Applies To: John Comaroff

  • Ethnicity, Inc.

    Ethnicity, Inc.

    In October 2000, Business Day, a leading South African newspaper, published an extraordinary story. Its title read: Traditional Leaders Form Private Firm for Investment.1 Contralesa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders, is the voice of ethnicity in this postcolony. It speaks for culture, customary law, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Also for the authority of chiefs who, as a power bloc, seek to change the national constitution. Their objective is a nation-state that accords them sovereign autonomy over their realms, a nation-state that puts the dictates of indigeneity before the universal rights of citizens.

    According to Business Day, Contralesa had decided to move ethnicity into the global market place: it was creating a corporation to investin mining, forestry, industry and tourism, that archetypical site for the commodification of culture. Said Patekile Holomisa, powerful Xhosa head of the organization: “We have concentrated for too long on the political fight for constitutional recognition.” The time had come to empower their peoples by venturing out from their traditional capitals into the realm of venture capital. Since then, Contralesa has become a truly cosmopolitan concern, a multi-million dollar business with interests carefully diversified across the planetary economy.

    Could it be, pace all social science orthodoxy, that the future of ethnicity – or, at least, a future – lies, metaphorically and materially, in ethno-futures? In taking identity into the market place? In hitching it to the world of franchising and finance capital? Leruo Molotlegi, King of the Bafokeng,2 a wealthy South African chiefdom, intimated as much in an address on “corporate ethnicity” at a leading American university. The Wealth of ETHNO-Nations is a topic about which he knows a lot. His people is famed throughout Africa for its lucrative platinum holdings. In 2000, soon after he succeeded to his throne, Leruo was picturedon the cover of Mining Weekly under the caption, “Meet the New CEO of Bafokeng Inc.”3

    Cut away to another time, another optic, another part of South Africa.

    In 1994, in the North West Province, there appeared an op-ed piece in The Mail, the local weekly,4 by one Tswagare Namane. “Our futures,” he predicted, are going to rely increasingly on tourism. To attract it, however, demands not just hotels or game parks. It requires “uncovering,” and marketing, “what is authentically Tswana.” Recourse to the cargo of cultural tourism, as we all know, has become a global panacea, an autonomic reflex almost, for those with no work and little to sell; this despite the fact that it seldom yields what it promises. But Namane had in mind something more than simply the tourist dollar. The commercialization of identity, he argued – pace Frankfurt School orthodoxy – does not necessarily reduce it to a brute commodity. Per contra: marketing what is “authentically Tswana” is also a mode of self-construction, of producing Tswana-ness. And an assertion, thereby, of universal being-in-the-world.

    I have searched for something genuinely mine; something I can cherish as the achievement of my forebears, something to affirm my humanity and my equality.

    This restless urge, he added, is most acutely felt by persons dispossessed of their past. Note the choice of term: “dispossession.” It connote of property, propriety, prosperity, paradise lost. “What I am reclaiming is my ethnicity, my heritage; not my ‘ethnicism’.” The distinction, a striking piece of vernacular anthropology, is critical. Ethnicity refers here to membership in a population with distinctive ways and means; ethnicism, to the tribal allegiances “propagat[ed by] apartheid.” Heritage, of course, is culture projected into the past, and, simultaneously, the past rendered into culture. It is identity in alienable form: identity whose objects and objectifications may be consumed by others and, therefore, delivered to the market. Its alienation, as Namane saw, has the curious capacity to confer upon ethnicity a currency at once social, political, moral, material and affective. Even more – and here is the irony – in solidifying the stuff of difference, of locality and indigeneity, the circulation of that currency also holds out the promise of universal recognition: of entry into what, from the perspective of the parochial, is a global cosmopolis. To have culture is to be human – in an age in which “humanity” is the key trope of species being. If they have nothing distinctive to alienate, many rural black South Africans have come to believe, they face collective extinction. As a Tswana elder once said to us: “if we have nothing [of ourselves] to sell… does it mean that we have no culture? No presence in the world?”

    To be sure, the sale of culture seems, in large part, to have replaced the sale of labor in the Brave Neo South Africa,5 whose industrial economy, founded on racial capitalism, is presently under reconstruction. A new breed of consultancy firm, like African Equations, has arisen to advise communities on how best to market themselves and their cultural products.6 There is a growing demand for their services. Ethno-businesses are opening up all over. Like Funjwa Holdings, established by the Mabaso Tribal Authority in KwaZulu-Natal and funded by a major bank, to “reap the sweets and cakes of free enterprise.”7 Seeking to draw “thousands of international visitors each year,” the “Mabaso people” have invested in a wildlife park offering such “authentic” African activities as bow-hunting – which, being Zulu, they never did.8 By these means they hopeto find “empowerment.” Mark this term. It has little to do with power or politics. What it connotes is access to markets and material benefits. Among ethnic groups, it is frankly associated with finding something essentially their own, something of their essence, to sell. In other words, a brand.

    This, patently, is not just true of South Africa, or Africa, or that part of the World formerly known as Third. It is as true in the US, where, as Marilyn Halter (2000) points out in The Marketing of Ethnicity, there is a large “industry [to remind] hyphenated Americans of how valuable heritage is no matter how remote or forgotten it may be” (our italics). According to brandchannel.com, this has “spawned an array” of culture-conjurers, a.k.a. “ethnic marketing experts,” whose commerce – referred to as the “ethnic industry,” in an unwitting parody of Adorno – yields $2b a year. Even in Britain, long known for its indifference to difference, that industry is growing quickly. The English and Celtic “heritage” business is expanding in direct proportion the decomposition of Great Britain as national imagining. Scotland the Brave has, literally, become Scotland the Brand.

    The juxtaposition of branding, marketing, culture, and identity – what Namane pointed to in seeking something “authentically Tswana” to sell – finds echoes in recent scholarly discourse. Thus Martin Chanock (2000:24-26) suggests that, in our age, in which “fantasies work where reality fails,” advertising technologies, those neoliberal weapons of mass instruction, replicate the production and alienation of culture.9 In particular, he says, the process of branding – of creating an attachment to a commodity, to both its object-form and to the idea of an association with it – is “full of clues to the ways in which allegiance to culture [is] made.” Note the term “allegiance to culture.” It translates, with little slippage, into ethnicidentity. But here is the heart of the matter. To survive, concludes Chanock, “[c]ultures, like brands, must essentialise. Successful, sustainable cultures are those that brand best.” This calls to mind a remarkable example of the willful “commodification of tradition” in South Africa (Oomen 2005:161). It concerns the koma, the initiation school of the Pedi of the Northern Province. Initiation rites, across Africa, are held to transmit “deep knowledge”; it is here that cultural secrets are passed on (cf. J. Comaroff 1985). For Pedi, the koma is also a lucrative business. This is not just because locals pay up to $250 to take part (p. 162, n.129). It is also because many non-local youths – for whom the fee is much higher – also enroll. Pedi brand koma has become a niche product in a regional culture market. In this immiserated economy, the alienation of vernacular knowledge is both a means of self-construction and a source of income. Cultural survival is giving way, in many places, to survival through culture. But with a twist: the more successful an ethnic group is in commodifying its difference, the quicker it may devalue itself. This is the irony, too, of the quest of those who consume exotic cultures-as-commodity: the more they pursue their alienated selves in the geist of others, the more that geist risks succumbing to the banality of the market (cf. Povinelli 2001).

    But not always. Ethno-commodities are queer things. Apart from all else, their aura does not, as critical theory would have had it, inevitably diminish with their mass production and circulation. As we have implied, ethnicity as a fact-of-being-and-becoming seems often to take palpable, credible, creative life in the very process of its commodification. Thus we read of Balinese dances, designed for tourist consumption, which so captured the imagination of “natives” that they ended up replacing the sacred, auratic originals previously performed only in the temple (Sanger 1988: 99-100). Observing similar things in China and elsewhere, Phillip Felfan Xie (2003) arrives at an unwitting, counter-intuitive syllogism: that, far from destroying cultural value, the commodification of “tradition,” insofar as it valorizes indigeneity, is as likely to be a “positive mechanism in the pursuit of authenticity,” a means of finding “true selves,” individual and collective, “through the appropriation of pastness.” The dialectic of banalization and enchantment is a complicated, unpredictable one. It is propelled, among other things, by the ever growing impetus of capital to create value by conjuring with difference. And, to invoke Źiźek (n.d.), by the enduring presence of unalienated otherness as the “necessary supplement” to a sense of dispassionate modernity.

    What conclusions may be drawn from all this? Could it be that we are seeing unfold before us a metamorphosis in the production of identity and subjectivity, in the politics and economics of culture, in the interpellation of indigeneity into worlds beyond itself, and, concomitantly, in the ontology of ethnic consciousness? If so, what lies behind this metamorphosis? Where is it leading? Does it have a telos of its own? Note that, in posing the problem thus, we treat ethnicity, culture, identity, and indigeneity not as analytic constructs but as signs variously deployed by human beings across the planet in their quotidian efforts to inhabit sustainable worlds.

    ETHNICITY, IN THE ONGOING PRESENT: one or two questions of theory

    Let us pause briefly here to offer two general observations about cultural identity. One is ontological, the other, orientational.

    First, ontology.

    The oldest, most foundational question of all about ethnicity, sui generis – ethnicity as consciousness, ethnicity as a sociological formation, ethnicity as a sentiment deep enough to die for – is whether it is primordial or an instrumentally-motivated social construction.10 Happily, this question – which once divided scholars, organic intellectuals, and militias – has receded in significance. Few social scientists would argue any longer for primordialism, pure and simple, although ethno-nationalists continue to kill for it. To many in academia, bromides about ethnicity really being both, part primordial and part social construction, offer a banal compromise, a way of distantiating an intractable problem. In fact, that compromise is itself incoherent, impossible: primordial attachment and the social construction of identity describe irreducibly different ontologies of being that cannot, logically or sociologically, dissolve into each other. Unless, of course, the primordial is treated not as an explanation for ethnic consciousness, but as a phenomenological description of how that consciousness is experienced from within by those who share it (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:49-67; J.L. Comaroff 1996). More important, for now, however, is the fact that the compromise itself – that ethnicity is part primordial, part social construction – actually mimics an ever more palpable social fact: the great existential irony that, in its lived manifestations, cultural identity is increasingly apprehended, simultaneously, as a function of voluntary self-production and the ineluctable effect of biology. In other words, as both construction and essence.11 This doubling, we would argue, is not a contradiction at all: it is an endemic condition of identity in neoliberal times. Of which more in due course.

    Second, orientation.

    It is a matter of observation that, across the positivist social sciences, treatments of cultural identity, where they extend beyond its modes of expression and representation, tend overwhelmingly to orient towards its political dimensions; perhaps this is itself the corollary of the triumph of constructionist perspectives, for which the fabrication of any collective consciousness is, by definition, a political act (cf. Hall 1996:442f). Which is why politics and identity are so often locked in conceptual embrace, as if each completes the other. So much is this the case that the economics, ethics, and aesthetics of ethnicity are, by extension, almost invariably reduced to a politics: to the pursuit of sharedsocial and material interests (cf. Jung 2001); to struggles for recognition in the face of homogenizing hegemonies; to redress for histories, real or imagined, of injury, suffering, victimhood (cf. Brown 1995); to the right to engage in “different” bodily and domestic practices, poetics, musics, moralities.

    Patently, the politics of ethnicity are critical. All the more so because “neoliberalism” is commonly said to disperse the political by submerging its ideological bases in the imperatives of economic efficiency and capital growth, in the fetishism of the free market, bioscience, and technology, in the dictates of security and social order, in the demands of “culture” (Comaroff 2001). At the same time, the continued privileging of the politics of ethnicity has a number of costs: it depends on an under-specified conception of the political; it reduces cultural identity to a utility function; and it confuses the deployment of ethnicity as a tactical claim to entitlement with the substance of ethnic consciousness. Indeed, it is arguable that ethnicity-as-political

    identity and ethnicity-as-cultural identity are quite different phenomena, despite being conditions of each other’s possibility. Ethnicity-as-political identity usually presents its cultural bases not in the “thick” terms of a living, inhabited order of signs and practices – i.e., of ethnicity-as-culture in its anthropological sense – but in the “thin,” second-order terms that, purged of density, refer to very general ethical values (cf. Jung 2001:22-4). Like Britishness, which stresses such things as fair-play and civilty. Or ubuntu, African “humanity,” usually glossed in South Africa as a socially-oriented sensibility by contrast to Western individualism.

    But, most of all, the stress on the political misses precisely what we began this lecture with. Recall Contralesa, the trustees of culture in South Africa, who have taken identity into the realm of venture capital; recall, too, the King of the Bafokeng, with his emphasis on corporate ethnicity. None of their visions lacked a politics. But what they recognized is that the institutional topography of the world has shifted: that the current age is one in which the political is no longer apprehensible as an autonomous domain, with sovereignty over material life; that politics and economics, inseparable as never before, are anchored together at once in the market and in the law. Nor is this revelation confined to South Africa. In China, says Arif Dirlik (2000:129), “ethnic groups, once defined politically, now perceive themselves as `natural’ economic groups.” Pay attention to the stress on natural economic groups. It will have echoes as we proceed.

    These observations lead, in turn, to a Big Issue. To the extent that theyare true, should it not follow that the context in which culture, identity, and politics are embedded is itself under radical reconstruction? That context is typically taken to be the nation-state and, ever more nowadays, the neoliberal order of which it is part. Or, more accurately, in which it is dialectically entailed.

    It has become commonplace to bespeak the metamorphosis of the modernist polity under the impact of globalization, neoliberalism, empire, whatever. The more difficult question is how precisely to make sense of this unfolding history. And how to do so in such a way as to illuminate the variant species of political subjectivity taking shape within it.

    THE NATION-STATE AND ITS SUBJECTIVITIES

    Modernist European polities, according to Benedictine history – Benedectine, as in Benedict Anderson (1983)12 – were founded on a fiction of cultural homogeneity, on an imagined, often violently effected, sense of horizontal fraternity. Much has been said about this imagining: that Euro-nationhood was always more diverse than its historiography allows, always a work-in-progress, always subject to a tenuous hyphenation with the states that ruled them. But that is another story, a narrative of the longue duree which begins with Westphalia and ends in the Failure of the West. (Now, tellingly, renamed the “global North.”) Since the late twentieth century, those polities have had increasingly to come to terms with difference. Historical circumstance has pushed them toward a more heterodox nationhood (J.L. Comaroff 1996:177). Hence the growingliteratures, scholarly and lay alike, on citizenship, sovereignty, multiculturalism, minority rights, and the limits of liberalism. Hence the xenophobia that haunts heterodoxy almost everywhere. Hence, too, our disciplinary concern with the curious counterpoint between cosmopolitanism and indigeneity, both variously understood. Hetero-nationhood seeks – usually for pragmatic, not ethical reasons – to accommodate cultural diversity within a civic order composed of universal citizens, all ostensibly equal before the law. And to embrace identity politics within a liberal, constitutionally-founded conception of national community. Especially since 1989, global neoliberalization has not merely transformed the sovereignty of nation-states. It has actively compounded the degree to which they are both polymorphous and porous: we scarcely need mention, here, the ever more mobile demographics of wage labor; or the incapacity of many Western cosmo-polities to reproduce their social infrastructures without the discomforting presence of “aliens”; or the impact of the electronic commons on the planetary circulation of virtually everything – and everything virtual. All of which, plainly, are corollaries of the hegemony of the market, of its power both to breach and to buttress borders, to curtail and to extend the regulatory reach of states, to valorize the local and to cast it into economic force-fields well beyond itself.

    In this world, in which the political and the ethical are also swept up under the sign of the market, freedom presents itself ineluctably as choice: most of all, as choice of identities and modes of fashioning them. Which is why it is that culture, the quintessential space of self-fashioning, has become an ever more animated site of politics; why those politics center less on the general good than on the pursuit of goods; why ideology is giving way to ID-ology, the -ology of identity, as a basis for mobilization (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003) – especially with the “globalspread of democracy,” which makes a fetish out of freedom-as-choice. But why should shared essence be such a compelling premise on which to define being and belonging? And to claim recognition? Because it appears to run to the very core of “life itself.” Note: “life itself,” a trope at once bioscientific and philosophical that has become the foundational obsession of our age, alike populist and specialist. From this vantage, in polities having to come to terms with diversity as never before – and in which class is so dispersed as not to provide a meaningful call to social action – there can be no more persuasive a ground on which to pursue collective interest than the assertion of an essential right to be different. Which is why, finally, in our Brave Neo World, cultural identity has become, simultaneously, a function of elective self-production and ascriptive biology.

    To the degree that it has, to the degree that ethnicity represents itself as both primordial connectedness and a commonality of interest, it follows that culture would congeal into a naturally copyrighted, legally protected collective possession; in other words, into genetically-endowed intellectual property (cf. Coombe 1998). A true fetish, it becomes a form of monopoly capital, yielding value to its owners as its products are soldfor profit.

    Note, here, the stress on legal instruments: on copyright, intellectual property, and the like. The modernist polity has always rested on jural foundations, of course. But, of late, there has been a palpable intensification in the resortto legal ways and means. The signsare everywhere: in the development of a global jurisprudence far more elaborate than its internationalist predecessor; in the epidemic of new national constitutions since 1989; in the proliferation of legal NGOs across the world; in the remarkable spread of human rights advocacy; in the subjection of ever more intimate domains of human life to litigation. In South Africa there is even a Law Train that traverses the land. It prompts citizens to seek redress for their troubles by recourse to the languages of legality. People across the planet are being encouraged to behave as homo juralis. And collectivities of all kinds are given ever more reason to mimic bodies corporate (Comaroff and Comaroff 2007).

    There is a critical corollary to all this. It concerns the relocation of politics into the legal domain. As Martin Chanock (2007:34) notes:

    In place of a politics in which rights were delivered through the political process, now jurisprudence is the site of important decisions. No longer part of the bargaining and struggle of the political arena, decisions about entitlement are de-politicised and rendered by means of the law.

    This is part of something to which we alluded earlier: the displacement of the political. More and more are differences of all kinds being fought out in the courts – whether they involve private freedoms, property rights, or national resources, access to medical treatment or titleto real estate, sovereignty or cultural knowledge. Politics may or may not be about class any more. But it certainly is about class actions. In ways unthinkable until recently, governments and their agencies, especially those that deal in death and taxes, are regularly sued by their citizens; and citizens are ever more litigious in respect of each other. What once happened in parliaments, street protests, and political councils now finds a new space of contestation. Even history is being re-politicized, redeemed, recouped in the courts. Britain, for one, is being sued by several formerly colonized peoples in East Africa, each demanding restitution for an old wrong: the Nandi, for the killing of their leader in 1905; the Nyoro for a land seizure in 1900; the Samburu for injuries inflicted by relict munitions. In all these class actions, the plaintiff is an ethnic group, reclaiming its past by jural means. And asserting a corporate identity in the process.13

    Project the legal subject onto the terrain of cultural identity, add the reduction of culture to property, mix it with the displacement of politics into the domain of jurisprudence, and what is the result? It is, to return to where we began, Ethnicity, Inc.”

