Coming of Capitalism, perhaps the most perduring was nationalism. And the nation-state, a political community—conjured always out of difference, often against indifference— that gave the Durkheimean conscience collective a distinctive, effervescent twist. Recently, as everyone knows, there has been much talk of its death, especially with the end of the Age of Empire, the close of the Cold War, and the onset of the postcolonial era; it is as if the Treaty of Westphalia has finally given way to the Failure of the West. We shall consider this view, and the articulate dissent it has provoked, in a moment. What is beyond question, however, is that the Second Coming, the dawning Age of Millennial Capitalism, has had complex, controver- sial effects on the present and future of the nation-state.

    Alien-Nation, Hyphen-Nation, Desti-Nation: The Future of the Nation-State and the Fetishism of Law In its broad outlines, the scholarly debate over the current condition of the nation-state — the definite, singular article — has become something of a cliché. The thesis that the hyphenated modernist polity is being dramatically subverted, doomed even, has been rehearsed ad infinitum, with varying degrees of nuance; aspects of it have been foreshadowed in what we have already said.

    Nation-states, from this vantage, have been rendered irrelevant by world mar- ket forces (1) because capital has become uncontrollable and keeps moving, at its own velocity, to sites of optimum advantage; (2) because the global workforce has become ever more mobile as job seekers, increasingly managed by private agen- cies, migrate ever further in pursuit of even the most menial of jobs, under even the most feudal of conditions;35 and (3) because these human flows seem, in vary- ing proportions, to elude surveillance, despite the highly repressive mechanisms often put into place to monitor national frontiers. Under such conditions, it is said, state regulation of both capital and labor becomes obsolete, impossible; so, too, do fiscal designs that run counter to the mechanisms of global markets and/or the imperatives of global corporations. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996: 175–76), who argue the antithesis, put it, “[States] can no longer independently affect the levels of economic activity or employment within their territories. . . . [Their] job is to provide the infrastructure and public goods needed at the lowest possible cost.”

    In its historical framing, this thesis sees the leitmotif of the twentieth century as the “battle between government and the marketplace” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998), the latter winning out to the point that “public sectors are shrinking, deregulation is everyone’s priority, state companies are being auctioned off to private investors, and Wall Street is the most powerful influence on economies everywhere” (Garten 1998: 7). As Sassen (n.d.: 4–5) notes, this perspective casts the strength of the nation-state in a zero-sum opposition to the global economy —note, not to neoliberal capitalism, nor globalization tout court, but to the global economy. Where one gains, the other must lose. Thus, says Robert Ross (1990: 206–7, 218), until recently the regulatory role of national governments expanded progressively. Now, however, corporations are able to prevail on states “to restrain regulations, cut taxes, and allocate more public funds toward subsidizing production costs,” which puts “global capital in a position to demand changes in state policy” (211, emphasis ours). Taken together, this adds up to the prognosis that, “in the long run, the power of the state, of centralized government, will weaken everywhere, an inevitability which will change profoundly the very tex- ture of history” (Lukacs 1993: 157).

    In all this, as will be clear, it is the workings of transnational corporations, and especially the mobility of their productive operations, that are held account- able for the imminent demise of the nation-state. Others have also laid causal stress on the fiscal mechanics of the world economy, in particular on their tech- nological transformations. Joel Kurtzman (1993), for example, holds that the growth of a global electronic economy—based on an “electronic commons” in which virtual money and commodities may be exchanged instantly via an unreg- ulated world network of computers—has shattered the integrity of sovereign polities (85–86, 214–15): it has eroded their monopolistic control over the money supply, their capacity to contain wealth within borders, and even their ability to tax citizens or corporations. From this perspective, the emergence of a global economy is said to be undermining the nation-state by deconstructing currency, credit, and customs boundaries—which formerly gave governments a major means of control over the wealth of their nations—by creating mobile markets across the planet, thus dispersing the production and circulation of value. Which is why, it is so commonly said, many states are finding it impossible to meet the material demands placed upon them by their citizenry or to carry out effective economic development policies; why few can adequately house, feed, school, and ensure the health of their populations; why even fewer can see their way clear to settling their national debt or reducing their deficits; why only a handful can be confident about the replacement of infrastructure over the medium term; why almost none have the capacity to control their money supply, let alone flows of goods and people; and why a growing number have shown a startling inability to regulate violence.

    The thesis has also been argued in terms other than the simply economic, of course. The eroding boundedness of the nation-state, its loss of sovereignty as a commonwealth of signs, has been variously attributed, not least on the pages of this journal, to the impact of planetary cultural flows and electronic media (see e.g., Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1989: 69–70; Moore 1989; Foster 1991); to the assertive spread of transnational communities, social movements, and identities; to the universalization of many aspects of the law (if not of justice; Silbey 1997: 209), the expansion of tribunals that subject national jurisdictions to supranational ones (Darian-Smith 1995, 1999), and the rise of an intercontinental commercial arbitra- tion establishment (Garth and Dezalay 1996); to “worldkill,” the commodification of violence that makes it possible for corporations, political blocs, shadow states, or nations to rent soldiers on the Internet, to arrange for the application of force in breach of sovereign borders, even to buy a coup from a multinational company (John L. Comaroff 1996);36 to the shift in dominant patterns of warfare from confrontations between countries to civil conflicts that tend to trans-localize themselves, to kill higher proportions of civilians than ever before, and to feed an arms industry that has metamorphosed from a highly regulated import-export business to a global trade in illicit gun-running;37 to the assimilation of many of the traditional functions of government either into the private sector or into supranational combinations.

    As Peregrine Worsthorne recently noted, in an essay tellingly entitled “Farewell to England’s Nation State,” the “only area where [the country] remains independent and sovereign is sport.” On which Patriotic Front, he adds laconi- cally, “miserable results say all that needs to be said.” Even here, labor has become a mobile commodity as citizens of convenience take the field in acquired (“naturalized”) colors; although it is true that this is perhaps the most significant, sentiment-inspiring, trauma-inducing site of national effervescence in many parts of the world.38 In every other domain, Worsthorne continues, English institu- tions, all of them dysfunctional, have been replaced by more effective interna- tional or global ones. “But who cares?” he asks. “It is time to change our think- ing.”39 This from a notable public intellectual, in Britain’s most widely read conservative newspaper, about England, self-appointed cradle of modernity, democracy, and the state—not some struggling postcolony still trying to throw off the effects of the Age of Empire.

    Some do care—and are not prepared to give up so easily on the salience of the nation-state. It is not yet time, says Khachig Tölölyan (1991: 5), “to write [its] . . . obituary.” Turner (n.d.: 25), for one, argues that the “development of the global capitalist system” has “not led to any withering away of the state” at all. Quite the opposite, the relevance of “[nation-]state boundaries” has been height- ened; contemporary states, especially successful ones, still “attempt to regulate, encourage or obstruct flows of workers, capital and commodities across their bor- ders” (25). In stark contrast to the likes of Kurtzman, Turner also speaks of the perceived “need for national economies to remain competitive under global con- ditions” (23–24); a far cry, this, from the notion that there no longer is any such thing. Similarly Hirst and Thompson (1996: 17): “The globalization of produc- tion,” they hold, “has been exaggerated.” Companies, of which few are truly to remain so” (2). Also overstated are claims for “the dominance of world mar- kets and their ungovernability” (6); in point of fact, financial flows and trade are concentrated in the “triad” of North America, Europe, and Japan (2). Here, in a nutshell, is the countercase.

    This antithetical position has a nontrivial political dimension for its advocates, especially those on the left. To the degree that globalization dissolves the sover- eign nation-state into a sea of planetary economic forces and legal jurisdictions, it would appear to negate any real prospect of progressive or proletarian politics— be they international or intranational—as they would have no terrain on which to occur, no concrete object in terms of which to frame itself, no obvious target against which to act (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996: 1; Ahmad 1992: 317).40 We share the concern. As it is, there is a strong argument to be made that neoliberal capitalism, in its millennial moment, portends the death of politics by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, in the inexorable, expanding “needs” of business, in the imperatives of science and technology. Or, if it does not conduce to the death of politics, it tends to reduce them to the pursuit of pure interest, individual or collective—or to struggles over issues (the environment, abortion, health care, child welfare, human rights) that, important though they may be, are often, pace Jameson (1999: 47), dissociated from anything beyond themselves. It is here that the analytic case for the sustained salience of the modernist polity merges into the normative case for its desirability.

    A parenthetic comment here. There are those who would muddy the argument by pointing out that the notion of a strong nation-state has always been some- thing of a fantasy. This on three grounds: the state, the nation, and the hyphen. Recall, in respect of the first, Philip Abrams (1988: 75–77), for whom the state was always “the distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies”: an “essentially imaginative construction,” it was, at once, a “triumph of conceal- ment” and an ongoing “ideological project.” Even more extreme is Ralph Miliband’s (1969: 49) famous claim that “the ‘state’ . . . does not, as such, exist.” Shades here of things written long ago. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer (1985: 7) remind us that Marx (1967) believed the state to be “in an important sense an illusion . . . : [it] is at most a message of domination—an ideological artifact attributing unity, structure and independence to the disunited, structureless and dependent workings of the practice of government.” For Weber (1946: 78), too, it was “a claim to legitimacy, a means by which politically organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed, and it is constituted in large part by the activities of institutions of government themselves” (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985: 7). A truly curious force of history, this: at once an illusion, a potent claim to authority, a cultural artifact, a present absence and an absent presence, a prin- ciple of unity masking institutional disarticulation. But nothing like the kind of essentialized “thing” that much of the current debate treats either as alive or dead. Likewise the nation: the enormous literature on the topic—both before and after Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983)—makes it abundantly clear that neither at its dawn nor in its high modernist phase was this polity homogeneous, that even its European exemplars were as different as they were alike. What is more, their capacity to regulate boundaries and to control flows—of capital and cultural property, communications and currencies, persons and information— was invariably incomplete in the face of transnational pressures and incentives. So, too, was their hold over the loyalty of their citizens and subjects. Indeed, the nation-state has always and everywhere been a work in progress, nowhere a fully realized accomplishment. The same may be said, by extension, of its hyphen- nation: of the articulation of state to nation. Polities across the planet vary hugely in both the extent to which, and the manner in which, nation and state are con- joined in them, of which more shortly.

    In part, it is just such complexities that have led to reformulations of the argu- ment from both sides—and to the opening up of a middle ground. Even those who have made the case most forcibly for the continuing relevance of the nation- state do not deny that it is undergoing transformation or that it has been weak- ened in some respects in the face of global capitalism (see, e.g., Hirst and Thomp- son 1996: 170–71). The problem, of course, is to specify how it has changed. For some, its metamorphosis is captured in an aphoristic shift, an apt metaphor for the millennial moment: Philip McMichael (1998: 113), for one, speaks of the sub- stitution of the “citizen state” for the “consumer state.” This is a polity, adds Susan Hegeman (1991: 72–73), in which identity, at all levels, is defined not merely by the consumption of objects, but also by the consumption of the past (89–91). Echoes, here, of Jean Baudrillard (1998); also of the language of national charters, in which the protection of consumers takes precedence over the protection of workers and citizens are redefined as “stakeholders.”

    More substantively, synthetic positions typically begin by deconstructing the zero-sum opposition between globalization and the autonomous functioning of nation-states. Few would continue to deny that the sovereign independence of the latter has contracted, not least in the realms of economic management, defense, and communications; that, for all their efforts to regulate the flow of labor, their hold over the mobility of people, inward or outward, has been more or less undermined; that their parliamentary politics are devoted, in increasing proportion, to safeguarding the operations of the market, to providing stable and secure environments for transnational corporations, and to attracting overseas invest- ment. In this respect, add Hirst and Thompson (1996: 179), it is also true that, without international warfare and conventional enemies, the state does become less immediately significant to its citizens; “national efficiency” (in such things as industrial growth, education, health care, welfare, and the provision of infra- structure) does diminish; and solidarity, save for sporting allegiances, does pale. At the same time and in counterpoint, Sassen (n.d.: 6–9) observes, “most global processes materialize in national territories, [largely] through national institu- tional arrangements, from legislative acts to firms.” These may be transformed in the process, but they remain perceptibly national in their location and operation. To be sure, Sassen continues, states often participate actively in setting up those fiscal and legal frameworks through which the global economy works, and with- out whose specialized instruments it could not exist—they are not just inert objects on which that economy impacts. Nor are they inert objects in the face of the emergence of regional economic spheres that breach their frontiers— whether these be officially constituted, like the Oresund Region in Scandinavia (Peebles n.d.), or spaces of unregulated activity dominated by armed factions, like the Chad Basin in West Africa. With regard to the latter, in fact, Janet Roiman (1998) demonstrates that, far from proclaiming the demise of the nation- state, these transnational networks exist in complicated, mutually perpetuating, often complicitous relations with it; this notwithstanding the fact that those who control the networks—often very powerful armed factions—compete with gov- ernment for financial and regulatory ascendancy. In doing so, they depend on the very national frontiers they transgress and the institutions of the state in order to produce wealth; conversely, the state establishes its own legitimacy, and justifies its own existence, by doing battle with these armed factions.

    It is also the case, as we have intimated, that not all nation-states submit to the demands of the global economy without some mediation or intervention; few administrations would survive if they did. Take postcolonial South Africa again: while the African National Congress (ANC) government is unreservedly commit- ted to participating in the global capitalist economy, its new labor laws seek to protect workers in ways that do not simply serve the interests of transnational business; quite the opposite, employers have protested these laws for that very reason. Whether or not they will survive, and what their effects will be over the long run, is still very much in question. But the general point of which this is an exemplary instance—that nation-states do seek to hold a measure of control over the terms on which their citizens engage with the market—will be clear. So too will the fact that the processes by which millennial capitalism is taking shape do not reduce to a simple narrative according to which the nation-state either lives or dies, ebbs or flourishes. Its impact is much more complicated, more polyphonous and dispersed, and most immediately felt in the everyday contexts of work and labor, of domesticity and consumption, of street life and media-gazing.

    This brings us back full circle to the relationship between the nation-state and millennial capitalism—which, we reiterate, is not synonymous with globalism, although globalization is an inherent part of it. Rounding off the dialectics of the argument we have just outlined, we would like to make a few points about this relationship. All flow from things already said.

    Let us begin with the most basic. There is an antinomy at the heart of the con- temporary history of the modernist polity. On one hand, there is no such thing, save at very high levels of abstraction, as “the nation-state.” Self-evidently, the sociology of the polities that exist under its sign varies dramatically. It is difficult to establish any terms in which, say, Germany and Guinea, Bhutan and Belgium, Uganda and the United States, England and Eritrea may be held to belong to any- thing but the most polythetic of categories. Nor are the substantive differences among them—differences that are growing as a result of their engagement with global capitalism—satisfactorily captured by resort to vapid oppositions, to con- ventional contrasts like rich versus poor, North versus South, successful versus unsuccessful countries. In some places, as we all know, the state can hardly be said to perdure at all, or to perdure purely as a private resource, a family busi- ness, a convenient fiction; in others, the nation, as imagined community, is little more than a rhetorical figure of speech, the color of a soccer stripe, an airline without aircraft, a university rarely open. More complicatedly, there are many postcolonial, postrevolutionary polities, not least but not only in Africa and the former Soviet Union, in which there have developed deep fissures between state and government, this being a corollary of the transition from old to new regimes, in which, as often as not, the power brokers, bureaucrats, and administrative per- sonnel of the past are either left in situ—typically to ensure the confidence of foreign investors—or succeed in finding less visible ways to keep their hands on the levers of authority. Almost invariably, this sets in motion a struggle into which neoliberal capitalist enterprise inserts itself, often with decisive effects. On occasion, too, as in Russia (Ries 1999), organized crime seizes on that struggle to fashion itself into a spectral, underground para-state, providing civic amenities and policing on a fee-for-service basis (cf. Derrida 1994: 83). This, in turn, leads to the popular impression that government has retreated, that order has evapo- rated, that the nation-state is no longer.

    On the other hand, despite this variability in their political sociology, nation- states appear, at least in their exterior forms, to be more similar than ever before, converging on the same notions of the rule of law, enacting similar constitutions, speaking more and more English, borrowing from a single stock of signs and symbols, worshipping together at the altar of Adam Smith, and, yes, all alike dealing with the impact of the global economy—as well as the sense of crisis, real or imagined, to which its implosion has given rise. Even the strongest, for reasons we have spelled out, find themselves hard put to sustain past levels of public expenditure and/or the costs of infrastructural reproduction. Many of them, moreover, have been witness both to calls for “less government” and to a widening rupture in their hyphen-nation; in the disarticulation, that is, between nation and state. Indeed, the assertion of civil society against the state, itself a burgeoning global phenomenon, is just one symptom of that disarticulation. Of, so to speak, alien-nation. Again, none of this is unprecedented. Throughout their history, states have suffered legitimation crises, been held to account for exces- sive public spending, and had to deal with threats to the integrity of the political community. That, however, does not diminish their significance in the white heat of the millennial moment.

    The millennial moment.

    As the term suggests, it is out of the current sense of change and crisis, especially in its impact on the hyphen-nation of the modernist polity, that the millennial dimensions of millennial capitalism reenter our narrative in two ways.

    First, it is striking that almost everywhere that occult economies have arisen, the perceived need to resort to magical means of producing wealth is blamed, in one way or another, on the inability of the state to assure its national citizens a regular income: to protect them from destitution as productive employment migrates away across its borders; to stop the inflow of immigrants and others who divert the commonweal away from autochthons; to incarcerate criminals, witches, and other nefarious characters who spoil the world for upright, hard- working people. The state is also held culpable for failing to safeguard those upright people from violence. To wit, when communal action is taken—in the name of informal justice, cultural policing, or whatever—against those who ply the immoral economy, it is often in the millennial hope of restoring coherence and control in a world run amok, of filling the void left by the withdrawal of the state and making good on its sundered obligation to the nation (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999d).