    CASINO CAPITAL, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND INCORPORATION

    Neither the incorporation of ethnic groups nor the commodification of culture is new. In North America, it has had legal recognition since at least 1934, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. In1971, moreover, the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act explicitly re-organized indigenous peoples into corporations composed of shareholders whose rights were based on genealogy, whose traditional lands became private, alienable property, and whose cultural products, a growing proportion of them trademarked under the Silver Hand, were directed toward the market (Hollowell-Zimmer 2001).14 But the popular prototype of Ethnicity, Inc. in the US lies in the Native American casino-owning “tribe,” its apotheosis in the Mohegan Sun and the Pequot Foxwood Resort, two enormous monuments to ethno-marketing and the architecture of vernacular kitsch; at Foxwood are found such establishments as Ethnic Concepts International Gift Shop.15 As it turns out, the Native American cases of ethno-incorporation are bewilderingly complex; their identity economies stretch far beyond the gaming house. But most of them share five things that will turn out to be significant as we proceed.

    The first is obvious: the more like profit-seeking corporations indigenous groups become, the more the terms of membership privilege birth, blood, and biology over social or cultural attachments. And the more they tend to be contested.16 The second, by contrast, is counter-intuitive: not infrequently, it is commercial enterprise that begets an ethnic group, not the other way around. Vide the Pomo Indians – Pomo in both name and spirit – that, in the 1950s, consisted of two families, without tribe or territory. These families lived on land set aside for homeless Native Americans until they secured reservation land and a casino licence. Whereupon they became “the” Pomo. Or better yet, the case of the Augustine Cahuilla Indians, who consist of one woman, Maryann Martin, but who have been allowed to open a gaming house on an abandoned reservation in California. By these means does Ms. Martin constitute a certified ethnic group. Nor is she the only one-person ethno-corporation in North America.17

    The third notable thing about the US cases is that, in many of them, the creation of a corporate ethno-economy has been set in motion by venturecapital from outside. Its source is usually non-Indian financiers, for whom real or virtual “tribes” are franchises licenced to make a killing. As this suggests, ethno-enterprise is mandated by culture, but may not originate in it. In fact, several officially recognized bands have little connection to vernacular life-ways. Maryann Martin, the last living Augustine Cahuila, was raised African American. But, once on the road to incorporation, they typically begin to assert– if necessary, to discover or invent – their “traditions,” which may then be merchandized; hence the Ethnic Concepts store on the Pequot reservation – and, close by, a state-of-the-art Museum and Research Center of Culture. The content of identity, as we all know, is often produced in response to the market. So, sometimes, is indigeneity.

    The fourth matter of note is that, once recognized by the state, Native American groups tendto proclaim their sovereign autonomy against it.18 Thus, for example, Indian tribes, now major contributors to political campaigns in California, refuse to report their donations; as “nations,” they claim exemption from US law. Predictably, such assertions provoke reactions; the State of California has litigated against several Indian tribes.19 Similarly, when the governor of New York insisted that cigarette sales on the Mohawk reservation be licenced by his state, indigenous leaders invokedsovereign exclusion; the Mohawk make their own tobacco products and, acting under the sign of ethno-preneurship, were determined to protect their market.20

    Finally, the Indian cases indicate that ethno-incorporation strives for geo-spatial materiality.21 To be sure, it often involves a land claim. Which is not surprising: real estate held in patrimonial tenure – territory, that is – is typically taken to be a founding principle of sovereignty. Note these five points. They will, we repeat, turn out to be critical.

    The prototypical Native American instances of Ethnicity, Inc., those associated with casino ownership, presumed a cultural identity at their core. But the substance of that identity was incidental to their incorporation. There are exceptions to this. Or rather, inversions: “tribes” whose corporate history began not with casino capitalism22 but with the copyrighting of their cultures. Take the Zia Pueblo (Brown 1998:197), who successfully sued New Mexico a few years back for the unauthorized use of their sun symbol on state flags. The design, with its spiritual powers, they said, was their holy-owned property. Or, also in New Mexico, the Indians of Sandoval county who, over centuries, developed a ritually-valued variety of blue corn that, in the 1980s, became a fashionable health food. As a result, Five Sandoval Indian Pueblos, Inc. was established to superintend the sale of trademarked agri-goods, like “Hopi Blue” (Pinel and Evans 1994:45). Here, in sum, an ethno-corporation arose from distilling local knowledgeinto a brand that, in turn, sedimented sociologically into an ethnic federation; just the thing Chanock pointed to in saying that “sustainable cultures are those which brand best”(above, p.5).

    The branding of culture has been facilitated by an implosion, in recent times, in the domain of intellectual property: in the laws governing its possession, the rights accruing to it, and the spheres of existence over which it extends. This has persuaded the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization to recognize an “inherent” right of indigenous peoples to the fruits of their vernacularknowledge (see e.g. Posey 1994:227-233; Greene 2004:213) – one effect of which has been to accelerate yet further their incorporation in many places. Some of them quite unexpected.

    Which brings us to a Tale of Two Ethnicities, two instances of Ethnicity, Inc. that draw together the various strands of our narrative by addressing an unresolved dialectic at its core: the dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture. It should be clear by now that they are not the same thing. Hence the contrast between (i) those Native American groups, exemplified by casino capitalists, that became bodies corporate by virtue of being shareholders in enterprises enabled by their sovereign legal status and (ii) those made into corporations by virtue of a shared copyright in vernacular signs, knowledge, or practices. The relationship between these two tendencies, it turns out, completes the dialectic. But we are running ahead of ourselves. Our Tale of Two Ethnicities returns us to where we began: Southern Africa.

    ETHNO-FUTURES, AGAIN

    The first takes us to the edge of the Kahalari Desert, to the Land of the San – known, pejoratively, as Bushmen. It involves the hoodia cactus, xhoba, which they have imbibed since time immemorial. In the past, when hunting in the desert, it stayed their appetites and thirst; it is used these days to stave off the effects of poverty. San suffered severely from the predations of colonialism: stigmatized, victims of various forms of violence, removed from their ancestral lands, prey to illness and alcohol, their numbers diminished greatly. Over the past century, in fact, most of their communities dispersed into the immiserated reaches of the South African “coloured” population.

    The hoodia saga was to unleash a global media frenzy: In the USA, 60 Minutes attested to the efficacy of the plant and spoke in awe of its promise for the fat-fighting industry;23 the BBC sent a reporter “deep into the Kalahari desert,” to “one of the world’s most primitive tribes,” to sample the “extremely ugly cactus” that “kills appetite and attacks obesity with no side effects.”24 It all began in in South Africa in 1963, when the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) became interested in the medicinal properties of the cactus (Evans 2003); this was stimulated by reports of its use by San trackers deployed by the army in its wars against the enemies of apartheid. The CSIR corroborated its appetite suppressant capacities, identified their bioactive component and, in 1997, patented it under the label P57.

    The CSIR licenced P57 to Phytopharm, a British company – which, after extensive trials, licenced it on to Pfizer for $21m; ironic perhaps, since xhoba has some of the same properties as Viagra, Pfizer’s most famed product. It is at this point that the story becomes especially interesting.

    The San first heard about the patent when Phytofarm announced P57 to the media. Or, more precisely, it was Roger Chennells,25 a human rights lawyer, who read a quote from the head of Phytofarm, Richard Dixey, to the effect that the people from whom the knowledge of hoodia derived, were extinct. At the time, Chennells was representing the San in a land claim (see Robins 2003:12-14; Isaacson 2002), in the course of which there emerged an NGO, the South African San Institute (SASI), one of many such organizations that surfaced with the end of apartheid, with liberalization, and with the postcolonial politics of identity.26 Chennells told SASI that the San were victims of biopiracy, that the return on the patent could be huge – its value in the US is about $3b a year (Evans 2003:16) – and that this was an opportunity to assert a collective identity under the San Council, a new body created by SASI to give political shape to, and claim sovereignty for, their ethnic aspirations (Evans ibid:14).

    Richard Dixey may have been disingenuous in asserting the extinction of the San; the advantages to Phytofarm were plain enough. When the San Council protested to the CSIR, it acknowledged the error of its ways, Dixey confessed his “embarrassment,” and a profit sharing agreement was signed. Since then, Pfizer has given way as licencee to Unilever. Since then, too, the San Trust, set up to manage the incoming funds, has received its first royalties, has begun to tackle the problems of distribution among the San of South Africa, Nambia, and Botswana, and has filed suit against twenty-six illicit producers. Since then “the San,” as an ethno-corporation has taken ever more articulate shape.

    In point of fact, Dixey had not been altogether wrong. The San may not have been extinct, but their ethnocide had gone a long way. Having been cast out of their social ecology, “they” did not evince much by way of a collective identity; their dispersal into the gray racial space of South Africa made it impossible to do so. But the assertion of intellectual property – coupled, significantly, with the land claim that preceded it – reanimated San “identity.” And gave it ever “thicker,” more dense substance; a symptom of this, interestingly, being a sudden increase in people accusing each other, on biological grounds, of “not being real San .” 27

    Thus it is that there has been a language revival, that genealogies are being collected to create a population register; that SASI has initiated a “cultural resources management project”; that programshave been designed for “San-controlled income generation” using indigenous knowledge in a sustainable manner; that a legal platformhas been set up to protect the global interests and dignity of the San. All of which had the effect of re-indigenizing this “people” through the very act of interpellating them into a distinctly cosmopolitan sense of being-in-the-world. When we asked Roger Chennells whether a new ethnic identity had been produced in the process, he answered in the affirmative. He is correct. The presumption that “the” San actually had a sharedidentity– or a coherent ethno-sociology – prior to the colonial dispersal of a complex population of hunter-gatherers collectively called “Bushmen” is itself contentious: who or what “they” were has long been a subject of bitter debate.28 But that does not matter any more, at least not outside of the academy. Today they are a multi-national, ever more assertively cosmopolitan ethno-corporation: as we said, “the” San, and the San Council that makes manifest their sovereignty, now straddle three of the countries of southern Africa.

    The other story involves the Bafokeng, the people made wealthy by platinum, the people whose kings are spoken of as CEOs, the people actually referred to in South Africa as Bafokeng, Inc.29 The history of their incorporation begins, long ago, with land: one of their nineteenth century chiefs realized that, to protect their territory from white settlers, his people ought to purchase it outright (Cook n.d. [a]:5-6). So he sent young men to the diamond fields and commissioned their wages to buy as much terrain as possible. The subsequent history of South Africa did not make it easy to hold on to this land. But, by establishing the Bafokeng as a private, corporate owner, the purchase enabled their chiefs to defend it from seizure (Cook ibid.:6 et passim), especially after the discovery of platinum in 1924 and its leasing to Impala Platinum, a large company, in the 1960s.30 The greatest challenge, in this respect, came when the puppet homeland government of Bophuthatswana, set up by the apartheid state, exiled the chief of the Bafokeng, expropriated their mineral rights, and negotiated contracts directly with Impala; this sparked a lengthy series of legal actions which eventually yielded a victory for the “tribe” in 1999 – and, with it, a lucrative profit-sharing arrangement.31 All of which made the Bafokeng so adept at litigation that, as one journalist put it, “their traditional weapon became the law, not the club.” 32

    The corporate growth of Bafokeng, Inc. in the wake of these legal processes has been breathtaking. This nation of 300,000 shareholders – membership is defined by patrilineality – has largestakes in a complex network of companies; their interest in Impala alone yielded $80m in 2002.33 In addition, they have opened up two new mining operations each valued at $65m;34 established a profitable partnership with Exxon;35 bought a huge construction company;36 purchased 20% of South Africa’s second largest packaging plant;37 and own 33% of SA Chrome, now renamed Merafe Resources.38 Merafe is Setswana for “nations.” Nor does the story end there. Their sovereing government is vested in the Royal Bafokeng Administration; their global investments are overseen by Royal Bafokeng Finances; a Royal Bafokeng Economic Board managesdevelopment within the chiefdom; and their mineral interests are husbandedby Royal Bafokeng Resources (see e.g. Gray 2003:16) – which may soon become a public company.39 By these means, “the Bafokeng” chiefdom would become the ultimate ethno-enterprise: one in whose present holdings and futures you or we might purchase stock.

    What is missing in all this? The cultural element of Bafokeng cultural identity. King Leruo and his money managers have long presented themselves as highly cosmopolitan business people primarily concerned with a sustainable future: Vision 2020 is their ambitious plan to develop Bafokeng into a “self-sufficient,” fully employed, globally-oriented nation by, well, 2020 (Gray 2003:13-14). Of late, however, there has been much more culture talk, much more talk of indigeneity. Since being installed in a ritual saturated with the trappings of a tradition partly historical, partly made up, powerfully vernacular, the young king has taken to essaying “African values,” to celebrating “traditional governance,” and to arguing that, in moving toward “Afro-modernity,” his people must “affirm” their essence (see Gray ibid:14). In short, Bafokeng, Inc, the manifest commodification of Bafokeng identity, appears to be reaching toward a cultural sensibility in order to complete itself.

    Running the San and Bafokeng together, then, the dialectic at the heart of Ethnicity, Inc. reveals itself. Each of these cases evinces the five things foreshadowed in Native America, if in different proportions: membership in both has come to be defined genealogically, with some contestation either evident or imminent; in both, commercial enterprise has been instrumental either in crystallizing or in reproducing the sociological entity in which cultural identity is presumed to inhere; in both, venture capital and legal expertise from outside has been crucial; both have asserted their new-found sovereignty against the state; and both have based their incorporation on land claims, past or present. In both, moreover, the displacement of the political into the legal has been demonstrable: both have fought their battles by means of lawfare. In the process, they have both naturalized the trope of identity around which their “rights” adhere – and interpellated into it a significant measure of affect. This is particularly striking in the case of the San. It is arguable that knowledge of the hoodia was produced not by “the San” at all – who may or may not existed at the time – but by hunters of the Kalahari, a class defined by their relationship to a mode of production. The projection of a vernacular right to intellectual property onto “the San,” a putatively “primordial” collectivity, has the effect of extinguishing a class of producers as it distinguishes and materializes a cultural identity – and, as it does so, giving ontological primacy to the idea of identity itself. Thus, to reiterate, does ideology become ID-ology and hide itself in a sense of the natural, the inevitable, the given.

    Most of all, though, the stories of the San and the Bafokeng, precisely because they are such extreme instances, demonstrate how and why it is that Ethnicity, Inc. rests on a dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture; and, at another level, between indigeneity and the human cosmopolis. Whether it starts with the incorporation of identity, as in the Bafokeng case, or with the commodification of cultural property, as in Kalahari, the process evinces a drive to complete itself in the other. Thus it is that a dispersed group of former hunters and gatherers have become “the San,” replete with a sovereign sense of their own ethno-sociology, their own governance, their own affective economy, their own range of institutions to make it all real. Thus it is that Bafokeng, Inc is turning to vernacular ways and means in the name of an Afro-modernity which it may inhabit as it reaches toward 2020. Neither is fortuitous. After all, Ethnicity, Inc., to the degree that it naturalizes collective right, material entitlement, and sovereignty, does require both the incorporation of identity and cultural substance to realize, recognize, fulfill itself. Which is why it tends to begin in land, thence to make claims to sovereignty, to secure its cultural property, and to invest in the long-run. The future of ethnicity does seem to lie, at least in one important respect, in ethno-futures.

    CONCLUSION

    We have come not to praise to Ethnicity, Inc. Nor do we extol empowerment that depends on the commodification of culture or the Empire of the Market, let alone the creeping judicialization of politics or the naturalization of the ethno-trope of identity into a brute term of social being. Quite the opposite. Ethnicity, Inc. carries with it a host of costs and contradictions. What we seek to do here, in short, is to interrogate a world-wide phenomenon in the making; one that is much more complicated than it first appears.

    In so doing, we have stressed that Ethnicity, Inc. has deep roots and many precedents. After all, nation-states have long sought to distinguish themselves by marking as unique their national cultures, their heritage, their essence as embodied in both utilitarian and aesthetic objects. French champagne, Italian grappa, German opera, British tea and…china, have long been branded national products. In ever more cases they carry trademarks. Implicitly, in other words, the modernist nation has always been a brand, with some strange consequences; note, in this regard, Jonathan Franzen’s brilliant caricature of Lithuania, Inc. in The Corrections, the upshot of which is that its national economy is sold by a quite plausible mistake to a bank in Atlanta. Note, too, the fact that Silvio Berlusconi, CEO extraordinaire, often refers to his country as Azienda Italia, “Italy, the Company” (Muehlebach n.d.). Nor only nations. Religions too. Note how the judiciary of Pakistan, in deliberating the dispute between Ulema, religious authorities, and the Ahmediya, whom they style as blasphemers, has recently chosen to treat Islam as intellectual property (Ahmed 2006). And the process is proliferating in time as well as space: vide the recent efforts of the Israeli national archive to establish in a court of law that, because he was a Jew, Kafka’s works were rightfully the intellectual ‘assets” of the Israeli state as the guardian, in perpetuity, of Jewish heritage (Butler 2011). What is going on here, it seems, is the hyperextension of an old phenomenon. And its migration into places it has not gone before: into the domain of cultural being, where, as Clifford Geertz (1963) once reminded us, modernity was supposed to run up against its limits. But the ethnically-defined peoples of “traditional” Africa, Latin America, the USA, and Asia have become thoroughly modern, if each in their own ways. Even more, they have sometimes passed by the modern and, like that Indian tribe of which we spoke, leapt directly into the Pomo. Which, above all, distorts, exaggerates and sometimes renders absurd, the lineaments of modernity. We may or may not like what Ethnicity, Inc. promises. But we are going to have to live with it, and, even more, to fashion an engaged anthropology to deal with its unfolding logic, its ambiguous promises, its material and moral vision for times to come, the deep affective attachments that it engenders. All of which suggests that it is spreading with exponential speed, albeit on very different scales of elaboration. Why? Perhaps because Ethnicity, Inc. is the congealed product – a fusion both hot and cold, if you will – of three elemental features of the neoliberal tendency: the apotheosis of intellectual property and the reduction of culture to it; the migration of politics into the realm of the law; and the growing naturalization of the trope of identity as the taken-for-granted domain of collective action. Herein lies a critical station on the Road, if not to Damascus, then to a Brave Neo World.

  • Ethnicity, Inc., translated into Chinese

    Ethnicity, Inc., translated into Chinese

    CAMBRIDGE, MA – A Chinese translation of John L. and Jean Comaroff’s pathbreaking Ethnicity, Inc., is underway and expected to be issued later this year.  First published in 2009 by the University of Chicago Press in the USA and by the University of the Witwatersrand Press in South Africa, the book has been praised for charting a new field of research in the social sciences, and for having a field-altering effect on the study of ethnic identity. “The study of ethnicity and indeed of neoliberalism will never be the same after the publication of this book, ” anthropologist Keith Hart commented in the American Anthropologist.  Matti Bunzl, Director of the Wien Museum in Austria, noted, ““The Comaroffs are among the very finest anthropologists working anywhere in the world today. As genuine leaders of the discipline, every new book they publish is an event, and this one is no exception. Ethnicity, Inc. will be a watershed for anyone looking for new ways to explain our neoliberal world. This extraordinarily lucid book is one of the most ambitious, wide-ranging, and thought-provoking pieces of anthropological scholarship written over the past few decades…”

    Ethnicity, Inc. has already been translated into Spanish and Polish, and excerpted in a Czech publication. The University of Chicago Press has now issued a translation license to Rive Gauche Publishing House, via Andrew Nurnberg Associates International Ltd., for a “complex Chinese-language edition.”