    Second, in the face of the same rupture, there is a strong tendency for states to appeal to new or intensified magicalities and fetishes in order to heal fissures and breaches in the fabric of the polity. Here, again, an interpolation: recall our com- ments on the question of identity. For reasons alluded to earlier (and explored in extenso elsewhere; John L. Comaroff 1996) one of the most notable corollaries of the changing face of nationhood in the neoliberal age, and especially after 1989, has been an explosion of identity politics. Under these conditions, imagining the nation rarely presumes a “deep horizontal fraternity” any longer, not even in what once regarded themselves as the most undifferentiated of polities. While the vast major- ity continue to live as citizens in nation-states, they tend to be only conditionally, partially, and situationally citizens of nation-states. Ethnic struggles, ranging from polite altercations over resources to genocidal combat, seem immanent almost everywhere as membership is claimed on the double front of innate substance and primordial sentiment, as culture becomes intellectual property (Coombe 1998), as indigenous knowledge becomes an object of commerce, as aboriginal spirituality becomes the site of a consumerist quest (Povinelli, in this issue), as self-imagin- ings, visual representations, even genes become copyright incarnate.41 In the event, homogeneity—as “national fantasy” (Berlant 1991), national aspiration (Anderson 1983), national imperative—is giving way rapidly to a recognition of the irre- ducibility of difference. All of which puts even greater stress on hyphen-nation; all of which presses even more the necessity of finding its millennial key. The more diverse nation-states become in their political sociology, the higher the level of abstraction at which “the nation-state” exists, the greater the imperative to find that key. By their very nature, as David Harvey (1989: 108) notes, modernist states had always “to construct a . . . sense of community . . . based on [more than] money,” and, hence, to conjure up “a definition of public interests over and above the [bour- geois] class and sectarian interests” they served. They still have to fabricate that sense of community. But, with the displacement of class, the interests that they have now to encompass lie in cultural and other forms of identity.

    That states rely on magical means to succeed in the work of hyphen-nation, of articulating nationhood, is a point recently made by Michael Taussig (1997) and Fernando Coronil (1997), each in his own way. A resort to mass-mediated ritual both to produce state power and national unity and to persuade citizens of their reality is epidemic in the age of millennial capitalism—in rough proportion, per- haps, to populist perceptions of crisis, to the inability of governments to sustain their monopoly over the means of violence and the flow of wealth, and to the alien-nation of their subjects. Thus, suggests Eric Worby (1998: 560), in those parts of Africa where the hold of ruling cadres is tenuous at best, executive authority has become dependent on the performance of quotidian ceremonial, extravagant in its dramaturgy and improvisational content alike, to ensure the collusion of citizen-subjects. The latter, he goes on (562; after Mbembe 1992a: 3–4), live with the state in a promiscuous hybrid of accommodation and refusal, power and parody, embodiment and detachment. This, in turn, tends to rob “the public” of its vitality and, reciprocally, vulgarizes the political—with it, nation- hood as well—reducing it to a chimera, which creates the need for yet more magic.

    Here, it seems, lies the key to the magicality of the state in the age of millen- nial capitalism. It is not just that ruling regimes resort to theatrical display or to illusion to conjure up the present and future of the political community, its desti- nation; this has always been true, from Elizabethan royal progresses (cf. Geertz 1977) to the trumped-up rites of colonial regimes (cf. Fields 1985). It is, rather, that they become caught up in cycles of ritual excess in which ceremonial enact- ments of hyphen-nation, alike in electronic space and real time, stand as alibis for realpolitik—which recedes ever further as its surfaces are visible primarily through the glassy essence of television, the tidal swirl of radio waves, the fine print of the press. By constantly narrating hyphen-nation, moreover, these cere- monial enactments tend to draw attention to its fragility, to the ineluctable differ- ences on which the body politic is built, to the divergence of interests that it must embrace. State ritual itself, then, becomes something of a pyramid scheme: the more it is indulged, the more it is required. Hence its cyclicity, its excess, its mil- lennial qualities.

    But it is not only in the register of ritual that nation-states engage with the millennial. Another crucial dimension is the fetishism of the law, of the capacity of constitutionalism and contract, rights and legal remedies, to accomplish order, civility, justice, empowerment. Like all fetishes, the chimerical quality of this one lies in an enchanted displacement, in the notion that legal instruments have the capacity to orchestrate social harmony. This misses a point once cogently made, in prose fiction, by Carlos Fuentes (1992), namely that power produces rights, not rights power; that law in practice, by extension, is a social product, not a prime mover in constructing social worlds. Still, like many fetishes—including the “free” market itself—this one continues to survive its repeated demystification. The modernist nation-state has, from the first, been grounded in a culture of legality. Its spirit, with a nod to Montesquieu, has always been the spirit of the law. Globalization and the growth of neoliberal capitalism intensify this by an order of magnitude. The latter, because of its contractarian conception of human relations, property relations, and exchange relations, its commodification of almost everything, and its celebration of deregulated private exchange, all of which are heavily invested in a culture of legality.42 The former, because of the way in which it demands new institutional modes of regulation and arbitration to deal with new forms of property, practice, and possession—as well as with the abrogation of old jurisdictional lines and limits (cf. Jacobson 1996; Salacuse 1991; Shapiro 1993). But the fetishism of the law goes way beyond this.
    In situations of ruptured hyphen-nation, situations in which the world is con- structed out of apparently irreducible difference, the language of the law affords an ostensibly neutral medium for people of difference—different cultural worlds, different social endowments, different material circumstances, differ- ently constructed identities—to make claims on each other and the polity, to enter into contractual relations, to transact unlike values, and to deal with their conflicts. In so doing, it forges the impression of consonance amidst contrast, of the existence of universal standards that, like money, facilitate the negotiation of incommensurables across otherwise intransitive boundaries.43 Hence its capacity, especially under conditions of moral and cultural disarticulation, to make one thing out of many, illocutionary force out of illusion, concrete realities out of often fragile fictions. Hence, too, its hegemony, despite the fact that it is hardly a guarantor of equity. As an instrument of governance, it allows the state to repre- sent itself as the custodian of civility against disorder: as having a mandate to conjure moral community by exercising the monopoly of which Harvey (1989: 108) spoke—a monopoly over the construction of a commonweal out of inimi- cal, immanently fractious diversities of interest. This, in large part, is reflected in the rash of new constitutions written since the late 1980s. If law underpins the langue of neoliberalism, constitutionalism has become the parole of universal human rights, a global argot that individuates the citizen and, by making cultural identity a private asset rather than a collective claim, transmutes difference into likeness. It is an open question whether or not these constitutions yield any empowerment at all. (Interestingly, the celebrated South African one has recently been dubbed a Tower of Babel: it is utterly incomprehensible in the vernaculars of those whom it was supposed to enfranchise.44) After all, as we have said, not one of them actually speaks of an entitlement to the means of survival. They do not guarantee the right to earn or to produce, only to possess, to signify, to consume, to choose. This is consistent not only with the neoliberal mood of the millennium but also with another of its panaceas: the renaissance of procedural democracy, a “universal human right” that transposes freedom into choice by offering empowerment through the ballot—the black box that reduces politics to the rough equivalent of a quinquennial shopping spree (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997)—all in the name of the rule of law, of its magical capacity to promise new beginnings.

    But cultures of legality, constitutionality, right, and democracy speak primar- ily to the question of hyphen-nation, to moral community and citizenship, from the discursive vantage of the state and its functionaries. From the other side of the hyphen, from the side of “society against the state,” there has emerged another, complementary discourse of populist, millennial optimism: civil society.

    Postnative, Posthuman, Postscript: Civil Society in Pursuit of the Millennium

    More than any other sign, perhaps, civil society has surfaced as the Big Idea of the Millennial Moment;45 indeed, as an all-purpose panacea for the postmodern, postpolitical, postnative, even “posthuman” condition.46 Its recent genealogy, before and after 1989, is too well known to detain us here (see, e.g., Walzer 1992; Cohen and Arato 1994; Krygier 1997), save to say that the more of a global obsession it has become, the less clear it is what the term might actually mean— as a concrete object(ive), as an abstract concept, or as a political practice. Civil society, it seems, is known primarily by its absence, its elusiveness, its incom- pleteness, from the traces left by struggles conducted in its name. More aspira- tion than achievement, it retreats before the scrutinizing gaze. For all those, like Václav Havel (n.d.), who seek a way Toward a Civil Society, there are others who deny the point of so doing. Why? Some, like Michael Hardt (1995: 27), argue that we are already in the “postcivil society” era, an era incapable of producing the conditions of its possibility. Others simply dismiss it as an inherently polymor- phous, inchoate, unspecifiable signifier. Worse yet, it is said to conflate an ana- lytic construct with an ideological trope, thus rendering the former promiscuous and the latter vacuous (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a).

    In spite of this, civil society has served as a remarkably potent battle cry across the world. During inhospitable times, it reanimates the optimistic spirit of modernity, providing scholars, public figures, poets, and ordinary people alike a language with which to talk about democracy, moral community, justice, and populist politics; with which, furthermore, to breathe life back into “soci- ety,” declared dead almost twenty years ago by the powerful magi of the Sec- ond Coming, especially Maggie Thatcher. Amidst fin de siècle cynicism and retrospection, protagonists of civil society look bravely toward a new world. True, their idyll has been disparaged for its excessive Eurocentrism, for its naive liberalism, for re-presenting old-style imperialism in a seductive new garb, and for the manner of its export by such latter-day evangelists as non- governmental organizations. True, too, it has been downsized, localized, tailored to the neoliberal age; purged, in short, of global historical visions and grand emancipatory dreams (cf. Cohen and Arato 1994: xii). But, notwithstanding the skepticism, the Idea—the fetish—has worked its magic, kindling a reformist spirit all over the place as it promises rescue from the political vacuum of postmodern nihilism.

    What is it, then, about civil society that so fires the moral imagination? What makes it such a trenchant trope for these millennial times? An answer is to be found in the parallels between the history of the here and now and the history of the First Coming of the Idea in the late eighteenth century; the post-Enlightenment age in Europe, that is, that spawned the hyphenated nation-state, the concepts of political economy, culture, the civil, civility, civilization—and the distinction between “the state” and something that came to know itself as “society” (cf. Keane 1988a: 15).

    It is common cause that the world-historical conditions of the late eighteenth century embraced philosophers and everypersons alike in a phenomenology of uncertainty (Becker 1994: xii–xiv); a sense of unease occasioned by the intersec- tion of epochs, at which time the generic nature of humanity, of sociality, of self- hood and its abstraction in labor, property, and rights, of the value of things, of received means and ends was under ontological reconstruction. Though they could not have known it, they were living at the front end of an Age of Revolu- tion (Hobsbawm 1962), an age that posed profound issues of practical epistemol- ogy. Those issues were formulated, in the first instance, in political terms: they grew out of a malaise of governance, of populist opposition to absolutist rule and monarchial despotism (see, e.g., Woods 1992: 79; Keane 1988b: 65).

    But behind the surfaces of the political were working much more fundamen- tal processes of reconstruction: those attendant upon the advance of capitalism and commodity relations; upon the birth of the right-bearing citizen-subject; upon the empowerment of the bourgeoisie and the emergence of a public “with its own opinion[s]” and “interests” (Taylor 1990: 108; cf. Habermas 1989); upon the dawn of modernist nationhood; upon the rise of what Crawford Macpherson (1962) was famously to dub “possessive individualism.” In light of these processes, the problem of “the social” presented itself with particular force. How, given the erosion of old ways of being and knowing—not to mention the expand- ing scale and cumulative abstraction of human relations—was the present and future of “society” to be grasped? Wherein lay its moral, material, and regulatory moorings? It became imperative, says Tester (1992: 7), to “explain how society was [even] possible” in a world in which “time-honoured answers were collaps- ing through mixtures of political crisis, intellectual enlightenment, technological development and the . . . rapid urbanization of social life”; in which new, national divisions of labor were taking root amidst the encroachment on everything of finance; in which the sanctity of the family was seen to be at risk; in which peo- ple, things, and nature (cf. Coronil, in this issue) were being objectified in an altogether unprecedented manner. In which the prospect of Adam Smith’s face- less “society of strangers” stalked disturbingly close to hand—novel specters of a haunted gothic fiction dramatized the strangeness of what had become real (Clery 1995: 174).

    It is not hard to see why, at the time, discourses of civil society, in both their analytic and utopic registers, should have focused on the issues that they did: on the relationship between state (or, more generally, political authority) and soci- ety; on the posited existence, in the space between the citizen and the sovereign polity, of an interpolated public with its own will; on the role of voluntary asso- ciations in providing alternative loci for the achievement of the commonweal; on a democratizing image of self-generating moral community, whose elemental atom was the Christian family; on the significance of the free market in under- writing the prosperity of that community; on the capacity of commerce to inscribe civility in a new civics. Foreshadowing here of Hegel, Simmel, Durkheim and Habermas.

    The parallels with the present are more than obvious; indeed, they knit together all the various strands of our portrait of the Age of Millennial Capital- ism. Now, as then, the call for civil society typically presents itself as an emanci- patory reaction to a familiar doubling: on one hand, to the greater opacity, intrusive- ness, and monopolistic tendencies of government; on the other, to its diminishing capacity “to satisfy even minimally the political and economic aspirations” of its component publics (Haynes 1997: 16), to guarantee the commonweal, or to meet the needs of its citizenry. Thus, for example, in Central Europe the pursuit of the Idea, which took on millennial features from the first, is said to have arisen in response to increasingly repressive communist rule—and in postcolonial times, to have been sustained by the memory of Soviet excesses (see, e.g., Rupnik 1988; Krygier 1997). In the West, a cause for it has been found in burgeoning corpo- ratism of the state (Taylor 1990: 95–96) and a disenchantment with politics tout court. And in Africa it is ascribed to the rise of antistatist, promarket populism occasioned by the collapse of totalitarian regimes (Young 1994: 36), whose “pol- itics of the belly” (Bayart 1993) and vulgar spectacles of power (Mbembe 1992b) persuaded citizens that governments no longer “champion society’s collective interests” (Haynes 1997: 2).

    But this, too, speaks purely to surfaces. Now, as then, the roots of the process lie deeper: in the interiors, and the animating forces, of the Age of Millennial Capitalism—in particular, in its impulse to displace political sovereignty with the sovereignty of “the market,” as if the latter had a mind and a morality of its own; to reorder the ontology of production and consumption; to reconstruct the essence of labor, identity, and subjectivity; to disarticulate the nation from the state; to reduce difference to sameness by recourse to the language of legality; to elevate to first causes “value-free” technological necessity and the ostensibly neutral demands of economy; to treat government as immanently undesirable, except insofar as it deregulates or protects “market forces”; to fetishize “the law” as a universal standard in terms of which incommensurable sorts of value—of relationship, rights, and claims — may be mediated; to encourage the rapid move- ment of persons and goods, and sites of fabrication, thus calling into question existing forms of community; to equate freedom with choice, especially to con- sume, to fashion the self, to conjure with identities; to give free reign to the “forces” of hyperrationalization; to parse human beings into free-floating labor units, commodities, clients, stakeholders, strangers, their subjectivity distilled into ever more objectified ensembles of interests, entitlements, appetites, desires, purchasing “power.” And so to raise the most fundamental question of all: In what consists the social? Society? Moral community?

    Here, then, is our point. As in the late eighteenth century, and in strikingly similar fashion, the Idea of Civil Society makes its appearance just as the fabric of the social, the possibility of society, the ontological core of humanity, the nature of social distinction, and the essence of identity are being dramatically challenged; just as we experience an epochal metamorphosis in the organization of production, labor, and the market, in technology and its sociocultural implica- tions, in the constitutive connections between economy and polity, nation and state, culture and place, person, family, and community; just as we find it impos- sible to sustain the dominant terms of modernist sociology-as-lived, of received anthropologies of knowledge, of our geographical grasp of an increasingly four- dimensional world (Harvey, in this issue). Amidst populist moral panics, mass- mediated alienation, crises of representation, and scholarly perplexity, Civil Society, in its Second Coming, once more becomes especially “good to think,” to signify with, to act upon. The less substance it has, the emptier its referents, the more this is so; which is why its very polyvalence, its ineluctable unfixability, is intrinsic to its power as panacea. It is the ultimate magic bullet in the Age of Mil- lennial Capitalism. For it promises to conjure up the most fundamental thing of all: a meaningful social existence. And, thereby, to lay to rest—for now at least — Adam Smith’s ghostly phantasm: the Society of Strangers.

    ✦✦✦

    We have argued that many of the enigmatic features of economy and society circa 2000—be they the allegorical transfiguration of the nation-state, the assertive stridency of racinated adolescence, the crisis of masculinity, the apoth- eosis of consumption, the fetishism of civil society, the enchantments of everyday life—are concrete, historically specific outworkings of millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism. For all their apparent polysemy and disarticulation, these things are closely interrelated, all at once rooted in the past and new in the present. Together, they point to the fact that we inhabit an age that is both revo- lutionary and yet is also an ongoing chapter in the story of capital, a story that, in Theodor Adorno’s (1981: 96) phrase, “sound[s] so old, and yet [is] so new.” Despite the proclamations of neoliberal prophets, history has not come to an end. Nor will it soon. As Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (1999) puts it, “Millenarianism will survive the millennium.” Today’s apocalypse will become tomorrow’s mun- dane reality, laying down the terms of a dialectic out of which human beings will struggle to make sense of the world, to make livelihoods, politics, communities.

    Already there are signs of altered configurations, of fresh efforts to challenge the triumphal reign of the market, to turn aside the sweeping consequences of transnational economic pressures. In the wake of fragmenting national identities, Turner (n.d.) observes, newly assertive social movements have begun to pursue common cause on a world scale, forging an alternative, critical “global civil soci- ety.” It is too early, patently, to take the measure of their success. But their “pas- sionate intensity,” to invoke the spirit of Yeats one last time, might yet kindle the mature politics of a new age; “the worst” might yet become the best. There are also signs that organized labor is seeking expansive ways and means to deal with the emergent economic order. Thus a leading unionist: “The end of the century is the starting point of . . . an international labor fightback. . . . Global unionism is born.”47

    We can only hope. History, of course, will determine the substance of the poli- tics of the twenty-first century. For our part, we find it unimaginable that innovative forms of emancipatory practice will not emerge to address the excesses of neolib- eral capitalism. But that is in the future. For now, in introducing this special issue of Public Culture—a rich array of analyses of, among other things, economy and society, the production of knowledge, the fashioning of public spheres and popular discourses, the nature of nature, citizenship, subjectivity, and identity—we seek to stress the epistemic importance of critical distance. Of a refusal, that is, to be seduced into treating the ideological tropes and surface forms of the culture of neoliberalism—its self-representations and subjective practices, identities and utilities—as analytic constructs. Life, under millennial capitalism, is neither a game nor a repertoire of rational choices. It is irreducible to the utilitarian prag- matics of law and economy or to methodological individualisms of one kind or another. Indeed, these and other theoretical discourses are part of the problem. Critical disbelief, in pursuit of a reinvigorated praxis, is the beginning of a solution.