  • Interview with Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff

    Interview with Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff

    Between 1976 and 2010,  Alan Macfarlane, a professor in the Department of Sociology at Cambridge University,  conducted a series of interviews with anthropologists from around the world. Two of those anthropologists included John and Jean Comaroff. They discussed their early lives, their work in the field, life under the Apartheid regime and anthropology, among other things.

  • Figuring Democracy

    Figuring Democracy

    12.01 a.m., 25 April 1994. Wale Street, Cape Town, South Africa: The last strains of the anthem of the ancien regime – part requiem, part death- rattle – drift off into the night. A local choir, carefully rehearsed for the occasion, begins to belt out the new national song, with its familiar, once- banned libretto of liberation, its hymnnotic harmony of hope. The old flag, long an emblem of colonialism and apartheid, is folded away for the last time. Its replacement, a brash, multicolored icon of consensus, is raised. The symbolism, by intent, is too obvious to miss. Calico curtains ring down and up as the world’s latest Midnight’s Child, the “new” South Africa, is born.

    1

    Perhaps it was sacrilegious, at that precise moment, that moment of unreserved optimism, to recall Malcolm Bradbury’s Doctor Criminale. In this novel about a postmodern philosopher, a fictional fusion of Foucault and Derrida, the Hungarian ex- wife of the hero, one Gertla Riviero, reflects upon the recent transition to democracy and free market economics throughout much of the contemporary world (1992:276):

    “Democracy, the free market,” she muses, “do you really think they can save us?…Marxism [was] a great idea, democracy [is] just a small idea. It promises hope, and it gives you [Kentucky] Fried Chicken.”

    Ms. Riviero’s commentary is sad, cynical, salutary. Especially so when read in the cooling afterglow of post-election South Africa. Especially so as we call to mind the queues that waited for hours outside polling stations in those last heady days of April, 1994, some in almost sacral silence, some in carnivalesque revelry. Those snaking, eternal queues reminded us of the interminable lines that graced McDonald’s in Moscow a few years back as people voted with their feet not merely for hamburgers or cheeseburgers, but for a market economy and capitalist consumerism. The association may seem irreverent. Yet Gertla Riviero’s question carries an obvious, ominous punch, precisely because it calls into doubt our taken-for-granted narrative of democratization, a heroic liberal myth which links the conventional practices of modernist politics to the prospect of material and social salvation. So, too, if in a different way, does the image of patient, passive people standing in millennial lines to choose either cheap food or political candidates; all the more so as we recall Bayart’s (1993) discomforting aphorism for African public life, to wit, “the Politics of the Belly.”

    Let us pursue this question, and follow these lines, for a while. They lead us into an unexpected encounter with very different philosophies of governmentality, democracy, and modernity.

    II.

    It became commonplace during the 1990’s, especially in Europe and North America, to ascribe the fin de siècle push for democracy in many parts of the world to the end of the cold war and the triumph of the free market over communism. In fact, as many have pointed out, this view was flawed from the first. Apart from all else, the push began well before 1989. But no matter: the association is itself a symptom, often misrecognized, of something much longer in the making, namely, a fundamental reconstruction of the modernist world-order. We have ourselves suggested before that the events of 1989 were evidence of an unfolding Age of Revolution, an epochal process akin to the one that began in 1789 – the European Age of Revolution, that is, which gave us modernity, the seeds of the nation-state form, industrial capitalism, the second colonialism, and much besides (J.L. Comaroff 1995). The present revolution has been marked, in particular, by the rise of a planetary political economy in which sites of production and consumption are widely dispersed; in which social class is rendered barely visible by being scattered promiscuously across the earth; in which finance takes precedence over fabrication, flexibility over fixity, the short-run over the long; in which the state outsources many of its received operations, not least those involving the exercise of violence; in which the nation is confronted by the irreducible fact of increasing demographic heterogeneity; in which governance is represented primarily in the argot of technical oversight; in which politics, more a matter of ID-ology than ideology (see Chapter 3), is increasingly focused on the simultaneous calculi of right, interest, and entitlement, often pursued by judicial means.

    For many, these things are cause for despondency. Let us return to Dr. Criminale, Bradbury’s figurative philosopher. Ours, he says (1992:330), is the media age, the age of simulation…The age of no ideology, only hyperreality…Too little reality, also too much. Everywhere, wild fantasies, everyone wants a violent illusion. Life is a movie, death a plot ending, no stories are real. And even the philosophers think in unrealities, [as] they describe a world of no ethics, no humanism, no self.

    In this new Age of Revolution, fear of the atomic bomb subsides. But anomic bombs explode all over the place. People across the globe – alienated, disempowered, dispossessed – commit extraordinary acts of violence in the name of ethnic and national aspiration. The “me” generation folds into the “we” generation. And the end of politics, at least politics as anything more than the pursuit of brute interest, appears visible on the horizon.

    The scenario, like Doctor Criminale himself, might be fantastic. It is, however, becoming ever less fictional, ever more recognizable.

    But how is this darkly pessimistic view of the contemporary world to be reconciled with the rise of late 20th century democratic movements in so many far-flung places? Were those movements not a positive, liberatory sign of the times in that premillennial moment, that Great Time of Signs? And how, in particular, ought we to understand them in Africa, long seen in the West as the continent-least-likely-to- democratize-itself?

    It is difficult to gainsay those who draw connections between the recent rise of democracy and the triumph of consumer capitalism – even if the line of causality that joins them is at once complicated and the subject of ongoing debate. Capitalism, to be sure, does not require democracy; it has done perfectly well under authoritarian regimes in the past, and continues to do so in many parts of the late modern world. But those nation-states that seek to democratize themselves appear, these days, to require at least the figment of a free market. An elective (or is it electoral?) affinity connects the ballot box to business. Nor is it a passive affinity (cf. Young 1993:299f). U.S. overseas aid has become largely conditional on the establishment of “democratic institutions.” For which read “regular elections.” To wit, in 1996, Robert Mugabe – then still a leader of some standing, now a discredited dictator who takes every opportunity to censure the West – drew a direct connection between ballot box, business and foreign involvement in African politics: “Western countries,” he said, push “multi-party [systems] for Africa because it enables them to “buy influence” and “manipulate parties” into creating congenial economic environments.2

    The contemporary Western concern with the democratization of the global south, however, is not reducible to utility alone, important though that may be. It has roots in the hegemonic, indeed ontological, association throughout the global north of freedom and self-expression with choice. Democracy has become to homo politicus what shopping has long been to homo economicus: a sacred, cosmic fusion of free will and righteous human satisfaction. They are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin, two regimes of consumption underpinned by the same mode of ideological and material and production.

    On 1 May, at 11.48 p.m., during the counting of votes after the first free election in South Africa, SATV Channel 2 broke into its local news coverage to broadcast a meta-advertisement, an advertisement for advertising. “ADVERTISING,” blared the message on the primal screen, “THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE.”

    It is no coincidence, then, as several theorists have observed, that democracy has increasingly been reduced, in practice, from the substantive to the procedural (e.g. Farer 1989; Barsh 1992); that, purged of any ideological density, it has come to connote little more than the periodic exercise of preference, the satisfying of desire, the physics of pure interest. To wit, it does not take a political theorist, or the fictional Ms Riviero, to make the point that, understood thus, democracy is a small idea, one that is more likely to bring with it Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald’s than an amelioration of the human condition. We might go yet farther: to argue that processes of democratization bespeak a historical paradox, namely, that “the people” are being empowered in the politics of state at the very moment when, as we have noted, the politics that count are moving elsewhere — to global processes and institutions, into the corporate world and non-governmental organizations, the media and the law, new social movements, “grass roots” coalitions, and other domains of civil society.

    To phrase all this in the interrogative voice, is it possible that Dr. Criminale is correct: that democratization is a product of the death of politics, of its dispersal to everywhere and anywhere and nowhere in particular? Is democracy rising because it has become politically beside the point?

    An echo here from home. Speaking of democracy in a workshop at the University of Chicago many years ago, Wayne Booth – author, tellingly, of The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) and The Rhetoric of Irony (1974) – observed that freedom of speech is guaranteed in America only to the extent that no one is listening; that, while everybody has a right to talk, nobody has an obligation to pay attention; that democracy disempowers by encouraging a cacophony in which voices cancel each other out.

    Put these two things together – the reduction of the Idea of Democracy to the exercise of choice and the decentering, de-institutionalization of politics – and what do we get? For one thing, some of the concerns that many Africans, academics and intellectuals and every-persons alike, raise about the export of modernist European models to the global south: that they are founded on an “extremely narrow” conception of public life, one that places too much emphasis on “votes and free-market economics”3 and too little on the realization of universal human rights, civil liberties, the commonweal, and transparent, accountable government – all of which, according to recent survey research, tend to be embraced in popular African definitions of democracy (cf. Bratton 2002:5), definitions that also take on heavy local inflictions across the continent. Given that the meaning of the term is hardly unambiguous or uncontested in the global north, as Mahmood Mamdani (1986, 1990, 1992) has noted – we paraphrase him heavily here – how much more murky does it become in Africa, whose vast array of dynamic, evanescent cultures have their own theories and practices of politics, of personhood, of power, of representation. As this suggests, the cultural transitivity of the concept cannot simply be presumed, as it so often is by comparative political scientists. The more general implication? That the common presumption in the West according to which Africa ought to adopt the liberal modernist Euro-American model (see e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001), an ideology floating free of its social and historical moorings, leaves Africans with a unenviable dilemma: to opt for either (i) a highly un-African political order, wherein the body politic is composed of autonomous, individualized, right-bearing citizens whose primary political being is congealed in the exercise of the ballot;4 or (ii) an “indigenous” alternative, usually characterized as anti-modern, ethnically-based, patriarchal, traditionalist, customary, communalist, clientalist, and authoritarian – and/or, more insidiously yet, populist. What kind of choice is this? Even more fundamentally, what, in its own terms, might democracy actually mean in Africa?

    Mikael Karlstrom (1996:485) observed, in the mid-1990’s that, notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on democracy in contemporary Africa, surprisingly little heed had been paid to this last question. As long as it is not adequately addressed, he added, we have little hope of grasping postcolonial politics at all, little hope of making sense of such things as, say, the Ugandan insistence that political parties are inimical to representative government. But there is yet another corollary here. Some African counter-discourses on democratization, as we have already intimated, are grounded in a vernacular political anthropology that offers a substantive critique of conventional Western political theory and practice. By confronting this narrative we stand not merely to understand African politics better than we do now – to understand what lies beyond the “politics of the belly,” beneath the “banality of power…in the postcolony.5 We might also arrive at a more reflexive, critical appreciation of our own received political forms.

    On the Levi-Straussian principle that one good case may illuminate an entire world, let us offer an exemplary instance to make our argument. Our choice will be surprising perhaps. We do not take a country in which representative government or electoral politics have been repudiated, subverted, or misappropriated. Such examples are either too easy or too stereotypic to be useful. Rather, we take Botswana, the African nation-state most widely regarded as a “model” democracy6 – and the closest, by common agreement, to the Western ideal. This very similarity, at least in appearances, will serve to underscore a brace of revealing differences.

    III.

    Consider the following facts. In October 1974, Botswana held its third national elections, in which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won an emphatic 85 per cent majority of the seats in the national assembly.7 Both before and after the ballot there was a great deal of public discussion, seemingly spontaneous and unprovoked, of the advantages to be gained from the introduction of a one-party state. Many people, clearly, favored a move away from the existing British-style multiparty system; so much so, in fact, that the president at the time, Sir Seretse Khama, felt compelled to comment repeatedly on the subject, to refuse even to ponder the possibility – and to encourage people both to vote and to consider the merits of all parties. His public statements were featured prominently in the Botswana Daily News at the time.8

    In hindsight, and from the vantage of the global north, this expression of popular support for a one-party system would seem odd. First, it did not come primarily from BDP voters. Adversaries of the government were among its more enthusiastic protagonists; to wit, Puo Phaa, official organ of the opposition Botswana National Front – which was led by Bathoen Gaesitsiwe, the ex-ruler of a large chiefdom – urged the formation of a “national government, fusing all political groupings into a single administration.9 Second, it was not engineered by a cadre of bosses or captains in the name of a mass ruling party. At the time, as Colclough and McCarthy (1980:41) note, the BDP was anything but that: “indeed it scarcely exist[ed] between elections.” Third, in refusing insistently to change existing electoral arrangements, much to the delight of South Africa and other Western powers,10 the Khama regime was aware that the BDP was passing up its best chance to gain a legitimate monopoly of the organs of state. Fourth, and most puzzling of all, demands for a one-party system were typically justified on the ground that it would foster both better government and more participatory democracy.

    These demands resonated with informal views we encountered in rural Botswana at the time, especially in the south.11 As we shall see, they were consistent with the way in which village populations tended to participate in electoral processes. What is more, they echoed opinions we had heard before. During the previous general election, in 1969, we had been delivered a memorable lesson in comparative political anthropology by a local teacher, an organic intellectual from the edge of the Kalahari. This man, who described himself as “neither a radical nor a traditionalist,” had argued that one-party systems were the “only true social democracies.” With due respect for old European verities, he added politely, the very idea of a multiparty democracy is a contradiction in terms. It abases politics, shrinking them to nothing more than an occasional act of choice. And, by erasing all real government accountability between elections, it licenses the indifference of regimes in power both to popular participation and to public criticism – thereby alienating the citizenry at large from the everyday functioning of the state. President Khama seems to have been aware that views of this ilk had been gaining currency among people in the countryside. Speaking before the 1974 election at Oodi, a small town near the capital, he went to great lengths, in defending multiparty democracy, to stress that “the Government’s intention was not to fetter or discourage… criticism.” That, he said, would be “against our Setswana tradition.”12 Of which more later.

    How, then, do we explain such manifestations of antagonism against multiparty democracy, especially where it seems to have taken root so successfully? Why did it appear to these people as an oxymoron, as antithetical to participatory politics, even as an elaborate Western mystification? What accounts for the positive light in which a one- party system came to be regarded here? And to historicize these questions, one or two more: Was this outburst of vox populi merely a passing moment in the history of the public sphere in Botswana, its civil society crying out, ever so briefly, against the postcolonial state? Or did it speak to something more enduring. If so, what? And how?

    After all, foreign observers have been quick to comment on the non-involvement – “apathy” or, worse yet, “ignorance” are the words commonly used – of the electorate in matters affecting national politics in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

    In order to address these issues, we begin by turning to so-called “traditional” Setswana political theory and practice, a vernacular theory and practice that, albeit contested and constantly transforming itself, persisted through the colonial epoch; then to its conjuncture with the postcolonial politics of the nation-state. For it is here, we believe, that the answers lie. Observe, in all this, that we have three subtexts, three not- so-hidden agendas. One is to show that African political anthropology, despite repeated criticisms of theoretical aridity, has something yet to add to the analysis of world- historical phenomena. The second grows out of an old axiom. Long ago, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940:4) said that Western political philosophy, because of its lack of comparative perspective, has had nothing useful to say to political anthropology. We seek to turn this on its side: to argue that a political philosophy found in another social world may be the basis of a critical anthropology of our own. The third is to provide a corrective to the persisting tendency in the global north to reduce Africa to adjectives – communalist, clientalist, patriarchal, and the like – thus to reproduce tired racist archetypes. And, worse yet, to mistake those archetypes for empirical descriptions in which to ground political theory.

    IV.

    Botswana, until 1966 the Bechuanaland Protectorate, is usually said to be made up of eight distinct chiefdoms (“tribes”). These, prior to incorporation within the British Empire in 1885 and with modifications during the colonial period, were the major, but not the only,13 political communities into which indigenous populations were grouped.14 Although the system of local government has changed over the years, and chiefs have been denuded of much of their authority,15 the eight chiefdoms still exist. Some of the larger ones are today (more-or-less) coterminous with the jurisdictions of districts and their councils. Moreover, while its urban centers have grown enormously, Botswana is stereotypically seen as a predominantly rural nation: much of its citizenry was raised in, and sustains active links with, “villages.”

    While chiefdoms varied in size and in the minutiae of their institutional arrangements, the dominant features of their political organization, cultures, and ideology were broadly shared. These have been thoroughly documented;16 although there does remain some controversy about the politics of succession to high office17 – and an unfortunate tendency among Western social scientists to typify the public sphere in Tswana communities, often glossed as “the kgotla system” (see below), in rather too simple terms.18 For present purposes, the briefest of summaries will do.

    From the earliest documentary accounts we have of centralized “Bechuana” polities, dating from the first half of the 19th century, three things are clear.19 The first is that the chiefship was seen to be the axis mundi of the social world. It was, as one Tshidi-Rolong elder said to us in 1969, like the pinnegare, the central pole, of houses of old. Everything – the fertility of the earth and the abundance of the rains, security from attack and success in war, the passing of the seasons and “giving of the seed-time,” material wealth and spiritual well-being, the crafting of legislation and courts that judged fairly – all these things, and much besides, turned around the apical office. Its holder, in principle at least, personified his people, signified their sovereignty and subjectivity, embodied their essence. He was known by an honorific whose form was the metonymic singular of the name of his “nation” (morafe): Mokwena, the ruler of the Bakwena (mo-, sing; ba-, plural), Mongwaketse, the ruler of the Bangwaketse, and so on.

    But, second, a clear line was drawn between chiefship (bogosi) and chief (kgosi), office and incumbent. The former stood for the very existence of the polity. It was the public sphere incarnate, the morafe made manifest and represented back to itself as a political principle. The authority vested in it – albeit historically shifting over the long-run – was taken, at any moment in time, to be beyond question. The latter, by contrast, was merely human. He might be more or less effective a ruler, more or less influential, more or less adept at mobilizing the political capital available to him. Early European visitors to the Tswana were impressed by the charisma and command of some “kings” who, it is said, struck awe into their followers and whose slightest whim elicited the strictest compliance. But they were also fascinated by the frankly critical way in which most sovereigns were addressed at their own courts. And by the fact that their power was often constrained by the sheer unwillingness of their subjects to do their bidding.20 Elsewhere (e.g. J.L. Comaroff 1975, 1978; see n. 17) we have shown that a chief who lost all legitimacy, who was said publicly to be “not fit to rule” (Campbell 1822,2:157), was likely to find his genealogical status successfully contested by a rival. This in spite of the prevailing rules of ascription according to which sovereigns held office by virtue of birth, not election. It was always possible to unfix the fixities, to unscrew the inscrutabilities, of ascribed rank by reconstruing the relations that gave rise to it.

    The third thing of note is that great store was placed here on what might be glossed as “good government.” Substantively speaking, chiefs were responsible for all aspects – political, judicial, administrative, material, spiritual – of collective well-being; that is, for everything in the public domain. This, furthermore, is to be understood in historical terms: sovereign responsibility embraced the fluid realities of time, space, and situation. Where transformed conditions demanded, say, that the colonial state be dealt with in a particular fashion, or that dams and storage depots be built for purposes of agrarian “development,” rulers were held to account for the discharge of these functions. But, and this is the crucial point, the ideology of good government paid less attention to the content of public affairs than to the means by which they were managed.

    Tswana ideas about the proper means of governance were elaborate, nuanced, and enduring; we heard any number of discourses on the topic in the 1970’s. Above all, they stressed (i) the participatory, consultative aspect of the public sphere, in which there was, ostensibly, “perfect freedom of debate” (Philip 1828,1:133), and in which all male citizens (more recently, all adults)21 were entitled to a voice – just as they had the right to be represented by headmen on chiefly councils; (ii) the proportional relationship between the performance of any ruler (assessed against the cannons of good government) and his legitimacy (as indexed in his recognized capacity to wield control over people, policy, and public life); and (iii) the fusion of what, in Western social science, is nowadays distinguished as civil society and the state.

    In sum, chiefs were expected to rule “with” the people. Kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe went the most quoted adage in the Tswana political lexicon; “a chief is chief by the nation.” What this meant, in practice, is that sovereigns were expected to surround themselves with advisors to guide the everyday life of the polity, men for whose advice and actions they were held responsible; to hold regular meetings of councils of headmen and other chiefly conclaves; to summon public assemblies of various kinds from which emerged policy that reflected popular views and attended to the common weal; to ensure that the hierarchy of courts over which they presided did not favor the rich over the poor, royals over commoners, or men over women (even though the latter, as “jural minors,” had to be represented by male kin); to be open always to approach by their subjects, whose physical welfare they were also obliged to heed, redistributing food and other requisites in times of need.

    In Southern Tswana chiefdoms, in fact, past rulers were — in some places they still are – recalled by the legislation they introduced (cf. Schapera 1943) and by the wisdom of those whom they recruited as advisors. They are also remembered by their capacity to bring rain, itself a sure spiritual gauge of political mastery; but that is another story. Ultimately, in this respect, chiefly success was numbered in observable achievements: “improvements,” in the Protestant-saturated language of modernist governance. But delivering improvements, in turn, hinged on the public cooperation that a ruler could command. Which, tautologically, depended on the degree to which he was seen to measure up to the ideals of good government. Note, by way of example, the following text, which we published more than thirty years ago (J.L. Comaroff 1975:145). It comes from a speech made by a local elder statesmen in February, 1970 at the installation of Besele, the new ruler of the southernmost chiefdom of Barolong:

    A chief can only be judged by what he does…If you treat [people] with respect, they will treat you with respect. If you shun them, they will shun you. And if you frighten them they will run away… We will be watching to see whether you are going to make improvements. Chiefship is not an easy job. A chief never sleeps. A chief does not discriminate. Batswana say that a chief is chief because of the nation. If we cannot see you in the court [kgotla] we shall draw away from you. And if we do will you still call yourself chief?

    In analyzing this text when we first published it, we noted, in particular, how it underscored the significance attributed, in the local political imaginaire, (i) to the Hegelian interdependency between ruler and subject; (ii) to the measurability of chiefly success in terms of practical, palpable accomplishment (“what he does, his industry…[his] improvements”); and (iii) to the possibility that an authoritarian or an inattentive sovereign may be repudiated [“shunned”], even removed (“if we [draw ourselves away from you, will you still [be able to] call yourself chief”), notwithstanding the ideology of ascription in terms of which succession to high office is represented (see above; also n.17).

    This, self-evidently, implied the existence of a model of incumbency, a paradigm of political legitimation in terms of which the actions of rulers were evaluated and their authority negotiated; by which, that is, the equation of performance to power was given practical, realized form. At the core of this equation was a simple socio-logarithm: the willingness of political subjects to comply with the commands of a chief was held to depend on the degree to which he could demonstrate, in public, that he had properly discharged the obligations of his office.

    It follows – pace received wisdom that goes back to African Political Systems (1940) and persists in some quarters – that the “rights and duties” of Tswana (and, for that matter, other African) sovereigns was never immutable, never fixed by “tradition.” To the contrary. Their authority varied widely. As we have already said, some appeared, alike to their subjects and to outsiders, as mighty kings. Having established their legitimacy, they could exercise almost dictatorial power. Others found it hard to impose their wills, or their executive decisions, at all. Most, however, traversed the line between these extremes during their reigns.22 To be sure, many of the scholarly arguments that surround the analysis of Tswana politics, past and present, flow from an inattention to precisely this capacity for transformation over time and space.

    How, then, did the model of incumbency, the equation of performance-to-power, work out in everyday practice? The answer to this question begins with the fact that, whatever their formal agendas, public meetings were also forums in which chiefly regimes were subjected to debate and evaluation. The process was founded on a crucial assumption: that there existed, tacit but nonetheless well understood, an incremental scale of sovereign authority; that, as the legitimacy of a ruler increased, the more inclusive (and exclusive) became his recognized right to regulate the various ways and means, the instruments and institutions, of governance23 – expanding, potentially at least, until it embraced virtually all aspects of social life. Thus, for example, before the passage of the Tribal Land Act (1968), a strong chief enjoyed, among other things, sole control over the distribution of fields, pasturage, and residential plots – either allocating them himself or appointing surrogates to do so – and a monopoly over the creation of new political constituencies (wards, sections, villages, provinces), along with the offices that ruled over them. He also could expect to be obeyed when he summoned labor for communal works and improvement projects, to receive sundry forms of tribute, to minister over the timing of the ritual and agricultural cycles, and to have his legislative initiatives, executive orders, and legal judgments implemented with dispatch.24

    Conversely, a ruler who lost his legitimacy, a process that occurred slowly rather than suddenly, found it ever more difficult to exert control as, cumulatively, he forfeited the various rights of office. The exact composition of this scale of rights differed from chiefdom to chiefdom. But it appears to have existed in some form everywhere; again, with contrasting degrees of explicitness. In Barolong, for instance, the first thing a chief would lose was his sway over the activities of voluntary associations, which were likely to listen to him politely and then ignore him utterly; thence he would forego his monopoly over the allocation of land, this usually being effected by public demand that a committee be appointed to “help” him make decisions. Next went the taken-for- granted presumption that judgments and sentences handed down in his court would be executed without question. This was followed by the erosion of other capacities and entitlements: to call people to labor on public works, to enact legislation, to establish new constituencies or regulate space and time, to demand tribute, finally even to summon meetings.

    But this leaves one part of the question unanswered. By what rhetorical means and concrete measures was the indigenous equation of performance to power actually resolved? How was the legitimacy of a reigning chief – the substance and scope of his command over the public sphere — actually negotiated? How, in short, did sovereign authority actually come to expand or contract?

    Through mahoko, words. Words spoken in kgotla, in the public sphere, which were assumed to have great pragmatic power to affect the world; words spoken in the genre of political oratory, a genre not specifically named in Setswana but one for which Tswana are justly famed. Theirs is a rich aural culture, in which the aesthetics of utterance are potent indeed. And in which the negotiation of chiefly legitimacy takes on a very particular form.

    Before saying more about that genre, however, a point of clarification. The kgotla might have been where chiefly authority was negotiated, but the production of that authority, and the power that lay behind it, was an altogether more complex matter. To hold that legitimacy was determined by the unconstrained consent of the governed, that it was decided purely by argument in town meetings, or that rulers bore passive witness to their own evaluation – all of which is implicit in the vernacular model of incumbency – is to simplify reality. Public debate, always the object of careful strategy and management, was a site of struggle, not a neutral enactment of vox populi. The distribution of support to which it gave voice depended, in major measure, on prior power relations, relations forged in offstage dealings of various kinds. The discourse of chiefly evaluation provided a medium by which the invisible calculi of patronage and influence congealed into social “facts,” collectively recognized lines of alliance and antagonism. There is a tautology here, of course: civic discussion was taken both to reflect and to determine sovereign legitimacy. But the tautology is more apparent than real. Verbal exchanges in kgotla made manifest, and so converted into the currency of politics, all the transactions that occurred, dispersed and individuated, across the axes of everyday life.

    Tacit in all this is a political dynamic of some moment for the more general question at hand. Inasmuch as discourses of chiefly evaluation expressed alliances and antagonisms, support and opposition for the ruler – inasmuch, that is, as they were a partisan theater of the political, they tended to be articulated around identifiable factions. The existence of (usually a pair of) such factions was endemic in local public life. (The reasons for this are too complex to go into here. They flow from the fissiparous character of Tswana polities of the past, which were often wracked by rivalries over the chiefship. These invariably pitted the reigning sovereign against an agnatic adversary, thus dividing the morafe into two blocs, each around its royal leader.) One of the factions was always composed of “king’s men,” core supporters from among whom the personnel of his regime were drawn; 19th century missionaries, tellingly, sometimes referred to them as “the chief’s party.” The other, which might be more or less articulate(d), bounded, and assertive, depending on circumstance, typically clustered around senior royal patrikin who were, potentially and often in practice, the ruler’s primary adversaries for position and property. Again, all this been well documented. The point, as far as we are concerned, was the taken-for-granted, almost inevitable presence of factional alignments in local politics. For out of these blocs came the primary players, the dramatis personae, of the public sphere — as well, significantly, as the political and dialogical motivation that gave shape to discourses of chiefly evaluation.

    The aesthetics of public discourses about governance and chiefly performance – the poetic play, that is, of form and substance – held the key to their politics. The latter derived from the juxtaposition, in “parliamentary” speeches, of two kinds of utterance; two styles, whose difference was closely connected to the vernacular distinction drawn between office and incumbent. One style (elsewhere we have referred to it as a “formal code”; J.L. Comaroff 1975) spoke of the ideals of good government, and of the regnant ideology of chiefship, largely in idiomatic form; phrases like kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe (see above), batho ga se ba melamu, ba bokwa ka lotlhare (“people are not ruled with clubs, they are waved with winnowing fans”), and others that specified expectations of office-holders. These utterances relied heavily on formulaic speech, were rarely phrased in the first person singular, their author usually being the collective “we” (“We Barolong say that…;” “It is our way/custom…” “Our fathers taught that…”). What is more, because they invoked shared values, they presupposed the consensual agreement of speaker and audience.

    Strikingly different to these formulaic utterances, the second kind addressed the performance of the chief. Phrased always in the first person singular (“I must speak my mind, Chief!…”; “I have heard what others say. It is my view that …”), statements made in this register were not formulaic at all. Typically frank and forthright, sometimes even brutally censorious, they tended to be syntactically more elaborate, to deploy a wider vocabulary, to rely more on evidentiary argument than on shared assumptions, and to be voiced with a view to their persuasive force. These statements were made in a spirit of political argumentation. In observing such speech acts, we were also struck by the fact that, in contrast to more formal utterances – which, at best, were heard in polite silence – they were typically listened to in rapt attention.

    These two styles were deployed in careful counterpoint to one another during the course of most political speeches. For their part, “king’s men” sought to convince the public at large of the convergence between the ideals of good government and the reigning incumbent’s record of actions and accomplishments; this by iterating the first, in formulaic speech, as a point of reference, a template almost, against which to mount first-person polemics, propositional claims and political arguments. Conversely, opposition factions would try to force the greatest plausible divergence between the mantras of good government and the material performance of the office-holder, at least as they construed it in their narratives of failure.

    For chiefly protagonists, it follows that the greater the degree of convergence they could establish in the public eye between ideal and performance, the broader the claims they could make for expanding the authority of the ruler. Ultimate success, in theory, was when office and office-holder became as one, when statements in the formulaic mode about the first might be said to apply to the second; in practice, this condition of absolutism was never reached in Tswana polities, there being counter- forces which put constraints on the accumulation of sovereign power beyond a certain point. The inverse is also true. For opposition blocs, final victory occurred when the divergence between the ideal of good government and the performance of an office- holder became so great – and, concomitantly, sovereign authority so truncated – that the ruler was no longer a “real chief.” Whereupon, as we implied earlier, he could well be deposed.

    Participation in discourses of chiefly evaluation was not confined to those who identified with one or other faction, although the close supporters and active antagonists of a ruler were likely to be most vocal; also the most caught up in the political tactics and intrigues that often lay behind, and broke through to the surface, in the dramaturgy of public dialogue. The unaligned, however, did not merely add their voices to the debate. They acted, at once, in the manner of a chorus and a jury, echoing or disagreeing with the arguments of those more partisan, commenting on their plausibility and persuasivess, and suggesting implications that might follow for the standing of the chief. From these interventions a measure of consensus was likely to emerge as speakers began slowly to draw closer in their views; this measure serving to confirm, expand, or redelimit the state of sovereign authority for the time being.

    In sum, the kgotla was more than a forum for the discussion of social policy, although it certainly was that too. Nor was it just an African analogue of the classical polis (see n.18). It was also (i) a context for ongoing discourse about governance and sovereign authority – and, simultaneously, (ii) a space of contestation in which the powers of a living ruler were negotiated and given social currency. Its primary constituencies were factions rather than political parties, one a chiefly bloc and the other an opposition. These constituencies, patently, did not differentiate themselves according to ideology or matters of principle. Their arguments, recall, were about the means of government, not its content. In striking contrast to Western nation-states, where policy is seen from within to be the provenance of partisan politics, here it was taken to be a product of public discourse.

    There is much more to the subtleties and the substance of Tswana political culture, past and present. Also to the workings of its public sphere. Enough has been said, however, to allow us to revisit, and to make sense of, contemporary discourses of democracy and the postcolonial politics of this nation-state.

    Two brief, final observations before we do.

    One is that there has been a revisionist tendency, in some circles, to portray “the kgotla system” as an altogether more repressive, more authoritarian institution than we and others allow. Good (1992:70; cf. Parson 1984:6f), for instance, says that “the kgotla essentially operated to facilitate social control by the leadership,” the implication being that it had less to do with the politics of public deliberation than with the sheer exercise of power by ruling cadres (cf. van Binsbergen 1995). This might have been true, some of the time, of some of the stronger, more centralized chiefly regimes – such as that of the Ngwato, the largest of all “tribal” polities in Botswana and the one usually treated as paradigmatic. But, as a general statement about the Tswana public sphere, the claim does not bear scrutiny. The documentary record shows that the kgotla was always a site of active political contestation in which, far from merely being exercised, sovereign authority had to be negotiated. And could be forfeited as well as fortified, withdrawn as well as won.

    The other point is that, in the passage from the past to the postcolonial, the kgotla has remained a crucial element in the political imaginaire of Botswana. This in spite of its roots in the “village.” Or its “traditionalist” connotations. Since independence, in fact, public forums, called “freedom squares,” have been created all over the country, including in urban contexts. The resonance with an older vernacular public sphere could not be more obvious. Furthermore, as we shall see in a moment, national politicians have found themselves drawn back to the kgotla even in the course, and cause, of distinctly nonparochial political processes. In short, what we speak of here is far from a quaint anachronism, a romantic remnant of days gone by. It describes a cultural context, and a set of discursive practices, that are very much of the continuing present.

    V.

    Let us return, then, to postcolonial politics and discourses of democracy.

    In 1965, some months before Botswana became independent, national elections were held for the first time. Here, as in many other parts of Africa, decolonization – in the formal, political sense of that term – was fairly rapid. Three years earlier, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had been established under the leadership of Seretse Khama and “other bourgeois nationalists” (Good 1992:72) drawn largely from a cattle-owning elite with strong connections to the countryside. From the start, the BDP promised to relegate chiefship and “tribalism” to the peripheries of postcolonial governance. It pledged itself to the evolution of a secular liberal nation-state, European in style; to the growth of a secure capitalist economy based on a mix of agrarian and industrial development, conventionally conceived; to a politics of moderation, the rule of law, and broad principles of social justice.

    From the start, too, as Picard (1987) notes, the BDP groomed itself to be a “government party.” Enjoying strong support from the colonial administration, it acquired “a monopoly of the resources and apparatus of the state” (Good 1992:72). Other parties were formed as well, some of them earlier. But they never approached the levels of organization, the material and cultural capital, or the broad-based following of the BDP. The latter was helped by the fact that its members of parliament and district councillors “frequently [had] close kin ties with the traditional aristocracy” (Colclough and McCarthy 1980:41). Although the party set out to marginalize chiefs, and to distance post-independence Botswana from its indigenous political culture/s, there is no question that Seretse’s own popular status at the grassroots was due, in part, to his royal rank –which had been dramatically underscored by imperial intervention. Heir to the Ngwato chiefship, he had famously been forced, by Her Majesty’s Government, to renounce his rights to office as a condition of return from an involuntary exile occasioned by his marriage to a white woman.

    That first election, as we said above, yielded an overwhelming victory for the BDP. What was most notable about it, though, was the very high turnout: 74% of all those registered. This was in spite the fact that, in some parts of the country, voter education had been severely limited. Moreover, because distances to polling places were often large and transport was not always available, it was physically difficult for many actually to cast a ballot. Nor was the organization of the election entirely problem- free. All of which made the high rate of participation altogether remarkable. And interesting, too, in light of accusations, voiced in the media and by foreign observers in the 1980’s, that a disturbing proportion of the populace of Botswana evinced indifference to, or ignorance of, the democratic process. It is even more striking in light of what was to happen later.

    What, then, did happen later?

    Several things, of which four stand out. The first was a radical drop in voter turnout in subsequent elections, down, for example, to 31% in 1974. There is one conspicuous exception, however: 1984, the national ballot after Seretse Khama’s death, when his successor, Quett Masire, had to go to the country as its new president-in- waiting. And go to the country he did. Literally. He went from kgotla to kgotla in an effort to persuade people to vote, to prove his willingness to listen to their demands, and to assure them that he would govern them well (Shepherd 1984:28.) An explanation for these patterns of voter turnout? According to Holm (1987:124), “a segment of the public” thought that, “as has always been the case with a chief, there is no need to reelect the President. Thus they do not go to the polls until a new President is chosen.” He is correct to draw the parallel, although we would take it further. As incumbents of apical offices, chiefs and presidents were subject to similar ideologies of governance (cf. Charlton 1993:331): both were expected to demonstrate their acumen and accomplishments in office; neither could assume their legitimacy; each was held to account for his actions, for the wisdom of his advisors, for the performance of his regime; and each had to subject himself to evaluation – all of which Masire appears to have appreciated. But, as long as they ruled “with the people,” and delivered the fruits of good government, there was no particular need to vote for or against them; under which conditions, ironically, as Colclough and McCarthy (1980:44) conclude, “declining turnout [may] be taken as a mark of approval.” Indeed, Holm (op. cit.) implies, it is only when a new incumbent has to be designated, for reasons of death or deposition, that there is a felt need for an expression of mass public opinion. Then, too, the process runs in close parallel. In each instance, a candidate is identif ied by a ruling cadre (the majority party in the case of the president, powerful royal factions in the chiefdoms), and is presented to the polity for its consideration. Hence the high turnouts in 1965 and 1984. And the indifference on most other occasions.25 In such circumstances, procedural democracy – defined (i) by elections whose primary justification is the abstract passage of time, (ii) by an ethos of choice and change, and (iii) by mass public participation – seems a somewhat curious creature. Of which more in a moment.

    In this respect, second, another statistic is noteworthy. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, it was said that only a small proportion of the populace “knew” their parliamentary representatives, except where they were major public figures. Struck by this at the time, we did a preliminary survey, asking the question of 105 people in five southern villages. Around 55% said that they had no idea of the person concerned. Another 30% could give a name, but nothing else. Just under 15% answered in the affirmative. Yet more remarkable was the fact that over a quarter offered, unsolicited, that it made little real difference: that BDP members of parliament were the advisors and councillors of the president and that he was responsible both for appointing them and for their actions. Echoes, again, of a model of governance whose genealogy stretches deep into setswana, “Tswana ways.” In point of fact, politicians have become less anonymous in recent years. Still, one part of the idea, that a leader is responsible for the personnel of his/her regime, remains firmly intact.