  • Reflections on Liberalism, Policulturalism, and ID-ology

    Reflections on Liberalism, Policulturalism, and ID-ology

    How do the nation-states of the twenty-first century – nation-states increasingly forced to come to terms with the ethnic heterogeneity of their citizens – deal with the problem of cultural difference? How, in particular, does the Constitution of post-apartheid South Africa – widely believed to be the most enlightened in the contemporary world, the most tolerant of diversity – strike a balance between the “One Law” of “The Nation” and the plurality of customary beliefs sustained, as a matter of right, by the various peoples who make up this postcolony? What happens when the Constitution and Custom appear to contradict one another – and raise questions of basic human rights, even of life-and- death? How are such contradictions managed, resolved, dissolved, disclaimed? Who has the authority to police the cultural lives of a citizenry when the majority recognize legal orders other than that of the nation-state itself? These questions are addressed in a critical, broadly situated analysis of the confrontation between the Constitution of South Africa and the Kingdom of Custom of one of its indigenous peoples, drawing on a complicated case, involving death rituals, argued before a high court judge in the lexicon of modern jurisprudence. It demonstrates how a “living constitution,” tolerant of everyday ambiguity and quotidian contradiction, is being forged in the space of strategic engagement opened up by the alternative languages and cultures of legality that exist in this postcolony. And in others like it.

  • Transparent Fictions, or the Conspiracies of a Liberal Imagination

    Transparent Fictions, or the Conspiracies of a Liberal Imagination

    “Only connect.”
    E.M. Forster, Howard’s End

    Ours, it appears, is an Age of Obsessions.

    It is an age in which people almost everywhere seem preoccupied, simultaneously, with transparency and conspiracy. With the lightness and darkness of being. So much is this so that, in 2001, a year that has long signified the cinematic surreal, an outbreak of livestock disease in the United Kingdom is attributed by ordinarily rational people to everything from the secret machinations of the prime minister1 to the covert operations of animal rights activists, from the illicit import of cheap meats by the Ministry of Defense to Iraqi biological warfare.2 No wonder the country is alleged to be “on the verge of a nervous breakdown…[which] has no root in real facts and figures, only in a diseased imagination.”3 At the same time, in the United States, after a presidential election that gave the nation much to be really suspicious about, the media tell their mass publics one thing above all else: “Trust no one.”4 Conspiracy, in short, has come to fill the explanatory void, the epistemic black hole, that is increasingly said to have been left be- hind by the unsettling of moral communities, by the so-called “crisis of representation,” by the erosion of received modernist connections between means and ends, subjects and objects, ways and means. All this in a global world that is at once larger and smaller, more and less knowable, more and less inscrutable than ever before.

    If conspiracy is the autonomic explanatory trope of our age, its conceptual grounding lies in its obverse, in transparency. It is, therefore, with the latter that we begin.

    The current preoccupation with transparency reveals a distinct shift in our understanding of the term. At least according to Zizek (1997:131). When used in relation to modern technolo- gy, he argues, it presumed the possibility of actually uncovering “how the machine works”; but, in its postmodern sense, the word implies the exact opposite. This, Zizek explains, is epitomiz- ed in the signifying economy of computer screens, whose cartoon icons may simulate everyday reality with beguiling concreteness; yet they conceal the real workings of the machine behind the glass facade, contriving the kind of legibility that renders the technology itself opaque. Is this so? Perhaps, perhaps not. For many of us, the dials on our dashboards and telephones be- speak a mechanical reality only slightly less impenetrable, suggesting that there has been a shift of degree, not kind. But Zizek reminds us of two things. The first is that our obsession with transparency is not unprecedented; the second, that changing patterns of illumination cast new shadows and, with them, new domains of darkness beyond their arcs of light. In fact, the more literally we believe in the axiom that to “see is to know,” the more haunted we are by what hovers beyond the edges of the visible. The sublime is obscure, according to Burke (Mitchell 1986:126), eluding ordinary sight. It is the precisely the relation between the manifest and the inscrutable – or the front and backstage, to invoke Goffman’s (1959) more mundane, dramaturgical image – that undergirds the enduring fascination evinced by human beings almost every- where with the properties of power. As David Graeber (1996:8) observes, invoking Hobbes on idolatry, the invisible is by nature unspecific and, hence, of infinite possibility. Efficacy and influence, alike in rhetoric and realpolitik, lie largely in controlling the capacity to reveal and conceal, to make “reality” appear or disappear.

    The essays in Transparency and Conspiracy provide rich, varied evidence of an impul- se, palpable across the face of the planet, to reveal the hidden workings of power. And to unco- ver its tangled complicities. This impulse is part of a more general zeitgeist; Tony Karon refers to it as “epic paranoia,”5 describing it as a readiness to connect apparently random, dispersed features of ever more impersonal worlds into tight configurations of collusion and menace, be they local sagas of harassment and corruption or worldwide, even extra-terrestrial, cabals of fanatical terror. For most Americans, the cataclysm of September 11 served to confirm – spec- tacularly, implosively – the global reach of evil empires, of secret networks of crazed killers, of suicide cells that would foment Armageddon by infiltrating the innocent forms of everyday life in the “civilized world.” But well before that day, well before that moment of revelation and radical rupture, it had already been noted how educated Europeans have come regularly to be consu- med by frightening reports of ever new hazards lurking unseen in the social fabric. Many of them, ironically, are thought to emanate from across the Atlantic;6 although Africa, of course, has long been the ur-source of epic, epidemic fears, its perennial place beyond the arc of light making it a fertile feeding ground for Eurobsessions with inscrutable dangers of one kind or an- other. Along with this, as its condition of possibility, goes a passion for “see-through visibility” that stretches from proliferating rites of national and institutional accountability to the aesthetics of public buildings and domestic design.7

    As we have already intimated, none of this is altogether new, even though the anxieties of the moment may suggest otherwise. While that does not detract from the importance of the studies collected here – quite the converse – it underlines the essential truism that change is always also, in crucial respects, continuity: that cultural creativity involves not merely incessant improvisation on existing themes, but also the re-presentation of reality in terms that are “al- most the same but not quite” (Bhabha, as cited by Humphreys). Thus it might be argued that, while moral panics about the workings of conspiracy have waxed luxuriantly after the Cold War, so did McCarthyism after World War 2. And fascism after the war before that. Each was an ur- gent hyper-rationalization of mundane modes of explanation common in the contexts from which it sprung. What is more, these outbreaks bear some resemblance, as populist theories of cause, to the millennialism and witch cleansing that occured in many non-Western societies af- ter colonial conquest. Paranoia and political theory, Hellinger notes, are often not easy to sepa- rate in practice; both exist, in large part, in the eye of the beholder. These divers manifes- tations of moral panic might be viewed, in other words, as just so many chapters in a long-runn- ing narrative, as so many variants on an old modernist theme, as a story “[which] remains the same, yet is constantly changing” (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).

    At the same time, the proportions of change to continuity, of rupture to repetition, are neither over-determined nor immutable; they are always labile, always liable to alter. There is, we believe, an immanent historical logic to the current chapter of the story, to the one writing itself just now, that does point to an epochal shift, to significant historical discontinuities amidst the continuities. We do seem to be caught up, at the turn of the millennium, in a swelling tide – an overabundance, Humphreys calls it – of claims to discern the destructive hand of evil agents, from devil-worshipers, witches, and global jihadistas, through purveyors of death in the name of spiritual truth, to pedlars of human body parts, genetically modified foods, and other nefarious commodities. Their malign machinations are envisaged as cumulatively universal in scale, even though they are made manifest in very particular sites; like the Satanists who target sleepy towns in the South African heartland, or international kidney snatchers with a penchant for New Orleans airport, or faceless felons who pollute the US postal services with biopoisons. It is true that the quests to divine their identities – with their attendant rituals of unmasking, con- fession, and apology – have precedents in earlier times; times when the pursuit of transparency likewise kindled the popular imagination, prompting a passionate pursuit of hidden truths and moral crusades; times also, as it turns out, of epochal shift. Thus, for example, the great trans- formation that ushered in the so-called “modern” world was also a period of feverish effort to find covert connections, to discern the invisible hand that gave design and purpose to a univer- se made opaque, through great economic and technical change, to contemporary theories of cause and effect; indeed, of history-in-the-making. As we have said elsewhere, we may be, at present, in the formative stages of a social revolution every bit as radical as that of 1789-1848. Several critical features of the current moment reprise, as prefixations, that earlier time; (neo)li- beralism and (neo)Protestantism, for instance. Then, as now, ontological categories and expla- nations were in flux, sparking debate about the definition of personhood and civil order, about the nature of economy and society, about the proper constitution of the state. It was a debate that struggled to frame new vocabularies and to reconcile an enhanced sense of human agency with a concomitant understanding of the “objective” forces of history.

    Optical Illusions

    It is exactly this kind of reprise — the Elightenment replayed “with a vengeance” – that Harding and Stewart see in the “paranoid” fixations of millennial America; these fixations show a “haunting trace” of sensibilities excluded by the idioms, the very obsessional explicitness, of our therapeutically-minded culture. And it is to the Enlightenment that we must look for the ori- gins of the modernist language of transparency and conspiracy; also for the signs and concepts that comprise the mis-en-scene of liberal empiricism. For it was the progressive dissolution of the Great Chain of Being, of theodicy and ecclesiastical authority, that cast humankind adrift in a material universe whose mundane truths had to be learned anew by patient, self-willed sub- jects, equipped only with sense and reason. The blind sage in Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1983) cedes his place, as the keeper of truth, to a prosaic English empiricist, who, with the aid of vision-enhancing spectacles, produces knowledge by collecting and connecting “clues” lying on the face of the world. In this universe, “seeing is believing.” Mortal beings, says Foucault (1975), increasingly made themselves both the objects and the measure of knowledge, their lives and deaths to be read less as a sign of cosmic metaphysical forces than as the sum of mundane biophysical processes, knowable primarily through the modest art of observation. Thus it is that the autopsy could become paradigmatic of the forensic gaze; thus it is that the corpse, its vitality, motion, and social connectedness all erased, could provide a “black border” within which the interior logic of life itself might be brought to light. Yet the very exclusions that permitted this illusion of transparency and order — that set the body apart from sociomoral en- tanglement to proclaim that truth inheres only in concrete evidence contained within the discre- te, anatomical individual — ensured that the definition of life captured by biomedicine was ende- mically limited, bereft of myth and mystery. Less tangible properties of being fell outside of its purview. This remains true of radical empiricism, sui generis : it continues to privilege sight over all other forms of perception, to restrict communication about the real to apparently transparent modes of representation, and to dismiss out of hand anything unsusceptible to positivist accounting, from the force of metaphor or moral values to the power of Vodoo or paranoid fantasy. Of course, the dialectical play of visibility and concealment, of darkness and truth, is not just a Dialectic of Enlightenment, so to speak. As we implied earlier, it is probably as old as poli- tics itself. The emergence of the Greek “public,” for instance, has been described as a process of “unveiling” in which powers, formerly secreted in the hands of aristocrats, were revealed for all to see (Vernant 1983, cited by Graeber 1996:11). The quest for transparency, in sum, has a long genealogy. But its techno-empiricist connotations were born of optical imagery associated with a specific period in the history of modernity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:185f), of its ma- terialities and moral discourses. The likes of Mumford (1934:124) have gone so far as to argue that the development of large-scale glass production was crucial to the evolution of a modern objectivist worldview. This claim suggests rather too stark a technological determinism for our own tastes. But it does seem clear that the phenomenological impact of glass – the everyday experience of its materiality – did much to shape the analytic sensibilities of the Age. Specta- cles, telescopes, microscopes became physical extensions of the human eye; as Mumford (1934:131) notes, they helped render the mysteries of nature “transparent.” And they fixed the idiom of all forms of knowing, not least of the workings of society. Mitchell (1986:166), for one, has remarked on the central place of optical metaphor, of images of “rational transparence,” in the writings of post-Enlightenment political theorists of all stripes, from Burke to Marx. This fo- cus on transparency also produced its own obverse: a concern with refraction, distortion, con- cealment, collusion. And a symbolic lexicon to go with it: note, in this respect, not only the ca- mera obscura – itself a famously telling icon of the dangers attendant on taking visible truths at face value – but also the hidden hand and, most of all, the fetish.

    To be sure, it is precisely its revelatory language, its argot of optics, that discloses the dark underside of Enlightenment, its traffic with discourses of unreason, race, and empire. Illumination — a condition of consciousness recognizable only to those freed from benighted savagery – was a key trope of humane imperialism, giving moral force to a host of “civilizing” crusades at once spiritual and secular. Not only did the idea authorize a blanket assault on the “primitive” lifeways of sundry others. It also shaped the everyday practices of European colonization at their most substantial. Missionaries to the heathen in southern Africa, for instance, took great pains to persuade their would-be converts to build large windows into their houses. Why? To illumine the dusky interiors of their lives and beings, leaving superstition and mystery no place to hide; to make the home a place of edification, self-construction, surveillance; to achieve a salvific lightness of being (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:278).

    The inverse of transparency in the imperial imagination, McCarthy Brown shows, was the concept of the fetish. This was the standardized nightmare of savage unreason, of depraved idolatry: fetishism evoked a childlike propensity to bestow life on “inanimate things,” insisting, with a kind of primitive paranoia, on the sort of essential, fateful connectedness between people, objects, and spiritual forces that had become anathema to a Cartesian consciousness. The primeval status of superstition and witchcraft in evolutionary histories of the modern West, like the pejorative attitude toward Voodoo and other practices likewise deemed “magical” in contemporary America, is persuasive evidence of the enduring usefulness of the fetish as a ra- cinated foil to Eurocentric images of clear-eyed reason. This lends ironic power to Marx’s refle- xive notion of commodity fetishism, that unsettling reminder of our own civilized idolatry, not to mention the alchemy that hides in the light of our own “rational” market economy.

    If the genealogy of transparency-as-trope cuts a revealing swathe across the history of the modern empirical imagination – being finely tuned, as we have seen, to the changing regis- ters of ordinary experience – its latest unfolding points squarely to the future. Thus the mechanical optics of the Industrial Age have been upgraded in, and interdigitated into, the digital era: Windows now come from Microsoft, whose corporate leaders speak as new-age missionaries for the liberating power of knowledge. The e–revolution – or, more properly, evolution – holds out the promise of a radically democratized McWorld; although some believe that promise to be pure elusion, an infantile e-scape from the more concretely pressing political realities of our times. Maybe. More salient for present purposes, the digital age brings with it the dread of ever more extensive, nefarious, tangled webs of cyber-intrigue as hackers, militias, fundamentalists, pornographers, syndicated criminals, and schemers of all stripes gain unregulated access to means of mass communication. As the division of labor everywhere becomes increasingly glo- bal, local communities across the planet are enmeshed in economies of expanding scale and abstraction, ensuring the ever more mundane experience of realities – like long-distance mig- ration, IDs and credit cards, virtual communities, digital money, electronic frontiers — that eschew any simple division between the legible and the opaque. If ever there was evidence of the dangers of too literal an application of these dichotomies, either as a mode of analysis or as a political call to arms, it is now: now, when the numbing complexity of material, social, and cultural flows across the earth presents us with a plethora of realities that are, at best, translucent. Realities, that is, that are neither transparent nor opaque, neither in plain sight nor hidden from view. We struggle, as Schrauwers says, to see “through a glass darkly,” much like social think- ers did in the ferment of the first Age of Revolution. Now as then, we must be suspicious of the imperious claims of naive empiricism, especially in the name of technical necessity – be it biological, economic, or environmental. We in the human sciences need to fight for multiplicity and polyphony in the ways in which we may come to know the world; also for a broadband sense of what might count as evidence. And we must advocate for the significance of the unseen, for regarding as critical those forces in the world that do not present themselves in technically measurable proportions, from the social effects of abstract capital to the material implications of anomie. Above all, we need to recognize that it is the very complexity of our times, the under- mining within them of the architecture of social certainties, that prompts the quest for simplifying truths, for reassuring melodramas of good and evil, for magic that would translate complicated structural influences into the language of personal desire, animosity, forgiveness. All of which is as true of new social and economic theory as it is of new social movements

    Beyond Empiricism:

    With this in mind it is instructive to reflect, as several of the contributors to Transparency and Conspiracy have done, on contexts in which liberal empiricism has come into contact with rather different local understandings of power and agency, whether among minority communities in Europe and America or in postcolonial Africa, Korea and elsewhere. Take the African case. Here, as Sanders and West both make plain, the “harbingers of a brave new transparent world” are often unaware of the intricacies of vernacular conceptions of power – and, hence, of the mystifying effects of their own languages and practice, whether they be the introduction of ID’s or democratic voting procedures. It is not that local discourses lack their own ideas of visi- bility and concealment. Much has been written about secrecy and revelation on the continent, past and present; also about ontologies of witchcraft, sorcery, exorcisms, and purges, forms of cultural practice that provide paradigmatic instances of conspiracy theories in action. Yet the ambivalent reception of ballot boxes in rural Mozambique indicates that “transparency” means different things in different places: where communities are used to a public show of hands, for example, the “privacy” of the ballot box evokes suspicions of concealment, especially in places where memories of colonial surveillance still linger. Likewise, party politics often connote a form of cabalistic collusion, a lack of the kind of accountability expected from hereditary rulers or single-party systems (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997b; Karlström 1999). But, even more than this, where understandings of the operation of power are vested in the ongoing interplay of the manifest and the invisible – of humans and spirits, words and deeds, persons and context – discourses about the capacity to act in and upon the world assume a distinctive shape.

    In fact, as West notes, in much of Africa, politics is taken to be a perpetual “game of hide and seek.” Here leaders are always sorcerers of a kind. For sorcery, whether turned to good effect or ill, requires a kind of vision more profound than that usually implied by European empiricism; insight like that of Sanders’ Ihanzu “seer,” who is attuned to the invisible “real reali- ties” thought to animate the tangible, everyday world. Like Freud’s paranoic (see Humphreys), the seer sees something that escapes normal people. Only, in his case, the knowledge is made socially salient and useful. Such visionaries – and the objects that help them bring things to light, from oracles and “traditional X-rays” to severed heads and identity tokens – are hardly the hostages of an arcane “tradition.” They conjure with a wide range of distinctly contemporary forces, forces that manifest themselves in the conflicts and triumphs of lives at once local and translocal, forces that might as well be discerned in the cannibalistic practices of new neoliberal elites as in the mysterious flow of consumer goods or in the capricious capers of the IMF (see Bastian, Kendall, and Sanders). In so doing, they articulate processes of varying scale and perceptibility, translating the reified abstractions of economy and society into a dramaturgy of such ordinary human motives as desire, ambition, anger, and jealousy. Even remorse. Unlike a Car- tesian landscape, on which human beings are set apart from matter and nature, and act os- tensibly as isolates in empty space-time, the experiential terrain of witchcraft and spirit possession is a frenzied field of intersecting influences among persons, environments, spirits, and things. Even cities, as Bastian (1993:141) has demonstrated, can assume dangerous, over-heated personalities; these being the product of intense commerce and improper accumulation. In these contexts, the modernist injunction to “only connect” is redundant; albeit by grammatical accident, the split infinitive underscores the point. Knowledge requires the constant monitoring of, and action upon, already existing connections as they pass in and out of focus and visibility.

    Virtual Paranoia: the return of the repressed?

    What, to return to our opening questions, might any of this tell us about the burgeoning twenty-first century obsession with transparency and conspiracy? Or about its expression in fantasies, common across the planet nowadays, of righteous, revelatory crusades against invisible evil-doers? The obsession itself would seem closely related to another widely noted phenomenon of our times: the rise of a host of new charismatic religious movements that are at once intensely local and yet also span vast distances through human migration, the web, and satellite dishes. These movements, Harding and Stewart point out, provide richly creative languages for rationalizing the ever more attenuated relationship between self and world. Especially in their more markedly millennial forms, they posit moral certainty and closure in an increasingly limitless, open universe, charting clear causal pathways through a jungle of information, of wildly circulating signifiers, of immaculate deceptions; all this at a moment when the authority of grand narratives of society and history are giving way to the dispassionate, dispersed reign of the market.

    In like vein, Hellinger argues, populist stories of conspiracy and revelation should be seen as serious, sometimes empowering moral allegories that seek certainty amidst indeterminacy, surety amidst insecurity. As such, they explore the links between invisible structural forces and human action, not least political action; in so doing, they often capture terrors that more cautious analysts fear to name. These moral allegories bear an uncomfortable resemblance to some species of orthodox social thought; especially social thought of a critical bent, which presumes, as a first principle, that, wherever ruling elites exist, they act in various ways to maintain their hegemony (Parenti 1994, in Hellinger). The Buryat Mongol fable that Stalin was the rein- carnation of a Blue Elephant mirrored the “paranoid” discourse generated by Stalinism, says Humphreys; though the former exceeded the latter, she notes, by insisting on the role of individual accountability in history. Humphreys uses “paranoia” less in its commonplace, pathological sense than to describe a genre of enclosed narrative that displaces attributes of the self onto others. Such narratives, she notes, permit people to voice otherwise suppressed, highly ambivalent senses of their own historical agency. This understanding of the term, we would add, contrasts with its more derisive use in the cut-and-thrust of everyday life where, like most accusations of unreason, it tends to tell us less about essential truths than about political or confessional contestations. Indeed, to label a person or persons “paranoid” is another, generic form of displacement, one that seeks to locate them beyond the limits of “normal” society; in the case of a group of believers, it is to relegate them to the marginal world of “primitive” superstition. As this suggests, allegations of pathology may, among other things, mark out fault lines of social, cultural, and ideological difference. Like the fault lines of race within many modern nation-states (“Blacks/Jews are paranoid”); or those that distinguish Western rationality from “Muslim funda- mentalism”; or those that sustained the reciprocal conspiracies that were spun, by Cubans and exiles alike, around the small body of Elián Gonzalez (cf. Ryer n.d.).

    By connecting disparate dots from across our far-flung universe into often bizarre con- stellations, however, and by discerning design in a laissez-faire universe, conspiracy theorists may capture strange, startling truths. Thus the myth of the primordial Blue Elephant, whose triumphant return to the post-Socialist scene, recall, proclaimed a crucial flaw in Soviet theories of history: the inability to link structural determinism in any meaningful way to personal agency and morality. It is this will to connect, finally, that distinguishes the various vision quests of the post-Cold War world, be they the therapeutic millennium of an America Calvary, popular Nigerian efforts to expose those who profit from the flesh of compatriots, or the nervous efforts of Ko- rean shamans who struggle in the shadow of the IMF to implicate household gods in financial success and failure. What makes them seem “paranoid,” from a liberal humanist standpoint, is not merely that they tie macrosocial processes to the acts and intentions of particular human beings, impersonal forces to intensely personal effects; nor only that, as familiar oppositions fade and old borders erode, they imagine enemies and evil-doers to be ever more pervasive, taking up residence, like X-file aliens, in otherwise ordinary citizens and neighbors. It is that these vision quests, and the narratives of conspiracy in which they are grounded, presume the eclipse of middle-order social institutions, of conventional sites of production and power, of a collective sense of morality, sociality, and history.

    As market forces take on increasing autonomy, and local productive relations become ever more subservient to the interests of global capital, the “deep horizontal fraternities” that once shaped ideals of nationhood, class, and community give way to a politics of identity, of technical necessity, and of the consumer rights of a “me generation” turned “we generation” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000:305); also, putatively, to the legal regulation of more-or-less eve- rything. History is reduced to “memory,” oppression to “victimhood”; the latter to be redressed less by empowering social reform than by the payment of financial reparations. The productive tensions, in modern life and thought, between subject and society, member and congregation, citizen and nation are reduced to a dialogue of customers and contracts, consumers and rights, clients and therapists. Stakeholders, all, in a vast impersonal order of exchange. Small wonder, then, that the millennium, in neoliberal guise, tends to be radically privatized; hence the planeta- ry popularity of prosperity gospels, national lotteries, pyramid schemes, and technicians of the arcane who “see” into the future. Small wonder, too, we should be witnessing the widespread pursuit of new forms of moral accountability and of new faiths capable, in Durkheim’s (1947:479) classic terms, of “completing” both the fragmentary knowledge of means and ends afforded by science and the growing abstraction of “man” in “society”; faiths, in other words, that offer insight into, and means of acting upon, the mysteries and malign undersides of a rapidly changing world. Neither should we be surprised that God and Satan – ultimate embodiments of invisible, infinite power and, also, of the ultimate Revelation and Conspiracy – should hold so central a sway over popular imaginations in this Age of Transparency, this age in which everyone is suspicious, and nobody really knows who the enemy is. Or what the hidden hand is actually doing, how it is doing it, and to whom.

  • After Labor

    After Labor

    Concern has been steadily mounting, across the globe, that a “world without jobs” is fast approaching. And that wage labor as we know it is disappearing. “Work,” it seems, “is not working, for ever more people, in ever more ways.”1 But there is little agreement about how, why, where, or in what measure this is actually happening. Or what might take the place of mass employment as the grounding of economy and society in the foreseeable future. Why do we – scholars, citizens, politicians, people at large – seem congenitally unable to think beyond a universe founded on wage labor, both proletarian and white collar? After all, capital has always striven to free itself of a dependency on that labor to the greatest extent possible – to the degree, as it is now becoming more commonplace to note, that wage work has been an ideal rather than an actuality for many, perhaps most, people at most times across the planet.

    The implication? That paid employment has always been more or less precarious, always a living anachronism, always threatened by the possibility of erasure. Why, then, has it remained so central both to popular and to theoretical understandings, alike left and right, of life under capitalism (Denning 2010), all the more so amidst anxieties about its immanent demise? To be sure, work has been said to “dominate and pervade everyday life – especially in Britain and the US – more completely than at any time in recent history.”2 So what exactly is unique about the contemporary moment? As we fail to conceptualize an age after labor, we seem ever more to be haunted by nightmares of our own redundancy, by surreal images of a world in which value is produced by other means – or by workers who are simultaneously living-and-dead, present-and-absent, human-and-nonhuman: zombies, robots, mutant species, and other assorted humanoids. What does this tell us about the afterlife of homo faber?

    Might we enrich our answers to these critical questions by moving beyond the Archimedean limits of Euro-America? The latter may be the source, and the ultimate horizon, of so much of our theory-work on capital and labor. But, we shall argue, a more comprehensive history of global capitalism must embrace the enduring entailment of the Euromodern world in its antipodean others – the source, after all, of much of its animating energies as well as labor power in its most precarious, most devalued, most dehumanized forms. It is a history, we shall see, whose southern past the north appears to be re-living in this, as in so many other, respects (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Beck 2000).3

    II.

    In the late 1999’s, we wrote about the sudden appearance of zombies in the South African popular imagination (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). While it was foreshadowed in local figures of predatory evil, this specter took late modern shape at a particular moment, a moment when the already fragile infrastructure of black male working life had been threatened, quite abruptly, by a radically shrinking labor market. There was a cruel irony here: wage work, or at least a large proportion of it, was made superfluous at just the time when decolonization was supposed to transform the racial capitalism of apartheid into a social order that promised fair pay and a better life for all. The “transition to democracy” coincided here with a worldwide wave of neoliberal reform: reversing the high point, in the global north, of state-centered social welfare, regulation, and redistribution after World War 2 (see below), propertied elites sought to reassert their class interests against the rising power of labor on a planetary scale by pushing to liberalize capital, to open up free trade, to give the market full reign, and to champion the private sector (Harvey 2005).

    As part of a rising hegemony, Western development agencies, under the so- called Washington Consensus, pressured governments in debt-strapped, emerging economies to outsource the functions of state, to open their borders to corporate capital, to accede to its demand for flexible, minimally protected labor, and to encourage processes of financialization – with dire consequences for most ordinary citizens (see e.g. Stiglitz 2002). In the upshot, post-authoritarian societies like South Africa experienced democratization as an ambiguous mix of enfranchisement and dispossession, simultaneous in- and exclusion; this as their new administrations sought to square liberal political freedom with the effects of mandatory laissez faire. In point of fact, global processes of deregulation had been gaining traction in such contexts since the 1970’s. But they accelerated appreciably in the 1990’s, when the dramatic decline in employment was accompanied by a surge of so-called “jobless growth.” As The Economist put it of South Africa, “the economy is doing nicely – but at least one person in three is out of work.”4

    It was then that public talk about the intervention of an army of surrogate workers became audible: talk of an “invasion” of abject migrants (makwerekwere) who would take on any degrading job, and, more tentatively and even more abjectly, of ghostly beings raised from the dead, who toiled in a nocturnal economy for their avaricious owners. Zombies (dithotsela; also diphoko), specters that lacked speech and the animating qualities of personhood, bodied forth in popular rhetoric, song, media, even magistrate’s courts and industrial conflicts (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). They bore testimony to an occult force that appeared to exist “by sucking living labor” (Marx 1976:342; see also Carver 1998:14).5

    Thus it was that wage work, at once valorized and rendered superfluous by the changing shape of the industrial economy, returned again in phantasmic guise, making inchoate threats to the established bases of human existence. Zombies, of course, have been a ghostly presence, a “profane illumination” (Benjamin 1978:179) one might say, throughout the long history capitalist modernity. Their historic associations with the predations of slavery and colonial extraction migrated into the US vernacular, probably during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1943, where they were transmogrified by the insatiable culture industry into the “scientifically-reanimated, undead”: cannibalistic consumers – rather than ravaged producers – who became versatile figurations, across the world, for various sorts of late modern monstrosity, predation, and horror.6 Not least, in this regard, were the rapacious effects of ever more arcane modes of accumulation; hence, in recent times, the circulating tropes of “voodoo economics,” “zombie banks,” and “zombie companies” (Kane 1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:40);7 South Africa’s deeply indebted electrical supplier, Eskom, said to be “the world’s largest power utlility,” has been described as a “state-owned zombie apocalypse.”8 Adds Aditya Chakrabortty from the UK, “The undead maraud around our popular culture,” but “[they are] also us. Britain in 2018 is stalked by zombie ideas, zombie politicians, zombie institutions.”9

    As the product of ghoulish greed, the zombie bears uncanny resemblance to other recent figures of proletarian undoing, like the genetically engineered “equisapiens” of Boots Riley’s luminous allegory of capitalist alchemy, Sorry to Bother You (2018). The human component of this hybrid species is not left to chance: it is black and male. In writing about racial capitalism Hylton White (n.d.), draws on Moishe Postone’s (1980) argument about anti-semitism and the figuration of the abstract power of capital: if Jews appear as the “racial body of money,” as “will without labor,” blacks are “labor without will…labour-in-itself: a brute biological force in need of mastery.” Riley’s “horse people” are the artifacts of WorryFree, a corporation that, in the words of critic Jordan Miner, is in the business of creating “creatures that are only valuable because of the extra labor” – the horse power – “they can produce.” Robots, he adds, “aren’t as efficient.”10 Shades here of the “animal spirits” that have appeared, variously, in theorizing the essence of man under capitalism, from Marx (1976:229ff), who associated them with the force that “heightens the efficiency” of the worker, to Keynes (1936:161-2), who saw them as “[the worker’s] spontaneous urge to action.”

    The robot, patently, is the other great nemesis of homo faber in these times. A recent study, tellingly titled, “‘You’re Fired,’ Says the Robot,” describes the prevalence, in the American workplace, of “technophobia,” an anxiety-related syndrome centered on new technologies, most notably robotics and artificial intelligence (McClure 2018). Similarly anguished is a 2018 op-ed essay by the Vice Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg.11 It features a prominent picture of the “first humanoid robot in South Africa” (Figure 1): the deceptively endearing “Pepper” has a map of Africa on its white metallic chest12 and the national colors around its neck. It stares intently into the eyes of its creator, a brown man, who apprehensively returns its gaze. Labor locks eyes with its mechanical replacement, whose artful, anthropomorphic form seems surplus to functional requirement. Like the zombie, the android, a robot in human form, re- presents, as a dialectical image, the figure of proletarian laborer both in the honor in the breach. Even as it is being rendered redundant, we remain entrapped in the fetishistic logic of wage work. It appears perpetually to come back, in archetypal human form, if only an agonistic measure of its effacement: an “estranged recognition” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2011:149), perhaps, of the fact that “it is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working population…” (Marx 1976:782; Denning 2010).

    III.

    In one of his last essays, “Critical Theory and the Historical Transformations of Capitalist Modernity,” Moishe Postone (2017a:148ff) reiterated his long-standing disagreement with what he termed “traditional Marxism.” It concerned the role of labor under capitalism. Rather than the means by which humans transform nature to their purposes at all times and in all places, labor, he insisted, is a “form of mediation” peculiar to capitalism (p.149). Put more plainly, capitalism is an historical formation, one “in which labor” – proletarian labor, that is – is the iconic source of surplus value, and “the primary constituter of the social world” (Jay 1993:183). Marx’s own project, added Postone, was a critique of proletarian labor aimed not at its realization in unalienated, meliorated guise, but at its total overcoming. Read from this vantage, capitalism could not be transcended by way of a more equitable distribution of the fruits of industrial manufacture or by the collective seizure, on the part of workers, of surplus value. Both would leave existing relations of production intact.13 They would leave intact, too, the so-called “treadmill” that drives forward the process of accumulation and, hence, the contradiction at the core of capitalist modernity: that, with technological and other advances, proletarian labor becomes “increasingly anachronistic” (Postone 2017b:50), increasingly irrelevant to the generation of wealth or to brute productivity – and yet it remains essential to the economic system of which it is a constitutive part. And to its endogenous sense of how value is to be created.

    Thus it is that, historically, capitalism “ceaselessly generates what is ‘new,’ while regenerating what is the ‘same’,” moving beyond the necessity of proletarian labor while continuing to assert its indispensability (2017b:48,50). While it may produce the possibility, out of its own internal workings, of giving way to other kinds of social system, to different social formations, it seems systematically to prevent their realization. Thus it is, too – and here we add our own gloss on Postone’s statement of the contradiction, and its anticipation in Marx’s concern with the deskilling, devaluation, and demise of labor14 – that, as wage work comes under threat, it typically returns in refigured, re-imagined, dehumanized forms. Among them, as we note in our opening fragments, are the specters of the zombie, the android, the mutant: the laborer who requires no pay, whose toil is pure surplus value, who has the bodily form of a human worker but none of the needs. A ghostly figure of human labor under erasure this, one that simultaneously retains its original meaning, says Derrida, yet is “rub[bed] out” (Anderson 2012:4; cf. Derrida 1976:61; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:290). But the zombie, an illumination from the suppressed underside of the long story of capitalism, also makes evident something more: the invisible story of disenfranchised, racialized labor born of historic plunder and imperial dispossession. Labor ab initio deemed deskilled, devauled, archaic. And frequently, wageless.

    IV.

    Modern conceptions of work, whatever their provenance, tend toward the metaphysical. However prosaic and utilitarian their definition of material production, they draw on the suppressed theological roots of liberal thought that takes labor to be a defining attribute of human being, the capacity that permits the species to separate itself from nature, acquire property, make history, and reach for the gods. Marx (1976:127) was not alone in seeing labor as the essence of an “exclusively human” ability, a mindful practice. But, like Postone after him (above, p.0), he also insisted that, in its prevailing proletarian form, it is the unique product of capitalism; an historical paradox this, given, as we noted earlier, that capital, under the sign of producing value, has always sought to free itself from its dependency on wage work by alienating and discounting it, by maximizing the surplus extracted from it, by quite literally dehumanizing it.