    Third, notwithstanding low voter turn out and the relative anonymity of political representatives, election meetings held by the BDP tended to draw crowds in the countryside. Among the opposition parties, in contrast, only those visited by important personages – an ex-chief back home, a charismatic with a big following, and the like – were well attended. We sat at many with only the candidate and a few of his friends. At BDP meetings, too, local people expected the president or a “close advisor” (i.e. a cabinet minister), to present themselves. Constituency politicians, those parliamentarians whom they “did not know,” were not good enough. After all, and this is the point, these meetings were knowingly modeled on the kgotla, that space of intersection between civil society and the state, between the public sphere and the politics of incumbency. Their object was not just to discuss matters of social concern, to play at popular, consultative democracy. It was also to evaluate the performance of the president and his party. And to hold him accountable for the extent to which the BDP had met the demands of good government. In this light, it seems injudicious to conclude, as van Binsbergen (1995:25-8) does, that the appeal to “the kgotla system,” dubbed a “neotraditional facade,” is merely a cynical effort by an authoritarian “state elite” to subjugate, appropriate, and manipulate local institutions. This was not the spirit in which Masire went to the country in 1984, nor the tenor of the BDP meetings which we attended over the years. Perhaps, though, it is the trend of the present and future. But that is another story.

    In both their poetics and their politics, BDP election meetings evoked earlier discourses of chiefly authority. Speakers tended to line up into blocs of pro- and antagonists – the former being local party members, the latter, a coalition of dissent – surrounded by an unaligned public. Most of them spelled out the requirements of good government, typically in formulaic terms and in the authorial name of the transcendant “we” of nationhood and/or setswana. And then they offered their appraisals, often in starkly frank, pragmatic prose, always in the first person singular. In so doing, depending on their political positioning, they either proclaimed a convergence or a divergence between ideal and reality. Supporters, in particular, told a teleological tale of improvement. They spoke of the very successful “material performance of the post- independence state” (van Binsbergen 1995:27); also, usually, of the disbursement of resources “to all parts of the country equally” and the absence of clientelism (Charlton 1993:341). Others disputed just these things. The specifics of their counter arguments were contingent on place and circumstance, but they were frequently couched in accusations that government had “forgotten them.” (A popular pun in the south played on the name of the capital, Gaborone, named for the local chiefly dynasty; BDP critics called it ga re bone, “it does not see us.”) On both sides of the debate, however, there was the tacit assumption, utopian perhaps, that the BDP could only expect to enjoy legitimacy and the cooperation of the populace to the degree that it established the quality of its governance.

    This is not to say that the electoral process mimicked the workings of the kgotla, past or present. The politics of the nation-state were not those of the chiefship writ large, nor are they today. Nonetheless, they did converge in two things. One was a deep aversion to autocracy at all levels of governance; hence Khama’s insistence that to “fetter criticism” is “against…Setswana tradition.” The other was the unspoken conviction, widely distributed across the various publics of Botswana, that substantive democracy depended on the simultaneity of (i) discourses of policy, seen here, as we said, to be the product of deliberative processes, not of partisan interest; and (ii) discourses of accountability, in which the proportionate relationship between performance and power was negotiated. The outcome of that negotiation, expressed in a quantum of sovereign authority, might have been heavily influenced by offstage dealings, by the capillary workings of the state, and by the social capital mobilized by ruling elites. And it might have been perverted by the covert forms of authoritarianism of which van Binsbergen speaks. But, for now, what is significant is this: underlying all public spheres was a civic culture that specified the means of producing a certain kind of participatory politics, a politics grounded in an articulate, popular ideology of good government.

    In this civic culture, it will be clear, elections were important to the degree that they opened up a space, periodically at least, for substantive democracy. On the other hand, voting – procedural democracy – was much less salient, save at moments of crisis. Which is why people in the countryside would attend protracted political meetings and then often not cast a ballot, or do so more to express their dis/approval for the governing party than to exercise choice. Thus, for example, in 1974, the Botswana National Front (BNF) candidate from Barolong, O.B. Marumolwa, voted for the BDP – against himself. After hearing the president and a cabinet minister speak at several meetings, and give account of their performance, he declared that they should remain in office. “You do not just remove a ruler,” added Marumolwa, himself of royal descent.

    This brings us, fourth, to the curious character of political parties here. Recall Colclough and McCarthy’s (1980:41) comment that the BDP was “not a mass party” at all; that it barely existed between elections; that it was, more than anything else, an immanent reservoir of support centered on the president and his cabinet. Nor, for their part, have any of the minority parties been an enduringly significant presence in the public domain. Even at their most active, these parties have served less as coherent ideological alternatives to the BDP than as a critical opposition, pure and simple. Some of them have been odd ideological hybrids. The BNF, for one, grafted a “traditionalist” wing, headed by a former chief, onto a “radical” one, led by a left wing Euro-intellectual. Custom and communism partying together is hardly what Weber had in mind in his classic typification of this species of voluntary association. In fact, both the BDP and BNF seem to have behaved more like the factional blocs we encountered in kgotla. This impression is reinforced by their conduct in the national assembly (Colcough and McCarthy 1980:46):

    [T]he daily business of the National Assembly is conducted in a manner closer to the best of the African one-party states than to the Westminster model. The alignment is not so much the government benches against the opposition as Ministers against the backbenchers. Sometimes, indeed, opposition members are seen to support the Government when its own backbenchers are critical. Thus the role of the National Assembly, like that of the traditional Kgotla, is to audit proposals made by those in authority: to approve them and occasionally reject them. The Ministers respect this function of the assembly.

    Talk here, once more, of a one-party state, and its juxtaposition to the workings of the kgotla, brings us full circle to the problem with which we began, and to the denouement of our argument.

    VI.

    Put together these various points and it will be clear what the call in the 1970’s for a one-party state was all about. It was an argument, in effect, against procedural democracy. Against democracy as the mere exercise of electoral options. Against the idea that freedom may be equated with choice. Against democracy, to return to Gertla Riviero, as a small idea, the kind of European export that promises the world and delivers Kentucky Fried Chicken. Given their own conception of participatory politics, their own ideologies of sovereign authority, legitimacy, and accountability, it is obvious why so many citizens of Botswana were alienated by the Western model, at least as presented to them. And why, by threatening to confine mass public involvement to a fleeting season every five years, it opened up a chasm between the state and civil society. For some, the very fact that the BDP leadership was so keen to sustain a Euro- styled multi-party system was itself an indictment.

    More positively, the agitation for one-party government – towards which, interestingly, the national assembly was then moving in its own routine procedures – was a demand for a (re)turn to substantive democracy, to a civic culture in which participatory politics would be the stuff of everyday life. And in which the ruling regime was authorized to act for the nation in proportion to its warranted performance in office. Put another way, it called for a vernacular, indigenously rooted version of the kind of liberal democracy that Euromodernity has long idealized but scarcely realized – let alone implanted successfully elsewhere, especially when other interests have intervened. In hindsight, the gesture might appear to have been utopian, quixotic even. It also dated to a particular moment in the early history of this postcolony. But it gave voice to a deeply felt critique of taken-for-granted European political practices and institutions.

    That critique spoke of a specifically African alternative, one that demanded not less popular sovereignty but more, not less accountability but more, not just choice but a public culture of criticism. All of which, of course, the global north has been moving steadily away from in recent times; prescient here is Julius Nyerere’s piquant comment, made already in the 1960’s, to the effect that the United States has “only one political party, but…[has] created two versions of [it].”26 Euro-American heads of state tend these days to act with ever greater impunity, to claim ever wider executive authority, and to promise as little government as possible. Concomitantly, large numbers of their citizens appear willing to forego freedoms, sovereignty, and the rule of law in the name of security and material well-being; vide the Patriot Act in the USA and the introduction of detention without trial in the UK, both post-9/11 measures that recalled the days of high apartheid in South Africa. Except in moments of rupture, moreover, levels of political involvement in the north seem steadily to wane, amidst accusations of epidemic apathy. In some European countries – Spain, Portugal, and Sweden being notable cases – an even smaller proportion of voters are currently able to name electoral candidates than was the case in Botswana in the first years of its independence (Norris 2004:230-48).27 As citizens of that nation-state sought ways to move from procedural toward substantive politics, so the West seems intent to move in the opposite direction.

    In September 2009, a public intellectual and journalist in the USA, well known for his centrist political views, could quite plausibly title a widely syndicated essay on contemporary America, “One-Party Democracy.” Echoes of Nyerere, several decades on.28

    The process that we have described here, we reiterate, was firmly located in the social realities of Botswana at the time: in its comparative ethnic homogeneity, its small size, its proximity to a particular historical past, all of which made the dream of a demos founded on popular sovereignty and direct state accountability appear eminently viable. These realities do not obtain everywhere. To the contrary: Botswana was, and is, relatively unique. And yet the vernacular political forms found there bear strong similarities to others in Africa (cf. Chabal 1986), some of them clearly visible, some submerged, some violently suppressed. Which raises a familiar conundrum, if in unfamiliar terms: Why it is that, for the most part, “democracy,” however it may be defined, is so fragile across the continent? What is it that intervenes between the conditions of its possibility, which are patently present, and its practical realization? How is it that the possible is rendered, if not quite impossible, then so difficult to accomplish? Why, where “democracy” may be said to prevail in the nation-states of the global south, does it seem more procedural than substantive, more “thin” than “thick”? Could it be that Euro-America’s contemporary move in the same direction, toward a “thinned out” version of representative government, provides a clue? That Africa has merely seen the emptying out of the large idea, its reduction to a small one, before the global north? That, in this regard too, the latter is evolving toward the former? And for the same reason, namely, that politics itself is escaping the formal public sphere and the institutions of state more and more as it migrates elsewhere. Could the de- democratization of north and south simply be a devolutionary counterpoint coming to us everywhere as part of the neoliberal age — an age in which, Archbishop Ndungane of Cape Town recently argued,29 citizens everywhere are valued purely as “voter fodder,” in which “good government, transparency, accountability, integrity and honesty” are known largely by their absence? If so, does it not demand that we address this counterpoint in taking on the Big Question of Theory, ca. 2010: Wherein lies the future of politics and the public sphere, sui generis, as the new century unfolds? Is it, as we have begun to suggest in previous chapters, in new social and religious movements and other forms of mass action, in politics of life, their strident mobilization of “the street,” their ever more assertive resort to lawfare, their deployment of the internet, and all the other means of experimental insurgency that have emerged so powerfully in the south and appear to be migrating northward?

  • Foreward: Everyday State and Democracy in Africa

    Foreward: Everyday State and Democracy in Africa

    Everyday State and Democracy in Africa: Ethnographic Encounters, notable for both its timeliness and breadth of vision, mobilizes the distinctive, decentering perspectives of ethnography to capture the living practices, the everyday vernaculars, of the state and democracy in contemporary Africa. It exemplifies the turn in African studies—perhaps, more accurately, return—to treating these phenomena, in the first instance, as ordinary activities of world-making rather than as formal institutions or enshrined sovereignties; although, to be sure, those ordinary activities animate the manifest architectures of governance, the concrete abstractions, that bear down on the human beings who create and inhabit them.

    The volume finds uncanny resonance in what, on the face of it, is a starkly different take on the enigmas of African politics today, politics at once mundane, material, mythic: William Kentridge’s haunting Shadow Procession (1999) and its sequel, More Sweetly Play the Dance (2015). These animated films depict a recurring progression of moving images, the relentless march of history across the African continent—embodied here in anonymous human forms tramping en masse across the dystopic landscape of Johannesburg, amid the detritus of abandoned mines, industrial ventures, im/possible futures (Maltz-Leca 2018, 178). Some figures stumble or limp on prosthetic limbs. Some drag their possessions or tote the master’s burden. Some wear robes, bearing aloft palm fronds. Others march in coordinated defiance, striving, it seems, to interrupt the inexorable flow. A jubilant female soldier, up high on a platform, pans the horizon with an oversized gun as an associate waves a mammoth flag. A third holds aloft what looks like an iron cage in which he appears entrapped. Max Weber’s modernity on the move— economy, society, state, democracy?—going who-knows-where. Then a giant megaphone strides by on legs of human scale, as if broadcasting in the “language of stateness” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 5).

    These visual metaphors trace the predatory, performative, self-inflating logics of power, the ostensibly immaculate authority of ruling hegemonies; what Kentridge, artfully, calls “concepts on legs.”1 But they also make poignantly plain that it is ordinary walkers—and how better to capture the distinctive, self-mobilizing quality of the human?—who, in their joy, inspiration, or vengeance, breathe life into the larger visions and vehicles, the ways and means, of political society. We have no idea where the interminable stream, a regiment of load-bearing walkers, comes from or where it is headed. But it presses ever onward, flowing over barriers and around obstacles, thus to trouble the integrity and fixity of established forms (Fischer 2018). All this renders manifest a democracy in, and of, practice: it enacts, for whoever may be watching or listening, the endless mystery of what it takes to make and unmake a conscience collective, to produce society, to conjure into being that other fetish-on-the-hoof, the state.

    William Kentridge’s relentless walkers reiterate what he terms the “fugitive nature of anything you might be tempted to think of as an essence.”2 All social forms, in sum, are artifacts, structures of longer or shorter duration, constructed by people on the move, migrants of one sort or another, as they traipse across time and space. This, he insists, is a general truth that is less escapable in Africa than elsewhere; in places, that is, where normative fictions appear more sustainable, more resolutely “factual.”3 Similarly, we suggest, with ethnographically grounded social analysis. The point of the ethnographic gaze, not least when it is directed toward settled concepts like democracy and the state, is to look behind surface forms, elective affinities, and narrated certainties in real time, on the ground. By these means may everyday social and cultural practices be made to reveal “how realities become real, how essences become essential, how materialities materialize.” And how they persist, or melt into air (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 20).

    The turn to the everyday, the handmade, the unfinished, the transient might seem especially apposite to the experience of our precarious, deregulated times; times in which performativity, impermanence, self-making, and “responsibilization” are leitmotifs of public discourse. But it also speaks to a more enduring truth about the variable, evanescent life span ofall social forms and conventions, past and present. And to their rootedness, however stable and structured they may appear, in the practical activity of sentient agents, existing in labile symbiosis with wider human and nonhuman worlds. While early functionalist anthropologists might have fashioned timeless, ideal-typical models of “traditional” African societies, these were self-consciously systematized renderings of colonized communities whose internal political arrangements were no less under constant construction, no less pragmatically constituted, than those of liberal-modernist, putatively democratic postcolonies; after all, over the centuries, Africa witnessed the birth, rise, fall, and demise of precolonial states, including empires and kingdoms.

    Of course, Africanist political anthropology has, from the first, challenged many of the Euro-normative axioms of political science—and done so in a manner directly relevant to the perspectives and objectives of the present volume. Recall that, in his preface to African Political Systems, Radcliffe-Brown (1940, xiii, xxiii) famously asserted that the empirical observation of “simpler societies” could not be accommodated by the received paradigms of Western political philosophers or economists. Scholars of comparative institutions, he observed, were wont to depict the state as “an entity over and above the human individuals who make up a society,” attributing to it “something called ‘sovereignty,’ and ‘will,’” But states do not “exist in the phenomenal world” in this form. What do exist are a “collection of [individuals] . . . connected by a complex system of relations,” who together seek to control and regulate the use of brute force.

    Radcliffe-Brown, it scarcely needs saying, was proudly structural-functionalist. Yet he was quite nuanced in his denunciation of naked positivism: without “new and fruitful ideas,” he wrote, “method in itself gives birth to nothing” (1940, xiii), a point well taken in the era of big data and neo-empiricism. In his insistence on deflating the phantasmic supremacy of the state as a “fiction” obscuring the actually existing substance of political life, he anticipated one of the genealogies to which this collection is heir: a rich seam of grounded theoretical writing in anthropology and beyond that has shown, in fastidious detail, how dispersed practices of governance and sovereignty generate the effects of the state as a reified, hegemonic form of “politically organized subjection” (Abrams 1988, 63; see also Sharma and Gupta 2006). Also, how rites of conviviality, consumption, even terror crank the handle that inflates images of stateness (Mbembe 1992)—much like the magic through which ritual and mimesis generate “society” as something sui generis, something metaphysical (Foucault 1991; Taussig 1997; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Mazzarella 2017).

    But the charmed life of reified abstractions like “the” state or democracy—and the aspirations they inspire—are never above the socio-material forces of history. However much energy is given to the work of their everyday production, they remain vulnerable to discrepancies between the vision they articulate and the realities of life-as-lived: between, on one hand, the idyll of equality, rights, inclusion, security, well-being—the elemental components, these, of consociality—and, on the other, the disruption, disempowerment, immiseration, and necropolitics that render tenuous the legitimacy of their claim to be anything other than the self- serving rhetoric of plutocratic elites (Ake 2000, 7). The slippage between promise and realization has been all too evident since the end of the Cold War, a period, as we all know well, that has seen dramatic shifts in the global political-economic order; specifically, in the triangulation of state, democracy, and market, exacerbated by the planetary consolidation of financially founded corporate power. The implications of these transformations have been particularly acute in Africa. The impact here of liberalization, deregulation, and the outsourcing of the operations of state—ostensibly to decentralize authoritarian rule and to free economic enterprise from predatory accumulation—have opened up new modalities of “private indirect government” (Mbembe 1999), rogue accumulation, and the expropriation by capital of communal assets (Peters 2018). All of which has driven ever larger numbers of unwaged people into what Kentridge has called the recurring “procession of the dispossessed” (Maltz-Leca 2018, 176).

    Again, that Shadow Procession. Again, More Sweetly Play the Dance—an allusion to Paul Celan’s “Todesfuge” (“Death Fugue”), a poem from 1940s Germany—which speaks of “a way of living through violence and a way of dying by it.”4 The questions raised by the current moment, questions arising out of the rearticulation of state, democracy, and market, questions about whether the procession leads to new ways of living or hitherto unimaginable ways of dying, are these: With the state itself becoming ever more the institutional instrumentation of the market, ever more “captured” by capital, ever less bound by any sort of social contract, wherein lies the place of a politics of ordinary life? How, under these conditions, might everyday practices engage in making a democratic politics, and, even more, sustainable sociality? What sorts of statements might they, do they, make about the predicament of the present, a present in which the state and liberal-modernist democracy, far from having entered a new symbiosis at fin de siècle, may be caught up in their own danse macabre, a negative dialectic? Given that African Political Systems, the founding text of political anthropology, began by problematizing the state and the fictions hidden by its reification—given, also, that several studies contained in that volume addressed the richness of indigenous democratic practices—what does revisiting the nature of both, of both the state and democracy, eighty years on tell us about them? And about the kinds of quotidian activity that seek to address them, animate them, live them in the here- and-now? This is the clutch of questions toward which Everyday State and Democracy in Africa: Ethnographic Encounters leads us. It is an intellectual procession out of the shadows, less a danse macabre than a lively scholarly tournament of ideas, ethnographically choreographed, about the present and future of political life in Africa, and in the world in which it is situated.

  • The Wealth of Ethno-nations

    The Wealth of Ethno-nations

    The significance of ethnicity – of ethnicity understood as a foundational basis for forging selfhood and collective identity, feelings of primal attachment and shared affect, political claims to rights and the protection of interests, even for national belonging – has grown visibly over the past few decades. Needless to say, the phenomenon itself is hardly new.1 As a slippery, polyvalent concept of collective being, it had already troubled Max Weber (1968, 387ff.) a century ago – although, as a common noun, it only appeared in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary in 1961 and entered the anthropological lexicon relatively recently (Surak 2010, 152; Comaroff and Comaroff 2011, 68-72). What has been especially striking of late, however, has been its explosive entry into the market place. Of course, the merchandising of cultural difference – of the emblems, effects, capacities, and embodiments of “otherness” – dates back deep into to the mists of time. But the commercialization of culture and the corporatization of identity, the two constitutive elements of what has come to be referred to as “ethnicity, inc.,” have intensified greatly across the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century with the triumph of the maret as the ur-ideological nexus of world-making. Nor is it just that such things as heritage tourism, the sale of vernacular musics and art, or the financialization of the exotic have expanded rapidly in scale. It is that ethnic identity itself has been repurposed, taking on more objectified, commodified form. In so doing, it has animated novel species of value, claims to sovereignty, territory, and property, kinds of sociality and sensibility, and claims to distinctive skills.

    More than a decade ago, in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), we explored the impact of these transformations on peoples and populations across the globe: on the sense of personhood, sociality, ownership, and belonging they conjured into existence, on the emotive energies they engendered, and on the conscience collective they shaped. We tried, in other words, to plumb the impact of the commodification of difference in terms that went well beyond reducing ethnicity, inc. to the rise of global neoliberalism: terms that addressed the reifying, rationalizing effects of the commerce in things, qualities, and people – and, simultaneously, the slippages, spillages, and mutations spawned by that commerce. In short, we argued that the commodification of ethnic and national identity appeared to be generating new social and productive relations, revitalized affiliations, refigured aspirations, all of them with consequences yet to be fully determined. Nor is this occurring in a vacuum: it is part and parcel of an epoch in which the very essence of personal and political subjectivity, of economy and society and culture, of nation and state, has been under radical reconstruction; an epoch, also, in which the growing salience of identity is manifesting itself in the changing nature of labor, in the transnational migration of ethnically-marked workers in pursuit of livelihoods, and in the emergence of new, culturally-assertive diasporic networks and communities.

    The commodification of identity and, in particular, the imbrication of ethnic enterprise in the changing global order raised a number of critical questions. Would, could, the identity business deliver on the empowerment it appeared to promise, especially where received forms of livelihood, local work, and security were under threat? And, if it did, for whom? How sustainable were the relations of production, distribution, investment, and ownership it conjured into existence? When and where did that business fail to take root or flourish. At stake, too, were the sorts of ambitions authorized by identity-as-business – and how they might relate to other kinds of ethno- politics, including those inflamed by violence. Even more pressing was the question of whether ethnicity, inc. was a passing phenomenon at this particular historical conjuncture, or part of an enduring shift in the economic, judicial, expressive, and existential nature of cultural identity. And, equally relevant here, a related matter. To what extent has ethnicity, inc. masked another side, a dark underside, of identity-in-the- market: the devaluation and discounting of ethnically marked labor, especially that of unskilled migrant workers – in response to demand in the extractive, agri- and service industries – with their own affective and material investments in the identity economy?

    These questions pose another one, one that remains significant. Does the stress on the economics of ethnicity underplay its continuing political significance? After all, is it not the case that any assertion of ethnic self-determination, not to mention the incorporation of ethnic groups,2 takes shape within the overarching sovereignty of the nation-state and its legal Lebensraum (Surak 2010, 156-7)?3 Or, indeed, that any claim to recognition made in the name of identity is always, in the first instance, a political act? This, to be sure, echoes a core assumption of much anthropological and sociological theory-work on ethnicity; also the practical consciousness of a great deal of activism. But the framing of the question in these terms – which, in the spirit of liberal orthodoxy, treats the political and the economic as discrete institutional domains – misconstrues the very essence of ethnicity, inc.: that, in the new order of things, the political, the economic, the social, and the cultural dissolve into each other, mediated by the juridical, itself the frame of reference that validates economic rights and political claims. Put another way, even when the assertion of difference is voiced purely as a matter of politics, even when it disavows the economic, it always carries material, moral, affective, and jural entanglements along with it, whether or not they are made audible or visible.

    In the age of deregulation, in sum, when capital subdues labor and statecraft is largely shaped by the demands of the market, it is impossible any longer to treat “the political” as a discrete domain unto itself. The identity economy, we shall argue, is at once a political economy, a moral economy, a cultural economy, an affective economy. What is more, nation-states, themselves ever more corporate in form and function, have been drawn deeper and deeper into that economy. Many of them now brand themselves, actively market their intellectual property and creative capacities, celebrate an essential ethno-national character, and assert their putative cultural homogeneity against difference. In the upshot – even when they are constituted, ideologically, as civic, liberal democracies – nations have come increasingly to resemble ethnic groups writ large, especially those ethnic groups that have incorporated themselves, commodified their cultures and human capital, and entered assertively into the identity business.

    But we are running ahead of ourselves.

    The Enduring, the Emergent, and the Unforeseen

    Far from being a passing phenomenon, a conjuncture purely of the short-run, corporate identity has continued to manifest itself widely among peoples marked by their difference. All available evidence affirms the fact that populations that self-define as bioculturally distinctive have increasingly come to regard themselves as rights- bearing, asset-holding entities, their material and immaterial cultural products resources by law in the same way as is true of any limited liability company (Meiu, Comaroff, and Comaroff 2020). In the age of mass production and planetary circulation, moreover, commodities locally produced, and authenticated under the sign of indigeneity, tend to acquire added value – and, as they are interpolated into the economic mainstream, sometimes serve to revitalize struggling communities and defunct industrial margins (Colloredo-Mansfield 2011).

    Some culturally assertive, well-established ethno-corporations have continued to grow into major businesses, ever more firmly situated in the global economy; vide the Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. (STOFINC.com), whose income in 2019 was $853.84m,4 whose asset value is estimated to have risen to $12bn, whose brands now cover a wide range of industries, and whose holdings currently pay an annual dividend of $128,000 to every man, woman, and child in the Seminole Nation.5 Nor, it appears, are they the biggest or fastest growing Native American business in the USA. That honor, it is said, belongs to the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux of Minnesota; their entertainment operations and diversified holdings are reported to yield a yearly distribution of approximately $1m to every member of the four hundred and eighty strong community.6 In South Africa, famously, the Royal Bafokeng Nation – or Bafokeng, Inc. (e.g. Cook 2011; Kriel 2010), the object of a fair bit of anthropological attention – has expanded its financial and business interests, as have other ethnic mega-firms all across the world. And between them and those that struggle to eke out a sparse living through selling culture, are any number caught somewhere in the middle, striving to incorporate successfully and command a niche in the existential business of marketing products and skills under the sign of their identity.

    At the same time, a number of fine-grained ethnographies have begun to address the inverse situation: that in which corporate ethnicity fails to emerge where it might be expected to fluoresce. Such in the case, for instance, in Australia (Darian- Smith 2020); its government has largely crushed the autonomous efforts of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples to trade their internationally known, highly valued arts – itself part of what many see to be an oppressive “cultural backlash against minority peoples” – by subsuming them into national tourist industry (ibid., 241-2). This points to the significance of the state in the process of ethno-incorporation. Australia is not alone in discouraging indigenous populations – by means coercive or constitutional or managerial, for reasons stated or unstated – from entering into the moral and material economy of the market on their own account. By contrast, others have actively encouraged ethnic enterprise and even incorporation – like the USA, where the Indian Reorganization Act (1934) and Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) made “Recognized Tribes” into legally-founded corporations,7 although many have ended up in brute poverty. For identity to be minimally viable, and to become the stuff of enterprise, some validation of a legally-recognized right to difference must exist in the wider political context. Or be assertively claimed – all the more so since, otherwise, it risks being devalued, racialized, discounted.

    But it is not just state action that may intervene in processes of incorporation and the commodification of identity. There are also cases of endogenous refusal, not least when ethno-populations mistrust the market, believing that alienating their cultural products, their labor, or their knowledge, may lead to alienating themselves from their identity and its core values. Hence the long-time unwillingness of the Navajo and Hopi to join the Native American world of “reservation capitalism,” which only dissipated in the face of deep economic crisis.8 There are contexts, as well, in which the very idea of incorporation or the commodification of culture – indeed, even the assertion of ethnicity – provokes frank ambivalence. This is true of Roma, who are scattered all across (especially Eastern) Europe. A significant proportion of their number appear to doubt whether, in fact, they have customs or an identity in common; some actually hide that identity for fear of evoking a long history of stigmatization. Or worse. This is in spite of strong encouragement, coming from UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and sundry other protagonists, for them to “reclaim” their intangible heritage in the form of language and culture; also in spite of efforts by the activist Romani Movement to assert not just a collective identity, but “non-territorial nation” status (see e.g. Petrova 2003; Covrig 2004).9 And so we have, today, such entities as the Romani Cultural and Arts Company (http://www.romaniarts.co.uk/), registered in 2009, but as a non-profit, itself an ambivalent entry into the world of ethnic incorporation – a half way house, of sorts, on the road to ethnicity, inc.

    It goes without saying that some populations evince a simple lack of inclination – rather than outright refusal or indecision – to incorporate themselves and/or market their cultures. Moreover, ethno-business, at base, requires something to sell, something that others can be persuaded to buy. Many ethnic groups simply do not have anything much to merchandise. The ecology of cultural production excludes them from the wherewithal to engage in the identity business, except perhaps from their availability as relatively unskilled, even abject, labor. Where they do engage, however, and do so actively, the marketing of culture-as-commodity, its objectification and enclosure, is seldom free of argument. More often than not, it sparks bitter dispute and invariably requires careful choreography to disambiguate the messages it conveys. This is a point persuasively made by Tatiana Chudakova (2020) in respect of the contested effort to market Buddhist merit in Buryatia, eastern Siberia, and by Finola Kerrigan, Jyotsna Shivanandan, and Anne-Marie Hede (2012) on the ongoing struggle of the Incredible India Campaign to brand the kaleidoscopic, volatile, hybridizing cultural commonweal of the world’s largest democracy. It is also evident in Andrew Graan’s (2013) analysis of the fractious local response to efforts by Macedonia’s rulers to refigure Skopje as a historic European capital.

    These accounts illuminate some of the complexities involved in ethno- commodification: in the symbolic and material labor invested in making and retailing the tangible stuff of difference, thus to transform identity into capital. They also underscore the fact that the more power it packs, the more the process of incorporation is likely to become the object of argument. And the fact that, when it does, it brings into sharp focus latent ambivalences over the financialization of culture itself. This is not in the least surprising. For those who see themselves as sharing it, “a” culture, duly reified, has transcendent value. It is taken to be above the market, beyond price, vested with existential, timeless worth. And yet culture, sui generis, has never been entirely outside of the market or beyond price. As a form of monopoly capital, moreover, it promises to yield recognition, rights, royalties, and returns to those who “own” it. But only if and when it is rendered into – its relative worth determined by – a currency of universal valuation. Monetized, that is. And sold.

    Rudi Colloredo-Mansfield (2011) has sought to cast further light on the kinds of activity on which ethno-commodification depends. Bringing cultural objects to the market and securing a sustainable niche for them, he shows, rides on, among other things, the intensification of local production, the mastery of new technologies and expertise, and mobilizing external sources of investment and merchandising. The viability of ethno-commerce, he adds, is often threatened from within by efforts to privatize shared vernacular knowledge, skills, or hereditary status – and from outside by those who seek to profit from that commerce by investing in it on exploitative terms. Conversely, the intellectual property law used by individuals or sub-groups to appropriate (i.e., “enclose”) shared cultural practices and possessions can also be deployed in the name of the ethno-commons to protect joint heritage from its privatization.

    Colloredo-Mansfield (2011, 53) makes another important claim: that, rather than being regarded as discrete or opposed spheres, commerce and the commons frequently “grow…up together.” Like the gift and the commodity, we would add, ground zero of economic anthropology. The very idea of the commons in its contemporary sense, he suggests, is a consequence of market development, not a vestige of precapitalist relations. Hence the conviction of many resource activists that, if the business success of ethnopreneurs can be sustained, it would enhance their power, on behalf of the collective good, to limit the potential damage wrought by commodification, especially at the hands of outsiders. Not coincidentally, it is primarily against the rapacious tendencies of global capital that indigenous movements have grown up all over to champion stewardship of the commons: many local communities have taken a strong stand against the commercial erosion of their territories and, with it, the basis of a secure local livelihood. Witness, in this connection, the quest of the population of Haida Gwaii to preserve the custody of their terrain in British Columbia, Canada (Weiss 2018). Or the eight-year-long battle of Saami (also rendered Sami or Sámi) reindeer- herding cooperatives in northern Finland to retain control of their historic grazing lands (Sanders 2015).

    This strange symbiosis of market and ethno-commons is evident, too, in contemporary development discourse. For some time now, and increasingly, marketing strategists have stressed the competitive advantage of rooting translocal production, even of mainstream commodities in locally grounded sites, as Apple, Inc. has done in Cupertino, California, for instance. This is said to confer on them a distinctive “geographical indication,” or GI, a tag recognized by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to denote “the possess[ion] of qualities or a reputation…due to [their] origin.”10 In enhancing product identity, “geographical indication” is thought, in prospect at least, to invigorate the local cultural terroir and its generativity (Colloredo- Mansfield 2011, 51) – as though it were ethnicized. But not always. In practice, resort to GI may be, and often is, patently tenuous. Michele Fontefrancesco (2012), for example, notes that the “crafting of locality” in Valenza, Italy – where distinctive jewelry is manufactured in ostensibly traditional fashion – is belied by the rigid enforcement of techno-scientific norms from outside. In the age of finance capital and deregulation, the narrative of the commons and commonality is often just that: a narrative that, with ever greater intensity, romances vernacular authenticity, productivity, creativity, and togetherness while still being commandeered by those who control the means of manufacture and marketing. Meanwhile, the policies of more traditional development agencies, those aimed at populations on the margins of established economies, display a newfound emphasis on the capacity of inalienable heritage to generate alienable value. In the upshot, they have taken to urging people/s marked by their difference to regard alterity itself as a species of unlimited monopoly capital, an “abundant,” profitable source of wealth waiting to be harvested (see Hirsch 2020).

    The very intangibility of ethno-cultural heritage enables and enriches the rhetoric of value without limit, of the conjuring of money from nothing (cf. James 2015). To the degree that it does, investors and developers also have continued to push financialization, encouraging competitive ethnoprise and the recognition of indigeneity as a site of abstract investment capital (Nakassis 2013, 118), however uncertain it may be to yield returns of any magnitude. All too often, the discourse of natural abundance reverberates cynically, often alchemically, in marginal environments, environments already stripped of other assets or employment opportunities. In such places, as noted in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009, 41-42), the concept of “human capital” can take on ever more unnerving concreteness. Not only their culture or their natural habitat, but the very bodies of ethnic subjects increasingly become the source of exploitable – and for venture capital from outside, sometimes highly profitable – value in the form of branded raw material: for genomic and pharmaceutical research (Abu El-Haj 2012; Benjamin 2015; Petryna 2009), for “natural” prowess in sports,11 for innate musicality (Copeland n.d.), military force (May 2020), and exotic sexuality (Meiu 2017; 2020), or for other aptitudes and skills, including taxing physical labor.

    It seems clear, then, that, over the past several decades, ethnicity, inc., has been on the rise in many places, some of them unexpected. Such is the story of the Griqua, a marginal population in the South African interior (see Schweitzer 2015), who, at one point in their history, were said scarcely to exist and who have based their “reinvention of indigeneity…[and] the commodification of [their] ethnic history and culture” in a struggle for land rights (Zips 2015). Or, half way across the world, in Tibet, where, Martin Saxer (2013, 201) tells us, being Tibetan “serves as a commodity or asset . . . [as] actors engage, willingly or not, in the economy of Tibetanness.” Some mass media have picked up on the global story: the Vancouver Sun, for one, published a report in early 2018 under the title “The Rapid Growth of Ethnic Economies.” These economies, it said, had increased dramatically in both geographical scatter and visible incidence over the previous few years.12 We could go on ad infinitum: the phenomenon, patently, has entered the realm of the new normal.

    This is not to deny, as we have already made plain, that the spread of ethnicity, inc., founded conjointly on the commodification of culture and the incorporation of difference, has been very uneven, that it has sometimes been flatly repudiated, iconoclastically redeployed, or paid no heed. Moreover, it has had positive effects for some and steep downsides for many others, typically along pre-existing lines of inequality; worst yet, it has reaped brute exploitation where marginalized populations have nothing to sell but their ethnically-branded labor power in a market in which the commodification of difference meets the logic of racial capitalism (Maldonado 2009). But at base, there is no question that ethnicity, inc. – as a constructed sociological, political-economic, affective, and ethical reality – has sunk deep roots and, however haphazardly, is spreading. Nor only spreading. It’s framing logic is also extending itself further and further into the heartland of collective conscious and material life. Just as it is radiating out horizontally across the geoscapes of the planet, so is it upscaling vertically, to more embracing forms of being in the world – including nationality, which itself appears to be becoming ever more ethnicized. And in both its horizontal and its vertical extensions, identity, inc. is interpolating itself deeper and deeper into the contours of the labile, constantly mutating global economy. In fact, the strident efforts by marketers everywhere to invest commodities, producers, and brands with a distinctive essence, to particularize, exoticize, and root them in a given terroir, underlines a core feature of the identity economy: the more that culture is made marketable, the more the commodity itself is rendered cultural, thus to resonate with the desires of identity-seeking consumers. Commodification is, indeed, a queer process

    Ethno-Economics: Scaling out, Scaling up

    Perhaps the most immediate expansion of the reach of ethnicity, inc., is to be found in its original locus classicus: ethno-communities in postcolonial states and former settler colonies, emergent “nationalities” in postsocialist societies, and culturally marked minorities in (more or less) liberal democratic polities. Here, where they are positioned to do so, ethnic corporations tend to make claims for political and legal recognition as they widen their horizons in pursuit of business opportunity, some of it an intensification of older kinds of commerce, some of it new: in, among other things, heritage, eco-, and thanatourism (“dark tourism,” e.g. Hartmann 2014; Light 2017);13 in enclaved enterprises such as gambling and licensed big-game hunting (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Yatsuka 2018); in mining, forestry, transport, and communication (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009); in the marketing of indigenous knowledge, arts and crafts, ritual performances, music and vernacular theater (ibid.), even in “living museums” that offer menus from which visitors may purchase culture at “fixed prices” (Zips 2018, 22).

    In Africa, moreover, there is now wide acknowledgment of the “rebirth” of the “kingdom of custom,” the sovereign terrain of indigenous rulers, a number of whom – like the King of the Royal Bafokeng Nation (above, p.00) – have emerged as powerful corporate figures, even CEOs (Comaroff and Comaroff 2018). The liberalizing thrust of structural adjustment policies, under the Washington Consensus, played a significant role in this turn of events. It actively encouraged the devolution of aid and investment away from national capitals toward so-called “local communities,” thereby (re)legitimizing their rulers as their sovereign representatives – with fiduciary jurisdiction over their often considerable material and cultural interests (Comaroff and Comaroffibid.; Geschiere 2018). It is no wonder that many of these rulers have become skilled dealers in ethnic patrimony, willing real estate and labor brokers with mining companies, and adept venture capitalists on their own account (e.g. Coyle 2018; J. Smith 2018). Or that, emboldened by a mix of authority at once corporate and customary, some have taken to challenging the sovereignty of the state (e.g. Buthelezi and Skosana 2018). These cases illuminate, yet again, the entanglement of politics and economy at work in ethnicity, inc,: how it may potentiate unprecedented inflows of value and, in so doing, reconfigure “traditional” modes of empowerment – while opening the door to new, or repurposed, vectors of inequity, exclusion, even despotism (Darian- Smith, 2020).