    This paradoxical proposition – that labor is essential to the ontology of human life under capitalism, and yet is undone, at the same time, by the conditions under which it has evolved – is critical to any understanding of the history of the past in the present. And to contemporary debates about the nature of work and its futures.15 Not only was wage employment, for the most part, a consequence of dispossession but, in the world at large, wagelessness has always been more common than paid labor (e.g. Denning 2010; Broad 2014:214). That said, Romantics early and late have insisted on a vision of toil that transcends instrumental function: it is artful, ethical, redemptive (Hughes 2007). Liberal and Marxist thinkers, too, have evinced a sense of its intrinsically moral aspect (Weeks 2011:12; Muehlebach 2012). But they have tended to sustain a more restricted, normative conception of work as a materially productive, remunerated activity. Feminists, by contrast, see this normative conception as irredeemably masculinist, blind to the essential productivity of unpaid domesticity and its contribution to the generation of wealth (Federici 1975; Coulson et al 1975; Beneria 1981).16 Scholars of racial capitalism (Wolpe 1972; Alexander 1979; Robinson 1983), moreover, have shown how the structural articulation of gender and race has served to devalue and debase black labor by shifting the costs of its reproduction onto women, often rural women, operating mainly outside the market economy. Not only does this suggest that waged and unwaged toil are interdependent and alike socially necessary; hence the coining of hybrids like “peasantariat” (e.g. Parson 1984) or “semi-proletariat” (e.g. Wallerstein 1976; Broad 2014:220f.) to describe colonial class formations. It also makes plain that modes of defining and classifying occupations are always ideological, mobilizing intersecting axes of difference (race, gender, age, civic status) and types of activity (skilled/unskilled, kin/market-based, affectivel/material) to prioritize, rationalize, and discriminate in the name of accumulation (cf. Bear et al 2015; Yanagisako 2012). Self-evidently, capital, colonial and metropolitan, past and present, has always been more diverse in its modes of operation than hegemonic narratives are wont to suggest. But the more general point is that the history of capitalism has reenacted, perennially if in different manifestations, the contradiction at its core, asserting the centrality of labor while discounting and disappearing much of it.

    As we shall see, the proliferation of occupations, skills, and kinds of compensation attendant on the restructuring of capitalist production from the late twentieth century onward plays out much the same contradiction, the same counterpoint, in a different key. The labile routines, flexible (even “zero hour”) contracts, and deregulated modes of accumulation that comprise lives and livelihoods in the contemporary moment (Bear et al 2015; Calvão 2016) – their uncertainties, their precarities, their ruptured temporalities – may seem unprecedented. In the age of the “gig” economy, of rampant financialization, rising self-employment, and the waning market for formal jobs, they may appear to have emancipatory possibilities. Hence their celebration by “post-workists” (Frase 2016) seeking a “[life] beyond the colonizing power” of formal employment (Frayne 2015:67) and the daily grind of “bullshit jobs” (Graeber 2013); also by those who claim that more fluid, expansive, “intelligent” forms of labor might provide the basis for a new commons (Hardt and Negri 2004:109), a new “grammar of the multitude” (Virno 2004). But much of what look to be new sorts of occupation actually go back a long way – often unmarked, unremarked, unremunerated – only to return in the here-and-now in renamed, rebranded guise. The “flexibility” and “casualization” associated with the neoliberal moment merely puts a techno-economistic gloss – in the ostensible cause of efficiency, growth, profit, even creative disruption – on forms of job insecurity, piece work, un- and underemployment, corporate-friendly contracts, and the scanting of labor protections integral to the longue duree of capitalism (cf. Broad 2000); this notwithstanding its talk of the dignity of the wage. Take, for instance, emergent categories like “affective” and “immaterial” work. They may acknowledge feminist demands for recognition of the unwaged, largely invisible labor of domesticity, nurture, and social reproduction. But they also tend to sentimentalize the very nature of that labor. Which is deeply ironic, since it is precisely their sentimentalization – their “elevation” to the decommodified domain of the “priceless” – that has been key, historically, to the feminization of womens’ activities, their literal de-valuation, and their confinement to the “sacred” space of the home (Fedirici 2008; Bear et al 2015). What remains clear, however, is that being recognized as bona fide labor has not ensured that they are remunerated at anything remotely commensurate to the value they produce or the time invested in them.

    In summary, then, what all this points to is a convergence of two processes whose entailment underlies the latest chapter in the unfolding relationship between capital and labor, its intrinsic contradiction, its working out in the “new” global economy – and our reading of this moment, both in theory and in its historical realization. One of those processes lies in the morphing planetary geography of labor. By recommissioning the structures of colonial extraction, corporate capital – facilitated by (more or less “captured”) states almost everywhere – has (re)constructed commodity chains in such a way as to decentralize, distanciate, fragment, and render mobile its sites of operation (cf. Broad 2014). [See brands and their surfeits; Nakassis] Already in the 1970’s, this was anticipated in what was called the New International Division of Labor (NIDL; Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980), a concept criticized at the time for ignoring the persistence of older metropolitan structures and their interpolation with emergent forms, but recently recuperated to take account of the intensified implications of techno-advanced, translocal manufacture on a global scale (Starosta 2016).17 As a result, what had hitherto been proletarian jobs in the nations of the north have migrated to southern reaches: postcolonial worlds erected on a mix of occasional (“flexible”?) contract work in the formal economy and various modes of value production in so-called informal economies (Hart 1973). Much of this activity, past and present, has been centered on the household and its surrounds, on extended (sometimes corporate) kin ties and feminized labor,18 on close social and religious networks, and on locality; a good deal of it involves petty commodity production, micro-marketing, “putting out” for industry elsewhere, and “penny capitalism” of one or another sort (e.g. Tax 1953), often implicating creative credit management (James 2015; see below). These are worlds in which material deficit imposes on individuals and families, especially women, an onus for multifaceted survival strategies. Such strategies, perforce, often include taking the cheapest, least protected, most insecure, most casualized employment made available by capital under conditions of maximal deregulation; this while simultaneously operating in the labile, flexi-environment of the informal sector. Here, at the frontier of “the race to the bottom,” both corporate capital and its rogue competitors – think blood diamonds, coltan, endangered species, narco-commerce – experiment most violently in their efforts to extract optimal returns. Consequently, fabrication tends to be reduced to its most elemental, to one operation in the commodity chain, paid minimally for each productive act and for nothing else. And likely to move on abruptly to another elsewhere, with little notice, if conditions favor doing so. As these sites open up for business, jobs and makeshift infrastructure migrate to them, putting northern labor in competition with, and displaced by, their more abject, more vulnerable antipodean counterparts.

    This is where the second process enters the mis-en-scene. As the attenuation of the proletarian labor market has made itself felt in the global north – with our caveat that its economies have never been anywhere near fully proletarianized, always heavily dependent on transient workers and unpaid, feminized toil – there has arisen a lively facsimile of the informal sectors of the south. This creeping informalization, as formal work gives way to diverse kinds of casualization, is partly subsumed by the growing “gig” economy, partly by other “economies” to be described in detail later: such things as the sharing economy, the caring economy, the artisanal economy, the intimate economy (below, p.000ff.). These are neither proletarian nor regularly waged. They depend on deploying the vitalism of the human body, its capacities and it properties, as micro-capital that may be put to the purposes of accumulation: activity centered on the household and, more generally, the private sphere, thus to erase, ever more, the line between sites of production and reproduction, male and female, work and home, normatively separated with the rise of industrialization. And so the infrastructure and accoutrements of the domestic domain – cars, rooms, private computers, smartphones, the kitchen table – are turned into assets that yield disposable income, as may be hospitality and intimacy itself. And so everything becomes capital, in prospect or in practice, everything the object of financialization, including, maybe most of all, the neoliberal self. Of course, many of these tendencies toward the informal, broadly conceived, have always existed, more or less overtly if unmarked, in northern contexts as well. What has changed is their proportionate relation, in labor demographics, to formal wage employment, alike proletarian and white collar, domestic and migrant; their recognition as a measurably significant part of material, social, psychic, and ethical life; and, as we shall see, their partial reappropriation, through various sorts of so-called “platform” business, back into the formal sector that spun them off. In all these respects, patently, the global north is coming more and more to resemble the global south (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012), living its history, so to speak, as Secondhand Time (Alexievich 2017). Another instance this, perhaps, of Rancière’s (1999:113) claim that, under prevailing global conditions, we live the suppressed secrets of modernity shamelessly, unhidden; in this instance, to restate it in slightly different terms, the contradiction that modern capitalism is erected on the elemental necesssity of labor which, at the same time, it seeks constantly to devalue and displace to the point of redundancy.

    This contradiction – played out recursively over the past centuries and across the entire world – is also manifesting itself, with rising intensity, in the experiential and political fabric of everyday life in the present continuous.

    Thus, on one hand, almost everywhere, public discourse continues to speak as though a waged population remains the norm. Labor as the fons et origo of economy and society – the prime basis of social value, the first and last source of human dignity, the core of material and civic existence – has lost little of its idealized purpose. “Ironically, while the ‘age of work’ seems to have come to an end,” observe Cedarström and Fleming (2012) in Dead Man Working, a darkly provocative reflection on the zeitgeist of our times, “working has assumed a total presence – a ‘worker’s society’ in the worst sense of the term – where everyone finds themselves obsessed with it.”19 If anything, growing anxieties about its precariousness have heightened its psychic centrality: a compulsive preoccupation with employment drives mainstream political manifestos, visions of education, and criteria of self-worth.20 Even the finance sector, where value is accumulated by means and instruments of ever greater abstraction – this by distancing itself as far as possible from manufacture and service, indeed from the commodity economy tout court, to which it denies any anchorage or point of reference – harks back to the language of labor: it refers to what it traffics in as “products,” as though they were commodities yielded by honest toil, to the profits it yields as “earnings,” and to itself as an “industry.”

    This is hardly surprising: “Work is the primary means by which individuals are integrated not only into the economic system, but also into the social, political, and familial modes of cooperation,” notes Kathi Weeks (2011:8). It is ”a basic obligation of citizenship.” And, ethically if not legally, also something akin to a right. Hence statesmen everywhere speak in the promissory language of “bringing back jobs” in received proletarian and white collar guise; Donald Trump’s notorious fixation, in 2016 and after, on reviving the largely defunct US coal industry is symptomatic of the nagging impasse between the idealization of blue collar production in America and its cynical decommissioning – its simultaneous presence and ever more blatant erasure under pressures of profitability.21 For their part, voting publics respond by taking promises of job creation seriously; low unemployment is regularly invoked as both an objective and an achievable measure of effective governance – even if a job does not yield an income, a matter to which we shall return.

    To be sure, whatever form it may take, however it may metamorphose, wage labor endures, with almost uncanny persistence, as the perceived basis of species-being. In the USA, notes Derek Thompson (2015), “[i]ndustriousness has served as America’s unofficial religion since its founding. The sanctity and prominence of work lie at the heart of the country’s politics, economics, and social interactions.” Similarly in Britain, argues Joanna Biggs (2015:264), where labor gives life meaning “when religion, party politics and community fall away.”22 And not only in these places. Employment, a.k.a. “decent jobs” for its citizenry, is typically portrayed as the most critical function of the nation-state everywhere; hence the millennial prominence, in government manifestos – left and right, north and south, east and west – of putting “the people” back to work, despite the repeated failure to do so.23 Cyril Ramaphosa put it front and center in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) to South Africa on 7 February 2019: “jobs” was the single most repeated word, used thirty-three times in a seventy-nine minute speech.24 Every previous president, in every SONA since 1994, has done the same thing, if not with the same stress-by-repetition.

    On the other side of the contradiction is the rising apprehension that “the end of work” is already at hand, never again to be reversed. Almost quarter of a century ago, economist Jeremy Rifkin’s The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era (1995) echoed that apprehension. It argued that “worldwide unemployment would increase as information technology eliminated tens of millions of jobs in the manufacturing, agricultural and service sectors,” with a “devastating impact…on blue-collar, retail and wholesale employees.” It also resonated with the fear that “the workplace would become ever more stressful,”25 that corporate managers and knowledge workers might benefit but that the middle class would shrink, many of its jobs, perhaps proportionally more than proletarian ones, replaced by screens and machines.26 Rifkin’s thesis was greeted with a measure of scholarly skepticism (see e.g. Caffentzis 1998 [2001]), among other things for its techno-determinism, for over-reading the effects on the job market of the factors he had identified while ignoring others, and for relying on a simplistic, normative conception of employment. But, like Richard Sennett’s (1998) account of changes in the structure of work-and-career at the hands of “corporate re- engineering”27 under the “new capitalism” – also Ulrich Beck’s bleak “destandardization of work” (1992) and the demise of “work society” (2000) – it captured a dawning American nightmare.

    That nightmare is epitomized by a spreading rustbelt, where the flight of industry, the technicization of what remains, and the concomitant eclipse of labor have become iconic of economic, social, cultural breakdown. Hence the terrifying images, conjured up by the culture industry, sociological futurism, and social media, of haunted, cityscapes bereft of the assembly line and the punch card, dotted with derelict stores, boarded up schools, delapidated homes, and abandoned churches, criss-crossed by windswept, empty streets. In sum, a cadaver left behind as industrial capital moves away and what Soules (2014) has termed “zombie urbanism” takes its place, turning decay into revenant assets through financialization and the displacement of production to yet more precarious, exploitable elsewheres across the planet.

    The anxiety that work is becoming anachronistic, that is under terminal threat, is anything but new. Like the fact of widespread wagelessness, it is as old as modernity itself. In the late sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth 1 refused to patent a knitting machine because it imperilled the jobs of “young maidens who obtain their daily bread” by handcraft;28 in the early 1800’s, English Luddites attacked the stocking frames that looked to devalue their skill and their livelihoods (Thomis 1970); and, in 1862, grain shovelers in the Port of New York demanded protection against the onslaught of elevators that rendered them redundant (Spann 2002:140). Similarly almost a century later: “Austerity policies, low wages and automation…were also of concern in the 1950s,” a Union Perspective Blog noted in 2015. But the head of the United Auto Worker’s Union, confronted by robots newly placed on the vehicle production line, had his own rather laconic response. He is said to have asked Henry Ford II, in 1952, “Henry how are you going to get [those] robots to buy your cars?”29

    Economists might speak of the “Luddite fallacy,” insisting that, rather than displacing skills or destroying occupations, new technologies merely realign existing divisions of labor, often to positive effect. But this hardly accounts for the social and existential dislocation – and the capricious trade off of lives, careers, and futures – occasioned by the radical reorganization of work. Witness, most recently, the felt effects across the world of casualization, outsourcing, and mechanization; of the polarization of employment markets within and between nations; and of the reduced quality of so many waged jobs. Hence Cedarström and Fleming’s “dead man working”; it evokes precisely the sort of fear-inducing zombification with which we began. In what Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) call the Second Machine Age, artificial intelligence and “brilliant” machines have changed the name of the game: they have colonized even some of the most creative, most intuitive professions – from medical diagnostics through criminal detection to musical composition – formerly assumed to be reserved for “humans only” (Thompson 2015). Recall here the fate of horses, once regarded as second only to homo sapiens in their indispensability to divers forms of material production.30 No species, it seems, has the cunning, capacities, or nobility to be secure from the relentless quest for better, more worry-free returns on labor time. Remember, here, those indentured equisapiens from the spooked imagination of Boots Riley (above, p.00): corporate capital might yet find the body of the post-worker, in whole or in part, more lucrative than a mechanical alternative.

    Since the 1990s, as our opening fragment suggests, angst about the impact on wage labor of the knowledge economy and of robotics – as well as other AI and techno-developments – has taken on hyperbolic proportions. A widely publicized report by McKinsey Global Institute (2017),31 for example, based on research in forty-six countries, has it that 800m jobs will be lost to robotics alone by 2030; less cited is a passage (p.3) adding that this does not necessarily mean mass unemployment, allowing for shifts in population demography – and, as Thompson (2015) notes for Youngstown, Ohio, iconic in the US for the end of work, the move of the unwaged into other forms of occupation. In equally agitated vein, an Oxford University study forecast, in 2013, that “machines might soon be able to perform half of all US jobs” (ibid.). The anxieties provoked by all this, filtered through social media, are especially acute at the already marginal edges of industrial workforces: among people of color, immigrants, those with limited knowledge capital and digital literacy. Thus a lively, all female YouTube discussion on “Black People vs. Robots,” curated in January 2019 by Data for Black Lives.32 Debate dwelled on the particular vulnerability of African American women, whose gains in personal service jobs since the 1970’s – in sales, transit, bank- telling – have proved especially vulnerable to automation. No sooner had these gains been realized, it was noted, than they were lost again; shades here of the newly enfranchised black South African laborers after apartheid, recognized and reduced to redundancy in a single stoke. The value calculations that drive investments in new technologies seldom factor in the social or material costs of human disposability, let alone their psychic effects. Typically, the loss of work – like falling wages and reduced pensions and other benefits33 – is blamed instead on the inefficiency, or the “unreasonable” wage demands, of the workers themselves.

    The precarity of workers at the margins, their structural impermanence in the formal economy, links them to other historically mobile wage laborers: migrants, currently the object of moral panic pumped, in many quarters, by neonationalist politics. Alike in Europe (see e.g. Pijpers 2006), the USA and UK,34 and the global south (e.g. Gordon 2014), these “transients” are popularly thought to seize the jobs of deserving citizens – despite the fact that they are essential to the reproduction of national economies, as Brexit Britain, circa 2019, is fast discovering.35 [Lack of labor is actuall driving emchaniszation in the US, where it is held by ovserers to be less efiicient than human labor. Primed in large part by nostalgic imaginings of homogenous, sovereign political communities, secured against the negative effects of global laissez-faire, these visions evoke a world that never really existed: societies composed of gainfully working members, each according to their abilities. But metropolitan Europe and the US – indeed, capitalist econom ies from their beginnings, as Cedric Robinson (1983) so carefully showed – have always rested on their seamy, suppressed undersides: their shadowy, unfree workers (Calvão 2016), a mass of paupers, in a technical sense, sans permanent jobs or independent means of subsistence (cf. Jones 1971).These were not enslaved and colonized populations abroad, but the semi-indentured back home, usually people from the edges of empire who have been kept well away from sites of secure, formal employment in both industrial and post-industrial times. [as one observer from agribusinee recently obsreved: farm work/food production across the world is in the hands of immigrants.] This reinfoces yet again the fact that it is leess naked economic determinism, but the complex ideological cast of modern captalism that is a key driver: capital strives to free itself from human labor by non-human productive means. The obsession with robotics…even where humans are more efficient…[NYT)

    How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers – addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?

    How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers –addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?

    How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers – addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?

    V.