    Outscaling: From the Country to the City

    As it has continued to move beyond its “traditional” terrain at a quickening rate, identity- based enterprise has become ever more caught up in the force-fields of mainstream regional and national economies. Where the commodification of culture takes shape at the interface with state-level institutions – and the local meets its exteriors – it often gives rise to remastered categories of subjectivity and belonging.

    Take two examples.

    One concerns a process of emerging ethnopreneurial citizenship in the tourist industry of mainland China. In a village in the southwest, reports Mengqi Wang (2012), people who identify as Buyi (or Boutei) have responded to government development initiatives by establishing a museum that has turned their everyday household goods into protected cultural artifacts. There is nothing new in this, but, as Wang shows, the attempt to make the village itself into a timeless open-air diorama of traditional culture has been undermined by the very process of museumization. For the largely script- based rendering of Buyi life as ossified essence to be consumed by outsiders, itself an act of “internal orientalism,” has thrust their micro-universe into the currents of national history. And economy. In the upshot, the villagers have begun to live these scripts both in their daily interactions and in their dealings with the state, enabling them to become energetic agents of their own commercial enterprise – thereby proving, too, that “they needed to be traditional first…if they want to be modern and ‘developed’” (ibid, 452). In the Age of Ethno-commerce, like so many others elsewhere, they find themselves pushed to be both at once to qualify for recognition and its returns. Thus does locality extends itself outward in time and space. Of course, “the local” can only be recognized as such, and take on meaning, in relation to other localities, other geographies, beyond itself; it is never given, never simply “there,” always produced (Appadurai 1995).

    The other example dates back a decade or so to Bogotá, Colombia. At the time, the local Asociación de Cabildos Indigenas, an organization of urban ethnic groupings, was trying to form a coalition of Kichwa, Ambika-Pijao, and Muiscas; these ethnic communities are not legally recognized as such under the Colombian constitution because they lack their own territories. Their objective? As Ati Quigua, a well-known activist leader, explained to anthropologist Diana Bocarejo (2007; 2015),14 they wished to build an “indigenous shopping mall” in order to “generate resources, income and sustainable projects.” But “what would an indigenous mall actually look like?,” asked Ms. Bocarejo, given that the plan was to have the mall also house all the usual major stores in a somewhat conventional, high-end retail palace. To “symbolize indigeneity,” replied Ms. Quigua. But there was more to it. As a Kichwa notable added, the point was to “have a…space where we can display our cosmology…[I]t will narrate the history of the place, there will be small plazas where we will do, as they say in North America, our pow wow, what we call a minga’,” a vernacular term that refers to collective ceremonial work. There would also be theaters in which to “perform our dances, our rituals…where people,” not least tourists, ”can be with us.” Where better for commodified custom and custom-made commodities to converge, and to infuse each other, than an urban shopping mall in the regional and national capital? Where better “to anchor and fix modern indigeneity”? (Bocarejo ibid.)

    As far-flung as these two cases are, they exemplify processes of identity management found increasingly across the planet: processes of scaling outward upward, that is, in which the material assertion of collective being and the commodification of culture transcend the local, seeking to realize themselves in worlds beyond their own visible horizons. When this happens, when ethno-incorporation takes root, expands its reach, and asserts itself, it may challenge state sovereignty and national belonging, not least by (re)fashioning and claiming the primacy of bioculturally based citizenship. And styling themselves as “nations” in their own right: hence the Seminole Nation, the Great Sioux Nation, the Royal Bafokeng Nation, the Griqua Nation, to mention just a few. Of this, more in a moment.

    The interpolation of ethnic subjectivity into the conscience collective of the larger body politic, and its materialization in regional, national, and global economies, has also become a rapidly growing concern of the mass-marketing industry; palpably more so than it was in the early years after the millennium. The emerging practices of this industry are revealed in a burgeoning literature on ethnicity and advertising. Shalini Shankar’s (2012; 2015) studies of merchandising to Asian Americans in the US, for instance, suggest that mainstream copywriters – not themselves Asian American – engage in a complex set of identitarian marketing strategies. They aim to fashion common brand identities in ways that reconcile received stereotypes of a homogenous Asian identity with the internal diversity of the population categorized as Asian- American, thus to embrace “their” difference in the market at large. The overriding aim of their messaging is to transform this population into targeted consumers for their products; this by way of a process of “racial naturalization” that makes them visible as fully-fledged citizens on the endemically-plural but putatively inclusive US cultural landscape (Shankar 2015, 15).

    As minority populations come to constitute lucrative target markets in their own right, ethnic publicists, as distinct from mainstream marketeers, seek to sell their cultural products back to those populations as much as to others. Arlene Dávila ([2001] 2012), one of the first scholars to explore ethnicity inc. in North America, wrote of the ambiguous implications of this endeavor in Latinos, Inc., which explores the multibillion- dollar Hispanic advertising industry in the US. Insider efforts to harness the potential of the Latin American “nation within a nation” (ibid., 4) and to brand its diversity, she notes, have turned out to be only a little less reductive, homogenizing, and exoticizing than the exertions of mainstream marketers – thereby abetting the tendency of the latter to render the Latino population marginal to the larger (i.e., white) consumer public. Not surprisingly perhaps, the reception by Hispanic Americans of these vernacular marketing strategies has been deeply ambivalent. They have provoked estrangement, anger, bemusement – and vigorous debate not merely about the politics of Latino identity, but also about the perverse pleasures of consumer recognition. Like other instruments of merchandising, advertising seeks to mobilize the creativity of market forces as an abstract form of capital, one that has the capacity, in and of itself, to generate value. As such, it has emerged as both a means and an object of collective action. Not surprisingly, then, the argument of images within Latino marketing has become complicated, ironic, and ever more sophisticated as widening cultural and class diversity among Hispanics resists stereotypy or encompassment. And as “Hispanic business,” like “Asian American” business, becomes more and more entangled with the wider US and the transnational economy.

    Again, much the same may be said of the outscaling effects of ethno-marketing on other culturally-defined populations, east and west, north and south.

    Upscaling: From Ethno- toward Nationality, Inc.

    Talk of the Hispanic “nation within a nation” points, in turn, to the upscaling of the identity economy; specifically, to Nationality, Inc. This phenomenon has gained a good deal more visibility, traction, and scholarly attention of late, all the more so as nationhood has itself become more explicitly ethnicized; all the more so too, perhaps, as, in counterpoint, many ethnic groups – recall the Seminole, the Sioux, the Bafokeng, and the Griqua – style themselves as nations. Orthodox political theory, famously, assumes the reverse (Tamir 2019, 425-6). It takes ethnicity-as-polity to be a primordial form of association, derived from “‘hot” attachments of ancestry and blood relations – and destined, with the advent of modernity, to give way to “cooler” ties of solidarity, vested in a social contract and rational-legal authority (e.g., R. Smith 1986; Kamenka 1975). Critics have long been skeptical of this evolutionary telos and the ideal-typical opposition on which it rests. In some contexts, ethnicity, inc. and nationality, inc. merge seamlessly into one another. This is especially so in those polities that actually see themselves as ethnonations, polities whose citizens, ostensibly united in blood and soil, language, culture and faith, are held to share a unique, primal substance. Germany, Israel, Russia, Malaysia, and post-socialist Eastern European countries, among others, are often given as examples, although the matter is more complicated, since ideology, sociology, and demography do not always line up seamlessly with one another. But even modern civic nations, as Benedict Anderson (1983, 7) reminds us, hold to the fantasy of cultural homogeneity and shared heritage, a fantasy that also is often racially-inflected – and, in any case, grows in part out of the suppression of their ethnic undersides, their local “tribalisms.” Even in western Europe, heartland of the liberal democratic state, ethnic and civic nationalism typically infuse each other (Tamir 2019), their difference, despite often shrill claims to the contrary, more a matter of degree than kind (Weber 1968, 925; Povinelli 2006, 197; Tilly 1990). What is more, nation-states of both sorts long foreshadowed ethnicity, inc., having acted, almost from the first, as proto-corporations, concrete abstractions that possess sovereign territory, invest themselves in signs of distinction, and marshal their economic and cultural interests by recourse to law and war.

    Ethnicity and nationalism, to be sure, are political artifacts of a broadly similar sort (Weber 1968, 392), both being mythopoetic fictions and imagined communities (Anderson, ibid.) sustained by idioms of genealogy and family. And mobilized under the sign of existential solidarity, exclusivity, and a commonweal. The former, moreover, is seldom ever erased by the latter: nationhood is a perpetual work-in-progress – a “daily plebiscite,” as Ernest Renan (1992) once famously quipped,15 a “cry of passion, a tug of war against reason,” noted Ernest Gellner (1965, 149; in T amir 2019, 422) – not least because heterogeneity almost always remains present to trouble it. This is most overtly so in postcolonies, whose histories have left them with a legacy of “tribalism” invented or exacerbated by the violent divisiveness of colonial rule (Mafeje 1971). But, with the turn to the political logic of neoliberalism – its celebration of deregulated economic interest over collective solidarity, privatization over a social contract, rights over responsibilities, locality over centralization – the sovereignty of civic nation-states has increasingly been challenged by claims made against it in the name of biocultural difference.

    That challenge has provoked energetic push-back framed in emphatically ethnonationalist terms: hence Brexit in a Britain formerly known as Great; hence, too, the Trumpist call, amidst the ebbing global hegemony of the USA, to “Make America Great Again,” a coded euphemism for “white ethnic”; hence the appeal, in a Russia devoid of the Soviet Empire, of Russkii, broadly understood as Russian ethnic culture, language, and “traditional” values (Blakkisrud 2016);16 also the assertive rise of Hindutva, an exclusionary Hindu nationalism, in India (Basu 1996); and the strident efforts of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) to essay “Germany [only] for the Germans.”17 These populist movements, and there are many more, have been fueled by the worldwide increase, under economic and political duress, of migration and other kinds of traffic across state boundaries; they speak to a crisis of coherence, of solidarity, of the ability actually to imagine community amidst fragmentary interests and impulses. Referred to by Anna Triandafyllidou (2021) as “neo-tribal nationalism,”18 this push-back invokes the homogenized nation-as-identity, claiming to defend the integrity of its culture, heritage, autochthony, and patrimony against difference-as-dissolution. As one observer put it in explaining the attraction of Brexit for so many Britons, “[it asserted] “a sense of rightful ownership”19 amidst, in the phrase of another, “the anger that some genuine British identity – remembered or misremembered – was being drowned within the shallow waters of the European Union…”20

    It is in this context that the contemporary salience of nationality, inc., as a distinctive, late modern phenomenon, is to be understood. While the state might always have been a corporation in the broadest sense of the term, in recent times it has become corporate sensu stricto: a metabusiness, so to speak. It acts an und für sich, subcontracting and franchising out its operations to the private sector, financializing its biogenetic endowment, its intellectual property, and its other assets, commodifying its collective Geist to attract commerce, and creating a conducive fiscal environment for its stake-holder citizens. No longer simply a custodian of the treasury or a guarantor of the welfare of those citizens, government under “neo-liberal political rationality” (Brown 2003) has largely relinquished its role as a mediator among “class and sectarian interests” in the cause of a greater public good (Harvey 1990, 108). It is itself ruled by the logic of the market (Foucault 2008; see above).

    As the state mimics a holding company, as the aforementioned line between politics and economics gives way, as the social contract is translated into the language of stake-holding, so nation branding becomes a potent vehicle of collective representation and so-called “world-making.” Increasingly, ruling regimes are told by their subjects: “market us” (Graan 2013, 281). Increasingly, the market is where the alchemy of legitimation and vitalization lies. And so heads of state become businessmen, and some businessmen become heads of state, be they Silvio Berlusconi or Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron or Cyril Ramaphosa, Mark Rutte or Tihomir Oreškoviæ.21 On occasion, countries that lack a CEO-president call for their leaders to act like one: in Kenya, when Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002, he was told “we want [you] to operate like the chief executive of a company and…ensure that the country ‘makes profit.’”22 The convergence between CEOs and presidents, suggests Tom W.C. Lin (2014, 1351f.), is not surprising: the two “form a double helix of executive power” at the center of contemporary economy, law, and society. This, he adds, is itself “reflective” of “the convergence of the public sphere of government and the private sphere of business,” along with the “trend towards the privatization of government functions” (p.1353). Hence the “construct of the President as CEO” (p.1354; emphasis added). And the nation as a brand to be managed and marketed, its being-in-the-world to be monetized.

    From Ethnic to Nation Branding . . . and Its Undersides

    As it seeks to recast twenty-first-century nationhood in the mold of the commodity form, nation branding echoes and extends the cultural and material logic of ethno- commodification. Now highly developed, widely theorized, thoroughly fetishized, the former is an analogical projection of the latter into the digital era. Yet conjuring the civic nation in ethnic terms always involves addressing a challenge. Because civic nationhood lacks the essential and essentializing coherence that ethnicity presumes, it has to assert homogeneity, fraternity, and a sense of affective connection in the face of social difference, cultural heterogeneity, and internal dissent; in the face, also, of the fact that the metaphors of kinship and genealogy on which nations draw tend to stretch thinly across their typically diverse scapes.

    This is why politicians, confronted by forces that pull against national integrity – global capital, world religions, transnational movements and migration, the planetary electronic commons, border-breaching social media, and the like – invoke the emotive power of autochthony: of inalienable belonging rooted in a homeland by virtue of birth (Geschiere 2009). And why branded, culturally-authenticated commodity images are enlisted in essaying and enacting the value, and values, of nationhood. Ours, after all, is an age in which trade is taken to be the prime engine and index of wealth; in which diplomacy is displaced by professional marketing and the enchantments of advertising (Coombe 2012; Marsh and Fawcett 2011); in which the international order, formerly composed of more-or-less bounded national economies, melts into a largely boundless emporium for transacting the emblematic objects of national je ne sais quoi; in which patriotism may be explicitly asserted in shopping for homegrown brands, even in places where one might not expect it – like China, for instance, currently “undergoing a consumer brand revolution,” encouraged by the state, in which a nationalistic “young generation is…actively looking for brands that align confidently [with] Chinese identity.”23

    Recent work on nation branding makes clear quite how pervasive it has become.

    Professional ad men and women have grown adept at hyping their “indispensable” ability to engender esteem, trust, and investment potential for their client nation-states, especially in uncertain times.24 They point to an array of triumphal achievements: how stagnant, strife-torn Tatarstan elevated itself from the dreary Russian periphery by rediscovering a masterful medieval history and sense of ethno-national purpose; how Cape Verde, an arid archipelago off the African coast, became an attractive “melting pot of cultural flavour”; how the minuscule West Indies polity of St Kitts and Nevis became the world’s most patronized and popular – but far from the only25 – purveyor of citizenship (and second passports) acquired in exchange for a hefty investment in local real estate or donation to the country’s Sustainable Growth Fund.26

    As this suggests, branding promises to exceed ordinary means and ends. In so doing, it is like the transformative magic of ritual. But is it ever unambiguously efficacious? It is never without excess, argues Constantine Nakassis (2013), never without a surfeit of meaning, always open to contestation, redeployment, even parody. As semiotic confections, brands invariably run up against other signs circulating in the world – and, in the process, often spawn unexpected associations. We have seen how, in the case of Latino, Inc., efforts to interpolate ethnic consumers by marketing “their” culture seldom take place without friction, often producing doubt, dispute, or censorship. Nation branding, like ethnic branding, traffics in a double abstraction. On one hand, it calls into being a collective identity, a tangible imagining, the very stuff of fetishism. On the other, it turns the content of that identity into a currency, a species of capital (ibid., 117). But as a medium of investment and speculation, its alchemic capacity to animate commodities and produce wealth is open to demystification the moment it fails to deliver.

    And it has failed to deliver quite visibly of late, in tandem with recurring economic crises, rising rates of mass debt, and government-by-austerity. As often as not, states find it hard to back up hype with substance, thus to make good on the vaunted power of commodity images to stimulate production and/or consumption – especially where marketing seeks, by means magical and mimetic (Mazarella 2017), to breathe life into postindustrial urban wastelands and postcolonial or postsocialist peripheries. Efforts to brand and market Malta some years back, to cite one vivid example, were declared a “total failure,” and a costly one at that.27 Romania, to cite another, is said to have had a long history of unsuccessful attempts to sell itself and its cultural products.28 This, of course, presumes that success and failure are actually measurable in a meaningful way, itself a dubious claim (see e.g. Browning 2016).

    Some ethno-nations brand themselves without relying on the ad industry to market their putatively unique capacities and commodities. Take, for instance, the Philippines. In 2008, an essay appeared in Nation-Branding.info urging the state not to employ expensive “market gurus.” Better to establish its own brand by directly selling its culture with more real substance, with its “true spirit and essence,” to the world, in order to “add value to practically everything associated” with the Philippines. In their own words, “Filipinos ARE the brand.”29 In 2011, the government formed a National Branding Council to “shape the…brand” And to create a “stronger [sense of] nationhood and national pride.”30 Of all the things that the Philippines offers in its own branded self- image, however, perhaps the most notable is “caring for others.” It is taken to be “innate in the Filipino culture,” embodied in malasakit (empathy).31 As a Manila newspaper put in, in 2017, “[b]eing a caregiver is not only a matter of profession …[It is] about deep love, respect and care to someone of old age or anybody else who needs treatment…This is something rooted in Filipino culture and an identity as a Filipino.”32 And something that has been steadily financialized. The country relies heavily for its economic well-being and social reproduction on remittances from migrant laborers employed abroad – not least from the very many women in the care sector, for which the Philippines has become known globally.33 The assertion of their culturally-validated expertise in this sector is also an effort to dignify and valorize low-paid service work.

    As this suggests, it is not just cultural objects that have come to embody ethno- nationality in the global market place. So, in many contexts, has ethnically-indexed labor power. Indeed, it is here that the underside of ethnicity-in-the-marketplace becomes visible: in the long history of mobilizing difference as a critical mark of contrasts in human capacity and worth. Simply put, different ethno-racial populations are held to have dissimilar skills and capacities for work – menial or managerial, blue or white collar, cerebral or physical – and are deployed, managed, and remunerated in the planetary division of labor accordingly. Hence the bleak, often violent history of capital accumulation founded on brute ethno-racial exploitation, a.k.a., racial capitalism (Robinson 1983); hence, too, the long history of (more or less coerced) translocal labor migration. With the ever more complex division of productive labor across the world in the age of liberalization, with rising planetary inequality, and with mutating global supply chains, the flow of people on the move in search of wage work has been dramatically intensified. So, also, have the efforts of nation-states – both the exporters and the recipients of labor – to interpolate themselves into, and profit from, the traffic. Migrant workers stereotypically coded in ethno-national terms, patently, vary in their situation in labor market hierarchies, ranging from, for example, high-level Indian computer technicians and Pakistani doctors through professional Fijian soldiers to lowly paid, abject Mexican fruit pickers and Uyghur cotton workers; both of the latter, the fruit and cotton pickers, being part of a planetary pattern in which an overburdening percentage of debased agricultural work is done by ethnically-marked migrants.

    It is into this context that Filipino care work fits. In 2006, the Manila Bulletin, one of the country’s most widely read publications, posted a prominent ad featuring then president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and a woman named Mary Joy Bunil, both dressed in super-hero capes, along with 30 other women in maids’ uniforms (Guevarra 2014:130). Highlighting “the latest Philippines export commodity, the Supermaid” (italics added), the commercial portrayed these women as a “different kind of domestic worker.” It cited malasakit and repeated the claim that a special skill in caring for others is “innate” in Filipino culture. But the prominence of Filipino workers at the frontlines of transnational domestic and residential labor – which reflects a “crisis of care” across the world, especially in the Global North (Hochschild 2000) – has a less happy face to it. Filipino female labor migration, patently, is not new. It dates back to the time of US colonization in the early 1900’s. However, ethno-nationally driven labor brokerage has grown exponentially since 1970’s, using gendered and racialized tropes to sell migrant carers as preferred domestic workers – not least because they are notoriously vulnerable, being frequently unprotected by national labor standards, and hence open to exploitation and abuse (Nasol and Francisco-Mernchavez 2021).

    The Philippine state is not alone in relying heavily for its economic well-being and social reproduction on the underside of its ethno-national brand, its exported, culturally- certified labor power. To the contrary, it illuminates a much more widespread phenomenon; vide the cases of, among others, India and Pakistan, the nations of Central America, and much of West Africa. Nationality, inc., especially but not only among the poorer polities of the planet, is frequently Janus-faced. Nation-states seek to sell their commodity image and branded cultural products on one set of global markets while, simultaneously, augmenting their coffers from the remittances of subjects who alienate their ethno-nationally validated labor power on other, equally global markets elsewhere.

    Coda

    Ethnicity and nationality, inc., then – primed by their commodity-branding, by the logic of the market in goods and labor, and by prevailing political, material, and social rationalities – seem here to stay, be it as accomplished social facts, active aspirations or unrealized fantasies. So, too, are other modes of incorporation that replicate them in substance and/or spirit. To be sure, the temporalities and trajectories of the identity economy lead in all directions. They run from nation to ethnicity, ethnicity to nation, and both to many other species of imagined community: locality, region, religion, race, and so on. All alike are vested in the commodification of culture and the presumption of shared essence – manifest in material and immaterial property, in human capital and labor.

    But the identity economy is itself a symptom, not a cause. So, too, are the forms of commodification and incorporation in which it is imbricated. The rise of that economy is a corollary of the rush to financialize life itself. And to financialize the different forms of sociality, solidarity, and affect, of cultural affinity and conscience collective, in which life invests itself. It scarcely needs saying any more that our bodies, our selves, our quotidian activities, our very being world are all under threat of being reduced to a greater or lesser cash value; this in times in which trust in most forms of civic community – beyond the most immediate “hot” ties of blood and soil, and perhaps faith – have been . As the contemporary world places ever more pressure on us to become entrepreneurs of ourselves, both individually (as “me”) and collectively (as “we”), are encouraged to see our human capital lying in an essentialized personhood mediated by, among other things, race and class, gender and generation, sexuality and ethnicity. That is not all we are, patently, not by a very long way. Nonetheless, in these, the early decades of the twenty-first century, identity increasingly appears as an economy – and, reciprocally, economy appears irreducibly caught up in identity.

  • Theory from the South

    Theory from the South

    There appears to be a growing echo, slowly reverberating around the world, that, for good, ill, or both, Africa is the future, a harbinger of Europe’s history-to-come. Experts may debate the reasons for this: among them, a significant population bulge heavily skewed toward youth; an urban “revolution” unique in the current era; burgeoning consumer markets, rising middle classes, and accelerating techno-development; also, a propensity to repurpose material practices both foreign and homegrown, thus to remake modernity for late modern times. Says Keith Hart (2017:2), basing his prediction on the long historical relationship between demography and economy, “Sooner or later, Africa and Europe will change rank order.” The former – Africa, the continent that once signified the West’s prehistoric past and remains a perennial “basket case” in the jaundiced eyes of Euro-America – is now frequently taken to prefigure what lies ahead for humanity at large.

    A decade or so ago, our Theory from the South explored this proposition and its implications for the social sciences, one of them being that Africa, as an “ex-centric” location (Bhabha 1994) and ground-zero of the Global South, has become a privileged axis from which to theorize the emerging world order of the twenty-first century. In so doing, it provoked a great deal of argument and, among northern intellectuals unused to the idea that their hemisphere may not be the font of all knowledge and theory-work, frank skepticism.

    Reduced to its essence, the thesis of the book is this. While Euro-America and its antipodes are caught up in the same world-historical processes – each being entailed with the other in a counterpoint of reciprocal remaking, of “creolization” – the South has tended to feel their effects before the North. And much more intensely. There are good reasons for this. Most significant, perhaps, is the familiar fact that the imperial expansion of modern capitalism into colonies across the planet laid the basis for the violent exploitation of human labor and local ecologies, of raw materials and real estate, without the legal, moral, or political constraints that governed life at the metropole. The colony, site of rampant “primitive accumulation,” was, in short, the dark secret of Empire, its working laboratory for the refinement of the means and ends of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983). For all the talk of a civilizing mission, of progress and development, the social, economic, and governmental infrastructures of the liberal nation-state were never put securely in place here; as a result, a southern, illiberal variant of capitalist modernity, with none of the liberal conceits of individual freedom, rights-bearing citizenship, or equality before the law, took firm root. Which left postcolonial populations open to brute exploitation with the dawn of a new age of empire; the age, that is, of structural adjustment, of largely unregulated, highly mobile corporate capital, of the hollowing out of state, civil society, and democracy, of the displacement of welfare with the fetishism of rights – all under the magical sign of the market.

    In the upshot, the “advanced” edges of post-Cold War political economy – its profitable re-engineering of legal and regulatory instruments, of taxation and labor arrangements, of modes of extraction and enclaved sovereignty – rooted themselves deeply in Africa; so much so that, in 2010, Newsweek declared the continent to be “at the very forefront of emerging markets…Like China and India, [it is]…illustrative of [the] new world order” (Guo 2010:44). “Africa Rising” duly became the meme of the moment: The Economist editorialized about it,[1]a YouTube documentary dramatized it,[2] a fashion magazine was named for it,[3] scholars debated it,[4] an IMF conference was held to discuss it,[5] a sustainable development program took it on as a charter,[6] and an eminent professor of marketing invoked it as call for shrewd global business investment (Mahajan 2009). The basis for all this? A major influx of Foreign Direct Investment earning high returns; healthy GDP numbers and growth rates in many countries; the rise of homegrown African mega-corporations; the increasing presence of transnational firms; and thriving local informal economies marked by flexible, strikingly inventive enterprise, some of it, alike licit and illicit, having grown out of performing outsourced services for northern firms. And so new regimes of work and time, new perceptions of futurity, new modes of sociality and livelihood, have taken root – regimes with analogues that are becoming ever more visible in Euro-America.

    At the same time, and for the same reasons that have made the continent so exploitable for capital, so open to the siphoning off of value to worlds outside, the dystopic aspects of our times have also been most readily evident in the South. Material inequality, human disposability, mass un- and under-employment, epidemic illness and homelessness, eco-despoliation, crippling private and public debt, violent crime, and social exclusion remain endemic. Indeed, it was this counterpoint of promise and dystopia, of creative life-making and destructive death-dealing, that we sought to detail in Theory from the South. It is a counterpoint whose trajectory is under-determined. And it is full of surprises; an unruly dialectic, if you will, that does not recapitulate the telos of modernity or its reverse, defying both received Marxisms and liberal modernization theories of one sort or another. Sometimes it also defies expectation in almost uncanny ways: just as many African economies weathered the global recession of 2008-9 more successfully than did those of the north, growing at unanticipated rates as others struggled, so Africa has weathered the Covid-19 pandemic better than most, perhaps because it has had a long history of dealing with public health and economic crises.

    But this is just half of our story. The other half has to do with contemporary Euro-America, site of rising carceral populations, of spiraling inequality, poverty, precarity, and debt, of a crisis of social reproduction, a silently ticking generation war, and increasing real joblessness, most of it unmeasured; all of these things, usually taken to be symptomatic of so-called “developing nations,” are now endemic to much of the World  formerly known as “First.” The “new normal” of the North, it seems, is replaying the recent past of the South, not least because many of the rights and protections of citizenship once associated with liberal democratic societies have been eroded, leaving their a rising proportion of their populations, especially the poor and racialized, in something like the predicament long endured by colonial, and subsequently postcolonial, subjects – although, to be sure, there is good cause for seeing Africa less as postcolonial than as Afropolitan (Selasi 2005; Mbembe XXXX), if in its own singular, endogenous ways. This is why, in so many respects, Africa, Asia, and Latin America appear to be running ahead of Euro-America, prefiguring its history-in-the-making. And why Euro-America, tracking behind the antipodes, appears to be “going south.”

    Take, for just one example, the rotting urbanism spreading through parts of the Global North. When it is said, for example, that Lagos augurs the future of the modernist city (Koolhaas and Cleijne 2001) it is not because northern conurbations also have rising homeless populations, ever more stricken neighborhoods, and pathological patterns of inequality. (Nor is it because real estate on Victoria Island is more expensive than its equivalent in Manhattan, or that “smart city” experiments are mushrooming across the continent, abetted by Chinese capital.) It is because urban scapes, as planetary phenomena, have strongly convergent tendencies: among other things, their rhizomatic patterns of sociality; their fractured political rationalities and the claims made to sovereignty within them; the gating off of their elites and the privatization of their civic amenities; the segmentary sprawl of impermanently housed, radically under-resourced populations which, at very best, enjoy only partial citizenship; their economies, including the burgeoning informal (sharing, caring, criminal, affective, i.e. “gig” ) economies arising under the impact of radical changes in labor markets everywhere. These are all corollaries of the ways in which capital, and its cultural mediations, are playing themselves out under parallel, globally-emergent sociological and infrastructural conditions, conditions that began to manifest themselves in the South earlier than they did in Euro-America. And are most graphically visible in Africa.

    In Theory from the South we explore a wide range of phenomena of which the same things can be said: that they presented first in the South, and tend to be more hyperbolically visible there than they are in the North. These extend to such things as the changing nature of personhood and political subjectivity; the erosion of democracy and the crisis of liberalism; the shift from a politics of ideology to the politics of ID-ology, a politics of right/s in which identity takes precedence over all other forms of claim and mobilization; the radical transformation of labor as capitalism – itself taken ever more to be a millennial, indeed enchanted, solution to all social problems – is treated the primary force determining world history-in-the-making. The book also asks a number of foundational questions: What, exactly, is meant by theory in this day and age? And what is “the South,” given that it is a shifting signifier which cannot easily be pinned down? Given, also, the fact that “it” is not, as some would have it, simply the antithesis of “the North,” a mythic geography within which exist unreconstructed, untouched indigenous worlds whose vernacular life ways may offer rescue or redemption from the contradictions, deformities, and disfigurements of global modernity. But these are topics for another time, another blog. Theory from the South is intended as an ongoing conversation about the contemporary global order and how we are to make sense of it.

  • Maxwell Owusu Array

    This is certainly a brilliant book.

  • Harry Basehart Array

    Rules and Processes is a complex but eminently successful excursion into the logic of dispute processes among two Tswana peoples of southern Africa and an innovative processual analysis that deserves to be ranked with the foremost studies in the processual mode in recent years. One of the rare collaborations of anthropologist (Comaroff) and lawyer (Roberts), the book may well become as influential as the pioneer research of Llewellyn and Hoebel. Unlike the latter, however, Comaroff and Roberts have eschewed a juristic approach, choosing instead to focus on process. The ensuing book attests a singular unity of thought, cast in anthropological rather than legal terminology…A stimulating, theoretically sophisticated, and subtle analysis, Rules and Processes deserves wide attention. The work is consonant with (while not derived from) nonpositivist approaches that have attracted contemporary sociocultural anthropologists, such as phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, structuralism, and semantic analysis; perhaps, too, the seminal work of Weber may be cited. This is an exciting treatise.

  • Richard Abel Array

    This is the first collaborative book by an anthropologist and a lawyer since Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel wrote The Cheyenne Way forty years ago… It surpasses its illustrious predecessor in every way and immediately joins the select circle of indispensable anthropological studies of legal phenomena.

  • Ian Hamnett Array

    A work of impressive scholarship in which theoretical sophistication and ethnographic richness are convincingly matched.

  • Peter Geschiere Array

    This is an exciting but also frightening collection of articles. The central issue is how people in postcolonial Africa try to come to grips with ‘modernity’ – its premises and disappointments. The contributors come from the Africanist circle around Jean and John Comaroff at the University of Chicago, who have collaborated for some time…Together the essays give a powerful image of the creativity and dynamism with which African societies use their cultural heritage in order to deal with modern changes. The collection is all the more exciting since most contributions are based in recent fieldwork, using vivid scenes from the field. This makes them also quite frightening. Together they convey a forceful image of the depth of disappointment about modernity on the continent – of desperate struggles to participate at least to some degree in its dreams and the fierce internal tensions that follow from this.The introduction by the Comaroffs is overwhelming in the speed and riches of its ideas.

  • Alma Gottlieb Array

    …a magnificent assembly of essays in which each effectively tackles the symbolic, historical, political, social, and economic forces that have continued to give life meaning in sub-Saharan Africa over the past century. As such this book should quickly establish itself as a landmark volume that finds a place of the shelves of all who are interested in processes of postcolonial change and what they signify all over the globe…The eight essays, written by current and former students and colleagues of the editors, [explore] ‘the extent to which modernity – itself always an imaginary construction of the present in terms of the mythic past – has its own magicalities, its own enchantments.’ As such, the essays all evince the strong influence of the Comaroffs who…have long charted a path toward analyzing the many imaginative representations of colonialism and its disastrous aftermath.

  • Philip Leis Array

    In the best tradition of the rethinking genre of anthropological critiques, John and Jean Comaroff and this volume’s eight contributors brilliantly review the notion of civil society — largely developed and utilized by non-anthropologists – from both theoretical and ethnographically grounded perspectives. Beginning with an expansive introduction to the concept of civil society, or what the editors and others refer to as “the Idea” or abstraction, they lay bare the concept in contexts that have to do as much with the West as Africa. The authors reexamine the concept of civil society, thought to be universally applicable in its scope because of its level of abstraction. They see it, however, as a Western-centric concept that breeds invidious comparisons when applied to Africa. The locations in sub-Saharan Africa vary, and the ethnographic sampling is eclectic, but several themes and approaches run through the essays: the tendency to savage and then salvage the concept of civil society, an awareness of the problems with relativity, and an acceptance of the ambiguities found in studying civil and state relationships…

  • Violence and the Law in Post Colonies:

    Violence and the Law in Post Colonies:

    Criminal obsessions after Foucault: post colonialism, police surveillance and the metaphysics of disorder

    “In recent years, depictions of postcolonial nations have congealed into a terrifying epic of lawlessness and violence, adding a brutal edge to older European archetypes of underdevelopment, abjection, and ethnic strife. But the similarities between the post colony and the world beyond it are unmistakable. And growing. The global north is evolving toward Africa. Everywhere, criminal violence has become an imaginative vehicle, a hieroglyph, for thinking about the nightmares that threaten the nation.” This short book contains two essays: each first explores an aspect of the global preoccupation, expressed most volubly in postcolonies, with criminal violence – and the complex, ambivalent ways in which police play into that preoccupation, feeding it in order to claim a sovereign right to violence in enforcing the law.”

  • Nancy Howell, University of Toronto; David Lee, University of South Florida Array

    …this is a wonderful book for lovers of Southern African cultures, as well as for students of classic ethnography and visual culture. There is value in these photographs on a number of levels. They are valuable as data and as illustrations of Schapera’s studies. They have considerable historical importance for Botswana, as documented by Kgosi Linchwe II in a letter included in the introduction to the book, and they provide convincing evidence that the various cultural/ethnic groups of Botswana were interacting in the 1930s as they are now. Finally, there is much value in the aesthetic beauty of these photographs, reminding us that cultures reassert their values in a wide range of contexts… The editors have thoughtfully considered the long career of Schapera to create the present volume. It is a book that is satisfying as a record of colonial times, enriching our understanding of Schapera and his subjects of study.

  • Robert James Gordon Array

    These spectacular photographs reveal a much more complex Schapera than his writings allow and provide a more complete and aesthetically charming supplement to his work. The combination of clear, insightful, and entertaining scholarship – written by some of the foremost anthropologists of the region – and stunning photographs makes this a highly original and important book with a wide appeal.

  • Shula Marks Array

    Isaac Schapera’s photographs magnificently capture everyday life among the Kgatla [chiefdom in the former Bechuanaland Protectorate, now Botswana] at a period of great social change through a seemingly artless focus on artifacts and architecture, dress and deportment. In their introduction, Jean and John Comaroff – Schapera’s most outstanding successors – provide a scintillating and thought-provoking portrait of Schapera as ethnographer and photographer. This splendid volume will be a most valuable resource to anthropologists and historians and a source of illumination and enjoyment to readers interested in southern Africa.

  • Picturing a Colonial Past:

    Picturing a Colonial Past:

    This volume presents for the first time the selected photographs of the renowned British anthropologist Isaac Schapera (1905–2003). Taken between 1929 and 1934, largely during his earliest work among the Kgatla peoples of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), the 136 images in this selection reveal an emotional engagement and aesthetic impulse that Schapera seldom expressed in his writings. Covering a broad spectrum of daily activities, they include depictions of everything from pot making, thatching, and cattle herding to village architecture, vernacular medicine, and rainmaking ceremonies. Visually fascinating and of exceptional quality, these images capture the uniqueness of an African people in a particular time and place. They are contexualized and their significance explained in Jean and John Comaroff’s insightful introduction, while Adam Kuper’s illuminating biographical sketch of Schapera provides new insight into the life of the photographer. Picturing a Colonial Past reveals not only a rare side of old Botswana, but also of one of the most famous anthropologist who worked there.

  • Zombies and Frontiers in the Age of Neoliberalism

    Zombies and Frontiers in the Age of Neoliberalism

    Postcolonial South Africa, like other postrevolutionary societies, appears to have witnessed a dramatic rise in occult economies: in the deployment, real or imagined, of magical means for material ends. These embrace a wide range of phenomena, from the ubiquitous presence of thoroughly contemporary zombies, through “ritual murder” and the sale of body parts for “medicinal” purposes, to pyramid schemes and other financial scams. And they have led, in many places, to violent reactions against people accused of illicit accumulation. In the struggles that have ensued, the major lines of opposition have been not race or class but generation—mediated by gender. Why is all this occurring with such intensity, right now? Why has the figure of the zombie taken on such salience at this historical moment? An answer to the question, and to the more general problem of making sense of the enchantments of modernity, is sought in the encounter of rural South Africa with the contradictory effects of millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism. This encounter brings “the global” and “the local”—treated here as imaginative constructs rather than explanatory terms or empirical realities—into a dialectical interplay. It also has implications for the theory- work and methodological practice of the social sciences and humanities in making sense of twenty-first century world, its material, moral, social, and political lineaments.