    A historical parenthesis at this point, albeit a rather important one. It comes again courtesy of Moishe Postone (2017b:40-1) who, following Piketty (2014) and others, reminds us that the history of inequality, over the past century, has not been linear. To the contrary, it has fluctuated visibly, in consonance with other economic indices. After a period of deepening inequality in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there came a period, around the middle of the twentieth, during which it was sharply reduced, only to be followed by a reversal from the early 1970s: a resurgent, ever more extreme skewing of wealth and political power. This trajectory, he notes, was global, its three periods marked by a distinctive trend in average rates of economic growth: relatively low and slow in the first, more than doubled in the second, and decreasing palpably in the third. The pattern is clear: both growth and per capita GDP rose, especially in the middle phase, as wages increased and levels of inequality dropped; conversely, both have waned as wages have stagnated and levels of inequality risen. Since 1973, Postone adds, standards of living have fallen observably for the majority of Americans – and, he might have added, for many across the planet, both north and south – as income gaps have widened. That optimal second period, post-World War 2, is the one associated, in the archaeology of capital, with state- centric Fordism, underpinned by a Keynesian ideology of economic management. And by sanguine imaginings, at least partly realized, of a world of full employment, workers’ rights, and comprehensive social welfare, extending to the protection of citizens against joblessness, homelessness, ill-health, and indigence.

    A quick look at employment figures in this respect – figures that, as we shall argue, are to be read as much for what they hide as for what they reveal – is indicative. In the USA, for example, joblessness in the second half of the 1960s, when much more of the active population was counted than is the case today, never rose higher than 3.8%. In the early years of the Reagan administration, as the Fordist era gave way to the neoliberal, it rose above 8%; 10.8% in 1983.36 What is more, the African- American unemployment rate appears to have been roughly double that of whites for for those late twentieth-century decades.37 Likewise the UK, whose figures for 1945 to 1971 varied between 1.2% and 2.7%; it averaged a slightly higher 3.12% between 1952 and 1967. In 1983, under Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party, by sharp contrast, it reached a startling 12.9% (McGaughey 2018:5) – with blacks even more likely to suffer joblessness than in the US at the time.38 This is all the more striking in light of the fact that, in 1978, the Conservatives had unleashed an election slogan, designed by admen Saatchi and Saatchi, that proclaimed “Labour Isn’t Working.”39

    Tellingly, the history of trade unions in the USA and UK echo these trends, although it is as well to keep in mind that a large proportion of the population working without formal wages has never been included in them (Denning 2010). In 1954, 34.8% of all American wage and salary workers were union members, a figure that went down to 20.1% in 1983, soon after the attack on labor by the Reagan administration. It now stands at 11.3%.40 The power of the British unions, at its height in the 1960s and 1970s, was radically eroded during the 1980s at the behest of rising Thatcherism and its corporate backing. As archives released thirty years later show, it set out quite explicitly to “crush” these politically influential organizations41 – although revisionist conservative media prefer to attribute their demise to globalization,42 while another, more technical, view has it that the high inflation of the 1970s created a superfluity of labor that greatly weakened them.43 The ironies here are unmistakeable.

    If growth and GDP are taken to be significant indices of material well-being, both the US and the UK were at their healthiest during times when jobless rates were at their lowest, labor unions at their strongest, and inequality at its most attenuated; times, also, when the vision prevailed of an international order of new “developing” nations, aspiring to forge liberal modern economies and democratic societies in the aftermath of colonialism. Of course, there are any number of contingencies that affect fluctuations in employment and inequality, among them inflationary cycles, recessionary pressures, market “corrections,” and political upheavals. But our point does not lie in the specificity of these numbers. It lies in the fact that they speak, if tacitly, to a historical consciousness that recalls the post-W orld War 2 decades, in respect of national economies and societies, in a particular way.

    Those post-World War 2 decades – the coming-of-age years of the still powerful “baby boomer” generation – sustains a paradigmatic presence in the sociological imagination. This, in many ways, was the moment at which liberal democratic modernity, as retrospectively remembered, reached its zenith: at which talk of the Great Society, in its various global northern variants, appeared most persuasive; at which poverty and insecurity seemed to recede in the face of the norm of lifelong employment; at which the struggle for civil rights and the recognition of difference, most notably in respect of race and gender, looked like it had made permanent advances. But hiding in the plain sight, just off camera, there lurked persisting forms of exclusion, inequity, and injustice: in the impoverished black ghettos of US inner cities, for example, and the bleak estates of Northern Ireland; in the poorer reaches of immigrant England, the target of xenophobic outbreaks; in the violent theaters of neoimperial warfare in Southeast Asia and in innumerable other places. Recall that Martin Luther King was in Memphis, in early 1968 before his assassination, in support of a strike of African American sanitation workers, protesting their deadly dangerous, poorly paid, minimally protected jobs.

    Some saw, in these sites of immiseration, near and far, the possibility of popular struggle against the structures of capitalist power across the West; to wit, C. Wright Mills’ “Letter to the New Left” in New Left Review of September-October, 1960, and the subsequent rise of mass socialist and black power movements. But the superpowers themselves were avidly pursuing Cold War proxy battles for control over nominally independent postcolonial nations, the latter increasingly peripheralized by those setting the terms of international commerce; at the same time, those powers also took pains to crush dissent at home, ascribing it to “foreign interference” attendant on Cold War antagonisms and/or to communist provocateurs. And all the while, in tandem, there was a mounting resurgence of conservative forces that decried any kind of welfare state regime – in the US, New Deal liberalism, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, labor driven socialism – as an unfortunate and dangerous development that undermined individual freedom and pointed towards totalitarianism (Goldwater 1960). And so ended the post-war period, with its aspirations to etatist social democracy. From the 1970’s onward, as we noted earlier, those conservative forces were to capture the political center and push ideological orthodoxy in a contrary direction. Capital responded to the gains made by organized labor and civil rights activism in Euro-America in the mid-twentieth century by devising new free trade mechanisms under a “program of global restructuring…oriented toward altering labor markets and the organization of work” (Broad 2014:215). And so the long, dialectical struggle between capital and labor entered its latest chapter: wherever it could, the former, embodied in an ever more powerful corporate sector, pushed for privatization, deregulation, labor-free financialization, reduced legal liability, and policies of austerity at home – and reconfigured, flexibilized, outsourced production abroad, to places where workers were more abject and less protected.

    Still, for all the reverses that have occurred since, the postwar conjuncture continues, in critical respects, to be the normative template against which social expectations tend to be measured, even as the gap between those expectations and reality grows with every passing year. And so it remains plausible to speak, in the future perfect tense, of mass employment and the possibility of secure salaried work for all (see below, p.00) – undergirded by a modernist mythos honed in an age in which labor seemed to approach the most equitable pact possible with capital, in which, as we have said, the liberal idyll appeared within reach. It is a mythos that lingers even as, for more and more people, its promise disappears into the realm of the unreachable, the unreal. And gradually, especially for rising generations, the unthinkable.

    Which takes us back into realities present, into the present continuous now almost fifty years in the making, a neo-present without a foreseeable denouement.

    VI.

    Simply put, how, then, are we to read the planetary geography of labor, its empirical lineaments, in the here-and-now? Has work really come to the “end” of (its) history? Self-evidently, many people do still toil in the manufacturing and service sectors of both the global north and the global south. And, with ongoing shifts in the ecology of production, new jobs are created. The low official unemployment figures for most Euro-American nation-states – which we are soon to deconstruct – make that much plain, even if they do not speak to the nature of those jobs.

    [[In the global south, long home to a thoroughly racialized colonial capitalism, extractive industries, factories, and sweatshops continue to hire people who have no alternative but to be exploited, people whose labor has never been remotely “free,” whose effective indenture has displaced a rising proportion of Euro-American wage earners. As this reminds us, the imbrication of the south and the north in this respect – long written into the deep history of empire – has intensified since the 1970s with the space-time compression of the global economy (Harvey 1990); specifically, with the increasing velocity and brutality with which capital has taken to extracting labor, land, and resources (mostly) from debt-strapped postcolonies rendered accessible and vulnerable by so-called “structural adjustment.” Hence, for example, the indivisible the link, as Fedirici (2008) notes, between the post-industrial computer worker in Silicone Valley and the pauperized digger of coltan, essential to digital technology, in war-torn Eastern Congo; and, more extemely, the disemployed US garment worker and the lowly child laborer in Cambodia.44 ]]

    At the same time, as we have intimated, the mechanization, modularization, and dispersal of wage work has served its devaluation by allowing production to be parceled out, geographically: in the age of the “planetary labor market,” observes Mark Graham,45 “millions of jobs can now be done from almost anywhere on Earth,” even at the level of the micro-task. enabling firms to take advantage of what has been called “the global reserve army” on a “per-click” rather than a per-person basis. Employees in remote reaches of rural Central Africa may work in some of the twenty-first century’s most advanced tech industries, carrying out routine tasks – like basic data recognition and classification – that machines cannot yet perform. These workers are components of an overall process about which they are told practically nothing, including the fact that the very tasks they are performing are likely soon to render them and their kind redundant. And while, in theory, the flexibility of geographies of production could distribute the opportunity to work across the world, in practice, says Graham, they exert “huge downward pressure on wages and working conditions” everywhere; Kaushik Basu (2016:3) – just one voice in a fast growing literature aptly dubbed “Globalization, Labor Markets, and Inequality” (Dadush and Shaw 2012a; a) – refers to this effect of planetary articulation as “labor-linking.” It is no accident, in this light, that the make-shift, open-air factory described by Graham is located deep in the Central African countryside: long histories of violent extraction in colonial contexts, as we have already intimated, have always been the underside of the Euromodernist romance of free labor. Postcolonial work often survives, in the age when labor migrates with less friction than people,46 because African workers are often still cheaper than machines. Even quite highly skilled workers, as Nina Sylvanus (n.d.) shows, may remain less costly to capital than their robotic replacement – as they are in African ports,47 where, unlike in, say, Hamburg or Rotterdam, crane operators have not been substituted by nonhuman “solutions.” At least not for now.

    In other words, partly because of the globalization and reorganization of productive work, partly because of the way that capital has come to redefine its relationship to labor and technology, secure, emplaced employment in advanced industrial societies – the sort on which, ideologically at least, livelihoods, social benefits, long-term career trajectories, and local communities were thought to be founded until fin de siècle – has given way everywhere, north and south, to a quite different regime. Whether more or less people are actually “employed” (whatever that may mean today),48 whether there are more or less jobs (however they may be defined), the corporate capture of the state, financialization and deregulation, the rising hegemony of the market, and the re-articulation of the planetary economy have led to an ever greater proportion of received forms of work likely to migrate abruptly to more exploitable sites, to be mechanized, to be casualized, to be reduced to piecemeal (“per unit” or “per click”) operations – or, in the case of extractive industries, to be displaced when its products, like diamonds, are made by new synthetic means.49 Either way, as it has become commonplace to note, real remuneration under the new regime tends either to be largely static or liable to downward pressure,50 open to wage theft by corporations or labor brokers, and perennially uncertain.51 Which compels workers, class and race and gender and generation notwithstanding, to become entrepreneurs- or contractors-of-the-self: responsibilized, risk-bearing persons, possessed of their species being-as-capital; neoliberal subjects, that is, of the sort characterized by Foucault in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) – and as anticipated in the post-Keynesian economics epitomized early on by Gary Becker’s Human Capital (1964).

    For those who find it difficult to remain in the conventional workforce, or to find a “traditional” job – rising numbers across the world, uncounted in national statistics (see below), have stopped trying – the pursuit of alternate means of securing an income presents itself as a matter of brute survival. This may be especially so in the global south, although it is increasingly true of the north as well; after all, “of those who are employed, 60% world-wide are in temporary, part-time or short-term work with falling wages” (Fouksman 2017a:28). In South Africa, for example, according to The Economist, a startling 870,000 formal sector jobs were lost in 2009 alone despite solid economic growth;52 this in the wake of the severe attrition of the labor market over the longer run (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Yet wageless black South Africans, around 27% of whom are officially unemployed,53 have found creative ways to husband Money from Nothing (James 2015), and, even more, to make a living, albeit often a spare one, from an astonishingly wide range of activities (Steinberg 2013);54 Furthermore, as research has repeatedly shown, most of them sustain a strong desire to find employment and thereby join the salariat (e.g. Ferguson 2015:40; Fouksman 2017b:4; Dubbeld n.d.:22; cf. Barchiesi 2007); this amidst ongoing public debate, echoed in other countries too, over the politics of distribution, the social necessity of cash transfers, and the un/desirability of a basic income grant for citizens who, argues James Ferguson (2015), are owed a “rightful share” of the national wealth (see also Fouksman 2017a:30).55 To wit, many proponents of these distributional transfers – or, as they are now being called in Italy, “citizens’ income” – link them to re-entry into the job market or into petty entrepreneurialism (a.k.a. self-employment), and hence celebrate them as an answer to the “end of work;”56 although, for his own part, Ferguson (2015:20) has it that “wage work…is not going to return.” Perhaps in proportion to its eclipse, wage labor, it seems, is being morally revalued as it is materially devalued. The former, its moral value, as we have noted, has its roots in the theological inscription of labor in the very fabric of modern capitalism; it appears to sustain itself, even to wax, in the age of the Moral Neoliberal (Muehlebach 2012; see above). Contemporary personhood, as this suggests, remains deeply invested in the dignity of work and the socio-psychological significance of an earned income (see e.g. Somavia 2015; Fouksman 2017b:4), all the more so as large numbers of (especially young) people in many parts are suspended in what has come widely to be known as “waithood,”57 a concept first developed in relation to one of Europe’s southern peripheries and now commonly used across the world.

    [In the past, development economics tended to have a negative view of the informal economy, the so-called second economy, as impeding economic growth; they tried to merge the informal into the formal; in recent years the informal econ has been rebranded and revalorized as a “hidden engine…of growth” (Boyd on WIPO). Likewise, the World Bank now writes of artisanal mining, still criminalized in many parts of the world, as job creating. However, Emma Stuart et al say that “informal is the new normal”]

    And so rising numbers of people across the planet, extruded for one or another reason from formal employment, turn to an ever expanding range of practices that conjoin entrepreneurialism and the capitalization of the self to auto-employed labor in the cause of (more less hand to mouth) primitive accumulation. Thus it is that there has been an explosion of adjectives attached to the noun “economy”; to name just a select few, the artisanal economy, the sharing economy, the caring economy, the affective economy (what Arlie Hochschild [1979] called “emotion work,” aka immaterial) economy, the cultural economy, the criminal economy – some of them subumed under the collective rubric of the “gig” economy. And in each case, the term “economy” may itself be replaced by “labor,” thus to describe the species of activity now commonly associated with it. Each, moreover, has commanded a burgeoning literature of its own, both scholarly and popular. This is not the place to review them in detail. For present purposes, some synoptic sketch notes will do.

    Take the artisanal economy. “Artisans,” according to an article published in 2015 by Forbes,58 constitute “a sector now equivalent to the world’s fourth-largest economy,” with the “fourth largest workforce,” although it did not say quite how such a quantum might be calculated; it added a quote by then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to the effect that artisans are a “terrific” “place to begin” looking for “innovative way to help developing countries flourish,” as though they are a new historical phenomenon, unknown in the global south. Still, if has become a “type of entrepreneurship…widely acknowledged as an engine for poverty reduction and economic development.” And so history has been turned on its head: what modernity sought to drag domestic economies away from has become a panacea for reversing the devastation left in the wake of modernization. And, according to Derek Thompson (2015), not just for the global south: it was, he noted, one of the futures for the likes of Youngstown, and other northern cities devastated by the latest chapter in the history of capital.

    What is more, an international NGO industry – another sort of entrepreneurial “economy” in itself, one that employs an immaterial army of to manage post-work across the planet – has grown up in support of the artisanal “sector.” NGO’s like the Alliance for Artisan Enterprise (also Artisan Alliance), whose home page claims that the “artisan sector is the second-largest employer in the developing world after agriculture, worth over $32 billion every year.”59 The Artisan Alliance is “hosted” by the Aspen Institute and is sponsor of “a new #ChooseArtisan campaign to bring attention to the importance of the creative economy” (our italics) – which, adds the Forbes article, is a “pathway out of poverty for millions of households.” But it ends a little more soberly, with the “serious roadblocks” that face artisans, such things as under- capitalization, disadvantages of scale, illiquid inventories, ephemeral and unpredictable demand, inability to tap into supply chains and formal markets, and so on and on. All of which tends to ensure that the artisanal economy remains an economy of the poor, producers whose products, if they are successfully sold, continue to accrue profits to people other than themselves. Like IKEA, which “collaborates with rural artisans around the world to create limited-edition collections that are sold in its stores.” Needless to say, we do not know how its profit sharing arrangements, like so many “fair trade” retail marketing contracts, are structured.60 Nonetheless, across the world, artisanal economies are often touted as a panacea for the flight from wage labor into entrepreneurialism – and are often a resort for those who find themselves suddenly un- or under-employed, with few other choices – although, of course, what they obscure is the fact that artisanship is simply labor without a wage, labor with the risk that the commodities produced by the unwaged entrepreneur of her- or himself has also to be marketed, a process for which that producer takes all the risks, and bears allthe costs, involved.

    Or take the sharing economy, made globally visible, and typified, by the rise of such megacorporations as Uber and Airbnb. It is a largely “platform” economy in which self-employed laborers deploy their “under-utilized assets” and “flexibile schedules” – i.e. unused, unpaid, unwanted labor time – effectively to become “independent contractors” engaged in “the peer to peer based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and services, co-ordinated through community-based online services” (Hamari et al. 2015:2047). What sorts of operations (eBay? Craigslist?) actually fall within this definition, or cognate ones – and in what sense digital mega-firms are “community-based” – is a matter of some discussion (Yaraghi and Ravi 2017:4-5). Still, the explosion of this economy, whose projected revenue growth from $14bn in 2014 to $335bn by 2025 (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC] 2015:14), another occult statistic since such things are hardly knowable, appears to have reached deeply into accommodation and hospitality, transportation and delivery, consumer goods, cash lending, labor swaps; this to the extent that a report by PwC (2015), which defines the sharing economy quite capaciously (p.5) and offers a detailed analysis of who uses it and for what purposes, reports that 51% of US respondents to their survey said that they were likely to be providers and 71% consumers in this economy within two years, i.e. by 2017. For PwC, the rise of this economy is a potential threat to labor, rather than a panacea for those rendered precarious by the new capitalist economy (p.29):

    “One of the more controversial aspects of the sharing economy is the impact it has on the labor force, and the perceived shift toward contract-based employment…For some, this is regarded as a benefit, enabling workers to earn wages on their own time and their own terms. For others, it heralds an era of depressed earnings and greater reliance on welfare and other government subsidies. 78% of adults said they expected that in 30 years, working multiple jobs would be the new normal for wage earners.”

    The last sentence, however, is its own corrective: PwC’s informants appear to understand that it is their current status as employees in secure, income generating employment that is under threat, making their entry into the sharing economy, past or potential not a problem, but a solution. But one thing is clear: across the globe, the horizons of this economy, however it ought best to be named and characterized – whether it involves government supplied low cost housing in a South African black township being rented to tenants as its owners relocate to a shack in the backyard or a retired chef in a Singapore high-rise using his dining room as a chic restaurant to entertain “guests” – appear to be expanding rapidly as ordinary people across the planet find it necessary or desirable to recommission their possessions or their labor power in the cause of yielding an income.

    Thus far, the sharing economy has rested in turning into assets the means of domestic reproduction and everyday life. This, of course, is not new. It has precedents in many parts of the world, especially in the global south – among them, for example, the shebeens of black South African townships during the apartheid years, where, in the absence of private space or family around them, migrant laborers treated the homes of their owners as something akin to a shared “living room,” a place to eat, drink, and socialize around the figure of the female host. It is simply that the practice has spread, especially in the north, and become more explicitly a strategy of accumulation by turning non-commodified objects and services into commodified ones. More recently, however, the sharing economy has stretched away from the domestic into the finance sector, with a major explosion, across much of the world, of peer-to- peer [P2P] lending and debt-based crowdfunding (a.k.a. “crowdlending”), usually brokered through on-line “platform” companies, some of which – in light of the high risk/high return nature of the practice, now referred to as an “industry” – have evinced very sharp cycles of accumulation and implosion;61 sans platforming and the internet, as those familiar with the global south know very well, P2P lending has long-standing foreshadowings in rotating credit groups across colonial and postcolonial Africa (e.g. Ardener 1964; James 2015) and in Islamic finance (Sadr 2017); also Japan, where it is said to go back to the thirteenth century (Izumida 1992).

    From sharing to caring, of course, is a relatively short step. The caring, or affective economy, likewise, has become newly revalued as a domain of labor. As we have already noted, feminist critique has long pointed out that unremunerated domestic work and household production, done largely by women – but also, in “traditional” African cultures, by youths (e.g. Meillassoux 1981) – has classically gone unrecognized for what it has always been: an unrecognized, unwaged toil, rendered a free good by a patriarchal, gerontocratic ideology of kinship, family, and matrimony. In recent years, however, many of the forms of labor associated with (uncommodified) care, much of it invested in intergenerational kinship ties, have become a source of paid activity. [Filipino’s across the world; Israel only as example] Hence, for instance, the 30,000 Filipino women who look after the elderly and infirm in Israel (Liebelt 2011) – “Israel’s Invisible Filipino Work Force”62 – whose incomes support their own families back home, thus displacing the work of domestic life, and its reproduction, into the global labor market. A very global market, one that extends far beyond Israel: in Canada, to take another example, a program to import Filipinas to care for children brought almost 24,000 in 2014 alone.63 What is more, public discourse in the Philippines invests the export of its carers with cultural heft. Hence a Manila newspaper: “Being a caregiver is not only a matter of profession… [It is] about deep love, respect and care to someone of old age or anybody else who needs treatment…This is something rooted in Filipino culture and an identity as a Filipino.”64 Thus do culture and selfhood fuse into a brand that is born in the form of putatively unalienated labor that seeks, as it takes on the guise of a commodity, to become a form of monopoly capital. [LONG HISTORY; state labor export policy, with legal and diplomatic mechanisms; on 4 continents; see essay of Filipino state policy in relation to labor exports, M. Scott Solomon. ADD Cape Verde, women migrants in domestic reproduction]

    Of course, the line between care and other forms of commodified service can be rather murky; vide Luise White’s Comforts of Home (1990), a study of prostitution in colonial Kenya, which makes the point that “the work of prostitutes” which did not carry the stigma here that it did in Euroe, “was family labor” (p.2) their relationships with their male customers both “intimate and stable” (p.1). Hence the title of the volume, which describes a phenomenon common in other parts of urban Africa – especially those that were host to large populations of single proletarian migrant men; recall South African shebeens, mentioned a moment ago – and made famous in popular culture by the jazz opera, King Kong, in which Miriam Makeba played her debut role as the keeper of “Back of the Moon”65 – which were widely treated as homes away from home. Given the explosion of the caregiving market in many diverse directions across the world – not coincidentally, the anthropology of care has become its own burgeoning scholarly market of late (see e.g. Alber and Drotbohm 2015) – there are many other instances that come to mind, but perhaps none so remarkable as growing Japan’s “rent-a-family” industry (Batuman 2018),66 a commodified service in the supply of care described as “human affection through the form of the family” (pp.51, 57). Companies like Family Romance will supply substitutes for almost any conceivable role, not least to provide “the comforts of home” (p.59): doppelgangers for a divorced parent for an emotionally wrought teenager, a deceased spouse and daughter for a lonely widow, an overweight mother fearful of appearing at school events and embarrassing her child, a bridegroom for a totally staged, fake wedding to appease impatient (proto-grand)parents, a wife’s lover from whom an aggrieved cuckold demands an apology, children for neglected elders and vice versa, and so on, and on. The industry, which appears to have spawned a great deal of prose fiction, has a deep archaeology, as Batuman (ibid.:58) reminds us, and not only in Japan: “people throughout human history have been paying strangers” – typically strangers of less elevated socioeconomic status – “to fill roles that their kinsfolk performed for free.” Or were expected to and, either out of necessity or preference, did (and increasingly do) not. The vast majority of white South African families during the apartheid era devolved (as many still do) some of the intimate functions of motherhood and wifehood to lowly-paid black carers, “maids” as they were known (Cock 1980, Gaitskell et al. 1983) – and dealt awkwardly with the affective ties that grew up as a result. It was an awkwardness expressed once in the cruelly ambivalent treatment of these women less than fully human, certainly not adult, and yet as faux “members of the family,” servants who could be terminated at a whim; Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) refers to the highly exploitative relationship between “maids and madams” (Cock, ibid.) tellingly in light of our present concerns, as “mutual zombification.” [Bougeois families have long paid underclass others to raise their families in the most intimate domains of the domestic; wet nurses, nannies etc]

    The Japanese case is quite different, of course, in the nature of the contract and the conditions that have given rise to it; it attaches to the high end of the caring, affective economy, not to its indentured extremes. According, again, to Batuman (2018:57f), the rise of immaterial labor here, in this form, is owed largely to two things: changes in the post-World War 2 economic sociology of the country, which has seen the rise of single person (including older) families, a withering of the extended household, and, with “the deregulation of the Japanese labor market,…the erosion of the salaryman lifestyle”; and a spreading Foucauldian postmodernism that imagines everything to be constructed, including the affective relationships associated with intimate domesticity, thus allowing “the alchemy of the marketplace [to] transform strangers into loved ones” (p.58). And so the affective economy creates a domain of employment that returns an older form of unwaged, intimate labor as respectable, paid domestic work, less a new phenomenon than the re-cognition and re-tooling of something that has always existed as a species of devalued, proto-indentured work. [across the world there have always been paid companions; here it extends into the family and close kinship, a line typically drawn elsewhere to differentiate it from kinship; kinship highly relevant here under advanced capitalism, more so than in many places.]

    To which there is yet a further twist. Japan, it appears, lies at the frontier of the expansion of the affective economy into…robotics which, if it ever comes about, will displace the labor of humans in this sector with machines: robot lovers and wives, the largely masculinist anti- or post-human fantasy. Nor will “she” be merely a sexual service provider. She will interact with “owner, understand him, entertain him, offer him companionship, thus to encourage the relationship with her to “develop into love.”67 Unless and until switched off, thereby accruing to the “virtual love industry” the huge advantage of partners, made to desired specification, but sans the usual irritations of living with a spouse. [MARRIAGE rates everywhere dropping; its too expensive; the movie in Shoplifting] Which, some believe, would well suit the culturally inflected needs of the 45% of Japanese men who, according to a state survey in 2011, have no interest in finding a live female partner.68 All of which resonates wth David Levy’s visionary Love and Sex with Robots (2008), which predicts, well, sex and love with robots, culminating in marriage by 2050 – thus, presumably, eliminating spouses from the domain of unremunerated intimate and domestic labor, and rendering redundant their waged human replacements, only to have them return in humanoid form, once the machine age version of an African brideprice has been paid.

    The notion of a specifically Japanese proclivity for solving the problem of social isolation by recourse to commodified intimacy, like the presumptive inscription of Filipina caregiving in a primordial Fijian sensibility, opens a opens a bridge to yet another growing species of labor: that accruing to cultural economies, to what we have called, elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), Ethnicity, Inc., a phenomenon that has expanded in some contexts in direct proportion to the loss of wage work (p.11ff.). This phenomenon, too, comes in many guises. In so far as it inflects emergent forms of employment – some of it, of course, manifest in, and articulated with, the rising artisanal economy – it expresses itself in an appeal to essentialized potencies and capacities that are said to inhere in an ascriptive identity: Australian Aboriginal art work, Zulu pottery, Lanna Thai massage, Peruvian Shipibo shamanic medicine, Himalayan Sherpa mountain guidance, Roma divination and fortune telling, Nepalese Limbu weaving, Chinese Miao silver smithing. In many instances, these activities involve self-employment and entrepreneurial engagement; some ethno-providers of goods and services represent themselves as deeply “traditional – indeed, exotically “other” – albeit in strikingly digital-savvy ways as they sell their skills and wares on their own account. Others are employed in the corporate sector for a wage: San (Bushmen) game trackers in the safari industry, “nimble fingered” Bengali tea pickers, Zapotec textile producers, Maori and Samoan rugby players. [This capitalizes on the abundance of culture; money from nothing – ie cultural resources – see Eric Hirsch]

    Again, none of this is new. There has long been ethnic and national branding, simultaneously inside and outside the market, simultaneously essentialized and commodified, simultaneously alienable and inalienable. What is notable, however, appears to be the scale with which ethno-prise, amidst a rising consumer appetite for “authenticity,” is increasing the demand for ethnicized labor. On occasion, moreover, that labor has interpolated itself into inter/national imaginaries. Note the case of Fiji. Simon May (n.d.) shows how, in the context of a growing world market for private military power, indigenous Fijians assert a “form of cultural distinctiveness,” founded on their claim to be a “fighting people,” in order “to secure positions for themselves as…contractors within the supply-chain of outsourced warfare” – most notably, in the British army. The means of violence, it seems, is an integral part of the expanding cultural economy. And not only in its licit forms.

    Which brings us to another context in which entrepreneurialism of the self, primitive accumulation, and labor conjoin increasingly outside the formal sector: what is sometimes referred to, with more than a hint of racism, as the “black” economy, which stretches, with considerable plasticity, from petty hustling to violent crime. Across Africa, for example, what sometimes begin as hustles often end up as recognized, more-or-less il/licit, jobs in the so-called “informal sector.” These include everything from “car guarding” and “personal security” in South Africa (Steyn et al. 2015) through professional trickery in Nigeria (Hibou 1999 [MORE specific]), kukiya- kiya (“making do”) in Zimbabwe (Jones 2010), and débrouillage (“getting by,” “managing”) in the Francophone west,69 to coastal piracy and high-end smuggling in the Chad Basin (Roitman 2005, 2006). Despite its “informality,” this sector has a major, well-recognized impact on GDP, [NB OF ARTISANAL/SMALL MINING ON GDP/GNP] on the socio-material and moral landscapes of the continent, and on the viability of many nation-states, a good number of which seek now to levy taxation on its enterprises (Dube and Casale 2017).70 Hustling, of course, has a large presence in the global north as well, some of it close to the engines of finance capital and the state (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), but much of it minor, nestling along the fringes of the “formal” economy.

    At its “darkest,” the informal sector merges into criminal or “shadow” economies, which offer a wide, and growing, range of job opportunities across the world; the image of the “shadow,” and of “criminal specters,” having gained considerable purchase in the florescent literature on the anthropology of crime, criminal states, and the murky line between the legal and illegal in the in the contemporary age of global capitalism (see e.g. Ferguson 2006; Reno 1995, 2000; Roitman 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:16ff; cf. Derrida 1994:83). And, for a disturbingly large number of people, their sole means of survival. Thus, for example, as Levitt and Venkatesh (2000:755) note,72 recent studies of US street gangs – which remark their dramatic corporatization since the late twentieth century (e.g. Taylor 1990)73 – indicate that many of their “members pursue financial activities in response to alienation from legitimate labor markets” (our italics). Levitt and Venkathesh go on to compare average earnings in the drug trade with those in the formal sector: marginally higher, much riskier, motivated less by income in the present than by the prospect of future riches (ibid.). And, of course, the relative ease of finding work. This, we stress, is not to imply that the criminal economy is founded purely on, or shaped purely by, economic necessity or inequality, although such claims are quite often made. Unemployment, as Jonny Steinberg (2000:1f.) has pointed out, is far from the only explanation for law-breaking. People enter into this economy – or resist doing so – for a wide variety of reasons. Our point, simply, is that, along with other “post-work” spheres of human activity, it provides a site, at once material and social, into which people who would otherwise have lived their lives out in the wage labor force might interpolate themselves; or, if rational choice theorists (e.g. Becker 1968; Posner 1981) were to be believed, might choose to enter, basing their decision on a risk-return calculus like any other. [UNDERCLASSES have always lived this way – Dickensian London/ SA: people “choosing not to join the formal economy”]

    In public perception, of course, and in much normative sociology, criminal activity is taken to be the opposite of work; as if human endeavor requires a moral imprimature to be regarded as labor, sensu stricto. And yet for many of those who partake of it, crime is work. Serious, skilled work. There is an unforgettable moment in Mark Gevisser’s Lost and Found in Johannesburg (2014) when, trapped in a brutally violent house invasion, he reports, verbatim, the words of one of the armed attackers: “This is our job. This is how we do our work. You go to your work and we go to our work…You must respect us or we will kill you” (p.250). Less a case of honor among thieves than the honor of thieves. And the dignity of their labor. Also its requisite professionalism. Thus a Johannesburg detective laughs at an inept pair of carjackers, naifs who lacked the necessary proficiency for successful hit: “F—ing amateurs. They didn’t even know what they were going to say” to their intended victim (Altbeker 2000:27). Sometimes, as Paswane Mpe (2000:1) reminds us, this line of business has its own heroic celebrity, by now a Benjaminian (1978:281) cliche: the abiding, if perhaps ambivalent, admiration for the sheer artistry, the accomplished performance, evinced in the clever heist, the daring robbery, the slick take-down of a reviled personage; the assailants in the attack to which Gevisser was a participating witness referred to themselves, proudly, as “heroes [with] guns” (ibid.). In the criminal economy, as this boast implies, the revolver or the knife or the club, relatively cheap objects, are the only required means of production – or, more accurately, of redistribution. At its non-violent end, the chosen tools of trade may be a cheap laptop, a cell phone, counterfeit plastic, a stolen uniform. Criminality-as-labor, self-evidently, offers many points of access, many techniques of extraction, many sources of primitive accumulation. [Hijack Stories: “step away from my associate,” said to a cop] [Criminal behavior in colonial contexts seen as critique of racialized social exploitation, and a form of redistribution; from the much critted Primitive Rebels to Van Onnselin’s Regiment of the Hills.]

    Not everyone extruded from the formal sector is able to enter into one of these economies, be it artisanal, sharing, caring, cultural, criminal, or whatever. People who no longer sustain the prospect of earning an income may nowadays find themselves caught up with corporate capital not as labor but as more-or-less dehumanized commodities: as objects from which value is extracted under regimes of radical privatization and financialization, regimes that look, systematically, to profit from anything and everything. [Capital always finds new places to go, more assets to harvest.] Perennial as it has always been to capitalism (Luxemburg 1951:452ff.), primitive accumulation in its postmodern guise, ever more all-consuming (Harvey 2005), seems especially prone to a necropolitics; the “subjugation,” that is, “of life to the power of [social, if not physical] death” (Mbembe 2003:39). To wit, necrocapitalism, as Bannerjee (2008) and others call it,74 expropriates unto itself the very necessities of existence: water, air, food, shelter, security, land, infrastructure, culture. Indeed, the corporate capture of these things has spawned what are now referred to as “living politics” (Chance 2017), the “politics of life” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:159f.; cf. Agamben 1998:10), “vital politics” (e.g. Povinelli 2016; Muehlebach 2017)75 – all terms for collective action against the (necro?) capitalization of, and profiteering off, assets long held to inhere in citizenship and the social contract, in people’s sovereignty, civil society, and the commons. Specifically, the elemental bases of life itself (Simmons 2016).

    Perhaps the most dramatic instance of the transformation of human labor into human life as commodity is to be found in the carceral subject. There is no need here to recapitulate the literature – most developed in the US but echoed elsewhere – on the “penal state” (e.g. Simon 2007; Garland 2013) and “carceral capitalism” (e.g. Wang 2018). Suffice it to say that it ties the fluorescence of neoliberalism to the warehousing of previously working, now disposable people (especially Blacks, Hispanics, but also indigent Whites) in “correctional” facilities (Herivel and Wright 2003), leveraged largely through a “war” on the criminal economy (Wacquant 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2016); to the maintenance, in addition, of segregated urban environments, creating zones – ghettos, favelas, banlieus, projects, townships – of containment (Beckett and Herbert 2010; Smith 2013; cf. Massey and Denton 1993) and “hyperpolicing” (e.g. Tibbs 2010); to the practice of “governing through crime” populations said to be uncivil and worse (Simon 2009; cf. Foucault 1977); to the “farming” of fines from the poor, itself a source of their spiraling, unaffordable debt and high rates of imprisonment (Stillman 2014:5); to the more or less permanent elimination of convicted felons from the labor market. It is by these and other means, disenfranchisement among them, that citizenship is annulled, rights removed, humanity negated. And the formerly employed reduced to a corporeal reservoir from which surplus value may be gleaned. In times past, penality carried with it, at least ideologically, the promise of rehabilitation and a return to the workforce. Not any more. In many places, crime and punishment are about permanent exit, social death, zombification – thus to make the prisoner’s body, sans sentient civility, an instrument of accumulation.

    How? Well, for one thing, by privatizing prisons, parole, and other institutions of the criminal justice system – or, more often, outsourcing their operations – which licences carceral corporations to charge the public purse for accommodating, feeding, guarding, and providing other “facilities” to inmates; this at the same time as making the latter pay, often extortionately, for basic goods and services76 – all at minimum cost to themselves. The culture industry, epitomized in the USA by Orange is the New Black (dir., Jenji Kohan 2013-present), offers vivid ethnographic illustration of quite how comprehensive, and profit-seeking, is the business-managerial treatment of convicts and their bodies. Not surprisingly, there is plenty of evidence to the effect that firms operating in the prison-industrial complex lobby actively to keep captive populations as large as possible; the paroled population, as well, from whose supervised “freedom” hefty returns are also to be earned. At the same time, prison labor itself, often thought to be a prime site of exploitation, is a rather limited enterprise: in most correctional facilities relatively few do productive work for the private sector. Most who toil at all do so menially, usually servicing the institution itself (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2016:44).77 It from working on them, sustaining them in a condition of relatively spare life, that money is to be made.

    The point need not be labored. The carceral subject-as-object is just one instance of a growing economy in which humans, reduced to their bodies, are commodified in the cause of neo-primitive accumulation; “neo-,“ since this, too, is far from new. Per contra, it has a history as long as history itself, in which modern slavery and racial capitalism are epochal moments from whose effects a good part of the planet is still having to recover. Its twenty-first century forms, alike, do not require to be spelled out. Trafficking, in all its hydra-headed guises, is said to be a “pandemic…[from] which no country is immune”: according to UNICEF, there are 21m people being trafficked around the world, yielding annual profits of $32bn.78 Contemporary slavery, says one authoritative source, embraces some 40.3m people today;79 in 2016, estimates varied from 21m (International Labor Organization) to 46m (Global Slavery Index).80 Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers also present themselves as embodied, for-profit opportunities to those who deal, legally or otherwise, in transporting, managing, and servicing displaced persons. To be sure, the categorical distinctions separating different types of exploitable subjects are often murky, porous. But, more to the present point, in the world “after labor” it is the line between the working and the worked-on that draws our attention, a line that tends increasingly to be crossed in one direction – away from the former toward the latter. Which returns us to the paradox: if this is so, if conventional forms of wage labor are disappearing, or morphing in so many directions, how do we explain the low official unemployment rates in so many places – or, almost everywhere, the fairly common presumption, indeed blind faith, that economic and social problems may be resolved, alchemically, by “creating more jobs”?

    VII.

    Once again, let us distinguish between the empirical, the conceptual, and the phenomenological dimensions of the paradox.

    Take the first first. Empirically-speaking, as we have already said, there has never truly been a time of full employment. Or anything near it. The ideology-speak that continues to pretend to the possibility (see e.g. Stiglitz 2003:292f.; Schmid 2008:vii) – and/or claims that, under felicitous conditions, it has been “achieved”81 – wilfully ignores the fact that capital has always sustained, more or less c/overtly, a “reserve army of labor” (Marx 1976:781 et passim);82 or that, as Cedric Robinson (1983:24) insists, slavery and indenture has always been a critical element of capitalist production in and beyond Europe, and that, along with discounted, insecure immigrant labor, were a significant proportion of national proletariats. Nor is this all. As Kasmir (2018) observes, even at the height of Fordism in the US, the ur-case of this ideology- in-action, “whole segments of the population were excluded” from the workforce. As she and others have intimated, the precarity of the poor and the pigmented, the domestic and the disabled, the marginal and the migrant – those, in short, unembraced by organized labor and discounted as unemployable – may have become a scholarly preoccupation of late (after Butler 2004; cf. e.g. Standing 2011). But it has been an immanent feature of the history of capitalism all along, epitomized by racially-saturated colonial contexts like South Africa. What is more, Michael Denning (2010) recalls, Marx himself observed that the “wageless,” having been expelled en masse from work, were rendered invisible to political economy, indeed to polite society, from the first. This was especially so in the global north, we would add, during the post-World War 2 years, the heyday of Keynesian hegemony (above, p.00), when, in Denning’s words, “the wage [as] the source of capitalist ideolog[y],” of its notions of freedom and equality and the good life, were most palpably fetishized – thus to obscure the fact that wageless life is not a side effect, but “the starting point in understanding the free market,” past and present.

    Herein lies a critical element in the resolution of the paradox: its empirical erasure at the hands of the ostensibly value-free pragmatism of formal economics and modernist political discourse; specifically, of its occulting of reality by recourse to statistical reason.83 Put it this way: if, in a population, a significant percentage of those who lack employment are made to disappear from sight by literally discounting their very existence, the remaining proportion, those who do have jobs, will, statistically- speaking, appear concomitantly large. Under these conditions, there is no army of jobless people to be concerned about, nor does the “end of work” seem imminent. Per contra, full employment looks to lie well this side of the horizon of possibility and of public policy – thus to sustain the dignity of labor, and an honestly earned paycheck, as the mythic cornerstone of the good life.

    Thus in the USA, for example, the official unemployment rate hovers below 4% at present, which conjures the illusion of a largely working population. But this figure only takes into account those who are positioned to look for work and are doing so. It ignores entirely the “employment-population ratio.”84 The latter, by contrast, embraces everyone of working age, including those who are no longer in the formal job market: those who, unable to find anything else, have taken themselves out of it to enter into other – recall, artisanal, sharing, caring, affective, cultural and criminal – economies; or those who are prevented from entering employment by virtue of disability, injury, imprisonment, forced retrenchment, early retirement, custodial responsibility for others, and so on; or those who have simply become unavoidably indigent. In April 2018, this ratio was just 60.3%; in other words, almost 40% of the able bodied citizenry of America, their sociological profiles highly predictable, were not in waged jobs. These figures, trust them or not, come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.85 The discrepancy between the employment-population ratio and official jobless numbers, which are the ones most touted in the political sphere and the academy, derives, in major part, from the uncounted carceral population; the mass of primarily Black and Hispanic inner city residents to whom the formal economy is effectively closed; people, mainly women, compelled by the lack of state welfare to look after others; and laid-off laborers in places from which manufacturing and extractive industries have decamped.

    Nor is the US alone in the way it dis/counts. In the U.K, according to a study undertaken at Sheffield Hallam University, “unemployment is three times [more] than the official count,”86 notwithstanding the fact that this much-heralded count, 3.9% at the time of writing, is the lowest since the pre-Thatcherite Labour Party administration of the mid-1970s. The Hallam study echoes both public discourse – which acknowledges that “there is more hidden unemployment than suggested by the official statistics”87 – and scholarly accounts. In respect of the latter, economist David Blanchflower (2019), in his forthcoming Not Working, puts it bluntly: “don’t trust low unemployment numbers… Standard economic measures are often blind” to the very large numbers who are radically “underemployed or have simply given up trying to find a well-paying job”; extraordinarily, 55% of all jobs created since 2008 are part-time, that is, in the gig economy. He adds, also, that “wages have fallen more [in the past decade] than ever in recorded history” – and that the self-employed, who boost the myth of “rosy employment figures,” earn significantly less those in paid jobs.88 Another case, this, of hiding the radical transformation of contemporary labor, of its structural demography, in a form of occult numeration that, simultaneously, makes phenomena reappear as they disappear, rendering them at once absent-and-present in the moment of their re- presentation. Likewise Italy, often said to be a southern nation in the global north (Wagner 2017; Dainotto 2011; Cassano 2012),89 where the official unemployment rate is 10.5%, where migrants who work for “hunger wages…in conditions of slavery” are blamed for almost everything and are the object of rising racist violence,90 and where a large slice of the population is “employed in the black [economy]”: the Minister of Labor in its Five Star Movement (M5S) government has actually referred to the uncounted millions living below the poverty line and “on the margins of [the] country,” as “invisible people.”91 The nations of the global south, in general, register rather higher levels than do the USA or the UK; hence our comments earlier about those both officially recognized and publicly discussed in South Africa, whose “expanded” rate – the rough equivalent of the US employment-population ratio – was 37 percent in 2018. Either those nations are less intent to hide their historically low formal employment rates behind a statistical fig leaf, or more of their able bodied adults persist longer in looking for wage employment.

    There is another way to make the paradox disappear empirically. It is, in addition to discounting significant numbers of those excluded from work, by “add[ing] more people into the employed category without changing anyone’s actual status.”92 There are two obvious ways of doing this. The first is to count radically under- employed people as if they were properly employed, going as far as to take in those who do barely any work at all. Statistics South Africa, for instance, counts persons those who did wage work for no more than a hour in the week before its quarterly labor force surveys,93 So does the USA, which also includes those who, while formally having a job, were not necessarily doing it for one or another recognized reason.94 As this suggests, so-called “non-standard workers” – who labor on flexitime, under highly temporary and fragile arrangements, or under that oxymoronic absent-presence, the zero-hour contracts,– may inflate formal numbers by a significant margin: along with the self-employed, they made up a full 39% of the entire European Union workforce in 2016 (European Commission 2018:19). At the other extreme are those in a regular position who are paid insufficient to subsist on, and have, therefore, to hold multiple jobs; school teachers and menial service workers in the US come immediately to mind. They are counted just once, hence to enshrine the idea that it is formal employment, under whatever conditions, that is significant, rather than a livelihood – a point to which we shall return.

    The second way of making the paradox disappear by making more people appear to be employed is to redefine labor so broadly as to include basically any form of social productivity, be it mental or manual, waged or unwaged, formal or informal, even licit or illicit. This is what the European Commission on the Future of Work, Future of Society (2018:7,19) comes close to doing in the cause of recognizing unpaid exertions as a worthy basis of the dignity classically associated with wage labor: “Traditional concepts of work,” it says, “must be rethought to take in a much broader array of ‘non-standard employment,” including “a range of unpaid contributions to our societies…” Nor is the European Commission alone in this. Finding value in unpaid labor has become a common ideological theme of the twenty-first century, argued alike by feminist and critical race theorists, theologians, neoliberal ethicists, and many others besides. And so not only is the paradox made to disappear empirically by only discounting those who are recognized as officially to be counted, but also conceptually by including more or less anything in the category of value-producing enterprise – and asserting, thereby, the sustained ethico-theological centrality of work as the core of human being in the new age of capitalism. It also contributes to the erasure of “the end of work” from the phenomenology of social experience. For the unemployed, it is not a structural feature of contemporary capitalism that besets them; it is the contingent misfortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time: Youngstown or Flint or the coal towns of Kentucky or factory-shuttered towns of northern England. Or other places from which jobs have migrated. But, if we take this conception of labor, the circle is closed: all those “new” economies in the global north, those long established informal economies of the global south – all those species of activity which have flourished anew with the “end of work” – are embraced within it.

    But, while it may be disappeared empirically and conceptually by these means, phenomenologically-speaking, the paradox – the fact that wage labor remains at the elemental core of capitalism, and of species being under its political theology, yet appears as an anachronism, at its historical “end” – has not gone away. Nor have the anxieties, even the social panic, that it provokes. If anything, those anxieties keep reappearing, underscored symbolically by the figures of the zombie, the robot, and the posthuman mutant – and politically in populist promises of job creation and the like. Formal statistics may pretend to low unemployment rates – and my be claimed by politicians as proof of the positive effects of their policies – but experience tells otherwise. Not merely that work is dispersing itself into distant geographies and new temporalities, but also into the yawning disconnect between a job and an income.95

    Again, we have anticipated the point.

    – Recall David Blanchflower (2019; see above, fn.00), who says what amounts to the same thing in pointing out that the illusion of high employment rates in the UK in the past decade or so – he might have added that it applies to much of the world – has been sustained by a palpable drop in real wages and by the rise in underemployment counted as though it were employment, Put another way, if a significant proportion of people cannot subsist beyond the poverty level on their pay, there opens up a significant gap between a job and an income. This is precisely what has happened in many places: people who have jobs, either paid or self-employed, who are earning below the minimal needs for life and who, therefore, need more that one source of income to survive, are fundamentally misrepresented by official employment figures, whose very real predicament they hide. As Steven Shaviro, among very many others notes – this in a review of Lisa Adkins’s The Time of Money (2018) – “[w]ages are no longer sufficient to meet household needs, even if women as well as men enter full time into the workforce,”96 thus forcing almost everyone to accumulate debt. Given the number of people who hold jobs or work for remuneration insufficient unto their needs, national employment rates would need to be far in excess of 100% even to approach something akin to full employent; the gap between jobs and incomes hides the real state of inequality and material well-being. And disappears the contradiction between capital and labor from visibility by sustaining the illusion that most people have jobs either in the formal or in the gig economy – an illusion that is less untrue than it hides precisely what it reveals, i.e., that capital is succeeding, in significant measure, in erasing labor, replacing it by technology, outsourcing it into the gig universe, and the like, while celebrating a neoliberal economy in which everyone is at once an entrepreneur of themselves, a contractor of their own energies and capacities, and/or a commodity.

     

  • A Silent Tribute to Tata Madiba

    A Silent Tribute to Tata Madiba

    Thanks for asking us to write something on Nelson Mandela, which we appreciate. Alas, though, we both feel somewhat exhausted on the subject, having done any number of things for the media. The Harvard Gazette has already published a long interview with us, in which we try to contextualize Mandela’s legacy and move subtly away from the big-man history that underpins all the empty hagiography now so pervasive in the US and British press.1 That legacy is not the story of an individual hero, as iconic—or, rather, metonymic—as he may have become. It is the story of a sovereign struggle, one that involved the deaths of many unnamed heroes, innumerable heroic acts without signature, processes both with and without subjects. The reason that we all feel morally orphaned by the death of Madiba, of Rolihlahla (the troublesome one), of Tata, our last living grandparent, is that he was our final link to a modernist sense of political possibility, a utopianism without innocence, with critique rather than self-obsessed cynicism. But sadly, he became a living anachronism in the land of his birth, as the latter was overtaken by neoliberal adjustment, despite all that he had done and been. Somehow, while he lived, that older sense of freedom still seemed recoverable. The death of the man is also the death of an epoch, of our epoch, one in which people like you and we actually dared to put faith in the ideals of democratic equity, of justice, of a humane humanity, of the sovereignty of citizens. All that seems fanciful, indeed irrecuperable, after Mandela. In short, the reason that we feel unable to write any more about this moment is that we have said, in deliberately few words, everything we think about it. At this point, the greatest eloquence is the eloquence of a deeply reflective silence. Much of the rest is noise, ritual noise most of it, noise often being made by people who have lacked the courage to stand openly for the things to which Madiba—and the movement at large of which he was part, since he was not “apartheid’s conqueror,” in the phrase of the US media,2 just its most famous struggle hero—gave their lives, their freedom, their spirit. Perhaps the lesson of those lives for us in the US is what we, as a country, did NOT do to fight apartheid while Rolihlahla Mandela languished in prison, what we have done repeatedly to fight AGAINST democracy under the sign of security and self-interest, why we continue to condone the blatant racism and brute inequity in our desperately unequal, cruel society. Rather than mourn Mandela, which South Africans will do, have done, in their millions, perhaps Americans should mourn the death, in our own country, of the ideals and principles for which he stood.

  • A Correction Presents: Jean and John Comaroff on Theory from the South

    John Comaroff is Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology at Harvard University. Before joining the Department of African and African American Studies, John Comaroff was the Harold H. Swift Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. He is also an Honorary Professor of Anthropology at the University of Cape Town, and an Affiliated Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation. His current research in South Africa is on crime, policing, and the workings of the state, on democracy and difference, and on postcolonial politics. His authored and edited books include, with Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (2 vols), Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, Modernity and its Malcontents, Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa, Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Ethnicity, Inc., Zombies et Frontières A l’Ere Néolibérale, Theory from the South: or, how Euro-America is evolving toward Africa, and The Truth Abouth Crime: Policing and the Metaphysics of Disorder. With Jean Comaroff he is currently completing The Return of Khulekani Khumalo, Zombie Captive: Law, Imposture, and Personhood in Postcolonial South Africa, and co-editing Chiefship and the Customary in Contemporary Africa.

    Jean Comaroff is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology at Harvard University. Jean Comaroff was educated at the University of Cape Town and the London School of Economics. After a spell as research fellow in medical Anthropology at the University of Manchester, she moved to the University of Chicago, where she was remained until 2012 as the Bernard E. and Ellen C. Sunny Distinguished Service Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, and Director of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory. She is also Honorary Professor at the University of Cape Town. Her research, primarily conducted in southern Africa, has centered on processes of social and cultural transformation – the making and unmaking of colonial society, the nature of the postcolony, the late modern world viewed from the Global South. Her writing has covered a range of topics, from religion, medicine and body politics to state formation, crime, democracy and difference. Her publications include Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People (1985), “Beyond the Politics of Bare Life: AIDS and the Global Order” (2007); and, with John L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (vols. l [1991] and ll [1997]); Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (1992); Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism (2000), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (2006), Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), Theory from the South, or How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa (2011), and The Truth About Crime: Policing and the Metaphysics of Disorder in South Africa. In the pipeline is The Return of Khulekane Khumalo, Zombie Captive: Law, Imposture, and Personhood in Postcolonial South Africa. Also in process is an edited collection, Chiefship and the Customary in Contemporary Africa. A committed pedagogue, she has won awards for teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and has worked to enable college students to study abroad, especially in Africa.

    A Correction: Podcast: 10/21/2021

    https://www.acorrectionpodcast.com/phonyeconomy/r7jwsa5xhfks2b4wlre5g4645p9f7y#.

  • Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods

    Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods

    Abstract

    Among the 19th-century Tswana, we argue, cattle were like commodities; they linked processes of production and exchange, embodied an order of meanings and relations, and had the capacity to reproduce a total social world. They were, in sum, prime media for the creation and representation of value in a material economy of persons and a social economy of things. But they also had particular historical salience. As the Tswana were colonized, the encounter between periphery and center, local and global economies, was played out—materially and ideologically—in the contest between beasts and money, a contest which has given rise, also, to such token currencies as “cattle without legs.” The double character of cattle—as icons of a “traditional” order and as weapons in the struggle to assert control over modern life—has significant implications for our understanding of commodities in noncapitalist, non-European contexts, [cattle, commodities, money, colonialism, South Africa]